‘HELPING PEOPLE HELP THEMSELVES’:
DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF POVERTY IN CANADA, 1964-1979

by

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Abstract

For a remarkable period between the late 1950s and mid-1970s, a global politics of poverty emerged. Prompted by anti-imperialist struggles, working class demands, social and cultural ferment, and socialist alternatives, the politics turned on how to alleviate global poverty – and to what ends. It had different manifestations, but contained shared core insights and practices. It did not simply animate the international sphere, but permeated national, regional, and local politics as well. In this context, some Canadian liberals believed that development would contribute to the elimination of poverty, internationally and domestically, by involving people more fully in the values, economic processes, and political practices of liberal capitalist democracy. Community development, regional development, and international development emerged as concurrent, if contested, schemes to revitalize liberal democracy within and beyond Canada’s borders.

This study is a political history of the relationship between poverty, democracy, and development in Canada in the 1960s and 1970s within a larger global frame. Through a focus on development programs across three scales, I trace the on-the-ground activism of reformers and radicals in dialogue with the global context in which they consciously rooted their work. The focus of the local scale is the community development and animation sociale activities of Company of Young Canadians (CYC) in Lesser Slave Lake, Alberta and St-Henri, Montreal. On a regional scale, I examine the efforts of Cape Breton Development Corporation (DEVCO) to address regional inequality and poverty. Adopting an international scale allows us to focus on the Third World international development activity of Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) – namely, its project in Tanzania. I argue that liberal reformers, amid exchanges with a New Left, created and committed to development programs they believed would empower people, both in Canada and abroad, to confront their own poverty and foster a meaningful democracy rooted in everyday life. However, development programs – having stopped short of amending capitalist social relations and the political and economic hierarchies they engendered – realized neither their anti-poverty nor democratic goals.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOA</td>
<td>Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Area Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Atlantic Development Board</td>
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<td>AIM</td>
<td>American Indian Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARDA</td>
<td>Agricultural and Rehabilitation Development Act / Agriculture and Rural Development Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARISM</td>
<td>Association des résidents des Îlots St-Martin</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASE</td>
<td>Action sociale étudiante</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASJ</td>
<td>Action sociale jeunesse</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAEQ</td>
<td>Bureau d'aménagement de l'Est du Québec</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Comité d'action politique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBHPA</td>
<td>Cape Breton Handicraft Producers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBL</td>
<td>Cape Breton Lamb Ltd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBMF</td>
<td>Cape Breton Marine Farming Ltd.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSPA</td>
<td>Cape Breton Sheep Producers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBTA</td>
<td>Cape Breton Tourism Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Co-operative Commonwealth Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDTF</td>
<td>Community Development Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFC/SN</td>
<td>Challenge for Change/Société nouvelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Comité indépendance-socialisme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJC</td>
<td>Compagnie des jeunes Canadiens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Conseil des œuvres de Montréal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSH</td>
<td>Comité ouvrier St-Henri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSN</td>
<td>Confédération des syndicats nationaux</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUSO</td>
<td>Canadian University Service Overseas</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUSOTAN</td>
<td>Canadian University Service Overseas’ program in Tanzania</td>
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<tr>
<td>CYC</td>
<td>Company of Young Canadians</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Cape Breton Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIAND</td>
<td>Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOSCO</td>
<td>Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DREE</td>
<td>Department of Regional Economic Expansion</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAE</td>
<td>Enzootic Abortion</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>East and Central Africa program, Canadian University Service Overseas</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>Enterprise Cape Breton</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECBC</td>
<td>Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECSA</td>
<td>East, Central, and Southern Africa program, Canadian University Service Overseas</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCAI</td>
<td>Fédération canadienne des associations indépendantes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLF</td>
<td>Front de libération des femmes du Québec</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLP</td>
<td>Front de libération populaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLQ</td>
<td>Front de libération du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAP</td>
<td>Front d'action politique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRED</td>
<td>Fund for Rural Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTQ</td>
<td>Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRDA</td>
<td>Human Resources Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAA</td>
<td>Indian Association of Alberta</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAB</td>
<td>Indian Affairs Branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDD</td>
<td>Industrial Development Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEL</td>
<td>Industrial Estates Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>IYC</td>
<td>Canadian Indian Youth Council</td>
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JOC - *Jeunesse ouvrière catholique*
LIP - Local Improvement Program
LSLDA - Lesser Slave Lake Development Association
MAA - Métis Association of Alberta
MAD - Metropolitan Alliance for Development
MFDC - Micmac Fisheries Development Cooperative Ltd.
MLA - Member of the Legislative Assembly
MP - Member of Parliament
MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MSA - *Mouvement souveraineté-association*
NARP - Native Alliance for Red Power
NDP - New Democratic Party
NFB - National Film Board
NGO - non-governmental organization
NIB - National Indian Brotherhood
NIEO - New International Economic Order
OAU - Organization for African Unity
OFY - Opportunities for Youth
P80 - *Perspective ‘80*
PA - Pulmonary Adenomatosis
PAANE - Protest Alliance Against Native Extermination
PAC - Pan Africanist Congress
POPIR - *Projet d’organisation populaire d’information et de regroupement dans le secteur d’ouest de Montréal*
PQ - Parti québécois
PRSU - *Projet de réaménagement social et urbain*
RIN - *Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale*
SHQ - *Société d’habitation du Québec*
SIDO - Small Industries Development Organization
SWAPO - South West Africa People’s Organization
SU CO - Service universitaire canadien outre-mer
SUPA - Student Union for Peace Action
SYSCO - Sydney Steel Corporation
TANU - Tanganyika African National Union
TEQ - *Travailleurs étudiants du Québec*
UMW - United Mine Workers of America
UN - United Nations
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
USDA - United States Department of Agriculture
ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union
Introduction

Two hundred or so of Canada’s Cold War liberal intellectuals met to discuss public policy in Kingston, Ontario in September 1960. Tom Kent delivered the paper that attracted the most attention. An Oxford graduate, English immigrant, and former newspaper editor born in 1922, Kent was also a key Liberal Party advisor.¹ He keenly noted that 1950s attitudes towards social provision in Canada were conservative. Yet he argued that social democratic experiments in Britain and Western Europe, the growth of socialism in Eastern Europe and Asia, and the perceived Soviet success had put liberals on the ideological defensive. Determined to head off “the ghost-ridden, latter-day prophets of the dead age of laissez-faire,” he demanded a new, positive liberalism that would sustain a plural society and mixed economy.²

Kent insisted that the state should promote conditions of political, social, and economic freedom. Freedom was not simply the absence of coercion, but also the existence of opportunities for the individual within society. Kent argued that full employment policies and a social security system were essential to ensuring “the maximum possible release of individual energy and initiative.” Influenced by economist John Kenneth Galbraith, he believed that social security was a form of collective consumption designed to remove “economic and social hazards” and “to protect people against poverty-inducing disasters.” Kent’s list of suggested social programs ran to eleven items, including medicare, improved education, public housing action, and enhanced welfare provision. Notably, a development imperative permeated the list,

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as Kent also included regional development and foreign aid – as a step towards “world welfare” – in his program.³

For policymakers, poverty grew in importance in the early 1960s. The influence of forces for change in the U.S., where Michael Harrington’s best-selling poverty exposé, The Other America, preceded Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty, was notable.⁴ Kent borrowed the premise. In late 1964, he proposed a Canadian “attack on poverty” as a policy and re-election theme for the minority Liberal government. His Canada Work and Opportunity Plan aimed to eliminate poverty by bettering conditions for people earning inadequate incomes and increasing assistance to those who were not part of the workforce. “The poor are in many cases poor because things once went wrong for them – they were ill, or in the wrong place, or got little schooling,” Kent explained. The program would “create second chances” and “ensure that people are not needlessly shut out of the affluent society,” while also encouraging the growth of the Canadian economy. In addition to social welfare measures, Kent proposed development, manpower, and mobility programs. He insisted that government must ensure an equality of opportunity for all.⁵

As Kent’s policy prescriptions began to suggest, poverty was an overtly political issue in Canada and was interrelated with development, democracy, the welfare state, and the global Cold War. This dissertation engages with these themes by focusing on Canadian development programs pursued both in Canada and the Third World between 1964 and 1979. I argue that

development was central to Canadian efforts to reduce poverty and to democratize society both in Canada and abroad during the Cold War. Liberal reformers, in dialogue with a New Left, created and committed themselves to development programs they believed would empower people to confront their own poverty and foster a meaningful democracy rooted in everyday life. However, development programs – having stopped short of amending capitalist social relations and the political and economic hierarchies they engender – realized neither their anti-poverty nor democratic goals.

The broad Sixties shift towards acknowledging inequality, and seeking to do something about it, took place within what I call the global politics of poverty, a politics prompted by anti-imperialist struggles, working class demands, social and cultural ferment, and socialist alternatives, all of which took place within and beyond the borders of ‘nation.’ For a remarkable period between the late 1950s and mid-1970s, poverty was an open and visible political question. In this context, left liberals, as well as New Leftists, believed that development would contribute to the elimination of poverty, internationally and domestically.

The global politics of poverty permeated international, national, regional, provincial, and local politics. Efforts to eliminate poverty through development took place on a number of scales. In Canada, development was perhaps a patchwork initiative. Yet its common prerogative underlay liberal efforts to improve the socio-economic prospects of Canadian and global citizens. Community, regional, and international development programs promised to include people more fully in the values, economic processes, and political practices of liberal capitalist democracy. On-the-ground programs to alleviate poverty through development reveal much about the possibilities and limits of liberal democracy in the 1960s and 1970s.
Development focused on ‘helping people help themselves.’ Ordinary people were encouraged to internalize a possessive individualism, freeing themselves from dependence on others and owning their own capacities. Yet urged to improve their own lives, people also had an opportunity to participate in decision-making and contribute to an enlargement of democratic possibilities. Democracy and development proved to be fundamentally contested concepts. As a result, development was an ambiguous political project.

The chapters to come offer concrete explorations of how community, regional, and international development programs worked in practice. This introduction makes a case for how best to conceptualize poverty’s place within the historical contexts of the welfare state and the global Cold War. It also lays out the rest of the dissertation’s itinerary.

**Poverty and the Pre-History of the Welfare State in Canada**

The welfare state was the most important liberal response to poverty and political demands for social provision during the twentieth century. The scholarship on the making of the welfare state in Canada stresses the interaction between the state, its agents, and ordinary people in the period bracketed by the Great Depression and postwar reconstruction. In sum, it argues that male breadwinning and the family were central to the ways in which the state shaped social provision as well as to how working Canadians could press their claims to citizenship.⁶

The irony of the Canadian ‘making of the welfare state’ literature is that it is really a pre-history. As the story of Tom Kent begins to illustrate, the welfare state was effectively established in the 1960s and was different both in degree and kind from the social legislation that preceded it. The welfare state, whether described in terms of specific government functions or as

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a collection of programs, meant direct state institutional involvement in the distribution and redistribution of security and equality within society, according to a politically constituted understanding of social citizenship. Notably, sociologist Claude Offe has argued that exchange processes in late capitalism have become increasingly obsolete in organizing social life. He contends that, since the mid-1960s, the liberal state has intervened as never before to maximize the exchange opportunities of both capital and labour. The classical factors of production – land, labour, and capital – were no longer taken as given or considered to be in the private realm, but rather developed, shared, distributed, and allocated by specific state policies. This is precisely how we might understand the nature of the creation of the welfare state in mid-1960s Canada.

The historiography of the welfare state in Canada risks teleology. The sense that the welfare state was long in the making, and ever being made, has fed into a misleading search for its origins. Early twentieth-century political shifts and legislative changes are too easily assimilated to the coming of a welfare state as such. The timing, intensity, and causation of government intervention in the domain of well-being needs reconsideration and re-periodization. Specifically, the most significant institutions, programs, and policies of the Canadian welfare state were shaped in the context of the global politics of poverty. To reframe scholarship covering events prior to the actual making of the welfare state as a pre-history is not to diminish its importance, but to denaturalize its meaning. It serves our purpose to briefly rehearse that history.

In the early twentieth century, the provincial and federal states took steps to adjust what was a municipal and charity responsibility for indigents. They did so to prevent disruptions to

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capitalist labour markets and to assist local authorities in providing what amounted to less than adequate relief to sharply defined categories of vulnerable or out-of-work Canadians.9 For its part, the federal government focused on striking workers, intervening in labour disputes with police and military repression and, from 1907, industrial relations mediation to force organized labour back to work on terms that suited employers.10

A dynamic relationship between mobilization and democracy in Canada was first exhibited during World War I. When much was demanded of the citizenry, people were most able to act and to make gains. Women’s suffrage was extended to secure English-Canadian support for conscription, while postwar boards were created in many provinces to set low and selective minimum wages for women industrial workers. If soldier families were assisted during the war through private fundraising, veterans were the subject of concerted state rehabilitation efforts designed to return them to strict economic self-sufficiency. Pensions, health care, insurance, and land grants were provided, but these measures were curtailed beginning in 1920 and demobilized veterans were no longer able to press demands.11 Wartime labour dissent built into a workers’ revolt highlighted by the Winnipeg General Strike. However, once the war was over, state and capital action was directed at breaking labour radicalism.12

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10 Paul Craven, ‘An Impartial Umpire’: Industrial Relations and the Canadian State, 1900-1911 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).


If there were notable interwar experiments in corporate welfare, the state itself prescribed strict self-sufficiency and local relief for all manner of workers. During the Great Depression, the federal government adjusted the dynamic only slightly. To prevent municipal and provincial bankruptcies, it moderately subsidized unemployment relief, all the while insisting on fiscal restraint. And where the federal government provided relief directly, it did so with the anti-revolutionary object of removing unemployed single men from cities and placing them in rural work camps. Meanwhile, ad hoc 1930s measures to restructure farm debt, market agricultural products, stimulate the construction industry, and establish a central bank all deferred to markets and established business interests.

Conversely, labour and moral reformers gradually secured minimal state subsidy for social provision to persons considered unemployable. In irregular fashion, provincial governments passed workers compensation legislation from 1914 and mothers allowances from 1920. In 1927, federal old age pension legislation was enacted and provinces passed enabling acts over the next decade. In short, disabled workers, widowed mothers with children, and the destitute elderly, as a strictly circumscribed deserving poor, might receive paltry public sums.

The state might also provide ad-hoc grants to a variety services offered by charities seeking to shape working class life.\textsuperscript{17} Overall, in the domain of well-being, state action before 1939 was reactive, sporadic, and limited to a position of subsidizing charity works.

During World War II, mobilization again created conditions for reform. Full employment, the pronounced entry of women into the workforce, the growth of industrial unionism, and the rising popularity of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) led to federal government efforts to contain organized labour and defuse social demands. But once postwar demobilization eased public pressure, further social provision disappeared from view.

Three main reforms were instituted by the federal government in response to wartime employment, income, and fiscal conditions. First, in 1940, an actuarial unemployment insurance scheme was passed. Issuing from a Depression-era steadfast avoidance of confronting cyclical or structural unemployment, unemployment insurance addressed short-term joblessness and its rules excluded occupations that were seasonal or gendered as female. While unemployment insurance did end strict reliance on local relief and private charity, the federal government also stopped financing relief for those who did not qualify for the new provision in 1941.\textsuperscript{18} Second,


in 1942, new legislation ensured that many lower-earning Canadians began to pay tax on their income. The change improved the state’s ability to raise revenue while also creating reason for ordinary Canadians to demand more of the state. Third, in 1945, family allowances were introduced as a form of income supplement for married men. The measure was Canada’s first universal social program. These were all isolated adjustments to state financial practices.

The federal government, acting in cooperation with business, grew in size and capacity during the war. But, strictly speaking, it would be wrong to conflate enlarged wartime bureaucracy with the coming of welfare state provision. Moreover, as with World War I, postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction were largely temporary undertakings. Rehabilitation was limited to employment, education, and healthcare initiatives for veterans. Meanwhile, the federal government attempted to re-establish prewar norms by encouraging women workers to return to domesticity. For its part, reconstruction planning yielded little more than market-oriented designs for growth in such domains as housing and consumer goods manufacturing.

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The ‘postwar welfare state’ is a clumsy phase that ignores more than a decade of inaction following limited wartime reforms. It is a concept that should not be grafted onto a postwar scholarship, whose central theme, historian Mary Louise Adams explained, is that while many Canadians valued conformity in the 1950s and sought to ensure it, the period was one of immense social change. Historians have shown that professionalized expertise grew in importance in many areas of life. But change, however marshalled, did not extend to welfare reform. Rather, the postwar agenda was conservative and in line with longstanding practice.

The myth of the ‘postwar welfare state’ in Canada has been sustained by three ideas: those of social security reform, Keynesianism, and the postwar settlement. None of these was as they seemed. First, in 1943, social scientist Leonard Marsh, writing for the Committee on Post-War Reconstruction, laid out a model for a comprehensive welfare state in Canada. Pushed by wartime social and economic changes that made reform seem inevitable, the Liberal federal government repackaged these proposals in 1945 in its Green Book. In a classic article, historian Alvin Finkel has warned that taking the Green Book as the onset of the welfare state ignores what happened. The end of the war and the start of a postwar boom allowed the King government to defer change, institute tax cuts, and leave the Green Book to die as a result of

26 For example, Magda Fahni and Robert A. Rutherford, Introduction to Creating Postwar Canada: Community, Diversity, and Dissent, 1945-75 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 4.
stalemated provincial-federal constitutional discussions. Nor was there an onset of Keynesian economic management overseen by farsighted bureaucrats. While Keynesian ideas circulated, they did not become the predominant approach to economic policy. Postwar growth was the product of an expansionary capitalism driven by Cold War rearmament, trade liberalization, absence of overseas competition, cheap energy, and consumer spending rather than technocratic management. On these two counts, the ‘postwar welfare state’ was illusory. A third, the postwar settlement – described in one telling as labour-capital peace prompted by the introduction of collective bargaining and industrial legality – simplifies matters. The state-mediated peace itself was limited, unevenly applied and at times resisted or subverted by employers. Factors like economic growth and a Cold War chill on radicalism, both of which led organized labour to moderate its politics, mattered a great deal in curbing militancy. Moreover, neo-liberal business interests mounted a postwar offensive to press pro-market ideas. Capital-labour relations were not settled and remained contested both within and without state rule-making.


Those historians favouring the view that the welfare state was gradually elaborated following World War II will point to a trickle of legislation. Primarily, these measures involved revised old age security legislation in 1951, the re-entry of the federal government into the domain of welfare relief with the Unemployment Assistance Act in 1956, and hospital insurance and equalization payments to provinces in 1957. However, as political scientist Gerard Boychuk has cogently argued, these measures demonstrated the interest federal bureaucrats had in uniform provision across the provinces rather than any great concern in deepening state responsibility for the well-being of Canadians. Indeed, social expenditure in 1961, as a proportion of the federal budget, was relatively smaller than it had been in 1951. Instead, the welfare state, however circumscribed, was not implemented until the mid-1960s.

There could be no welfare state without first a politically accepted concept of state-led distribution and redistribution of social security and equality. Leonard Marsh offered one model in 1943. A member of the League for Social Reconstruction, Marsh’s ideas borrowed from William Beveridge and turned on a social democratic vision of parliament-approved, state-marshalled, technocratic socio-economic planning. Yet Marsh’s proposal was defeated and, as Michiel Horn observes, the later welfare state did not resemble his designs. Rather it was Tom Kent’s liberal borrowing of CCF-cum-Galbraithian ideas that would prevail in the 1960s.

39 Historians writing about earlier periods have in fact gestured in this direction. Marshall, 288; Struthers, The Limits of Affluence, 257-258. Moscovitch and Drover concur that a developed welfare state in Canada was substantially established between 1963 and 1968. Moscovitch and Drover, “Social Expenditure,” 36, 38.
40 Ian McKay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals: Rethinking Canada’s Left History (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2005), 147.
There are two important caveats to draw from the existing making of the welfare state literature. The first comes from political and social history work, especially by Shirley Tillotson and Lara Campbell. Changing attitudes and values among ordinary Canadians regarding the provision of private and public welfare shaped the context in which the welfare state was eventually created. As such, 1960s reforms did not come out of nowhere. Second, from a legislative perspective, both James Struthers and Dominique Marshall have noted that provincial and local reform and social provision generally preceded federal counterparts. Federal welfare state measures should not, then, be overemphasized. However, Struthers has written that federal legislation and funds have equally been significant motors of provincial innovation and expanded social spending. Such a dynamic was especially true during the 1960s.

If the welfare state was made in the 1960s, an immediate explanation for its creation is needed. The process was influenced by the global politics of poverty in Canada, which also saw the introduction of development programs to confront poverty and promote democratization. During the Cold War (with mobilization again a bridge to reform), the socialist alternative, decolonization, and popular movements built from below created room for calls for greater democracy and an end to poverty. They put pressure on the Canadian state to demonstrate that liberal capitalism could be a viable way to collective well-being. Hope, historian Tina Loo insists, became a project of a newly activist state. We turn to this confluence.

Cloutier, Printer to the King, 1943); Sir William Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services (New York: Macmillan, 1942).

42 Tillotson, Contributing Citizens; Campbell, Respectable Citizens.


44 Tina Loo, “Moved by the State: Forced Relocation and a ‘Good Life’ in Postwar Canada,” The McLean Lecture Series in Canadian Studies, University of British Columbia, January-February 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RAxGA1IAKA.
The Global Politics of Poverty in Canada

A veritable global politics of poverty emerged between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s. It was propelled by popular movements, constrained by geopolitical contestation, emboldened by economic prosperity, and centered on ‘development.’ Poverty became a central, and broadly contested, global political issue. A Canadian politics of poverty evolved amidst transnational political, intellectual, and cultural currents and it attended to poverty both at home and abroad.

Unmistakably, poverty was rediscovered in late 1950s and early 1960s Canada. The acknowledgement of socio-economic inequality took place within what I will be calling the global politics of poverty. In this context, poverty was rendered, within limits, a matter of public concern in Canada. Social scientists, bureaucrats, politicians, social workers, priests, student activists, Indigenous leaders, and low-income people themselves debated and confronted poverty in inner cities, in rural communities, on reserves, in regions deemed underdeveloped, and in the Third World. There existed a sense that poverty could, and should, be ended.

But just what did eradicating poverty entail? Could poverty be addressed, as liberals suggested, by enlarging the social, political, and economic space of democratic capitalism through welfare state creation and development, so as to accommodate the well-being and active political participation of marginalized people? Or, as radicals argued, did eliminating poverty necessitate a deeper and implicitly post-capitalist restructuring of the base and forms of democratic participation? This debate was at the heart of poverty politics in Canada.

The global politics of poverty turned on how to alleviate global poverty – and to what ends. It was framed by new ways of quantifying inequality; prompted by decolonization; invigorated by Cold War struggle for or against the extension of global capitalist hegemony;

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shaped by representations of the poor; marked by consensus on the necessity of ‘development’; sustained by the Third World; and punctuated by divergences on how development should be understood and achieved. It did not simply animate the international sphere, but it permeated national, regional, and local politics, too.

New forms of “poverty knowledge” made poverty legible by the 1960s. Internationally, macroeconomic methods of comparing national incomes revealed the extent of inequality in the world. The Bretton Woods economic system, which envisioned an atomized world of regulated national and colonial economies, encouraged such comparisons.46 Domestically, social scientific studies revealed poverty among parts of the population. In 1968, government statistician Jenny Poduluk attempted to quantify deprivation by calculating a poverty line. She concluded that about 29% of Canadian households had an insufficient income, seeing as they spent more than 70% of their income on the basic necessities of food, clothing, and shelter.47

The conjuncture of decolonization and the Cold War transformed poverty into a crucial political issue of transnational dimensions. Decolonization was the often-violent process of replacing ruling colonial authorities and asserting national political independence and self-determination. Beginning with India’s independence in 1947 and continuing especially into the late 1970s, diasporic anti-colonialism and successful decolonization struggles in Asia and Africa produced a considerable challenge to postwar order.48

Poverty politics mattered because global capitalist hegemony was at stake. Hegemony, Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci elaborated, is the spontaneous consent of the masses to the

direction of social life by the dominant group in society. But where such consent is lacking, the state apparatus seeks to ensure it. Indeed, historian Odd Arne Westad has argued that the Cold War was a superpower struggle for economic hegemony in the violently decolonizing world. Cold War competition greatly shaped the domestic and international framework within which changes in former colonies took place. In multiple ways, postcolonial elites consciously crafted their political agendas in accordance with or in contrast to Soviet and American models. In turn, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to cultivate allies during a period in which the consequences of decolonization were as yet unsettled. In a militarized international sphere, where force and coercion were as important as persuasion in securing consent, a “war” on (if not over) the poverty lived by two-thirds of the world’s population was launched.

In the recurrent representation, poverty incubated revolutionary potential and the poor were a cultural, and often implicitly racial, other. The image was most influentially articulated by anthropologist Oscar Lewis. He argued that the “culture of poverty,” which he defined according to a list of personal traits, was a universal adaptation of the poor “to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society.” In Canada, the culture of poverty gained wide political purchase as an explanation for persistent poverty. Not only did it animate Kent’s War on Poverty, but prominent liberal organs such as the Economic Council of Canada also adopted it as an analysis of the poor. Somewhat differently, New Leftists found

the concept useful as a way of explaining the alienation and disempowerment of the poor.\textsuperscript{53}

Indeed, Lewis had intended to emphasize the psychological effects of poverty, not inherent qualities of the poor that he observed doing field research in Puerto Rico and elsewhere. In fact, he wanted to challenge the Marxist idea that a dispossessed ‘lumpenproletariat’ was inherently reactionary. Lewis instead drew on the idea, articulated by Martinique philosopher Frantz Fanon, that those living in poverty had revolutionary potential.\textsuperscript{54} However, as historian Alice O’Connor has succinctly argued, the culture of poverty concept undercut its own radical potential by rooting its analysis in behaviour and psychology and turning away from a critique of capitalism implicit in the idea.\textsuperscript{55} Moreover, it allowed that poverty – and the revolutionary threat it represented – might be remedied through the disciplinary procedures of capitalism.\textsuperscript{56}

For liberals, addressing poverty was inseparable from efforts to extend the global bounds of capitalism and political liberalism. A capitalist economy, including deepening exchanges between internationally connected markets, was presented as means to growth and progress. The United States was the foremost actor, adapting New Deal interventionism to remake the postwar world economic system in the face of socialist alternatives.\textsuperscript{57} Yet Canada participated in a broadly shared liberal internationalism. As historian John Price has emphasized, the Canadian government insisted on the superiority of liberalism and its foreign policy was shaped by


\textsuperscript{55} O’Connor, 122.


continentalism, racism, and imperial projections of power.58 There was conditional liberal political support for postcolonial democracy and a global cultural pluralism that might stand as an alternative to colonial racial order.59 However, the more concerted purpose of diplomacy, military interventions, trade, and foreign assistance was to extend, on a global scale, a liberal subjecthood rooted in possessive individualism. Political theorist C.B. Macpherson, who deployed the concept critically, described possessive individualism as a product of the liberalism’s long dependence on capitalist social relations. Its key propositions are that humans, existing in a society in which market exchanges were predominant, are proprietors of their own selves and that their freedom comes from freedom of dependence on others. Liberal political obligations, then, rest on the self-interested capacity of individuals alone.60 Cold War observers could view the absence of a possessive individualism as the very cause of poverty.

Development was overwhelmingly asserted as the remedy for poverty. Indeed, much of the global politics of poverty was viewed through its lens. Development contains the idea that rational action can shape socio-economic processes in such a way as to improve the lives of human beings. The word ‘develop,’ adapted from French in the mid-seventeenth century, originally meant to unfold or unwrap. Its meaning was metaphorically extended from the mid-eighteenth century, coming to refer to biological and economic evolutionary changes. But, in later usage, the unfolding of change was quite apart from “the will to improve.”61 Usefully, M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton distinguish between the immanent process of development and the

intent to develop. A doctrine of development seeks to bring the intent to develop to bear on the immanent process of development and, by destroying unwanted elements, shape it for the good.62

Development was important because it allowed for a global politics of poverty built, to a striking degree, on consensus. Partly, this was a consequence of the way ‘development’ could be ambiguous, metaphorical, and variously defined. Yet a postcolonial doctrine of development, crystallized in the 1950s, was rooted in a broadly shared conviction of the necessity of alleviating poverty. It set out a series of propositions. In place of a world of colonizer and colonized, a more general, if still binary, vision of developed and underdeveloped nations was imagined. Underdevelopment itself was universalized, and so were ideas about what was required to overcome it. In the process, development became both a means and an end. To ‘catch up’ with developed counterparts, restructured underdeveloped societies were required to facilitate the pursuit of material prosperity and economic progress. Development behooved governments to improve the standard of living of their poor citizens. The state, relying on an exaggerated belief in the capacity of scientific and technological progress to meet growing human social needs, would make a common series of technical interventions and capital investments in infrastructure, agriculture, industry, and services. And developed nations might assist the process with loans, expertise, and technology transfers. In this way, development held out the prospect of international economic cooperation.63 At the same time, consensus blurred back into Cold War contest. The postcolonial development impulse was buoyed by competing efforts of the United

States and its allies, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, China, and the United Nations to provide material and political support to former colonies.  

Modernization theory, an intervention in the debate over which political system might best secure development, was the most powerful framework for considering poverty. It was an influential synthesis because it explained why poverty existed (low productivity), how it could be overcome (economic growth), and what the end goal should be (a modernity in which wants were satisfied through market exchanges). W.W. Rostow gave modernization theory its fullest anti-communist articulation, setting out a program to counter the views of Soviet intellectuals advocating a direct state role in the economy for the pursuit of socialist ends.  Like many of his contemporaries, Rostow was led by postwar prosperity to conflate development and economic growth, that is, the increase in per capita income in relation to the gross domestic product. He argued that – through capital investment, the rise of manufacturing, and the emergence of an amenable political, social, and institutional framework – all societies historically moved through five sequential stages of economic growth to reach the “age of mass consumption.” Such a modernity would facilitate higher living standards, not to mention capital accumulation.

Planning and realizing state-led modernization required skilled technicians. Experts, at times emboldened by a self-confidence gendered as male, could often press technocratic and one

dimensional solutions to poverty. The exercise of power tended to marginalize the democratic and egalitarian ethos that formed one of the key rationales for anti-poverty interventions. Anthropologist James Ferguson has argued that the discourse of development itself works to deny politics and suspend its effects. Politics, however, never disappeared so neatly from view.

In large measure, the global politics of poverty was sustained by the Third World. Historian Vijay Prashad has argued that the Third World was a vigorously bottom-up project pursued by the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America who dreamt of a democratic and egalitarian world after colonialism. They pressed demands for political equality, a redistribution of the world’s resources, an improved return on labour power, and an acknowledgement of the shared heritage of science, technology, and culture. Anti-colonial and postcolonial movements often foregrounded insistence on racial integration and economic inclusion. For instance, the American Civil Rights movement drew inspiration from global struggles and its leaders combined demands for political equality and for economic justice. By the mid-1960s, unrealized improvements in standard of living standards prompted more starkly articulated calls for liberation and structural change. For example, Ghana president Kwame Nkrumah denounced neo-colonialism and advocated a struggle against it, arguing that the imperial character of the international economic system belied the significance of formal political independence.

Despite remarkable unity, significant class, political, and ethnic tensions remained. As Third


World leaders pursued their aims, they often shared in elitist attitudes towards common people. Development programs were, understandably, met in many cases with resistance.

In a further dimension where the global politics of poverty was conflictual rather than consensual, several development alternatives were articulated in the 1960s and 1970s. The most important was dependency theory. \textit{Dependentistas} argued that development and underdevelopment were interconnected historical, social, and political processes taking place within global capitalist and geopolitical structures. Within development practice, there were some attempts to chart a ‘third way’ between capitalist and socialist development models (or, at least, to mediate the effects of capitalist social relations). Tools employed included state ownership of certain sectors of the economy, import substitution polices, and quasi-corporatist schemes designed to restrain inequalities between elites and the masses. Equally, cooperatives were sometimes promoted as means both of capital accumulation and redistribution. For some critics of modernization, scale itself was an important question. Notably, in 1973, economist E.F. Schumacher made an influential critique of the social dislocation and ecological destruction caused by large-scale technologies. He instead advocated a kind of development focused on small-scale, intermediate technologies adapted to local people and environments. In broader terms, a range of left liberals and leftists discontented with contemporary liberal democratic capitalism and Soviet-style socialism looked to the Third World for alternatives.

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The global implications of the Cold War and decolonization found various domestic expressions in Canada. Canadian involvement in the Cold War, historian Robert Teigrob has demonstrated, was conditioned by culture and consumption of American mass media. As Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse suggest, official fears of ideological enemies at home and abroad fueled efforts to build a security state. Cold War insecurities also found expression in cultural, sexual, and family-centric anxieties. Equally, preoccupations with nation became much more pronounced. Historians have commented on the 1960s demise of British-Canadian identity. A new flag and anthem, cooperative federalism, bilingualism, and multiculturalism were inserted in its place. A.G. Hopkins argues that new ways of constructing national belonging should not be trivialized. Like colonies in Asia and Africa, white settler countries underwent aspects of decolonization as the core concept of Britishness was replaced. Canadians had to come to terms with both global and Canadian decolonization. In part, this meant resisting the neocolonialism of the United States. New forms of cultural and economic nationalism were representative of anti-imperialist sentiment. Moreover, in Quebec, activists asserted

77 Robert Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States’ Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
82 On economic nationalism, see Stephen Azzi, Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999); Paul Phillips and Stephen Watson, “From Mobilization to Continentalism:
themselves against the domination of not just American capital, but also English Canada. And Indigenous activists mobilized to challenge settler colonialism itself.

Yet, in a manner that has thus far escaped historians, poverty – whose very presence in Canada threatened to undermine the legitimacy of liberal capitalist democracy – was a central Cold War liberal concern and key to the making of the welfare state.

Admittedly, domestic political exigencies provided a leading edge of poverty politics. Interest in reform flowed from electoral politics, a late-1950s recession, and a reconsideration of the role of the federal government. From 1957, Progressive Conservative government – drawing electoral support from Western and Atlantic Canada, preoccupied with defending national security and sovereignty in the North, and committing to John Diefenbaker’s “unhyphenated Canadianism” – contributed to more active federal interest in the varied economic and social conditions across the country. Plus, relegated to opposition status, a Liberal Party accustomed to being in power was opened to reformism. Tom Kent was a central figure in remaking Liberal policy, in no small part to head off the progressive electoral threat posed by the NDP.

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1964, under the influence of the US War on Poverty, Kent made creating opportunities for the poor, abetted by economic expansion, the centerpiece of Liberal minority government policy.

The “attack on poverty,” made public in the Speech from the Throne in April 1965, was portrayed as a program for “the full utilisation of our human resources and the elimination of poverty among our people.” Its key components were spending on regional, rural, and fisheries development, worker training and mobility, improved social assistance, and a Company of Young Canadians. Kent was charged with leading the effort from the newly created Special Planning Secretariat. At face value, there were a quite limited number of programs included in the War on Poverty proper. But, in fact, poverty was the instrumental concept in the sudden making of the welfare state, prompting the direct involvement of state institutions in shaping the security and equality of citizens within liberal democratic society.

Consequently, Kent maintained that there were two kinds of poverty in Canada. There were those Canadians unable to support themselves at an adequate level. Here, Kent meant the sick, the injured, the disabled, and so on. And there were those Canadians who were liable, temporarily or permanently, to be unable to make ends meet. The implicit reference was to the unemployed, seasonally employed, and underemployed. Rather than maintain past distinctions between a deserving and an undeserving poor, Kent insisted on redistribution of income and services to aid both groups of non-producers. Privately, he wrote that poverty would not be, strictly speaking, eliminated, but rather that its severity and numbers would be limited. To do so, he envisioned nothing less than the re-structuring of government and intervention in areas such

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as public housing, medical services, social work, education, job creation, worker placement and mobility, farm consolidation, and Indigenous welfare.\textsuperscript{87}

Crucially, Kent believed that a viable welfare state in Canada depended on near full employment in an ever-expanding economy. And the rhetoric of ‘equality of opportunity’ rendered the scheme as an inclusive and even participatory project.\textsuperscript{88} The state would intervene to create ‘opportunities’ for Canadians to re-engage or to intensify their market exchanges.

Two types of measures were taken. Firstly, to realize social security and welfare provision, an unprecedented series of reforms and legislation was introduced. With provincial programs often serving as models, the federal government implemented universalized social welfare provision and accommodated it within federalism. Universal, means-oriented, and cost-sharing social welfare policies were all passed: youth allowances (1964), Canadian and Quebec Pension Plans (1965), Guaranteed Income Supplement (1966), Canada Assistance Plan (1966), and Medical Care Act (1966). In related fashion, state spending greatly rose (though without becoming substantially more redistributive).\textsuperscript{89} Government accounted for 19\% of all spending in the Canadian economy in 1951 and 47\% by 1982. Viewed another way, spending on social welfare, health, and education was 4\% of GNP in 1946 and 15\% by the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{90}

Concurrently, provinces made use of the new availability of federal funds to establish and


\textsuperscript{88} On the elasticity of the concept, see Charles Frankel, “Equality of Opportunity,” \textit{Ethics} 81, no. 3 (1971): 191-211.


expand their own socio-economic programs, especially in the domains of education and health. In Manitoba, for example, public spending tripled between 1958 and 1965.\textsuperscript{91}

Secondly, the state intervened in labour and, to an extent, capital markets. With respect to the latter, new incentives to capital included the creation of a Department of Industry in 1963, major 1964 amendments to the National Housing Act to allow for urban renewal, a range of legislation offering grants and capital incentives, state assistance securing new markets abroad, and infrastructure spending. As the last item best demonstrates, modernization had many Canadian adherents.\textsuperscript{92} Numerous Canadian governments looked to derive political legitimacy from infrastructure projects.\textsuperscript{93} In the name of attracting industry and creating employment, “province-building” efforts in this period focused on hydroelectric dam and highway construction.\textsuperscript{94} Federal government “nation-building” followed parallel lines, marked by the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the completion of the Trans-Canada Highway, and a spate of bridge building, port modernization, and nuclear power generation projects.

Meanwhile, federal employment policies came to comprise mobility, manpower, and development initiatives. Mobility programs meant moving the poor to places where they would find permanent, waged employment in the capitalist economy. Neoclassical economists had long


\textsuperscript{92} Miriam Wright, A Fishery for Modern Times: The State and the Industrialization of the Newfoundland Fishery, 1934-1968 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

\textsuperscript{93} Of course, infrastructure projects to assist capital were not new as such, though their scale increased. See H.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines, and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1974).

argued that labour mobility would solve unemployment, yet viewed labour markets as self-regulating. In the late 1950s, though, the federal government began to experiment with facilitating labour mobility, through both assisted and forced relocation. Such a commitment was formalized and extended in the 1960s.95

Manpower programs meant ensuring that prospective workers would have the skills to match those demanded by employers. Mainstream economists suggested that unemployment was produced by a mismatch between the skills required in the modern workforce and the qualifications of workers.96 The concept of “human capital” helped provide a justification for government retraining programs, education spending, and immigration policy.97 Policymakers argued that future growth depended not just on physical capital, but also on “investments” in the education, services, and information available to workers. The federal government, and provincial education and human resources departments, especially sought to retrain unskilled labourers and educate young people with the expectation that these efforts would improve overall productivity, remedy unemployment, and enable workers to earn higher wages. Equally, Kent oversaw the introduction of the points-based immigration system in 1967 in the interest of attracting skilled labour from abroad, with the same aims in mind.98

More than any other form of welfare program, development would realize Kent’s maxims of poverty reduction, growth, and equality of opportunity for all Canadians no matter who they were or where they lived. To develop was to intentionally intervene in the unfolding of actually

existing social relations and to seek to amend them. Development promised to be
transformative, not only creating jobs, expanding the economy, and remaking environments, but
encouraging people to improve themselves for the better and to overcome poverty by integrating
themselves into liberal capitalist and democratic processes. Indeed, if there was something
especially coherent about 1960s liberal engagement with socio-economic inequalities, it was a
belief that society could be enhanced by applying a general philosophy of development. In
development lay Canada’s most concerted attempts to address poverty at home and abroad.
Efforts to alleviate poverty through development reveal much about the possibilities and limits of
liberal democracy in the 1960s and 1970s.

Democracy was far from an incidental part of the equation. Effective development was
understood to require the participation of a mobilized citizenry. Development was about
‘helping people help themselves.’ Social and economic change would only be successful if
people were active in taking the decisions that affected their lives. The promises of development
and democracy were thus interrelated in Canadian and global efforts to overcome poverty.

The entanglement of the global and the local was perhaps the key theme of the historical
period, stretching from the late 1950s to mid-1970s, termed ‘the Sixties.’ Karen Dubinsky et
al. have convincingly argued that the Sixties were a global phenomenon, driven by a passion for
change, marked by a shift in politics to the left, and shaped by the rise of social activism as the
primary mode of agency. The Sixties, they conclude, contributed to a new global

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University Press, 2003). On Canada, see M. Athena Palaeologu, ed., The Sixties in Canada: A Turbulent and
Creative Decade (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2009); Dimitry Anastakis, ed., The Sixties: Passion, Politics, and
Style (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008); Lara Campbell, Dominique Clément, and Gregory
consciousness.\textsuperscript{100} Most vividly, anti-imperial activism in Canada drew inspiration from the

Third World struggles and narratives. More than simply a collection of coexistent leftisms, anti-war,\textsuperscript{101} student,\textsuperscript{102} labour,\textsuperscript{103} Indigenous,\textsuperscript{104} women’s,\textsuperscript{105} gay and lesbian,\textsuperscript{106} anti-racist,\textsuperscript{107} urban,\textsuperscript{108} environmental,\textsuperscript{109} and nationalist\textsuperscript{110} mobilizations shared in the global movement to

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\textsuperscript{100} Karen Dubinsky, Catherine Krull, Susan Lord, Sean Mills, Scott Rutherford, eds., Introduction to \textit{New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness} (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009): 1-6.


\textsuperscript{103} On labour activism, see Ian Milligan, \textit{Rebel Youth: 1960s Labour Unrest, Young Workers, and New Leftists in English Canada} (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014).


\textsuperscript{108} On urban protest, see Danielle Robinson, “‘The Streets Belong to the People’: Exppressway Disputes in Canada, c. 1960-75” (Ph.D. diss. in History, McMaster University, 2010).


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make a better world. The Sixties marked a significant historical period during which demands for great democracy and social justice in Canada were powerfully sustained from below.

Historical geographer Richard Harris has argued that Sixties social movements were democratic in a radical sense. Broadly, they sought a more equal society and greater citizen participation. Yet within the movement, there were distinct liberal and radical elements. The liberal desire for democratic revision was analyzed in its wider context by Canadian political theorist C.B. Macpherson. In 1965, he argued that there were three models of democracy in the world and each appeared viable. Liberal democracy was countered by alternatives: vanguard party rule for, if not by, the people in the Soviet Union and Third World nationalist governments seeking to express a Rousseauian general will. Macpherson commended liberal democracy for its ethical core, its political freedoms, and its civil liberties. But he suggested that liberal democracy’s continued relevance depended on it becoming more than an expression of consumers’ sovereignty and on its global effectiveness in countering massive inequality so as to enable people to realize and enjoy their fullest human capacities. This was precisely the reformist impulse Tom Kent exemplified, and it was implicitly shared by other liberals acting within a global politics of poverty. Liberal hopes were for an inclusive, integrated pluralist democracy involving all those hitherto excluded from affluence. This ambition, though, ran up against New Left ideas.

The New Left’s key conceptual pillars were a desire for community belonging, a quest for an authenticity that would end alienation, a belief in participatory democracy, and an

111 For a synthetic treatment of these subjects, see Palmer, Canada’s 1960s; Myrna Kostash, Long Way from Home: The Story of the Sixties Generation in Canada (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1980).
opposition to Cold War militarism. The New Left ethos – set out in a search for an alternative to prevailing models of liberal democracy and state socialism – was implicitly post-capitalist and activists believed that individuals had the right to participate in the social decisions that affected their lives. Significantly, such a commitment extended to the poor. The New Left in Canada argued that the poor, alienated from society, were potential agents of radical social change. And participating in a revival of radical analysis, some activists drew on neo-Marxist understandings of the state, capitalist social relations, and international political economy.

Notably, in their shared commitment to overcoming poverty, left liberals and New Leftists drew from many of the same ideas and influences. They shared a pedagogy of empowerment and sustained an interest in development. But they diverged on whether a liberal liberation was possible or desirable. Therefore, the Sixties were marked by multiple, even divergent, attempts to renew or reconstruct democracy. Attention to development programs in practice, within a transnational frame, is the only way to understand and relate these efforts.

The tide of social democracy in Canada receded after 1972. That year was followed by a weakening of concerted efforts to limit the market with political power and make it subservient to the needs of society. The long 1963-to-1972 capitalist expansionary period ended and unemployment and poverty would again seem more general than extraordinary occurrences in the mid-1970s. The broad mobilization of Sixties social movements eased. Government grants that had sustained myriad forms of citizen engagement were clawed back. The growth in public

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sector unionism was largely over. Strike action would give way to a renewed business offensive on labour.\textsuperscript{116} The wave of provincial election results delivering avowedly progressive provincial governments ebbed.\textsuperscript{117} And Pierre Trudeau’s initial Just Society rhetoric, turning on ideals of citizen participation and equality of opportunity, was confounded by actual federal policies – from social spending to wage and price controls to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms – designed to uphold the status quo and restrain the expectations of ordinary Canadians.\textsuperscript{118}

In 1971, the Special Senate Committee on Poverty recommended that the federal government institute a guaranteed annual income. Liberal proponents of such a guarantee viewed it as a means of social reform or as a way to rationalize social spending. Left proponents argued that a decent standard of living was a universal right. But the Trudeau government did not implement the proposed measure.\textsuperscript{119} As the economic crises of the 1970s set in, hopes of eliminating poverty faded. Indeed, monetarist anti-inflation policies worsened unemployment, especially in a context of concessions to business and socio-economic spending cuts.\textsuperscript{120}

Therefore, not only was the welfare state created in the 1960s, the ascent of neoliberalism and austerity over the course of the 1970s should be understood as an immediate counteraction to the state’s expanded role in providing social welfare. Left liberalism and New Leftism were

politically marginalized. And while welfare state programs were too popular to eliminate, they had clear limits and were not beyond being weakened through budget cuts. As with social security, development programs lingered, but they did so in changing political context.

The sort of the global politics of poverty in Canada had an even more pronounced Third World counterpart. From the late 1960s, American social scientists and policymakers increasingly embraced and empowered military regimes to defeat socialism and to press forward with technocratic modernization. First World actors more aggressively sought to ensure their ready access to cheap labour and primary resources. The 1980s culmination of these efforts, in which Canadian capital and the Canadian state were complicit, was an enforced debt crisis and the implementation of structural adjustment and trade liberalization policies in the Third World. The ideological and geopolitical rise of neoliberalism and the defeat of the Third World project signaled an end to the global politics of poverty.

**Community Development, Regional Development, International Development**

Poverty, and its wider hold on 1960s-1970s politics, had an important impact on those like Kent at the decision-making centre. To implement anti-poverty action, the federal government initiated a number of development programs seeking to ‘help people help themselves.’ Community development, regional development, and international development emerged as concurrent, if contested, schemes to revitalize liberal democracy within and beyond Canada’s borders. This dissertation concretely appreciates the ideological link between

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development programs on different scales and seeks to understand them within the same historical frame. It is through development initiatives that we can make sense of how the state, activists, experts, and ordinary Canadians conceptualized democracy in this historical context.

This study is a political history of the relationship between poverty, democracy, and development in Canada within a larger global context. Analysis across three different scales within a single, transnational frame enables a fuller and deeper understanding of the purposeful, if otherwise seemingly peripheral, connection between development and democracy. As such, the dissertation provides new insights by following the transnational and spatial turns. By moving beyond the nation, my approach reveals larger processes and interconnections. But rather than simply enlarge the geographic scope, my study registers a shared history of anti-poverty politics by capturing dynamics on several different scales.

The chosen case studies enable an interconnected analysis of development programs pursued in distinct and varied contexts yet sharing many core themes. The focus of the local scale is on the activities of the Company of Young Canadians (CYC) in north-central Alberta and southwest Montreal. The regional scale examines the efforts of Cape Breton Development Corporation (DEVCO) to amend regional inequality and poverty. The international scale addresses the Third World international development activity of Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) – namely, its project in Tanzania. After a note on methods, the next paragraphs describe the organizations and their relationship to the state, provide a brief genealogy of the development practice used by each, and chart the itinerary of the rest of the dissertation.

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125 Karen Dubinsky, Adele Perry, and Henry Yu, Introduction to Within and Without Nation: Canadian History as Transnational History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 4-11; Barney Warf and Santa Arias, eds., The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2009).
In terms of methodology, my research was initially rooted in several key archival collections. Drawing on these materials, I identified and then consulted further archival holdings, publications, and periodicals. My work necessitated travel to libraries and archives in four provinces. I also compiled a list of participants, which served as a directory of potential interviewees. After securing General Research Ethics Board approval (as well as scouring the internet for contact information), I emailed or telephoned participants in the hopes of speaking with them about their experiences. Apart from one meeting held in person, I conducted interviews over the phone. I recorded these conversations and subsequently made notes on what was said. The dissertation draws extensively on primary sources, as well as a broad range of secondary literature.

Announced in 1965 as part of the “attack on poverty,” the Company of Young Canadians was a state-funded and youth-driven anti-poverty organization. Volunteers were paid a living wage to work in communities, live among residents, and ‘help people help themselves’ through community development and animation sociale. Community development arose out of British mass education policy in late colonial Africa and was formalized as decolonization began. It was used prominently in several newly independent nations and transplanted to Canada at the end of the 1950s. Animation sociale emerged from French colonial rural self-help schemes. Employed in Quebec from the early 1960s, it blurred with organizing traditions from France and the United States. CYC’s two practices, if having different trajectories, had shared roots in the 1930s international movement for rural reconstruction and in an attempt to religitimize empire through reform. They were both applied social sciences whose pedagogy presumed that once people

learned about their common problems and identified their “felt needs,” they would use small-scale organization and democratic decision-making to plan and carry out cooperative solutions.

Community action, as an exercise in participation and self-government, was thought to have an integrative effect that could result in material improvement and impart a liberal, possessive individualism.127 Though Canada had a longer history of co-operative action, community development and animation sociale were imported within the global politics of poverty.128 CYC was chief among the organizations engaged in participatory anti-poverty activism.

Much of what has been written about CYC has an institutional bias and dwells on organizational dysfunction and controversies.129 Yet to understand how the company mattered, its community development and animation sociale work – and its connections to local politics and struggles – must be considered in practice.130 Chapters 1 and 2 consider CYC community development in the Lesser Slave Lake area of Alberta. Chapters 3 and 4 examine CYC use of animation sociale in the St-Henri part of southwest Montreal. My research draws largely on the


Company of Young Canadians fonds at Library and Archives Canada; government records housed at Provincial Archives of Alberta; collections available at William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections, McMaster University Libraries; the Métis Association of Alberta fonds at Glenbow Museum and Archives; newspapers (consulted largely at Library and Archives Canada, the Alberta Legislature Library, and the Université Laval library); and interviews I undertook with participants. Theses and government publications (consulted notably at the libraries of Université de Montréal, Université Laval, Université du Québec à Montréal, and University of Alberta) were also useful.

Regional development is considered next. In 1967, coal mining operations in Cape Breton were nationalized and a crown corporation was established to confront the political crisis posed by the prospective collapse of the island’s industrial economy. Cape Breton Development Corporation was tasked with winding down longstanding mining as well as stimulating alternative industry and employment in the region.

The application of regional development took shape in the 1960s. Some programs – Agricultural and Rehabilitation Development Act (1960) and Fund for Economic Development (1966) – focused on rural areas. But regional policy shifted, driven in part by provincial government efforts (including Bureau d'aménagement de l'Est du Québec and the Newfoundland Resettlement Program) to centralize rural populations. The Atlantic Development Board (1962), Area Development Agency (1963), and the renamed Agriculture and Rural Development Act (1966) turned federal policy toward the attainment of urban, industrial, capitalist modernity. In 1969, Department of Regional Economic Expansion was created to subsidize infrastructure and
private industry at growth poles. Sociologist Ralph Matthews wryly observed that an anti-poverty strategy premised on giving money to the rich “seems questionable.”

Examining DEVCO offers a way into the history of regional development in Canada within a wider global politics of poverty. Chapter 5 examines DEVCO’s contradictory efforts to fulfill its regional development mandate by attracting secondary manufacturing industry to Cape Breton between 1967 and 1971. Chapter 6 traces DEVCO’s divergent, and Tom Kent-led, attempt to realize a participatory kind of regional development from 1972 to 1977. From what I can ascertain, DEVCO’s files were likely destroyed by a succeeding federal agency.

Alternatively, my analysis draws especially on the Thomas Worrall Kent fonds at Queen’s University Archives; materials held by the Beaton Institute; publications from Cape Breton University Library’s Bras d’Or Collection; federal government department records available at Library and Archives Canada; newspaper articles; and interviews with participants.

Finally, international development is considered through a focus on Canadian University Service Overseas/Service universitaire canadien oultre-mer (CUSO/SUCO). Formed in 1961, it was the primary secular non-government organization for Canadians travelling to the Third World to participate in technical assistance. Such assistance was premised on the idea that people in industrialized societies could help the people of the Third World help themselves.


132 Ralph Matthews, The Creation of Regional Dependency (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 49.

The bulk of the literature on Canada’s international dealings focuses on the thoughts and actions of politicians and Department of External Affairs bureaucrats.\(^{134}\) Recently, growing interest in global history and the Third World has led a few historians to extend the approach to Canadian interactions with new nations.\(^{135}\) David Webster’s work on Canadian-Indonesian relations is instructive regarding Canada’s geopolitical role. If Canadian experts, diplomats, and politicians held up their country as a model for post-colonial Indonesia, Canadian decisions had everything to do with North Atlantic alliances and multilateral institutions and little to do with Indonesia per se. Plus, Indonesian officials could hardly distinguish Canadian contributions from those of other western donors.\(^{136}\) Historians have begun to explore ways in which Canadians and non-Canadians were caught up in global power relations as well as political, cultural, and intellectual exchanges. Certainly, shaped by American hegemony, the development interventions of Canadian government, NGOs, missions, and institutions formed part of a broader geopolitical and liberal internationalist impulse that involved all First World nations.\(^{137}\)

In 1950, the Canadian government began to offer capital and technical experts to developing countries. Loans – in addition to fostering investment in infrastructure, economic


planning, and agriculture – served to finance the sale of Canadian food, equipment, and arms to Third World nations. Additionally, Canadians were placed in Third World civil service jobs. Notably, French-Canadian charges of Commonwealth bias, and Quebec’s growing international diplomacy on education questions, conditioned a 1960s effort to direct aid to former French colonies as well as English ones. From 1965, the federal government also channeled funds through Canadian international development non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Volunteer-sending international development NGOs – whose antecedents were missionary work and secular student service groups – were a widespread Sixties phenomenon. The organizations – the Peace Corps being the most prominent example – were created both by university students and national governments in the First and Second World. CUSO/SUCO was formed in 1961 and became the chief Canadian organization sending volunteers abroad. Though a non-governmental entity, it was largely dependent on state funding from 1965. After

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1968, the CUSO anglophone and SUCO francophone sections were increasingly autonomous.\textsuperscript{142}

Certainly, the group’s interventions might best be understood through contextualized case study.\textsuperscript{143} Chapter 7 and 8 examine CUSO’s international development ideas and practice in postcolonial Tanzania. My account draws especially on the CUSO fonds held at Library and Archives Canada; various CUSO publications; and interviews I conducted with participants.

The selected programs did not differ solely in scale. The welfare state sponsored development in varying ways and intensities. The three development organizations under study each had a distinctive doctrine of development. Loosely, we might arrange them from most to least state-centric. DEVCO was a technocratic crown corporation making a quasi-corporatist attempt to reshape one regional economy and its social patterns, by substituting job-creation and entrepreneurship for democratic political participation. CUSO was a non-governmental organization – financed by the Canadian and Third World states – involving Canadians in postcolonial national development efforts directed by state bureaucracy. CYC was a state agency providing a constrained framework for a range of activists – ranging from liberal to revolutionary politics – to foster grassroots organization, democratic change, and local self-help among the poor.

Even where these development efforts took different forms, the chapters to come demonstrate their shared ground. Development programs sought to reconcile liberal democracy


\textsuperscript{143} SUCO’s archives are held privately and the author has not consulted them. On SUCO, see Martin Desmeules, “Histoire du volontariat international au Québec: le cas du Service Universitaire Canadien Outre-Mer - SUCO 1960-1985” (Thèse de maîtrise en Histoire, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2009).
and capitalism. They drew liberals and New Leftists into attempts to confront poverty and to democratize society. They turned on the pedagogical premise of helping poor people help themselves. They worked to forestall a radical transformation of property relations. To these themes the conclusion will return.

Poverty mattered between the late 1950s and mid-1970s. And where development was pursued, as a means of confronting poverty and promoting democratization, the global politics of poverty could be read on several different scales. For activists, decision makers, and ordinary Canadians in Lesser Slave Lake, Alberta and the St-Henri part of Montreal, on Cape Breton Island, and in Tanzanian places like Dar es Salaam, Tabora, and Mwanza, development and democracy were at once contingent on particular dynamics and linked in a debate with global reach.
Chapter 1

So That Community Can Help Itself

In July 1966, Indigenous protestors marched on the Alberta Legislature to demand government support for local industry and employment in Wabasca. Six months later, Métis in the hamlet of Faust began to mobilize on social and economic issues. In both instances, white critics sought to discredit the activism by blaming it on outside agitators working for Company of Young Canadians (CYC).¹ Upholders of the status quo were correct in a basic respect: the Lesser Slave Lake area of north-central Alberta was indeed a site for CYC intervention between 1966 and 1976. And CYC actors would discover that the wider global politics of poverty had great purchase in the economically-depressed communities surrounding the lake. Residents lived with the ongoing historical products of colonization, entrenched racism, and marginal economic existence characteristic of 1960s-1970s northern Canada. In these conditions, CYC sought to stimulate social change at the local level through community development.

CYC was a state-funded and youth-driven anti-poverty organization employing. It paid volunteers a small wage to enter communities, live among residents, and ‘help people help themselves’ through community development and animation sociale. Between 1966 and 1969, it had significant autonomy and a mission, partly shaped by New Leftists, of creating a society in which people had the power to shape their own lives. Planners initially envisioned that CYC would place volunteers both at home and abroad, possibly in partnership with Canadian

University Service Overseas (CUSO). Yet budget cuts from 1968 led CYC to postpone its international development plans in perpetuity. A series of controversies prompted the federal government to place political and financial limits on CYC activity in Canada from 1970 to 1976, when the company was abolished. After 1971, rather than bring in volunteers from elsewhere, CYC increasingly hired local people to work on projects in their own communities.

Community development – a concept formalized as decolonization began, applied in the Third World by national governments and neo-colonial powers alike, and adapted to Canada in the early 1960s – was central to CYC. The company aimed “to help people and communities better their own situations and tackle their own problems.” Volunteers would contribute to “constructive social change” by assisting residents “in articulating their own problems and in working on them,” so as to get at the root causes of poverty and social injustice, and to address the needs of the community. To a degree, CYC’s program focused on absence – of community, of leadership, of wherewithal – and passed over existing political, social, and economic relations. Instead, CYC might seek to assert a left communitarianism consisting of authentic human relationships, meaningful belonging, and consensual participatory democracy. Such an ambition appealed to New Leftists and left liberals alike, leading authors to alternatively suggest that CYC was a site of cooptation, opportunity, or radicalization for left-leaning youth. CYC was a state

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4 Company of Young Canadians, *A Report by the Organizing Committee of the Company of Young Canadians to the Prime Minister of Canada* (Ottawa: Company of Young Canadians, 15 November 1965), 13-16.
agency providing a framework for debate and pursuing a doctrine of development rooted in organic connections to grassroots anti-poverty activism.

Histories of CYC have tended to focus on the organization itself. Yet though a nationwide program within a transnational global politics of poverty, the company’s on-the-ground work was geographically fragmented and locally circumscribed. CYC interventions in places across Canada are better understood in practice. Scholars Stuart Henderson and Harvey Rothstein, who have examined CYC activities within larger studies of Toronto’s Yorkville district and British Columbia alternative schools, offer contextualized scholarship of the sort.

Community development was a means of confronting poverty in Lesser Slave Lake. At the outset, CYC members believed that outside intervention might spur self-directed community transformation. CYC did initially raise the prospect of social change (though that remained a vaguely defined aim) and fostered debate about racial inequality and local democracy. However, it was soon clear that the goal of community development was integration – an idea premised on better involving socially, economically, politically, or racially marginal groups in mainstream society. CYC personnel precipitated a coalition that lobbied for provincial government support of community economic action, generated political debate among Indigenous peoples, and fostered localized self-help projects that served as a measured critique of state-sponsored regional development. Community development involved acting on ‘the poor’ (many of whom


were, in this instance, Métis), encouraging them to work collectively toward the resolution of existing social problems and to take cooperative action to alleviate their own poverty. So empowered, Lesser Slave Lake residents pressed for greater economic equality and increased democratic control over development. Yet whatever tension CYC-assisted community action sustained between radical and progressive politics, the emphasis on development consistently encouraged the integration of local people into dominant social values, liberal democratic political exercises, and capitalist economic processes through small-scale remedial action.

Poverty and Lesser Slave Lake

The emergence of community development in Alberta, which directly preceded CYC involvement, was intimately connected to poverty in Lesser Slave Lake. In 1960, the Alberta Tuberculosis Association sponsored a survey, conducted by University of Alberta professors and students, of Métis in the area. The study was inspired by a more extensive one carried out in Manitoba between 1956 and 1959. In the Manitoba report, social scientist and civil servant Jean Lagassé argued that, rather than simple lack of income, the incompatibility of dominant and Indigenous cultures and the inability of Indigenous peoples to adapt to modern society was at the root of their poverty. Criticizing the failure of traditional social work, Lagassé called for a community development approach to the “rehabilitation” of Indigenous peoples to bring about self-directed social and economic progress. Taken with these ideas, those behind the Alberta study hoped that their work would inspire action on Métis poverty in their province.8

Sociologist Chris Andersen argues that the Métis are a political community, one socially produced and with roots in historical relations with other peoples. However, colonial legal and

administrative categories defined Métis in terms of mixedness. They were considered neither white nor First Peoples.⁹ As historians have shown, the state excluded Métis from the numbered treaties and extinguished their land rights at the end of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, Métis were ostensibly citizens among others, their social well-being a matter within provincial jurisdiction. Of diverse origins and differentiated among themselves by class and circumstances, Métis mobilized in interwar Alberta to secure some access to land. However, powerfully constrained by racialization, many – especially northern – Métis remained a marginalized and impoverished other. Within a global politics of poverty, social scientists and provincial officials rediscovered Métis people and their material deprivation in the late 1950s and 1960s.¹⁰

The Card Study, as it would be known, was published in October 1963 and touched on Indigenous poverty, residential and economic segregation, and anti-Indigenous racism in Alberta. It concluded that the moderately high incidence of tuberculosis in Lesser Slave Lake “reflects more the social, economic, and cultural factors of the entire situation than ethnicity in and of itself, particularly as these factors converge in stress situations. If these factors can be altered in such a way as to minimize stress, the probability is that the tuberculosis rate may in time be reduced, barring, of course, the possible migration of infected people” from other places. Therefore, it was argued that addressing the disease largely depended on “the alteration of statuses” of Métis, particularly when it came to health, education, and culture. Tuberculosis

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⁹ Chris Andersen, “Metis”: Race, Recognition, and the Struggle for Indigenous Peoplehood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), 4-12, 130.
control should focus on extending “civilization” northward – an implicit reference to government services and a waged capitalist economy – and ensuring Métis participation in it.11

One of the report’s recommendations was the creation of a provincial community development program, something done in 1964. Fred Colborne, the minister responsible, argued that the aim was “to hasten the pace of changes in underdeveloped and underprivileged areas through the co-operation and involvement of the local people in their own problems with a view to achieving social and economic security.”12 Community Development Officers were placed among Métis in several northern communities.13 From summer 1965, Indian Affairs Branch also financed community development on reserves in Alberta.14

Government wished to act on Indigenous poverty in Lesser Slave Lake. That poverty was tied to the region’s history and social geography. The earliest inhabitants along the lake were the Beaver, whose lands were eventually encroached on by woodland Cree. First Peoples were joined by fur traders in the 1780s, missionaries by the mid-nineteenth century, and Métis after the 1870 and 1885 resistances on the prairies. During the Klondike gold rush in 1897-1899, the lake was along one of the routes north and some prospectors stayed as settlers. Colonization was formalized with Métis scrip issue and the signing of Treaty 8 in 1899 and 1900, separate treatment that formalized an existing distinction between Métis and Cree. The extension of the Northern Alberta Railway between 1912 and 1917 prompted settlement in earnest. New access

11 Card et al., 294, 398.
12 F.C. Colborne, Address on Government’s Proposed Community Development Programme, March 1964, 2, University of Manitoba Libraries, Department of Archives and Special Collection, Walter Rudnicki fonds, MSS 331, A. 10-38, Box 98, Folder 9. (emphasis in original); Card et al., 404.
to southern markets stimulated commercial fishing, forestry, and mink farming around the lake, whereas agriculture settlement took place in the Peace River country to the west. Land, class, and social status came to distinguish Euro-Canadian residents (who included anglophones, a range of European immigrants, and Franco-Albertans) from status Indian and Métis counterparts during the interwar years. By 1950, towns, unincorporated hamlets, First Nations reserves, Métis colonies, dispersed marginal farms, and houses built by the highway all dotted the lake area.\(^{15}\)

The population of the area was 14,888 in 1966. Most work was seasonal and the average annual income was about 70% of the Alberta and Canadian averages. Close to half of all residents were Indigenous, for whom poor housing, disease, juvenile delinquency, high incidence of incarceration, low levels of education, alcohol abuse, and discrimination marked life. The life expectancy of Indigenous men and women in northern Alberta stood at 34 and 36 respectively.\(^ {16}\)

Consider the dynamics in and around Faust ("Fost" in local parlance), a provincially-administered hamlet along the southern shore. In 1963, the settlement’s population was 872, 58% Métis and 42% non-Indigenous. A handful of white small-business people dominated the local economy and civic life. They had allies in the few white mink ranchers on nearby farms. Faust businesses stood south of provincial Highway 2 – alongside church and community buildings, a school, and well-painted houses owned by white elites and a small number of clergy, teachers, and other government employees. On the north side, railway infrastructure, three

\(^{15}\) Donald G. Wetherell and Irene Kmet, \textit{Alberta's North: A History, 1890 to 1950} (Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute Press, 2000), 3-5, 44-46, 49-71, 170-175, 185, 246, 321-327, 344, 388; Gordon Clark Merrill, "The Human Geography of the Lesser Slave Lake Area of Central Alberta" (M.A. Thesis in Geography, McGill University, 1951), 63-86.

fishing wharves and plants, a small mill, and a box factory were joined by the scattered shacks and unpainted frame houses of Métis and poor whites. Many of the Métis residents were involved in commercial fishing on the lake. Their semi-urban settlement in Faust differed from other Métis who squatted along road allowances or lived on one of three area Métis colonies. The colonies, created in the late 1930s after concerted pressure from Métis activists, were analogous to First Nations reserves and administered by the province. Indeed, First Peoples were themselves distinguished by their legal status and land bases. Five Cree nations were located in the hinterland north of the lake, but four others had reserves interspersed with towns and hamlets along Highway 2. For example, the Driftpile Cree Nation abutted Faust.  

Like the wider area, Faust entered a crisis after 1965 as the main economic activities collapsed. The depleted lake was closed to commercial fishing and there was little option for many Métis other than reliance on social assistance. Mink pelt prices collapsed and pushed ranchers towards bankruptcy. The local mill ceased production. A surge in oil and gas exploration, encouraging a temporary influx of skilled workers to the town of Slave Lake, gave way to extraction from established wells. Around the lake, declining employment meant falling business for local retail and service firms. Outmigration was an economic strategy adopted by many, especially white, residents. In Faust, twenty-six of about 150 families left between 1966 and 1968 alone. The hamlet’s population declined to a low of about 300 by 1976.  

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The University of Alberta Committee for Social Research, which had carried out the Card Study, sought to move from research to action. In summer 1964, it sent two white physical education graduates to lead a recreation program in Faust. If the Faust Community League (whose creation the study had stimulated) expected the graduates to offer programs, Marna Moen and Denny O’Donnell proceeded somewhat in community development fashion and encouraged citizens to organize their own activities for local children. Swimming lessons were the chief activity pursued. As well, Moen and O’Donnell assisted in better organizing the Indian and Métis Progress League, first established in the 1950s, and in writing a brief to the province on Métis housing conditions. Reflecting on the hamlet – and on high unemployment and the poor conditions she witnessed – Moen wrote in her final report: “Discrimination between the people of Indian ancestry and the whites is more severe than you would expect.”\(^ {19}\) The Committee for Social Research hired two more university student duos to assist civic activity in 1965 and 1966. Encouraged by the summer projects and seeking community betterment, the Faust Community League responded to CYC’s creation by applying for volunteers who might work with local youth.\(^ {20}\) In August 1966, CYC volunteers Al Burger and Jeremy Ashton arrived.

**Faustian Drama**

In Faust, the earliest CYC volunteers subscribed to a distinctive, if fuzzy, community development ethos. It combined interest in community organizing, an unexamined belief in charismatic leadership, an anti-establishment inclination, and a diffuse aim of social change. Moreover, the ethos suggested – in contradictory fashion – that outside intervention would be a


catalyst for organic and self-directed community transformation. In any event, volunteers helped provoke a contentious debate over racial segregation and the quality of local democracy in Faust.

At CYC’s inaugural training session, mostly middle class volunteers were exposed to three trajectories of community development. First, the training program was contracted to the Coady Institute and the St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department, eastern Nova Scotia institutional bases for professor-priests with the Antigonish Movement. The movement, part of an interwar transnational pursuit of rural reconstruction, sought to address poverty by mobilizing fishermen and farmers to form co-operatives and to restore a measure of economic independence within capitalism. Second, some classes were led by community development expert Desmond Connor, who had also run training sessions for CUSO and the Peace Corps. Community development, with antecedents in interwar British mass education policy in colonial Africa, was formalized in the context of decolonization and the Cold War. It was a form of intervention that sought to mobilize people to address their “felt needs” and begin socio-economic transformation. Third, New Leftists who had lived experience with racial marginalization also contributed organizing ideas. Wilfred Pelletier, an Odawa CYC consultant, and Rocky Jones, a Black Canadian activist, spoke. Jones was among the Student Union for Peace Action members who, like some American New Left counterparts, undertook community organizing projects in the mid-1960s in the belief that the poor and marginalized had the right to participate in the decisions affecting their lives and might be agents of radical social change.

What did volunteers retain from this constellation of approaches? Al Burger, a 26-year-old Dutch immigrant working in Coquitlam as a draughtsman, and Jeremy Ashton, a 21-year-old English immigrant and one-time university student turned Vancouver labourer, absorbed certain principles. Ashton recalled learning that volunteers should enter a community as a free agent and not be beholden to any force within it. That volunteers were a sort of foreign element would in itself cause change and force the community to look at itself. Introspection would encourage the emergence of a new leadership from the more oppressed part of the community. Implicitly, the new leadership would drive forward organization and further change, resulting in a more egalitarian community and greater power on the part of poor and oppressed residents to effect the decisions shaping their lives. In these terms, and somewhat contradictorily, outside intervention was a catalyst for almost spontaneous self-directed social transformation. The initial CYC community development ethos, then, mixed together commitment to community organizing, an individualistic and liberal assumption regarding the necessity of charismatic leadership, anti-establishment sentiment, and support for social change.

Certainly, a New Left political sensibility ran through both Burger and Ashton’s outlook. Reflectively, Ashton drew on existential sentiment to explain that: “Most of us volunteered, I suppose, because we were searching for some kind of orientation, something which could give purpose to our lives.” Burger concurred: “Sooner or later, there is dissatisfaction and a person gets the urge to change things or make it a better world. This is a chance to do just that.”

Seeking meaningful action, some volunteers also sought cultural experiences uncommon to their

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26 Interview with Jeremy Ashton, 13 July 2015.
daily lives. Reaching across difference towards a sense of common belonging with others, CYC volunteers might participate in what Leela Gandhi has called the “politics of friendship,” a possible element of “minor” forms of anti-imperialism. When training ended, Burger expressed an interest in working in Indigenous communities and Ashton said that he preferred to work with those whose way of life was different from his own. They were both assigned to Faust.

Establishing themselves in a rented cabin, Burger and Ashton familiarized themselves with Faust. Ashton recalled that he tended to visit people at their homes, assist with chores, and hang out with youth. Both volunteers spent time socializing at the beer parlour. Increasingly, the volunteers developed ties with some of the older members of the Métis Progress League and hoped, as Burger put it, to help Métis who “want some of the power over their own lives.”

Having expected youth recreation activities, some Faustian elites were affronted by the informal things the volunteers got up to, likely scandalized at the appearance of too much partying and not enough ‘industrious’ behaviour. There was an unmistakable tension between the Community League’s community betterment goals and the potential for social change the volunteers saw in the hamlet’s social divisions. In January 1967, CYC received a letter accusing Burger and Ashton of spreading communism and being a bad influence on Faust youth. CYC staff agreed to a subsequent public meeting attended by about fifty people, including fifteen Métis, the local principal and teachers, several mink farmers, store owners, a Catholic priest, a handful of teenagers, and a few observers. Though the meeting was chaired by Wilf Ruecker (an accountant and president of the Community League), CYC consultant Ben Baich took a lead role

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29 Ashton admitted that he perhaps drank too much, too often. Interview with Jeremy Ashton, 13 July 2015.
31 Interview with Jeremy Ashton, 13 July 2015.
in describing the company and the local economic situation. To the objections of hamlet elites, Baich argued that, to outsiders, Faust just looked like “a ghost town with people in it.”\textsuperscript{32}

Once the floor was opened to comment, white critics voiced their objections to the volunteers. Some were dismayed by an incident at the local school. Asked about future career ambitions, one student said that he was going to join the CYC because he could sleep until noon and receive government pay without having to work. The volunteers were also criticized for poor manners and for frequenting the beer parlour. In addition to his New Democratic Party (NDP) membership, Burger’s beard and longer hair drew pointed comment, with one woman suggesting that he needed a bath. Henry Witt, a vociferous mink rancher, was well informed on CYC’s depiction in the media as a bastion of bearded radicals and cited CYC volunteer David DePoe’s involvement in an anti-Vietnam War protest in Toronto. Other residents invoked an international dimension by speculating that Burger was a draft dodger.\textsuperscript{33} In his CYC reporting, Baich dismissed most of the complaints as “of a quite superficial nature” and connected to expectations that the company would send conservative-looking youth to the community.\textsuperscript{34}

Overall, critics felt that the volunteers had not sufficiently involved themselves in community affairs and were not modelling desirable leadership. The belief cut two ways. In one respect, Faust elites contested the CYC assumption that outsiders had any right to pass judgement on, and stimulate change in, a community about which volunteers knew little. In a sense, this was a defense of local autonomy and pride. It showed CYC inattention to how difference – in the appearance and actions of volunteers – might undermine how seriously their efforts were taken. However, that volunteers insisted on a community development ideal of


\textsuperscript{34} Baich, with Assheton-Smith, “Resume - Faust Project,”, 2.
being unbeholden to habitual community elites raised another issue. The litany of complaints against Burger and Ashton in fact touched on a deep anxiety over the prospect – indeed, the threat – of change to the racial status quo in Faust. Therefore, when it came to race, the apparently disruptive presence of CYC volunteers had radical potential, as intended. Pointedly, Witt believed that the volunteers were spreading communism among Indigenous people. With an uncanny pop-culture-like grasp of Marxism, Witt attacked the volunteers: “They’re like body lice. They talk about social change. Social change to them means socialism and socialism is the first major step towards communism.”

By contrast, Alice Cunningham and Pat Lalonde, members of the Métis Progress League, stressed that they had developed a good relationship with the volunteers, who helped secure needed information from government departments.

For his part, Baich was actually encouraged. He argued that: “This is practically the first time the people of Faust had ever gotten together in such large numbers and it was felt that if this energy could be redirected they would likely be able to do for themselves all the things they expected the volunteers to do.” The immediate outcome of the meeting was the formation of a local advisory committee and a two-month reprieve for the volunteers.

Seeking to mitigate the local schism and to point a way forward, Burger published a public response in the Edmonton Journal. He argued that criticism of Ashton and himself had been limited to about ten people, people who did not know them well yet appeared impatient for tangible results. Burger also clarified his vision of community development: “we as volunteers help bring about better organization and co-operation in the community, so that it can better help itself. We are concerned with helping to bring about more participation in community affairs, so

that everyone has a chance to have his voice heard by the whole community.” Burger, invoking nascent middle-class nationalism, called on more people to get involved: “With the participation of all people, we can build the democracy foundations that the Fathers of Confederation have given us; and we can make Canada indeed a good place to live for everybody.”

Inclusiveness, and unspoken ideas about consensus and collectively resolving issues without conflict, seemed foremost in Burger’s interpretation. Community held out a possibility of fuller democracy.

Nevertheless, division remained – though its presentation as a white/Métis dichotomy obscured the degree of class and racial complexity in the wider Lesser Slave Lake area. In April, Baich met with the advisory committee. He argued that a racial split was in evidence, noting the “extreme paternalizing approach” of elites and “the resentment and independence of the Métis present.” While Baich thought the exchange of view was important, he regretted that the only question raised was the continued tenure of CYC volunteers. Not wanting to favour either side, Baich struck a compromise. Burger would be withdrawn and only return to Faust should a petition be received from the whole town or from Métis. The decision drew criticism from two observers associated with CYC, as they felt bowing to the pressure exerted by local white elites was a dangerous precedent to set in the context of debate over racial discrimination.

Ashton reluctantly stayed on, working with a youth organization, attending various meetings, and relaying concerns to welfare officials. In Ashton’s estimation, employment was at an all-time low and he noted that a “few more white families will be moving soon.” However, this was for Ashton a political opportunity: “So now the town is controlled by the school,

39 Minutes, Second Prairie Regional Meeting, 7; Baich, with Assheton-Smith, “Resume - Faust Project,” 2.
welfare, a few mink farmers, the stores, and the hotel. A handful of whites; few of them with a
big permanent stake. It’s time for the Métis to walk in and grab [power].”

Two largely settled positions emerged over the sense that a redistribution of power was
possible. First, even as Ashton clearly held out Métis as the agents of change, local whites
sought to discredit opposition by resorting to the trope of outside agitators. In July 1967, Fred
Merchant, a store owner, argued that CYC had been “an abrasive, disruptive force. Rather than
binding the Métis and whites together to work toward a common goal, they have been preaching
that the whites are bogeymen and shouldn’t be trusted. They have created a racial dispute.”
Second, Métis refuted such a characterization. Willie Courtorielle, a 53-year-old Cree man who
had lost his Indian status in 1956 and was president of the Progress League, underlined that:
“White discrimination has existed here since the community was born. The white people do not
want to help the Métis people. They don’t want the system to change.” He noted that the
involvement of CYC volunteers with local Indigenous people was “the first time a white person
has ever had anything to do with us…” Alice Cunningham emphasized that the volunteers had
“given us hope of escaping from the terrible conditions in which we now exist.”

For several authors, the backlash toward Ashton and Burger's presence in Faust is just
another sign of CYC incompetence, another so-called controversy to dramatize and write off. Such characterizations could not be more misleading. CYC intervention followed the diffuse
community development ethos shaped at the organization’s outset. In an unresolved tension,
volunteers were outsiders whose very presence in Canadian communities was supposed to spur

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40 Ashton, “Report on Faust,” 4; Minutes, Second Prairie Regional Meeting, 7.
41 Local teenagers, the envisioned targets of recreation activities, thought that the volunteers were “weird,” or had
“some swinging parties,” or “seemed to be drifting along just as we are.” Ron Hayter, “Two CYC Volunteers Divide
Alberta Town,” Globe and Mail, 13 July, 1967, 21; Minutes, Second Prairie Regional Meeting, 7; Iveson, 2, 5.
42 Daly 63-68; Hamilton, 70-72; James Lotz, “Does Community Development Exist?” in Citizen Participation:
almost spontaneous local introspection and self-directed social change, however unspecified. CYC practice revealed the inadequacy of the community betterment designs that had prompted company involvement in Faust. Witt’s furor, the conservatism and discomfort of other whites, and the defense of volunteers by Métis all crystallized as a far-reaching and deeply felt conflict over racial segregation and the quality of local democracy. If much of the conflict was displaced onto the volunteers and the issues not entirely articulated, community development brought the prospect of social change viscerally into the open. Yet CYC nonetheless relented in face of opposition, sought to appease local white elites with Burger’s withdrawal, and shifted away from the diffuse, anti-establishment sentiment behind the initial community development intervention. In the process, CYC demurred on a frank reckoning with racism and poverty in Faust.

The Lesser Slave Lake Project

Removed to Edmonton, Burger drew up a plan recommending the placement of volunteers in each of the small communities around the lake. In doing so, he expressed a continued commitment to assisting people of distinct, circumscribed communities articulate and meet their needs. But while the basic method of intervention remained the same, CYC community development philosophy shifted in Lesser Slave Lake and became more clearly entangled with the aim of integration.

Ben Baich, brought on as field staff person in September 1967, was largely responsible for the new focus. A former miner, he had been a community development worker in northern Manitoba. And he joined CYC from a job with Alberta’s community development program. His understanding of community development was grounded in these past experiences.

In late 1950s Manitoba, social scientist Jean Lagassé adapted community development to the ‘Indian and Métis problem.’ He believed that cultural difference was at the root of Indigenous poverty. Rejecting the paternalism and perceived ineffectiveness of casework, Lagassé privileged work with entire social groups “whose way of life is too different from that of the majority to be integrated as long as they clung to their way of life.” Holistic change would be achieved by encouraging people to organize and to solve their own problems, albeit with some outside financial and technical assistance. For Lagassé, community development was a means of integration – that is, of involving First Peoples and Métis in mainstream social values and economic processes by improving their material circumstances and changing their “mental outlook.” In these terms, integration was a process of acculturation to dominant society, though Lagassé felt that a sense of ethnic group identity and some attendant cultural practices could be retained so long as they helped individuals adjust to mainstream society. From 1960, Lagassé would lead Manitoba’s community development program, the first in Canada.45

Ben Baich, who in 1963 worked for Indian Affairs Branch in Manitoba and was versed in Lagassé’s project, helped the practice move to Alberta through informal discussions with government officials. One of Lagassé’s fieldworkers was hired to lead Alberta’s community development program.46 By the time Baich became CYC staff person in Lesser Slave Lake, community development geared toward integration was for him a well-established paradigm.

There is a scattered historical debate over whether ‘integration,’ as it would emerge in the 1950s and 1960s, was any different from earlier colonial policies of ‘assimilation.’47 The

46 Richards, 110-114.
distinction is subtle, but notable. ‘Assimilation’ was a colonial strategy enacted through state police power, Christian education, and capitalist social relations and was aimed at replacing Indigenous culture with Euro-Canadian cultural values which were deemed superior by Euro-Canadians believing themselves to be superior as a race; ‘integration’ privileged state-promoted yet increasingly self-directed acculturation to dominant society and was premised on a degree of cultural tolerance, a respect for civil and human rights, an idea of common Canadian citizenship, and thinking about Indigenous peoples as an ethnic rather than a racial group.

At a CYC public workshop in 1968, Baich exhibited integrationist sensibilities when he explained that volunteers strove to overcome apathy, not “shake the status quo.” A project document specified that the immediate objective was to involve “people steeped in economic and social depression” in doing something about their situation. In the long term, it was hoped that “the community will become involved in totally running itself and expressing it’s [sic] needs as a group to government.” A consensual kind of participatory democracy was sketched, in which an active citizenry made politicians and bureaucrats more responsive to local needs. It was assumed that communities could articulate shared interests.

Baich’s sense of community development nevertheless held a sharper political edge. In 1967 debates between CYC and Manitoba officials regarding Norway House, Baich insisted that CYC could be an agent in the redistribution of power between Indigenous and white peoples in

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communities where de facto racial segregation predominated. A contradiction between a goal of social change and a belief in consensus was well alive in Baich’s thought.

Before returning to a concrete exploration of how renewed contest over community development belied that contradiction, the next few paragraphs consider the organizational context of the Lesser Slave Lake project. In December 1967, new volunteers arrived from elsewhere and were each dispatched to a community. Matthew Hughes in Gift Lake, Linda Folster (a Winnipeg resident and member of the Sioux Valley First Nation) in Joussard, and Vicki Walters (of Victoria) in Kinuso only briefly lasted in their assignments. Gary Harland (a Detroit native) in Canyon Creek, Peter Lloyd (from Dundas, Ontario) in East Prairie, and Drew MacDonald (of Halifax) in Grouard stuck around longer. All six of these volunteers were urban youth between the ages of nineteen and twenty-one and, Folster excepted, white. Notably, Willie Courtorielle was also hired as a volunteer, first in Faust and then in Atikameg. Though volunteers were spread out and left to do their day-to-day work, they met recurrently with each other and Baich (who commuted in periodically from his home near Edmonton).

Volunteers faced trying working conditions for several reasons. Governance ambiguities, administrative problems, intra-company conflicts, and communication breakdowns within CYC worried volunteers to varying extents. The reality was that community development was challenging regardless. Organizing was slow and difficult interpersonal work, with no guarantee of results. It was trying – not least for young people sent to places they had never been before and charged with mobilizing strangers. Even for volunteers recruited locally, matters were

50 Marilyn Assheton-Smith, “Visit to Norway House by the Prairie Regional Staff,” March 1-8, 1967, 11, 17-18, LAC, RG116, Volume 184, N.
difficult because they sometimes faced local resentment over their new jobs. Certainly, volunteer attrition was an CYC-wide issue.\textsuperscript{52}

Working in Lesser Slave Lake offered specific difficulties. Though English predominated, lack of Cree language skills on the part of volunteers could be an issue in some locations.\textsuperscript{53} Plus, with housing scarce, volunteers largely billeted with local families rather than have space of their own. Volunteers, isolated from one another, had to adjust to small rural communities where poverty predominated and racial segregation characterized daily experience. For instance, Drew MacDonald lived with a Métis family in Grouard and, reflecting on local conditions and poverty, concluded one of his reports by noting: “I must also say that I was naive about this even when I had decided what project I wanted. Some of the situations I have seen and encountered I don’t think could be put into writing.”\textsuperscript{54} Considering the context, a CYC staff person felt that: “Volunteers may be able to come in and make six months’ contributions only and they not should feel guilty about not lasting long.”\textsuperscript{55} To 1969, eight of the first sixteen volunteers in Lesser Slave Lake did not last beyond a few months.

In its new orientation towards resolving social and economic problems, CYC community development continued to stimulate political debate. The experience on East Prairie Métis Colony serves not just to illustrate the kind of difficulties volunteers faced, but also as a reminder of the reactionary political weight behind Indigenous poverty. In East Prairie, Peter Lloyd, a 19-

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\textsuperscript{52} Hamilton, 59-67; Dickinson and Campbell, 9-10; Daly, 101-109; Ben Baich to Alan Clarke, Glen Brown, and Lynda Clarke, 13 June 1968, LAC, RG116, Volume 133, File 652 - Correspondence - Programme Activities No. 1; Al Burger with Jeremy Ashton, “Some Questions from Faust,” 8 February 1967, 1-5, McMaster Archives, Company of Young Canadians fonds, Box 1, File 1.5 - Incoming Correspondence; Company of Young Canadians, \textit{Annual Report}, 31 March 1968, 6, LAC, RG116, Volume 54, File 168-2, 3 of 4.

\textsuperscript{53} M. Assheton-Smith, “Report: Staff Visit to Lesser Slave Lake,” July 16 to 26, 5, LAC, RG116, Volume 133, File 652 - Lesser Slave Lake Project - Staff Reports 1; Interview with André L’Hirondelle, 3 July 2015.

\textsuperscript{54} Drew MacDonald to Jerry Gambill, “Lesser Slave Lake Project,” 22 March 1968, 2, LAC, RG116, Volume 133, File 652 - Correspondence - Programme Activities No. 1.

year-old who had dropped out of high school because of “the system,” lived with a Cree-speaking family of six in a two-room log home. The colony had 150 residents who often lived miles apart. In addition to adopting a dog, Lloyd rented a horse to get around. There was no electricity, phones, schools, stores, halls, or anything of the sort. Housing conditions were poor, heating came from wood stoves, and the only source of water, carried home by pail, was a stream. Having growing up in a suburb, Lloyd had difficulty adjusting to the lack of amenities and often made trips to Kinuso or High Prairie to rent a hotel room and bathe.56

Poverty was endemic in East Prairie. During the 1960s, such was outmigration that only a high birth rate stopped the population from falling. Residents subsisted through a mix of hunting, trapping, logging, wage work, and welfare, though Lloyd observed that applicants “have a hell of a time in the office of welfare.” Inattention to local needs was heightened by the absence of self-government. The colony was administered by a provincial Métis Rehabilitation Branch official, ostensibly in consultation with a three-person residents’ board. To Lloyd, “This board is mainly a puppet and little or none of the problems are forwarded to the government.”57

In January 1968, weeks into his assignment, Lloyd conveyed his own impressions and some resident concerns at a CYC seminar. He was immediately rebuked by Social Credit MLA Roy Ells. The politician, a hotel proprietor from High Prairie, used a letter to the editor to dispute the idea that government did not provide the colony with sufficient roads or ploughing services, and he refuted any notion that Métis were exploited by area logging operations. Ells’

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anti-hippie punchline invoked Toronto’s counterculture district: “Peter Lloyd is a likeable youth, but you cannot expect a kid just a few weeks out of Yorkville, Ont., to do much for the Indians. I have every confidence that if he sticks around they will be able to do something for him.”

Lloyd responded. Noting that the Yorkville quip was unfounded, he suggested that the MLA was patting government on the back for providing the colony with roads and bridges. Lloyd mused: “I am wondering if it is a privilege to have a means of getting to town to do your shopping.” He concluded: “I hope to learn a lot from the Métis. If you take time to listen you can learn a lot. I hope to get a lot more than votes from the Métis and give a lot more than empty promises. Yes, Mr. Ells, these people are nobody’s fools! Not even yours!”

In East Prairie, Lloyd’s presence began to generate questions about why he was there and about colony conditions. Plus, government ploughs began for the first time to clear side roads. And, after Lloyd wrote to government to complain about the way local men were transported to fight forest fires in the back of pick-up trucks, buses were sent. All the same, Lloyd’s willingness to live in East Prairie ebbed. He chose to transfer in September 1968 to Kinuso, where he admitted that he related far more to town elites than local Indigenous people.

Just days after Ells took his shots at Lloyd, Alberta’s Social Credit premier attacked CYC as a whole. Speaking at a prairie premiers conference, Ernest Manning declared: “I do not like to generalize about the CYC because there are some dedicated members. But others are nothing

but agitators and radicals.” Not coincidentally, Manning’s denunciation of supposed agitators was voiced amid bureaucratic and political efforts to rein in Alberta’s own community development program by “upset people who value peace and decorum over necessary social change.” When it came to CYC, Manning suggested that the company withdraw since the province might better spend the company’s budget on its own Alberta Service Corps. The Corps had been launched in summer 1967 to divert well-meaning youth into a provincial program rather than CYC. Similarly targeted at student idealism and rhetorically geared toward helping “Alberta’s economically or socially deprived people,” the Corps was a summer work program with a strictly service orientation. Indeed, two students were placed in Faust in summer 1967 where they started a play-school for local children at the Anglican church hall.

Conflict over CYC’s continued interventions seemingly ran counter to Baich’s belief that social change and consensus might be concurrently achieved. But even as community development sparked Social Credit rebukes, it did generate local discussion in East Prairie and precipitate improvements of provincial government services in a few small regards. Therefore, by targeting local initiative and government inaction, CYC community development more clearly subscribed to integrationist aims. Emphasis was placed on working with Métis to identify local issues and solutions. Métis were to mobilize themselves, against an unresponsive and reactionary Alberta government, towards action that would encourage their social and

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economic integration. Articulating, and meeting, definable and shared needs was presented as a means of securing an end to poverty within liberal democracy.

**Community and Region**

Provincial and federal government pursuit of regional development in Lesser Slave Lake greatly shaped CYC community development from summer 1967. In this context, CYC activity took a sharp turn. Encouraged by Ben Baich, and actively abetted by Al Burger, CYC focused more directly on local economic issues. Even if volunteers continued to prioritize working with poor Métis, the company did an about-face. CYC became a significant engine for small business and civic mobilization. A community, and later pan-community, coalition of business elites, concerned citizens, and Métis took shape and pursued a self-directed regional development strategy. This was consequential. In working for a better economic future, the unity of community, and of communities, was privileged and the deep social divisions and inequalities in Lesser Slave Lake became a secondary concern of CYC. Appeals to government for assistance turned on an insistence that democratically elected government had a responsibility to all of its constituents, particularly those in a hitherto neglected place like Lesser Slave Lake. Such an outlook on the part of CYC personnel involved an uncritical appraisal of shared interests and unrealistic expectations for development within capitalism.

Faust continued to be a focal point for CYC’s Lesser Slave Lake project. In June 1967, Métis residents successfully petitioned for Al Burger’s return. Within a few months, he was joined by his new wife and fellow CYC volunteer, Alona (née Ericson) Burger. Alona was a trained nurse and had previously been posted at a Manitoba mental hospital. Marriage appeared to give the Burgers a new status in the community. Over the summer, four other volunteers, three of them Indigenous, were briefly added in Faust. Indeed, by the second half of 1967, CYC
staff began to make a concerted effort to hire local Indigenous people as volunteers. For his part, Jeremy Ashton decided to leave the project in September.63

What was remarkable about the continued activity in Faust was the distance from the debates over race and outside agitators that had initially been generated by CYC intervention. Indeed, rather than confront the local establishment, volunteers actively involved themselves in boosting civic affairs. They assisted with youth programs and attended meetings of all kinds. Alona Burger, for instance, was a member of Faust Action Council for Education, an education-oriented women’s group begun by a Catholic nun. The group organized and ran its own preschool program when government support was not forthcoming. The Burgers also began to publish Faust News, whose circulation in Lesser Slave Lake communities reached about 200, to better inform people on local doings.64 Finally, volunteers conducted a door-to-door survey to gauge local concerns. For Al Burger writing in Faust News, that 289 of Faust’s 573 residents were under the age of sixteen presented a central dilemma: “What does Faust have to offer these young people? Are there jobs available to them? Will they have the same opportunities as young people have in the southern part of Alberta?”65 Concern over the futures of their children was one animating sentiment in the mobilization for economic development to come.

That mobilization was connected to provincial and federal policy initiatives. First, the province began to put greater emphasis on regional poverty. Following the discovery of oil at


Leduc in 1947, Social Credit government could sustain high social spending alongside strident anti-socialism in postwar decades marked by significant urban growth. The combination of increased public expenditure and limited redistribution benefitted the middle and upper classes. Ernest Manning came to describe his reactionary philosophy of government as “social conservatism” and rejected new federal government welfare state programs in deference to markets. However, development appealed even to Manning and he issued “A White Paper on Human Resources Development” in 1967. Historian Alvin Finkel has argued that the document sought to demonstrate compassion for the poor without compromising a belief in the rights of individuals.\(^\text{66}\) The paper argued that: “Society exists to enhance the development of free and creative human beings and should aspire toward the provision of full opportunity for every area of human endeavour.” It linked the development of individuals to further private sector growth and natural resource extraction. The province’s role would be to ensure “total resources development” to remedy regional poverty.\(^\text{67}\) Human Resources Development Agency (HRDA) was subsequently created to undertake comprehensive social and economic programming in eleven slow-growth areas of the province, including Lesser Slave Lake.\(^\text{68}\)

Second, the federal government considered applying its own area development tools. In May 1967, officials held a public meeting in Kinuso to discuss making new or expanding industries eligible for capital incentives provided by the Department of Industry’s Area


Development Agency. CYC volunteer Jeremy Ashton attended the meeting, as did greatly interested local business people, including shop owners and mink ranchers from Faust.\textsuperscript{69}

Indeed, beginning in Faust, government interest in region-wide economic stimulus provoked a corresponding transformation in outlook among area elites. In July 1967, the Faust Community League created a development committee “to explore all possibilities for economic development in the Faust area.” Its participants overwhelmingly came from the ranks of white residents, including a store owner, two mechanics, a housewife, and a provincial highways worker. Pat Lalonde, a retiree who had lost his Indian status in exchange for the right to vote, was the lone Indigenous member besides Father Arthur Lamothe, a Métis Roman Catholic parish priest. CYC volunteer Al Burger rounded out the membership. Through the fall, the new committee weighed possible commercial activities, including vegetable growing, reforestation, renewed commercial fishing, husbandry, a charcoal plant, peat moss collection, and so on.\textsuperscript{70}

How had CYC reconciled itself to work with white small town elites who had so demonized CYC and exhibited such anti-Indigenous racism? Baich maneuvered CYC in such a direction because he placed development ahead of any other objective. The first point of his plan of action in Faust was: “Involve everybody, Métis and White people, policy makers in government, M.L.A., government and civic services and others who are interested in the human and economic development of Faust - No stone will be left unturned.” Baich’s contingency plan, though, underlined his continued support for local Métis. He argued that if community mobilization for development failed, it was Métis who would lose out. Therefore, action to secure concessions from government was planned. Since large forestry companies held the

\textsuperscript{69} Ashton, “Report on Faust,” 2.
\textsuperscript{70} Ben Baich, “Faust (or Bust),” 15 September 1967, 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 133, File 652 - Lesser Slave Lake Project - Staff Reports 1; “What’s Happening in Faust?” 1, 4; Earle H. Waugh, \textit{Dissonant Worlds: Roger Vandersteene Among the Cree} (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010), 315.
timber reserves south of Faust without actually using them, an idea was hatched to potentially move Métis families into the woods and begin logging. Baich believed that the action would prompt a chain reaction: the forestry companies would object, the provincial government would be forced to act, and all the while Métis could emphasize that they simply wished to work. Baich reported that Métis leaders roared with laughter and approval upon hearing the idea.\footnote{Ben Baich, “Faust Report,” 9 November 1967, 2-3, LAC, RG116, Volume 133, File 652 - Lesser Slave Lake Project - Staff Reports 1; Iveson, 5.}

The flaw in Baich’s thinking, though, was that Faust elites had a self-interested stake in development and the provincial government proved sensitive to the demands of the small business figures who dominated local electoral politics. Métis interests were not articulated as such. Nor was it clear how existing unequal property relations would be anything but perpetuated. Rather, Métis interests were subsumed to the needs of ‘community’ as a whole. CYC people were left trying to promote diversity from within the mobilization for development.

A basic parallel can be drawn to the power dynamics, analyzed by John Gaventa, during concurrent US War on Poverty community organizing in Appalachia. Outside resources allowed a previously quiescent working class to challenge prevailing conditions in a coal mining area. However, local elites responded sharply out of a fear of losing control and worked to contain dissent. Part of their reassertion of power was to shape debate and to keep certain matters off of the political agenda.\footnote{John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 20-25, 137, 162-163, 214, 236.} In Lesser Slave Lake, local elites asserted development as a leading issue at the expense of racial segregation and class inequalities.

Assisted by CYC, the Faust Development Committee lobbied government for action. In December, it secured an Edmonton meeting with Manning, Cabinet members, Ells, and civil servants. Wilf Ruecker, Father Lamothe, and Burger spoke for the Faust delegation. Citing the
local economic crisis, they requested a feasibility study of their various commercial ideas.

Conservative attitudes about welfare provision and anxiety over the work ethic of Indigenous residents informed the discussion. It was agreed to meet again, to address a few immediate housing and welfare cases, and to ensure local participation in decision-making.\footnote{Meeting of the Human Resources Development Authority Committee with the Faust Economic Development Committee, Edmonton, 4 December 1967, 2; PAA, GR0048.004SF.0002F, GR1977.173; Box 58, File 631 - Human Resources, 1966-1968; “What’s Happening in Faust?” 3.}

The development committee quickly consolidated its ideas on paper and presented the “Faust Area Development Program” to HRDA officials. The plan called for clearing bush land and beginning reforestation to create future timber. It was also hoped that seeding grass and clover would provide feed for animal husbandry. Workers, drawn from the unemployed, would participate in on-the-job vocational training. Ruecker explained that: “We are trying to give the community an economic backbone, a reason of existing. We visualize a program to train Métis to operate any equipment and then use these skills to clear a large area of land for farming and ranching that would also involve Métis.” At least at the outset, Métis residents were the targets, rather than lead protagonists, of development. Following a feasibility study, Neil Gilliat, forest superintendent and soon HRDA coordinator, reported back that the scheme had secured provincial approval.\footnote{“What’s Happening in Faust?” 6, 8-9; “A Report on the Forest Development Potential in the Lesser Slave Lake Area,” PAA, GR0072, Accession 1976.0502, Box 13, L - Lesser Slave Lake Area Dev’t. Comm., 1968.}

With CYC help, pressure exerted by small business interests, a Catholic clergyman, and a few Métis had delivered an improvement project in the Faust hinterland. Baich took credit for the way Faust people focused on their problems, negotiated with government, and secured action, viewing all of this as “the direct result of CYC’s new approach in the area.”\footnote{Lesser Slave Lake Project, “Report to the Interim Committee,” 1.}

If the plan would employ Métis, it would be administered by white business owners and allies, who stood to benefit from it. Just three Métis joined a fourteen-person committee to push
forward the project. With the subsequent creation of the Central Alberta Land-Use Cooperative, Faustians ostensibly had a mechanism to administer the reforestation program with a certain autonomy.76 Here, though, the representational reality muddied the cooperative ideal. Notably, cooperatives were a type of organization recurrently fostered in northern areas in the 1950s and 1960s. They were formed in small settlements in the Arctic, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta with government sanction and assistance. By ensuring community ownership and providing a mechanism for democratic-decision making, cooperatives offered residents some measure of local economic control within capitalism. But they were institutions for capital accumulation as well as redistribution and, as the Faust situation suggested, possible venues for the reproduction of local hierarchies.77

For most, it was government delay in delivering funding, not questions of representation, that irked during the first half of 1968. Perception of provincial and federal inaction culminated in a July meeting held in Kinuso. Taking a page from the regional outlook of senior levels of government, the event went beyond Faust and drew over 100 people from fourteen communities around the lake. At the meeting, Father Lamothe argued that the “total community” was needed to fight for development. In that spirit, the Lesser Slave Lake Development Association (LSLDA) was created and two delegates from each community were elected.78 A ‘community of communities’ now sought development.

Lamothe emerged as the leader of LSLDA. Against a Catholic Church status quo, he was one of two diverging reformers in the Grouard diocese. Roger Vandersteene, a Flemish-born missionary, rejected derogatory clergy views of Cree morality, took a romantic view of Cree traditional life, and stressed the moral implications of Catholicism. He hoped to renew the Church in Lesser Slave Lake by adapting a suffering saviour ideology to Cree language and spirituality. Lamothe, who was Métis and became a priest in the early 1960s, replied that Indigenous peoples had suffered enough. He instead drew on liberation theology – an attempt, emerging in the Church from conflict in Latin America, to renew Christian faith by empowering the poor to confront their social and economic oppression. Lamothe affirmed development as a means of assisting Cree and Métis whom he believed were trying to participate in mainstream Canadian society. Though he would later give up on the prospect of institutional reform and leave the church, Lamothe’s LSLDA action exemplified his commitment to development.79

By June 1968, Ben Baich departed CYC for a job as a community development worker with Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.80 Between September 1968 and January 1969, Marilyn Assheton-Smith, a 31-year-old who also oversaw CYC’s program in the Northwest Territories, took over as staff person. She observed that volunteers around the lake were being drawn toward LSLDA and were willing to work with all people interested in development. She noted, however, that “predictably, in some communities, the whites have taken over the delegation. The volunteers are quite aware of this and trying to determine ways to deal with it.” Faust was one of these communities. In Canyon Creek and Joussard, residents

Lake, Wabasca, Whitefish Lake Area” [c. August 1968], 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 133, File 652 - Correspondence - Programme Activities No. 1.
80 Ben Baich to Stewart Goodings, Lynda Clarke, and Glen Brown, 23 June 1968, LAC, RG116, Volume 133, File 652 - Correspondence - Programme Activities No. 1.
made something of a compromise by appointing separate Métis delegates to LSLDA. Yet Assheton-Smith pointed out that distinctions of social status among Métis were complicating CYC efforts to involve Indigenous peoples. She felt that mobilization was “now concentrated in white parts of the communities and in the upper echelons of the Métis.” Equally, status Indians and band councils were refusing to become involved in matters in provincial jurisdiction or related to off-reserve questions. “The plan at present,” Assheton-Smith explained, “is to recognize those communities within communities and to try to be sure that they are represented, rather than designating the whites as enemies and trying to throw them out.”

In October 1969, HRDA and the newly created federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) finally funded the Faust forestry plan. Al Burger, who served as the land-use cooperative’s secretary-treasurer at its 1969-1971 height, argued that it was hoped “that the Faust program would be used as a proving ground for this type of development approach, and if proven successful that it would be applied in the entire lake area.”

A high of 100 people were employed by the cooperative; however unresolved issues over Métis representation and who the cooperative served quickly became sources of conflict. *Métis News* reported that Métis workers had, ever since the cooperative’s opening, “thought it belonged to the White-men and they were working for them only.” The paper asserted that the cooperative’s first meeting was held without notice, ensuring the absence of Métis representation on its board. In spring 1970, when the cooperative’s manager began to fire people and other workers were not paid, an open meeting was held to demand answers. The manager claimed that

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the cooperative had run out of funds. In November, a sixty-person delegation travelled to
Edmonton and requested additional government support to keep people off social assistance. It
was noted that about thirty families relied on the cooperative for employment. Government
officials promised only a study of future possibilities. By fall 1974, the co-operative was
inactive and subject to a provincial government takeover.83

Concurrently, in May 1970, a provincial-federal regional development program was
launched when Lesser Slave Lake was designated a “Special Area” by DREE. The Lesser Slave
Lake Special Area covered an enormous area. Within its bounds, industries setting up or
expanding operations were eligible for capital incentives under the Regional Development
Incentives Act. As well, the two levels of government would split the cost of new infrastructure
(in practice, this amounted to a federal subsidy of a mishmash of normal provincial government
functions). The program was organized per DREE’s preference for growth poles and activity at
industrial parks. High Prairie and Slave Lake (towns of 2,500 and 2,100 people, respectively)
were selected as growth centres. And, with a few exceptions, the financial incentives paid went
to seven forest product firms opening plants at the Mitsue Lake Industrial Park near Slave
Lake.84 Therefore, communities among communities were privileged in the Special Area.

In 1974, geographer Ian Mellor argued that government practice ignored intra-regional
inequality and conflated region with people. By focusing spending on two larger towns, the

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83 “Faust Co-op Activities,” Métis News, No. 11, 13 March 1970, 1, Glenbow Museum and Archives (hereafter
Glenbow Archives), Métis Association of Alberta fonds, M-4755, Box 146, File 1515; “Former CYC Volunteer
38, 20 November 1970, 3, Glenbow Archives, M-4755, Box 146, File 1516; “Alberta Ombudsman Studying
84 Webster, 57, 60; Canada, Department of Regional Economic Expansion, Canada/Alberta: Second Special Area
Agreement (Ottawa: Department of Regional Economic Expansion, 1971), C2; Alberta, Office of Program
Coordination, Slave Lake Office, Annual Report, Lesser Slave Lake Special Area, 1971-1972 (Slave Lake, AB:
Alberta, Office of Program Coordination, 1972); Canada, Department of Regional Economic Expansion,
Canada/Alberta: Agreement on Special Area of Lesser Slave Lake 1970/72 (Ottawa: Department of Regional
Special Area program neglected residents living in poor settlements along the lake’s southern shore. Businesses receiving capital incentives created 291 wood processing and 79 logging jobs, almost all of them seasonal. Indigenous workers held a hair under a quarter of the positions, but tended to occupy lower paying ones. Moreover, 46% of all jobs went to workers who had lived in the area for four years or less. Mellor concluded that the program did little for unemployed, unskilled Indigenous workers living in the Lesser Slave Lake hinterland. 85 In a separate analysis, planning student Douglas Webster largely concurred. The jobs created either paid poorly or, as in the case of HRDA administrators, required skills local people did not possess. He contended that regional development guaranteed continued inequality within Lesser Slave Lake. 86

The Progressive Conservative government elected in 1971 cut HRDA’s budget in half. Moreover, residents widely came to feel that they had been excluded from decision-making as a matter of course. One CYC evaluator observed that HRDA created its own channels of consultation, thereby undermining existing community organizations like the Faust Development Committee and LSLDA. 87 Formally segregated ‘Indian,’ ‘Métis,’ and ‘General Population’ regional councils were established to assuage residents through nominal consultation with government officials. Participation was circumscribed and reduced to a tool to secure consent.

For Faustians, who had envisioned regional development in which local people would exert control and reap the benefits, being passed over by technocratic designs was especially galling. Al Burger did not mince words as it became clear that civil servants were in charge and

that there would be no local control over the regional development residents had pushed for. Flatly, Burger’s judgement was: “The people got screwed.”88

On the face of it, Burger was right. A coalition of Lesser Slave Lake residents in search of a better economic future sought not just development, but also control over that development. Negotiations with government were pursued in the belief that liberal democratic government would respond to the needs and desires of an active citizenry. Government, in turn, viewed development as desirable, but in a form that escaped both local decision-making and benefit. Even then, expectations for capitalist development in Lesser Slave Lake proved unrealistic.

In calling forth ‘the people,’ Burger touched on the unresolved contradiction of CYC involvement with pro-development mobilization in Lesser Slave Lake. In working with individual ‘community’ and then with an area-wide ‘community of communities,’ CYC volunteers and staff put the idea of consensual, shared interests among all local people first. They viewed economic development as something that would involve and benefit all. They insisted on cross-racial cooperation and, in this way, avoided confronting class position or racism directly. At the same time, the racial and small business class character of Faust and LSLDA lobbying were acknowledged. CYC personnel hoped to work from within on the question of race, to advocate for greater representation of ‘communities within communities.’ These attempts had limited visibility or effect. More troubling, mobilizing around development was ephemeral in Lesser Slave Lake and, therefore, so too was CYC’s contribution.

Community Development in a Special Area

Once federal-provincial regional development began, CYC sought to assist neglected people – especially Métis – pursue social and economic development projects of their own making. Volunteers were placed with community organizations pursuing a range of activities.

While government and multinational corporations pursued large-scale resource development in northern Alberta, CYC, itself a federal agency, provided resources to groups that might otherwise have had few. In doing so, it encouraged inward-looking, community solutions to poverty. Though amounting to a critique of government policy, CYC practice continued to promote community as a site to meet needs and to make collective needs known to government. Interventions were not necessarily of great consequence. But, politically, CYC was a component of a multifaceted, cautious reformism in Lesser Slave Lake that nonetheless sought the integration of the poor into capitalist society and liberal democracy.

An interregnum took place first. In July 1969, new field staff Vic Cathers, a 37-year-old leftist and journalist from Toronto, reshaped the program to his own liking. He focused activities on a “CYC Centre” he established in a rented hotel in High Prairie. Seven inherited volunteers departed, replaced by four new arrivals as well as Peter Freeman, a member of the Driftpile Cree Nation. They ran a children’s art program, put on a travelling film night, compiled a community services directory, and met with local organizations. Yet Ottawa staff critically likened the CYC Centre approach to opening a small YMCA. Volunteer Dave Lough, who grew up in Northern Ontario and was committed to social justice though not self-identifying as a radical, concurred that the project had become too focused on service provision rather empowering local people to achieve change. In summer 1970, Lough and peer Peggy Birse fell out with Cathers and staff in

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Ottawa intervened to recommend new leadership. The CYC Centre was closed in early 1971. The outcome emphasized a shared sense within CYC that ‘social change,’ however undefined, lay somewhere out there in action undertaken by local people.

In April 1971, Al Bromling was appointed to lead the project. Raised on an Alberta farm, and 27 years old, Bromling volunteered as a CUSO English and biology teacher in India between 1966 and 1968. On his return, he was part of the first cohort studying for a master’s degree in community development at the University of Alberta. After completing a thesis and a practicum, Bromling was hired as a HRDA fieldworker. He occasionally collaborated with Lough and Birse, who subsequently pushed CYC administrators to recruit him.

Bromling worked within a changed organizational context. Having lost its independence from the federal government in December 1969, the company was under trusteeship until 1972 and less active in the field. Beginning in 1971, CYC turned away from “parachuting” in volunteers. Rather, it looked to partner with community groups and see that volunteers were “local young people selected by the citizens’ group they will be working with.” Executive Director Dal Brodhead increasingly adopted utilitarian and technocratic language. He argued that CYC provided communities with “human resources” and that CYC was a tool for economic

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92 “High Prairie CYC Staff Appointed,” 1; P.D. Brodhead, Executive Director, “The Company of Young Canadians,” Report to the Honorable Mr. J. Hugh Faulkner, Secretary of State, 22 May 1974, 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 178, C; Daly, 3.
development rather than a youth program.\textsuperscript{93} Localism, a practical approach, community participation, and ensuring that people had better access to government resources were all stressed for an organization emptied of radicals, and its radicalism, in English Canada.

After a period of short-term projects, volunteers worked with community organizations on an annual basis. When its budget expanded starting in 1973, CYC hired more local people and had more volunteers in the field than ever before. The Lesser Slave Lake project, which had six staff people in its history, had twenty-two volunteers from August 1966 to April 1971 and forty-eight between May 1971 and March 1976.

Within these contours, Bromling expanded activities in a fashion that roughly mirrored the geographic scope of the Special Area. It meant not only re-engaging communities around the lake but also moving for the first time into the Peace River Valley. An incrementalist, Bromling expressed impatience with the industrial focus of regional development policy. Outsiders who migrated in appeared to be the beneficiaries of forestry, mining, and oil booms. He felt that the human element of development was being ignored and that CYC represented a model for getting local people involved in progressive social action. Bromling resolved that volunteer placements be made “to encourage and support citizens’ programs for social, economic, and community development,” especially when it came to assisting unorganized and mostly Indigenous people.\textsuperscript{94}

A panoply of projects (and volunteers) came and went between mid-1971 and spring 1976, active on economic, housing, youth, and community issues. What to make of these various undertakings? In the absence of a responsive provincial government, CYC encouraged


communities to turn inward and to pursue everyday self-help. Overwhelmingly, projects sought to address immediate needs. Even as they did, community development remained intimately linked to questions over the democratic control of decision-making. CYC encouraged grassroots activity that related to slowly shaping Lesser Slave Lake movements for greater political and socio-economic democracy within the capitalist system. These dynamics can be seen, in greater detail and in turn, in CYC assistance in the town of Slave Lake, in rural Lesser Slave Lake, in East Prairie, and into the northern hinterland.

In the first instance, CYC supported a Friendship Centre in the town of Slave Lake. Friendship Centres were social service providers as well as social and cultural institutions directed at Indigenous peoples in Canadian cities and towns.\(^{95}\) From August 1971, a coalition of Indigenous and white residents, led by Thelma Chalifoux, sought to organize one. Born in Calgary in 1929, Chalifoux was a Métis activist who raised seven children largely on her own. Well-connected in Métis politics, she had worked for Métis Association of Alberta. Later living in Edmonton, Chalifoux promoted Métis culture and hosted a weekly television program. In 1997, she became the first Métis person, and first Indigenous woman, appointed to the Canadian senate.\(^{96}\) As the Friendship Centre showed, Chalifoux placed an emphasis (further explored in the next chapter) on Métis-directed development and integration into mainstream society.

Slave Lake reformers, responding growth-pole-driven conditions, were concerned with “white backlash” and hoped a centre would be “a catalyst to bring together a community that threatens to come apart at the seams.” If new jobs, houses, and cultural opportunities awaited

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 Indigenous families, “the boom also holds the danger of economic failure, family breakdown, cultural loss and disruption of life style for native people.” The centre, then, stressed the adaptation of Indigenous people to urban life. Bromling felt that CYC support was warranted, since the project was the product of local Indigenous activism and provided resources to low income families. Still, he acknowledged that the centre was “a conventional approach to assisting the social adjustment of migrating native people” and might represent “remedial and band aid efforts with the casualties of change.” Bromling hoped it would be something more. Chalifoux was one of two people hired as CYC volunteers during the organizational phase.97

The Slave Lake Native Friendship Centre opened in 1972. Stressing counselling and information, its offerings included court assistance, family services, alcohol education, and youth outreach. CYC funded further volunteers through early 1976, and they assisted myriad activities.98 As with other Friendship Centres, in delivering useful services and encouraging social and cultural activities, the Slave Lake centre was generally supportive of broader claims to socio-economic equality, cultural autonomy, and recognition of Indigenous rights. However, in aligning with integrationist aims, the political position of the centre relative to colonialism and racism was uncertain.99 The centre clearly did fit within CYC’s program, though. And, when Bromling left his CYC staff position in April 1974, Chalifoux was chosen as his replacement.100

CYC had other links to civil society activity, demonstrated by a second focus. Bromling approved projects on the south shore of the lake, in what was known as Improvement District 17. Improvement districts were sparsely populated rural areas where the province assumed the functions of municipal administration directly. From the late 1960s, I.D. 17 saw an influx of a new social group drawn by cheap marginal land prices: back-to-the-landers. Al and Alona Burger were pioneers in this regard, having stayed on land east of Faust after their CYC contracts ended. They raised two daughters and strove to live off their fifteen acres as much as possible, though Al also picked up odd jobs. In a newspaper essay, Burger observed that the way in which many Lesser Slave Lake people put the pursuit of happiness and liberty ahead of material possessions appealed to the “new settlers.” He rejected the notion that rural poverty in the area be seen as a racial question, writing about a shared struggle for economic livelihood and spiritual fulfilment within a consumption-driven capitalist society. Commending the work ethic of his rural compatriots, Burger declared: “Poor we are by the standards of a materialistic Canada but I for one, and many others with me, feel rich in spirit.” Here, the left communitarian (and, even, utopian) ideals often permeating CYC activism were on show.

Nascent grassroots efforts to build a viable rural economy were boosted by CYC. In January 1974, back-to-the-lander and volunteer Shane Salisbury conducted research on land policy, resources, and new “intermediate technology” (something, we will see, paralleled in rural development work in Cape Breton and Tanzania). Bromling was convinced that there was

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“tremendous unrealized economic potential” in farming and cottage home production. In June, CYC approved a one-year, two-volunteer project.104

Both volunteers, Terry Anderson and Dale Rogers, had at one point been among seven University of Alberta graduates living on a piece of land near Joussard that became known locally as “Hippie Hill.” There were thirty and forty back-to-the-landers in Lesser Slave Lake in all. Anderson, whose interest in CYC was largely financial and who had earlier been an Alberta Service Corps volunteer, took the main leadership role on the project. After some preliminary work, the volunteers stimulated the creation of the Northern Alberta Producers Collective. Fifty people – including back-to-the-landers, longstanding homesteaders, and Métis farmers – participated in its chief activity, holding a farmers’ market in High Prairie.105

For the volunteers, the effort connoted frontier-like individualism and community solidarity. Anderson argued that local producers could supply goods at lower cost than ones imported, create jobs, and increase communication and trade in the area, “thus developing and regaining a sense of community.”106 The volunteers underlined: “The type of community development which we feel is most important, is economic development which allows an individual to control his own means of production. Thus we are attempting to develop an

attitude of self-reliance and independence.” The economic dimension, boosting small-scale farm and home production, was foregrounded.107

Anderson and Rogers pushed ahead on their own as well, producing toys and growing teas, herbs, and seeds to sell under the Home Grown Producers brand name. Fiddleheads, gathered locally, sold well and Rogers even planned a fiddlehead cookbook.108 If this was the official face of their activities, staff worried about how the growing of marijuana might reflect on CYC. Chalifoux investigated, describing Anderson as “straight,” and reporting that while Rogers might smoke a little weed, he was not growing it.109 Notwithstanding this report, they and other back-to-the-landers actually grew marijuana plants discreetly.110

CYC also supported a brief early 1974 project centered on prospective municipal self-government. It fed into the Improvement District 17 Residents Association, which, while not always an organized concern, could be invoked by back-to-the-landers to press the provincial government for action.111 Advocating resident concerns also extended to electoral politics, with the NDP a site for progressivism in Lesser Slave Lake. Al Burger, Bromling, and Anderson’s then-wife Kerry all served in the constituency association. At the 1973 provincial party convention, Burger introduced a motion criticizing the way that regional development benefited non-residents and sought to transform Indigenous peoples into a labour force for foreign-owned corporations. More community participation in decision-making was called for. Métis leaders

110 Interview with Terry Anderson, 3 July 2015.
111 “Former CYC Volunteer Becomes Faust ‘Radical,’” Scope, 20 August 1975, 1, 9; Interview with Terry Anderson, 3 July 2015.
Stan Daniels and Henry Tompkins ran as the provincial NDP candidates in 1967 and 1975, respectively. Tompkins pledged support for Indigenous rights, farmers and fishermen, improved rural housing and services, and claims to municipal self-government in improvement districts.\textsuperscript{112} These were practical issues for Indigenous peoples, primary producers, and back-to-the-landers along the lake, all things lending themselves to a minoritarian progressivism.

At the East Prairie Métis Settlement, volunteers assisted – at three intervals between fall 1971 and spring 1976 – a vaguely defined improvement project begun by the colony council. Earlier CYC volunteer Peter Lloyd had described the council a “puppet” of government, but its members came to insist that the council could further social and economic development.\textsuperscript{113} During 1972, volunteer Gordon L’Hirondelle supported recreation activities. In late 1974 and early 1975, Harry Supernault spent time on recreation, a grant application, a housing survey, and a drug and alcohol abuse seminar. Fellow volunteer Andre L’Hirondelle organized a short-lived youth drop-in centre in an abandoned school house.\textsuperscript{114}

Chalifoux, who praised the volunteers for their work on “a very challenging project,” felt that the council remained constrained by uncertainty over its role and unfamiliarity with government procedure. Yet she noted that East Prairie Métis had begun to meet monthly with counterparts from two other colonies. She wrote: “Needless to say this is upsetting the


\textsuperscript{113} East Prairie Métis Colony Council, “East Prairie Development Project; A Submission to the Company of Young Canadians,” 20 August 1971, 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 135, 669 East Prairie Development - Correspondence and Programme Activities.

government department that handles these Colonies especially now that they are asking me to be their advisor on strategies for meeting government departments. I am now beginning to train André and Harry (the volunteers) on strategies with government.” Indeed, pressure from East Prairie prompted the local Métis Rehabilitation Branch official to informally devolve administrative decisions to the colony council in the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{115} 

If discontent with government was a significant issue for colony residents, so, too, was the dominance of urban Métis in the revived Métis Association of Alberta. A main concern was the association’s handling of the oil and gas royalties issue. Before the courts, the Métis Association was denied legal standing and it fell instead to the colonies to contest the provincial appropriation royalties that were supposed to flow into a colony trust fund.\textsuperscript{116} Representatives from the eight colonies in Alberta began to meet in the early 1970s, and they formed the Alberta Federation of Métis Settlements in 1975. Federation pressure, and protracted negotiations, eventually led to new provincial legislation in 1990 with an eye to self-government and development.\textsuperscript{117} While perhaps neither here nor there, CYC support came at the outset of colony efforts to secure material and political improvements.

In a further undertaking, Chalifoux sought to extend community development north of Lesser Slave Lake by offering resources to so-called “isolated communities,” small and formerly difficult to access Indigenous settlements encroached upon by the mid-1970s. New provincial highways and local access roads were built to facilitate tar sands extraction, and they opened new lines of transportation to the Loon, Trout, Chipewyan, Sandy, and Peerless “back lakes.”


\textsuperscript{116} The royalties dispute was settled out of court in 1999. Interview with Andre L’Hirondelle, 4 July 2015.

Chalifoux, along with activist William Beaver, helped organize a community organization in each place. They also established the Isolated Communities Advisory Board. Chalifoux argued that residents would require all types of “social adjustment” programs in the years ahead. She reasoned: “Our own native leaders can not possibly understand these people as even tho [sic] the same blood lines flow in their veins they have never lived the way these people do. I strongly feel that only by developing leadership from within these communities will we be able to assist them to face the great traumatic changes that will be brought upon them in the near future.”

Peerless Lake excepted, Chalifoux saw that one person per community (two elders and two younger men, overall) was employed as a CYC volunteer from March 1975. Much as Bromling had responded to the deficiencies of Special Area programming, Chalifoux shaped her policy around the observation that while the provincial and federal governments wished to see the tar sands developed, they were “completely ignoring the concerns of existing communities and settlements. 95% of the population of this area is Native therefore CYC priorities must be with unorganized Native people.” For Chalifoux, community development served to secure government accommodation and to stimulate Indigenous-led integration into mainstream society.

Whenever these projects might have accomplished was curtailed by CYC’s abolition in federal government budget cuts. CYC community development in Lesser Slave Lake, having existed in one shape or another since the company first hired volunteers, ended in March 1976. Though CYC hoped many projects would continue with alternative funding, Chalifoux felt it unlikely that such provincial support would be forthcoming in northern Alberta. She put it


bluntly: “The provincial government will not provide adequate social services.” Chalifoux herself returned to her role as director of the Slave Lake Friendship Centre.  

Meanwhile, the economic situation in Lesser Slave Lake worsened. A North American recession undermined the uncertain employment gains of the Special Area program in 1976, when four of the forestry companies attracted to Slave Lake went under. For government and Indigenous organizations, support of development around the lake gave way to chasing jobs to the northeast. Beginning with the first global oil crisis in October 1973, oil prices spiked and induced frantic exploration along Alberta’s tar sands. By 1977, hopes for development rested more keenly on the foreign-owned projects of Great Canadian Oil Sands and Syncrude. The provincial and federal government assumed massive costs to develop the tar sands in exchange for questionable benefits and overstated promises of new jobs. Both the Indian Association of Alberta and the Métis Association of Alberta met with oil companies and government in an effort to secure positions for Indigenous workers and a role for Indigenous businesses. Despite local and provincial activism, nearby Indigenous peoples experienced economic exclusion and dramatic environmental degradation as a result of tar sands extraction. Whatever economic gains might have been had, they remained dependent on world markets. Recession began in

120 “CYC Projects Ending in Lake Area,” Lakeside Leader, 10 March 1976, 1, 12.
121 Webster, 151.
1982 and oil prices collapsed in 1986.\textsuperscript{124} Meanwhile, possible petroleum industry work to the northeast meant little for people who continued to live on meagre incomes along Lesser Slave Lake. In Faust, for example, work remained largely seasonal and residents formed a community development corporation in 1984 to stimulate economic activity anew.\textsuperscript{125}

During the first half of the 1970s, CYC community development in Lesser Slave Lake promoted ostensibly autonomous local economic development and alternatively substituted for, and called for, responsive elected liberal democratic government. The orientation emerged from a critique of state-backed regional development and, later, of top-down provincial government natural resource policies. CYC provided volunteers to community organizations with few other resources and, in doing so, was part of cautious and variously expressed efforts to improve the economic livelihood and augment the political standing of people in Lesser Slave Lake. Yet, so situated, an accommodating CYC worked against more radical politics by insisting on integration, co-operation, and small-scale, community-level responses to poverty.

**Conclusion**

CYC’s intervention in Faust in 1966 called attention to racial segregation and raised the prospect of social change. But the diffuse potential of CYC’s initial community development ethos was filled out by action to secure a new economic base in Lesser Slave Lake within capitalism. Rallying around community, around collective ends, around a better future brought together small business people, concerned citizens, and some Métis in plans that largely depended on securing the backing of government and its various agencies. In this form, community development suggested that citizen engagement would ensure government support

\textsuperscript{125} Griffiths, Watson, Burger, and Associates, 69, 80.
for self-directed action to meet immediate needs. Resulting development programs neither remained under community control nor had the intended effects.

CYC members remained cognizant of racial – if not class – inequalities in Lesser Slave Lake and hoped to work from within broader developmental efforts to promote greater Indigenous participation and representation. Integration had an implicitly racial component. Yet Indigenous politics were themselves significantly divided. As the next chapter explores, CYC supported Indigenous activists, but also became one site where conflicts between Indigenous militants, reformers, and conservatives were played out.

In the early 1970s, CYC involvement in Lesser Slave Lake was reoriented toward a measured critique of provincial and federal regional development practices. In the absence of responsive elected government, volunteers were placed with community organizations encouraged to pursue self-help projects. Directing local activity inward, this shape of community development connected to reform movements seeking greater political and socio-economic democracy. At the same time, though, community action militated against more radical politics concerning race, unequal property relations, and the corporate focus of state-backed resource extraction by privileging the self-directed accommodation of the poor within capitalism. Community development was about integration.

Community development in Lesser Slave Lake mattered because it raised significant issues about the quality of local and electoral democracy. However, notwithstanding early debates in Faust, the practice never had more than an ameliorative character. Community development saw the poor acted upon, asked to change their behaviour, to work collectively to resolve social problems, and to take collective, possessive individualism-inflected measures to alleviate their own poverty. Development proved a diffuse, ephemeral, and even counter-
productive thing to organize around, lending itself to small business boosterism, government re-direction, and market limitations. Committing to community development meant brushing over serious questions about racism, colonialism, social stratification, power, and the way in which inequality was perpetuated within community and the larger political, social, and economic system. Whatever tension was sustained between self-help and self-determination, between social service and social action, CYC intervention did not sufficiently problematize those issues and remained an agent of small-scale remedial activity mostly bounded in local places like Faust, Slave Lake, and East Prairie.

Figure 1.1 Map of the Lesser Slave Lake Special Area Within Alberta

Source: Alberta, Municipal Affairs, Planning Services Division, Regional Planning Section, Lesser Slave Lake Regional Plan: Rural Land Use Study, Section 1 and 2: Historical and Physical Setting (Edmonton: Alberta, Municipal Affairs, April 1977), 2.
Figure 1.2 Map of Lesser Slave Lake Area

Figure 1.3 Albert Burger and Jeremy Ashton “Divide Alberta Town”
Figure 1.4 Company of Young Canadians Prairie Volunteers, Banff Conference, June 1967

Chapter 2

Something’s Going to Have to Change Around Here

Community development, a participatory method of anti-poverty action widely resonating in a decolonizing world, had origins in late British colonial policy in Africa. It was therefore unsurprising that provincial and federal policymakers adapted the concept to Canada’s own colonized peoples – with Manitoba, Alberta, and Indian Affairs Branch community development programs in the first half of the 1960s. In fact, the practice was applied to a range of Indigenous groups around the world, including in Peru, the United States, and Greenland.

Such was the purchase of localized approaches to alleviating Indigenous poverty that the authors of the Hawthorn Report (an important government-funded social scientific study of status Indians in Canada) made reserve-based economic development their main recommendation in 1966. Nor did Indigenous poverty escape the attention of Canadian New Leftists committed to community-centered activism, as the previous chapter began to show.

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The Company of Young Canadians (CYC) pursued community development among First Peoples and Métis as part of its larger program. And white New Left and centrist middle-class youth were not the only CYC volunteers. As Kelly Pineault has emphasized, CYC consulted with Indigenous activists and hired some as volunteers. She argues that the company was a site of convergence, where Indigenous youth and white New Leftists connected and where pan-Indianism, self-determination, and Indigenous media were promoted.\(^5\) Ties to an emergent Indigenous feminism were sometimes made.\(^6\) Yet these CYC-involved processes – occurring in places like Vancouver, the Northwest Territories, Winnipeg, northern Ontario, and Happy Valley, Newfoundland – were neither simple nor without conflict.\(^7\)

As with non-Indigenous engagement in poverty politics, the transnational dimensions of Indigenous activism were often in evidence. Participants in a new Indigenous militancy and nationalism made recurrent appeals for government development assistance akin to that provided to Third World nations. For these people, community development – and development more broadly – was attractive because it appeared to offer a path out of economic dependency.

Equally, radical Indigenous activists in Canada, drawing inspiration from Red Power and Black Power movements in the United States, located their work within a global struggle against colonialism as well as in opposition to local injustices. As historian Scott Rutherford has argued, Indigenous radicals, reformers and traditionalists all participated in calls for justice and


recognition during the global Sixties in Canada. However, there were also conservatives who deferred to the status quo. This chapter explores the dynamics of Indigenous politics by focusing on further aspects of CYC’s engagement in Lesser Slave Lake between 1966 and 1976.

To the extent that divisions between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in Lesser Slave Lake were important, they were not the full story of political antipathy. Indigenous politics in Lesser Slave Lake were significantly divided. Sociologist Ron Bourgeault has argued that the long-run processes – and contradictions – of capitalism and colonialism have shaped class, racial, and gendered differences among Indigenous persons which remain consequential. As such, in the 1960s, distinctions in class, legal status, economic base, gender, access to government, political inclination, and political tactics all served as wedges.

In Lesser Slave Lake, the tensions between Indigenous militants, moderates, and conservatives were brought into the open in debates over development and Indigenous rights. Activists carried a democratic desire to ensure that people had the power to shape their own lives. Where reformers, particularly those with ties to the Métis Association of Alberta, came to advocate Indigenous-led development and integration, working with government, and red capitalism, radicals privileged self-determination, anti-colonialism, and red power. Not only did advocates of these two diverging views come into conflict, local militant action also drew protest from more conservative people upholding decorum and who had a stake in the status quo. In the process, CYC played a supporting role in Indigenous mobilizations for reform, and for liberation, in north-central Alberta. More than being mere targets of a state anti-poverty program, Indigenous actors reworked community development toward several political aims. But it was

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8 Scott Rutherford, “Canada’s Other Red Scare: Rights, Decolonization, and Indigenous Political Protest in the Global Sixties” (Ph.D. Diss. in History, Queen’s University, 2011), 19.
not ultimately an effective means of challenging the underlying conditions activists hoped to change.

**Indigenous Mobilizations and CYC Connections in 1960s Northern Alberta**

The establishment of the CYC coincided with rising Indigenous political organization and action in Canada. The CYC was both a source of employment for some politically engaged Indigenous youth and, at times, a resource to Indigenous groups. Such a dynamic was evident in northern Alberta, where a growing number of Indigenous political mobilizations from the mid-1960s recurrently intersected with the CYC and some of its Indigenous members.

Wilfred Pelletier, a 27-year-old Odawa activist, was hired in 1965 to advise the CYC on working in Indigenous communities. He viewed the company idealistically as a “golden opportunity” to further pan-Indianism and better understanding. He recommended, at least at first, that CYC should hire young Indigenous volunteers to work in Indigenous communities. In a small way, the company followed that suggestion through cooperation with the Canadian Indian Youth Council (for clarity, IYC). IYC was created in September 1965 at a Winnipeg meeting Pelletier attended. Its young educated participants, positioning themselves as liaisons between reserves and wider society, argued that: “We feel we must organize with the objectives of gaining recognition, human dignity, and equality for Indian people in Canada. These human and civil rights have been, for so long, out of the reach of our people.” IYC members felt that they had made an effort to adjust to mainstream society, but 26-year-old Toronto Métis activist Duke Redbird underlined that “we have no intention of making this adjustment at the expense of our Indian heritage.”

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10 Wilf Pelletier, “Critique of the Company of Young Canadians,” Memo to the Staff and Interim Advisory Council, 10 June 1966, 3, 14-15 LAC, RG116, Volume 185, S; Pineault, 40.
11 Canadian Indian Youth Council, September 1965, 2, 4, 7, LAC, Department of Secretary of State fonds, RG6, Volume 91, Accession 1986-87/319, File C.B. 9-390-4 - Canadian Indian Youth Council; Heather A. Howard,
Wikwemikong First Nation who became well-known for her 1970s legal challenge to gender discrimination in the Indian Act, were recruited by CYC to set up joint IYC-CYC projects.

From 1965, a series of Indigenous mobilizations in northern Alberta pressed the provincial and federal government for redress. During their work, Corbière and Redbird found themselves involved with a Lesser Slave Lake protest that historian Alvin Finkel has argued shocked the Social Credit political establishment in Alberta. In part, government officials were irked because a civil servant with ties to the provincial community development program – none other than future CYC staff person Ben Baich – was active in the lead-up to the demonstration.12

In fall 1965, Métis and First Peoples from Wabasca and the Bigstone Cree Nation organized with the goal of securing an industrial base in their community. After forming a timber cooperative, local people approached the provincial government looking for support akin to the ARDA rural development program underway in Edson. Provincial officials suggested that such assistance might be forthcoming if the cooperative proved its viability. Therefore, members began to log and operate a make-shift mill over the winter months. Yet when cooperative leaders subsequently requested financing and nearby timber leases, government officials demurred on offering assistance. Though not immediately apparent to residents, civil servants and politicians had evidently planned to deliver local timber rights to Federated Co-operatives Limited, an as-yet-unprofitable private operation already receiving government support.13

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13 Fred Favel, “Wabasca: A Lesson in Politics,” 1-2, University of Manitoba Libraries, Department of Archives and Special Collection, Walter Rudnicki fonds, MSS 331, A. 10-38.1, Box 304, Folder 4; Interview with Neil Gilliat, 10 July 2015.
Uncertain as to why the provincial government had reneged, Wabasca delegations travelled to Edmonton and attempted six times to meet with Premier Ernest Manning to no avail. Changing tactics, sixty people marched on the legislature in mid-July 1966. Clara Yellowknee, a later CYC volunteer from Wabasca, invoked the money Canada spent on international development assistance and rhetorically asked: “Why not let us have some? People here need help.” But the demonstration was met by government inaction. Disconsolate protestors appealed to a Calgary meeting of Indigenous peoples for help. Financial assistance promptly arrived and a group mostly composed of IYC members (including Redbird, Corbière, Fred Favel, and Harold Cardinal) travelled to Wabasca to offer support. After weighing a next move, determined residents agreed to return to Edmonton to march again.14

The second march was made in late July 1966 by 250 Indigenous people and some newly mobilized allies. This time, a Wabasca delegation was ushered into a meeting with Manning. The first day of talks ended in stalemate. Notably, Manning sought to use the presence of educated young Indigenous people to discredit the protest. Invoking the “bad counsel” of outsiders, he suggested that two CYC member had urged Wabasca people to demonstrate. IYC president Leonard Mandamin felt compelled to insist that young activists were only there to help. Still, the Edmonton Journal inferred that the activists were outsiders based on appearance and education. Harold Cardinal, a 21-year-old “scholarly-looking” member of IYC and Canadian Union of Students, acted as interpreter for the delegation. Misidentified as being from Ottawa

14 Clara Yellowknee, Letter to the Editor, Edmonton Journal, 30 June, 1966, Provincial Archives of Alberta (hereafter PAA), Department of Energy and Natural Resources fonds, GR0072, Accession 1976.0502, Box 41, Wabasca Demonstration - Timber – Clippings; Favel, 3-4.
and Winnipeg, Cardinal was a member of the Sucker Creek First Nation in Lesser Slave Lake and soon to become president of the Indian Association of Alberta.\textsuperscript{15}

Bigstone chief Sam Young, who belatedly supported the protest action, accepted a compromise on the second day of negotiations that included government-financed logging operations, improved Métis housing, and better treatment from welfare officials. However, when it came to timber rights, Manning promised only that the Wabasca cooperative would be allowed to enter a competitive bid – something it lacked the capital to do. The poverty of the deal was emphasized weeks later, when the timber rights were delivered to Federated. Indigenous people were denied control over local resources. Plus, by late 1967, residents criticized the province for the slow implementation of Manning’s promises, especially with respect to improved housing.\textsuperscript{16}

A second protest took shape in late 1966. At its centre was Stan Daniels, a chain-smoking Métis politician and reformer born in 1924, who would come to work for CYC. He sought to dramatize exploitative conditions at Fox Lake through agitprop. Fox Lake was a northern community whose 400 status Indian residents were slated by the federal government for relocation to Jean d’Or Prairie. To highlight overcharging at the local Hudson’s Bay Company store, Daniels documented buying a $2.98 pound of beef sausage (where a comparable sausage cost 89 cents in Edmonton). He then delivered the sausage to Prime Minister Lester Pearson to


\textsuperscript{16} Howitt, “Politics Enter Indian Dispute Over Timber”; Finkel, 146-147; Favel, 4-6; Dave White, “Indians Critical of Housing Delay,” \textit{Edmonton Journal}, 23 November 1967, 26.
object to high food prices in northern communities. A picture of Daniels and a colleague trying to hitch a lift to Ottawa, a “Sausage for PM” sign in hand, was turned into a postcard.17

Accompanied by a reporter from the *Edmonton Journal*, Daniels and John Samson followed up by investigating wider conditions at Fox Lake. In a bleak appraisal, they described housing conditions characterized as a “national disgrace,” a deplorable welfare situation, and almost universal undernourishment. Though calling on the provincial and federal governments to intervene and lift residents from their “nearly subhuman existence,” Daniels and Samson also believed that the lack of leadership and organization within the community was an important factor. The visitors argued that the people themselves had to be involved in finding solutions to their own problems.18 Their conclusion amounted to a call for community development.

In the wake of Daniels’ activism, and encouraged by local interest, IYC forged a Fox Lake task force with CYC. Active in early 1967, its members were Phil Fontaine (Saulteaux and future leader of the Assembly of First Nations), Janet Spence (Cree and a registered nurse), and John and Duke Redbird. They saw themselves as resource people supporting the band council. The task force helped Fox Lake people gain information on government programs, secure an increase in wages paid to school bus drivers, obtain redress on welfare payments paid out below rates set by the province, and negotiate with Indian Affairs Branch and an oil company. Further, debate was stimulated over community leadership and Indigenous rights. The CYC-IYC intervention was short term and focused on a constellation of small concerns, yet nonetheless

pointed toward larger issues and ways of getting bureaucracy in a liberal democracy to respond to demands. Indeed, the task force’s report signaled integrationist aims and likened the work to the public education of people outside the Canadian mainstream.\textsuperscript{19}

By 1968, the political tenor of Indigenous young peoples’ interventions in northern Alberta shifted. The stimulus was provided by members of the Indian Film Crew. The Montreal-based crew was formed in summer 1968 as a collaboration between CYC and the National Film Board’s Challenge for Change/\textit{Société nouvelle} (CFC/SN) program. Through activist-filmmaking, CFC/SN aimed to empower disadvantaged groups by improving democratic communication and decision-making. The six Indian Film Crew recruits received ongoing training from CFC/SN filmmakers and were charged with producing documentary films that demonstrated Indigenous people from across Canada going about their daily lives. Postwar NFB documentaries depicting Indigenous peoples had been rooted in a supposed ethnographic neutrality and often stressed a transition to modernity. But the film crew initiative fostered the beginnings of Indigenous filmmaking in Canada, providing a medium for critiquing colonial policies and imaginaries.\textsuperscript{20} That fall, crew members arrived in the Lesser Slave Lake area and each pursued different projects.

Barbara Wilson, a 25-year-old Haida crew member who specialized in cinematography, travelled to Loon Lake, a community of twenty-eight Cree families some 400 miles northwest of Edmonton. Living in Montreal and having grown up in Haida Gwaii (where her father earned a living as a fishermen and logger), Wilson was shocked to discover that there were people in

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Canada who lived as those in Loon Lake did. Constrained by surrounding oil fields, residents could no longer sufficiently trap or hunt and squatted on a pocket of land along the lake. At first, Wilson lived in a teepee. Residents teasingly called her, though she protested, “wabus” (white rabbit). The racially-inflected reference was to the fact that though Indigenous, Wilson was initially not all that adept at living in the northern Alberta wilderness. When it grew too cold, she moved in with a local family in a one-room cabin that lacked floors or privacy. She recalled chipping through the lake ice to get water for washing. The lake was also the local source of drinking water. Among the photographs she took were shots of the cardboard insulation people resorted to for their homes and of shoeless children playing in the snow. Wilson was most profoundly affected by the number of tiny graves at the community cemetery. She would live in Loon Lake for about three months before joining up with the other film crew members in Faust in late October 1968.21

Wilson and her peers, motivated by a sense that the people of Loon Lake were being neglected and mistreated by government, spoke out against the prevailing living conditions. At a meeting on the campus of the University of Alberta, Wilson declared that some of Loon Lake’s large families were starving and that children did not have proper clothing nor access to health care. Just one man held a job. Community members lacked salt to preserve game and basic provisions like tea and bannock. Wilson, Tom O’Connor (21 years old and Anishnaabe), Roy Daniels (30 years old and Anishnaabe), and Noel Starblanket (22 years old and Cree) announced their intention to approach welfare officials over the inadequacies.22

In an action that distinguished their Loon Lake activism from earlier protests in Alberta, the film crew members formed Protest Alliance Against Native Extermination (PAANE) with local Indigenous young people in the Faust area. PAANE was a Red Power organization. Red Power militants in the late 1960s drew a parallel to Black Power in the United States and situated their activism in a global struggle against colonialism as well as local conditions. Duke Redbird has observed that many Red Power groups lacked a strong ideological or substantive base and were often short-lived. PAANE was certainly of the type, rooted especially in what Wilson called “idealism” rather than clear political program and existing little beyond the early months of 1969. Yet PAANE was a statement of political intent.

A regional welfare official called PAANE’s description of Loon Lake conditions “ridiculous,” while Fred Colborne, provincial minister in charge of Indian Affairs, deflected blame onto Loon Lake residents by intoning that “we can’t perpetually support people in uneconomic circumstances.” Officials sought to discredit PAANE by feeding inflammatory media coverage of the supposed radicalism of the activists. CYC field staff person Marilyn Assheton-Smith intervened to publicly declared support for the film crew members.

PAANE continued the engagement of a variety CYC Indigenous volunteers with growing, if somewhat episodic, Indigenous political mobilizations in northern Alberta. Indeed, CYC’s very creation coincided with increasing activism, and the company employed Indigenous youth – first from elsewhere, but also increasingly from Lesser Slave Lake beginning in 1967 – who might assist local protest or help give it voice. Markedly, PAANE stimulated not just a

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reactionary response from provincial officials, but also a rebuke from reformers – namely, in the person of Stan Daniels. To this conflict we will return. But to understand radical-moderate split in Lesser Slave Lake, an excursion into mainline Indigenous politics is needed, for Daniels – in addition to becoming CYC field staff person in Lesser Slave Lake between February and April 1969 – was the first president of a revitalized Métis Association of Alberta (MAA).

**Development and the Métis Association of Alberta**

Stan Daniels’ political perspective was rooted in the revival of provincial Indigenous associations and, specifically, of MAA. Renewed from the late 1960s, mainline Indigenous organizations in Alberta focused a good part of their aims and resources on the issue of economic development. Cooperation with government, employment programs, red capitalism, and Indigenous-led – indeed, Indigenous organization-led – development and integration emerged as central interests for Daniels and fellow Métis and First Nations’ reformers.

MAA, formed in 1932 to press land claims, survived into the 1960s, but with few funds and little organization. From 1965, meetings often held under the auspices of CYC or provincial community development work drew middle class Métis into efforts to revive the association.\(^{25}\) In 1966, an anonymous donation prompted research into a unified Indigenous federation in Alberta. Daniels was employed a fieldworker on the project and, in 1967, was selected as MAA president.\(^{26}\) Negotiations to form one organization for all the province’s Indigenous peoples ended in frustration, but Daniels continued his organizational work with the Métis because Ben Baich saw to it that Daniels was paid a salary as a CYC consultant. Moreover, Daniels happened, uninvited, upon a meeting about a proposed provincial survey of Métis people.


Daniels demanded MAA control of the study. The resulting fall 1968 project, funded by the province, was an unintended vehicle for the revitalization of Métis politics in Alberta.\(^\text{27}\)

The Métis Study Tour’s report relied on the fact-finding work of ten Métis fieldworkers who travelled the province. It was hoped that a candid account of the serious existing problems would stir Métis people themselves, the provincial government, and Alberta residents to confront Métis poverty. The study enumerated cultural erosion, poor education services, inadequate transportation, absence of healthcare, language barriers, sub-standard and over-crowded housing, lack of land rights, unemployment, discriminatory law enforcement, degrading and discrepant welfare rates, and racism as among the myriad issues facing Métis communities.\(^\text{28}\)

The report, too, commented on community development. With respect to the province’s own community development services, the study group criticized the tendency of Community Development Officers to “motivate people, get them going to do things for themselves, then run up against Government who is not ready to give them the service they require.” Contradictorily, while expressing a belief that CYC had an “extremely poor image” in Lesser Slave Lake and should hire more local volunteers, the report praised the effect of company’s work. It was argued that formerly apathetic people “are now angry, and are now communicating with one another. They are beginning to get organized. The Provincial Government is now showing particular concern for the area, whereas before there was little apparent interest.”\(^\text{29}\) In its double-edged appraisal of Métis mobilization, the report revealed a certain ambivalence about the role community development might have in change. But it still nominally deferred to local agency.

\(^{27}\) “Métis Study Tour Report,” December 1968; Sponsored by the Métis Association of Alberta; Funded by H.R.D.A. and Community Development, LAC, RG116, Volume 184, M; Clarence Longmore, Assistant Executive Director, Métis Association of Alberta, “Recent History of Métis Association of Alberta,” 1, Glenbow Museum and Archives (hereafter Glenbow Archives), Métis Association of Alberta fonds, M-4755, Box 22, File 286.

\(^{28}\) “Métis Study Tour Report,” ii, 1-6.

\(^{29}\) “Métis Study Tour Report,” 9-11.
The study constituted the leading edge of the government funding that helped transform the Métis Association into an active organization elaborating a range of activities for an enlarged membership. From 1969, MAA sought to mobilize its constituency through a fieldworker program. Not only did fieldworkers organize Association locals, they served as resource people and fixers on a range of community and personal issues. In Lesser Slave Lake, Bob Walker was MAA’s fieldworker in 1969-1970 (and again in 1975), having previous worked in farming, mink ranching, highway construction, and lumbering. Born in Driftpile in 1913 to a Cree mother and white father, Walker was also president of the MAA local in Faust where he lived with his wife Mary and nine biological and foster children. Walker travelled along the lake to visit Métis families, find out the kind of problems people were facing, and to establish locals.\(^{30}\)

The Métis Association was not alone in seeking to mobilize Indigenous peoples in Lesser Slave Lake. In 1967, the Indian Association of Alberta (IAA) – also a product of the 1930s – had itself been boosted by an Indian Study Tour. However, the federal government’s 1969 White Paper – which proposed the unilateral abrogation of treaty rights and the Indian Act – provided the impetus for IAA’s transformation from a grassroots reserve-based body into a political organization. At the head of the shift was Harold Cardinal, who went from IYC president to IAA president in 1967. Cardinal – emerging as the most prominent intellectual advocating for Indigenous rights, equality, and justice in Canada – drafted the so-called Red Paper (and *The Unjust Society*, a best-selling book) in response to the White Paper. Leaning heavily on the recommendation for reserve-based economic development issued by the Hawthorn Report, the Red Paper called for the creation of a provincial community development

corporation to support self-government and to offer financial assistance to First Nations’ business.  

Even with its new political outlook, the Indian Association – like the Métis Association – looked to offer services to local constituencies and hired fieldworkers to work with reserves and band councils. Also conducting community work in Lesser Slave Lake were the Alberta Native Communications Society and Alberta Native Youth Alliance. Therefore, the organizing efforts by Indigenous political organizations, alongside the activities of CYC, represented multiple, even competing, efforts to mobilize Indigenous peoples. Certainly, after 1969, the resources at the disposal of Indigenous peoples had significantly increased.

It was clear that mainline Indigenous organizations in Alberta sought to channel an important part of their purpose and resources toward demands for economic development. The advocates of ‘red capitalism,’ in the contemporary phrase used by Métis scholar Howard Adams, insisted on government assistance in developing Indigenous business and employment. As the Red Paper suggested, greater consultation with, and commitment from, government was understood as necessary for such development.

However, in Lesser Slave Lake, the provincial and federal governments preempted demands for development and for consultation. Within the Special Area regional development program, citizen input was institutionalized and segregated through the creation of ‘Indian,’

33 Howard Adams, Prison of Grass: Canada from a Native Point of View (Saskatoon, SK: Fifth House Publishers, 1989), 178-179; Palmer, 405.
Métis, and ‘General Population’ councils. Drawing on existing decision-making structures, the ‘Indian’ council consisted of representatives from area reserve band councils, the Métis council (headed by Bob Walker) comprised delegates of the seventeen MAA locals around the lake, and the ‘General Population’ involved white small business people. Emphasizing that participation was an exercise in cooptation, human resources coordinator Neil Gilliat made a point of not refusing any local proposals and passing them on to various provincial departments.34

Métis, however, were quickly aware of the deficiencies of regional development in Lesser Slave Lake. In 1970, MAA fieldworker Fred Larocque, noting misunderstanding between local people and officials, observed that “native people are getting the tail end of the development as I understand it.” Moreover, after the new Progressive Conservative government in Alberta froze, and then cut, human resources programs in late 1971, Métis critics expressed anger that job training and economic stimulus were being held up entirely.35

What discontent the Métis Association harboured over regional development practice was channeled into “A Proposal for Progress,” a 1973 position paper delivered to government by Stan Daniels. The report, which relied on the kind of technocratic language Manning’s government favoured, argued that Métis people had progressed to the point where the piecemeal efforts of the Human Resources Development Agency (HRDA) were no longer enough. The paper favoured a “total resources development” approach, wherein physical and human resources would be comprehensively targeted towards material, political, cultural, and social needs. Calling for close cooperation between government and the Métis Association, the report insisted on a program which might enable Métis “to enter into the main stream of economic development

and enjoy the social consequences of it.” MAA envisioned that Métis in northern Alberta could become self-sufficient through primary activities, private or public sector employment, or establishing their own businesses.\footnote{Métis Association of Alberta, “A Proposal for Progress,” Position Paper, 1973, 41, 46, Glenbow Archives, M-4755, Box 52, File 680.} Though the report insisted that government was not doing enough, the Métis Association accepted the liberal premise that greater democracy and equality could be achieved through development in a capitalist society.

Here, the key position of Indigenous reformers was on show. Daniels and MAA used the language of development and opportunity to press for inclusion in the presumed socio-economic benefits of dominant society. Development, with government support, involved attending to racism and colonialism by addressing their material consequences, yet absent critical attention to how capitalism shaped structural conditions and engendered poverty.

The surest expression of the accommodative approach was Alberta Native Development Corporation, created in May 1974. The Métis and Indian Associations, positioning themselves as liaisons between government and the grassroots, suggested that “the best hope lies in the financial support of programs which will enable the Native people of Alberta, by their own efforts, to become culturally, socially, and economically strong and independent, on their own terms.”\footnote{“Native People of Progress - An Alberta Solution,” A Proposal to Hon. Bob Bogle, Minister without Portfolio Responsible for Native Affairs, Government of Alberta, on behalf of the Native People of Alberta, [c. April 1975], 4-5, PAA, PR0092.0002, Accession PR1999.0465, Box 8, File 0075 - ANDCO: Alberta Native Development Corporation: #1, 1974-1978} Initially established by IAA with federal and provincial government cooperation, the corporation’s main aim was the participation of Indigenous businesses and workers in resource development, especially in connection with the tar sands. MAA agreed to participate. But after Daniels lost the association presidency in 1975, MAA redirected its efforts to the similarly-
oriented Métis Development Corporation. If a sign of MAA internal political struggle, the decision also ensured that Métis and First Nations development institutions would be distinct. And, as the previous chapter noted, MAA had its own schism in 1975. Métis colony residents unhappy with the urbanite domination of MAA formed Alberta Federation of Métis Settlements, for which oil and gas royalties, self-government, and development were key issues.

Divisions prompted by distinctions in legal status, class, economic base, access to government, and politics were signs that the reorganization of Indigenous political organizations, and attention to development, heightened rhetoric and contestation over who spoke for Indigenous peoples. On a Lesser Slave Lake level, a certain MAA territoriality was also evident. Bob Walker was particularly outspoken over what he felt was interference with the association’s leadership in Métis affairs. He criticized Métis who worked for HRDA, arguing that most of them “turned to brown white men” and adopted “the same attitude as a big whiteman.” Walker reserved particular criticism for the leadership of the Faust development coalition, likening Catholic clergy and former CYC volunteer Al Burger to “brain washers” who were hurting Métis people. At such a pitch, differences on questions of development and Indigenous rights stood to be particularly polarizing – between Indigenous reformers demanding government resources to pursue integration-minded development and business; radicals insisting on liberation; and conservatives concerned with respectability, upholding local hierarchies, and deferring to established relations of power with government and its local bureaucratic representatives.

39 Sawchuk, 63; Catherine E. Bell, Alberta's Métis Settlements Legislation: An Overview of Settlement Lands (Regina, SK: Canadian Plains Research Centre, University of Regina, 1994), 1, 8-9, 83-84.
CYC, Red Power, and Indigenous Political Division in Lesser Slave Lake

Sharp differences in political opinion, as well as personal and generational divides, engendered a reformer-radical split in Lesser Slave Lake. Conciliation with government, Métis Association-led development, and red capitalism were juxtaposed with self-determination, an end to colonialism, and red power. Within CYC in the late 1960s, Stan Daniels stood on one side of the debate and PAANE on the other. Yet moving forward in early 1970s Lesser Slave Lake, local Red Power activism also drew responses from other Indigenous moderates and more conservative people.

PAANE’s founding in October 1968 was a collaboration between Indian Film Crew members and local Indigenous young people, including Faust CYC volunteers Rose Auger and Gordon Willier. Leading the way was film crew member Willie Dunn, a 27-year-old Montreal-born part-Mik’maw folk musician (on Mik’maw activism in Cape Breton, see chapter six). A co-founder of Native Alliance for Red Power (NARP) – a Vancouver New Left group committed to Indigenous liberation, drawing on Marxism, and with ties to Maoist and Trotskyist political organizations – Dunn joined CYC in January 1968. After completing his now celebrated film on Crowfoot and colonization, Dunn travelled to Lesser Slave Lake.41 Confident and outspoken, Dunn viewed PAANE as a supplement to the Indian and Métis Associations and as a vehicle to deal with issues where Indigenous people were hurt or abused. Conditions at Loon Lake were an immediate inspiration but, for many Lesser Slave Lake Indigenous peoples, the way in which the RCMP enforced liquor and public statutes was among their immediate frustrations. Indeed, in

starting to hire local Cree-speaking Indigenous volunteers, CYC had young people better placed understand local issues and with concrete ties to Cree and Métis leaders, youth, and elders.\footnote{Interview with Dave Lough, 3 July 2015; M. Assheton-Smith to Claude Vidal, Executive Director, 9 January 1969, 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 133, File 652 - Correspondence - Programme Activities No. 1.}

In early January 1969, Dunn and Auger, along with NARP member Henry Antoine, were arrested following a fight between eight Indigenous and fifteen white people outside a hotel beer parlour in Canyon Creek. The arrests followed a period during which the activists were repeatedly insulted, harassed, and threatened by white area residents.\footnote{As the story was told to Marilyn Assheton-Smith, the fight’s beginnings centered on Rose Auger. Asked after what had happened, Auger said that someone had threatened to beat her up, and so she resolved to prove that it could not be done. Interview with Marilyn Assheton-Smith, 22 July 2015; Kostash, 155-156.} CYC staff person Marilyn Assheton-Smith suggested that it was only a matter of time before something like this happened to Dunn in Lesser Slave Lake. Invoking a parallel to racial segregation in the United States, Assheton-Smith explained that:

He is firstly Indian, and to this rather Alabama like area, that would be his primary identification. As a “cocky Indian,” doing CYC work in a racially tense area he was a prime target for angry whites, and by precisely the same set of social dynamics he was more able to do that work with Indians than a “safer” white volunteer. The result then of a scuffle between two whites and three Indians was three Indians arrested and it should be no surprise to any of us.\footnote{Assheton-Smith to Vidal, 9 January 1969, 1.}

The three were charged with obstruction of a RCMP constable and, under the Liquor Act, raising a disturbance. The magistrate in High Prairie sentenced Dunn and Antoine.\footnote{“Two CYC Members Jailed,” Edmonton Journal, 8 January 1969, LAC, RG116, Volume 133, File 652 - Correspondence - Programme Activities No. 1; Ian Hamilton, Director of Information to The Editor, Edmonton Journal, 21 February 1969, 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 44.}

Granted bail, Auger contacted radicals and the student council at the University of Alberta and, with the support of Harold Cardinal and an anthropology professor, mobilized support to confront the institutional racism of the police and courts. Gordon Wright, an Edmonton human rights lawyer with NDP ties, ensured that the three defendants had their
charges dismissed on appeal. Subsequently, Auger set up and ran a CYC-supported Native Defence Fund to assist Indigenous defendants. Financial contributors included the University of Alberta branches of the Student Christian Movement and Students for a Democratic University. Auger observed that the RCMP repeatedly abused its power and laid charges of obstruction against Indigenous people, a charge that was very difficult to fight. As she put it rhetorically: “Just what is obstruction?” Through her own case, she learned that someone who faced such a charge did not qualify for legal aid. The defence fund sought to correct this limitation.46

It was at this point that Stan Daniels, who would also sit on CYC’s provisional governing council in Ottawa, took over the Lesser Slave Lake staff role in February 1969.47 In a commentary sent to CYC headquarters, he argued: “The conditions are extreme. There is much material poverty, and worse there is deep apathy, indifference, discouragement. It is the latter psychological [sic] condition that is immediately relevant, and it is this that motivates the line of action that we wish to follow for a number of months.” He hoped to use CYC as a vehicle to improve “a proud sense of nativeness” and to offer a more “sensitive” approach to human development. Daniels envisioned a gendered division of labour aimed at making the “CYC image” more respectable. He wanted future volunteers to be clean-cut single men, while he requested a married woman as secretary. He contended: “It is the ‘bad’ behaviour of the Company in the past that has turned the Native off. The hard-line get tough, militant, publicity seeking kind of approach that has literally failed. The need is for a soft-pedal, persistent

presence which makes for confidence that is of the utmost importance.”

Markedly, it was not non-Indigenous bearded CYC radicals, as it were, that Daniels attacked. Rather, in an expression of reformer antipathy to militant politics, he moved against Indigenous radicals.

Daniels immediately objected to PAANE. Taking aim at Willie Dunn, Daniels argued that the volunteer had removed himself from the “nature and purpose of the C.Y.C.” Moreover, Daniels felt that Dunn’s “tendencies are entirely incompatible not only with the purpose of the C.Y.C. but especially with the needs of the Native people in the Lesser Slave Lake area.” Daniels recommended Dunn’s dismissal as a CYC volunteer.

By early April, Daniels was insisting on Rose Auger’s dismissal as well. He argued that Auger had been acquitted in the Canyon Creek incident on a technicality and he cited witnesses who testified that it had been Auger who baited people into a fight. Daniels also claimed that Auger had a drinking problem, pointing out the alcohol-related arrest of a person she had been with some night. Moreover, Daniels believed that Auger’s activism was further “indicative of her ability to be a troublemaker (of the wrong kind).” His starkly personalized attack, however, turned on matters the two had discussed between themselves. Daniels explained:

I am unable to support the Native Defence Fund, which has been organized by P.A.A.N.E. (Protest Alliance Against Native Extermination). I feel that the P.A.A.N.E. approach is far too extreme in terms of Native needs and the political situation in this Province at this time. It is a big brother approach, is misleading the Natives, and does not in any way come to grips with the roots of our problems. Rose Auger is unable to accept my position.

51 Daniels to Vidal, “Re: Rose Auger,” 1.

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Theirs was also a political split.

Rose Auger, then 29, was a Cree militant, feminist, traditionalist, and healer. The eldest of sixteen siblings, she grew up without Indian status because her father had been removed from the Driftpile band list by an Indian agent. She felt neither accepted by her own community nor residents in Faust. In April 1968, she attended the Alberta Native Women’s Conference in Edmonton, a meeting that led to the creation of Indian Rights for Indian Women and of Voice of Alberta Native Women Association. The conference exemplified an emergent Indigenous feminism, and Auger was inspired by it. A mother of six, she became a strong proponent of the matrilineal roots of Algonquin society and argued that the male patriarchal dominance of Cree communities was a product of colonialism. Auger defended Cree culture, something that placed her activism in a longer lineage. Despite concerted government attempts at suppression, some Cree dances and cultural practices persisted in the prairie provinces. From the 1930s, and in association with Indigenous political activity, some Cree and Métis sought to revive their cultural and spiritual values. However, it was not until the 1960s that a general reinvention of Indigenous spirituality and arts was in evidence. If in one sense a form of anti-modernism, traditionalism contributed to a new culture of resistance. Drawing on the spiritual teachings of her own

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grandmother, Auger became a traditional healer by the late 1970s and worked with juvenile offenders. She would emphasize the importance of Indigenous identity and spirituality.  

If Auger’s politics affronted white residents and an older male reformer like Daniels, they also stimulated — as Daniels had perhaps suspected — a reactionary response from more conservative Indigenous persons in Driftpile and Faust who had a stake in the status quo and in maintaining a sense of local pride. The rights of Indigenous peoples on welfare was a touchstone for a local political conflict in late 1973 and early 1974, with Auger its epicenter.

In November 1973, an anonymous letter to the editor of Lesser Slave Lake Scope, from a local resident who claimed to be a member of the American Indian Movement (AIM), expressed anger at “dog” treatment from social workers and civil servants. AIM was a Red Power organization formed in the United States in 1968. Its occupation at Wounded Knee in South Dakota — to protest corrupt local Indigenous leadership as well as American government failure to respect treaty obligations — resonated widely in the United States and Canada among activists as well as anxious authorities and secret police. The letter read, in part:

Do we want another Wounded Knee here? Yes, we do, at least we can die proud and not like a starved dog. We have waited long enough!

Indian Affairs will surely have to get off their fat asses and listen to people. Uncle Tomahawks and Dear Red Apples will sure pay for all the frustrations and apprehensions in which they’ve helped create. [sic]


Government has set up many bandaid programs, which go nowhere. I’ve been relocated, upgraded, and fired, laid off simply because I wasn’t where I wanted to be or doing what I want to do. […]

Our frustrations have been pushed so deep that you leave us no choice but to put our call through to our A.I.M. (American Indian Movement) brothers to Help! [sic]

So be it.56

Once the issue was raised, residents concerned with differential welfare rates and the rising cost of living secured, with the support of the Métis Association and Humans on Welfare (a social assistance advocacy group), a meeting in Faust with welfare officials. Residents expressed their grievances, but were generally pushed back by administrators who cited the confidentiality of individual cases. A number of people found the meeting unsatisfactory.57

Rose Auger did not attend the afternoon meeting, but hosted her own that evening. Nineteen Métis and First Nations people from Faust, Driftpile, and Sucker Creek attended, joined by three AIM members from Edmonton. Those present drew up a list of demands, calling for the removal of two welfare agents, a federal investigation of welfare rates, improved services, more jobs and equal access to them, assistance for the elderly, and funding for a program to teach youth about “the Indian Way.” A blockade of Highway 2 was considered if the demands were not met. However, a subsequent three-hour meeting of twenty-five residents and seven AIM members revealed a split over aims and tactics. Many residents were more immediately concerned about individual welfare issues. Plus, some local people wanted AIM members to do the work needed to secure redress. AIM representatives called on residents to mobilize towards

56 Name Withheld by Request, Letter to the Editor, Lesser Slave Lake Scope, 8 November 1973, 5.
solving their own problems. In the end, the blockade proposal was set aside and a committee was struck to meet again with federal and provincial administrators in High Prairie.  

The meeting took place in early December and featured shows of force on both sides. Alex Jenkins, of Indian Affairs, agreed to tour Faust and Driftpile only after residents threatened to carry him there immediately. At another point, an unidentified Faust woman whom one might guess was Auger threatened to use a knife to get government action. Still, Indian Affairs officials promised no systematic change and merely said they would review individual welfare cases to see which were eligible for maximum allowances. They were symbolically backed by six RCMP officers stationed outside the building during the meeting.

Local defenders of propriety, respectability, and the status quo began their own offensive at late December joint meeting of the Driftpile band council and the Faust Métis Association local. The organizations stated that neither had received any complaints and that recent AIM meetings were held without their knowledge. Equally, the Faust local objected to the solicitation of charity, referring to food and clothing collected in Edmonton by Auger and her partner. Driftpile Cree Nation chief, Eugene Laboucan, argued that the reputation of people on the reserve “has been discredited as they come through to the public as beggars.” Overall, the band and MAA officers claimed that the situation had been fanned by AIM outsiders and that they remained committed to working “across the table” with government. They also insisted that all future news releases would come from their offices alone, something to which Métis fisherman Stan Beattie would respond: “What are they afraid of? Is the truth hurting them?”

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59 “Tense Meeting at Indian Affairs,” Lesser Slave Lake Scope, 4 December 1973, 3.
In early January 1974, Auger was invited to address a University of Alberta seminar and pressed ahead. Speaking to a crowd of seventy-five, she criticized welfare payments, poor housing conditions, and government inattention to high rates of infant mortality and suicide. She suggested that Indigenous peoples were living in “a continual cycle of poverty.” Auger insisted that people wanted employment not handouts, referring to LIP projects that sent people “to make beaches for the tourists instead of giving incomes to people who want to help themselves… we don’t want this God-damned welfare; we’re sick of it.” Additionally, with a regional sensibility, she criticized IAA and MAA leaders for losing touch with the grassroots. *Poundmaker*, an underground student newspaper, quoted from Auger’s speech and ran an appeal from the Student Christian Movement for donations of food, clothing, woodstoves, and chainsaws.61

Coverage by CBC television’s *Hourglass* program, which featured Auger arguing that local people faced overcrowded housing and starvation, prompted further action by Cree from Driftpile and Métis from Faust. On 19 January, protestors picketed Auger’s home. Louise Laboucane, the chief's mother, joked (simplistically): “Look at me, do I look like I’m starving? I weigh 255 pounds and it would take me a WHOLE YEAR to starve!” The protestors had placards that bore slogans rejecting charity, calling for a chance to present an alternative view, and drawing on a language of respectability and contentment. ‘True Indians Do Not Beg,’ ‘Equal Time on Hourglass,’ ‘Lies, Lies, Lies,’ ‘ WHO Received Donations,’ ‘ We Have Everything City Has Except Pollution,’ and ‘We Are Happy Not Hungry’ were among the exclamations. Auger was accused of merely furthering her own private ends.62

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62 “Protest March in Faust,” 1, 6.
In late January, *Hourglass* returned to Faust and observed a confrontation between, on one hand, Bob Walker and the Métis Association local and, on the other, Auger and fellow activists including Eileen Prince, Paul Campiou, and Marvin Willier. Auger refused to speak English at one point and walked out of the meeting. Again, her critics pressed upon the question of what had become of donated food and clothing, as though this was the smoking gun.63

The CBC’s television crew also granted Auger’s opponents an extended interview. Chief Laboucane spoke for the band council and Mary Walker for the Métis local. Both were dismissive of the CBC’s persistent questions about education and nutrition and referred to the various small-scale activities of their own groups. Thelma Chalifoux – Métis Association member, coordinator of the Slave Lake Native Friendship Centre, and soon to become CYC field staff person in Lesser Slave Lake – demanded to know just who was starving. Francis Willier, one of the welfare officials activists wanted dismissed, focused on Auger’s character and her supposedly self-serving appeals for charity. Said Willier: “She was with CYC and had the same problems she has now.” One woman concurred to say that Auger was “up to her old trick.”64

As late as October 1974, Auger chose to invoke violence and militant rhetoric. Commenting on local alcoholism and poverty, she told a reporter: “Something’s going to have to change around here. And if people are going to have to die in order to make things change, then they’re going to die. We’ve had enough, maybe people better start dying now, now, now.”65

The threat of violence, rather than violence itself, was a tactic Auger used to confront the violence of colonialism. However, she was relatively politically isolated in Faust and Driftpile. In that, she shared qualities with other New Leftists – from American AIM and Black Power

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64 “No One is Starving!,” 1, 8-9.
activists to white radicals in the United States, Europe, and (as we will see) Montreal – who drew on the experiences of Third World nationalist and guerrilla struggles to invoke or use violence.\textsuperscript{66}

In a letter to Ben Baich, Auger noted that the backlash had been especially tough on her partner, but that she was committed to showing her children to have pride in being Cree. She was convinced that Cree traditions were “the true answer to our people’s plight. The wholeness of spirit, mind, body, to be proud of who they are again. [sic]” She noted that there was little alternative to social assistance in Faust, and that she repeatedly had to contest being cut off. She had not had a job in two years: “People say I’m too aggressive and militant for Indian Association or Métis Association! [sic] I’m glad that they didn’t hire me, because they’re all a bunch of crooks and sell-outs.”\textsuperscript{67} It would appear that Auger was too militant for CYC as well. Auger applied but was passed over for a field staff person post in 1974.\textsuperscript{68}

Baich responded supportively, feeling that, in defending a right to social assistance: “You Rose, are practicing democracy and I know it is tough because others would like to decide what is good for you and wish you would ‘know your place,’ be quiet and a nice Indian trying to be a white person.”\textsuperscript{69} Auger’s public response to her critics, which borrowed language from Baich and appeared in a letter to the editor, was a stirring appeal to liberal democratic ideals as well as Indigenous self-identification. Auger wrote: “we are living in a democratic country. Freedom of speech, free to organize or meet and free to practice out our own religion. Free to be who we

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{67} Rose Auger to Ben Baich, 15 February 1974, 2, LAC, RG116, Volume 191, Day Book - Ben Baich, Project Area Director for Manitoba, Sask, and Territories - Nov. 1973-Feb 1974.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ben Baich to Rose Auger, Faust, Alberta, 19 February 1974, 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 191, Day Book - Ben Baich, Project Area Director for Manitoba, Sask, and Territories - Nov. 1973-Feb 1974.
\end{itemize}
really are, Indian. [sic]” She argued that she was fed up with being silent, especially in face of a “fascist” Indian Affairs department. She called on Indigenous peoples to make their families, as she had done, their priorities. Auger’s appeal was evocative and direct. It demanded greater democracy and an end to colonial practices. Yet, having been actively involved in political debates in Lesser Slave Lake, she would have known that prioritizing one’s family and own interests meant different things to local Indigenous peoples with divergent political inclinations.

Conclusion

Company of Young Canadians proved a resource for Indigenous mobilizations for reform, and for liberation, in Lesser Slave Lake at a time when Indigenous politics was being revived and reshaped. Indeed, CYC was one site where the conflict between activists of different political visions, as well as with Indigenous conservatives, was enacted. Development was a central pivot in these late 1960s and early 1970s contests, not least because CYC was committed to the pursuit of community development and greater democracy. CYC paid a small income to Indigenous activists looking, in different ways, to realize those aims. Following a rising number of protests in northern Alberta, the political lines became clear. Indigenous-led development, integration, conciliation with government, and red capitalism privileged by reformers connected to the Métis Association of Alberta was largely rejected by radicals asserting self-determination, anti-colonialism, and red power. However, militant demands also generated pushback from local conservatives and moderates upholding their perceptions of respectability and elements of the status quo. All the while, Indigenous poverty remained.

Without reading these debates forward too much, nor diminishing ongoing Indigenous political divisions, Rose Auger appears in retrospect to have been on the leading edge of political

and cultural renewal in Lesser Slave Lake. She would regain her Indian status and her
membership in the Driftpile Cree Nation. A critic of materialism, Auger was influential in
bringing ceremonies and traditional dancing back to Driftpile life. Her daughter, Laura, argued
that: “She was Indian when it was hard to be Indian.” Markedly, as an elder, Auger’s Cree name
was Osohkahpowiskwew – or, ‘woman who stands strong.’ She died in 2006. In 2012,
members of the Driftpile Cree Nation, the band council included, organized the first Alberta
protest of the Idle No More movement. For nearly two hours, activists blockaded Highway 2.

The link between CYC and later activism in Lesser Slave Lake is by no means direct. A
state-funded, youth-driven organization working within a global politics of poverty, CYC made a
temporary contribution to forms of community self-help. But, for a decade, the company had
organic connections to grassroots activity in Lesser Slave Lake. Both non-Indigenous and
Indigenous volunteers acted on local residents, but also empowered them to act in a search for
greater political and socio-economic democracy. CYC-backed community development
promised to give people greater power to shape their own lives. But the search for
communitarian, consensual, and participatory solutions to poverty in Lesser Slave Lake saw
questions regarding class and racial inequalities within capitalism pushed to the margins.
Community development perpetually sought to integrate local people into dominant social
values, liberal democratic political exercises, and capitalist economic processes. As such, it was
not an effective means of contesting the conditions activists genuinely wished to change.

71 Meili, 19-23.
72 Keith Laboucan, “Driftpile Cree Nation Launched Idle No More Alberta Highway Blockade,” Aboriginal
idle-no-more-alberta-highway-blockade/, accessed 9 March 2015. On the Idle No More movement, see The Kino-
da-nimi Collective, ed., The Winter We Danced: Voices from the Past, the Future, and the Idle No More
Figure 2.1 Willie Dunn

Figure 2.2 Stan Daniels

Figure 2.3 Rose Auger, centre, and Allies at a Community Meeting in Faust

Figure 2.4 Faust and Driftpile Protestors Contesting Their Depiction on CBC’s Hourglass
Chapter 3

Un petit pouvoir

Parish priests in southwest Montreal took to the press in late December 1964 to denounce poor housing in St-Henri, a working-class neighbourhood whose hardscrabble popular image had been greatly shaped by novelist Gabrielle Roy and a National Film Board documentary.\(^1\) The priests called for immediate action, believing that prevailing living conditions were an obstacle to a happy human life and an authentic Christian existence.\(^2\) Spurred to act, the municipal government soon announced plans for urban renewal in St-Henri, where the income of four in five households was well below the Montreal average.\(^3\) From 1967, *Compagnie des jeunes Canadiens* (CJC), as the Company of Young Canadians was known in Quebec, worked alongside residents to build and exert “un petit pouvoir” – a small power – that might ensure more participatory decision-making in urban renewal as well as greater local democracy.

In the 1960s, new attention was paid to poverty by social scientists, religious authorities, unions, university students, and government in Quebec. Liberals and leftists took up a global politics of poverty on varying scales and in differing contexts. In Montreal, that meant applying the transnational practice of *animation sociale* in the hopes of involving residents of poor and working-class neighbourhoods in change on a local scale. Localized anti-poverty action was caught up in a global impulse, but it was also shaped by the specificities of political debate about a changing Montreal and the character of Quebec society.

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Poverty mattered for each of the broadly-defined factions. Progressive nationalists concentrated in the Quebec Liberal party undertook the Quiet Revolution from 1960. At the provincial and municipal levels, they attempted to use the power of the state to craft a secular, liberal democratic, and capitalist society. The socio-economic integration of the poor was no small part of the project. Development initiatives – most notably, urban renewal and participatory regional planning in eastern Quebec – sought to transform social and physical environments. But for some members of the educated middle class, modernization was an insufficient reform. Observing the domination of American and English Canadian capital and culture, they sought greater cultural autonomy and political power. They defended their linguistic rights and increasingly advocated Quebec’s independence. Centrist independentists with Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale distanced themselves from the earlier corporatist Catholic nationalism of clerical elites and the Duplessis regime; right-wing peers with Ralliement national sought to update that older ideology. Ameliorating poverty was relevant to building cross-class national unity and sovereigntist alliance. The two currents came together with leftists within Parti québécois in 1968. For social democrats and socialists, the politics of poverty was an opportunity to seek farther-reaching change. To many, independence and social transformation were entangled goals. Leftists were critical of liberal nationalism and – through popular, union, party, or armed activism – pursued class struggle and significant restructuring to end poverty. Often, their dissatisfaction with both liberal democratic capitalism and Soviet communism led toward a search for creative left alternatives. In the process, they drew on Cold War social scientific concepts, Third World liberation ideas, continental European leftist writing, and transnational Catholic social thought.4

4 Robert Comeau, “Du nationalisme canadien-français au nationalisme québécois,” in Histoire intellectuelle de
The common thread running through these visions of poverty redress was that the poor should not only be objects of action, but also agents of change. Increasingly, conscientious actors who rediscovered material poverty in 1960s working-class Montreal were taken with a new and prominent means of social intervention, *animation sociale*. Elaborated in St-Henri from 1963, *animation sociale* was a method for encouraging the poor to organize, address their own poverty, and participate in the decisions affecting their own lives. CJC was among the most consequential organizations to adopt the practice.

*Animation sociale*, applied with similar aims though of wider range than community development in Alberta, was CJC’s method of intervention in Quebec. Yet CJC’s use of *animation sociale* has been peripheral to histories of the company as well as accounts of community organizing in Montreal. A study of CJC allows for a much fuller analysis of *animation sociale*’s breadth and shifting character in poverty debates in Montreal. Between 1967 and 1974, CJC empowered left liberals, New Leftists, and revolutionary socialists to pursue the difficult work of citizen organizing in St-Henri. Even so, there was considerable debate over the practice, goals, and political meaning of *animation sociale*. Throughout accrued experience and political divergences, *animation sociale* was a changeable and fundamentally contested concept. It was a prism through which progressives, radicals, and revolutionaries worked out their visions for a more just and participatory democracy that would end poverty in Montreal.

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In the first part of this story, I consider the use of *animation sociale* and *animation sociale politique* among residents of the Little Burgundy section of St-Henri from 1967. In both guises, CJC animators sought to encourage the poor to take action to secure a meaningful place within a more egalitarian and inclusive Quebec society. Initially, they viewed *animation sociale* as a means of psycho-cultural change and, amid urban renewal, they envisioned the prospect of wider social renewal. However, efforts to forge a more egalitarian democracy from below and to involve residents in urban renewal decision-making were resisted by city officials. Struggling with ineffectiveness and challenged on the left, CJC animators shifted from the idea of sharing power to one of seeking its redistribution. *Animation sociale politique*, a revised strategy seeking to build citizen power, assumed that once local people studied their immediate problems they could progressively come to understand larger structural issues. Politicized residents would then build a “parallel power,” both in electoral politics and through issue by issue common fronts, to secure greater power in society. Despite the support of CJC and similar organizations, participatory projects were difficult to sustain and did not produce desired transformation. In their final appraisal, CJC animators blamed the poor for the failure of *animation* and its ambitions. Yet, for some residents, *animation sociale* and *animation sociale politique* provided a short-lived opening to exert a small power and to express democratic alternatives. In what follows, I contextualize *animation sociale* and urban renewal before analyzing CJC activism.

*Animation sociale*

Montreal was an important site for Sixties cultural and intellectual ferment. Notably, left-leaning activists and intellectuals made the city into something of a North American conduit for French-language texts and ideas originating in France and the Third World.⁶ *Animation sociale* was one important concept that moved transnationally, and which social reformers

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adapted in their efforts to confront poverty in Montreal. Two applied social scientists – Michel Blondin and Martin Béliveau – elaborated an initial animation sociale praxis taken up by CJC.

CJC’s animation sociale intervention in St-Henri built on an existing foundation. The Conseil des œuvres de Montréal (COM), a lay Catholic social planning organ under diocesan and the Fédération des œuvres de charité canadiennes-françaises authority, initiated experimental action to address urban poverty. COM leaders were motivated especially by the Quiet Revolution drive to modernize Quebec society. From summer 1964, social worker Michel Blondin led the effort. Born in a rural working-class family in 1938, Blondin was influenced by Catholic social thought and considered the priesthood. Instead, he enrolled a Université de Montréal in 1962 to study social work. He was dissatisfied with the dominant, individual casework approach and was instead drawn to forms of group intervention.

Blondin crafted a synthesis of animation sociale from diverse origins. First, animation sociale was a French colonial practice elaborated in interwar Africa and centered on encouraging participation in self-help rural development schemes. The concept blurred with the cooperative organizing Père Louis-Joseph Lebret undertook among Saint-Malo, France fishermen during the Great Depression. In the early 1960s, the animation sociale tradition was adapted to Quebec by Bureau d'aménagement de l'Est du Québec (BAEQ), whose model of participatory rural

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planning and modernization was borrowed in part from Lebret.\textsuperscript{11} Blondin briefly worked as a BAEQ animator in 1964. Second, he was introduced to the American community organizing current by COM’s Roger Prud’homme, who had studied sociology at University of Chicago. Blondin read the work of Saul Alinsky and Murray Ross, among others. Third, Blondin belonged to \textit{Chantiers de Montréal} while still a student. The group was formed at Université de Montréal in 1959 following the example of Université Laval students taken with Abbé Pierre’s ideas. Pierre, a Paris clergyman, advocated social action pursued by living with and working alongside the poor. As a \textit{Chantiers} member, Blondin started a small St-Henri youth centre. A fourth antecedent was \textit{Action catholique}, a Quebec interwar working class cultural and social movement which privileged self-activity and sought to democratize religion. The movement, and its Catholic personalism (stressing an individual-centered faith and liberal humanism), generated greater pluralism in Catholic thought and progressive parish activism.\textsuperscript{12}

With COM, Blondin pursued the new social work approach in St-Henri. Though acknowledging material deprivation, Blondin argued that the apathy and powerlessness of local people was key. He hoped to use \textit{animation sociale} to spur collective action that would address the root causes of poverty and produce widespread participation in decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{13}

Evidently, Blondin drew on anthropologist Oscar Lewis’ culture of poverty thesis, which was popularized on the Quebec left in the 1960s by the radical journal \textit{Parti pris}.\textsuperscript{14} The idea –


\textsuperscript{13} Michel Blondin, \textit{Social Animation, as Developed and Practiced by Le Conseil des Oeuvres de Montréal} (Canadian Welfare Council, Community Funds and Councils of Canada, January 1969), 1-2.

\textsuperscript{14} Gosselin, 77-79; Marie Letellier, \textit{On n’est pas des trous-de-cul} (Montréal: Éditions Partis-Pris, 1971).
which Lewis developed after field research in Alberta, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and India – held that a “subculture of poverty” was a universal adaptation of the poor to their marginal position in capitalist society and was passed down from generation to generation. The culture perpetuated poverty and was believed to be discernible in the lack of participation of the poor in larger society, minimal organization at a community level, the absence of childhood at a family level, and feelings of inferiority at an individual level. If the thesis was all-encompassing, Lewis wished to highlight the psychological traits produced by poverty, not immutable characteristics of the poor. Indeed, he meant to challenge Marx’s suggestion that the ‘lumpenproletariat’ was inherently reactionary. Lewis cited Martinique philosopher Frantz Fanon’s idea that Third World revolution arose from the desperately poor and he admired the Cuban Revolution for its attempt to realize the revolutionary potential of those living in poverty.15

Accordingly, Blondin argued that animation sociale was a technique of social intervention whose goal was the psycho-cultural transformation of poor people. He wrote that “the process of animation gives rise to a process of self-education, the essence of which is a heightening of the capacity for self-determination.” With the assistance of animators, residents would become aware of their collective situation, improve communication, set goals, and take rational action through a decentralized, autonomous, and participatory organization. Expressing an ideal of participatory democracy, Blondin contended that animation sociale was an anti-poverty tool because it “accords a large place to participation by the ‘little people’ of our society – the poor and the working-class people – because it seeks to give them back a real place in our society, to give them a share of power like any other social class.” The poor would adapt to

mass-consumption society and modernity. Therefore, participation was both a means and ends of greater integration and pluralism. Democracy, and society, were to be remade from below.\textsuperscript{16}

The first citizens’ committees in St-Henri were parish-based and dealt with issues such as an unsafe school, recreation, and housing. \textit{Jeunesse ouvrière catholique} (JOC), \textit{Mouvement des travailleurs chrétiens}, and worker-priests supported the work. After 1966, COM expanded into other working class areas of Montreal, gaining more social scientist and student allies.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Animation sociale} found adherents among socially engaged Quebec youth. From the 1930s to 1950s, many youth activities were channeled into \textit{Action catholique} groups like JOC.\textsuperscript{18}

In the 1960s, a heightened sense of social and, later, political commitment among the baby boom generation was expressed in new directions. A politicized student movement made university campuses sites of contestation and debate, but students also looked to change society at large.\textsuperscript{19}

Reflecting greater awareness of poverty, student voluntarism turned especially to the urban working class and the methods of \textit{animation sociale}. \textit{Travailleurs étudiants du Québec} (TEQ), a project begun by the Université de Montréal students’ union, received provincial backing in 1965 in response to the federal government’s creation of CYC.\textsuperscript{20} TEQ student animators – including

\begin{itemize}
  \item Louise Bienvenue, \textit{Quand la jeunesse entre en scène: L’Action catholique avant la Révolution tranquille} (Montréal: Boréal, 2002).
  \item Kevin Brushett, “‘Federally Financed Felquistes’: The Company of Young Canadians and the Prelude to the October Crisis,” \textit{Québec Studies} 55 (2013), 78.
\end{itemize}
two placed with COM in St-Henri – worked summers on recreation projects, and with unions, cooperatives, and other groups. The province subsequently created its own framework for student animators under the Action sociale étudiante (ASE) and later the Action sociale jeunesse (ASJ) labels. ASJ became a year-round program, but was ended through budget cuts in 1972.\footnote{Jean Laliberté, “Les Travailleurs étudiants du Québec: Student Social Action,” trans. Peter Katadotis, Our Generation 4, no. 3 (1966): 32-35; Blondin, Le projet St-Henri, 31; “L’Action social jeunesse disparait,” Bulletin de l’APLQ, No. 74, 24-31 août 1972, 10-12.}

CJC was immersed in this burgeoning animation sociale context. It had few initial volunteers in Quebec. Martin Béliveau, hired to lead Quebec operations in June 1967, changed matters. Within six months – and preferring politicized candidates – he attracted almost 100 personnel, including former TEQ volunteers. Though the Quebec program was never more than an administrative region within the larger company, Béliveau asserted a degree of autonomy.\footnote{“The Company of Young Canadians in Quebec - Information File,” Montreal, March 1969, 3, LAC, RG116, Volume 52, File 160-1 - Plans and Programs - General; Brushett, “‘Fedrally Financed Felquistes,’” 79; Charles Côté et Yannick Hanois, L’animation au Québec: sources, apports et limites (Montréal: Éditions coopératives Albert St-Martin, 1978), 255.}

Béliveau’s introduction to animation sociale came as a BAEQ fieldworker in summer 1965. In fact, he was a key figure in the political split among BAEQ animators. Against those who viewed animation sociale as a mere technical instrument of rational planning, Béliveau and fellow socialists saw it as a way to politicize people, to make them conscious of the inefficiency of the capitalist system, and to seek the social, economic, and political transformation of Quebec. After leaving BAEQ, he continued his education in France, where he studied with leading figures in the “people and culture” popular education movement.\footnote{Jean-Marc Piotte, “L’option politique du b.a.e.q.,” Parti pris 3, no. 10 (mai 1966): 47-48; Dionne, 137; Bréville, 293.} Béliveau would make his vision of animation sociale CJC philosophy in Quebec, and it attracted radicals and reformers alike.

Béliveau argued that CJC’s very goal was democratic participation, something that might ensure collective action to resolve society’s problems. By fostering informed engagement, a
democratic spirit, and a new community leadership, he insisted that animators were agents of change. Come 1968, his thinking was imbued by New Left and socialist thought. Bélieu

cited philosophers Herbert Marcuse and Raoul Vaneigem, as well as Marx and Nietzsche, and argued that animation sociale “aims, in betting on the creative capacity of individuals, to allow a group to better grasp and self-analyze itself; its aims to render a group capable of contesting its situation, of proposing new solutions to initiate change with the conscious and active participation of individuals.” He believed that animation sociale marked a refusal of all forms of humans dominating humans and was “a total reevaluation of society, it postulates absolute revolution.” It was for Bélieu a means of catalyzing the liberation of individuals, who could then use their creative capacities to forge a harmonious and peaceful society.

In May 1967, CJC agreed to place volunteers in southwest Montreal under the direction of COM animators. Volunteers, in terms articulated by Blondin and Bélieu, would use animation sociale to involve low-income residents in improving their own lives. Not only would collective action prompt psycho-cultural change and produce a new leadership, participation would involve the poor in capitalist modernity and remake liberal democracy from below.

By this time, urban renewal had become a key focus of animation sociale activity in St-Henri. Residents and animators confronted dramatic physical changes to the Ste-Cunégonde and

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25 “L’animation sociale vise, en misant sur la capacité créatrice des individus, à permettre à un groupe de se mieux saisir et de se remettre en question; elle vise à rendre ce groupe capable de contester son environnement, de proposer des solutions nouvelles pour engager un changement avec la participation consciente et active des individus.” Martin Bélieu, “L’animation sociale: un art, une stratégie, une tactique révolutionnaires,” septembre 1968, 3-4, The William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections, McMaster University Libraries (hereafter McMaster Archives), Front de Libération du Québec Collection, Box 1, File 19 - Publications.  
St-Joseph parishes. But before exploring how *animation sociale* worked in practice, it is necessary to understand urban renewal in its Montreal context.

**Rénovation urbaine**

Urban renewal was a far-reaching, city planning-driven intervention. It was a prominent aspect of postwar high modernist municipal planning and was pursued concurrently in Canada, the United States, and Western Europe in the decades after the Second World War.28 As elsewhere, urban renewal in Montreal figured within a broader attempt to rationalize land use, increase property values, and exemplify modernity.

Some reformers had long eyed slum clearances in older working-class neighbourhoods surrounding downtown, including St-Henri. In the 1960s, urban renewal became a more pressing issue.29 In 1963, Montreal’s Planning Department began formulating a master city plan and soon passed a city-wide, comprehensive zoning bylaw. In 1964, the federal government revised the National Housing Act to provide matching funds to provinces wishing to carry out urban renewal projects. Though empowered by a federal-provincial framework, it was largely local governments and planning departments that decided where and when to proceed. In early 1965, after lobbying by merchants and the very public denunciation of local poverty by area priests, St-Henri was confirmed as the first location of urban renewal in Montreal.30

Progress and modernity were the themes of municipal government in Montreal. In 1960, Jean Drapeau, following a civic morality campaign, was elected mayor. A series of governance

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reforms concentrated power in an executive committee and rendered city council, the municipal legislative body, mostly inconsequential. Drapeau, assisted by executive committee president Lucien Saulnier, presented himself as the bearer of popular will. In practice, the regime was paternalistic, authoritarian, secretive, anti-democratic, and closely tied to financial speculators and real estate developers who made a profit from the exchange value of urban space.\(^{31}\)

Accordingly, a profit-centric pursuit of modernity was exemplified in projects for the large-scale redevelopment of the downtown business core, the construction of freeways, the hosting of Expo and the Summer Olympics, and urban renewal. Each was premised on projecting progress to the electorate.\(^{32}\) However, they were pursued through the technocratic exercise of urban planning.

While urban renewal was justified to the public as a solution to poor quality housing, it was only ever a secondary concern (even as 80% of Montreal’s residents were tenants and faced rising rents, reduced vacancies, and deteriorating housing stock).\(^{33}\) Renewal cleared housing and only partly replaced it. Rather, the goal was to reorganize urban space and to raise property values, and therefore municipal tax revenue. Urban renewal involved expropriating property owners, displacing residents, demolishing existing buildings, servicing newly shaped lots, and completing infrastructure like roads and sidewalks.\(^{34}\) The plans made provision to build some

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public housing to which residents might return, but envisioned that private redevelopment would lead the way. In short, urban space was treated as a means of production and – to use Henri Lefebvre’s terminology – its exchange value was placed above its use value.35

In March 1965, the Planning Department presented a preliminary plan for urban renewal in ‘Little Burgundy.’ Carved from two St-Henri parishes, Little Burgundy was a 265-acre area bisected by the Canadian National rail yards and delimited by Guy, Atwater, and St-Antoine streets and the Lachine Canal. Its northern boundary ran along Canadian Pacific tracks and the route of a proposed freeway. Its southern edge bordered factories along the canal, including the Stelco steel plant.36 By a later appraisal, Little Burgundy had 14,331 residents, 73% of whom were French-speaking. Other residents were Irish-Canadian and Black-Canadian anglophones, as well as Italian immigrants. Housing conditions were poor, with planners noting that 76% of dwellings had inadequate heating, 52% had no running hot water, and 31% had no bath facilities. Some 90% of families were tenants and 77% of buildings were owned by non-resident landlords. Planners viewed Little Burgundy as a typical working-class area in Montreal.37

The overall aim of the renewal program was “the systematic and progressive improvement of the social, physical and economic conditions for the area as a whole.” Yet the primary objective was to strictly separate land uses through the creation of a residential district north of Notre Dame Street and an industrial district to its south. Other goals, like advocating the removal of the Canadian National rail lines and yard, were of a similar order. When it came to housing and social objectives, the planners wrote of the “erection of dwellings with rental

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36 Ville de Montréal, Service d’urbanisme, La Petite Bourgogne: programme préliminaire de rénovation urbaine; Bulletin spécial no. 1 (Montréal: Service d’urbanisme, mars 1965), 21.
levels which the present residents could afford to pay” and the “preservation of the environment’s social identity.” In terms of physical redevelopment, however, the plan proposed the large-scale bulldozing of the area and the construction of things new.38

Empowered by federal and provincial funds and assent, the Planning Department undertook its Little Burgundy experiment in stages between 1966 and 1972. The first section was a two-block residential area with 717 residents and 192 households, called the St. Martin’s Blocks. Planners proposed replacing existing structures with 286 new and 28 restored moderately priced housing units – all including stoves, refrigerators, central gas heating, and hookups for eventual automatic washers and dryers. The architectural designs laid out street-facing multi-unit buildings with interior parking space and courtyards.39 The appeal of renewal for residents was the promise of being moved, temporarily rehoused, and then returned to new, modern lodgings. However, rather than be mere passengers on a train of progress-minded technocratic redevelopment, it was in the St. Martin’s Blocks that residents, encouraged by social animators, first contested the practice and meaning of urban renewal in Montreal.

Rénovation sociale

Animators believed that, once organized and mobilized, people could understand their own needs and express them to government. Urban renewal seemed like a perfect opportunity to revalorize community and empower St-Henri residents to demand that authorities consult and inform them on decisions affecting their lives. In fact, citizen mobilization in the St. Martin’s Blocks came to constitute a marked challenge to existing democratic practice in Montreal, though there were clear limits to what residents achieved.

39 The St. Martin’s Blocks were delimited by St-Antoine, Richmond, St-Jacques, and des Seigneurs streets. Service de l’habitation de la ville de Montréal, Les habitations des îlots Saint-Martin, février 1968, 2, 15.
In response to city plans for urban renewal, Michel Blondin turned *animation sociale* toward the housing question. Markedly, he believed that the physical renewal of Little Burgundy might be an occasion to realize further reaching changes in the “mentalité” of the poor. COM identified its strategy as “rénovation sociale.” Social renewal’ would complement urban renewal, but the concept also implied farther-reaching socio-economic transformations to alleviate poverty. Animators would encourage self-directed social planning on the part of the poor themselves. The activism would revalorize community, encourage residents to make their needs known to government, and improve the quality of everyday life.41

CJC staff concurred with the theme of social renewal and justified intervention in Little Burgundy in terms of the social consequences of redevelopment. It was argued: “Urban renewal is often the denial of one of the rights of the people: the right to be part of a community. In the working class world, neighbourhood relationships are extremely important, for people who have nothing else, find compensation for their poverty in mutual help and friendship.” Without animators, poor citizens would be unable to react in the face of municipal technocrats. Only the threat of eviction would “shake them to awareness” and make mobilization possible.42

In these terms, the ideal was collaboration between bureaucrats and people affected by their decisions. *Animation sociale* might foster awareness among residents of their own needs, but also make those needs legible to city officials. In practice, residents wanted better housing but came to object to the lack of consultation and information coming from planners. Seeking to compel more responsive and sympathetic government action, residents appealed to the municipal

executive. Despite its integrative designs, CJC and COM animation sociale stimulated a form of political participation outside the existing norms, institutions, and power structure in Montreal. Citizens’ committees, themselves aspiring to a model of representative and participatory democracy, called the lack of municipal political representativity into question. In doing so, residents pressed for an enlargement of liberal democracy extending beyond mere suffrage.

In early 1965, Blondin encouraged the formation of Réveil des citoyens de la Petite Bourgogne and it remained active as an umbrella organization until 1968. Yet most activism centered on localized committees organized in response to each successive segment of the renewal program. As a result, the citizens’ movement in Little Burgundy was fragmented. This was consequential because it enabled authorities to more easily co-opt or rebut citizen demands for social renewal and for participation in the urban renewal planning process.

The social renewal idea was first pursued in the St. Martin’s Blocks. In November 1966, COM animator Hector Ouellet went door to door survey to gauge resident awareness of forthcoming expropriations. The survey generated interest and 150 people turned out at a subsequent public information meeting where city planners presented their renewal plans. Jeanne Leblanc – a single mother of three, social assistance recipient, and central figure in St. Martin’s Blocks mobilization – found the plans nice but her impression was that the neighbourhood would be transformed into something that no longer belonged to residents.

The ambivalence of some residents dissipated once their material security was actively threatened. Expropriation notices arrived in December 1966, containing little information beyond a July 1967 move out date. They provoked considerable anxiety and some residents

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Blondin, “L’animation sociale,” 296-299; Bougie, 49-52. For more on Réveil, see Jean Lavigne, “Le Comité de citoyens de la Petite Bourgogne” (Mémoire de maîtrise en sociologie, Université Laval, 1971).}
\footnote{Jeanne Leblanc, “La lutte des citoyens des îlots St-Martin,” in Petite Bourgogne, ed. Claude Larivière (Montréal: Éditions québécois, 1973), 46-47. Leblanc’s account was also published as Jeanne Leblanc, “Annexe 1: ‘Le viol de la douce consultation,’” in La Rénovation urbaine, ed. Simard, 76-96.}
\end{footnotes}
chose to move away. For those who remained, they found that landlords began to refuse all requests for repairs. In this context, animators began to mobilize both anglophone and francophone constituencies in the St. Martin’s Blocks. In early 1967, three Action sociale étudiante volunteers interviewed francophone families, sought to better inform them on renewal, and encouraged them to form a citizens’ committee to defend their interest. A small number of women, including Leblanc and Leonie Chasles, became active.

Among anglophones, McGill social work students working for the Montreal Council of Social Agencies were resource persons. Little Burgundy Citizens’ Committee was set up, but it devolved into one or two people writing letters to Lucien Saulnier, president of the city executive committee. In December, Bryan Knight picked up where an earlier student left off. Working one a day a week, he went door to door to meet residents. He discovered mix of long-term residents and new immigrants from countries such as Italy and Portugal, of workers, social assistance recipients, and pensioners, of homeowners and tenants, and of whites and blacks.

Indeed, a black anglophone working class had long been concentrated in the area, sustained by the segregated hiring of black American porters by the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific railways. A key institution of the black community, the Negro Community Centre (1927), was racially integrated in 1955 and moved into a hall adjacent the St. Martin’s Blocks. As the main local anglophone organization, the Centre offered social services and recreation programs irrespective of race (an orientation young Black Power activists challenged in 1971). Certainly, black Montrealers – who from the 1960s included immigrants from places

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45 Leblanc, “La lutte,” 47.
47 Bryan M. Knight, Expropriation ’67: A Teaching Record for Training Students of Community Organization (Montreal: McGill University, School of Social Work, 1968), 9, 81-82.
such as Haiti and settled in multiple parts of the city – faced various forms of everyday racial discrimination and periodically mobilized to contest it.\textsuperscript{48} At least one Little Burgundy resident found it difficult to secure a new place to live because of racial discrimination, but matters of race and language were not foregrounded in urban renewal mobilization.\textsuperscript{49}

On doorsteps, Knight was met with a mix of suspicion, hostility, and indifference. All the same, he looked to replicate the \textit{animation sociale} procedure pursued among francophones. Eight anglophone residents, a couple from Jamaica among them, were interested and formed the St. Martin’s Blocks Committee in January 1967. Their appeals to Lucien Saulnier for more information secured a meeting, yet most of the allotted time was taken up by city planners who ignored or dodged questions. Instead of conversation, the planners forged ahead with a highly technical slide show. Subsequently, low participation, personal vindictiveness, and class divisions between members of the two different anglophone committees hampered action.\textsuperscript{50}

Municipal authorities, it became clear, exercised power by meeting with residents to placate concerns, but refusing to be drawn on the timeline of renewal or the rights of residents. In the absence of such information, anglophone and francophone groups were encouraged by animators to work together. They compared notes on meetings they had had with the director of a newly-established municipal planning outreach office. Not only were residents dissatisfied with the answers they received, they found it strange that each group had been given different, and often erroneous, information. They decided to proceed with a single, bilingual citizens’


\textsuperscript{49} Maurice Bulbulian, \textit{La P’ite Bourgogne} (Ottawa: National Film Board, 1968).

\textsuperscript{50} Knight, iii, 4-5, 9, 14, 21, 37, 84.
group. Nonetheless, residents were left to wait. Even where the city assumed ownership of a property, occupants had to receive an eviction notice to receive a small indemnity.\footnote{Leblanc, “La lutte,” 47.}

On 7 June 1967, eviction notices arrived and informed residents that they would have to move out by 1 September. In these circumstances, Knight and Victor Dumas (who was likely an ASE volunteer) helped residents organize a meeting and issued invitations in French, English, and Italian. The next day 100 people, almost half the remaining St. Martin’s Blocks population, gathered to consider the situation. After hours of discussion (during which francophones were more vociferous than anglophones – something raising unanswered questions about the linguistic and racial dynamics in play), residents decided to act. They marched on city hall the following day and press coverage brought their concerns to public attention. Their elected delegates met with Lucien Saulnier and, using a language of citizen rights, demanded an increase in compensation, more time to move out, and that affordable and adequate temporary housing be provided. Saulnier rebutted the group by insisting that every case would be dealt with individually, not collectively. The pattern was repeatedly once more. On 22 June, Saulnier met with residents at the Negro Community Centre. He presented expropriation as neither terrible nor complicated. Local people, facing a search for new housing at the height of Expo, disagreed, yet were mollified. To Leblanc, it took residents a few days to realize that Saulnier’s benevolent paternalism had changed little. And so, they resolved to form a formal citizens’ committee.\footnote{Leblanc, “La lutte,” 48-49; Knight, 91-96; Serge Y. Piotte, “La rénovation urbaine et le phénomène de pression: étude monographique, le cas de ‘la Petite Bourgogne’ à Montréal” (Mémoire de maîtrise en sociologie, Université de Montréal, 1970), 138-139.}

Spurred to action, residents sought to defend their interests through the lines of representative and participatory democracy. Equally, they sought to enliven collective action by building social and community ties. At a joint supper night and election in late July, Association...
des résidents des Îlots St-Martin (ARISM) was inaugurated. Its mere creation prompted the city to raise the indemnities on offer, to delay eviction until November, and to redouble efforts to find residents new housing. Assisted by animators, ARISM began to meet weekly and its elected committee members made a concerted effort to consult with their neighbours and recruit more participants. The leadership expanded to include seven anglophones and seven francophones. Since some members were unilingual, meetings simultaneous translation.53

In August 1967, Yves Brunet, who had been an ASE volunteer collaborating with COM’s Hector Ouellet, joined CJC. Ouellet soon left. It was at this point that local urban renewal activism became a CJC undertaking. Brunet, who would later characterize Little Burgundy as a refuge of the poor, quickly realized how much work organizing was and requested additional support. In October, six more CYC volunteers were added to the project.54 Once ARISM was well established, some volunteers turned to renewal-centric committees on other blocks. CJC’s initial projects in Quebec were diffuse and ill-defined, and it was not always clear where or if volunteers were working. By summer 1968, nine volunteers were officially assigned to Little Burgundy, a number that declined thereafter.55

Just as the arrival of activist-filmmakers had fostered demands for social justice in Lesser Slave Lake, ARISM activists were boosted by the appearance of a Challenge for Change/Société nouvelle (CFC/SN) director. CFC/SN was a National Film Board program launched in 1967. It was premised on the idea that film could empower disadvantaged groups and facilitate

55 Interim Programme Committee, Minutes, 4-6 July 1968, Appendix 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 74, File 730-4 - Plans and Programs - Project Area Directors - Quebec - Reports 2 of 3.

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democratic decision-making, consciousness-raising, and consensus-building.\textsuperscript{56} Maurice Bulbulian travelled to southwest Montreal in September 1967 with the intention of making a film about deindustrialization along the Lachine Canal. However, he happened upon ARISM’s efforts to defend local interests in the face of urban renewal. Shot over two months, ARISM members were involved in the conception and realization of the film, \textit{La P’\textquotesingle tite Bourgogne}.\textsuperscript{57}

The film, which included CJC volunteers Yves Brunet and Édouard Casaubon, hit on several important themes. Shots of in-progress demolitions, children playing amidst rubble, and large stretches of emptied space conveyed the transformations unfolding. Roy Croxen, a middle-aged black resident married to an ARISM member, related the sense of injustice residents felt:

The city’s expropriating us: I didn’t think that was fair. That’s the part I didn’t like about it. I didn’t think that was fair at all. It upsets your whole routine of living, this moving and everything. It’s a way of living, you know what I mean? Move? That’s it! Then you gotta find that you gotta change all your ways and everything, what you’re doing. How to make ends meet and everything.\textsuperscript{58}

Equally affecting were scenes of ARISM members Jeanne Leblanc and Noël Daudelin touring \textit{Habitations Jeanne-Mance}, a public housing complex built in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{59} Two residents explained that tenants were dissatisfied and felt insecure due to ever-changing rents, surveillance by authorities, and an absence of lease agreements. Interviewed about what they had seen and

\textsuperscript{56} Zoë Druick, \textit{Projecting Canada: Government Policy and Documentary Film at the National Film Board of Canada} (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007), 127-128.


\textsuperscript{58} Maurice Bulbulian, \textit{La P’\textquotesingle tite Bourgogne} (Ottawa: National Film Board, 1968).

heard, Leblanc and Daudelin were discouraged and somewhat stunned. Remarked Leblanc: “We are better off in our shacks than in those houses, because at least we are at home. It’s one thing to be poor, but we are not obliged to sell our freedom to have something a little better.”

ARISM had been pressing for another meeting with Saulnier, and it turned out that NFB letterhead was enough not only to bring about a meeting, but also to have it held on camera. In the compelling central scene of the film, Saulnier and committee members debated democracy itself. Asked what he thought of citizens’ committees, Saulnier, who played uncomfortably with a matchbook and spoke deliberately, said that they were useful in the elaboration of policy. He saw committees as valid so long as they claimed to speak for the majority of the population. Leblanc interjected to note that committee members made no ‘claim’ to speak for residents, but were in fact elected by the people. When another committee member explained that residents would like to participate in the administration of public housing on a 50-50 basis, Saulnier’s response was sharper. He argued that, at the very least, administration would have to take place on a 51-49 basis in favour of authorities. He lectured paternalistically about his reasoning: “We assume, at each election, the responsibility of administering the public affairs of Montreal. And we surely cannot, with a measure that would not first be ratified by the majority of the electorate, share those responsibilities confided in us.” In their debate, ARISM members and Saulnier presented competing claims to democratic representativity and elected power.

The parameters of ARISM’s work were shaped by how renewal affected residents. The committee strove to ensure that residents were well informed on city plans and procedures and

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60 “On est mieux à nos cabanes que ses maisons là, parce qu’on est chez nous au moins. C’est beau d’être pauvre, mais on n’est pas obligé de vendre notre liberté pour avoir un peu mieux.” Bulbulian, La P’tite Bourgogne.
61 Waugh, 168.
62 “Nous assumons, à chaque élection, la responsabilité d’administrer les affaires publiques de la ville de Montréal. Et nous ne pouvons surement pas de geste qui ne serait pas, d’abords, ratifier par la majorité des électeurs, partager les responsabilités qui nous sont confiés.” Bulbulian, La P’tite Bourgogne.
that they received the assistance and compensation that they were entitled to.\textsuperscript{63} By the end of 1967, all the buildings in the St. Martin’s Blocks had been demolished. So, ARISM refocused on the difficult work of staying in contact with former residents dispersed throughout Montreal. A newsletter was started and a survey was carried out to see how people had fared with securing indemnities and new housing. The survey discovered that residents had often been forced to take poor quality temporary housing and were eager to return to the St. Martin’s Blocks. For the committee, detrimental housing conditions underscored the injustice of renewal.\textsuperscript{64}

ARISM continued to argue that residents had a right to participate in the planning and administration of public housing. Since clear housing policies had not yet been set, ARISM decided to proactive and study the question of a rent schedule. The work was punctuated in June 1968 by a ground breaking ceremony, during which police fastidiously guarded Mayor Drapeau from the gathered public.\textsuperscript{65}

The committee finished its rent schedule in September 1968. The bilingual report presented public housing as a matter of social justice, not charity. It accepted urban renewal and agreed that a minimum standard of housing should be ensured. But the committee insisted that residents should not have to pay, in elevated rents, for improvements about which they had little say. The report argued that the best possible public housing conditions could be achieved with a well-balanced rent scale and the participation of residents in the co-management of their complexes. Committee members were anxious to avoid a high concentration of social assistance recipients among tenants, contending that “experience has proven that grouping very low-income families to the same environment produces disastrous effects both on the individual and social

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{63} “Rapport sur le développement du projet Petite Bourgogne,” 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} Leblanc, “La lutte,” 49-51; La Service d’Habitation de la Ville de Montréal, \textit{Echos de la Petite Bourgogne}, no. 1, December 1967, LAC, RG116, Volume 118, 541 Projet Petite Bourgogne.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} Demers, “Pourquoi refusent-elles l’appartement idéal?”; Leblanc, “La lutte,” 51.
\end{itemize}
levels.” To ensure a socio-economically diverse population, the committee detailed a sliding rent schedule that would not overly penalize wage earners. A logic around “social change” was thus built into the rent scale. Though not entirely spelled out, the suggestion was that higher wage earners would act as a social and moral influence on lower income families. The community, it was argued, needed to contain “dynamic positive elements.” Therefore, ARISM sought to prevent a culture of poverty and realize a version of rénovation sociale.

Without a rent schedule of its own, the Montreal Housing Department took a conciliatory position and endorsed ARISM’s rent scale with a few changes. Only then did the committee learn that the authority to set public housing rents rested with the province’s housing agency. And Société d’habitation du Québec (SHQ) flatly rejected the work of residents. ARISM reached out to SHQ, but were given non-answers or referred back to the municipality. In the interim, ex-residents faced an approaching deadline if they were to get out of their temporary leases and return to the St. Martin’s Blocks for May 1969. The committee tried press releases, television and radio interviews, and ultimatums, and it planned an occupation of the new housing units. Nothing worked. And when city officials appraised ARISM of SHQ’s proposed rent schedule, committee members were taken aback and discouraged by the elevated rates.67

Fortuitously, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau visited Little Burgundy in mid-March and citizen activists were invited by city planning officials to attend. ARISM members reluctantly decided to go and listen. They also asked CJC volunteers to help make placards that expressed common sentiments, like “Where is the Just Society?” The next day, Trudeau was late for the meeting. The 100 people present talked and passed time by singing the popular tune, “On ne

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veut plus de promesses.” Citizen activists took the floor to discuss ongoing organizing work. By the time Trudeau and Lucien Saulnier showed up, they did so in the middle of a party atmosphere. Trudeau heard what residents were singing and turned on his heels and left.68

Leblanc noted that the entire scene had been spontaneous. That did not stop Saulnier from decrying CJC as responsible for agitation in Little Burgundy. Ironically, the controversy advanced ARISM’s cause. Provincial housing minister Robert Lussier now met with residents, and the province soon accepted the committee’s rent schedule for a period of two years. Leblanc felt that the battle had been won, even if it had necessitated some tactics she considered ‘none too Catholic.’ In May 1969, Bulbulian’s film was shown in Little Burgundy and, in June 1969, Leblanc left ARISM to become a CJC volunteer working with committees on other blocks.69

The victory was a pyrrhic one. In early 1970, ARISM remained active as a tenants’ group. It sought to make resident views known to housing officials, but had no real power. Moreover, participation had atrophied to two or three people. The financial details of the ARISM rent schedule were accepted, but not the vision of public housing behind it. No concessions over administration were made. And the provincial and municipal governments never intended to build more than a minimum of public housing, so they privileged placing people in greatest need in available units. If involving token citizen participation in the process, SHQ outflanked possible protest by imposing a province wide rent schedule beginning in May 1971. As ARISM had feared, wage earners were penalized. If a resident increased their income, they had to pay more for public housing. Some residents decided that for those rents they might

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as well live somewhere nicer and moved away.\textsuperscript{70} For Leblanc, the decision made public housing into ghettos for the working poor, the unemployed, and those on social assistance.\textsuperscript{71}

In Leblanc’s estimation, the St. Martin’s Blocks struggle had been one of the poor fighting with the means at their disposal, being “un petit pouvoir” – “a small power, that of solidarity, of gaiety and humour, with head and heart.”\textsuperscript{72} CJC volunteers supported residents in their struggle. The animation-initiated mobilization turned on, and generated, a community of common interest among residents of the same concentrated area. For COM and CJC animators, urban renewal raised the prospect of social renewal. People would be transposed from old to modern homes, thus solving a housing problem. But, more than that, \textit{animation sociale} might strengthen the bonds of community, and make residents more aware of their problems and better able to represent their collective needs to government. Renewal held out the possibility of making engaged citizens, ones capable of lifting themselves out of the socio-cultural condition of poverty and taking material steps forward. St. Martin’s Blocks residents sought, in practice, to make a vision of citizen power their own.

Faced with the physical destruction and social disruptions of urban renewal, ARISM was remarkable for generating genuine debate over the quality of local democracy. It advocated a vision of social renewal, developed a rent scale, and proposed co-management of public housing, even if the committee accepted the basic premise of urban renewal and pushed mostly for residents to be consulted on the details. Yet, as Robert Kardos has noted, insistence on

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\textsuperscript{71} Leblanc, “La lutte,” 57.

\textsuperscript{72} “un petit pouvoir, celui de la solidarité, de la fête et de l’humeur, avec la tête et leur coeur” Leblanc, “La lutte,” 56.
\end{flushright}
consultative government and participatory decision-making was a considerable challenge to existing practice of municipal politics in 1960s Montreal. The St. Martin’s Blocks was one site for emergent grassroots resistance.\textsuperscript{73} All the same, the initial drive for greater democracy extended only along the timeline of renewal. Once displaced, dispersed, and, for some, returned, there remained less immediate circumstance on which to mobilize on the housing question. The concerns of local people and the limited gains ARISM made regarding the rent schedule were overtaken by the universalized policy of the welfare state. Hitched to urban renewal, and in face of political and bureaucratic opposition, animation sociale’s promise of social renewal and remaking democracy from below was short-lived and circumscribed.

\textit{Milieu populaire}

CJC moved to replicate the St. Martin’s Blocks committee. Between 1969 and 1971, CJC volunteers animated committees on the Campbell, Quesnel-Coursol, Vinet Park, and Seigneurs Park blocks. Each committee was organized in reaction to subsequent sections of the urban renewal plans. Therefore, in a linguistically, ethnically, and racially plural area, resident activism was furthered split block-by-block. Facing a fragmented citizens’ movement, city and provincial officials could assuage or override opposition to urban renewal in Little Burgundy.

CJC did not organize entirely from scratch. Jeanne Leblanc headed the volunteer team. But significant work had to be done to reach, inform, and mobilize residents. In the short-term, CJC looked to help residents secure compensation as well as amenable rents in future public housing. Volunteers were envisioned as technical resource persons, working closely with citizens’ groups on research and strategy.\textsuperscript{74} Yet, if CJC manpower had been great at first,

\textsuperscript{73} Kardos, 166; Mills, \textit{The Empire Within}, 46.

\textsuperscript{74} “Projet Petite Bourgogne, rapport progrès; présenté au nouveau directeur de la Compagnie des jeunes Canadiens at au personnel administratif,” 2, LAC, RG116, Volume 43; “Petite Bourgogne,” [c. janvier 1970?], 1-2, LAC, RG116, Volume 118, 541 Projet Petite Bourgogne - Correspondence and Programme Activities.
volunteers in Little Burgundy never numbered more than four between late 1969 and 1971. By early 1971, just one volunteer remained to assist urban renewal-minded citizens’ committees.

Municipal officials had learned from their St. Martin’s Blocks experience and became proactive. New volumes of the renewal program came with promises of consultation. The piece-by-piece approach to renewal, however, served to subdivide opposition. Reginald McLemore, who worked at the Little Burgundy district planning office, argued that city officials contained citizens’ committees within a desired participation structure of open houses and meetings. He remarked that plans appeared to go through the entire consultation process without being changed in more than the minute details. Some planners saw public meetings as merely a way of testing, or even winning support for, plans. A chief instrument of the district planning office’s outreach was its bilingual newsletter, *Echos*. The paper ran updates on renewal plans as well as community events. It did so in a jocular and patronizing tone. Verging on outright belittlement, the Quesnel-Coursol Blocks section of the renewal plan was announced in October 1968 with the warning: “DO NOT BECOME ALARMED!”

CJC staff remarked on the stop-start nature of citizen mobilization. While municipal planners spoke of encouraging participation, they never gave immediate responses to citizen concerns. Residents were demobilized until unsatisfactory responses did arrive, at which point residents had to start anew. Appeals made to municipal officials were sometimes deflected toward the provincial housing authority, and vice versa. The city and province, it was argued, had learned to play the long game. Even though a critique of pseudo-participation took shape,

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75 Reginald McLemore, “Effecting Change in Low-Income Areas: Three Approaches (with a Case Study of La Petite Bourgogne Renewal Area, Montreal),” *Occasional Paper No. 4* (Waterloo, ON: Faculty of Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo, 1972), 10; Bougie, 122; Mayer, 216. See also Gérald Doré et Robert Mayer, *L'idéologie du réaménagement urbain à Québec* (Québec: ELOP-Québec, 1972), 66.

76 La Service d’Habitation de la Ville de Montréal, *Echos de la Petite Bourgogne*, no. 11, octobre 1968, 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 118, 541 Projet Petite Bourgogne. (emphasis in original)
the concerns of committees remained localized and specific to the unfolding of renewal.\textsuperscript{77} Much like ARISM had done, these new committees considered renewal plans and proposed changes.

In December 1970, for example, the Vinet Park Citizens’ Committee was formed. Residents professed no objection to urban renewal, but wished to ensure that they would have suitable, affordable housing and that the community exodus seen in the St. Martin’s Blocks would not be replicated. The ten-person committee executive, along with CJC volunteer Jacques Masson, studied the plans for their area and spoke with fellow residents. At a community assembly, they presented their findings and held item-by-item votes on proposed changes. In a small victory, the committee ensured that SHQ held its legally-obligated public meeting in Little Burgundy, rather than at City Hall as had previously been done. Yet when the committee delivered its proposed amendments, provincial bureaucrats deferred to municipal counterparts. A later meeting was held with city planners, but no modifications to the plans were secured.\textsuperscript{78}

Little Burgundy residents came to express exasperation. They were wary of animators, and they did not believe CJC could help change matters. Many felt that the planning department’s consultations were disingenuous and that forming committees was simply playing at the city’s game.\textsuperscript{79} Participation in the urban renewal process no longer appeared to have genuine meaning. In January 1970, CJC field staff person Clara Chicoine essentially agreed and expressed concern that citizens’ committees were studying the same issues again and again, and in isolation. She felt that committees needed to work together and she questioned a strategy

\textsuperscript{77} “Les Îlots St-Martin,” [c. janvier 1970?], 9, LAC, RG116, Volume 118, 541 Projet Petite Bourgogne - Correspondence and Programme Activities; “Rapport de l’atelier,” 8-9; Mayer, 192-193; Hamel, Logement, 199.


privileging dialogue, rather than confrontation, with government. Chicoine’s sense was that citizen activity had to lead toward politicization.⁸⁰

_Pouvoir parallèle et animation sociale politique_

An emphasis on the politicization of citizens’ committees was at the root of a broader citizens’ movement in Montreal. Between 1968 and 1971, the logic and goals of animators shifted and the character of citizens’ committees with them. Citizens’ committees began to push for greater social change and became a more politicized popular oppositional movement.⁸¹

Among animators at COM, disappointment over the results of their psycho-sociological approach to change was one factor prompting re-evaluation in 1968. Equally, young radical intellectuals, including (as the next chapter shows) those within CJC, increasingly viewed COM as a mere social service agency and rejected its _animation sociale_ vocabulary. Challenged on the left, COM animators dispensed with previous ideas about the neutrality of animators and took a more active role. In east Montreal, Pierre LaGrenade and Jean-Marc Gareau sought to build a new kind of citizen organization with the political strength to oppose the existing exercise of power. In LaGrenade’s analysis – which reflected the influence on Quebec sociologists of US War on Poverty community projects – material security came from the ability of people to secure the goods and services available in society. Poverty was therefore a function of powerlessness among the poor. COM animators felt that building a citizen counter-power was the first step towards the progressive redistribution of power and knowledge in society. Blurring somewhat into anarchism, they envisioned committees which would reflect, in miniature, a model for a more egalitarian, fraternal, and just society. Each committee, combining action and education,

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would begin by developing some specific community service and steadily stimulate wider political reflection. Frédéric Lesemann and Michel Thiénot have suggested that COM’s more politicized approach might be called *animation sociale politique*.\(^{82}\)

In step, CJC goals in Little Burgundy came to encompass a politicization of participation. CJC personnel hoped to provoke citizen consciousness about the structure and contradictions of society, which would push committees to attack the root causes of problems.\(^{83}\) CJC consultant Jacques Larue-Langlois, a socialist journalist who became active in *Mouvement pour la défense des prisonniers politiques québécois* (which was viewed as the legal arm of the *Front de libération du Québec*), offered a radical take on CJC’s updated direction. He presented CJC’s aims in sequence. In the short term, he believed volunteers needed to encourage participation and organize people around immediate problems. In the long term, he argued CJC should aim to build a “pouvoir parallèle” relative existing power structures and thereby ensure citizen participation in decision making at the heart of democratic process.\(^{84}\) Larue-Langlois spoke of a ‘parallel power’ in reference to ARISM, though the phrase recalled Lenin’s analysis of the revolutionary challenge Soviets posed to provisional bourgeois government in 1917 Russia.\(^{85}\)

Animators and citizens’ committees concerned with the limits of localized action increasingly sought to combine forces. A May 1968 meeting of citizens’ committees held in St-Henri was an important departure and revealed two persistent dueling tendencies. Some groups

\(^{82}\) Frédéric Lesemann et Michel Thiénot, *Animations sociales au Québec: rapport de recherche* (Montréal: Université de Montréal, École de Service Social, Laboratoire de recherche en intervention sociale collective, 1972), 310-311, 314-315, 320; McGraw, 84-87, 89.

\(^{83}\) Rapport sur le développement du projet Petite Bourgogne, présenté au ‘Comité intermédiaire des programmes’ de la C.J.C. - Conclusion,” 31 Mai 1968, 2, LAC, RG116, Volume 182, A.


attending the meeting insisted on the need for central organization, political action, and confrontation with the existing power structure. Others insisted on the specificity of the myriad of local problems, to which the first tendency responded that if there were so many little issues, there had to be a more general problem. Indeed, such reasoning formed the basis of the emergent framework of building a citizens’ parallel power through *animation sociale politique*.

For many animators, the municipal regime exemplified the unequal distribution of power in Montreal. This sensibility, already evident in ARISM’s confrontation with Saulnier, led to *Front d’action politique* (FRAP). Historian Marc Comby has shown that the FRAP grew from two directions. In addition to the politicization and federation of citizens’ groups, progressive unionists from 1968 called for a second front to confront issues beyond the workplace. Political action committees (CAPs) multiplied and André L’Heureux, a leading union intellectual, called for an autonomous workers’ party. FRAP, a municipal electoral coalition, emerged in May 1970 out of a series of union and citizen assemblies. Its program was populist, pursued in the interest of wage earners, and sought to advance wide-ranging progressive reform via election to municipal office. Animators and union leaders viewed FRAP as an instrument of democracy. However, whatever prospects FRAP candidates had for election were undercut by a reactionary political climate and low voter turnout among the poor following the October Crisis.

The notion of building a parallel power was by no means restricted to electoral politics, in part because some animators preferred to focus on the politicization of service provision. Come late 1970, CJC embraced broader efforts to improve citizen action. Clara Chicoine believed that the way forward was to move beyond the housing issue and address further questions such as

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recreation, education, and unemployment. She resolved that CJC would work alongside other animators to better unite grassroots activism in Little Burgundy on a burgeoning number of common fronts. Indeed, issue-by-issue reform coalitions were taking shape in Montreal neighbourhoods. Displeased with government provision, citizens’ committees and animators mobilized their own democratically run and self-administered services. Tenants’ associations, food and housing cooperatives, health clinics, recreation groups, and cultural activities began to appear in 1968. In turning attention to these ideas, CJC collaborated with an increasing panoply of social work organizations and projects interested in animation sociale.

_Projet d’organisation populaire d’information et de regroupement dans le secteur du- ouest de Montréal_ (POPIR) was chief among them. COM animators (before municipal regime pressure on the Catholic social service hierarchy prompted an end to its animation sociale service) worked with citizen and labour activists to form POPIR in fall 1969. The Catholic church provided a start-up grant and COM assigned three animators. POPIR was ostensibly an effort to advance animation sociale in southwest Montreal and to better coordinate citizens’ committee activities. The thesis was that self-directed organization and education would allow low income residents to solve their own problems and lay the foundations of a new economic system. Most immediately, POPIR turned attention to health, work, and consumer issues.

In late 1970, two CJC volunteers were hired to contribute to POPIR projects. Jean Lacroix, a young worker, helped organize a cooperative food store in St-Henri. Jocelyne Brault, a Université de Montréal political science student, focused on forming a workers’ cooperative in Pte. St-Charles. Brault was assisted by two CYC summer trainees, Carole Simard and Claudette

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88 Chicoine, “Projet Petite Bourgogne, rapport progrès,” 5-6; Garneau, 54-68.
89 McGraw, 97; Blondin, Comeau, Provencher, _Innover_, 68.
90 “Proposal of Agreement between POPIR and CYC,” n.d., 1-2, LAC, RG116, Volume 105, 456 POPIR - Correspondence and Programme Activities; Clara Chicoine, Projet POPIR, n.d., 1-2, LAC, RG116, Volume 105, 456 POPIR - Staff Reports.
Carbonneau, as well as Jean-Pierre Potvin, an animator from *Institut Parallèle* – which aimed to solve urban problems in Pte. St-Charles through participatory action and research.91

Organizations interested in training citizens themselves – rather than middle-class professional and students – in the techniques of *animation sociale* provided further impetus to mobilization. In fact, CJC (having hired local people like Lacroix and Jeanne Leblanc) was among the first groups to use citizens as animators. There were other initiatives. From 1968, the Catholic school board offered politicized adult education courses designed to move ordinary people past their immediate concerns and to a deeper analysis of social inequality.92 In mid-1971, *Centre de formation populaire* opened – run by former COM sociologist Louis Favreau – and aimed to provide citizen and labour activists with social scientific training.93 And, in Little Burgundy proper, *Perspective ’80* (P80) was created with a vision of using citizens as animators.

P80 was a new coalition of Little Burgundy organizations launched in November 1970. Its base was the Ste-Cunégonde parish presbytery, recast as the Little Burgundy Community Centre. It was run by an elected community council – including citizens’ committee veterans like Leblanc – and used paid citizen animators. By involving local people in projects, P80 would provide residents with instruments “to realize the necessary steps of their social liberation” and create “un mouvement politisation en profondeur.” Research groups were struck to analyze housing, work, health, education, and recreation issues.94 At a spring 1971 assembly, the


92 Guy Lessenini, “Les sciences sociales au service des comités de citoyens,” *Québec-Presse*, 27 juin 1971, 10B.


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findings were discussed and courses of action proposed. By then, P80 had secured funding and support from social agencies active on family, legal aid, recreation, welfare rights, and charity issues. Citizen action, aided by allies, included joining a citywide common front to oppose an east-west freeway (something that failed to stop the construction of a freeway section bordering Little Burgundy),\textsuperscript{95} defending consumer rights by founding a cooperative food store and loan system that lasted until 1972;\textsuperscript{96} and opening a small community-run health clinic.\textsuperscript{97}

For its part, CJC assisted P80 on the housing front. During 1969 and 1970, efforts to build either a southwest Montreal or a city-wide tenants’ association failed. With P80’s emergence, CJC volunteer Jacques Masson tried instead to mobilize tenants on a Little Burgundy scale. The project lasted a year, but Chicoine felt that Masson largely spent time explaining the legal procedures of urban renewal to residents.\textsuperscript{98}

CJC also took up the recreation front. A group of parents, along with volunteers Jeanne Leblanc and Conrad Tessier, launched a summer 1970 children’s art program. Kids attended classes taught by Tessier at the local CJC office. The project aimed to give children means of artistic expression, something absent from school curriculum. A CJC press conference popularized the effort and a number of psychologists, students, and educators offered to help.\textsuperscript{99}
CJC, at a parish school venue titled the Children’s House, affirmed teaching children democracy, cooperation, and group belonging. If the project was overseen by a committee of parents and childhood experts, the techniques of animation sociale were also used with the children themselves. From fall 1970, a group made up mostly of Université du Québec à Montréal students worked on Saturdays with about eighty kids. The children were encouraged to form clubs around specific artistic and recreation endeavours. Each club organized its own activities and had a dedicated animator. Plus, club members participated in general assemblies and elected representatives to a children’s parliament. The project was enlarged in summer 1971 and four participating university student animators were hired by CJC on short-term contracts. CJC emphasized affording local children and their parents opportunities to express themselves and to pursue their own recreational priorities. These aims were pursued through democratic practices and structures, as was the case in the broader political and pedagogical drive to build common fronts and parallel power in Little Burgundy.

Animation sociale politique was premised upon building a parallel power among popular groups that would confront poverty by precipitating a larger redistribution of power in society. In Little Burgundy, CJC collaborated with citizens and other agencies interested in animation techniques. Local people were mobilized around particular questions and set up needed self-help services. The animation sociale politique strategy presumed that once people studied issues such as housing, consumption, and recreation, they would progressively understand larger structural issues and become increasingly politicized. Therefore, participation was considered a pedagogy

Bourgogne - Staff Reports; Clara Chicoine, “Description du travail du volontaire stagiaire Conrad Tessier,” [8 septembre 1970], 1-4, LAC, RG116, Volume 118, 541 Projet Petite Bourgogne - Correspondence and Programme Activities.

for social liberation and political transformation. However, the common fronts that emerged in Little Burgundy were small, unstable, and divergent. Participatory projects could be attempted by citizens and animators drawing on the financial resources of government and social service agencies like CJC, but organizing simply remained difficult to pursue and sustain. Once FRAP had been defeated, it was also unclear in what way theme-by-theme common fronts would actually lead to the desired politicization and redistribution of power in society.

**Une situation de quartier**
In April 1972, Clara Chicoine withdrew CJC from the housing front in Little Burgundy. Surveying the previous two years, she argued that CJC work had followed well-known lines that had already led many citizens’ committees to failure. In the absence of a new direction, the training and mobilization of area residents had resulted in, in Chicoine’s estimation, almost nothing. Feeling that limited CJC resources were better spent on grassroots efforts with less institutional support, Chicoine chose to reorient support towards young workers in St-Henri.\(^{101}\)

Administrative pragmatism does not appear to be the full story behind the decision, though. CJC left not just the housing front, but Little Burgundy entirely. The decision was essentially confirmed at a September 1971 meeting of CJC’s staff-volunteer coordinating council. Montreal volunteers and staff were joined by COM and P80 in reviewing CJC’s program in southwest Montreal. Their analysis had two salient points. First, in implicitly critiquing service provision work, CJC personnel reaffirmed the overall dialectic of politicization envisioned by *animation sociale politique*. While volunteers felt that service provision was a

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\(^{101}\) Clara Chicoine à tous les membres de Perspective ’80, “Le retrait de la Compagnie des jeunes Canadiens du front logement dans la Petite Bourgogne,” 25 avril 1972, 1-2, LAC, RG116, Volume 118, 541 Projet Petite Bourgogne - Correspondence and Programme Activities.
way to legitimize CJC presence in communities, serve as a counter-balance to local elites, and allow for discussion, they agreed that services were a means, not an end, of intervention. If animation sociale politique was a sound approach, CJC people next had to explain its apparent failure in Little Burgundy. Here, a version of the culture of poverty thesis – an idea so vague that Oscar Lewis’ views regarding the revolutionary potential of the poor became unclear – seeped fully in. Those present debated whether CJC should continue its work in “popular neighbourhoods,” where discussants thought an underclass of social assistance recipients and the unemployed lived, or focus on “worker neighbourhoods” populated by white and blue collar workers. Summarizing the discussion, a CJC writer suggested that popular neighbourhoods could largely be defined in “cultural” terms and saw residents relate their problems back to “une situation de quartier,” a neighbourhood situation. Consequently, it was felt that citizen struggles tended to be defined in community rather than class terms and proceeded in isolation from other neighbourhoods. The poor were thought to be fatalistic and self-defeating. By contrast, discussants believed worker neighbourhoods were unified by socio-professional attachment and that workers had a more sophisticated sense of the broader socio-economic context. CJC members concluded that it was easier to organize workers, who were said to be more likely to demand their democratic rights and seek changes to existing relations of power.

Therefore, CJC ended its animation sociale engagement with urban renewal, effectively, by writing off the population of Little Burgundy as a lumpenproletariat mired in a culture of poverty and unable to effect personal, social, or political transformation. Animators, then, othered the poor and saddled residents with the perceived failure of animation sociale itself. In

103 Rigdon, 88.
104 “Priorités déterminés par les volontaires de la région de Montréal,” 3-7.
so doing, *animation sociale* adherents did not develop more than a simplistic reading of the physical and social transformations wrought by urban renewal.

In the early 1970s, the effects of urban renewal were jarring. Vacancies, expropriations, and boarded up buildings gave way to a succession of repetitive housing projects dotting an otherwise barren Little Burgundy area. Renewal exacerbated Montreal’s housing crisis by destroying a viable stock of low-rent housing without replacing it. By 1974, ninety percent of Little Burgundy housing had been razed and new housing construction fell short of what had been promised. Industrial workplaces had also been demolished, reducing the number of jobs in the area by half. Commercial businesses all but disappeared.¹⁰⁵

Physical destruction precipitated rapid depopulation and shifting demographics. Little Burgundy had 14,710 people in 1966, 9,412 in 1971, and about 7,500 by 1974. Between 1966 and 1971, the proportion of wage earners went from 75% to 42%, of retirees from 11% to 18%, and of social assistance recipients from 10% to 40%. By 1974, 58% of residents received social assistance.¹⁰⁶ Even Guy Legault, head of Montreal’s Housing Department, had to concede that the bulldozer and public housing style of urban renewal led to the ghettoization of the poor.¹⁰⁷

By that time, the renters’ association had atrophied, the recreation and housing committees disappeared, and *Perspective ‘80* pulled back. Journalist Maurice Giroux eulogized the demise of citizens’ committees as it became clear that urban renewal had worsened physical and social conditions in Little Burgundy. In the St. Martin’s Blocks, with public housing managed by a housing authority, off-street parking space and interior courtyards were conducive

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¹⁰⁶ Simard et Larivière, 58; “80% de locataires avec 80% des problèmes!” *Québec-Presse*, 17 février 1974, 18.

to vandalism, garbage problems, and drug dealing. Throughout the 1980s, gangs held some St. Martin’s Blocks units and the crime and violence associated with the drug trade concerned residents. Prompted by clergy action in 1989, the bilingual Little Burgundy Coalition was formed. Citizens worked with the housing authority to clear thirty units, block some alleyways, and install more transparent fences. The coalition subsequently spun off other committees and activities, marking a return of some citizen action.\(^{108}\)

Little Burgundy was rebuilt bit by bit into the 1980s, with a mix of public housing units and gentrification. Yet redevelopment neither served the interests or time-scales of former residents. To have been evicted, found temporary housing, and then move back was disruption enough. But a more than decade-long process of redevelopment had nothing to do with the experience of everyday life. Though cloaked in social concern and accompanied by some public housing to mollify residents, bulldozer-style urban renewal was about the rationalization of urban space and the revalorization of capitalist land and property values.\(^{109}\)

Beginning in 1967, CJC had intervened in St-Henri among residents facing urban renewal. For social animators, the reordering of urban space and the disruption of the lives of residents was an occasion to pursue wider-reaching social renewal. *Animation sociale* was understood as a means of psycho-cultural transformation among low-income people, involving people in modernity and remaking a more egalitarian democracy from below. While animation prompted resident efforts to participate in urban renewal decision-making, city and provincial officials sought either to rebut or co-opt citizen action. Faced with municipal intransigence and challenged on the left, social animators moved from an idea of sharing power to one of seeking


\(^{109}\) Simard, *La Rénovation urbaine*, 74; Bujold, 2.
its redistribution. CJC personnel adopted a revised method known as *animation sociale politique*. As a strategy, it assumed that once local people were encouraged to study issues such as housing, they would come to understand larger structural considerations and become increasingly politicized. CJC actors believed that building a ‘parallel power,’ both in electoral politics and through issue-by-issue common fronts, might allow citizens to secure greater power in society. However, despite drawing on government financial resources and agencies like the CJC, participatory projects were difficult to sustain amidst physical destruction and social dislocation and did not produce desired change. And, in their final analysis, CJC animators blamed the poor for the failure of integrationist ambitions and of *animation sociale* itself. However, for some Little Burgundy residents the combination of urban renewal and *animation sociale* afforded a chance – fleetingly – to exert a small power and to express democratic alternatives.

In 1974, the Quebec government created a housing policy task force and Jeanne Leblanc was appointed as a citizens’ representative. Cautiously, the task force argued that housing was a commodity requiring some government intervention to ensure that all Quebec residents were adequately housed. Leblanc, for whom *animation sociale* had been a radicalizing experience, registered her solitary dissent in a minority report. She argued that those government officials who spoke of housing as a social right were merely selling illusions. Urban renewal, she insisted, consisted of government intervention to service land, clear old buildings, and displace residents in order to generate new private economic activity and investment. Leblanc observed that public housing was no more than a residual program. In the wider frame, she argued that there was a fundamental conflict between the majority seeking affordable and amenable housing

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and the minority who owned housing stock and sought to maximize their profits.\textsuperscript{111} Calling for wide ranging measures for the state and citizens to wrest control of housing from profiteers, Leblanc concluded: “It is not enough to ‘Live in Quebec,’ we must live in a ‘Livable Quebec.’”\textsuperscript{112} Here, in one forum and for one activist, the Compagnie des jeunes Canadiens-assisted Little Burgundy citizens’ committee movement persisted.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 3.1 Little Burgundy Urban Renewal Map with Legend}

\textit{Source: Echos de la Petite Bourgogne, [unknown issue], 5, LAC, RG116, Volume 118, 541 - Projet Petite Bourgogne}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{111} Jeanne Leblanc, “Le logement: un droit ou une marchandise?” in Vers un Québec habitable, rapport minoritaire (Montréal: Groupe de travail sur l’habitation, mars 1976), 1, 5-7, 12, 14.

\textsuperscript{112} “Ce n’est pas tout d’‘Habiter au Québec,’ il faut vivre dans un ‘Québec Habitable.’” Jeanne Leblanc, “Recommendations: complement au rapport remis au G.T.H.” in Vers un Québec habitable, rapport minoritaire, 24.
Figure 3.2 Demolition

Figure 3.3 Lucien Saulnier and Jeanne Leblanc

Figure 3.4 Little Burgundy Crowd at St. Martin’s Courtyard
Blocks Groundbreaking Ceremony

Figure 3.5 St. Martin’s Blocks Housing and Courtyard
Source: Karolynn Hsu, October 2014.
Chapter 4

Une démocratie quotidienne

In April 1972, Compagnie des jeunes Canadiens (CJC) field staff person Clara Chicoine withdrew the company from the housing front in Little Burgundy and redirected animation sociale towards St-Henri workplaces. CJC activity among young workers, though, was anything but new. From 1968, some volunteers attempted to organize and radicalize the local working class. These two CJC interventions among St-Henri workers differed from one another and from earlier activity in Little Burgundy. In tracing them, we have the second part of our story about the varied meanings and practices of animation sociale.

Historians Bryan Palmer and Ian Milligan have shown that a leftist youth culture of resistance to alienation and liberal capitalist democracy was shared across class lines in Canada. In 1964-1966, young rank and file workers engaged in surge of wildcat strikes. They challenged their employers, their unions, and postwar labour relations. Moreover, working-class activists forced largely middle-class New Leftists to consider class and the labour question more fully.¹ In Montreal, wildcat strikes, a membership spike prompted by public sector unionism, Quebec nationalism, and connections to citizens’ activism fostered new militancy in the union movement. Historian Sean Mills has argued that, by the end of the decade, organized labour “became the dominant voice of opposition in Quebec.” As the last chapter described, progressive union leaders opened a second front beyond the workplace from 1968 and supported FRAP, a union-animator-citizen municipal electoral coalition. Ties between labour and citizens’

activism were multiple in working-class areas. Equally, animators attempted to forge more direct relationships with Montreal workers. In St-Henri, and with CJC support, there were dynamic interconnections between the New Left – be it social democratic, socialist, or Maoist – and young workers seeking to organize at the margins of the existent union movement.

CJC enabled a range of leftists to pursue community organizing activity in St-Henri between 1967 and 1974. In the process, there was ranging debate over the practice, goals, and political meaning of animation sociale. Over the course of experience and political divergences, animation sociale proved a malleable and decidedly contested concept. Most strikingly, and rooted in the wider global politics of poverty, it was an idea through which progressives, radicals, and revolutionaries articulated hopes for and models of a more egalitarian and participatory democracy that would end poverty in Montreal.

When it came to work and workers, these visions were more starkly conflictual. Between 1968 and 1970, socialists with CJC ties affirmed animation sociale’s democratic sensibilities, but sharply criticized what they saw as its reformist assumptions. Therefore, alongside St-Henri allies, they elaborated an alternative method that I will term animation révolutionnaire. The practice rejected attempts to integrate the poor into capitalist society, affirmed democratic participation, emphasized solidarity with the working class, sought to radicalize popular dissent, and envisioned liberating workplace and community on a path to eventual socialist transformation. By contrast, renewed CJC engagement with worker self-activity in St-Henri in 1972 to 1974 carried forward the animation sociale trajectory from Little Burgundy. Yet not only did CJC members appear to borrow strategy and tactics from far leftists, they distanced

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themselves from earlier ideas regarding the psycho-cultural transformation of the poor. Instead, they advocated *animation culturelle*, which sought to stimulate participation and action on immediate needs all while validating working-class culture. Despite clear differences, both *animation révolutionnaire* and *animation culturelle* turned on a pedagogical theme of imparting tools for citizen study and action. And they shared a desire for a democracy – “une démocratie quotidienne” – that would take root in everyday life in St-Henri.

**Animation révolutionnaire**

By the end of December 1967, new volunteers were flooding into expanded CJC operations in Montreal. While a team of volunteers worked on urban renewal and housing issues in Little Burgundy, another set of volunteers turned to St-Henri workplaces in search of another constituency with which to employ *animation sociale*. In collaboration with young workers, socialist volunteers crafted a critique and a modified version of *animation sociale*.

In the first half of the twentieth century, St-Henri was one of the most important industrial areas in Quebec, accessible by the Lachine Canal as well as Canadian National and Canadian Pacific rail lines. From the 1940s to the early 1950s, St-Henri workers organized and went to strike to advance their economic position. Most famously, organizer Madeleine Parent helped mobilize three strikes at Dominion Textile. Yet firms began to modernize and leave the area for single story factories built in industrial parks, along highways, and in Quebec and Ontario suburbs. Thirty industries departed in 1966 to 1972 alone, generating high unemployment and outmigration. The local population fell from 26,703 in 1966 to 22,360 in 1971. However, the combination of cheap labour and inexpensive, aging multi-story factory
buildings was a structural advantage for some secondary manufacturing industries that moved in.³

At St-Henri factories, unskilled work, slack periods, job insecurity, minimal wages, long hours, strict surveillance, industrial accidents, and pollutants were endemic. Three quarters of workers were non-unionized or had company unions. The number of young workers was significant, and many were already married and had children. Youth unemployment, a feature of early 1970s Quebec society more broadly, was marked in the area. It was the unskilled, poorly educated young people of St-Henri who served as a reserve army of cheap labour for capital.⁴

Arriving in such a context, CJC volunteers Louis-Philippe Aubert (26), Colette Aubert (23), Robert Tremblay, and Guy Levesque (a 20-year-old with a bachelor’s degree in sociology) carried out research and sought to develop connections with workers.⁵ And, with Louis-Philippe Aubert and Jean-Robert Primeau taking the lead, volunteers stimulated the creation of Comité ouvrier St-Henri (COSH) in May 1968. Bernard Mataigne (a 24-year-old former Université de Montréal student), Roger Boutin (a 22-year-old with a sociology degree), and Gilles Lenoir also


became active with the workers’ committee. Far different from activities in Little Burgundy, the committee and its animators were part of the revolutionary left.

Between 1967 and 1972, challenging empire in Montreal became a mass movement and, in the process, democracy was reconfigured in ways that encompassed new forms of individual and collective sovereignty and social solidarity. For socialist militants drawing on Third World liberation ideas as well as continental European leftist writing, anti-imperialism necessitated Quebec independence and anti-capitalist revolution. Their project formed part of a wider transnational challenge to existing political and cultural authority, which in many places crescendoed in the direct action and social conflicts of 1968. Emerging from the anti-imperialism and implicit anti-capitalism of New Left politics, some student and worker movements in Europe and North America adopted an explicitly revolutionary politics. Far left militants, influenced by Third World Marxism, sought through action to craft a new and more egalitarian revolutionary socialism distinct from a discredited Stalinism.

*Front de libération du Québec* (FLQ) was the illegal wing of Quebec’s radical liberation movement and it carried on a form of armed propaganda between 1963 and 1972. Louis-Philippe Aubert and Bernard Mataigne each had previous FLQ ties. In March 1964, Aubert, then a law student, and Mataigne, then editor of student newspaper *Quartier Latin*, were among three militants arrested for their activities as part of a FLQ cell at the Université de Montréal. Both

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6 Kevin Brushett, “‘Federally Financed Felquistes’: The Company of Young Canadians and the Prelude to the October Crisis,” *Québec Studies* 55 (2013), 83-84; Robert Lemieux, [Sans titre], in *St-Henri*, 74; [Undated list of volunteers], LAC, RG116, Volume 63, File 312-4 - Employment and Staffing - Recruitment - Volunteer 1 of 4
7 Mills, 9.
were arrested again, if separately, the same year. Aubert was acquitted, but Mataigne received a two-year suspended sentence for possession of dynamite and for being associated with an armed robbery that left two dead. Mataigne, who in 1969 publicly forswore violence, and Aubert were among the half dozen known former FLQ associates or sympathizers who joined CIC in 1967.9

FLQ was hardly the only organization of the heterogeneous radical New Left in Montreal. Quebec’s small communist movement had long since dwindled and leftist youth had to re-learn socialism on their own.10 Discontented with liberal democratic capitalism and Soviet bloc communism, young intellectuals searched for creative left alternatives applicable to the Quebec situation. Parti pris – a socialist, independentist, and secularist journal published between 1963 and 1968 – was deeply influential and provided a new language of dissent. Jean-Marc Piotte, one of the journal’s key thinkers and a BAEQ animator in 1963-1964, strenuously critiqued the FLQ’s thinking. He sought means of change better adapted to what he saw as, following French sociologist Serge Mallet, reformist conditions in Quebec. Piotte, drawing from European New Left theorist André Gorz, insisted that socialist change in developed societies progressed from intermediate aims. Therefore, socialists should reject ‘reformist reform,’ but support ‘non-reformist reform’ incompatible with the preservation of prevailing power relations. Piotte later introduced the Gramscian analysis of hegemony to a Quebec audience. The pages of Parti pris held other ideas inspiring political practice. Picturing what “un socialisme décolonisateur” might look like, Gabriel Gagnon drew on experience in Yugoslavia and Algeria

to advocate a participatory society that would overcome alienation through workers’ self-management. In articulating these sorts of ideas, Parti pris was by 1967 a decidedly Marxist publication. However, it ceased to appear amidst political divergences on the left – particularly over whether or not to support René Lévesque’s Mouvement souveraineté-association (MSA).\(^\text{11}\)

Indeed, the immediate involvement of CJC volunteers in St-Henri was rooted in the dynamics of socialist party politics rather than FLQ connections. There were a succession of efforts from 1965 to build an avant garde revolutionary socialist workers party in Montreal. (For example, Parti pris activists formed Movement de libération populaire and some of its members distributed texts at St-Henri factories.) These mobilizations were punctuated by various schisms and reconstitutions. In fact, in early 1968, an organized left had temporarily disappeared. CJC socialist volunteers sought to forge ties with the working class and, in the process, establish a new direction for socialist politics. After a failed first attempt in Ville Émard and Côte St. Paul, volunteers moved to St-Henri and established COSH with local workers.\(^\text{12}\)

COSH was a neighbourhood-based workers’ organization with about a dozen active participants from a wider membership of thirty-five to forty. The members wanted to take action to improve the lives of workers and agreed that low salaries and non-unionization were key issues. Through a survey of local factories, the activists were drawn into solidarity actions.

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COSH began to provide moral and financial support to striking workers, to demand changes to minimum wage legislation and the labour code, and to engage in unionization drives.13

CJC volunteers viewed themselves as paid militants helping to sustain COSH alongside workers. Henri Sirois, a committee member and worker who would stand as a FRAP candidate in 1970, noted that volunteers primarily carried out technical work and provided resources. Sirois said that he only later learned that Louis-Philippe Aubert, who served as COSH secretary, was a socialist militant from reading the newspaper.14

Nonetheless, the trajectories of COSH and socialist politics were much entangled. An organized left reappeared in the form of Comité indépendance-socialisme (CIS) in spring 1968 after left activists departed Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN), the mainstream party favouring Quebec national liberation soon supplanted by MSA (which was renamed Parti québécois (PQ)). CIS quickly had its own factional divides. Proponents of Bolshevism diverged from those wanting a mass workers party. The party split again in mid-1968. One of the splinter organizations was an activist revolutionary left group that would come to call itself Front de libération populaire (FLP). Some former RIN members joined FLP. It was in this re-alignment that COSH activists entered FLP.15 The presence of FLP militants ensured the stability of COSH and, in turn, the COSH experience had a profound influence on FLP thinking.

FLP militants viewed their organization as an avant grade and looked to stimulate workers’ mass consciousness. They sought to go directly to the people and reflected a Maoist utopianism blurring the distinction between intellectual and manual work. Members published the newspaper La masse, the theoretical review Mobilisation, and sought to build a non-

hierarchical party structure from the base through the creation of cells. The party pursued extra-parliamentary action, but stopped short of violence. In fall 1968, FLP members participated in, and helped lead, the dramatic surge of mass and student demonstrations in Montreal. By 1969, FLP affirmed the right of people to self-determination and called for the end to all exploitation. Envisioning a democratic and revolutionary regime, FLP supported Quebec independence, anti-imperialism, socialist revolution, workers’ power and self-management, the creation of a new man, and the establishment of a veritable democracy.\textsuperscript{16}

CJC volunteer Bernard Mataigne helped shape FLP strategy. He wrote that FLP militants should not substitute for unions or citizens’ committees. Rather, they should radicalize worker and popular struggles as a first stage of building a political organization of the masses and precipitating eventual popular insurrection. Both non-violent FLP-organized protests and violent FLQ bombings were steps to radicalization.\textsuperscript{17} FLP settled on trying to build a revolutionary party through the creation of worker and popular committees. In doing so, the party reimagined citizens’ committees as a site of practical and, indeed, revolutionary struggle for the left. Mataigne compared the FLP’s strategy to the community activism of the Black Panthers, rooted in the belief that revolution could only come from the most disadvantaged in society.\textsuperscript{18} COSH was the surest expression of the FLP model.

The strategy was clearly informed by \textit{animation sociale} techniques. But, after a brief collaboration with Michel Blondin’s \textit{Conseil des Oeuvres} (COM), CJC volunteers in St-Henri
refused to work with mainstream animators, rejected their vocabulary, and called existing traditions of citizens’ committees and animation into question.19 The criticism led COM animators to develop *animation sociale politique* (as the previous chapter discussed), but also pushed socialists to develop an alternative of their own.

The rejection of *animation sociale* by COSH and FLP militants was central, not incidental, to their activities. FLP split with CIS over the very question of *animation sociale*. And CJC volunteer Mario Bachand, the FLP intellectual who led the critique, presented a sweeping analysis. He denounced *animation sociale*, whether pursued by CJC, COM, the Peace Corps, or the CIA, as a “vast mystification” perpetuated to divert the masses from their genuine struggle to overturn the established order.20 Bachand insisted that *animation sociale* turned workers into people with immediate and concrete problems, each with issues in their own respective communities, who merely made demands upon the bourgeoisie.21

FLP intellectuals clarified their dissent in a paper, “Against Animation Sociale.” They argued that participation privileged cooperation over confrontation and that animation sought to facilitate worker involvement in the capitalist system. They wrote: “Participation, it is reformism, neo-capitalism. It not only holds a petit-bourgeois ideology, but also dupes Quebecois workers in making them believe that participation in decisions will resolve their problem of exploitation and alienation, that collaboration will save them from misery.” Citizens’

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21 François Mario Bachand, *Trois textes de François Mario Bachand* (s.l.: s.n., 1971), 27.
committees were mere pressure groups. *Animation sociale* was an instrument of integration that could do no more than make the most egregious conditions of capitalism bearable.\(^\text{22}\)

However, FLP radicals found elements of *animation sociale* to commend. They agreed with the basic premise of encouraging greater democratic participation among disadvantaged people and of contesting the arbitrary exercise of power. They affirmed defining and addressing problems along democratic lines.\(^\text{23}\) Bachand particularly praised the use of democratic meetings in which everyone had their say. He, too, thought the idea of building workers’ and citizens’ committees as a parallel power was a good one, but required a more total approach.\(^\text{24}\)

Rather than entirely discard *animation sociale*, FLP radicals imagined a revolutionary alternative practice. They found their traction when considering the role of the animator. Social animators were presented as reformers and as servants of capital for pursuing neighbourhood action that would lead only to concessions that the bourgeoisie was already prepared to make.\(^\text{25}\)

For failing to offer a socialist alternative, Bachand faulted the idea that animators, in the name of the free participation of all, should be neutral or apolitical parties. In place of this refusal, FLP intellectuals described a new form of animation to be undertaken by “revolutionary animators,” who could not stand outside the group and had to participate directly in the struggle of the working class. Solidarity was thus integral to what we might call *animation révolutionnaire*, a radical re-interpretation of *animation sociale*. *Animation révolutionnaire* had to move beyond immediate problems, analyze wider conditions, and pose the political problem of the working class taking power. The task necessitated a politicization of the masses, avant garde struggle,

\(^{22}\) “La participation, c’est du réformisme, du néo-capitalisme. C’est non seulement posséder une idéologie-petite-bourgeoisie, mais aussi duper les travailleurs québécois en leur faisant croire que la participation aux décisions réglera leur problème d’exploitation et d’aliénation, que la collaboration les sauvera de la misère.” [Author(s) redacted], “Contre l’animation sociale,” 1-2, in “Dossier: la Compagnie des jeunes Canadiens et la subversion.”

\(^{23}\) “Contre l’animation sociale,” 1, 4-5.

\(^{24}\) FLP, “Perspectives révolutionnaires,” 22; Bachand, 28.

\(^{25}\) FLP, “Perspectives révolutionnaires,” 21-22; Bachand, 27.
and the creation of a Quebec revolutionary party. COSH appeared a model of organization that might be replicated. FLP called for the creation of citizens’ and workers’ committees as well as factory and neighbourhood cells marked by revolutionary ideology. In the process, FLP advanced a different conception of community. Party intellectuals viewed working class neighbourhoods as potential “red bases” for anti-capitalist action.\footnote{26 “Contre l’animation sociale,” 6-7; FLP, “Perspectives révolutionnaires,” 22, 29.}

In August 1968, COSH decentralized. Where the main committee would be a site of coordination, activities were devolved to sub-committees. Teams were organized around a shifting array of priorities, including factory and neighbourhood organizing, education and social services, housing issues, and – in efforts disrupted by police searches and the enforcement of municipal zoning by-laws – a café and meeting place run at premises rented by CJC.\footnote{27 “Évaluation du projet St-Henri,” 2.}

The information team (led by Guy Levesque and later including fellow CJC volunteer Marcel Leduc) came together to produce Pouvoir ouvrier, a newspaper informing residents on COSH activities and local issues.\footnote{28 “Rapport annuel de projet - Saint-Henri,” n.d., 6, LAC, RG116, Volume 117, 537 Projet St-Henri - Rapport; “Évaluation du projet St-Henri,” 3, 5.}

Its articles called for struggle against an unjust, exploitative capitalist system. The second issue argued that by now workers must know that the current system was not built for them, but to line the pockets of the capitalist class. It suggested that workers no longer had confidence in elections, political parties, or even the unions that supposedly represented them. It called on workers to organize, unify, and bring about a genuine democracy. COSH was presented not only as a means of achieving these aims, but also as an organ of egalitarian, non-hierarchical, and deliberative democracy itself.\footnote{29 “Comité ouvrier: nouvelle démocratie, nouvelle structure, nouveau pouvoir, nouvelle force,” Pouvoir ouvrier, vol. 1, no. 2, août-septembre 1968, 3, LAC, RG116 Volume 118, 541 Projet Petite Bourgogne - Staff Reports.}
The thirteen-person factory team conducted outreach, supported unionization drives, and helped organize a march as part of *Opération Alarme* to call attention to youth unemployment. CJC militants focused most on organizing factory action committees, conceived as clandestine organizations of four or five workers seeking to build worker knowledge, spur and politicize union activity, and generate class solidarity. At a Simmons mattress factory, COSH assisted one such committee in a successful unionization drive. At Coleco, a unionization effort stalled when the organizers were fired. With Mataigne’s assistance, activities refocused on identifying labour code violations. At Toilet Laundries, Jean-Robert Primeau tried to rebuild a factory committee previously thwarted by the dismissal of those workers involved. At Hamel Cleaner, a COSH member abandoned a study of work conditions after someone threatened to break his legs. Overall, organizing in factories proved difficult. Though organizing efforts continued at larger shops, volunteers devoted more attention to matters outside of the workplace.

COSH seized on an issue of broad community concern. In October 1968, the province announced the location of a long-awaited hospital for southwest Montreal. Land speculators had vied over where the hospital would be built. Residents found the chosen site inaccessible. CJC volunteer Roger Boutin mobilized a COSH hospital sub-committee and it attracted several older residents. The committee demanded not only that the hospital be built in St-Henri, but that a

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30 “Évaluation du projet St-Henri,” 4; Comité ouvrier St-Henri, “Les chômeurs de St-Henri protestent,” communiqué de presse, 6 août 1969, McMaster Archives, Quebec Social and Political Organizations Collection, Box 1, File 2 - Le Comité ouvrier St-Henri - Pouvoir ouvrier.
31 Mataigne, “Le mouvement,” 89.
council of residents administer the facility themselves. In taking up the hospital issue, COSH gained greater visibility in the community.33

Yet divisions over politics and tactics prompted the hospital committee to announce its independence in summer 1969 and to disassociate itself from COSH’s views. Some residents remained members of both groups. Allied with local merchants and professionals, the hospital committee mixed opposition and negotiation as the hospital location issue dragged on past the end of 1973. For its part, COSH sustained a stance more critical of government than that of the hospital committee proper. Beyond contesting the hospital’s location, COSH pressed for improved health services to the community across the board. In the main, though, COSH failed to radicalize activism on the hospital issue.34

Nor did the hospital issue allow COSH to attract a much larger membership, a goal among the aims, strategies, and tactics articulated by 1970. Centrally, COSH sought a free Quebec in which workers took power. And – apparently drawing a non-militarized analogy from the foco theory inspired by Che Guevara, articulated by French Marxist Régis Debray, and discussed in Parti pris – COSH believed that it could develop a popular base for revolutionary struggle by establishing “poles of attraction” in working class areas. The poles, of which COSH was implicitly one, would strive to be vehicles for “uncompromised revolutionary theory” linked to the lived experiences of workers. Propaganda and the formation of community and workplace

34 Ares, 10, 65, 83-84; “L’hôpital à St-Henri: position finale du Comité ouvrier St-Henri,” 3-5, McMaster Archives, Quebec Social and Political Organizations Collection, Box 1, File 2 - Le Comité ouvrier St-Henri - Pouvoir ouvrier.
revolutionary nodes were the envisioned means of struggle, while contestation on health, labour, and housing issues were ways to advance the movement.\(^{35}\)

COSH’s desire to ‘weave a web’ of community nodes through *animation révolutionnaire* was an acknowledgement of the dynamism of the citizens’ movement in Montreal. A ten-person neighbourhood team began to go door to door, seeking to organize and build COSH on a parish- and block-basis. The nodes could bring people together, identify local problems, select local leaders, and carry out action. COSH’s community strategy insisted that people had to be politicized through analysis, organization against exploitation, and concrete conflict.\(^{36}\)

*Animation révolutionnaire* was product of FLP experiments within *Comité ouvrier St-Henri*, of discontent with *animation sociale*, and of a search for a socialist praxis with which to radically transform Quebec society. Adherents of *animation révolutionnaire* creatively merged Third World and European socialist ideas to left activism and a shifting political context in Montreal. Against *animation sociale*’s predilection for trying to integrate the poor into mainstream capitalist society, FLP militants insisted on democratic participation, the politicization of the masses, radical solidarity with the working class, and the liberation of workplace and community as means of avant garde anti-capitalist struggle. *Animation sociale* was both an influence and a foil in the making of a radical vision of democracy in St-Henri.

*La conjuncture politique actuelle*

Some of the socialists seeking to radicalize popular dissent did so within a CJC institutional context. And their vision of *animation révolutionnaire* led to conflict with CJC leadership and their eventual departure from the company, especially as federal and municipal


\(^{36}\) “Évaluation du projet St-Henri,” 2; Comité Ouvrier, “Bilan,” 2; Rapport du Comité ouvrier St-Henri, réunion du 10 mars 1970, 2-4, McMaster Archives, Quebec Social and Political Organizations Collection, Box 1, File 2 - Le Comité ouvrier St-Henri - Pouvoir ouvrier.
authorities moved to repress left activism in Montreal. Into the early 1970s, the idea of radicalizing popular and union politics remained. Still, *animation révolutionnaire* risked becoming a settled, even rigidly rote, strategy for politically isolated young intellectuals.

In Quebec, interpersonal conflict, lax financial oversight, uncertain policies and lines of authority, high turnover, and limited supervision of volunteers all affected CJC’s 1967-to-1969 expansionary period. One of the fault-lines in Montreal was between those CJC members who worked with credit unions and *Associations Coopératives d'économie familiale* (a union-initiated family budget counselling and consumers’ education organization) and those who worked on more open-ended organizing activity (particularly, as we have seen, in relation to housing and tenants’ issues). The period was punctuated by Martin Béliveau’s contradictory and independentist-minded attempt to distance CJC – a federally-funded institution – from the federal government. In January 1968, Béliveau announced that *Compagnie des jeunes Québécois* would be the name of Quebec branch of the company. Yet other Montreal staff members challenged Béliveau’s leadership, something that led to an intervention from Secretary of State Gérard Pelletier, Béliveau’s dismissal, and CYC Executive Director Alan Clarke’s resignation in May 1968 over such infringement on CYC autonomy. Béliveau’s replacement in Quebec was Peter Katadotis, a 30-year-old with a master’s degree in social work and then director of *Projet de réaménagement social et urbain* (PRSU), a McGill University-funded social service organization that had adopted the methods of *animation sociale*.38

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At the behest of CYC’s Ottawa leadership, Katadotis sought to weed out absentee volunteers. Historian Kevin Brushett has argued that Katadotis was ostensibly reluctant to intervene politically so long as volunteers were doing their work. Yet Katadotis belied this notion by seeking to dismiss COSH-connected volunteers Louis-Philippe Aubert, Colette Aubert, Gilles Lenoir, Bernard Mataigne, Roger Boutin, and Guy Levesque, as well as FLP comrade Mario Bachand – who claimed to only ever have anything to do with CJC when it came time for him to pick up his monthly cheque. Bachand aside, the others were involved in animating COSH and its ranging undertakings. In Katadotis’ estimation, their work was unsatisfactory and the volunteers appeared to be regularly absent. He believed that their multiple activities outside the CJC prevented them from concentrating on animation. But it is also clear that Katadotis, however New Leftist, was a member of the animation sociale mainstream, and COSH CJC volunteers disagreed precisely with those animators on what meaningful organizing involved. The volunteers saw themselves as militants with a broad mandate to radicalize popular discontent, not as restrained animators acting solely as everyday support workers for discrete citizens’ committees. As such, no distinction between CJC, COSH, and FLP work would seem to exist. Katadotis’ administrative exercise of power was inseparable from reformist political discipline directed against revolutionary socialists who had been – opportunistically and contradictorily – drawing salaries and living on CJC resources for divergent ends.

In response to Katadotis’ attempted action, radical volunteers met and agreed that only Bachand and Mataigne should be dismissed. To press their position, twenty volunteers occupied

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39 Peter Katadotis to Stewart Goodings and Richard Salter, Re: Quebec Situation, 1 August 1968, LAC, RG116, Volume 60, File 280-25/14 - Personnel - Bureau adm. 84 ouest rue Notre-Dame, 8e étage, Mont. 126 (closed).
40 Brushett, 81, 83-84.
CJC’s Montreal office in December 1968 to demand the democratization of CJC administration and an end to CJC policing of political affiliations. Some volunteers raided the company’s files during the occupation. CJC staff backed off the firings and volunteers successfully organized a coordinating committee to oversee hiring and project planning.  

Scrutiny of socialist militants within CJC was renewed the following October. Police raids – ostensibly to do with the death of a provincial police officer during a protest against the Murray Hill Limousine Service – targeted twenty-five CJC premises. Two volunteers, one of whom was Louis-Philippe Aubert, were among the twelve people arrested. A rifle, pamphlets, and a CJC photocopier were confiscated. Lucien Saulnier, president of Montreal’s executive committee, took the occasion to accuse CJC of harbouring terrorists and separatists, even suggesting that popular mobilization in Montreal was the work of Cuban-trained militants. To buoy Saulnier’s claims, security forces soon produced a CJC subversion dossier mostly containing radical literature, FLP position papers, and meeting minutes seized in the raids. Police surveillance photographs from various mass protests were also included.

For animators Louis Favreau and Donald McGraw, Saulnier’s scapegoating of CJC was nothing less than an attack on citizens’ committees, active in forging a common front which


44 “Dossier: la Compagnie des jeunes Canadiens et la subversion,” novembre 1969, McMaster Archives, Company of Young Canadians fonds, Box 5, File 5.15.

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increasingly challenged the municipal executive.\textsuperscript{45} This analysis was shared by COSH militants, who denounced Saulnier’s recourse to the myth of outside agitators, his desire to ban public protest, and his effort to impugn people based on purportedly subversive literature. The committee argued that, in all his accusations, Saulnier sought to defame all groups who opposed the totalitarian municipal regime and looked to build “une démocratie quotidienne” – that is, “to put in practice a popular democracy and not a paper maché and ballot box democracy.”\textsuperscript{46} As if to concede the point, Mayor Drapeau’s government responded to an anti-police repression protest in November 1969 – and to earlier popular action like \textit{Opération McGill} (a March 1969 mass march, conceived by Bachand, to demand that McGill University become a French-language institution) – by pushing through an anti-demonstration by-law.\textsuperscript{47}

CJC would move to end its connection with COSH, albeit somewhat after the fact. Mataigne, Boutin, Lenoir, and the Auberts had all departed (between August and November 1969) by the time CYC Executive Director Claude Vidal froze the St-Henri project in December and the remaining volunteers, Primeau and Leduc, left. A CJC evaluation group recommended the project’s definitive end given “la conjuncture politique actuelle.”\textsuperscript{48} Indeed, CYC leaders were called before a parliamentary committee to account for their Montreal projects.\textsuperscript{49}


\textsuperscript{46} “mettre en pratique une démocratie quotidienne et non une démocratie de papier mâché et de boites de scrutins” “Réplique de personnes visées,” \textit{La Presse}, 14 October 1969, LAC, RG116, Volume 42.

\textsuperscript{47} Auf der Maur and Chodos, 14-16; Mills, 138-162.


\textsuperscript{49} Importantly, if some CJC radicals had links to the revolutionary left, it was equally true that CJC had close ties to the Liberal party and the security establishment. Vidal and CJC official Pierre-Luc Perrier were appointed to the
COSH resolved to continue its work, even after another police raid in December 1969.\textsuperscript{50} It became more politically isolated and persisted along commune lines. Some members eyed a transition to armed struggle, though this never took place. On 16 October 1970, the federal government, arguing that an apprehended insurrection existed beyond two FLQ kidnappings, enacted the War Measures Act. Security forces proceeded with wide-scale repression of progressives and leftists of all stripes. Citizen, union, student, nationalist, and FRAP activists were directly targeted and more than 500 people were arrested. COSH members were among them, effectively ending their undertakings in St-Henri. Some COSH militants later hid revolutionary nationalist intellectual Pierre Vallières and studied Marxism. As for FLP, the party was unable to overcome its extremist image nor sufficiently distinguish itself from the PQ’s mainstream sovereigntist politics. FLP was always small and marginal before disappearing.\textsuperscript{51}

Mass arrests and state repression conditioned the municipal election in October 1970, which saw FRAP’s defeat. Disarray and, then, frank reevaluation occurred on the left during 1971 and 1972. Historian Sean Mills has argued that unions came to see themselves as the main vehicle for greater democracy in Montreal. Certainly, the \textit{La Presse} strike put labour at the forefront of action that culminated in a 1972 general strike.\textsuperscript{52} But even with workers, rather than students and the poor, taking precedence, there was significant debate over how best to proceed. Within the political action committees (CAPs) at the root of FRAP, many unionists favoured


building a more centralized party structure. Members of CAPs in St-Jacques and Maisonneuve disagreed, split off, and affirmed working class struggle over progressive electoral action. FRAP fell completely apart in 1973-1974. The left movement for national liberation also bifurcated. Some on the left, partly inspired by the apparent parliamentary path to socialism in Chile, joined the PQ. Others rejected collaboration with bourgeois forces.

For those affirming revolutionary politics, state repression confirmed that FLQ-style violence was naive and counterproductive. Militants, in their search for a more principled direction, began to study Marxist-Leninist texts. Still, partly inspired by the FRAP model for a mass movement, far leftists maintained an interest in organizing. In a familiar argument, many militants felt that, in the context of mounting strike action, workers needed to be politicized and that worker energies should not be contained by bureaucratic unionism. The caveat was that, unlike with the student and popular protests of 1968 and 1969, revolutionary leftists were on the margins of union-supported worker militancy in the early 1970s.

In the main, three alternatives took shape. Led by radical intellectual Charles Gagnon, former animators and university students taken with China’s Cultural Revolution rejected Quebec nationalism as an obfuscation of class struggle and formed what became, in May 1973, *En Lutte!* With a base at the St-Jacques Citizens’ Clinic, *En Lutte!*’s orientation was Maoist – accepting that the working class was the driving force of socialist revolution, that only a

vanguard party could lead the struggle for a dictatorship of the proletariat, and that the United States and Soviet Union should be rejected as imperialist superpowers. *En Lutte!* focused on the ideological education of its members and on agitprop, including strike support activities and the distribution of literature, premised on politicizing the masses. The group achieved its strongest support and greatest membership from 1975 to 1978, after PQ purged its left in 1974.56

The second tendency carried on the work of *animation révolutionnaire* more directly. It arose from debates at CAP Maisonneuve, involving some participants with past FLP ties. At least one CJC volunteer, former student leader Gilles Duceppe, was party to the discussions. Pierre Beaudet, writing in 1972 in *Mobilisation* (a publication begun by FLP in 1969), proposed a strategy reminiscent of COSH’s approach. Militants would ‘implant’ themselves in factories, form workers’ committees, and propel economic struggles within unions and the workplace. He argued that revolution was to proceed not from theoretical models, but from concrete struggles.57 A few dozen militants pursued the concept through trial and error. Many read European far left texts and, from a historical perspective, the French parallel was considerable. Drawing on Mao, some elements of the French far left sought to blur the distinction between manual and intellectual labour and to merge theory and practice by taking up factory jobs in a practice known as “établissement.” They studied conditions alongside workers, mobilized factory committees,

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and favoured non-hierarchical socialism rooted in workers’ self-management.\textsuperscript{58} If the practice had a different name in Montreal, the project – begun with groups like COSH – was the same.

Various schisms began to take place and, in January 1974, a meeting of a few hundred militants debated whether to continue with implantation. Opinion was split and so too were the resulting allegiances. Rejecting workers’ committee activity, some revolutionary leftists formed grouplets and the tendency toward sectarianism became more pronounced.\textsuperscript{59} Three Marxist-Leninist grouplets joined together in 1975 as \textit{Ligue communiste (marxiste-léniniste) du Canada}. The organization, which was renamed \textit{Parti communist ouvrier} in 1979, was a rival of \textit{En Lutte!} within the New Communist movement and it privileged immediate revolutionary struggle.\textsuperscript{60}

The third direction was in feminist socialist politics. In mid-1970, a leftist theatre troupe collaborated with COSH and sought to empower unemployed mothers by working with them to mount plays. Three members of the troupe also belonged to \textit{Front de libération des femmes du Québec} (FLF). FLF was the leading voice of white feminist radicalism in Montreal. Its members combined gender analysis, anti-colonialism, and radical socio-economic critique. They directly contrasted their work with the liberal feminism headed by \textit{Fédération des femmes du Québec}. And, insisting that québécoises were doubly exploited as women and as francophones, FLF activists would exclude anglophones and work only in ad hoc alliance with the Montreal Women’s Liberation Movement. When several splits led to FLF’s dissolution in late 1971, some feminist radicals departed for Marxist-Leninist organizations they often found to be sexist. Two former FLF and two ex-COSH members created \textit{Le Centre des femmes}. Endorsing a “féminisme révolutionnaire” and drawing on \textit{animation révolutionnaire} practice, the militants saw \textit{Le Centre}
as an autonomous node committed to the liberation of women, Quebec, and the working-class. *Le Centre* persisted for a while, but it atrophied and then disbanded in 1975.61

The downside of the New Communist movement in Montreal was slowly becoming apparent to some. Maoists were increasingly isolated from concrete working-class activism and from social and political forces such as the fast-rising PQ. Ideas about radicalization and revolution tended towards the sectarian and doctrinaire.62

Between late 1967 and early 1974, *animation sociale* provided inspiration and a foil for a small number of militants in the face of repression and amidst ongoing divisions on the revolutionary left. Animators and militants, some working for CJC, came to believe that they might radicalize popular and labour agitation through *animation révolutionnaire*. The practice borrowed *animation sociale*’s affirmation of small-scale organization, deliberation, and participatory democracy. But it rejected the reformist emphasis on the integration of the poor into society and aimed to secure economic democracy through workers’ organization and socialist revolution. Acting in solidarity with the working class, militants looked to politicize and deepen struggle. Even more so than their social democratic counterparts, far leftists found organizing and realizing their aims in St-Henri difficult. Yet *animation révolutionnaire* was a significant bridge to clarifying, if temporarily, revolutionary left strategy and aims and to posing a radical perspective for the movement for greater democracy in St-Henri and in Montreal.

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Milieu ouvrier

In spring 1972, a second CJC intervention in St-Henri followed upon the perceived failure in Little Burgundy. A few young workers trying to unionize knew about CJC through friends and requested volunteer support. Staff person Clara Chicoine acquiesced, feeling that: “When CJC brings its assistance to St-Henri youth, it helps poor people (in a full appreciation of the term) who have only the wealth of their youth.” And she insisted organizing would need to begin in the workplace.63

In taking the new direction, Chicoine suggested a method that at once adapted animation sociale politique and recalled animation révolutionnaire. She hoped to sustain activism by establishing permanent, self-sufficient nodes of militants in working-class areas. Each group would ensure that people had the ability to address immediate needs, deepen their understanding of collective problems, expand their popular base, and demand more systematic change. CJC would contribute to the process by providing resources and animators. Chicoine insisted that CJC volunteers themselves be personally engaged as militants and be ready to reflect on issues of class consciousness, unionism, the nation, and ongoing organization.64

Not only did CJC actors agree that workers represented the most dynamic element in Montreal, they borrowed the strategy and tactics of far leftists. Between 1971 and 1974, at the same moment that Marxist-Leninist radicals were implanting themselves in white- and blue-collar workplaces and trying to form committees, CJC volunteers assisted young workers in establishing factory committees to press their demands. The means were similar though the ends


were divergent. These St-Henri workers and their CJC allies did not advocate revolution. Yet they did demand greater democracy in factories, in unions, and in Quebec society.

In St-Henri, a renewed series of unionization campaigns took place from 1971. An initial struggle at Coleco influenced the upsurge in worker activity that precipitated CJC intervention. The toy plant ran three shifts and 600 to 800 workers laboured forty-two hours a week, though many were laid off during a December to February slack season. Wages began just above minimum wage, safety conditions were poor, and workers were harassed to speed production.65

Through company-initiated bribery and intimidation, a Fédération canadienne des associations indépendantes (FCAI) local was set up at Coleco in September 1968. FCAI was a federation of company unions formed in 1959 and its president, Lucien Tremblay, spoke of “protecting” workers without antagonizing bosses or taking strike action. FCAI twice signed collective agreements at Coleco without consulting workers.66 Left militants targeted FCAI for its collusion with management. FLP called for FCAI to be crushed and, for their part, FLQ cells bombed FCAI headquarters three times between 1969 and 1971.67

Anti-FCAI sentiment also soon extended to animators. In summer 1970, POPIR animators Benoit Michaudville and Pierre Pagé aided the creation of Mouvement des travailleurs du sud-ouest de Montréal. In part, the organization strove to assist workers neglected by CSN and FTQ mount unionization drives to displace FCAI. The overarching aim was to unite

workers, confront problems like factory closures and periodic lay-offs, and address wider political, social, economic, and educational concerns. The project was undermined when the Montreal archdiocese withdrew its financial backing for POPIR. By then, both FTQ and CSN expressed interest in confronting FCAI. The Quebec branch of the United Steelworkers of America (a FTQ affiliate), the Métallos, stepped in to pay Michaudville. Between September 1971 and August 1972, he assisted successful unionization drives at four factories.68

For its part, the Métallos was the largest industrial union in Quebec. The CIO-initiated United Steelworkers of America organized a first local among Montreal steelworkers in 1939 and further workers seeking to affiliate battled for union recognition during the Duplessis years, most famously in a defeated strike at Murdochville in 1957. In the 1960s, paralleling workers’ mobilization across Canada, the steel union in Quebec tripled its membership. Workers led unionization campaigns and engaged in militant contract battles. Moreover, as the adoption of the Métallos name in 1960 exemplified, Quebec identity became a central concern. The Métallos made demands – effective by the mid-1960s – that French be recognized in the workplace and in dealings with largely English-Canadian management. In 1972, the union supported a social democratic and sovereign Quebec. As the intervention in St-Henri began to suggest, the early 1970s were a period of dynamism and growth for the Métallos. Smaller shops unionized, participation intensified, and membership rose from 30,000 in 1970 to 45,000 in 1976.69

At Coleco, workers organized to confront their work and economic circumstances. In March 1971, forty-five workers demanded that the president of the FCAI local step down. FCAI leadership responded by threatening the workers with sanctions. Undeterred – and building on shared grievances against foremen – 17-year-old Diane Perron spurred clandestine September discussions about replacing the FCAI local. The Métallos agreed to participate and sent in two union officials. Workers also turned to Michaudville and Mouvement des travailleurs for assistance. The size and turnover of the workforce made organizing difficult. Yet activists pursued unity to secure their aim of a just collective contract, as well as an end to repression in the factory. The process of gathering signed union cards accelerated in October with outrage over an accident in which a worker lost four fingers in a machine due to company negligence.70

Management and the company union attempted to disrupt the unionization campaign. FCAI intimated that the factory would close should a Métallos local be formed, implored workers to call the police on organizers, and had an informant infiltrate the organizing committee. Activists received threatening phone calls and an attempt was made to hit one with a car. Management tried to discover and isolate the organizers, transferring some to more difficult tasks and firing six (including Perron) on pretexts. But enough union cards were gathered to apply for accreditation and receive it in December. The company was forced to reinstate the organizers it had fired, but soon took advantage of the slack season to lay off militants again. Coleco was compelled to re-employ Perron since she was elected president of the new local, but she was given a unique work schedule and isolated within the factory.71

In January 1972, workers struck a negotiating team in advance of collective bargaining. Taking advantage of open elections, some skilled workers from the former FCAI local won positions. However, during the negotiations, militants were most concerned by the lack of information, innovative clauses, and union education coming from the Métallos negotiator. Workers suggested that Métallos might address these deficiencies by paying one of them to act as a resource person within the factory. Despite such engagement, management repression was largely successful and workers accepted a contract little better than previous ones.\footnote{Larivière, St-Henri, tome 3, 114-115; Michaudville, [“Coleco”], 59.}

For organizers, the struggle was not over, even if leaders like Christine Royer and nun Madeleine Neveu were not back on the job until summer 1972. Time had been lost, yet militants still tried to counteract repression by educating workers on their legal rights, building political consciousness, and ensuring that the contract was respected. Moreover, the Coleco struggle produced links to workers at other factories. And, not only did Michaudville and Perron come to advise CJC, a CJC volunteer established ties with Coleco factory activists in September 1972.\footnote{Royer et Bouchard, “Ce n’est pas pour demain”; Michaudville, [“Coleco”], 59; “Projet Les jeunes travailleurs de St-Henri,” September 1973, 1; Groupe d’encadrement ‘Maison des jeunes de St-Henri’ à membres du Conseil administrative, engagement d’un troisième volontaire au projet “Maison des jeunes de St-Henri,” 2 mai 1972, 3, LAC, RG116, Volume 114, 521 Maison des jeunes de St-Henri - Staff Reports; Gérin-Lajoie, 181.}

Concurrent with the Coleco campaign, volunteer Jocelyne Brault began to work with Lumiray workers. Brault’s attempt to build a workers’ cooperative in Pte. St-Charles, where citizen economic action received POPIR and Institut Parallèle support, had just collapsed. In December 1970, Brault recruited unemployed workers for Loge-People, a project focused on buying and cooperatively renovating homes. Once McGill architecture students supported that effort, Brault focused on building a cooperative factory using the popular education methods of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (which, as we shall see, also inspired some CUSO members in Tanzania). Brault was influenced by the workers’ control ideas circulating in Montreal New Left
journals like *Parti pris* and *Our Generation*. She drew especially on French sociologist Albert Meister’s accounts of *autogestion* and cooperatives in Yugoslavia.\(^74\) From April 1971, Pte. St-Charles Workers’ Industries attracted workers, funding, and a government contract to build small boats. If early problems with production and absenteeism were resolved, the expansion of the workforce undermined *autogestion* mechanisms. Newly hired workers believed that cooperative management should be sacrificed in the pursuit of profitability and succeeded in conferring personnel and production decisions to foremen. In response, Brault asked to be transferred.\(^75\)

She moved to St-Henri in April 1972 to work with the Lumiray group. The factory employed between 90 and 140 workers. Among them were a mix of francophones and anglophones, of French Canadians, Italian Canadians, and Black Canadians. The average age was twenty, though some were below the legal working age of 16. Nearly 70% of the workers were women, many of them married with children. Typically, workers had dropped out of school and faced poor pay and working conditions in St-Henri shops like Lumiray.\(^76\)

Building from the needs and interests of workers, Chicoine hoped that Brault could help establish a form of autonomous organization which would provide workers with a small power and encourage dynamic change. Both Brault and Chicoine wished to document the work and replicate it in other factories (though Lumiray workers resisted the emphasis on written social


\(^76\) “Lumiray: bilan d’une lutte,” 19, 22; Groupe d’encadrement “Maison des jeunes de St-Henri,” 1.
scientific model-making, seeing it as “too intellectual” of a process.) The project recalled COSH efforts to organize factory action committees and mimicked the ongoing initiative of implanted radicals seeking to propel worker struggles from within shops. It shared an emphasis not only on growing politicization, but also on imparting concrete organizational tools useful for action: committees, union locals, shop-steward systems, factory newspapers, contract negotiating teams, general assemblies, petitions, surveys, studies, and reports.

Chicoine insisted that the focus was not union organizing but rather on empowering young workers to act in the face of foremen and business union. Yet unionization was the immediate concern of the Lumiray group. Prompted by a woman who had previously worked at Coleco, three male workers began a unionization drive. The core group of militants grew to about twenty, including twelve women. Brault helped the organizers administer a questionnaire to gauge the militancy and knowledge of their co-workers. The results suggested that workers knew little about the social and material organization of their own factory. So, about fifteen workers began to meet to examine work conditions, ownership and profits, the possibility of relocation in the event of a strike, and wider social dynamics in St-Henri. They drew up a formal report and delivered their findings at a workers’ meeting. In part, the study revealed significant gender inequalities at the factory. Women were paid less and performed different tasks. However, male organizers largely saw these differences as normal. Moreover, women were largely marginalized in the militant group’s activities.

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Once workers applied for accreditation, management increased its interference. The union local president was laid off. Others were suspended for talking and followed to the washroom. To counteract repression and improve communication, the militant group set up a shop steward system. Though stewards had to meet outside of work, about forty workers became active. But it remained difficult to keep in touch with all workers. After some debate, a workers’ newspaper was started and became central to worker self-activity.80

Even unionized, workers had to continue their struggle to gain a say. Collective bargaining negotiations began just a week after the local was accredited, before an elected five-worker negotiating team was ready. As a result, a Métallos official took over the negotiations and failed to keep workers informed. Concurrently, management eased repression to demobilize workers. The shop newspaper sustained some militancy by denouncing the way contract negotiations were being carried out. Finally, women militants unhappy with the secrecy around the contract talks circulated a petition to demand a public meeting. At a series of general assemblies, Lumiray workers strove to influence the negotiations by endorsing progressive contract clauses. Demands included the abolition of lead-hands, a forty-hour work week, an end to compulsory overtime, and maternity leave. Once a tentative agreement (including maternity leave for women with a year’s seniority) had been reached, the union negotiator pressured workers to accept it by saying that if they dissented, they would be obliged to strike. However, realizing that the proposed wage structure discriminated against women, women militants organized a wildcat work stoppage the following day. The Métallos official was forced to return to the negotiating table and secure improved terms.81

During these events, the Lumiray newspaper facilitated contact with workers at other St-Henri factories. Lumiray and Coleco counterparts met in February 1972 to discuss conditions and their respective unionization struggles. The collective bargaining experience led militants to consider union democracy itself. Dissatisfied with dominant role of Métallos union officials in contract negotiations, workers wanted to participate in bargaining.82

The workers took a stand for greater union democracy. In a brief delivered to the Métallos congress, workers at Lumiray, Coleco, and CCM outlined their position on central unionism. They criticized Métallos for favouring work in large factories, ignoring non-unionized workers in small enterprises, controlling information, and preventing the autonomy of locals. They accused union officials of expediency in collective bargaining negotiations and, in the process, failing to inform and train factory militants to press their own claims. The workers called for a program of union education on labour law and union services. Plus, they requested union resources to build strong worker organizations in each factory.83

The St-Henri workers also clarified their views on the future of the labour movement in Quebec. They rejected the notion that greater equality between workers and capitalists might be achieved through bargaining. Rather, they envisioned a politicized labour movement premised on class conflict and the assertion of worker control over production, capital, and employment. Programmatically, the activists backed sectoral organization and worker-led bargaining. They also insisted that solid organizations, linking economic issues with everyday social problems, had to be built in each factory. Therefore, St-Henri militants presented their own factory

83 Des Travailleurs de C.C.M., Coleco, et Lumiray, “Pour une information, formation, organisation: syndicales et politiques des travailleurs,” n.d., 5-7, LAC, RG116, Volume 114, 521 Maison des jeunes de St-Henri - Staff Reports.
committees as a means of democratizing the Métallos union, and Quebec society. At the very least, pressure from smaller locals pushed the Métallos to better respond to worker needs.

Notably, Michel Blondin – the former COM animator who spent the early 1970s working in international development with Service universitaire canadien outre-mer – was hired by the Métallos in 1975 and pursued a pedagogy of self-education among unionists.

Back at Lumiray in 1972 and 1973, Brault assisted about twenty-five committee members trying to defend the rights of workers. They contacted the minimum wage and unemployment insurance commissions with grievances, pressed the provincial Department of Labour and the city Health Department to enforce labour and health code statues, and gathered literature to better study labour law, union organization, and the capitalist ownership structure of local factories. The workers’ newspaper reported what committee members had learned.

Increasingly, committee members broadened their activism out of a sense that problems at work were inseparable from those of the family and community. For a start, feeling that many young women at the factory were uninformed on birth control, activists contacted Le Centre des Femmes. Feminist radicals in Montreal argued that women’s liberation had to be rooted in the working class and that women had to fight not just for gender equality, but also access to child care, birth control, abortion, and self-defense. The Birth Control Handbook, widely circulated in English and French, was a key text of the movement. The accrued profits allowed activists to run an abortion referral service in 1970-1971. After the collapse of FLF, Le Centre provided

\[^{84}\text{Des travailleurs de C.C.M., Coleco, et Lumiray, “Pour une information,” 1, 4, 6-7.}\]
\[^{85}\text{Gérin-Lajoie, 183, 229-230; Michel Blondin, Yvan Comeau, Ysabel Provencher, Innover pour mobiliser: l’actualité de l’expérience de Michel Blondin (Québec: Les presses de l’Université du Québec, 2012), 67-71, 97-98.}\]
\[^{86}\text{Groupe d’encadrement “Maison des jeunes de St-Henri,” 1; “Projet ‘Les jeunes travailleurs de St-Henri,’” [c. 1972], 2-4; “Projet Les jeunes travailleurs de St-Henri,” septembre 1973, 4.}\]
contraception counselling and took a leading role in fighting for improved access to abortion.\textsuperscript{87} So, it hosted an information session on birth control for Lumiray workers. In turn,\textit{ Le Centre’s} revolutionary feminists took an active interest in the struggles of St-Henri women. They argued that working class women faced a double work-day – at the factory and in performing childcare and housework – and that the struggles in the workplace and the family were interdependent. \textit{Québécoises deboutte!}, the centre’s newspaper, published a worker-written account of the unionization struggle at Lumiray, as well as a version of events at Coleco.\textsuperscript{88}

Lumiray workers went on to begin a daycare project and discuss issues of debt, consumerism, health, and housing. Turnover, small shop dynamics, and the economic insecurity of workers made organizing difficult. All the same, when Brault left CJC employ in June 1973, the shop steward system was still place and the factory committee remained, albeit with few members. Chicoine considered the Lumiray group to be successfully autonomous.\textsuperscript{89}

Chicoine hoped to replicate the experience at other factories. A second CJC volunteer was hired in May 1972. Claudette Carbonneau was well-versed in animation, having voluntarily aided Brault in Pte. St-Charles and at Lumiray. She began to assist a group formed at Simmons, some five years after CJC-COSH volunteers had helped a factory committee there unionize workers. About thirty workers were concerned with poor hygienic and safety conditions in a plant built in 1919 and where an 80% male labour force of 450 to 500 toiled on ten-hour shifts.\textsuperscript{90}

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Activism on workplace health and safety issues was a prominent part of a growing working-class environmental consciousness in Canada and Quebec.\footnote{Katrin MacPhee, “Canadian Working-Class Environmentalism, 1965-1985,” \textit{Labour/Le Travail} 74 (2014): 123-149; Renaud Bécot, “Aux ravines de l’action environnementale du mouvement syndical québécois, 1945-1972,” \textit{Bulletin d’histoire politique} 23, no. 2 (2015): 48-65.} At Simmons, activists campaigned to improve ventilation in the painting department, address unsafe lifts, and cut down on fumes and cotton dust throughout the factory. The activism resulted in a health inspector visit and company redress. Attention turned to machine-related injuries, inadequate emergency exits, the lack of first aid equipment, cafeteria dirtiness, and noise. A safety committee was formed and worked with the St-Henri community health clinic to study the question of noise pollution. Additionally, a shop steward system was begun and workers collaborated with Coleco counterparts on a joint newspaper. Women militants formed their own study group.\footnote{“Projet Les jeunes travailleurs de St-Henri,” septembre 1973, 3-4, 9-10; “Bilan, ‘Projet Les jeunes travailleurs de St-Henri,’” 1, 3-4.}

Workers also pursued improved conditions at the factory cafeteria, as they objected to unsatisfactory and expensive food, run-down conditions, and no service during the night-shift. The committee, believing that a cooperative cafeteria would not only solve these issues but also encourage worker participation, met with University of Sherbrooke students and Ste-Justine Hospital unionists to discuss, respectively, success and missteps in setting up cooperative cafeterias. The Simmons workers also mounted an education campaign touching on the history and aims of cooperatives in Quebec. Concurrently, though, the committee pressured management to renovate the existing cafeteria and see that selection and quality was improved.\footnote{“Bilan, ‘Projet Les jeunes travailleurs de St-Henri,’” 2.}

By the end of 1973, unionization struggles had had concrete results. Workers at Lumiray and three other factories unionized, Coleco militants replaced a FCAI local with a real one, and
the local at Simmons was revitalized through factory committee activism. CJC had been directly involved at Lumiray and Simmons, while workers at Coleco later received support. With the assistance of CJC volunteers, small groups of workers organized, informed themselves on immediate workplace issues, and took up concrete tools of action. They pressed for the enforcement of the welfare state’s labour and health regulations and for unions that were more democratic, participatory, and capable of addressing rank and file concerns. Adapted to three St-Henri workplaces, CJC animation sociale sustained incipient worker self-activity in defense of workers’ interests. Chicoine’s desire for a politicized, organized, and enlarged movement for systematic change, however, still appeared considerably beyond the scope of what three CJC volunteers and a several dozen militants might accomplish in St-Henri.

**Animation culturelle**

Working-class activism in St-Henri went beyond the workplace. Stemming from their factory committees, workers tried to connect work, family, and community issues. CJC assisted the process. Chicoine described the wider reaching activity as “animation culturelle.” Unlike earlier animation sociale, which had turned on changing the attitudes and practices of the poor, animation culturelle sought to stimulate participation all while validating working-class culture. In addition to trying to mitigate factory conditions, CJC sought to ameliorate the everyday lives of workers through self-help cultural enrichment. CJC people felt that bridging workplace and community would produce broader change on terms set by workers themselves.

This kind of organizing work was somewhat presaged by the extension of CJC work with Little Burgundy school children to 15- to 25-year-old St-Henri youth. The goal was to facilitate cultural expression. A newspaper, a boutique, a café, and workshops in photography, music, and

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95 Clara Chicoine, Projet d’une “Maison des jeunes de St-Henri,” [c. 1972], 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 114, 521 Maison des jeunes de St-Henri - Staff Reports.
art were envisioned. In spring and summer 1971, about thirty-five young people participated in various activities supported by CJC volunteer Monique Durand.96

Subsequently, *animation culturelle* was facilitated through *La Maison des jeunes travailleurs*. *La Maison*, which came to occupy three houses across from the Coleco factory, marked a creative effort by Coleco organizers to hold onto their gains. They hoped that a neighbourhood centre would permit continued contact with workers who were laid off or who moved to other jobs. Workers from local factories accessed education and service offerings, including a daycare, a library, meeting space, a job postings board, and a workers’ cafeteria. Discussion groups and classes in film, photography, and music were all held. Workshops, on subjects like labour law or running a shop newspaper, were put on. Jacques Couture, a worker-priest and community organizer (who, elected in 1976, became minister of labour in a PQ government), helped keep *La Maison* going.97 Yet it remained a site of worker self-activity.

In August 1971, a general assembly at *La Maison* voted to request a CJC volunteer who might encourage a “prise de conscience” among St-Henri workers about neighbourhood and larger socio-economic realities. From mid-October, CJC’s Pierre Laurence served as an animator and resource person. Early on, he assisted a group of fourteen workers who wanted to open a “cultural café.” However, interest dwindled. In search of new directions, Laurence, Brault, and Carbonneau surveyed workers on their problems outside their workplaces.98

La Maison was a remarkable attempt to develop ties among employed and unemployed working-class youth. Individual factory committees could collaborate and broaden their reach to family, community, recreational, and even class issues through La Maison. Yet the structural conditions that made La Maison a worthwhile project threatened its very existence. In late 1972, when high winter unemployment arrived, those activists who remained employed at Coleco were too few to sustain the shop newspaper, the shop steward structure, or their health study. Once the slack period ended, another recruitment campaign had to be launched. What was true on the factory floor was also true at La Maison. Militants struggled to keep close contact with unemployed St-Henri youth and expended considerable effort trying to revive participation. A small number of Coleco and Simmons workers, especially, continued to study and address health, safety, and regulatory matters at La Maison with CJC animator support during 1973.99

In early 1974, the last CJC volunteer contract was up and CJC ended its support for the factory and community mobilizations of young workers in St-Henri. From 1968 to 1970, CJC volunteers with Comité ouvrier St-Henri struggled to make inroads because of the difficulties of organizing in factories and because of their radical ideology. In 1972 and 1973, CJC-assisted activity faced the same workplace conditions, but imposed a different kind of ideological constraint. Privileging worker autonomy and animation culturelle, factory committee and La Maison politics offered to improve factory conditions through worker knowledge of health, labour, and safety statutes, greater worker involvement in the collective bargaining process, and by easing community and family life with cultural enrichment and women’s assertion of their reproductive rights. Participation was understood as a means and ends of greater democracy in jeunes travailleurs de St-Henri,” juin 1972, 1, LAC, RG116, Volume 114, 521 Maison des jeunes de St-Henri - Staff Reports.
factories, in unions, and in Quebec society. Yet, in pursuing relatively localized and small-scale ameliorative action in the milieu ouvrier, CJC in many ways repeated the animation sociale method undertaken earlier in Little Burgundy without addressing its limitations or answering the critiques revolutionary leftists had come to in their own similar work. How animation sociale’s democratic sentiments might take long-term root remained an uncertain proposition.

Conclusion

From 1967 to 1974, animation sociale was CJC’s instrument for confronting poverty in St-Henri. In one sense, it was a common pedagogy and practice that exuded a participatory ethos and a purpose of remaking democracy from below. The poor were to be assisted in confronting their own poverty through representative small-scale organization, participatory and deliberative study, rational action, and community belonging. Yet animation sociale remained a changeable and contested concept, successively adapted by CJC personnel to changing circumstances and political outlooks. Animation sociale and socio-cultural transformation, animation sociale politique and social democratic politicization, animation révolutionnaire and revolutionary socialist mobilization, and animation culturelle and working class validation were pairs in an ongoing conversation over the means and ends of democracy.

Animation sociale was variously put to work and rethought, and its practitioners continually struggled to build a wider movement from very particular local action. All told, they continued to vest democratic possibility and the prospect of change with the working and non-working poor themselves, whether this meant liberal pluralist integration, social democratic reform, or socialist emancipation. None of these visions of democracy was realized as such. But the significance of animation sociale was in allowing and, for a time, sustaining the expression of a succession of ideals for a more participatory and just democracy in Montreal.
Animation sociale was applied with more range in St-Henri than was community development in Lesser Slave Lake, but both were Company of Young Canadians means of involving low-income people in small-scale action. In adapting two transnational forms of applied social science, CYC participated in a politics of poverty with global reach. The company was a venue for concessions, divergences, and some flexibility as liberal and leftists pursued anti-poverty interventions among ordinary people in differing local contexts. The organization assisted activism on questions of development and more, if over interrupted periods with a changing cast of volunteers. With socialist and Indigenous radicals employed then excised, CYC’s core ambition was empowering the poor to assert some more egalitarian and responsive liberal democratic capitalism from below. It was a stop-start democratic project undermined by capitalist social relations and the wider exercise of power it sought to amend.
Chapter 5

Industrial Prospecting

The liberal case for regional development in the 1960s and 1970s was that Canadians had a right to gainful employment no matter where they lived. In that respect, regional development was a call for spatial justice and for a measure of socio-economic democracy. With regional as with community development, the new welfare state sought to directly alter the processes of capital accumulation to make them more equitable and evenly distributed. Government action focused on accelerating economic growth and lessening unemployment in “lagging regions.”

Cape Breton Development Corporation (DEVCO) offers a particularly compelling, and largely unexamined, case of regional development in Canada. Unlike other regional efforts pursued through federal-provincial planning and cooperation, DEVCO was a crown corporation with significant autonomy and a mandate covering Cape Breton Island. It was created in 1967 to confront the so-called “coal problem,” to wind down longstanding coal mining operations, and to stimulate alternative industry and employment. The island’s economic future provoked widespread popular anxiety, most forcefully demonstrated when 35,000 Cape Bretoners marched in the Parade of Concern in response to the announced closure of the Sydney steel mill in October 1967. But DEVCO, unlike the grassroots-focused Company of Young Canadians activists in Lesser Slave Lake and Montreal, shifted the locus of development and enabled corporate and political elites to pursue ad hoc initiatives of their own making. A DEVCO doctrine of development consisted of a quasi-corporatist, liberal attempt to restructure the Cape

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Breton economy by making job-creation and entrepreneurship a substitute for democratic political participation.

Regional development was, more broadly, an important practice in the global politics of poverty. Governments in North America, Europe, and the Third World sought to address uneven development in the interest of preserving political and economic legitimacy. Recurrently, left-of-centre governments took on industrial promotion or the “dirty job” of restructuring industries facing market crises. Indeed, as in Cape Breton, governments in Britain, Belgium, and France responded to the decline of coal industries by pursuing alternative capitalist development in coal mining areas.\(^2\) Doris Boyle, an economist at Xavier College, had both the Cape Breton and international scene in mind when she spoke in 1967 of a “revolution of rising expectations” taking place in a world where two-thirds of people lived in poverty. She asserted that the “old economic fatalism – that nothing could be done about poverty, unemployment, gross inequalities and inequities in income and opportunity – are gone. Citizens want their conditions improved and rapidly and they want to use the power of the state to improve living standards.”\(^3\)

For one journalist, DEVCO represented “an unprecedented attempt by government to reconcile free enterprise with the needs of an area and its people.”\(^4\) Indeed, DEVCO worked to show that liberal democracy could resolve regional inequalities. But more than that, it tried to demonstrate that capitalism was the solution for, not the cause of, regional poverty. DEVCO, combining economic and ideological work, sought to remake the economy in one region by

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\(^3\) Doris Boyle, “The Economic Development of Cape Breton,” 5 November 1967, 3, Cape Breton University Library, Brass d’Or Collection, #1697, [http://www.openmine.ca/content/economic-development-cape-breton](http://www.openmine.ca/content/economic-development-cape-breton).

using state power and resources to promote entrepreneurialism and “free enterprise.” In an approach named “industrial prospecting,” capital incentives were used to attract new industry to two sites in Cape Breton from 1967 to 1971. This limited reform of the geography of production ignored underlying socio-economic inequalities and depended on unrealistic expectations of continued continental economic growth. Between the structural character of its practice and an emphasis on working-class job creation, DEVCO assumed that Cape Bretoners would participate in regional development only as a low-waged labour force ever-dependent on capitalist markets. The strategy, interrupted by recession, could not withstand its own contradictions nor deliver on the promise of a measure of socio-economic democracy in Canada.

**The Cape Breton Coal Problem**

The Donald Report, a 1966 study which laid the basis for the creation of DEVCO, argued that: “the Cape Breton coal problem is, essentially, the dependence of the Cape Breton economy and, to a lesser extent, that of Nova Scotia on the coal mining industry and the costs to the federal government of sustaining these operations.” Framing social realities as a so-called “coal problem” was a specific way of seeing the political economy of industrial Cape Breton. Ostensibly driven by concern over the dependence on a single industry, the “coal problem” was in fact a political problem – of how the liberal state should respond to a crisis of profitability of a monopolistic corporation, to the prospect of community collapse, to the vocal pressure of workers dependent on the coal industry, and to Cold War anxiety over more radical opposition. For all that it concealed, the “coal problem” rendered inequality into something depoliticized and targeted state intervention might resolve. Discourses framing Métis integration in Lesser Slave

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Lake, urban renewal in St-Henri, and (as we shall see) rural development in Tanzania worked the same way.

Geographer Doreen Massey has argued that, in a capitalist society where changes in spatial organization are related to capitalist relations of production, there is more than one kind of regional problem – each with its own particular relations of dominance, dependence, and inequality.⁷ She might have added that there is no one way of framing regional inequality. In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars drawn to dependency theory collectively argued that the underdevelopment of the Maritimes reflected the culmination of the spatial consequences of capitalist development in Canada. They understood political economy as a historical process.⁸

Coal was created over millions of years as plant matter was converted, through chemical transformations, heat, and pressure, into a high-energy fuel. The process produced ten coalfields in what is now Nova Scotia, including one reaching out beneath the Atlantic Ocean at Sydney on Cape Breton Island. In the 1890s and 1900s, two competing firms consolidated corporate control over the coalfield, industrialized extraction, and invested in coal-powered steel production.⁹ The industrial economy drew migrants and, in small communities, working-class solidarity generated repeated efforts to unionize and to contest low pay and poor working conditions. Speculative multinational financial interests established monopoly ownership of the Cape Breton coal and

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⁷ Massey, 5, 8.
steel industries, first with British Empire Steel Corporation in 1921 and then with Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation (DOSCO) in 1930. With the international communist movement resonating locally, militant miner resistance to wage cuts culminated in a 1925 strike defeated by police and army repression. Moreover, the 1920s marked the onset of economic crisis in Cape Breton, and the Maritimes more broadly. From its formation, DOSCO’s capital accumulation was sustained by rising government subsidies. The militancy of coal miners and steelworkers was contained by moderate and socialist union leaders who discouraged labour radicalism and conformed to postwar business unionism and industrial legality. The retrenchment of militancy was deepened, internationally, by bureaucratization and corruption within the United Mine Workers of America (UMW). After a strike in 1947, Cape Breton workers could not mount an effective resistance to the threat of mine closures, rising unemployment, and falling wages.

From 1939, the federal government assumed the losses of, and provided subsidies to, coal companies. In its study of the prevailing situation in 1946, the Royal Commission on Coal called for steps to modernize the precarious industry and return it to self-sufficiency. Yet commissioner Angus Morrison also insisted that given coal mining’s centrality to the Nova Scota economy, the resource could not be allowed to die. The 1947 and 1949 strikes of the Cape Breton Steelworkers Association, which employed mostly Irish workers, were quelled by the police and army. The miners’ militancy and junctures with the American labor movement did little to alter the course of the 1940s. In 1947, the federal government assumed the losses of, and provided subsidies to, coal companies. In its study of the prevailing situation in 1946, the Royal Commission on Coal called for steps to modernize the precariously industry and return it to self-sufficiency. Yet commissioner Angus Morrison also insisted that given coal mining’s centrality to the Nova Scota economy, the resource could not be allowed to die. The 1947 and 1949 strikes of the Cape Breton Steelworkers Association, which employed mostly Irish workers, were quelled by the police and army. The miners’ militancy and junctures with the American labor movement did little to alter the course of the 1940s.

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Scotia economy, it could not be allowed to collapse. The commissioners, though, rejected the nationalization of the industry, something periodically advocated by unionists since 1925.12

The postwar economy was not conducive to a resurgence in the coal industry. Cheaper oil and gas flooded consumer energy markets and hydroelectric development increased. Where the largest coal consumers in 1946 were railway companies, no train ran on coal by 1960. Mines closures, reduced production, and layoffs began in 1953. Cape Breton employment contracted, generating insecurity and sharply politicizing the future of coal mining.13 The federal government responded with another royal commission in 1959.

The Rand Commission crystallized the association between an industry with a crisis of profitability and concern over the social implications of corporate collapse. Ivan Rand predicted a resurgence for coal in some twenty-five years. In the interim, he argued that government had an obligation subsidize skeletal mining operations to avoid “a grave social disruption” and community collapse, since about 50,000 of 87,000 industrial Cape Breton residents were reliant on mining. Recommending reform to the regional economy, Rand insisted that dependence on a single extractive industry was not a viable economic base for a community.14

The commission report sparked commentary and prompted the reconstruction of Fortress Louisbourg (a project Rand suggested to employ out-of-work miners); it did not lead to coal industry reform.15 Further mine closures and job losses deepened unemployment and produced significant outmigration. Residents, who lived with deteriorating housing and poor services,
lobbied government for corrective action. In 1965, the federal government asked J. Richardson Donald to study the soaring cost of coal subsidies and recommend a new policy.16

Donald finished his report in May 1966. If largely concurring with Rand’s assessment, Donald saw no future for coal mining. He advocated curbing labour costs through a pre-retirement program and reducing operations until eventual cessation of mining. To Donald, the social dimension of the coal problem was that the union and community (not to mention the company) were conditioned to expect subsidies and had difficulty accepting that “the declining importance of coal.” He sympathized with “the traditions of Cape Breton and the independent spirit of the local people; nevertheless, one is forced to the reluctant but overwhelming conclusion that no constructive solution to unemployment and the social needs of Cape Breton can be based on coal mining.” Privately, Hawker-Siddeley – a British multinational which had controlled DOSCO since 1957 – had informed the federal government that it wished to divest itself of its mines. Therefore, in contrast to progressives who eyed nationalization of Cape Breton industry as vehicle for revitalization, Donald proposed the creation of a crown corporation to slowly end mining.17 This was to be an ironic nationalization of the coal industry.

If regional stability or growth would not depend on the coal industry, Donald reasoned that the economy needed to offer other employment opportunities. That solving the “coal problem” necessitated a diversified economic base was by 1966 more consensus than novel proposition, as we will see. But Donald’s call for Cape Breton-specific action by the federal government advanced the close association of coal industry decline and the need for alternative

16 Morgan, 137, 142; Tupper, 536-537; Paul MacEwan, Miners and Steelworkers: Labour in Cape Breton (Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1976), 316-317; K.S. Wood and Harold Verge, A Study of the Problems of Certain Cape Breton Communities (Halifax: Institute of Public Affairs, 1966), 2; Donald, iii, 9.
development. He argued that a second crown corporation be established to strengthen the island economy “through the exploitation of its resources and the promotion of industry.”  

After a long period of deliberation, the federal government decided to accept Donald’s proposed program and introduced legislation to create one (not two) crown corporations. Allan J. MacEachen, a Liberal cabinet minister and one of two Cape Breton MPs, was the key impetus behind the action. Born in Inverness in 1921, MacEachen became an economics professor at St. Francis Xavier University, his alma mater. He would chair his department and direct the People’s School before being elected to Parliament in 1953 and holding several cabinet posts from 1963. That MacEachen was so involved in the Liberal response to popular pressure and the “coal problem” emphasized the issue’s importance to regional electoral politics. And in taking up development, MacEachen bridged the democratic intentions of Antigonish Movement adult education (see next chapter) to a postwar network of Liberal patronage.

The act to create the Cape Breton Development Corporation (DEVCO), given royal assent in July 1967, directly linked the elimination of coal mining jobs with the creation of new employment. The text of the law accepted that Cape Breton’s mines had fifteen years left to run and that “the substantial dependence of the people of Sydney and the surrounding area and of the economy of the Island” was a national concern. As such, it empowered DEVCO “to promote and assist the financing and development of industry” and to incrementally withdraw from coal production “in accordance with a plan that takes into account progress in providing employment

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18 Donald, 23-24.  
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outside the coal producing industry and in broadening the base of the Island’s economy.”21 The “coal problem” became a regional development problem: how best to create new jobs and, indeed, establish a new political economy in the fixed geographical space of Cape Breton.

**The Contradictory Promise of State-Aided Free Enterprise**

Political scientist James Bickerton has argued that DEVCO was a welfare-oriented development policy designed to avert economic and social disaster, but which reinforced dependence on government. Equally, Allan Tupper has portrayed DEVCO as an inevitable use of public enterprise to prevent economic collapse and to modify “the impact of market capitalism on a geographically concentrated group of Canadians.”22 The state’s intervention, however, went beyond addressing the impact of capitalism on the welfare of Cape Bretoners. In its ideology and practice, DEVCO aimed to reconcile and renew liberal democracy and capitalism. The contradictory premise was that state assistance would ensure that “free enterprise” delivered the same standard of living it did, so the thinking assumed, for the majority of Canadians.

When the bill to create DEVCO was debated in Parliament, the Liberal government was pressed to expand its scope. Of most interest, a NDP amendment proposed to include language specifically empowering DEVCO to launch, or partner in, businesses it would itself own and operate. Clarifying Liberal intentions, MacEachen argued that the idea was to make investments in existing firms, not, he said, “to build, from the ground up, a whole variety of industries. That is certainly not the intention of the bill. It may be a desirable objective from the point of view of some hon. members opposite, but the house in adopting this resolution did not intend to turn

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Cape Breton into a socialist island.” Tommy Douglas retorted: “It is a very good example of a capitalist island right now.” The Liberals voted the amendment down.

Socialism, thus rhetorically deployed with Cold War resonance, was a useful trope given the extent to which DEVCO’s creation sought to re-legitimate capitalism. Capitalist development was at the root of uneven spatial and social organization in Canada. But those involved with DEVCO understood Cape Breton as an aberration that could benefit from new connections to capitalist markets. This thinking was possible because the logic of the “coal problem” focused attention not on the economic system or broader relations of power, but on the fact of community and worker dependence on one industry, and subsequently on government. In these terms, the problem was with Cape Breton and regional development might focus insularly on remaking the regional economy. The political importance of regional development, however, was not similarly limited to Cape Breton because the overall aim was greater Canadian unity and equality in a politically-dynamic Sixties world.

DEVCO, which began work in October 1967, as a crown corporation that adopted corporate practices, was led by an industrial executive, had a board of directors of businessmen and consultants, and had important patronage ties to the Liberal party. DEVCO’s president was Robinson Ord. He was the 60-year-old chairman of the Canadian Export Association and president of Chemcell Ltd., a chemical corporation, where Tom Kent found work in 1959-1961 while acting as Lester Pearson’s policy and campaign strategist. Maurice Strong, the former president of Power Corporation and head of Canada’s external aid program, recruited Ord for the

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DEVCO job, while Pearson convinced Ord to accept a turn in public service. Ord admitted in an interview from his Montreal office that he had never been to Cape Breton.25

In Ord’s view, DEVCO was not a step toward the welfare state or socialism, but rather “a legitimate tool of free enterprise” adapted to a special situation. “I do not believe in socialism,” Ord declared, but felt DEVCO was justified because “no private company can do the job.” “It is the business of a Crown corporation,” he argued, “to stimulate private industry to the greatest possible extent.”26 He wanted to attract businesses and turn Cape Breton “into one of the most attractive parts of the world industrially as well as environmentally.” Likely drawing on his Chemcell experience, Ord eyed industries “where the raw material is imported and the finished product is exported.” He also believed that tourism had potential.27

Yet Ord was also convinced that something intangible was necessary to reshape Cape Breton as a viable market economy and a place for capitalist investment. He insisted that: “Bringing new industry to Cape Breton is not enough.” Rather: “What must be done is the creation of an environment in Cape Breton that will permit these industries to grow and prosper without being continually propped up by Government assistance. Our ultimate goal must be to create the kind on an economy that will be efficient and, therefore, will have within itself the


26 Capreole, “DEVCO President,” 1.

27 E. Leah Clark has suggested that DEVCO drew on the “enclave import” thinking of Albert O. Hirschman, an American economist who theorized that regional development might be fostered through spatially unbalanced economic growth. Ord appears to have been drawing on his own business experience and there is no direct evidence that he drew on Hirschman’s theories. Yet Ord’s focus on importing materials and exporting finished industrial products dovetailed with Hirschman’s speculation on how to kickstart industrial development in underdeveloped countries. Hirschman, influenced by his experience as an economic planner in Colombia, suggested that industrialization had to begin with industries producing goods for final demand. He argued that this could be done either by transforming primary products or, as Ord suggested, pursuing manufacturing with imported semi-manufactured goods. Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), 109-112; E. Leah Clark, “The Cape Breton Development Corporation: ‘Something Else’ in Regional Development” (M.A. Thesis in Canadian Studies, Carleton University, 1981), 70. Capreole, “DEVCO President,” 1.
capacity to adapt to technological change.” Cape Breton, in Ord’s imagination, would become a dynamic and growing capitalist regional economy, assembling and processing goods for a continental economy, as well as serving as its leisure periphery. Moreover, a change in attitudes about and within Cape Breton was a necessary precondition of economic change.

Douglas H. Fullerton, the economist and financial consultant who chaired DEVCO’s board, took up the implied behavioural issue, invoking the culture of poverty theme also present in Company of Young Canadians activities. Fullerton argued that Cape Bretoners had a “dependence syndrome” and had become too reliant on government direction and aid. He reasoned, “A particular aspect of this problem is the great lack on the Island of people with steam in their boilers – the entrepreneurs who start small enterprises on borrowed money, but who work hard to build the business up – creating jobs and wealth.”

Ord and Fullerton, both, were spokesmen of business, at the head of a crown corporation committed to regional development, lecturing on the requirements of “free enterprise” amidst a crisis of capitalism in Cape Breton. Their ideological work turned the economic system from a cause of unemployment to a solution for joblessness just waiting to be released. In the process, regional development became a political solution to inequality within federal liberal democracy in the 1960s. If the “coal problem” involved the dependence of Cape Bretoners on a single industry and government, regional poverty and inequality would be resolved by bringing in what Cape Breton lacked: diversified industry and entrepreneurial endeavour. DEVCO’s démarche would, accordingly, be “industrial prospecting” and delivering state-funded capital aid to private business. But, in the first place, these practices drew on important antecedents.

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29 “‘Above All, Cape Bretoners Must Learn to Accept Change,’” Cape Breton Highlander, 30 October 1968, 1.
DEVCO and its Antecedents

The development prerogative permeated its creation, but DEVCO was to a large extent a coal company not unlike DOSCO before it. The Coal Division was responsible for operating the mines and overseeing the attrition policy spelled out in the Donald Report. An early retirement plan saw 2,087 of 6,278 inherited jobs cut between 1968 and 1970. The division eyed reducing costs by closing mines, trimming operations, and enhancing productivity through mechanization. Policy was also shaped by further events. Paid for its coal assets, Hawker Siddeley announced the closure of its Sydney steel mill on 13 October 1967, just twelve days after DEVCO came into effect. In response, 35,000 Cape Bretoners marched in the Parade of Concern. With the federal government’s refusal to take control of the steel mill, the provincial government created its own crown corporation, Sydney Steel Corporation (SYSCO), to operate the plant. DEVCO assisted SYSCO by purchasing and operating the steel mill’s coke ovens.\(^{30}\)

While the Coal Division actively eliminated mining jobs, the Industrial Development Division (IDD) was responsible for creating alternative employment. Ord felt that IDD could learn from the efforts of Atlantic Development Board (ADB) and Industrial Estates Limited (IEL).\(^{31}\) Indeed, DEVCO’s regional development program built on immediate antecedents in industrial promotion and two leading staff people provided links to contemporary practice.

The first was Alasdair B. (Al) Graham, DEVCO’s executive secretary. Then 38, Graham was a Cape Breton native, media executive, and, crucially, Allan MacEachen’s former executive assistant. Graham maintained active links to the Liberal Party, would rise to the post of DEVCO

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\(^{31}\) Capreole, “DEVCO President,” 1.
Vice-President, and was appointed to Senate in 1972. While working for MacEachen, Graham served as a liaison between the minister and Nova Scotia Premier Robert Stanfield. Graham’s go-between work directly related to the creation of DEVCO and to initiatives including IEL.32

Industrial Estates Limited had roots in postwar efforts to diversify Maritimes economies. Regional disparity in Canada was aggravated by federal government policies, first, favouring World War II industries in central Canada and, second, assisting those same industries transition to peacetime production. The result was exacerbated inequalities in investment at the expense of Maritimes provinces.33 Under the banner of postwar reconstruction, Maritimes governments pursued frustrated efforts to diversify provincial economies.34 In the 1950s, outmigration and a decline of rural primary industries lent themselves to popular discontent and various proposed solutions. Regional elites succeeded in asserting a development ethos centered on attracting industry from elsewhere. The effect of petit bourgeois regional activism – what historian Margaret Conrad has called “the Atlantic Revolution” – was to establish regional equality as a goal of both provincial and federal policy and to forge a consensus on the need for “a vigorous capitalist economy, an interventionist democratic state, and mass consumption.”35

In Nova Scotia, the pro-business, activist Progressive Conservative government of Robert Stanfield created IEL in 1957. Justified in terms of creating new jobs, IEL aimed to diversify the

provincial economy and promote new secondary manufacturing through what Roy George has called “state-aided industrial development.” The industrial estates concept was borrowed from northeastern England and was premised on the idea that serviced industrial land and buildings would encourage industry. However, where IEL mostly became a lending agency after 1964 – offering ownership equity, grants, and special terms on financing. IEL’s directors were businessmen and they oversaw the transfer of public funds to capital with great autonomy and secrecy.\(^{36}\) IEL was a forerunner to similar provincial agencies elsewhere and inter-provincial competition for industries increased in the 1960s.\(^{37}\) Markedly, DEVCO adopted both IEL’s goal of securing new secondary manufacturing and its means and mode of promoting it.

The second DEVCO link to existing policy was F.J. (Fern) Doucet, Vice-President of Industrial Development. Doucet was a 44-year-old Cape Bretoner and a St. Francis Xavier University graduate with further degrees from University of Toronto and London School of Economics. He took up his post already well-versed in development practice, as his previous job having been as a senior economist with Atlantic Development Board (ADB).\(^{38}\)

Regional elites seeking business subsidies forced federal government action, too. John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives were elected in 1957 due in part to his populist appeal to those left out of prosperity. Though recession delayed regional initiatives, the Diefenbaker government did create the Area Rehabilitation and Development Agency (1961) to focus on rural “social adjustment” and ADB (1962) to prepare a federal plan for Atlantic development. The Pearson government added Fund for Rural Economic Development (1966) and an Area


\(^{38}\) “Fern Doucet to be Named Devco V-P,” *Cape Breton Highlander,* 24 January 1968, 1.
Development Agency (1963) created to promote private sector growth in depressed areas with tax incentives and capital grants.\textsuperscript{39} None of these initiatives was Cape Breton-specific, yet Doucet was involved in an inter-departmental study of the island’s economic prospects in 1964.\textsuperscript{40}

In line with these antecedents, DEVCO sought to use capital incentives, augmented by business services, to create “an industrial base in Cape Breton to replace coal mining.”\textsuperscript{41} In the short term, in search of what Doucet termed the “quickest payoff,” its IDD focused on attracting secondary manufacturing as well as service industries.\textsuperscript{42} The impatience to deliver immediate jobs no doubt reflected anxiety over local political pressure, significant unemployment, and the uncertain timeline on the continued existence of the coal and steel industries in Cape Breton.

**Bi-Polar Regional Development**

Geographer David Harvey has argued that while both labour and capital can move, the labour process must occur in a defined location of production. The spatial concentration of productive power in some locations and the relative emptiness of others is produced as the circulation of capital transforms and sustains certain social infrastructures at the expense of others. Yet social geography does not simply represent the needs of capital; it also reflects the


\textsuperscript{40} “Report to the Cape Breton Island Co-ordinating Committee from the Cape Breton Island Sub-Committee on Tourism,” [c. 1964], 1, LAC, Atlantic Development Board fonds, RG124, Volume 151, File B4.

\textsuperscript{41} Legislation empowered IDD to lend or grant money to businesses, to acquire land, to hold mortgages, to advertise, to coordinate with other government agencies, and “to do all other things deemed incidental or conducive to industrial development.” IDD received $20 million federal and $10 million provincial funding for these purposes. 16 Elizabeth II, Part I - 4 1/2, Chapter 6, Page 51, “An Act to establish the Cape Breton Development Corporation,” 62-63, LAC, RG14032, Volume 61, File 6; “Overall Plan Required Under Section 17,” 5.

\textsuperscript{42} IDD stipulated the incentives on offer, cautioning that DEVCO reserved the right to appoint directors and take an equity position in companies receiving support. a) Financing: 100% on buildings and land; up to 80% on machinery. b) Tax-free grant: 33.3% of the capital investment. c) Depreciation allowance: 50% per annum on machinery; 20% on buildings. d) Settling-in grant: $2,000 per employee. e) Business services: help finding a location and ongoing assistance. Cape Breton Development Corporation, *Industrial and Commercial Information* (Sydney, NS: DEVCO, 1968), 12, Cape Breton University Library, Bras d’Or Collection, #601, http://www.openmine.ca/content/industrial-cape-breton-industrial-and-commercial-information. Doucet cited in Clark, 68.
contradictions of capitalism and the struggle between capital and labour. The resulting spatial patterns are what Harvey has termed the “uneven geographical development” of capitalism.\textsuperscript{43}

To the extent that DEVCO sought to influence the “uneven geographical development” of capitalism, three interconnected assumptions were made about space. The first centered on the idea of “region,” the second had to do with location, and the third concerned the function and effect of capital incentives. IDD’s task was to generate alternative employment to coal mining, but mines on mainland Nova Scotia were excluded from nationalization. Instead, DEVCO’s legally demarcated spatial framework was Cape Breton Island. The island, as a regional unit of space, was not problematized. Ord insisted, for instance, that “we have to accept that whatever is good for one part of Cape Breton is good for the whole island.”\textsuperscript{44} Yet there were ambiguities. Should DEVCO only focus on industrial Cape Breton (Sydney, New Waterford, Glace Bay, and North Sydney), where miners lived and worked? Or did a regional outlook allow for action on other parts of the island? Did region include the four Mi’kmaw reserves under Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development jurisdiction? Would DEVCO play any role when it came to Cape Breton’s two national parks? How would DEVCO address the boundaries of municipal and provincial responsibilities? In terms of jurisdiction, spatial patterns, and social organization, Cape Breton was not unitary nor was “region” a self-evident concept.

As it emerged in practice, DEVCO’s initial regional development work took a specific spatial form. New industry, assisted by incentives and infrastructure, was concentrated at two industrial parks at either end of Cape Breton: Point Tupper in Port Hawkesbury and Point Edward across the harbour from Sydney. More than reflecting the importance placed on industrial parks, this spatial organization of development reflected growth pole theory.

\textsuperscript{43} David Harvey, \textit{The Limits to Capital} (London: Verso, 1999), 373-403.
\textsuperscript{44} Frank Miller, “Thorough Planning is Key: Ord,” \textit{Cape Breton Post}, 6 February 1968, 3, 5.
In the 1950s, the new discipline of regional economics emerged as a critique of the view that all space was homogeneous and that economic growth was evenly spread. Location theory – concerned with why industry and population concentrate in certain places rather than others – was a key approach in the field. Influentially, French economist François Perroux argued that at growth poles, modernized sectors served as “motor industries” which stimulated economic expansion and encouraged the aggregation of population and further industry. Not only did these centres intensify economic activity in the immediate urban environment, Perroux also suggested that the effects of growth spread out into the surrounding area. He concluded that if a growth pole was sufficiently powerful, it could shift the entire structure of the national economy.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Canadian regional planners, as well as those working in Europe and the Third World, drew on growth pole thinking – even as the concept remained vague and the empirical validity of Perroux’s ideas unconfirmed. By stimulating new industry in chosen urban centres in economically depressed regions, they believed that regional disparity in Canada could be reduced. Though not formally indicated, the influence of growth pole theory on DEVCO policy was evident in the preoccupation with fixing the location of industry in Cape Breton at two points. New plants were thought to serve as the basis of future income and investment in Cape Breton and, therefore, of self-sustaining economic growth and prosperity.

To attract industry to the island, specifically, IDD focused on offering capital incentives over and above those paid by provincial and federal agencies – “something extra,” Fullerton put

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45 Savoie, 9; O.J. Firestone, “Regional Economic and Social Disparity,” in Regional Economic Development, 209.
it. \(^{48}\) By providing capital incentives, IDD assumed that it was fixed capital costs that stopped firms from locating in Cape Breton. In a polemical analysis, economist Robert Woodward argued that the federal government’s use of capital subsidies was not only contradictory, but in fact inconsistent with the stated aim of creating jobs in depressed regions. He argued that labour subsidies were better suited to increase employment. \(^{49}\) The same critique may be applied to DEVCO. Plus, by bringing industries to a high unemployment area, IDD was guaranteeing firms a supply of labour without ensuring jobs for workers. Recall, though, that DEVCO’s interest in generating employment was always couched within a framework of revitalizing the regional capitalist economy. As Ord’s vision of technologically adaptable and growth-oriented modern industry made clear, IDD assumed that capital investment in equipment and production was necessary for industry to be viable. Capital incentives fit this ideological vision.

With its deference to capital incentives, IDD left itself open to dealing with companies that had little motivation to provide all of the jobs they promised and who came to Cape Breton simply because they lacked other means to raise capital. More, Doreen Massey has observed that in trying to influence the locational decisions of industrialists, regional policy was a geographical effort to produce geographical change. Yet spatial patterns are not necessarily the result of spatial causes and are instead entangled with social organization. \(^{50}\) Of the same order, DEVCO’s development program looked to influence the geography of production, but remained vulnerable to larger economic trends and underlying social relations of production.

\(^{48}\) “Overall Plan Required Under Section 17,” 5; Clark, 69.
\(^{50}\) Massey, 3-7, 13.
IDD fielded many requests for funds. From 1968 to 1971, small sums were spent on an eclectic number of civic projects, loans to small businesses, and a scholarship program.\textsuperscript{51} However, the main thrust of IDD’s strategy focused on two informal growth poles.

The first pole of regional development emerged at Point Tupper, a site along the Strait of Canso and just south of a transportation hub and fishing town, Port Hawkesbury. In 1955, the Canso Causeway, linking the mainland and the island, opened beside the community. The causeway’s promoters believed that it would improve transportation and facilitate the modernization of the coal and steel industries. Instead, it was a boon to the island tourism industry. For Port Hawkesbury, the causeway was a disaster. The ascendance of cars and trucks saw the closure of the town’s ferry and Canadian National railway terminals. Without jobs, many people moved away. Others formed the Four County Development Association to lobby government and to attract new industries, particularly a pulp and paper mill.\textsuperscript{52}

Pulp and paper development was long-sought in Nova Scotia. In 1899, the province created the so-called Big Lease, covering about 620,00 acres of Cape Breton Island. The forest reserve was conveyed to American financiers at advantageous terms with the expectation of industrial development. Yet the lease was simply held for speculative purposes until the province re-acquired it in 1957. The Big Lease and IEL incentives were promptly delivered to a subsidiary of Swedish corporation Stora Kopparberg, which agreed open a mill at Point Tupper (where the province created an industrial park). Ironically, Stora was encouraged by an unforeseen effect of the causeway: the roadway blocked drift-ice and created an ice-free deep


\textsuperscript{52} Meaghan Beaton and Del Muise, “The Canso Causeway: Tartan Tourism, Industrial Development, and the Promise of Progress for Cape Breton,” \textit{Acadiensis} 37, no. 2 (2008), 39-40, 47, 60-61.
water port in the Strait. In 1970 and 1971, DEVCO provided Stora with two loans and a large loan guarantee to aid the company to expand its facilities and diversify production.

Stora was not the only multinational attracted by incentives and a readily accessible port. British-American Oil planned to build a refinery at Point Tupper and, as DEVCO began its earliest operations, Ord believed that the project could be a “cornerstone industry.” DEVCO’s board concurred, admitting that while little employment would result, the “psychological advantages” of the refinery were important. DEVCO funded the construction of a wharf for the oil company, which also received province and federal subsidy.

In addition to capital incentives and industrial infrastructure, the growth pole project required community infrastructure. Here, the provincial government did not immediately provide needed services as Port Hawkesbury’s population trebled thanks to jobs at six new heavy industries. Overcrowded schools, inadequate medical services, high municipal debt, social conflict, and pollution were among the effects of growth punctuated by several construction booms and recessions. Moreover, in the surrounding rural area where corporate control of

55 “Must Coordinate Agencies: Ord,” Cape Breton Post, 15 January 1968, 3; DEVCO, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, Montreal, 3 April 1968, 10-11, LAC, RG14032, Volume 61, File 6; Ian MacNeil, “To Build $55,000,000 Oil Refinery at Point Tupper,” Cape Breton Post, 1968, 1; DEVCO, Fourth Annual Report, 12.
timbre limited forestry employment, residents mounted a protracted campaign to protect their environment against Stora’s plans to spray the Big Lease with insecticide.\footnote{Elizabeth May, \textit{Budworm Battles: The Fight to Stop the Aerial Insecticide Spraying of the Forests of Eastern Canada} (Tantallon, NS: Four East Publications, 1982); Morgan 181-184; Jon-Callum Makkai, “Margaree and Metropolis: Economic Marginality and Dynamic Underdevelopment in a Twentieth-Century Rural Cape Breton Community” (M.A. Thesis in History, Dalhousie University, 2000), 88-94, 97, 101.}

Industry at Point Tupper attracted people to jobs far more than it generated employment for existing residents. And the number of workers attracted from industrial Cape Breton was negligible.\footnote{Tom Kent to R. Ord, 2 April 1971, QUA, 1300, Box 6, File 11; “Special Area Agreements: Issues,” January 1970, 1-2, QUA, 1300, Box 6, File 6; Susan Catherine Fleming, “The Growth Centre Concept and its Application in the Maritime Provinces, 1970-1976” (M.A. Report in Economics, University of New Brunswick, 1979), 21.} For a crown corporation meant to create jobs to replace coal mining ones, the new smokestacks at Point Tupper were a long way from the mines. By including Point Tupper in its definition of region, DEVCO ended up boosting the state subsidy to two multinational corporations, benefitting few local people, and doing little to meet its immediate mandate.

In March 1970, the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) announced the creation of twenty-two “special areas” in Canada. As we saw in Lesser Slave Lake, firms locating or expanding operations in a special area qualified for capital incentives. The Strait of Canso was among those areas designated. Since the mining area had been excluded, it was suggested that industrial Cape Breton deserved greater DEVCO focus.\footnote{Morgan, 138-139; “New Industries Eye Cape Breton,” \textit{Cape Breton Post}, 25 July 1964, 3; DEVCO, \textit{Third Annual Report}, 14; “Unveil Industrial Park Plans,” \textit{Cape Breton Post}, 16 September 1966, 1.}

DEVCO’s second, more informal growth pole was indeed in industrial Cape Breton – at Point Edward Industrial Park, situated opposite the mouth of Sydney Harbour. DEVCO joined an existing government effort to turn a former naval base into “a modern industrial park.”\footnote{Morgan, 138-139; “New Industries Eye Cape Breton,” \textit{Cape Breton Post}, 25 July 1964, 3; DEVCO, \textit{Third Annual Report}, 14; “Unveil Industrial Park Plans,” \textit{Cape Breton Post}, 16 September 1966, 1.} Two early clients – Canadian Motor Industries Ltd. and Pyrominerals Ltd., both subsidiaries of
multinationals – received IEL subsidies.⁶¹ In 1969, the federal government transferred the property to DEVCO. IDD improved the wharf and shipping facilities and operated the site at a loss through the 1970s.⁶² Plus, IDD redoubled efforts to attract industry to Point Edward, earmarked as one of two physical locations of regional development in Cape Breton.

**Industrial Prospecting**

“Our industrial prospecting,” a delightfully ironic geological metaphor, was what Robinson Ord named DEVCO’s strategy for attracting ‘prospectors,’ who proved willing to accept capital subsidies to fleetingly pursue accumulation in Cape Breton. DEVCO published an information booklet itemizing available incentives and maintained offices in Montreal and Ottawa.⁶³ Further, it hosted groups of “leading industrialists,” contracted consultants, undertook recruiting trips, and even threw Atlantic lobster parties in California.⁶⁴ Al Graham recalled meeting with business types on a trip to California and encouraging them to locate their next branch plant in Cape Breton. The response, as Graham told it, would be “you know where the hell is that, and you’d have to take them up the coast of California to Vancouver and across the Prairies and into the thickly populated, the golden triangle as it were in Ontario and through Quebec down the Maritimes, down into Cape Breton and to then get them to come and look was something […]”⁶⁵

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⁶³ Robinson Ord, President, Cape Breton Development Corporation, “The Cape Breton Problem,” Address to the Atlantic Section, Chemical Institute of Canada, September 7, 1968, 2, BI, Chemical Institute of Canada, Atlantic Section papers, MG.14.6; Joan Capreole, “DEVCO President Says He’s Optimistic About Cape Breton’s Future,” Cape Breton Highlander, 1 October 1967, 1; DEVCO, Industrial and Commercial Information.

⁶⁴ “Industrialists Visit Sydney,” Cape Breton Post, 18 May 1968, 3; Second Annual Report, 14; DEVCO, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, Ottawa, 4 March 1968, 6, LAC, RG14032, Volume 61, File 6; “Fundamental Error in Growth Efforts,” Cape Breton Highlander, 2 July 1969, 4.

In seeking out branch plants operations of American or central Canadian corporations, DEVCO was willing to accept the constraints of concentrated control of capital, a high degree of foreign ownership, and significant continental economic integration that characterized late 1960s Canadian political economy. As we will see, most firms attracted by DEVCO manufactured consumer goods for American markets. Cape Breton was to become a site of assembly.

Therefore, DEVCO’s immediate answer to gradual de-industrialization in coal (and potentially steel) was to uncritically promote re-industrialization for an emergent consumer economy. DEVCO’s response to the spatial consequences of the continental political economy was deferential to capitalism. Future economic growth was presumed and officials simply sought to influence the spatial pattern of production and capital reinvestment – and, indirectly, employment – with subsidy. But it was assumed that DEVCO’s intervention was transitory, and that additional jobs would stem from further private economic expansion.

Clients DEVCO did find, though not with the desired results. DEVCO attracted the attention of one Californian would-be entrepreneur, Wylie Mason, Jr., and his unbelievably named Hustler Products. An incentives deal was reached in early 1969, but, by spring 1970, financial insecurity and a legal battle for control of the company led to a plant shut-down. The Point Edward employees, who never numbered more than 40, were laid off. Mason – thought to be using DEVCO subsidies to cover his personal expenses – went on to request additional aid. DEVCO instead applied for a court appointed receiver. Mason responded by complaining that too much of DEVCO’s support had been tied up in mortgages, when a cash grant would have

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been more to his liking. DEVCO’s board later concluded that while it did not have a legal obligation to pay the back wages owed to workers, it had a moral one and compensated them.68

The sequence of events was to be variously repeated when it came to the main agreements IDD concluded with other companies in 1968 and 1969. At Point Edward, there were four other failed consumer product ventures. First, in May 1968, DEVCO funded the arrival of Breton Versatrek Ltd., a Toronto-area firm making an all-terrain vehicle. Second, DEVCO also sponsored Richmond Plastics Ltd., a Vancouver company which produced plastic bodies for the same vehicle. Sales were poor. After initially injecting more capital into the operations, DEVCO’s board terminated its support for both companies. In late 1970, Breton Versatrek lapsed into receivership and Richmond Plastics shuttered its plant as well.69 Third, Cassette Cartridge (Canada) Limited, a New York-owned company, received DEVCO and DREE support in October 1969, but halted construction on its Point Edward facility seven months later. The principals were in default and DEVCO sued them for breach of contract.70 Fourth, W. Alan Kennedy Ltd., a Montreal cleaning compound company, received DEVCO support, but sales dropped and, by the end of 1970, it was on the way to bankruptcy.71 In a fifth

68 Tom Kent, Memorandum to the Minister, 27 April 1970, 1, QUA, 1300, Box 6, File 7; “DEVCO Applies to Court for Receiver,” Cape Breton Post, 10 June 1970, 3; “Hustler Takes Dig at Devco,” Cape Breton Highlander, 3 June 1970, 1; DEVCO, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, Montreal, 10 May 1971, 10, LAC, RG14032, File 10.
69 “Breton Versatrek Limited,” 1-2, LAC, RG14032, Volume 61, File 6; “Breton-Versatrek is Fascinating Industry;” Cape Breton Post, 1969, 4(Section One); Ian MacNeil “Another Industry for Point Edward,” Cape Breton Post, 23 May 1968, 1; “Richmond Plastics Limited,” 1, LAC, RG14032, File 6; DEVCO, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, Ottawa, 17 April 1969, 5, LAC, RG14032, Volume 61, File 7; DEVCO, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, Montreal, 15 October 1970, 3-4, LAC, RG14032, Volume 61, File 9.
71 “W. Alan Kennedy Limited,” 1, LAC, RG14032, Volume 61, File 6; “Road Ahead Promising for New Industry,” Cape Breton Post, 23 March 1970, 8(Second Section); DEVCO, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, Sydney, 4 December 1970, 8, LAC, RG14032, Volume 61, File 9.
case, DEVCO sponsored Rhand Electronics Ltd. in Glace Bay. In early 1971, after design, production, and financial difficulties, the stereo receiver manufacturer lapsed into receivership.  

There was one heavy industry twist to the focus on consumer goods. DEVCO afforded Kaiser Strontium Products Ltd., a multinational’s subsidiary, a large loan for a mining and refining project. Technical issues delayed the project until 1971, when ore mined on the island was processed at Point Edward. Yet production ceased in 1976 because an envisioned market for strontium use in consumer goods did not emerge.

Kaiser may have outlasted other DEVCO-assisted companies, but the immediate picture was that firms attracted to industrial Cape Breton in 1968 and 1969 went bankrupt in spectacularly quick succession in 1970 and 1971. What to make of these companies and how they fit with IDD’s regional development efforts? Inputs (aside from local ore), equipment, expertise, and management personnel (including most of DEVCO’s) almost exclusively came from outside Cape Breton. By relying on corporations whose ultimate ownership was based elsewhere (with the possible exception of Rhand), DEVCO ensured, too, that any profits would go afar. If IDD attracted a few established multinational corporations, it also encouraged smaller entrepreneurial outfits. By providing capital incentives, IDD allowed companies to set up while masking that they lacked the working capital to succeed. Many of the companies also depended on new products without demonstrated markets or on unproven production techniques. More to the point, DEVCO proved it could influence the location of a handful of operations, and

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therefore try to reinsert Cape Breton into the changing shape of continental capitalism. What DEVCO could not do, however, was influence larger continental and global recessionary trends in evidence from the late 1960s. In its embrace of capitalism, DEVCO could not ensure the economic viability of private operations. “Industrial prospecting” was an ad hoc strategy contingent on rose-coloured expectations of growth.

It bears exploring the social stratification and division of labour of DEVCO’s program as well. Prospective job totals were announced the moment IDD agreements were concluded. Repeatedly, the estimates were considerably overstated. Projections peaked at 1,000 jobs at the Strait of Canso, 1,500 in industrial Cape Breton, and 1,900 temporary ones in construction.74 Taking together the structural character of its practice and the emphasis on supposed job creation, DEVCO took for granted that Cape Bretoners would share in regional development only as a low-waged force ever reliant on markets.75 The failure of DEVCO-backed secondary manufacturing re-affirmed unemployment and bleak job prospects.

The class-based assumption of how Cape Bretoners fit into regional development was implicit in industrial prospecting, but more obvious in another project. IDD felt that the construction workforce it had helped stimulate might be used to build housing, an endeavour limited locally to custom building and cooperative groups. While DEVCO bought land for possible housing development, it never did build homes for residents. Instead, IDD financed a joint apartment and office building (Cabot House) and motel (a Holiday Inn). IDD’s logic was revealing. If the motel was geared toward tourism, the decision to finance Cabot House was

74 DEVCO, Third Annual Report, 12.
75 Comparable analysis has been applied to Highlands and Islands Development Board (1965), a Scottish agency with practices similiar to DEVCO’s. The pursuit of development transformed people’s opposition to economic marginalization into an insistence on the fuller utilization of their labour power on terms set by capital. Not only did job creation prove inadequate, workers remained marginalized in the division of labour. M.N. Geddes, “The Political Economy of Regional Development: The Scottish Highlands and the Highlands and Islands Development Board” (Ph.D. Diss. in Urban and Regional Studies, University of Sussex, 1984), 163-164, 191-192, 206.
justified on the principle that there was “a serious shortage of suitable housing accommodation for the managerial and technical personnel who will have to be brought into Cape Breton, at least during the first few years of the development programme.”76 This top-down view of regional development set management, DEVCO’s included, apart from Cape Breton wage earners.

The project was marked by cost overruns and the financial instability of the principals. Construction was also delayed when unionized sheet metal workers struck. Work stoppages were a common enough occurrence to prompt DEVCO to commission a report on the perception – one gesturing toward past coal miner radicalism – that Cape Breton had a “labour problem.” Professor Tim O’Neill concluded that, with respect to the series of early 1970s strikes, the island’s construction industry actually had a “management problem,” given high mark-ups, incomplete engineering work, overextension, and poor labour relations. Strikes, he concluded with statistical evidence, were no more likely in Cape Breton than the Canadian average.77 By fall 1970, DEVCO had taken full ownership of the complex and contracted a motel operator. As with tradesmen, development did not circumvent class conflict for service workers. In 1977, fifty Holiday Inn workers went on strike, joined by two hundred supporters at a solidarity rally.78

Other Cape Bretoners responded to their class position by organizing and mobilizing. At Hustler, workers unionized to press to improve their little-better-than-minimum wage pay. At Pyrominerals, workers staged a sit-down strike to contest the dismissal of ten colleagues. And

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76 DEVCO, Third Annual Report, 12, 16; DEVCO, Sixth Annual Report, 26; “More Motels Are Possible,” Cape Breton Post, 8 February 1969, 3; DEVCO, Second Annual Report, 15.
workers at Point Edward Industrial Park walked out against their employer, DEVCO, in 1977.\textsuperscript{79} In short, defensive action by workers did take place despite high levels of unemployment.

DEVCO, to return to the moment of multiplying bankruptcies, was an agency in crisis. With few funds, and absent favourable economic circumstances, IDD had no active development program in 1970 and 1971. Speculation on DEVCO’s continued existence mounted.\textsuperscript{80}

What the crisis afforded was a renewed opportunity to debate development in Cape Breton. One critique of existing practice came in-house. In July 1969, Douglas Fullerton quit as DEVCO chairman amidst rumours of his frustration with Ord’s conventional business approach. Fullerton’s replacement was R.B. Cameron, an industrialist who criticized “the helter-skelter drive to plunk down new plants and factories all over the province,” warned against “artificial” secondary industry, and called for better planning.\textsuperscript{81}

Cape Bretoners, too, sustained a critique of DEVCO and held out possible alternatives. Rev. Greg MacLeod, a professor-priest at Xavier College, maintained that DEVCO was “the chief hope for development in Cape Breton,” but criticized its secrecy and lack of local representation. MacLeod argued that: “If the North American system is, in fact, overproducing manufactured goods, it might not be wise for us in Cape Breton to pin too many of our hopes on competing in the ‘manufactured good’ market. It may be that the development and exchange of services for each other will one day become as important as the exchange of ‘goods and


\textsuperscript{80}Clark, 75; Della Stanley, “The 1960s: The Illusions and Realities of Progress,” in \textit{The Atlantic Provinces in Confederation}, 435-436; Standing Committee on Regional Development, House of Commons, 29th Parliament - 2nd Session, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Regional Development No. 4 - Thursday, May 2, 1974, 17; DEVCO, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors, Montreal, 10 May 1971, 2, LAC, RG14032, Volume 61, File 10.


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gadgets.” He favoured DEVCO investment in chronically under-funded housing, recreational, cultural, and municipal services, both to generate jobs and to foster “personal development.”

Concern over the quality of life in Cape Breton communities permeated his thinking.

MacLeod, and a like-minded set of business, labour, church, and community groups, channeled their calls for action into Metropolitan Alliance for Development (MAD) in mid-1971. They called on DEVCO to pursue a participatory approach to development, both in consulting with MAD and in meeting community needs. MAD’s John Hanratty warned Ord that Cape Breton had long “been subject to the absentee ownership and arbitrary decisions of DOSCO. We trust that you do not intend DEVCO to follow into footsteps of DOSCO.” In addition to lobbying activities, some MAD activists led by MacLeod pursued a vision of local economic control by establishing a community development corporation, New Dawn Enterprises.

Collectively, the criticism confirmed discontent with the failure of IDD’s initial program. A new leadership at DEVCO shared the sentiment. Behind closed doors, the corporation charted a renewed plan for regional development from late 1971.

Conclusion

In 1967, the federal government confronted a political crisis by bailing out a corporation which had long extracted coal in Cape Breton with a minimum of investment and labour cost, and by creating DEVCO in its place. A crown corporation, DEVCO’s mandate was to bring coal

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82 Fr. Greg MacLeod, “There’s Scope for New Approach,” Cape Breton Post, 1 April 1972, 5; Fr. Greg MacLeod, “Father MacLeod’s Apologia Pro Sua Apologia,” Cape Breton Highlander, 29 September 1971, 1.
mining to an end and to offset the resulting unemployment by stimulating new industry and employment. Yet DEVCO performed clear ideological work. The logic of the so-called “coal problem” focused attention not on capitalism, but on the fact of community and worker dependence on a single industry and on government subsidy. In this framing, the problem was with the region of Cape Breton, not anything else. Therefore, DEVCO could hope to fulfill the socio-economic promise of anti-poverty liberalism by revitalizing “free enterprise” and restoring entrepreneurialism, initially by importing those things from elsewhere.

DEVCO’s “industrial prospecting” practice insisted on a particular geographical and social organization of development in Cape Breton. Who benefited from development, and how, was a question rarely asked or answered. If regional development held out a democratic right to gainful employment for Cape Bretoners, DEVCO’s activities circumscribed that prospect to low-waged work at two poles at either end of the island. DEVCO worked, using corporate practices, to influence the location of secondary industry with capital incentives. The strategy depended on contradictory affinity for state-assisted entrepreneurialism, on inflated expectations of job creation, and on ahistorical visions of continuous economic growth. It tried to make capitalism work for Cape Breton by forging new ties to the continental economy and by seeking to shift the uneven geographical development of capitalist production. Yet in limiting its intervention to the subsidy of absentee capitalists, DEVCO stood to exacerbate rather than address underlying socio-economic inequalities in income, ownership, power, and quality of life. Labour and community actors in Cape Breton contested these consequences in their own ways. In any event, recession extending beyond its region contracted even DEVCO’s limited designs of reform.
To read the story forward, DEVCO would continue to operate in a 1970s context of deepening North American recession, growing unemployment, and further plant closures.\(^{85}\) The official unemployment rate in Cape Breton hovered at 10-12\% early in the decade. In 1973, the labour participation rate was 45.2\%, compared to the 57.5\% Canadian mean. Many younger people had no working experience at all.\(^{86}\) By 1976, high unemployment provoked several community responses, including a crisis town hall meeting sponsored by a rising local NDP and the creation of employment committees, job centres, and unemployed workers’ unions.\(^{87}\)

By Tom Kent’s calculation in 1977, unemployment and non-employment meant that Cape Breton had four jobs when it should have five, or a 53,000-strong labour force with 10\% unemployment when full employment would see 60,000 jobs.\(^{88}\) This was the economic context for continued efforts to boost the island’s economy in the 1970s. And it was Kent who, from late 1971, pointed DEVCO toward a policy for a new kind of regional development.

\(^{85}\) “Major Portion of Plant Will Close in September,” Cape Breton Post, 17 July 1974, 3; “We Worked for General Instruments, Part Two,” 2; “Employees Plan Project at CMI,” Cape Breton Post, 30 January 1976, 1.


Figure 5.1 The Industrial Arm of Nova Scotia
Source: Beaton Institute, MG 9.47.1 b.f.2, DEVCO, Cape Breton, The Industrial Arm of Cape Breton, nd, 1.

Figure 5.2 Where in the World is Cape Breton?
Chapter 6

A Special Kind of Place

On 5 October 1975, a double-decked Boeing 707 carrying about 500 sheep from Scotland landed at the Sydney Airport in Cape Breton. The animals were greeted on the tarmac by “the sound of pipes and applause.” DEVCO officials, who had arranged the transport, believed that the trans-Atlantic livestock would contribute to development. The “shepherd in charge,” as a journalist phrased it, was Tom Kent, corporation president from late 1971 to January 1977. And, if the sheep were any hint, Kent reshaped DEVCO’s approach to regional development.

Kent was alive to the question of regional inequality and felt that it threatened national unity. After crafting Pearson’s “attack on poverty,” he oversaw the introduction of manpower and mobility programs, as well the inauguration of a points-based immigration system, at the Department of Manpower and Immigration. When the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) was created in 1969, Kent was its deputy minister and principal policy thinker. He contended that the goal of regional development was “that economic growth should be dispersed widely enough across Canada to bring employment and earning opportunities in the hitherto slow-growth regions as close to those in the rest of the country as proves to be possible without an unacceptable reduction in the rate of national growth.”

Kent, however, felt that DREE had failed to fulfill its mandate and was persuaded to replace an ailing Robinson Ord as

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1 “Sheep on Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia Canada,” [1978], 3, QUA, Thomas Worrall Kent fonds, 5123, Box 4, File 7; Richard Gwyn, “Cape Breton Fights 50 Years of Poverty,” [unspecified newspaper article], 30 January 1975, QUA, Thomas Worrall Kent fonds, 1300, Box 4, File 17.
DEVCO president in summer 1971. Kent later said that he accepted the new role because he could not agree with Trudeau government policy that exacerbated unemployment.\(^4\)

In Kent’s view, DEVCO was a business operation with unusual motives – one that might offer a viable alternative in Cape Breton to outmigration or economic decline. He argued that DEVCO needed to confront both unemployment and underemployment. More, it should build from local people and local resources. He argued: “Development is for people. The basic idea of development is concerned with the quality of life. It is improvement in the way that people, as individuals, are able to live.”\(^5\)

Between 1972 and 1977, DEVCO’s regional development practice turned on imparting entrepreneurship, boosting production, and selling a particular kind of Cape Breton. Deeply embedded in liberalism under Kent’s leadership, DEVCO sought regional redress by intensifying the interactions of residents with the market through a participatory kind of regional development. The economic prospects of, and democratic possibilities for, Cape Bretoners were contingent on collaboration with DEVCO and the collective realization of a new Cape Breton. “I’ve been saying very bluntly,” explained Kent in 1973: “DEVCO can’t save you. Only Cape Breton can save Cape Breton. DEVCO can only help.”\(^6\)

The Cape Breton Theme

Kent re-imagined DEVCO regional development practice – and Cape Breton with it. The remade program involved a particular way of seeing the island, its past, present, and future.

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\(^5\) “Notes for an Address by Tom Kent, President of the Cape Breton Development Corporation to the Westmount Community Association, 22 February 1974,” 1, QUA, 5123, Box 2, File 12; Standing Committee on Regional Development, House of Commons, 28th Parliament - 4th Session, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Regional Development No. 4 - Tuesday, April 25, 1972, 9.

\(^6\) Bruce Little, “Cape Breton May Be Rich, After All,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 27 August 1973, QUA, 5123, Box 4, File 17.
Long dependent on coal and steel industries controlled by foreign capital, Cape Breton required entrepreneurial endeavour to adapt to post-industrial society and to overcome unemployment, underemployment, and poverty. It needed to engage in specialized production that recognized the island as a special kind of place. It had to sell a culturally Scottish society by the sea, with natural and scenic resources, rural appeal, and active connections to the past.

In these terms, Kent’s vision somewhat recalled what historian Ian McKay has described as ‘Innocence,’ a 1920 to 1950 form of anti-modernism whose ideological work was to try to stabilize liberal order amidst regional economic decline. Local elites and the provincial state imagined that Nova Scotia’s essence lay in an unchanging rural, rugged, and picturesque Scottish folk society by the sea. In so doing, they constructed a generic past-ness amenable to exchange. Myth-making was caught up with commodification, and it formed the basis of tourism promotion from the mid-1930s. At once, Kent set out a policy involving greater sensitivity towards, and increased commodification of, rural Cape Breton. Not only did DEVCO seek to provide the material and ideological requirements of tourism, it looked to root regional development in an idealized understanding of natural resources, cultural tradition, and rural authenticity. At the same time, as the histories of CYC in Lesser Slave Lake and (as we shall see) CUSO in Tanzania show, DEVCO work aligned with a transnational pursuit of some authentic form of rural

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development in the 1970s. The project was pressing because of the decline of the coal and steel industries.

Kent dispensed with two key aspects of past corporation policy. First, he reversed plans to end coal mining. The attrition policy had decreased employment and productivity, but at the expense of morale. Moreover, IDD had failed to build alternative industry. Kent could not envision a diversified regional economy without continued coal and steel industries. Key planks in a new policy were mine modernization, global coal sales, and financing improvements to the SYSCO steel mill. The Coal Division also experimented with using its purchasing power to buy, and generate jobs, locally. Second, Kent rejected using capital incentives to entice “foot-loose” industries to locate in Cape Breton. He argued that companies previously aided by DEVCO would not have succeeded anywhere, but especially not off the “beaten path” where labour, transportation, and production costs were high. An alternative was required.

Kent rethought the very purpose of development. He questioned its association with modern industries, the bigger, the better. Making underemployment and unemployment equal concerns, he felt that the focus should be on the income people received. Kent made a strong case for people-centered development: “I am going to ask you to think about development from the point of view that it is people who matter. Not bricks and concrete. Not even coal and steel.

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9 Cape Breton Development Corporation, Memorandum on Second “Plan,” 2 March 1972, 15, 18, QUA, 5123, Box 4, File 2; Interview with Dan White, 3 July 2015.
They are means to an end, servants not masters. The only development that is worthwhile is concerned with people, with how people live; especially, with how they earn a living.\textsuperscript{11}

The emancipatory possibility of entrepreneurship – understood as “seeking and taking economic opportunities” – was central to Kent’s presentation, something consistent with his predecessor. He argued that entrepreneurship was “the essential ingredient” in preventing the attrition of Cape Breton society. He suggested that a combination of history, disappointment, and a lack of capital had prevented the emergence of that quality. Kent decided that where “the cumulative processes of economic decline in a relatively remote society have become so well-established,” that DEVCO should “supply the initial entrepreneurship that is the pre-condition of the normal economic mechanisms beginning to function more satisfactorily.” It was not that DEVCO should substitute itself for the private sector, but that it could provide the “example of more vigorous local enterprise” that would attract outside capital.\textsuperscript{12}

Importantly, the process had as much to do with psychology as economics. Echoing the “culture of poverty” thesis (advanced by his predecessor and by CYC personnel in Montreal), Kent saw dependency as not just a product of capitalist development, but as something that had affected the behaviour of Cape Bretoners. Kent insisted that, in the past, residents had been “losers,” exploited by foreign capital and constricted by failing industries, and looked down on. He later argued that Cape Breton was not just physically, but also psychologically, an island.\textsuperscript{13}

Therefore, Kent contended that DEVCO would both work to identify “real opportunities” and to

\textsuperscript{11} Tom Kent, “New Waterford, October 28, 1973,” 1, QUA, 5123, Box 2, File 11.
\textsuperscript{12} DEVCO, Memorandum on Second “Plan,” 3; Tom Kent, “Notes for an Address by to the Halifax Rotary Club, Hotel Nova Scotian, 16 November 1971,” 6, QUA, 5123, Box 2, File 10; Cape Breton Development Corporation, \textit{Sixth Annual Report, Year Ending: 31 December 1972}, 20, BI, Newsletters.
convince Cape Bretoners that those opportunities could be developed. He hoped to build not only businesses, but “momentum.” To do so meant that the corporation would take risks in support of various ventures, and even be prepared to go into business itself. Yet in the process of whatever entrepreneurial endeavour it undertook, DEVCO would be imparting entrepreneurship to Cape Bretoners.

Kent sketched out a new kind of regional development within a changing North American economy. In “the so-called post-industrial society on which the developed world is now plainly entering,” he argued that the “right economic future for Cape Breton lies in producing a great variety of things in enterprises that are mostly fairly small, that produce the specialities on which an increasing affluent and educated and sophisticated society will spend more of its money.” Future sources of income and employment would come in service industries and in specialized processing and manufacturing operations: “This is the kind of business that the people of Cape Breton, with their unique environment and distinctive history and traditions and pride, should be able to do.” Kent retrospectively likened the approach to a “small is beautiful” outlook, which favoured the use of appropriate technology in small-scale production and was also advocated (as well shall later see) by CUSO in Tanzania. Tourism had “a central importance because, in addition to its direct contribution to increasing earnings on the Island, it can play a large part in making Cape Breton products known in the markets of North America and, in time, overseas.” Success of the tourism-driven program depended on “the

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establishment of the Cape Breton theme and on the response of local entrepreneurship on that theme.”

Kent genuinely believed that Cape Breton was inherently a special place, and participants in an island-wide cultural renewal in the 1970s agreed. That sense relied on identifying Cape Breton with rural life, Scotland, and folk tradition. The products Kent eyed were telling: tourism, furniture, oysters, lamb, pleasure boats, woollen goods, fish. He suggested industries “which bear close resemblance to many of those in which Scotland has been successful. I am thinking of whiskey, I am thinking of jams and marmalades and candies.” Kent argued that “the fact that Cape Breton once had relative industrial importance is less significant than the fact that here the environment is good and can still be preserved and that a slower, gentler style of life is coming back into style.” Cape Breton might secure development in a way that recognized the “cultural roots” of its people, all while remaining “almost entirely a place of nature.”

The environment occupied a prominent place in Kent’s imagination. DEVCO would take advantage of inherent natural resources: the island’s attractiveness, its inland sea, its land, and so on. At the launch of Cabotcraft Industries Ltd., a public-private venture to build yachts, Kent was presumably referring to the region’s oceanfront when he declared that boat building was “a natural industry for Cape Breton.” As an IDD employee observed, DEVCO took “a fairly liberal view of what a natural resource is.” To speak of natural advantages, however, was to invoke a presumed base in nature for economic development. Accordingly, Kent was not referring to

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nature so much as what historian William Cronon has called “second nature” – landscapes and ecosystems modified by people for commercial ends. Improving the environment, and bringing about a new “second nature,” was critical to Kent’s regional development strategy.

The new policy turned toward fishing, farming, forestry, and tourism, as well as some associated secondary production. Kent reorganized IDD, expanded its staff from seven to thirty-four, and hired more local people. Especially, he recruited a few Cape Bretoners who were prominent in the community or had media experience. The corporation, having nearly exhausted its original capital, received a renewed budget subject to annual parliamentary approval.

The subsequent sections of this chapter focus on DEVCO support for aquaculture, sheep industry, handicraft production, and tourism. Kent’s vision of an entrepreneurial sort of participatory regional development meant involving local people and local resources. In practice, this came in a few regular forms. First, loan provision was continued. Second, IDD undertook a few commercial projects of its own. Yet, third, IDD preferred stimulating tourism development and secondary industry through what is now called public-private partnership. DEVCO loans, subsidies, and ownership equity deferred economic risk with a view toward private profit and eventual full private ownership.

Of most interest, assistance to independent producers followed a fourth pattern. DEVCO met with producers’ organizations – and where one did not exist, stimulated their creation. Sheep farmer, cattle owner, oyster culture, beekeeper, Christmas tree cutter, vegetable grower, and handicraft associations were mobilized. IDD then delivered loans and expertise to producers presumed to have shared problems and be in common cause. Notably, in several cases, IDD

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21 Clark, 95; Interview with Dan White, 3 July 2015; Standing Committee on Regional Development, Minutes, April 25, 1972, 4.
established its own commercial subsidiary in a given sector. These companies were DEVCO-operated and almost entirely DEVCO-owned. Their creation extended the distance between those offering assistance and those receiving it. To the extent which development remained participatory, DEVCO was in a position of acting on behalf of, rather than in concert with, producers. Nonetheless, IDD stressed that if it took the “operational lead,” the goal was to have producer cooperatives eventually take over.22

Such an aim was articulated with scarce reference to Cape Breton’s history of cooperative organization. In the 1920s, the Antigonish Movement emerged in eastern Nova Scotia and Cape Breton as part of an interwar transnational impulse for rural reconstruction. Seeking to counteract the Depression-era appeal of socialism, the St. Francis Xavier University-spurred Catholic adult education initiative mobilized fishermen and farmers through mass meetings and study clubs to form co-operatives, build their purchasing power, and restore a measure of economic independence and dignity within capitalism.23 The movement waned by the 1940s. In stimulating producers’ associations, IDD employees took a position akin to that of extension workers – and DEVCO would maintain some links to the St. F.X. extension service.

22 DEVCO, Seventh Annual Report, 25.
Moreover, the accent Kent placed on participation, first, recalled earlier efforts to have primary producers collectively accommodate capitalism and, second, emphasized that DEVCO represented a temporary redistribution of government resources pending economic renewal.

Kent and his contemporaries saw regional development as a way to bring about regional equality and ensure national unity. Yet it focused not on the national economy, but rather on using a limited redistribution of state resources to transform socio-economic conditions in regions like Cape Breton. The practice was contradictory because the state sought to catalyze a revived liberal democratic capitalist order in which it would itself become marginal. The desired change depended on a particular, possessive individualism-inflected democratic participation. Kent warned that the development of Cape Breton would be a slow process, and one that required public awareness and active participation. He told Cape Breton Post readers: “If we have some proper self-confidence, if there is a wide understanding of how development can work, and the realism that goes with such involvement, then Cape Bretoners will create a better future; the DEVCO plan will deserve an important bit, but only a bit, of the credit.”

**The Great Spawn**

Kent’s policy was exemplified in DEVCO’s new attention to fisheries. From the 1940s, the state – especially in Newfoundland – supported the industrialization of the cod fishery. In the 1970s, DEVCO followed the example and made a series of loans to help modernize and diversify a tenuous fishery in Cape Breton. However, as historians Miriam Wright and Dean Bavington have demonstrated, hegemonic faith in industrial fishing and scientific management was deeply implicated in the overfishing which ended the Atlantic fisheries boom and prompted

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a cod fishing moratorium in 1992. While DEVCO contributed to the misplaced consensus, it focused its scientific, managerial, and commercial attention most on an alternative fishery: aquaculture.

Oyster farming, as it unfolded in the 1970s, was an applied experiment that drew together fishermen, technicians, and fisheries experts. The project echoed the Antigonish Movement. DEVCO contributed technical assistance, investment, ongoing research, and business organization. Decision-makers were convinced that aquaculture could become commercially viable. Yet DEVCO, and all those engaged in the emergent oyster fishery, encountered conflicting interests, environmental and scientific limitations or accident, and market constraints.

Bras d’Or Lake – a large salt water body at the centre of Cape Breton and, according to DEVCO, an untapped natural resource – was the focus for marine farming. DEVCO sought to transform the lake into a scientifically and economically efficient alternative fishery. However, the idea was first proposed by Mi’kmaq whose land bordered the water, the Eskasoni band. Oyster culture was initiated after contact between Mi’kmaw fishermen, led by Fred Young, and scientists, especially Roy Drinnan, at research station in Ellerslie, Prince Edward Island.

The Eskasoni Oyster Farming Association was formed in 1969 and, once two workers were trained, participants adopted a Japanese oyster culture technique. Scallop shells, with holes drilled in them and spacers separating them, were strung along vinyl-coated cables suspended across Crane Cove. Baby oysters – or, spat – would attach themselves to the shells, feed on

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28 The band was formed via an Indian Affairs relocation scheme in the 1940s. Lisa Lynne Patterson, “Indian Affairs and the Nova Scotia Centralization Policy” (M.A. Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1985), 1-3, 74-75, 125.
29 R.E. Drinnan and J.P. Parkinson, “Progress in Canadian Oyster Hatchery Development,” General Series Circular No. 51, Fisheries Research Board of Canada, Biological Station, St. Andrew’s, NB, April 1967, 1; Chiasson, 20.
phytoplankton, and be held away from possible predators (such as starfish) on the lake bottom. The cables were fixed to rafts, rather than points on land, so that the shells could be moved.  

From 1969 to 1971, Eskasoni fishermen petitioned for federal funding. In a strong parallel to Métis activism in Alberta, Mi’kmaq rooted their appeals in a deep association between oyster farming and economic independence. With 90% of the band’s 1,200 people dependent on welfare, development signified needed jobs. Rita Joe captured a sense of emancipatory possibility in her poem “Oyster Farming.” In the middle two of four stanzas, she wrote:

With expectations  
We wait.  
There by the Sea  
The blue of Bras d’Or  
Scallops hanging  
On pontoons of spruce  
We wait.  
For the great spawn.

There is a hill  
A watching place  
Where we see our labours  
There on Bras d’Or  
At long last  
An industry  
On suspended shells  
Farming the sea.

Government officials came to share the sense that aquaculture could be a significant job-producing industry. They contributed money and organizational support. In 1971, the Crane Cove Oyster Company – a DIAND-funded cooperative, owned in-trust by the band council – was formed at Eskasoni. In 1972, DIAND and DREE financed Micmac Fisheries Development

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30 Email to author from Phil Drinnan, 26 August 2015; Chiasson, 23; J.C. Medcof, Collecting Spat and Producing Bedding Oysters on Shell Strings (St. Andrew’s, NB: Fisheries Research Board of Canada, 1962).
Cooperative Ltd. (MFDC) to serve as an umbrella organization for oyster cooperatives now at each of the Eskasoni, Chapel Island, Whycocomagh, and Wagmaticook reserves.33

Experts were drawn to aquaculture as well. Provincial and federal fisheries scientists took an interest, while St. Francis Xavier University extension staff were engaged. Academics from Xavier College – transformed into University College of Cape Breton at a new campus in 1974 – also became involved. After meeting with fishermen in 1972, science faculty formed Bras d’Or Institute to study the prospects of marine farming and catalyze wider development ends. In addition to providing technical assistance, the Institute hosted workshops, offered continuing education, and collected studies relevant to the development of the island.34

DEVCO, though, was the most active agency seeking to develop aquaculture on the Bras d’Or. In late 1971, signaling Kent’s new regional development policy, IDD officials promised Eskasoni representatives legal and technical aid. However, since reserve-based oyster farming received DIAND support, DEVCO would in fact have little to do with Crane Cove or MDFC operations. The corporation turned toward the non-Indigenous communities that surrounded the lake, as well as a few private entrepreneurs. Kent envisioned that DEVCO could deliver capital and technical assistance to a cooperative association, itself comprising oyster farming societies at different points around the lake. During 1972, John Chisholm, head of the St. Francis Xavier University Extension Department and a veteran of the Antigonish Movement, involved about


\[^{34}\text{Cape Breton University librarian Nicole Dixon has now digitized these studies at \url{http://www.openmine.ca}, D.F. Arseneau, Director, “The Bras d’Or Institute and its Projects,” December 1975, 1, Cape Breton University Library (hereafter CBU), Bras d’Or Collection, #2828, \url{http://www.openmine.ca/content/bras-dor-institute-and-its-projects}; “Aquaculture Research and Development at the Bras d’Or Institute, College of Cape Breton, Sydney, Nova Scotia,” September 1977, 2-3, CBU, Bras d’Or Collection, #2998, \url{http://www.openmine.ca/content/aquaculture-research-and-development-bras-dor-institute}; DEVCO, Sixth Annual Report, 21; Benjamin Higgins, Cape Breton and Its University College: Symbiotic Development (Sydney, NS: University College of Cape Breton Press, 1999), 31-34; “Bras d’Or Lakes Study is Discussed at Xavier,” Cape Breton Post, 26 May 1972, 3.}\]
300 people in forming eleven community cooperatives. People in these rural communities were eager and expectant about a possible new way of earning income.35

However, cooperative-led, entrepreneurial development was not entirely what Kent had in mind, for IDD also created Cape Breton Marine Farming Ltd. (CBMF). Based in Baddeck, CBMF was a DEVCO subsidiary and the first example of the model IDD used to relate to primary producers. It assisted production and conducted research. Roy Drinnan was loaned to DEVCO to oversee aquaculture experiments and monitoring. His son, Philip, was among the technicians hired to carry out the everyday work. CBMF was also considered a vehicle for facilitating the eventual transfer of responsibility to the oyster farming societies. In 1973, 23-year-old fisheries biologist Robin Stuart was hired to act as a liaison person with the societies.36

DEVCO wanted to make aquaculture profitable. Profitability, according to the break-even analyses of financial staff and consultants, required increased cultivation. So, CBMF sought to ramp up production to a commercial scale and convey rafts to the cooperatives. CBMF became the largest aquaculture venture on the lake. At the late 1970s peak, there were 1,780 rafts, in cove after cove, and annual output reached about two million oysters.37

Oyster farming was supposed to take advantage of natural circumstances, but poor weather, lake conditions, disease, and lack of food proved issues. Many oysters did not grow to

35 “Oyster Farming Project Aired,” Cape Breton Post, 2 November 1971, 3; “Capital and Technical Aid Promised by Kent,” Cape Breton Post, 20 December 1971, 3; DEVCO, Sixth Annual Report, 21; Interview with Robin Stuart, 3 July 2015; Email to author from Phil Drinnan, 27 August 2015.
36 CBMF was initially called Cape Breton Primary Production Ltd.. Email to author from Phil Drinnan, 26 August 2015; Interview with Robin Stuart, 3 July 2015; Eric Cameron, “Bras d’Or Lakes May Yield a Rich Harvest,” Cape Breton Post, 14 June 1975, 5; DEVCO, Seventh Annual Report, 33-34.
37 Emails to author from Phil Drinnan, 26 and 27 August 2015; Interview with Robin Stuart, 3 July 2015.
a marketable size and quality. CBMF began to remove oysters from shells after a year or so and sell them to people who could let the oysters mature on the lake bottom.\textsuperscript{38}

CBMF tried to diversify production. Experiments were undertaken with Pacific salmon, trout, mussels, clams, and seaweed. Apart from mussels, the efforts relied on introducing new species to the lake. For example, a fish hatchery was installed and research was conducted on acclimating trout to salt water and winter. Yet production eventually fell short of expectations.\textsuperscript{39}

DEVCO personnel believed that marketing was a central issue and felt that reaching gourmet food markets was important to turning a profit. From a first harvest in 1975, oysters sold to distributors and processors as far away as Toronto and Halifax. There were also hopes that where tourists were often sold imported American oysters, Bras d’Or ones might come to be sold instead.\textsuperscript{40} In the collective logic, profit from oysters depended on high quality, a reputation tied to the island, and on reaching luxury food markets through export and import substitution.

Scientific, environmental, and marketing challenges were not the sum of the issues aquaculture stimulated. Much like local debates in Lesser Slave Lake and Montreal, contestation occurred on questions of democracy, the beneficiaries of development, and the role of expertise. At Crane Cove, a set of conflicts centered on community control and its purpose. Despite strong Mi’kmaw participation, the oyster cooperative board was chaired by a white store owner. Directly resembling militant mobilization in Faust and Driftpile, Alberta, a circular sent around the Eskasoni reserve in fall 1971 raised issues about local welfare and a sense of powerlessness.


It also demanded: “What about the oyster farm?? Who owns it?? How are the workers hired over there???? How come the chairman is not an Indian on the Board of Directors???” The circular announced a meeting and declared “POWER TO THE PEOPLE.”

The issue came to a head in 1974 thanks to a labour dispute. Fifteen workers staged a three-day wildcat strike and their spokesman, Charlie J. Dennis, presented an ultimatum to the band council: either the St. Francis Xavier University extension worker serving as farm manager be dismissed or the workers would quit. Additional demands included the rehiring of a fired foreman, better pay and working conditions, the hiring of a Mi’kmaw manager, and greater Mi’kmaw and worker representation on the board. At an emergency meeting, the Eskasoni band council asserted its control over the oyster farm. The manager and the board chairman were dismissed and a new board of six Mi’kmaw and one DIAND official was formed.

Greater control over the project did not allay all concerns. When DIAND cut its funding for austerity reasons in 1975, Joe B. Marshall, editor of Micmac News, questioned the premise of economic development. He argued that Mi’kmaw were entitled to compensation because their way of life had been destroyed, but believed that DIAND advocated development in a way that was a “mere token.” By devolving control of the Crane Cove project to the band council, Marshall suggested that the DIAND hoped to see a profit turned and then reinvested into municipal government. In the process, DIAND would no longer need to address fundamental issues of Indigenous rights and title. He accused DIAND, by operating in this manner, of trying to slowly carry out the policy of the 1969 White Paper.

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If one commentator insisted that the Bras d’Or was big enough for everyone, this may have been wishful thinking. For example, one cooperative complained that that CBMF rafts were edging in on its operations. Furthermore, though DEVCO officials were inclined to see the Bras d’Or as an unpolluted natural resource, others disagreed. Mi’kmaw leaders warned that, in the absence of treatment systems at three reserves, sewage seeping into the lake endangered oyster culture. DEVCO’s own efforts to turn the Bras d’Or into a tourist destination for pleasure boating, too, had the potential to disrupt aquaculture. DEVCO installed boat ramps, published a boating guide, and planned a marina. By the late 1970s, the greatest resistance to aquaculture in fact came from urbanites attracted to the countryside and who were upset that their sightlines of the lake were marked by buoys, rafts, and lines.44

The alliance between oystermen and experts could be an uneasy one. The scientific technician-run approach to aquaculture drew criticism. At a Bras D’Or Institute conference in 1975, the tension was both aired and exemplified. Two hundred delegates attended, but just six were working fishermen. Charles MacPhail of the Seal Island Marine Cooperative noted that, whereas the presence of officials and experts was underwritten by their employers, fishermen who attended would lose a day’s pay and also have to cover the conference fee. MDNC manager Peter Bernard believed that while the conference was constructive, much of it went over the head of fishermen. Moreover, Bernard felt that the conference was being used to advertise DEVCO’s work and ignored the fact that Mi’kmaq “fathered the concept of oyster farming.” The conference resolved to improve communication between scientists and fishermen.45

Bernard went further in his attack on DEVCO in the wake of production and profitability problems at Crane Cove. In the pages of *MicMac News*, he argued that, “not satisfied in dealing with small groups of non-Indians,” DEVCO had deliberately used an Indigenous project as a promotional tool. Yet any difficulties at Crane Cove could be blamed on Indigenous oystermen and serve to make future funding conditional on the stewardship of experts. Bernard insisted that DEVCO involvement had led to a utopian belief in oyster farming, the “exorbitant expenditures and subsequent financial failures of oyster associations and individuals,” and a farming method which, it turned out, “cannot and will not produce the choice oyster forecasted.” As Mi’kmaq continued their efforts, Bernard warned DEVCO and government off trying to push “mass production and pro-establishment thought” on “naturally-made professionals” who knew the environments in which they lived.46 For those who had invested time and effort into aquaculture, the sense that DEVCO had manipulated their hopes for its own promotion was most painful.

Limitations to job creation joined production problems. Oyster culture was not labour-intensive and the pattern of work was seasonal. In 1972, Crane Cove employed 390 people during the busy season. In 1974, MFDC employed 40, and DEVCO counted 50 full-time and 300 seasonal jobs generated by its aquaculture program. Fisheries biologist Ken MacKay noted that while employment expectations had been high, experience at Crane Cove showed that cutting down on labour costs was necessary to be “economical” relative to capitalist markets. He concluded that oyster farming was “not going to be a large industry.”47 Aquaculture could not completely reinvigorate the economies of the reserves and rural communities along the lake; nor

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could it benefit all residents. By 1975, Mi’kmaw communities looked for ways to diversify economic activity.\(^4\) Hopes for a development deferred engendered plans for more development.

For its part, CBMF’s designs for a cooperative-based industry were raised vexing issues. The eleven cooperatives ranged in size from about 125 members at Aspy Bay to as few as four elsewhere. They drew a wide range of people, some who were fishermen and others who were not. Since DEVCO had provided all of the investment and working capital, few participants were keenly active. Following a period of attrition, the cooperatives were dissolved about ten years after they had been created. Already by 1978, CBMF looked to convey young oysters to individuals rather than cooperatives. It also grew and sold some oysters to defray costs. Cost, though, became a pretext to dissolve CMBF and end support of marine farming in 1984.\(^5\) By the 2000s, Cape Breton aquaculture was a small private industry hampered by disease.\(^6\)

The limited economic impact of aquaculture, and the resulting disappointment, was perhaps most curious because there had been such an early consensus that the possibilities of aquaculture were uncertain and unknown. Consultants hired by DEVCO in 1972 even warned that oyster culture prototypes in Asia and Europe had pursued only on small scale.\(^7\) Nonetheless, DEVCO’s commitment the idea that Bras d’Or was a natural resource ready to exploit and its conviction that commercial aquaculture could become viable led to CBMF’s undertakings on a large scale. Marine farming development was believed to be possible and

\(^6\) Interview with Robin Stuart, 3 July 2015; Robert J. Morgan, *Rise Again! The Story of Cape Breton Island: Book Two, From 1900 to Today* (Wreck Cove, NS: Breton Books, 2009), 172-175.
1970s experiments sought to bring it about. In time, scientific, environmental, and market limitations or accident, as well as conflicting interests, adjusted expectations.

The curtailed reality itself was less remarkable than the sense of disappointment and anger it generated for Bernard and others. They had spent years in time and effort, and pursued a frustrated collaboration with agencies including DEVCO, without realizing their anticipated designs. But it is in dreams of a “great spawn” that development’s power was most clear. Development signified more than getting by; it held out the democratic promise of economic independence within liberal and capitalist society.

**Trans-Atlantic Sheep**
DEVCO’s newfound commitment to rural Cape Breton was further exemplified in support for agriculture. Vegetables, cattle, bees, orchards, and community gardens all received attention. Yet surveying the agricultural scene, Kent identified lamb as the “one product whose quality, for the little that is now produced, is outstanding.” He felt that lamb “could be a high-class food for the affluent market.” Flock sizes had declined from the mid-nineteenth century. Drawing on the longer trajectory, Kent juxtaposed the rise and fall of coal mining with the fall and presumed rise of sheep farming. Past farmers had given up their flocks to go work in the mines, the narrative went, but now rural renewal presented itself if DEVCO could change the attitudes of Cape Bretoners on the prospects of the sheep industry.

In a sheep policy crafted in 1973, Kent argued that Cape Breton had the natural resources – grass, this case implied – to improve food production. “The problem in economic

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engineering.” he continued, “is whether those resources can be organized to respond to the market.” To that end, he felt that expanding sheep production was necessary, and different forms of capital assistance might induce it. High prices represented an “important opportunity,” but Kent argued that, “for all their years of struggle and disappointment, Cape Breton farmers cannot be expected to seize the new opportunity unless they can reckon on some definite assurance that their work will not be in vain. DEVCO’s program provides that assurance.” DEVCO would take on “a degree of risk itself” and provide aid so that the economic constraints facing producers would be lessened and they might better benefit from the market.54 Sheep farming, moreover, was not unrelated to tourism. Tourism might not only deliver consumers who would eat local lamb, but sheep would dot Cape Breton hills and become a part of the scenery of economic renewal.55 Not just lamb, but lamb associated with Cape Breton, was needed for success.

If Kent wanted to engineer improved economic and ideological conditions, sheep farming was already shaped by shifting economic context. Maritime agriculture, marked from the nineteenth century by unequal distribution of land and resources deepened by market-driven stratification, underwent postwar changes following interwar difficulties.56 The conclusions of scholars examining Prince Edward Island are instructive. Despite government efforts to sustain agricultural trade, incomes and profit margins fell. People responded by abandoning farms, finding other sources of income, or investing in mechanization and additional land. There was a decided 1950 to 1980 movement from farming to part-time farming and to non-farm work.57

Indeed, sheep farming alone did not sustain rural Cape Bretoners engaged in the practice. In the early 1950s, Nova Scotia flocks averaged under thirty animals and the return on labour was slim. By the late 1970s, consultants estimated that it would take at least 500 sheep to make a full-time living. No Cape Breton farmer reached that threshold. If eleven of the island’s ninety producers had a minimum of 200 animals, seventy-two farmers had flocks of less than 100.

Sheep raising followed a seasonal rhythm linked to the livestock’s reproductive cycle. Each fall, farmers sold off most of the lambs born that spring. Flocks, reduced almost by half, were then maintained through the winter for breeding. Producers either practiced mixed farming or held other employment. As a result, sheep returns supplemented rural incomes derived from some constellation of farm activities, part- or full-time non-farm work, seasonal wage labour, handicraft production, old age pensions, and unemployment insurance.\(^\text{58}\)

DEVCO financial, technical, and commercial assistance to sheep farmers was slowly elaborated over the course of several years. In 1972, IDD officials encouraged farmers to form an association through which aid could be channeled. The resulting Cape Breton Sheep Producers Association (CBSPA) served to better organize and rationalize the sheep sector. It allowed DEVCO to engage sheep producers and to get them to participate in development.\(^\text{59}\)

Sheep farmers picked David Newton as CBSPA president. Newton and his wife Pamela were early back-to-the-landers from New York who moved, baby and dog in tow, to a farm at Point Edward in 1963. They stayed and raised six children. Like other rural residents, they

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periodically re-evaluated their priorities for generating income. The family built up a flock of about 100 sheep. Newton also cut pulp and grew vegetables. Yet an illness to one of his children pushed him to get a job in town as a *Cape Breton Post* associate editor. Soon after his election to CBSPA, Newton was hired by DEVCO and made IDD’s Director of Primary.60

DEVCO’s goal was to help existing farmers raise sheep more efficiently and effectively, and to raise their economic returns. Initial financial aid consisted of loans, a price guarantee, and a breeding subsidy designed to increase the size and quality of flocks. Only farmers with at least twenty-five animals were eligible for support. Yet an unintended effect of DEVCO (as well as provincial government) subsidies was to make sheep husbandry more attractive and to draw more people into the industry, especially among the back-to-the-landers who had moved to Cape Breton because of its cheap land.61 About fifty farmers took advantage of DEVCO support and the corporation counted a 30 per cent increase in flock numbers in 1973 alone. DEVCO also provided technical assistance. A demonstration farm in Mabou, overseen by Ann MacDonald and later Frazer Hunter, became a centre for resources, services, and husbandry courses.62

DEVCO’s attempts to boost production were fit to concurrent attempts to reach larger markets. In 1973, Newton got together a truckload of sheep to send to a meat packer. With most lamb sold locally to that point, the corporation insisted that its sales experiments “will make Cape Breton lamb known in the major consuming centres as quality meat.”63 The emphasis on

60 David Newton and Pamela Newton, *They Came from Away: Yanks, Brits and Cape Breton* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010), 1-4; Andrea MacIvor, “I Guess All Sheep Producers End Up with a Lamb in the Kitchen…” *Cape Breton Highlander*, 16 May 1973, 12; “Sheep Breeders Seek Assistance,” *Cape Breton Post*, 16 May 1972, 3.
quality and on “Cape Breton lamb” underlined the sense that marketing had to do with more than delivering lamb to buyers at a reduced cost to farmers. Rather, ensuring high returns and increased consumption was tied up with the diffuse concept of “reputation” – which to DEVCO officials connoted desire not only for tasty lamb, but also lamb associated with Cape Breton.

By 1974, Newton felt that the sheep industry was not expanding as quickly as hoped. To supplement breeding efforts, he bought up sheep along the eastern seaboard. Still, it was felt that the availability and quality of sheep restricted further expansion. Ignoring leading global lamb-producing nations Australia and New Zealand, DEVCO drew on a consensus among farmers and provincial officials that the stock best suited to Cape Breton could only be found in Scotland. As Newton explained, white-faced North Country Cheviot sheep were “of the highest quality” and had the very wool to offer protection from the island’s driving rains and harsh climate.64

Cape Breton Lamb Ltd. (CBL) was a company created by DEVCO in 1974 to undertake a large-scale importation of sheep from Scotland to Cape Breton. Given that imported livestock were subject to quarantine regulations – sheep had to be at least three and a half years old and held in isolation for thirty months – the capital and logistics required were beyond the individual farmer. Still, CBL was modelled to involve producers. If DEVCO would provide a loan to cover operating expenses and own half the company, the other shares were made available to farmers. Yet only about ten bought shares, just enough for DEVCO to make a case that its scheme had actual farmer support. DEVCO owned 96.2% of the company and CBL was to a significant extent a subsidiary acting on behalf of, rather than in concert with, sheep producers.

MacDonald was CBL manager, Newton its president, and Kent chairman of the board. This kind of top-down development made the scale of CBL’s activities possible, but not, as we will see, without generating tensions with the farmers it was designed to assist. DEVCO continued to consult with CBSPA, but neither the association nor CBL’s minority shareholders had a true hold over undertakings. That said, DEVCO believed that CBL could be dissolved once the importation and quarantine were complete and the sheep stock sold to producers.

From spring 1975, DEVCO personnel arranged the transportation, quarantine, certification, and purchase of some 1,500 sheep from farms in Scotland and northeastern England were bought. When all was set, DEVCO transformed the importation of the first 500 sheep into an October 1975 media event. DEVCO-commissioned filmmakers as well as the news media were on hand to capture the scene. The importation was replicated in fall 1976, with about 1,300 more sheep flown in. Following the importations, CBL’s main activity was managing quarantined flocks. Sheep were briefly held at Point Edward and then contracted to local farms for three years. Come 1978, CBL’s inventory was 3,206 sheep.

DEVCO planned to unload the post-quarantine sheep to two markets. First, it would sell sheep to island farmers. Second, it would sell a smaller number of sheep to North American buyers to build a reputation for Cape Breton as a site of excellent breeding stock. As such, DEVCO wanted to engage both in the feeder and breeder (as it were) markets, possibly

65 “Cape Breton Lamb Limited. 4-5 November 1974,” 2-4; Interview with David Newton, 15 July 2015; DEVCO, Tenth Annual Report, ix (a); “The Sheep Are Coming Again but No Evictions This Time Around,” Cape Breton Highlander, 1 October 1975, 3; Tom Kent, Chairman, Cape Breton Lamb Limited to Honourable E.F. Whelan, Minister of Agriculture, Ottawa, 5 May 1978, 1, QUA, 5123, Box 4, File 7.
undercutting Cape Breton’s claim to a special, Scottish breed all of its own. Newton recalled that gaining publicity for DEVCO’s sheep was thought to be the more important thing. 68

CBL’s plans to make a return on its investment via off-island sales, though, hit a diplomatic snafu. According to American regulations, British sheep could only enter the United States via Canada. But United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) changed its rules in 1978 – doubling the quarantine period and extending the time sheep had to be established in Canada. Newton suspected that USDA changed its guidelines under pressure from American breeders aware that DEVCO’s sheep were coming to market. He met with USDA officials, Kent wrote to the U.S. Ambassador in Ottawa, and Canada’s minister of agriculture contacted his American counterpart. The diplomacy did not have an effect and the policy stood. 69

The diplomatic exchanges occurred amid a wider DEVCO effort to advertise “The Great Sheep Sale,” the grandly named fall 1978 auction of sheep imported three years prior. Blurring into self-congratulation, CBL’s sale brochure laid identification with the past, nature, rural charm, and inherent Scottishness on thick. It juxtaposed modernity with anti-modernism and deployed Scottish place names in a description of the 1975 importation. Emerging from a double-deck of a Boeing 707 were: “Rams with names of ancient lineage – Braeval, Champion, Brotherstone Rover, Achscrabster sailor – whose massive frames were formed by the Pentland Firth and on the sides of Lauderlake. Following them came the ewes, flatfoothed and bright eyed

69 Interview with David Newton, 15 July 2015; Newton, “Sheep,” 175 fn. 11; Kent to Whelan, 5 May 1978, 1-3; Eugene Whelan, Minister of Agriculture, Canada to Tom Kent, Chairman, Cape Breton Lamb Ltd., Received 4 July 1978, 1-2, QUA, 5123, Box 4, File 6; Tom Enders, Embassy of the United States, Ottawa, Canada to Tom Kent, 28 July 1978, 1, QUA, 5123, Box 4, File 6; Eugene Whelan, Minister of Agriculture, Canada to Kent, Chairman, Cape Breton Lamb Ltd., Received 25 August 1978, QUA, 5123, Box 4, File 6.
hill stock from the shores of Lock Shin, motherly park ewes from Orkney and Balnamoon. Five hundred head in all, vanguard of another thousand to follow, centurians in a new army.”

CBL promotional literature laid out even more extensive imagery. “Among gourmets,” it began, Cape Breton lamb “basks in a reputation of quality – it has acquired a distinction over the years which is the envy of other sheep producing areas.” Sheep, it asserted, had been in Cape Breton as long as Acadians and Scots. Mabou, Margaree, and the shore near Framboise were deployed as connotative place names to rival those of Scotland. The sheep were complemented by a natural paradise: “There is no question that the Island of Cape Breton, not only on the western side and on the high, most drenched hills, is admirably suited to sheep production. Disease, the bane of lowland areas does not thrive. And so on the hills and shores of Cape Breton, an animal has developed which is vigorous and able to withstand adversity.”

The lamb itself was “noted for its fine texture, its lack of coarseness,” and DEVCO’s copywriter insisted that this was likely related to what could be foraged in the Cape Breton environment: “The lambs are not stuffed with grain in feed lots nor are they growing fat in lush bottom pastures. They have ample milk from the ewes and in the high hills there are plentiful fine-stemmed grasses. In the spruce and fir woods where the flocks shelter from the mid-day heat, there are berries, a bite of mushroom, an occasional browse among hardwood saplings, clear water, and always a tang of salt in the air, for the sea is never far off.” The sensory tour concluded with an uplifting sales pitch. DEVCO assistance and improving markets “add to the growing conviction that the sheep industry will play a significant part in a reviving rural economy, and a quality-conscious public will be able to ask for and be served Cape Breton

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lamb.” It finished: “When you eat lamb, wherever you may be, perhaps it will evoke thought of hills and shorelines, and the forests, fields, and lakes of Cape Breton Island.”

CBL sold about 800 offspring to Cape Bretoners and some 350 to other Canadian buyers. The original quarantine animals were also auctioned. And fifty-three local producers sold 1,700 lambs at improved prices. For Newton, that Cape Breton sheep were “commanding premium prices” indicated that they were “damned good.” He observed that since the prices were up to four times what a butcher paid, farmers would be spurred to breed their purchases or sell them as breeding stock. Newton saw the high prices as a sign of success and anticipated no downside.

In 1979, the sheep imported in 1976 were sold at a second CBL auction. Afterward, DEVCO maintained its demonstration farm and technical assistance, but CBL ceased to be a going concern, its chief function fulfilled as anticipated. Later auctions were held by CBSPA. Therefore, DEVCO’s sheep intervention appeared to follow its own designs: financial, technical, and commercial assistance were giving way to a self-sufficient industry marshalled by independent producers in common cause.

From 1973, DEVCO eyed additional ways that sheep farmers could earn income. Ideas included slaughtering facilities, tanning, and the manufacture of wool. DEVCO’s interest in value-added sheep products was connected to Kent’s sense that secondary manufacturing and, indeed, cottage industries should be closely tied to Cape Breton’s resources. Dan White, a 27-year-old teacher active in the community and local media, was hired as IDD’s Director of

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72 “Cape Breton Lamb,” n.d.
75 DEVCO, Seventh Annual Report, 36; “Cape Breton Lamb Limited, 4-5 November 1974,” 3.
Secondary Industry in 1974.\textsuperscript{76} IDD and White moved ahead with a nascent kind of vertical integration in sheep-related industry. In 1976, both a wool mill and a tannery were set-up in advance of the completion of the sheep quarantines. Therefore, DEVCO officials bet that market conditions would be favourable and that sheep producers would indeed soon have large flocks.

In the first instance, DEVCO hoped to process local sheep wool and then distribute finished yarn through Island Crafts (a subsidiary discussed in the next section). DEVCO initially worked with local craftspeople. But IDD bought a small mill for Cape Breton Woollen Mills Ltd, a public-private partnership, in a bid to increase and mechanize production. The company ran into technical and quality issues, but employed as many as seventeen people. IDD followed up by considering a further venture to produce woollen garments. An Icelandic company was invited to apply its component production model (albeit with clothing in the distinct “Cape Breton Image”), but the project was not carried forward. Meanwhile, for the mill, markets proved scarce and costs high. DEVCO sold its shares to the private operator in 1984. Yet the mill, requiring more work and capital than the operator was willing to invest, was closed.\textsuperscript{77}

In a second initiative, DEVCO sought to expand tanning operations begun at the Mabou demonstration farm. Unable to locate a local investor, IDD bought new equipment and set up a company called Woolbur Tannery at Blue Mills.\textsuperscript{78} Carl Reichel, a Czech-born tanner struggling with his own business in Newfoundland, was brought on as manager. The tannery temporarily closed in 1978 and, experiencing difficulty obtaining sheep hides locally, had to buy hides from

\textsuperscript{76} Interview with Dan White, 3 July 2015; “Two City Men Join Devco,” \textit{Cape Breton Post}, 6 July 1974, 3.


elsewhere to keep production going. Pending the expansion of local flocks, then, larger scale tanning operations were tenuous. In 1982, the company was sold to Reichel and renamed.\textsuperscript{79}

Cape Breton had 11,960 sheep in 1966, 6,382 in 1971, and, thanks to DEVCO’s importations, 10,123 on sixty-four farms in 1976. In 1981, in part because some imported sheep had been auctioned to off-island farmers, there were about 8,000 head in Cape Breton. However, the number of sheep was just 2,582 in 1991 and under 1,500 in 2009.\textsuperscript{80} What happened?

Most immediately, disease affected the horizons of the sheep industry under DEVCO’s watch. In spring 1979, Pulmonary Adenomatosis (PA) was spotted at the Mabou demonstration farm by farmers and DEVCO staff. PA causes cancer-like tumour growth on the lungs to the point where sheep die from asphyxiation. Three further Cape Breton cases were later discovered, though not in DEVCO sheep. PA may well have originated with sheep that farmers mixed in with their newly-acquired North County Cheviot sheep.\textsuperscript{81}

A second disease was more consequential. Abortions were a common occurrence among imported sheep. It was not until farmers sent dead lamb to the provincial veterinary laboratory in Truro that a cause was pinpointed in April 1980. Enzootic Abortion (EAE), a bacterium indigenous to North America, was prompting late-term abortions in pregnant ewes.\textsuperscript{82}

Between ongoing sales of lamb and the arrested birth rate caused by EAE, sheep numbers dropped. By fall 1980, there had been an estimated 16% flock loss. Guy Sanders, a sheep and


\textsuperscript{80} Newton, “Sheep,” 171; MacDonald, “History,” 10-12; Morgan, 179-180.


cattle farmer in Orangedale, remembered the debilitating feeling of having worked all year only to have to bag dead lambs. With profit margins already slim, a few farmers pressed for compensation and relief. DEVCO responded with a one-year moratorium on interest payments and by helping secure farmer access to a EAE vaccine. Farmers wanted more information as well, and lobbying led to a special provincial task force on EAE and PA.\(^3\)

Amidst the clamour, the predominant official tone was one of lamentation for the lost reputation of Cape Breton lamb as much as the loss of actual sheep. The sentiment was hardly surprising given the repeated emphasis Newton and Kent had placed on building up the Cape Breton lamb brand. Dr. Bruce Nettleton, a Truro veterinarian, captured the theme in 1981 when he argued that disease had seen Cape Breton lose its reputation as a place of top quality breeding stock. Moreover, he intimated that the great enthusiasm for the sheep farming, which had led to the importation, was the first step in the industry’s downfall. DEVCO officials, then, were the implied culprits. By Nettleton’s informal estimates, 10% of island sheep died and prices for breeding stock had fallen to 50-67% of 1979 prices.\(^4\) For his part, Newton argued that disease was a minor problem and that it did not obscure the success of the importation, which he labelled “a bloody triumph for this area.” However, the public controversy, coupled with Tom Kent’s departure from DEVCO’s board in 1982, led DEVCO to end its support of the sheep industry.\(^5\)

Putting pause to concerns over disease were the facts that PA did not spread and the EAE vaccine proved immediately effective. However, when it came to the trajectory of the Cape Breton sheep industry, the prevalence of disease was not the whole story. In fact, DEVCO’s


commercial activities and marketing interventions appear to have produced an economic bubble. The much trumpeted sheep sales in 1978 and 1979 generated record sale prices because DEVCO insisted that sheep from Scotland were well adapted to Cape Breton and that they would be the basis of a desirable and profitable product, Cape Breton lamb. Newton, recall, believed that soaring prices were a fine indication of success. Most of the buyers, however, were the very Cape Breton producers DEVCO hoped to assist in building up their flocks. In the view of longtime Margaree sheep farmer John MacKinnon, the subsequent problems the industry faced came about because too many inexperienced newcomers got involved in sheep production. If he sounded curmudgeonly, he also observed that many Cape Breton sheep farmers “paid these ridiculous prices and they found they didn’t make a go of it […]”

Farmers had invested in new ewes at the height of prices sustained by DEVCO fanfare regarding its trans-Atlantic sheep, with no guarantee that inflated prices would hold.

Not only did farmers not really benefit from the sheep program, but DEVCO’s efforts to extoll a distinctive Cape Breton lamb – and thereby encourage consumers to pay more for it – failed to have an effect. Unable to compete with cheaper New Zealand and Australian imports, new and even established producers gradually got out of sheep farming and focused on other things. Plus, coyotes migrated to Cape Breton by the mid-1980s and keeping large numbers of sheep safe increasingly required costly investment in new fencing and barns. Remaining farmers mostly chose to keep smaller herds and, therefore, raised sheep only as one among several economic activities. Occupational pluralism remained key for rural household economies.

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86 Donham, 52.
In 1986, a DEVCO consultant report on Cape Breton agriculture concluded that the sheep industry “appears to be in a state of decline and, almost without exception, farmers and farm leaders felt that the sheep program originally promoted by the Corporation failed to reach its objectives.”88 Such expressions were emotional antonyms to the sense of hope generated by regional development. DEVCO’s assistance to sheep producers sought to boost production, impart entrepreneurship, intensify market interactions, and sell lamb linked to an idealized Cape Breton. DEVCO succeeded in generating short-term enthusiasm for sheep farming and in briefly boosting the island’s sheep stock, but not much beyond that in its transitory involvement.89 Farmers spent a lot of time, effort, and capital on the promise of future increases in income and of revitalized sheep and sheep-related industries. The economic return failed to materialize.

Handicraft Capitalism
Alongside secondary industry closely tied to a reshaped “second nature,” DEVCO also envisioned a craft industry in Cape Breton. It occurred to Kent that there was little of the handicraft activity he associated with tourism.90 In fact, the provincial government had been actively supporting a handicraft “revival” since the 1940s. As historian Ian McKay explores, there was little original about the anti-modernist Nova Scotia handicraft movement and, in large part, it had been invented to suit the tourism industry.91 Nor was a 1960s and 1970s re-devotion to folk ‘tradition’ and craft production unique to Cape Breton. Middle-class generated folk movements appeared in Britain and North America, including in nearby places like Halifax and Newfoundland. More markedly, craft and small-scale production became widely touted alternatives for those seeking culturally, ecologically, and economically sustainable development

89 Interview with David Newton, 15 July 2015; Interview with Frazer Hunter, 14 July 2015.
91 McKay, Quest of the Folk, 152-153, 178-200.
in rural and depressed regions of the Third World as well as the First.\textsuperscript{92} Some Canadians took to the development-minded idea of culturally-rooted craft industry, whether government fieldworkers among Inuit in the Arctic, back-to-the-landers in Lesser Slave Lake, Canadian University Service Overseas staff in Tanzania, or – indeed – DEVCO officials.

None of this is to say that interest in a cultural connection to the past was not genuinely felt by some. Cape Breton’s craft renewal had real community impetus and formed part of a wider cultural revival. Much as sociologist James Overton has detected in Newfoundland, a cultural movement was connected to what historian Kenneth Donovan has labelled Cape Breton “patriotism.”\textsuperscript{93} This nascent neo-nationalism was, from the early 1960s, expressed through an embrace of heritage. Heritage, geographer David Lowenthal has argued, domesticates the past for present uses, but is also an article of faith and a site of creativity.\textsuperscript{94} That creativity, as well as more targeted efforts to commodify the past, could be seen in the burgeoning array of festivals, concerts, and museums begun in Cape Breton. It, too, was evident in the fiddling revival launched in 1972.\textsuperscript{95} When it came to handicrafts, some Cape Bretoners were active cultural producers, as well as participants in the commodification of heritage, seeking to boost their incomes by taking advantage of tourist, and far off, markets.

Rev. Greg MacLeod was a key resource person in generating renewed interest in craft production. Born in Sydney Mines, MacLeod first learned about the ideals of the Antigonish


Movement when he attended Xavier College in 1945. Seeking to serve the community, he joined the priesthood in 1961 and soon taught at his alma mater. In 1964, he left for Belgium and later Oxford to pursue graduate studies in philosophy. He travelled to Poland and Czechoslovakia to examine cooperative housing schemes, concluding that state-led efforts were ineffective. After exposure to liberation theology on a trip through Latin America, MacLeod returned to his teach in Cape Breton in 1969. He was shocked by the high level of unemployment and, idealizing the “small, self-supporting community,” decided to act. On the one hand, he engaged in advocacy work through Metropolitan Alliance for Development. On the other, he responded to government inability to attract new industry by seeking an alternative form of business creation. Though he spoke with St. F.X. University extension workers, MacLeod felt that their model for cooperatives was no longer suitable. Still, he rooted his work in Cape Breton’s tradition of Catholic social action and sought a kind of “neo-cooperatism.” He helped set up the Bras d’Or and Tompkins Institutes at University College of Cape Breton. If the former focused on technical and scientific matters, the latter was named for the progenitor of the Antigonish Movement and encouraged faculty to become involved in the social, economic, and philosophical dimensions of development. Later, responding to the inequities of free trade in the 1980s, he drew on his experiences to partner with two Mexican universities working with Mayan community groups in Yucatan.96

In 1971, students working under MacLeod’s direction on an OFY project met with handicrafts producers and found that a key concern was marketing. Tourists were buying souvenirs made in Asia, and craftspeople agreed on the need for action. Cape Breton Handicraft

96 Interview with Greg MacLeod, 10 June 2016; Greg MacLeod, New Age Business: Community Corporations That Work (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Social Development, 1986), 1-2, 4; Greg MacLeod, “The 1970’s,” n.d., 2-4 (a document in the author’s possession).
Producers Association (CBHPA) was formed. MacLeod, who served as executive director, envisioned it as a cooperative organization which would allow producers to maximize their profits and provide equipment, instruction, and marketing assistance. CBHPA set up a depot in Sydney, sold wares under the “Capecraft” label, and sought government for resources.97

DEVCO was initially disinterested. David Dow, an IDD employee, told a CBHPA meeting that DEVCO was more interested in mass produced cheap souvenirs than craft production. Provincial and federal departments similarly did not provide support, with DIAND notably involved in furnishing handicraft materials to local Mi’kmaq. Indeed, Mi’kmaw involvement in handicrafts appears to have run entirely parallel to the non-Indigenous revival.98

MacLeod secured support for the nascent craft sector revival from Company of Young Canadians (CYC). The earliest CYC volunteers arrived on the island in 1966. Between 1968 and early 1970, a more concerted program sought to address the needs of workers in industrial Cape Breton. However, budget cuts (and intra-organizational antagonism) provoked the project’s end. Further, CYC temporarily withdrew from the Maritimes. When it returned, CYC had shifted its approach toward placing volunteers with existing community organizations. From November 1971 to December 1973, CYC funded two volunteer positions with CBHPA.99

98 Rolland, 2; Eleanor Huntington, “Handcrafts Group is Active,” Cape Breton Post, 25 March 1972, 3; “15 Persons Employed in Handicraft Center,” Cape Breton Post, 27 April 1972, 3.
In the context of high unemployment, handicraft producers looked to supplement, part-time jobs, seasonal work, early retirement settlements, and pensions. Creighton Brown, an Anglican priest and CYC’s Nova Scotia field staff person, supported CBHPA’s effort to help craft producers secure a reasonable return within an emergent tourist industry. He contrasted the association’s “desire for self-determination” with past government efforts to fund, without success, “large manufacturing and mining outfits, which simply tended to enslave Cape Breton workers to the whims of the owners. With this project, the people included are natives developing innate skills which in turn can make them economically healthy.” Brown, it seems, could not have agreed more with Kent’s re-orientation of DEVCO.

By its first annual meeting, CBHPA had about 300 members. CYC volunteers Chris Kendall and Brian Curtis operated the craft depot, assisted with a newsletter, and helped organize a Christmas sale. For the time being, CBHPA was weakly organized around local guilds and lacked money to pay instructors, buy needed equipment, and purchase raw materials.

Another OFY grant saw twelve young people hired to run “Capecraft Enterprises” in summer 1972. The project had two emphases. First, Debbie MacInnis, a Xavier College student, conducted a detailed history and inventory of craft activity. She travelled from community to community, rode her bicycle around, knocked on doors, and documented informal handicraft networks. Second, the other workers displayed and sold handicrafts at tourist attractions and festivals. It was as much a promotional effort as a commercial undertaking.

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102 Interview with Debbie MacInnis, 13 August 2015; “Capecraft Enterprises,” Opportunities for Youth, [1972], 1, BI, MG.14.11.8b.
MacLeod pressed ahead on another front as well. Taken with a craft school in Halifax, he worked with women from CBPHA’s Sydney guild to found the Cape Breton School of Crafts in 1973. He also mobilized a nascent not-for-profit business venture, Cape Breton Association for Co-operative Development (later a subsidiary of New Dawn Enterprises, a community development corporation founded in 1976), to buy and renovate an empty store. Upstairs apartments were let, while the craft school was given the store-front space free of charge. The school, supported by government grants, saw ordinary people teach their peers crafts.

Debbie MacInnis and John MacLean, both participants on the “Capecraft Enterprises” project, took over as CYC volunteers and continued to support CBHPA from fall 1972 until late 1973. In an important shift, the association moved its depot to the craft school. Freed of managing inventory, MacInnis and MacLean mobilized guilds. They travelled to different communities, met with residents, and encouraged them to organize and apply for provincial funding. In MacInnis’ estimation, about half of those attracted to guilds had some experience in craft production. The other half were drawn to the prospect of a hobby or earning income. Collectively, the formation of guilds generated passion and excitement about craft production. Indeed, many different people contributed to the fledging handicraft movement.

The efforts to build a committed membership were mixed. The Sydney guild, with its base at the craft school, was particularly dynamic. Courses attracted participants, including a
good number of back-to-the-landers (some of whom had skills to share). Other urban guilds were active, but organization was more difficult to achieve in rural areas.105

Moreover, there were concerns about the bottom line. Greg MacLeod worried that CBHPA had “built up expectations in the membership which we could not fulfill.”106 By fall 1972, many members had become disillusioned with the limited financial success of marketing efforts. Indeed, Creighton Brown reported that producers were debating amongst themselves the very usefulness of the association if it could not deliver a sufficient economic return. He also detected a key faultline, noting that some participants viewed crafts as a hobby and others felt that it was a business. Where hobbyists took pride in their work and were happy to give their creations away to friends and family, more sales-minded people became disappointed and upset when their wares did not sell. Meanwhile, while some members wanted to sell locally, more established producers – such as rug hookers in Cheticamp – eyed world markets.107

MacLeod was certain that “with the proper resources, a potential handicraft industry might develop.” Since he was teaching full-time, he also hoped to withdraw from CBHPA once it was on a better footing.108 MacLeod therefore appealed to DEVCO for assistance, asking it to pay for a full-time executive director and fund a wholesale centre which would pay upfront for crafts. However, spring 1972 discussions faltered over a sense that DEVCO was trying to

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105 Interview with Debbie MacInnis, 13 August 2015; MacLeod, Report to the Company of Young Canadians, 1-3; Creighton Brown, Nova Scotia Field Staff Report, 1-31 August 1973, 3, LAC, RG116, Volume 76, File 740-23/2-1 - Report 2 of 2.
106 MacLeod, Report to the Company of Young Canadians, 1-3.
108 Gregory J. MacLeod, Cape Breton Handcraft Producers Association [c. April 1972], 1, BI, MG.14.11.8b; CBHPA Letter to CYC, n.d., 8; CBHPA, Newsletter, January 1972, 3.
change to CBHPA’s direction against its will. To Debbie MacInnis, it appeared DEVCO was antagonistic and viewed the association as a competitor.109

As opposed to trying to strengthen the association, DEVCO began an intervention of its own. As with oysters and sheep, IDD left CBHPA to operate as a voluntary organization and created a subsidiary of its own in June 1973. Island Crafts was a non-profit retail and wholesale operation first run by Marguerite Campbell, a florist, and Viola Spencer, a gift shop owner. Campbell cautioned, “We don’t want to handle anything that is inferior in quality, or ‘junky.’ Many of our Cape Breton craftsmen do exquisite work, and this is what we want. So tourists can buy the kind of souvenirs and gifts here that wear a Cape Breton label with pride.”110 The craft industry DEVCO envisioned, then, depended on the connection tourist consumers would make between the island and quality handmade goods. Unlike the inclusive craft sales operated by CBPHA, employees at Island Crafts became arbiters of whose crafts were put out for sale.

Island Crafts was structured to facilitate the expansion of craft production. Producers were paid an upfront wholesale price for their wares, thereby allowing them to reinvest in new materials. By 1975, about 200 artisans were involved. Presumably, the subsidiary would defer its costs through sales or through DEVCO subsidy. It pursued sales on two tracks. First, it looked to retail, and to supply other retailers, relative the island tourist market. Second, it looked to penetrate the Canadian craft wholesale market. Buoyed by its marketing work, DEVCO began to offer design advice, provide loans, and experiment with new products. Notably,

109 Gregory MacLeod to John Teeter, Vice President, DEVCO, 23 May 1972, 1-2, BI, MG.14.11.8b; Creighton Brown, Nova Scotia Field Staff Report, 1-31 March 1972, 5-6, LAC, RG116, Volume 76, File 740-23/2-1 - Report 1 of 2; Interview with Greg MacLeod, 10 June 2016; Interview with Debbie MacInnis, 13 August 2015.

DEVCO collaborated with Parks Canada to form Louisbourg Reproductions, which made eighteenth century-themed souvenirs to sell to tourists at Fortress Louisbourg.\textsuperscript{111}

In 1977, DEVCO surveyed ongoing challenges in the craft sector. Citing a low return on labour, quality issues, and limited cooperation between producers, the corporation suggested that the potential of the industry had yet to be fully exploited. DEVCO resolved to assist the 300 or so “commercially-oriented craftspeople – not the hobbyists.” Cape Breton Crafts Ltd. was created to boost sales at Island Crafts, improve quality and productivity, and develop small cottage-craft industries (namely, the aforementioned Louisbourg Reproductions, Woolbur Tannery, and Cape Breton Woollen Mills). Certainly, the creation of the consolidated subsidiary redoubled DEVCO’s efforts to commercialize the regional crafts trade.\textsuperscript{112}

Limits to the realization of commercial designs remained. Consultants in 1978 concluded that the Island Crafts marketing experiment had not had the desired effect. Handicraft production was not becoming an industry of much note. If Island Crafts’ gross sales grew from $70,000 in 1974 to just over $300,000 in 1980-81, the modest gain still indicated that handicrafts remained no more than an income supplement for the few hundred producers involved.\textsuperscript{113} Nonetheless, the handicrafts sector persisted, Island Crafts itself lasted to at least 1990, and building a viable craft industry in Cape Breton remained a sought-after aim.\textsuperscript{114}

\footnote{114}{The Cape Breton School for Craft and Design (\url{http://www.capebretoncraft.com}) is a direct descendant of the original craft school. George N. Soulis, “Crafts: From Home to Industry, From Hobby to Profession; A Discussion of Crafts and Craft Related Industries: Their Effects on the Social, Cultural, Educational, and Economic Activity in}
To develop a handicrafts industry was to, in many respects, reshape the activities of producers and to change and commoditize their work products. With Island Crafts in the 1970s, DEVCO aimed to create, sustain, and make best advantage of markets, both those stemming from tourism and from consumer tastes more broadly. To a significant extent, these efforts involved identifying crafts with a distinct Cape Breton-ness. Hundreds of Cape Bretoners were active participants in the process. However, within market and skill constraints, the commodification of crafts did not necessarily lead to commercial viability. Plus, the goal of turning handicrafts into an industry did not sync with the wishes of every producer whom DEVCO believed it was acting on behalf of. Not all handicraft revivalists were motivated by purely commercial concerns. As the divisions within Cape Breton Handicraft Producers’ Association and the motivations behind the Cape Breton School of Crafts demonstrated, heritage-evoked and patriotism-inflected cultural production did not inspire in everyone an impulse to increase productivity and realize the entrepreneurial undertaking of development.

A Special Place
Tourism was central to DEVCO’s regional development strategy in the 1970s. Tom Kent argued that “tourism brings a lot of money into Cape Breton” and putting it first “will do most to help us get other things, both improved public services and new manufacturing industries.” He continued: “For us, tourism is the road to the markets. Cape Breton Island is off at a corner of the continent. To produce and sell successfully, we have got to be known, well and favourably known. ‘Made in Cape Breton’ must become a mark of distinction.”115 Development would require a special kind of Cape Breton.

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115 Kent, “Deveco: Where It’s All At,” 5.
The foundations of tourism are ideological as well as material. Tourism, sociologist John Urry argues, is a leisure activity centered on consuming goods and services which generate pleasurable experiences which differ from those of everyday life. Urry uses the concept of the “tourist gaze” to describe the social organization of such unusual scenes. Historically contingent, each tourist gaze is shaped by consumers as well as the professionals who help construct it. Insistently, DEVCO worked to further mould, even overdetermine, a tourist gaze in Cape Breton already influenced by Innocence. Yet DEVCO also operated at the intersection, identified by historian Karen Dubinsky, of tourism-as-gaze and tourism-as-industry. Dubinsky argues that tourism produces social meaning, yet that meaning is shaped by political economy as well. Commodifying nature, emotion, and place can be profitable, but also complicated. In looking to bring about regional development through tourism, and to connect both to a specific “imaginary geography” of Cape Breton, DEVCO indeed mixed commerce and sentiment. A tourism-as-regional development strategy was not unique to Cape Breton and attempted in places such as northeastern New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, the south of France, and the Scottish Highlands. It was also hinted at in state-sponsored beach clean-up schemes in Lesser Slave Lake, while Expo in Montreal and travel from Tanzania into southern Africa proved tourism was a source of dissension in my other case studies. DEVCO’s tourism program had

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particular meaning, and specific fault lines. Its efforts attracted the active participation of some Cape Bretoners, but also highlighted social divisions and prompted rebuttals.

A DEVCO report implied that tourism had been neglected, remarking: “Cape Breton has a substantial tourist industry almost without trying.”119 In fact, tourism promotion was long pursued. In the 1930s, Cabot Trail and Cape Breton Highlands National Park, which was rooted in the sublime and tartanism, opened.120 Tourism was boosted by the completion of the Canso Causeway in 1955, making the island accessible from mainland Nova Scotia by car.121 The federal government contributed a prime destination with the reconstruction of Fortress Louisbourg from 1961.122 By 1965, Cape Breton Tourism Association (CBTA), a lapsed body, was renewed by private operators.123 Certainly, tourism was a growth industry in the 1960s, with new museums, heritage villages, and folk festivals.124 In this context, tourism development was identified as a possible IDD activity, though little was done before Kent’s arrival.

Under Kent, DEVCO tourism promotion involved improving accommodation and restaurant facilities, developing and diversifying attractions, and advertising Cape Breton as a destination. Kent wanted more people to visit the island, remain longer, and spend more. He also hoped to extend the summer travel season into the fall. In 1974, Kent noted that the average tourist drove Cabot Trail, visited the Fortress, and stayed less than two nights. Expenditure on

119 DEVCO, Seventh Annual Report, 39.

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“Cape Breton content” was low since much was spent on gasoline. Yet he argued that the income and employment generated by tourism still approached that of coal. In terms of sheer scale, tourism development seemed a way to confront extensive Cape Breton unemployment.125

DEVCO’s assistance to tourist operators, as well as its own initiatives, were understood as vital, if temporary, interventions to assist tourism growth. Kent cautioned that DEVCO did not plan to spend unnecessarily or to substitute for private enterprise: “we should do things that are too risky for the private sector to tackle now but not which will in the longer pay off in increased tourist business.”126 DEVCO positioned itself to assume short-term economic risk on the development of tourism infrastructure with a view to future market activity and private profit. Concurrently, advertising and tourist information services would build consumer demand.

DEVCO served as a promoter, even architect, of the content of Cape Breton tourism. Refining the tourist gaze was something that Canadian governments had participated in from the 1930s, yet DEVCO’s work in the 1970s was notable because it was region-specific.127 Kent wanted to “reflect in the tourist industry the distinctive flavour of Cape Breton.” He had three features in mind. First, the island’s scenic beauty and “natural assets” were understood as central to its appeal. Second, Kent believed that people were drawn to “historical things” and that additional heritage attractions should be pursued. Third, he stressed the “cultural situation,” by which he largely meant connections to Scotland and to rural ways of life. Kent emphasized that the target tourist demographic was those who wished to spend a week or two on the island

126. Notes for an Address by Tom Kent, President, Cape Breton Development Corporation to the Annual Meeting of the Cape Breton Tourist Association, Sydney, Nova Scotia, 13 June 1972, 13, QUA, 5123, Box 2, File 8.
127. See Alisa Apostle, “Canada, Vacations Unlimited: The Canadian Government Tourism Industry, 1934-1959” (Ph.D. Diss. in History, Queen’s University, 2003); McKay and Bates, In the Province; Dubinsky, “‘Everybody Likes Canadians,’” 320-347; Michael Dawson, “Consumerism and the Creation of the Tourist Industry in British Columbia, 1900-1965” (Ph.D. Diss. in History, Queen’s University, 2001).
“getting to know a special kind of place, enjoying a “quiet” holiday that is without the strains of foreign travel but still provides a large degree of remoteness from their working lives.”

The person hired in 1972 to lead the strategy was Terry MacLellan, a local media celebrity known by her professional name, Ann Terry. Island-born, MacLellan made her reputation beginning in the mid-1950s as the host of a women’s morning radio show and later did work on television. She believed that tourism was integral to Cape Breton’s progress.

Scottish, seaside, and heritage themes abounded in DEVCO-created accommodation facilities, food services, and attractions. DEVCO loans to private tourism operators were common. But IDD went further in contributions to the establishment of a motel, cabin and camping facilities, food services, and a bed and breakfast program.

Indeed, DEVCO built Highland Heights Inn and leased it to a private operator. In addition to the Scottish name, DEVCO stressed that the motel had a view of the Bras d’Or, a restaurant serving “fresh Nova Scotia seafood,” and proximity to the Highland Village in Iona. IDD also financed and ran Dundee Estates Ltd., a project with cottages, a restaurant, and a golf course designed to resemble “a little bit of Old Scotland” and “a little bit of New Scotland.” As well, IDD built, and took a majority ownership stake in, Whale Cove Summer Village and Inverness Beach Village. Visitors could stay in cabins and on campsites. DEVCO further emphasized seaside themes with beach development at several sites, pleasure boating

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128 “$200,000 Project to Assist Tourist Industry,” 3; “Tourist Development: Strategy,” 1, 2, 4; Standing Committee on Regional Development, Minutes, April 25, 1972, 13.
infrastructure on the Bras d’Or, and the creation of a ‘lost treasure’ scuba diving attraction. Food services played on maritime themes and heritage nostalgia. With fast food in mind, DEVCO set up a chain of four Chowder House restaurants. At Fortress Louisbourg, it operated a bakery and two restaurants. In names – L’Épee Royale, Hôtel de la Marine, and Destouches House – and menus, a French maritime, colonial, and royal past were evoked.

Quaintness was at the root of the Bed and Breakfast program, launched in 1972. Partially forgiven loans allowed people to upgrade rooms in their homes and make them available to visitors. IDD’s Ray Peters, a former accountant at the Sydney steel plant, oversaw matters from 1974. He argued that the program facilitated a source of income for people whose homes had emptied due to children moving away or a spouse dying. Notice how outmigration became an economic opportunity. Peters likened operators to “front line tourism industry workers,” providing the friendly hospitality which would lead visitors to extend their stays in Cape Breton. DEVCO was actively involved in marketing, supervision, and training. Prices, practices, and iconography were standardized in a bid to mimic hotel chains. DEVCO created a logo (a white shield replete with a gothic font declaring “Bed & Breakfast”) and printed it on lawn signs, soap packaging, matchbooks, and a brochure detailing locations. By spring 1980, there were fifty-two hosts and DEVCO counted over 7,700 guests and more than $100,000 in accrued income.


Coal mining did not expressly fit the rural, seaside, Scottish ideal otherwise privileged in tourism development. But nostalgia did. As Meghan Beaton has observed, commemorating an ongoing industry was contradictory.\(^{134}\) DEVCO pointed to distant, rather than persisting, coal mining. It financed a mock nineteenth-century miners’ village at Cape Breton Miners’ Museum. It also rehabilitated a French mine at Port Morien. Ahistorically, the site could be accessed by train, since DEVCO operated the Cape Breton Steam Railway between 1973 and 1980.\(^{135}\) Most remarkably, IDD transformed a mine it had itself closed, the Princess colliery, into an underground tourist attraction. Opened in 1977, it was rounded out with a gift shop, a pottery workshop, and a restaurant. DEVCO believed that a tour of a 100-year-old mine would “provide tourists with an insight into coal mining.” In these terms, DEVCO again deflected attention onto a more distant past. The seasonal attraction operated at a loss and closed in 1982.\(^{136}\)

Beyond the creation of themed tourism infrastructure, DEVCO sought to improve information services and marketing. In cooperation with the CBTA, IDD funded tourist information booths and literature describing attractions and activities. Most notably, DEVCO created a popular road map and “trip planner.” It was clad in tartan trim and proclaimed “ciad mile failte” (Gaelic for “a hundred thousand welcomes”) on a back cover showing kilt-wearing bagpipers walking along a grassy hillside path. Cape Breton “is alive with history and yet deep in peacefulness,” the trip planner read, “a land where the pace of life is sometimes slow because


people still take the time to be friendly with one another.” The guide split the island into five thematic areas, each given its own scenic charm. For example, on the Western Shores, “surely there can be no finer way to end a summer day than to be seated around a bonfire on the beach while the haunting strains of a bagpipe waft gently downwards from the highland hills.” Only the smallest corner of planner eschewed anti-modernism and noted that coal mining, Strait of Canso plants, and tourism were Cape Breton’s leading industries.137

From the late 1970s, DEVCO increased efforts to attract more tourists. DEVCO offered a tour package and carried out a multi-medium advertising campaigns. In 1986, a promotional film featuring a myriad of appearances from local celebrities was produced.138 Despite the broad range of interventions, IDD indicated in a 1979 policy review that tourism in Cape Breton was “faced with severe problems”: namely a short season, rising costs, and an ever more competitive international tourism sector.139 These profit-centric concerns masked a number of social, economic, and cultural fault lines in the tourism industry.

Who benefitted from tourism was not a question DEVCO broached. Rather, it was tacitly assumed that tourism development would, and could only, benefit the entire region. Yet DEVCO formally allied itself, though financial assistance and through cooperation with CBTA, with tourism operators. Indeed, IDD encouraged entrepreneurial endeavour, arguing that tourism was “no longer regarded as a retirement career, but a challenging business for young people.”140

139 Cape Breton Development Corporation, Industrial Development Division, “Review of Second Plan (73-78) and Description of Third Plan (78-83),” Revised April 1979, 43, Bl, MG.14.13.10.
140 DEVCO, Eleventh Annual Report, 21.
DEVCO officials attended to managerial concerns by expressing anxiety over the manner in which workers provided service. Al Graham contended that indifferent waiters, hotel clerks, and gas station attendants would do more to damage the tourism industry than any deficiency in physical facilities. Terry MacLellan told tourism operators that a “caring attitude” was perhaps the most important aspect of their business. More broadly, DEVCO reported a need for “long-term informal education” to sensitize residents to the hospitality requirements of tourism. These concerns were not unique to Cape Breton. John Urry argues that the preoccupation with ensuring that low paid workers offer high quality service relates to the almost sacred quality of the tourist gaze. Service, and its “emotional work,” can only be provided in spatial proximity to tourist attractions and is closely connected to the experience of visitors.

Certainly, for every tourism business owner in Cape Breton, there were many low paid, seasonal workers. DEVCO counted these jobs in its statistics – claiming in 1979 to have directly or indirectly created 1,000 tourism positions – but said little of their pay, work conditions, or seasonality. Furthermore, DEVCO sidestepped the prospect that tourism, relative to the importance placed on it, did not in fact create all that many jobs. In a historical case study, Jon-Callum Makkai evaluated the impact of sport fishing tourism in Margaree. Only people owning cottages and other means of production profited, while a limited number of guide jobs for men and service jobs for women were also generated.

Who made up the tourism workforce generated debate. In 1964, federal planners dismissed tourism as an unstable economic base because they did not think it would reduce long-

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141 “Courtesy Key Speaker Says,” Cape Breton Post, 24 October 1968, 3; Clayton Campbell, “Tourism Needs ‘Caring Attitude,’” Halifax Herald, 1 April 1982, Bl, Scrapbook #84; DEVCO, Ninth Annual Report, 29.
142 Urry, 59-61.
144 Jon-Callum Makkai, “Margaree and Metropolis: Economic Marginality and Dynamic Underdevelopment in a Twentieth-Century Rural Cape Breton Community” (M.A. Thesis in History, Dalhousie University, 2000), 163-169.
term male unemployment. Their analysis called attention to the seasonal and gendered character of service jobs: “The labour force in the tourist industry is largely made up of housewives and students who take summer work in the hotels, motels, lodges and restaurants, and who tend to withdraw from the work force in the winter months.”145 In these terms, tourism offered income to part-time workers. Unequal access to even those jobs was still a matter of concern and was best dramatized by forty Mi’kmaw activists in 1977. They demonstrated at Fortress Louisbourg to protest government inaction on land claims. They added that despite the fortress being under DIAND jurisdiction, not one Indigenous person had been hired during the reconstruction and only one Mi’kmaw worker was employed once it opened to visitors. The protest prompted the fortress historian to consider hiring two to three Mi’kmaw “re-enactors.”146

The most trenchant labour attack on Kent’s tourism focus was voiced by Ed Johnston, a Canadian Labour Congress official, in the pages of Cape Breton Highlander. Likening DEVCO to “a colony of high-paid functionaries,” he warned: “Be careful, Tom, of putting on showy spectacles in the tourist end of things. The unwashed masses are not easily fooled into believing that Cape Breton’s future is in the short season, low-wage, non-unionized, casual employment of the Atlantic Provinces Tourist Industry.”147 From a community angle, John Hanratty wondered if tourism would do anything but supplement incomes or turn the island into “an ugly theme park.” He argued that catering to visitor needs was disturbing when 20% of homes did not have

145 “Report to the Cape Breton Island Co-ordinating Committee from the Cape Breton Island Sub-Committee on Tourism,” [c. 1964], 4, LAC, RG124 Volume 151, File B4.
146 “Indians Stage Demonstration at Louisbourg,” Cape Breton Post, 11 October 1977, 4; “Indian Role at Louisbourg Fortress to be Studied,” Cape Breton Post, 4 November 1977, 4.
running water. “Forget the tourists,” he wrote, “let’s improve our homes and communities for ourselves and for our children, and not as a way to scrounge a few more dollars off tourists.”

The drift toward cultural tourism, also evident on a provincial level, had the potential to raise further contention over the commodification of Cape Breton. Beyond its themed attractions, IDD subsidized a burgeoning array of museums and festivals. In the early 1980s, meetings with tourism operators prompted a full-blown heritage focus. IDD officials travelled to Scotland and concluded that interest in things Celtic made cultural tourism a “viable product.”

That cultural tourism might be an updated solution for regional development did not sit well with all. In an incisive critique published in New Maritimes, Sandra Harder wrote that Cape Breton’s mining and fishing communities “did not magically appear as if by some accident of contemporary design. Why should their future survival be linked to their ability to appeal to tourists who care little for their history or their future?” Noting that the beneficiaries of tourism in the 1980s included multinational hotel chains, Harder argued that tourism stood only to drive up the local cost of living. She remarked that tourism continued to a weak “job creator” and the service work it did sustain offered slim pay and protection to workers. Moreover, Harder went on to question “the explicit manipulation and exploitation of culture, heritage, tradition, ethnicity and history.” She suggested that tourism would in fact have a disruptive effect on cultural heritage. In all, she felt that DEVCO was ignoring the costs of tourism development. The irony of the shift from reliance on coal as commodity to the commodification of coal mining

150 “A Boost for Museums from DEVCO,” Cape Breton Highlander, 16 August 1972, 4; DEVCO, Seventh Annual Report, 40; DEVCO, Tenth Annual Report, 19.
heritage for the gaze and consumption of tourists was clearly not lost on DEVCO miners themselves. In July 1981, during the first coal miner strike in Cape Breton since 1947, United Mine Workers’ pickets disrupted the Princess Tourist Mine, and DEVCO was forced to temporarily close the attraction.  

Regional development through tourism, more still than DEVCO’s other 1970s activities, called forth Kent’s overall vision. DEVCO worked to generate and assist small business activity, to contribute to tourism infrastructure, and to attract and embolden a tourist gaze trained on a natural, scenic, rural, seaside, Scottish, and special kind of place. Seasonality, growing competition, and dilemmas of profitability made the designs tenuous. More dubious was the proposition that tourism offered a sufficient or even desirable platform for greater regional equality. Within Cape Breton, questions mounted over the costs and unequal benefits of tourism development. As DEVCO focused its attention on encouraging alternative economic growth on the island, socio-economic advantage for all was assumed rather than demonstrated. Thinking in terms of region deflected attention from the class character of a program rooted in stimulating entrepreneurialism and commodifying Cape Breton.

**Coal, Development, and Neoliberalism**

Between 1968 and 1977, DEVCO received about $400 million from the federal government – $230 million to cover coal mining operating losses, $120 million for mining investment, $50 million for development. Therefore, DEVCO remained, to a significant extent, a coal company. Oil prices spiked in 1973 and 1979, leading DEVCO to increase

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154 Mr. Matheson’s Speech to the Liberal Caucus, Delivered September 17, 1977, 1, BL, MG.9.47.1b, File 1.
production and consider a new mine. But, after a boom period punctuated by two mine disasters, the price of oil collapsed in the early 1980s and hopes for renewed coal development with it.\textsuperscript{155}

In January 1977, Kent left his DEVCO post to become president of SYSCO. He had become convinced that a new, modern steel plant was essential, jotting down: “Prospect: all depends on steel.”\textsuperscript{156} The would-be salvation of the Cape Breton economy was a proposed government partnership with a corporate consortium, Cansteel Corporation Ltd., to build a new $2 billion steel complex. Global recession and overproduction scuttled the plan by 1978. Kent moved on to Dalhousie University in 1980. The old mill was closed in 2001.\textsuperscript{157}

Although Kent remained on the board until 1982, new leadership at DEVCO unmade his program. A pro-private business emphasis marked a more fiscally conservative and neoliberal corporation of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{158} IDD tried to partner with oil companies in offshore exploration.\textsuperscript{159} And DEVCO began to rid itself of its development assets in 1984. After cuts and sales, IDD accounted for 4% of DEVCO’s budget. In 1986, local complaints that DEVCO was ignoring its mandate led the federal government to create Enterprise Cape Breton (ECB) to deliver business tax incentives.\textsuperscript{160} Then, in 1987, the government dissolved IDD, replaced it with Enterprise


\textsuperscript{156} Tom Kent, “Planning and the Cape Breton Case,” UNB, 19 March 1976, 2, QUA, 5123, Box 2, File 13.


\textsuperscript{159} Cape Breton Development Corporation, Offshore Petroleum Unit - Strategic Overview Document (Sydney, NS: DEVCO, October 1981), 1-2, CBU, Bras d’Or Collection, #3032, \url{http://www.openmine.ca/content/offshore-petroleum-unit-strategic-overview-document}.

\textsuperscript{160} Brown, 25-26; James Bickerton, “Federal Regional Development Policies and Atlantic Canada’s Islands,” in Competing Strategies of Socio-Economic Development for Small Islands, eds. Godfrey Baldacchino and Robert Greenwood (Charlottetown: The Institute for Island Studies, University of Prince Edward Island), 246; Jones,
Cape Breton Corporation (ECBC), and put development efforts under the purview of Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA). ECB was absorbed into ACOA (and the same thing occurred to ECBC in 2014). DEVCO no longer had any responsibility for development after 1989.161 In 1995, the federal government ended its annual subsidy to the corporation and mining was subsequently curtailed. DEVCO ceased to exist at the end of 2009.162

**Conclusion**

The regional development interventions of DEVCO were considerable in the 1970s. Sixty-five sheep farmers, a few hundred part-time handicraft producers, a similar number of full-time and seasonal oyster fishermen, and tourism operators plus a thousand or two summer workers were influenced by activities described in this chapter. Still, Kent put the job gap in Cape Breton in 1977, thanks to unemployment and non-employment, at about 12,000. Defensively, DEVCO’s annual report observed that the “short-run situation was highly unfavourable” given far reaching global recession and that the task had become “one of sustaining the development effort despite adversity.” Most strikingly, Kent began to conflate job creation with job preservation.163

Kent had much to say with respect to self-evaluation in late 1976. He argued that “Cape Breton would be dead” without government programs like DEVCO and, in terms of “the benefits per dollar,” DEVCO represented “a very considerable success in our area.” He continued:

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[...] our problem is not that previous effort has been wasteful or ineffective, it is simply that when the Canadian economy as a whole is working badly, Cape Breton’s difficulties are multiplied. The effort that would give us real progress in favourable circumstances may not save us from disaster in bad times.  

While Kent suggested, here, that things might have been better in a growing economy, he also laboured over the question of whether DEVCO regional development was a success or a failure.  

But lest Kent have the last word, success or failure in regional development was not really the point. From 1972 to 1977, DEVCO’s regional development program focused on teaching entrepreneurship, increasing production, and selling a re-imagined and special Cape Breton. Residents were selectively recruited into a participatory kind of regional development through entrepreneurial action. Greater implication in the market economy, therefore, was understood as necessary for achieving spatial equality and lessening regional poverty in Canada.  

More broadly, DEVCO consisted of a limited redistribution of state resources in the interest of reconciling liberal democracy with the spatial and social consequences of the capitalist system. Kent was an otherwise shrewd observer of this necessity. In November 1973, he insisted in a speech that: “An economic system is valid only to the extent to which it serves the purposes of men in society. And we do not have an enduring concept of a Canadian society unless its complex of purposes includes the determination that there should not be gross inequalities of opportunity from region to region of the national society.” Yet development did not require immediate socio-economic equality or structural change. Rather, what was demanded of Cape Bretoners was present-day cooperation alongside DEVCO and active commitment to the collective renewal of a specific region. In the process, improvements in standard of living, as well as political alternatives, were deferred. The democratic and economic

164 Standing Committee on Regional Development, Minutes, December 1, 1976, 6.
165 Tom Kent, “An Economic System is Valid Only to the Extent to Which It Serves the Purposes of Man,” Cape Breton Highlander, 14 November 1973, 6.
promise of regional development lay somewhere in an unspecified future, and encouraging such a deferral of hope was its most important political and ideological work.

Figure 6.1 Sheep on Cape Breton Island
Source: Queen’s University Archives, Tom Kent fonds, 5123, Box 4, File 8, DEVCO, "Sheep on Cape Breton Island," Cover.

Figure 6.2 Pam and David Newton, and Lambs
Source: Cape Breton Highlander, 16 May 1973, 12.

Figure 6.3 Tom Kent, in Engineer Coveralls, at the Launch of Cape Breton Steam Railway
Source: Cape Breton Post, 3 July 1973, 3.
Figure 6.4 Bed and Breakfast Program Brochure

Source: Beaton Institute, "Notes" - Cape Breton Development Corp., DEVCO, Cape Breton's Bed and Breakfast Program brochure, nd.

Figure 6.5 Cape Breton Island Trip Planner

Source: Beaton Institute, Reference, DEVCO, Cape Breton Island Map and Island Trip Planner, nd.
In fall 1964, thirteen volunteers from the first full Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) contingent to East Africa arrived in Tanzania. Over the next two years, they would live and work in the country. In doing so, they – like the thousands of CUSO members who travelled to the Third World – contributed their energies to international development assistance. Pursuing ideals, adventure, or useful humanitarian work, the volunteers shared in a liberal internationalist engagement with poverty and development in postcolonial Tanzania.

Within a global politics of poverty, community and regional development were attempts to address inequality in ways that empowered people and enriched domestic democracy. International development took the impulse abroad and into the realm of international relations. Liberal internationalists were recurrently attracted to Third World nations that appeared to share their ideals. In the 1950s, India – the world’s most populous liberal democracy – was the focus of much development assistance. By turn, following the Arusha Declaration in 1967, liberals saw Tanzania as an African model of moderate politics and worthwhile national aims. Indeed, perhaps with tongue in cheek, Kenyan academic Ali Mazrui described a political phenomenon he termed “Tanzaphilia.” It was “the romantic spell” Tanzania cast on many intellectuals and observers, and that drew them in. A broad range of leftists – as Mazrui put it, from “Gandhians to Maoists, humanitarians to ruthless revolutionaries” – were also among those attracted to the Tanzanian project of self-reliant development and ujamaa. Many leftists disenchanted with state socialism in the Soviet Union searched for alternatives. The Third World repeatedly

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1 They were preceded by Colin McNairn, a law instructor at University College, Dar es Salaam, in 1963-64.
presented possible models of grassroots socialism and lived democracy, whether Cuba and Algeria in the early 1960s, Tanzania and China in the late 1960s, Chile in the early 1970s, or Nicaragua in the early 1980s.\(^3\) Markedly, to both liberals and New Leftists, development suggested that improved collective material well-being would provide a basis for global equality.

International development practice intersected with Third World postcolonial aspirations for global equality and an end to poverty. In 1969, Julius Nyerere, president of Tanzania, told a University of Toronto audience that national independence merely existed on paper because “real freedom is undermined by our poverty.” Invoking the subsistence farmer, Nyerere declared: “Only as his poverty is reduced will his existing political freedom become properly meaningful and his right to human dignity become a fact of human dignity.”\(^4\) The year prior to Nyerere’s visit, the per capita annual income of Tanzania’s 9.5 million (and 95% rural) population was $CA60.\(^5\)

Development was a means to end poverty, in Tanzania as it was elsewhere in the Third World. Both Canadian state and non-state actors participated in what was a wide transnational impulse. Social scientific critiques of Canadian international development assistance have been

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many. Liberal scholars have focused on the apparent failures of foreign aid to alleviate poverty. Marxist analyses have insisted that aid has served to open new markets for Canadian goods and therefore to involve Canada in global capitalist hegemony and imperialism. Detailed historical enquiry into international development assistance has begun to complement social scientific studies. Recent contributions focus on state provision of foreign aid, Canadian technical experts abroad, mission and church contributions to development, and the general history of CUSO itself. A contextualized study of CUSO and the political, ideological, and practical aspects of its development assistance adds a dimension to newer work.

Canadian University Service Overseas/Service universitaire canadien outre-mer

(CUSO/SUCO) was a non-governmental organization – financed by the Canadian and Third

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World states – whose doctrine of development turned on involving Canadians in postcolonial national development efforts directed by state bureaucracy. Created in 1961, its existence was underwritten by the Canadian government from 1965. A board of directors and an executive director ran the organization, though decisions made at annual general meetings shaped policy. Local committees, often based on universities campuses, did recruiting. Volunteers were given two-year contracts to work in public sector jobs on local salaries paid by Third World states. CUSO/SUCO programs in each country was grouped by geographic region, and administrative staff were based in Ottawa. Abroad, after 1968, field staff kept contact with state bureaucracies, assisted volunteers, and (from 1971) shaped priorities. In a parallel to what occurred within Company of Young Canadians, SUCO asserted its autonomy in 1968 and moved its office to Montreal. If the two remained part of the same corporation until 1981, SUCO effectively operated as CUSO’s Quebec counterpart. In postcolonial Africa, CUSO and SUCO engaged in development work largely along English and French colonial linguistic lines. The program in Tanzania (CUSOTAN), part of CUSO’s East and Central Africa (ECA) and – from 1969 – East, Central, and Southern African (ECSA) region, was one such initiative. A consideration of CUSOTAN offers insight into how international development worked in practice in one context.

Between 1964 and 1979, Canadians with CUSOTAN attempted to assist the development of Tanzania. In their engagement with Tanzanian political philosophy and lived realities, the

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9 CUSO’s regions were West Africa; East, Central, and Southern Africa; Asia/Pacific (which became two regions, Asia and South Pacific); Caribbean (which was halved in the mid-1970s); and Latin America. SUCO sent volunteers to francophone Africa, French-speaking nations in the Caribbean and southeast Asia, and Latin America. Indeed, CUSO and SUCO collaborated in jointly sending volunteers to Spanish-speaking Latin American countries.

10 In addition to activity in anglophone East, Central, and Southern Africa, CUSO sent volunteers to West African countries Nigeria, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Ghana. SUCO placed volunteers in Cameroon, D.R. Congo, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Upper Volta, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda-Burundi, Senegal, Chad, Togo-Dahomey, and Tunisia.

commitment to international development assistance took a leftward trajectory. At first, a generally felt liberal internationalist respect for self-determination encouraged CUSOTAN personnel to contribute to national aims as temporary members of the civil service, especially as secondary school teachers. Following the Arusha Declaration, CUSOTAN field staff increasingly sought to defer to, and express sympathy for, Tanzanian socialism and southern African liberation movements. By 1974, those CUSOTAN members most engaged on development questions adopted a neo-Marxist analysis of global power relations and class dynamics in Tanzania. A resulting left-leaning international development praxis was, with many contradictions, directed towards rural development in the mid-1970s.

This chapter begins to uncover CUSOTAN development thought and practice. First, I explore the role of international development assistance, and CUSO intervention, in the context of postcolonial Tanzania. Second, I consider the position of volunteers working in education. Nearly half of CUSOTAN personnel laboured as secondary school teachers and they did so, ambivalently, amidst questions regarding education, development, race, social stratification, language, and political philosophy. Third, I examine the growing alignment of some CUSOTAN people with anti-colonialism and liberation movements in southern Africa. Overall, even prior to New Left intervention, there was a running debate over just what CUSOTAN support for national development aims entailed. If some volunteers were content to fulfill their immediate jobs and steer clear of overtly political questions, a desire on the part of some staff and volunteers to affirm and identify with Tanzanian self-determination demanded something more. In taking seriously a liberal internationalist vision of Canadian deference to, and assistance for, Tanzanian government policy, CUSOTAN members advocated a deepening – if largely cautious – support for Tanzanian socialism and anti-imperialism. But without considering the underlying
processes of global capitalism, and in continuing to subscribe to dominant development ideas, their hopes for a kind of liberal liberation in Tanzania were disappointed.

**Postcolonial Tanzania and International Development Assistance**

CUSO provided international development assistance to Third World nations, and it did so in complex postcolonial contexts like that in Tanzania. Historian Jeffrey Byrne has argued that postcolonial states in Africa were as much the product of imperial strategy as they were forged by anti-imperial mobilization.\(^\text{12}\) Such was the case in Tanzania. The mainland Tanganyika territory was colonized by Germany in the 1880s and seized by Britain during World War I. Following World War II, a colonial policy of multiracialism was pursued, seeking to keep British administrative and Indian merchant minorities on an ostensibly equal footing as the overwhelming black majority. But black opposition to social inequality along racial lines grew. Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) gave focus to rural agitations and to a new nationalism. From 1958, colonial policy shifted towards developing an eventual African state, but still deferred immediate independence. Yet anti-colonial pressure forced the issue and British authorities granted Tanganyika its peaceful independence in 1961.\(^\text{13}\)

There was continuity between the colonial and postcolonial period. TANU government unmade racial segregation and indirect rule, but did not immediately seek to end dependence on trade or on foreign capital and expertise. Sisal, cotton, coffee, and rubber were important export commodities. Yet only about a third of men participated in the cash economy. Small farmers

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largely focused on subsistence in what was overwhelmingly a peasant nation. For the new
government, development was an inherited ideology and a foremost concern.¹⁴

For colonial authorities, development had signified increased agricultural production for
export. From the mid-1930s, they sought to turn rural people toward cash crop cultivation
through coercion or self-improvement mobilization. Colonial state-building was pursued more
actively through agrarian doctrines. In Tanganyika, community development, agricultural
extension, and increased education and healthcare services all took shape in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. A ten-year development plan was produced.¹⁵ Notably, Père blancs missionaries
sought to contribute to rural development by translating Quebec’s Desjardins movement to
Tanganyika.¹⁶ Centrally, British authorities viewed development as a tool to alleviate poverty
and embraced it in an effort to re-legitimize an empire increasingly challenged by national
movements, labour militancy, and dissent. And development became a way for imperial powers
to reconcile themselves to the loss of formal empire by ensuring connections to ex-colonies.¹⁷

Postcolonial elites, shared in the development impulse, as well as the emphasis on state
action and often elitist attitudes toward common people.¹⁸ Certainly, the pursuit of development
in Tanganyika changed little after independence. British civil servants were retained pending an

¹⁴ Ronald Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 59; Pratt, 21, 90-91; Coulson, Tanzania, 4, 43, 47, 135.
Africanization of the bureaucracy, rural people were still pressed to grow certain crops, and continued private investment was encouraged. The World Bank helped shape the orthodoxy. From 1961 to 1966, Tanganyika had the appearance of an ex-colony among others in Africa.¹⁹

Like other new nations, Tanganyika faced considerable challenges to its political stability. In January 1964, an army mutiny took place, necessitating the intervention of British troops to suppress and leading to the dismissal of the army in favour of a new one populated by members of TANU Youth League. But more than that, the crisis facilitated dramatic political change. A one-party state was declared, opposition political parties were outlawed, and the autonomy of the trade union movement was ended. Civil servants and police were forced to join TANU. These actions eliminated organized dissent, sharply curtailed political freedoms, and restrained civil society. State and party were increasingly conflated. Further, a violent leftist revolution in Zanzibar (an island off the coast of East Africa) stimulated Cold War rivalry and Nyerere, who would have preferred a broader pan-East African state, hurriedly negotiated Tanganyika and Zanzibar’s union. Tanzania was the name of the resulting country.²⁰

Even before union, Nyerere began to articulate a political ideal for Tanzanian postcolonial society. His vision of a cohesive nation centered on small, closely-knit, self-governing communities where a common life and values might be shared. Nyerere’s central concept was, as historian Priya Lal observes, a highly gendered and patriarchal one: ujamaa, a Swahili word that might best be translated as ‘familyhood.’ Nyerere argued that the “foundation, and the objective, of African socialism, is the extended family.” Socialism itself, he insisted, was “an attitude of mind,” rooted in a fair share of what was sowed rather than acquisitiveness

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¹⁹ Pratt, 60-61; Aminzade, 136; Milcah Kalondu Mrema, “The Role of the World Bank in the Development of Tanzania” (Ph.D. diss. in Sociology, The American University, 1986), iii; Coulson, Tanzania, 176.
and capitalist inequality. Such a sensibility was exemplified by traditional African villages he characterized as devoid of exploitation.  

Ujamaa was an important variant of African socialism. However, Nyerere was an anti-Marxist influenced, from his University of Edinburgh days, by Fabian democratic socialism. Political scientist Cranford Pratt (a Canadian who, while an External Aid technical officer, was principal of University College of Dar es Salaam in 1961-1965) argued that Nyerere’s socialism was primarily moral rather than economic. Still, once TANU’s single party ascendency turned the state into a site of accumulation for the well-educated, ujamaa was a resource with which to confront growing inequality between leaders and the led. Spurred in part by a university student strike to resist compulsory national service, Nyerere confronted his opponents more broadly.

The central action was the Arusha Declaration, written by Nyerere and issued in 1967. It argued that TANU’s goal was to build a socialist nation based on principles of equality, human dignity, citizen participation, freedom, economic justice, and common cause. It charged the state specifically with eliminating poverty, ignorance, and disease. Calling it “stupid” to rely on foreign funds as the major instrument of development, the statement declared: “Independence means self-reliance.” The basis for self-reliant development would be increased agricultural

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production, as well as new agricultural processing and industry, and would depend on hard work, land, and sound leadership.\textsuperscript{24}

The Arusha Declaration was a vision with which to inspire hope among the rural masses. Neo-Marxist intellectual Issa Shivji argues that, between 1967 and 1974, it was a legitimizing philosophy as well as a strategy for political stability, but not about genuine equality. Immediate changes included limits to civil service salaries and benefits, new progressive taxation, and public ownership of key sectors of the economy. Yet despite expressed ideals, the political reality was soon something different. TANU restricted the merchant class, trade unions, rural cooperatives, religious leaders, peasant organizations, and rural ethnic leaders. Once the state nationalized major plantations, industries, banks, trading companies, and real estate between 1967 and 1971, Tanzania became (excepting a small urban working class) a peasant nation dominated by an undemocratic bureaucracy concentrated in the state, parastatal agencies, and the party. The central political contradiction of postcolonial Tanzania was top-down rule in the name of the people. Authoritarian populism, not socialism, took shape.\textsuperscript{25}

Self-reliance had been declared in part to guard against over-dependence on foreign aid amidst Cold War tensions. After independence, Nyerere had justified accepting foreign aid as a way to reduce racial tensions, since the Indian part of the population controlled most domestic capital. But failure to attract sufficient investment led to efforts to reduce dependency on foreign capital as well. Indeed, the popular understanding of development in 1960s Tanzania was self-


sufficiency and freedom from non-African economic forces. Ironically, *ujamaa* and the Arusha Declaration impressed other governments and attracted aid. In the decade after self-reliance was established as a goal, Tanzania accepted a great deal of international development assistance.²⁶

International aid arrived from a variety of sources. Tanzania was a non-aligned country in the Cold War and numerous donor nations on both sides of the conflict supplied capital, resources, and personnel.²⁷ Dar es Salaam, especially, took on a more pronounced cosmopolitan air. The United States and China competed by undertaking massive infrastructure projects, a highway and a railway respectively. United Nations agencies, the World Bank, American foundations, church groups, and international NGOs (like Oxfam and the Canadian Hunger Foundation) provided assistance.²⁸ Volunteer-sending organizations, established on the Peace Corps model in numerous First and Second World nations, also participated. West German, Australian, Danish, American, Israeli, Swedish, Liechtenstein, and British volunteers could be found at work.²⁹ CUSO volunteers were not working alone in Tanzania.

CUSOTAN practice coincided with ramped-up Canadian aid to Tanzania. From 1950, Canadian official development assistance focused, under the Commonwealth’s Colombo Plan, on South Asia. In 1963, Canada still contributed 97% of its aid to that plan. In 1960, though, the External Aid Office – replaced by Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1968


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– joined the Special Commonwealth African Aid Programme. Contributions of funds and labour increased after Canada established diplomatic ties with Tanzania in 1964. Between 1961 and 1981, Canada provided Tanzania with $CA208 million in bilateral aid. Major spending included aerial surveys, urban planning, and electric power transmission projects. From 1967, CIDA agricultural assistance focused – in the pursuit of a world of bread consumers – on wheat culture. Research was done, Barabaig cultivators were displaced for a mono-culture factory farm, and frustrated projects to create grain storage facilities and an automated bakery were undertaken. In the late 1970s, CIDA initiated a railway assistance project, which in part involved financing the Tanzanian purchase of rails from the steel plant in Sydney, Cape Breton. Therefore, Canadian aid centered on infrastructure, economic planning, and agricultural development.

The federal government also placed Canadian professionals, on Canadian salaries paid by CIDA, in the Tanzanian civil service. To give a sense of the scale, in 1969, CIDA had about 700 teachers and 250 technical experts in Third World countries. The 57 CIDA teachers in Tanzania were among a total of 838 foreign teachers there. In 1970, 64 technical experts also worked for various departments. CIDA provided scholarships to Tanzanian students going the other way to study at Canadian universities. Additionally, CIDA backed the Canadian Executive Service

30 Roger Young, Canadian Development Assistance to Tanzania (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1983), 43-44; Morrison, 47.
Overseas, a CUSO copycat that placed two executives in the country in 1968. Finally, Canada agreed to train the new army formed following the 1964 mutiny. Dozens of Canadian Armed Forces officers served as military instructors between 1965 and 1970.

In fall 1964, CUSO formed an East and Central Africa program (ECA) and sent a cohort of volunteers to Tanzania for the first time. Until the decade’s end, there was little to distinguish CUSO’s program in Tanzania (CUSOTAN) from its parent organization. From 1962, CUSO aimed “to recruit qualified graduates who are willing to serve and learn overseas in conditions of service similar to those prevailing for similarly-qualified citizens of the host country.” Each volunteer was placed at the request of a national government. CUSO hoped that volunteers might contribute to development and themselves “derive a richly rewarding educational experience.”

In 1966, ECA Director Frank Bogdasavich evoked the moral mission and Cold War imperative behind that philosophy. He linked peace and development and argued that: “The gap between our living standards and those of most people in the world is not only dangerous, it is wrong. This is repeatedly admitted by most Canadians, but most of us continue to find more urgent matters to attend to. Not CUSO.” In his view, CUSO provided technical assistance by having volunteers fill “middle-level manpower” needs in “technically backwards” nations.

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36 Frank Bogdasavich was a law instructor at University College, Dar and CUSO East Africa coordinator in 1964-66, ECA Director in 1966-67, CUSO Executive Secretary in 1967-1968, and CUSO Executive Director in 1968-
In the context of international contributions to the Tanzanian public sector, CUSO volunteers were distinguished in three ways. First, as English speakers, CUSO personnel were more sought than many Europeans. Second, Canadian volunteers were viewed in Tanzania as more politically acceptable than American counterparts given Cold War geopolitics. Indeed, in 1968-1969, the government expelled the Peace Corps over American aggression in Vietnam. 37 Yet, third, CUSO volunteers were particularly expensive. Unlike aid agencies such as CIDA (or some volunteer-sending organizations) which paid the salaries of the personnel they sent, a significant part of CUSOTAN’s program – more than 50% by a 1972 estimate – was borne by the Tanzanian government through the payment of salaries and the provision of housing and health care to CUSO volunteers. In 1969, volunteers received 1,100 shillings a month when the average annual income of Tanzanians was 386 shillings. More remarkable was a five-year projection that spending on CUSO might total 1.25% of Tanzanian government investment. 38

Given its goals and position, CUSOTAN was poised to contribute to two nation-building projects within a global politics of poverty. On the one hand, dependent on Canadian state funds for its continued existence, CUSO participated in the welfare state’s efforts to forge what Tom Kent had called “world welfare.” Prime Minister Lester Pearson told CUSO members that foreign aid, in assuaging the misery and “rising expectations” of Third World peoples, could help

avert “world-wide revolutionary violence and subversion.” By subscribing to humanitarian concern, anti-poverty action, and liberal democratic capitalism, CUSO dovetailed with Canadian state interests abroad. Indeed, when CIDA began to finance CUSO through a formal NGO Program, it did so to “tap the enormous resources, experiences, expertise and knowledge that resided outside of government.” On the other hand, CUSO’s presence abroad depended on the assent and subsidy of Third World governments. CUSOTAN aligned itself with the postcolonial state project in Tanzania and placed Canadians in the government bureaucracy. Liberal internationalist ideology was sufficiently malleable to accommodate both nation-building roles.

Historian Ruth Compton Brouwer has demonstrated that about 9,000 thousand Canadian CUSO volunteers went abroad by 1981 to dozens of Third World countries – predominantly on teaching assignments for which they had no prior experience. Most volunteers were Canadian born, in their early twenties, from middle class or skilled working class backgrounds, from Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-Celtic urban or suburban families, and from the Protestant or Catholic mainstream – all things typical of students at the Canadian universities from which volunteers had generally just graduated from. Women were over-represented. These young people were motivated by a desire for adventure, by idealism, and by the hope of doing useful work.

According to information compiled from the CUSO fonds at Library and Archives Canada, 353 CUSO individuals were posted to Tanzania between 1964 and 1979. There were 209 men and 144 women. There were as few as ten from visible minorities. There were 70 couples. Among married women, approximately fourteen were non-working. A handful of couples had children with them. It appears that four sets of volunteers married after meeting

40 Morrison, 69.
41 Brouwer, Canada’s Global Villagers, 2, 28-32, 36.
with CUSOTAN. Table 7-A sketches, where sources have specified, the size of the CUSOTAN volunteer contingent over time. The height of volunteer placements was between 1968 and 1971. The professions of the volunteers are categorized in Table 7-B. By the author’s totals, there were 151 CUSOTAN teachers in secondary schools between 1963 and 1979. Another 26 volunteers taught technical and commercial subjects at other post-primary institutions, while five volunteers were posted at the University College in Dar. Therefore, where CUSO participated in international development assistance in Tanzania, it did so especially in the field of education.

### Table 7-A CUSOTAN Volunteer Contingent, 1963-1978

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incoming Fall Volunteers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Country Volunteers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 7-B CUSOTAN Volunteers by Profession, 1963-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>36</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and administration</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Librarian</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Volunteer</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other professional field</td>
<td>1 [or 2, if one double counts a nurse who chose to become a primary school teacher part-way through her contract]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school teacher</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school teacher</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-primary technical or commercial subject instructor</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University lecturer</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s notes from LAC, CUSO fonds, MG28 I 323.

### Education for Development

Nearly half of CUSOTAN volunteers worked as secondary school teachers. Many were new B.A. recipients without teacher training or work experience. Yet they were at the forefront of CUSOTAN efforts to realize development. Field staff Shirley Baker, an older Canadian who
had been living in Tanzania, felt in 1969 that: “Teaching still comes closest to being the most realistic meeting of the countries [sic] needs for CUSO personnel. There is an obvious job awaiting them for there are always classrooms of children needing teachers. There is certainly a positive indication of accomplishment at the end of two years by virtue of having taught students and having seen them achieve another year of schooling.” The sentiment was not exactly inspiring and accepted a connection between formal education and development at face value.

But what did education have to do with development? How did secondary schooling fit Tanzania’s socialist project? What could young Canadian teachers hope to contribute? Answers to these questions were complex and intentions often did not match realities in Tanzania. From 1964 to 1978, CUSOTAN teachers operated ambivalently in relation to questions regarding education, development, social stratification, race, language, and political philosophy.

Nyerere, himself a former teacher, gave education a privileged place among national aims. He issued a major statement, “Education for Self-Reliance,” in 1967. He argued that, since education spending accounted for one-fifth of state revenue, reevaluation was in order. The purpose of education, he suggested, was to transmit accumulated knowledge and to prepare young people for participation in society. As a result, he felt that the inherited colonial education system – with its emphasis on elitism, white collar skill, and the pursuit of individual wealth – was inappropriate to the postcolonial situation. Rather, education should foster the cooperative, egalitarian, and communitarian rural-focused values envisioned by the Arusha Declaration.

Self-reliant development would require the education of Tanzanians along new lines.

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“Education for Self-Reliance” made education a development issue, and it shaped subsequent education policy. But Nyerere’s vision, however global, did not do away with distinctions between elites and cultivators, between the cash and subsistence economies, between formal and rural education. Alongside a rural-centric educational philosophy, secondary schools continued to train a minority of students to meet civil service manpower needs. Thus, it was presumed that well-educated graduates drawn from the black majority would come to direct Tanzania’s development from above, while peasants would contribute from below. To Nyerere, the relationship signified a more cooperative, egalitarian society. But though seeking to confront inherited colonial education legacies, a policy of education for development remained constrained by the socio-economic and class implications of the formal school system.

Under colonial rule, schools were few. Segregated and differential education offered to blacks, Indians, and whites ensured social differentiation along racial lines. The schooling of blacks, aside from a limited number of clerks, was considered threatening. Rural-centric mass education was prioritized ahead of formal instruction. By 1962, male literacy was 14% and female literacy was 5%. Just 3% of the population had attended more than primary school.

After independence, reforms were made. The education system came under full state control, schools were racially integrated, curriculum was Africanized, and vocational subjects were abandoned. Yet, at the primary level, fees continued to restrict enrollment to the better-off. Since there was only limited expansion of secondary schools, advancement remained conditional on exam results. Private secondary schools became an increasingly prominent alternative for

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those who could afford them. Conditions led to frustration from rural people who understood secondary education led directly to cash economy employment for their children.46

In 1966, there was a dual crisis in education. First, parents criticized the lack of job and educational opportunities open to their children. Second, university students went on strike to protest legislation requiring students to do two years of national service before entering university in Dar. Nyerere responded by ordering the students home (though the banishment was later reversed) and issuing “Education for Self-Reliance” to confront student elitism and popular discontent, as well as to emphasize education as a core component of rural socialist life.47

The social bifurcation of education would remain, however. For the vast majority of students, primary school was terminal and it emphasized agricultural development. Parents continued to demand improvements. Meanwhile, secondary and higher education were geared toward civil service employment. If so-called “self-reliance” activities (largely consisting of student labour on school farms) were introduced, they were generally pursued in isolation from the curriculum. Plus, rote and examination-centric learning, authoritarian teacher-pupil relations, competitive grading, and exclusivity in the school system militated hopes of developing creative, critical, and cooperative citizens among the educated. Transformation in the form, content, and outcome of education was not immediately apparent in Tanzanian schools.48

Amid reform and entrenchment, reliance on foreign teachers continued. Nyerere argued that technical assistance was required to meet state developmental aims simply because Tanzania

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did not have enough trained personnel. If the civil service was to be Africanized, he reasoned, international teachers were first needed to train a greater number of students. Notably, Nyerere felt that teachers had a great deal of power and responsibility, suggesting that they could shape the aspirations and socialist attitudes of youth and the nation.\(^{49}\) Until sufficient Tanzanian teachers were trained, the task fell especially to non-Tanzanians such as CUSO volunteers.

CUSOTAN field staff considered the apparent contradiction. In a 1969 appraisal, Chris Brown worried that volunteers were not particularly relevant to the socialist project. Bluntly, he wrote: “CUSO teachers are white, westerners, and usually middle-class non-socialists which combined limits the effectiveness and relevance of the CUSO education programme in Tanzania.” At the same time, he acknowledged that CUSOTAN teachers were stuck in an awkward position of authority, left to enforce national educational policy. Brown observed that self-reliance activities, imagined as sites of cooperative endeavour, were resented by students. He reasoned: “On the one hand the CUSO teacher as a foreigner cannot lead change for this is the rightful role of the Tanzanian teacher, and on the other hand he definitely should support the concept, and practice self-reliance, even though it places him in an ambivalent position. The situation is not irresolvable, but some CUSO teachers tend to lose the perspective of the goal at their respective schools.” Brown, even in working through these difficulties, retained a sense that placing teachers and filling manpower needs in Tanzania could be contribution enough.\(^{50}\)

ECA Assistant Director Rudolph Carter pressed for greater CUSOTAN identification with national aims. He felt that Nyerere’s reevaluation of education, public denunciations of lingering colonialism, and the withdrawal of the Peace Corps demanded that “CUSO must


\(^{50}\) Christopher (Chris) Brown was CUSOTAN Field Staff Officer in 1969. Brown, “Education Report,” July 1969, 5.
seriously question its role in that country.” He believed that an ongoing presence would depend not only on government policy, but also on “the responsiveness of the CUSO organization in assuring that it remains a productive, integral manpower resource. In Tanzania, a productive resource with the context of the on-going cultural revolution and socialism is one that is positively identified with the direction of the country and that is not ‘reactionary.’”

The role of foreign teachers was decidedly politicized once the socialist project was declared. In one respect, teachers from abroad continued to signify that the Africanization of the public sector had yet to be accomplished. Certainly, CUSO personnel expressed support for government plans to progressively reduce reliance on foreign teachers. Shirley Baker observed that many volunteers expressed a sense that once local teachers were available, CUSO might “consider its job done and phase itself out.” Volunteer Richard Carothers, who starred in a CUSO promotional film, noted that international teachers – arriving from a plethora of donor nations – were so common that students were habituated to them. Yet, with attention to cultural sensitivity, he added: “I think, though, it would be rather naive to think that teachers from outside can really do the job as well as teachers from Tanzania. There are really quite a few differences in our cultural backgrounds and teachers from outside really, I think, at times aren’t going to understand the background of students, their family lives, their own lives, the way they are going to think and the problems they are going to have all the time in school.”

Most pointedly, the presence of CUSOTAN teachers intersected with cultural, racial, and socialist politics. Following the Arusha Declaration, a new popular discourse around “aliens,”

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52 Baker to Olivero, Regional Report, 4.
“enemies,” and “parasites” took root. It turned especially on race and was directed at those who could be construed as enemies of *ujamaa*. On the one hand, the discourse was directed at the Indo-Tanzanian minority, which had long controlled domestic capital. On the other hand, it could be directed against white foreigners who occupied positions of authority associated with colonial rule, including teachers who might influence youth with “alien habits and values.”

To be sure, racial discourse did not engage the full complexity of society. Black Tanzanians were differentiated by region, class, ethnicity, and religion. Caste was a further division in the Indian diaspora. In Zanzibar, an Arab population had its own sub-groups. Still, the nationalization of private schools provoked racial consequences volunteers could see. At Aga Khan Secondary School in 1968, the oldest students came from the well-off Ismaili Muslim community. Younger students were almost all black Tanzanians. On staff, Indian and Pakistani teachers were joined by Russians, Poles, East Germans, Americans, and a CUSO volunteer.55

Still, there were persistent staff concerns that CUSO’s presence had become too visible, a tacit acknowledgement that white faces stood out and were subject to political meaning. As volunteer Hugh Winsor put it: “The first distinguishing characteristic about a volunteer is that he is a white man. Everybody can see that, so he has a lot of history to answer for.”56 Bob Olivero felt that CUSOTAN should not expand beyond its 1968 level to avoid “jeopardizing the programme,” an implicit reference to the exclusion of the Peace Corps.57 In 1970, ECSA Director Lawrence Cumming worried that the rising number of volunteers in Dar had become so

57 Robert (Bob) Olivero was ECA Director in 1968-1969. Bob Olivero, Director, ECA, to All ECA Field Staff and Local Co-ordinators, “Projections,” 1, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 17, File 17-17.
conspicuous that rumours about group and personal behaviour began to circulate.\textsuperscript{58} Shirley Baker equally cautioned: “I do not wish to see a Canadian impact, just a modest number of the best people possible doing a competent job and making their personal impact on a day-to-day one-to-one, quietly effective basis.” Her sentiment was rooted in her understanding of popular East African views about race: “They want Africans. We are white. Call it racialism, discrimination, what you will, this is one of the things African Independence is all about.”\textsuperscript{59}

Both positive and negative evaluations of the position of volunteers were noted. Chris Brown argued that the rise in national consciousness among the student body put CUSOTAN teachers in an uncomfortable position, yet believed that discomfort “can be a healthy position, so long as the volunteer understands the reasons for CUSO’s presence.”\textsuperscript{60} But volunteer John Bayne strongly suggested that CUSO reconsider placing teachers in Tanzania. He wrote that:

The feeling that one frequently gets is that many Tanzanians, especially the younger teachers who have recently graduated, don’t want us here, and that they believe the sooner we leave the better. To ask any person to work in such an environment seems unfair, to ask a new graduate who has been promised the opportunity to make a tremendous contribution to the development of Tanzania, borders on the criminal.\textsuperscript{61}

A couple of other teachers were apprehensive and discomforted by student talk of capitalism and racism. By contrast, Bonnie Keay actively worked to foster political consciousness among students, to the point where her conservative headmistress wondered if Keay was a spy. Further volunteers involved themselves in curriculum reform or improving teacher resources.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{58} Lawrence Cumming was a trained teacher who served as a CUSO volunteer in Kenya in 1965-1967. He was ECSA Director in 1969-1971 and later became Executive Secretary of Oxfam Canada. “Appreciation of CUSO Tanzania Programme,” 2, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 19, File 19-26; “Curricula Vitae of East and Central Africa Staff Attending CUSO Regional Meetings,” 1, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 35, File 35-32.

\textsuperscript{59} Baker to Olivero, Regional Report, 5.

\textsuperscript{60} Brown, “Education Report,” 6.


For CUSOTAN teachers, it was often everyday goings-on and job satisfaction that mattered most. Low morale was a genuine concern and it often stemmed from heavy teaching loads, multifarious extracurricular responsibilities, and conflicts with school officials over “their attitudes towards expatriates.”  

ECSA consultant Dennis September, an older South African and African National Congress (ANC) member who had fled apartheid and received Canadian citizenship, argued that much of the frustration of CUSO teachers in Tanzania and Zambia stemmed from the fact that school conditions did not meet their expectations. He suggested that CUSO personnel felt increasingly disenchanted with their inability to fulfill “their desires to ‘bring about change’ either at the school or within the system.” He felt that the lack of qualified teachers was part of the problem and that too many volunteers suffered from “first job blues.”

Matters came to a head at an April 1972 meeting in Dar. Most CUSOTAN teachers argued that they should not be replaced in their jobs by future volunteers and that the placement of secondary school teachers should end. The volunteers felt underutilized, constrained by poor administration, and confronted by poor student discipline. Moreover, they argued that schools “did not measure up to the needs and aspirations of the people of Tanzania or to the policy of the Government of Tanzania.” Because of these views, field staff placed a low priority on teacher recruitment and later quietly sought to avoid fulfilling requests for teachers.

Some CUSOTAN teachers were still placed, but they continued to report poor job satisfaction. Indeed, by the mid-1970s, the slow pace of educational reform and the gap between rhetoric and practice generated cynicism. Plans to achieve self-sufficiency in secondary teaching

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63 Baker to Olivero, Regional Report, 3.  
fell short because many Tanzanian teachers were upwardly mobile and moved into other civil service jobs or refused to work in outlying areas. As for the student body, field staff Richard Marquardt concluded that not only were schools not producing a new socialist man, they continued “to be breeding grounds of elitist attitudes.” Yet he commended efforts to at least restrain salaries and inequalities. His evaluation was mixed: “So while it is true that the schooled still tend to live comfortably at the expense of the unschooled, the trend is towards increased equality rather than increased disparity, in contrast to most surrounding countries.” The general view was that there remained reason to maintain faith in secondary schools “despite, or perhaps because of,” the continued dissatisfaction of Tanzanian leaders with the prevalent situation.

Still, the debate over whether CUSO should post teachers in Tanzania recurred. In 1978, when about 10% of the teaching force remained non-Tanzanian, CUSOTAN volunteers and staff were wary of the role of secondary schools in perpetuating elitism and could not achieve a consensus on what to do. Volunteer Eden Anderson argued that her own experience indicated that teachers needed to be prepared to face demoralized conditions and to witness the continued failures of “Education for Self-Reliance.” It was decided for CUSOTAN to recruit teachers in a targeted attempt to improve the English of Tanzanians attending teachers’ college.

Language was a strong undercurrent in CUSOTAN participation in education. Kiswahili played a prominent role in postcolonial society. It was a language popularized by trade and by


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German colonial preference. While British colonial authorities retained it for administration, English predominated in schools. Intriguingly, Kiswahili was appropriated in the 1960s as a language of Pan-Africanism, being both indigenous to East Africa and more widely understood than the myriad languages spoken by disparate ethnic groups within Tanzania. It became a compulsory school subject in 1965, the nation’s official language in 1967, and the language of instruction at the primary level. However, in contradiction of stated policy goals, English remained the medium of post-primary education. CUSOTAN volunteers could continue to occupy teaching roles thanks to colonial lineage and to the common view that proficiency in English was a necessity. The English of students entering secondary school was generally weak, requiring considerable collective focus from teachers. And so long as teaching staffs remained international, English was also the medium for communication among peers. But by the late 1970s, volunteers could be constrained if they did not learn to speak the national language. Eden Anderson noted that activities outside the classroom were carried on in Kiswahili. She concluded that “the faster one learns Swahili the more likely one is to integrate into the school environment and achieve a measure of job satisfaction.” A good many volunteers struggled to learn the language, though, and one noted that the process was frustrating and embarrassing. By way of recognition, in 1975, CUSOTAN spent money on language tutors for ten volunteers.

After 1971, declining government requests plus fewer placements reduced the size of CUSOTAN’s volunteer contingent as well as the extent of its provision of teachers to secondary schools. Yet between 1964 and 1979, the work of CUSOTAN teachers led them into a complex and ambivalent engagement with issues of education, development, social stratification, race,

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69 Coulson, Tanzania, 81-84; Buchert, 21, 27; Brennan, Taifa, 2; Cameron and Dodd, 191-192.
language, and political philosophy. The privileged place of education in ensuring socialist
transformation put non-Tanzanian teachers in an often-uncomfortable position of authority.
Volunteers discovered that anti-foreigner and anti-capitalist sentiment had racial significance
related to the colonial past and directly affecting their present experience. Equally, the linguistic
tension between English language instruction and Kiswahili facility spoke to unresolved colonial
legacies. Most evidently, CUSOTAN personnel found that Tanzanian secondary schools were
elite institutions which continually failed to live up to stated socialist ideals and contributed to
inequality. However, amid debate over the continued placement of teachers, CUSOTAN
members continued to see, even begrudgingly, contributions to formal education as a worthwhile
endeavour. Conceptually, education and national development were continually paired.
Education might shape young Tanzanians and feed the civil service for state-led national
development. Therefore, the belief remained that liberal internationalist contributions to
education for development might help secure national anti-poverty aims in Tanzania.

**Anti-Colonialism and Liberation Support**

As their involvement in education suggested, CUSOTAN members took the Arusha
Declaration and Tanzanian national aims seriously. This affinity, in one important respect, led to
CUSOTAN opposition to colonialism and minority rule in southern Africa. Field staff came to
understand national liberation as a necessary condition for social liberation and development.\(^\text{71}\)
Therefore, support for liberal democratic principles of self-determination and equal rights were
understood as a direct corollary to anti-poverty action. From 1969, CUSOTAN and ECSA staff
provided political and material support to southern African liberation movements, something that

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\(^{71}\) CUSO East, Central and Southern Africa, Current Regional Plan, Dar es Salaam, September 1977, Addendum B,
34, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 14, File 14-2.
involved criticizing Canadian complicity in continued imperialism. However, they did so not without the opposition of some volunteers and parties involved within CUSO.

Nyerere and TANU were firmly against colonialism and minority rule. These commitments were reflected in a militant foreign policy, the haven provided to thousands of refugees fleeing conflicts and oppression, and the willingness to allow liberation movements – as well as the OAU Liberation Committee – set up headquarters in Dar during the 1960s. Beyond the capital, Canadian military instructors were distressed by the apparent involvement of the Tanzanian army and Chinese advisors in training FRELIMO (Mozambique) guerrillas.72

By privileging anti-colonial unity, non-alignment, and Pan-Africanism, the Tanzanian government participated in what historian Christopher Lee has called the Bandung Spirit, the common cause of new nations pressing for human rights, self-determination, and world peace in international diplomacy.73 Anti-colonial unity was best exemplified by the Lusaka Manifesto, signed by Nyerere and twelve other east and central African leaders in April 1969. The document addressed racial oppression and colonialism in Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa and proclaimed an unassailable support for human equality and self-government.74

In October 1969, Nyerere visited Canada and reprised these themes in a speech at the University of Toronto. He insisted that overcoming poverty and ensuring economic freedom was as important as achieving political independence. But, as such, Tanzania’s national aims were inseparable from supporting the liberation of southern African peoples. Nyerere challenged Western nations not to betray their own democratic ideals by blithely accepting the South Africa

73 Christopher Lee, Introduction: Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung,” in Making a World After Empire, 15.
government’s claims that it was a bastion against communism in Africa. He granted that many Canadians might be inclined to focus on domestic issues. “But the world is very small now,” he cautioned. “Canada’s actions – or lack of them – in relation to Africa are also important to your future as well as to ours.” Nyerere called on his audience to support African freedom struggles.75

ECSA and CUSOTAN staff, some of whom had had contact with liberation movement members and had begun to appreciate the urgency of the situation, were receptive to the Lusaka Manifesto and its cause.76 And they took action in August 1969 by banning all volunteer travel to southern Africa. Many volunteers travelled through parts of eastern, central, and southern Africa. CUSOTAN teachers had three months of vacation at the end of the school year, while volunteers in the civil service also had time off. They recalled many of these trips: going on safari, hunting in the bush, climbing Mount Kilimanjaro, or visiting the beaches of Zanzibar.77 However, when it came to travel south, questions of race, volunteer behaviour, and solidarity were apparent. On multiple occasions, CUSO Zambia volunteers angered Zambian officials when their return was delayed during trips into South West Africa. Even more seriously, several CUSO Zambia volunteers were involved in traffic accidents in South Africa and one group of volunteers struck and killed a child. Dennis September wrote that 24 of 58 CUSO Zambia volunteers had crossed the border between January and May 1969. He wryly noted: “From my long talks with many volunteers I’ve failed to ‘educate’ them therefore I do not think that a policy of education and persuasion is the answer.”78 The travel ban would follow.

75 “Stability and Change in Africa, Address,” 140, 142, 144.
76 Interview with Lawrence Cumming, 11 August 2015.
Within ECSA, three positions on the travel ban were apparent. The first view was that of field staff who, as of September 1969, forbade all CUSO people from travelling to Rhodesia, South Africa, South West Africa, Angola, and Mozambique. CUSOTAN staff Chris Brown noted that the decision was made because such travel, and the spending it entailed, directly contravened the policies and boycotts put in place by the signatories of the Lusaka Manifesto. Indeed, officials from several governments had expressed dissatisfaction with CUSO on the issue. One of Brown’s chief concerns was that people who visited Rhodesia or South Africa were refused re-admittance to Tanzania. Rudolph Carter concluded that the travel ban represented “not simply a vote of solidarity for the basic human justice but also to align ourselves politically with the direction of our host countries.”79 In these terms, the travel ban was part and parcel of CUSO’s general desire to respect the aims of the national governments which employed volunteers.

The second viewpoint came from volunteers ambivalent about or unbothered by apartheid. Peter Boffa, a volunteer in Zambia who supported the ban, observed that there were pro- and anti-travel ban volunteers. He conveyed some of the logic of ban opponents, saying that southern Africa was a preferred tourist destination of volunteers because of good roads, cheap prices, and interesting places to see. He went on to say that: “when you have to face the costs of a trip up the hell-run to East Africa, the same to a lesser extent along the Great East Road, the costs of a vacation in Zambia (if you can find a place to relax), the time you have available to travel if you are not a teacher, the amount you have to spend on a vacation, and so on – then a

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couple of weeks down south is an attractive proposition.” Such considerations put tourism first, ignored that whiteness afforded volunteers the opportunity to travel, and failed to appreciate that apartheid conditions and economic exploitation contributed to cheap prices and so on.

The third take came from CUSO Malawi field staff Colin Freebury. He argued that personnel in Malawi felt that travel to southern Africa was a radicalizing experience. Freebury suggested that Rhodesia and South Africa were “their own worst advertisements.” He continued:

We all object strongly to white domination in Southern Africa, and we feel that a first-hand view of the situation is far more effective than second-hand propaganda in convincing personnel of the evils of apartheid. The eight of us who have been in South Africa and Rhodesia knew that before we saw these countries we disagreed because they offended an abstract ideal of human equality. Having seen them now we will not easily forget the suffering, the bitterness and the massive human waste caused by apartheid. Before, we might have disagreed in silence, now [we] cannot help telling what we have seen ourselves.

In these terms, travel was its own form of agitprop.

Beyond the issue of travel, CUSO members also considered liberation movements and Pan-Africanism more directly. Within Tanzania, the presence of liberation movements in Dar attracted the attention of at least a few volunteers in the late 1960s. Jacques Roy, a working-class Franco-Ontarian, became interested in liberation and began to attend seminars on the subject at the university in Dar. He got to know fellow CUSOTAN volunteers Robert and Janet Martin, both of whom were part of the politicized campus milieu. Indeed, the university was a key site of cosmopolitan, anti-colonial, and socialist ferment. Radical students, Issa Shivji (a Tanzanian Marxist scholar) among them, and faculty, including visiting professors like Walter

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80 Peter Boffa to Dennis September, 20 August 1969, 1-2, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 17, File 17-17.
Rodney (a radical Guyanese historian who adapted dependency theory to the history of Africa), Giovanni Arrighi (an Italian Gramscian sociologist), and John S. Saul (a Canadian political economist), took the Arusha Declaration and efforts to build a socialist nation seriously.  

Socialist, anti-colonial, and Pan-Africanist sentiment also intersected with Black Power. In November 1967, a university seminar featured Stokely Carmichael. Carmichael, a radical American civil rights organizer and Black Power proponent, had arrived in Dar determined to make connections with African revolutionaries. According to Roy, the audience heckled a white South African anti-apartheid speaker and cheered Carmichael. Black Power slogans were taken up. More broadly, historian Seth Markle has argued that Tanzanian domestic and foreign policy established it as “a vanguard state of anti-imperial politics” and made it a major site for black American international travel and activism.

CUSO was obliquely connected to international black radicalism through a circuit which flowed through Montreal, the Caribbean, and Dar. Sixties Montreal, in addition to a place where members of the black working-class in Little Burgundy participated in urban renewal-related activism, was a centre for black and Caribbean university students and revolutionary thought. In October 1968, radical Caribbean students in Montreal organized the Congress of Black Writers, which drew the likes of C.L.R. James (a Marxist historian from Trinidad), Carmichael, and Rodney. The latter two had ties to Tanzania and others would follow. Kennedy Frederick, a student militant from Grenada (and who helped lead a 1969 occupation at Sir George Williams

University directed against institutionally condoned professorial racial discrimination), left Canada with his wife Viola Davis and lived alongside Rodney in Dar. A direct CUSO link to Montreal-Caribbean black radicalism and Tanzanian Pan-Africanism were sustained by CUSOTAN teachers Rawle and Gloria Frederick. Rawle was a native of Trinidad and had previously taught in Montreal. Gloria immigrated to Canada from Bermuda, completed a doctorate in analytical chemistry, and had worked as a McGill University instructor. They were among the few non-white CUSOTAN volunteers and brought their two sons with them to Tanzania. In 1974, the Fredericks attended the Sixth Pan-African Congress in Dar. There were delegates from African nations, liberation movements, and organizations from the Caribbean, the south Pacific, and South and North America (including nine Black Canadians, mostly from Montreal and Toronto). The Fredericks noted that specific strategies for confronting racism and imperialism were not discussed, but themes of Pan-African unity and economic cooperation were emphasized. Meanwhile, Black Power also struck CUSO involvement back in the Caribbean. The imperialism of Canadian banks and corporations in places such as Jamaica generated anti-Canadian sentiment by 1970 that was occasionally directed at CUSO volunteers. Tanzanian socialism, transnational anti-imperialism, and CUSO also intersected with Indigenous activism. Marie Small Face, a Kainai graduate of the University of Alberta, volunteered with CUSO in Zambia, where she met her husband and black ANC activist Jack.

Marule. On her return to Canada in about 1971, she took an executive assistant job in Ottawa with National Indian Brotherhood (NIB), a fledging political organization created in 1967 to represent First Peoples with ‘Indian’ status under the Indian Act. Small Face and Marule threw a number of parties and regularly invited CIDA and CUSO employees, African diplomats, and Indigenous activists. George Manuel, the Shuswap president of NIB, used the occasions to sound out African representatives on colonialism and the circumstances of First Nations in Canada. Manuel was already attuned to a possible transnational Indigenous movement, having spoken with Maori and Aborigine peoples on a trip to New Zealand and Australia in 1971. He returned convinced that an international organization of Indigenous peoples was needed.  

When Manuel described his vision to Mbuto Milando, the Tanzanian diplomat remarked that Manuel appeared to be describing the emergence of a “Fourth World.” Manuel seized on the phrase as a way of framing the collective, transnational struggles of Indigenous peoples dispossessed within nations. With the help of Michael Posluns, a CUSO friend of Small Face’s, Manuel popularized the Fourth World concept in an autobiographical account of Indigenous political organizing in Canada and across borders. More immediately, Manuel was invited to attend the tenth anniversary celebration of Tanzanian independence in 1971. He publicly expressed admiration for Tanzanian socialism and rural development, and he intimated appreciation for armed liberation struggle. CIDA and Canadian High Commission efforts to quiet him backfired and the Tanzanian press covered not only the backroom conflict, but also reported on the dismal mortality rates, education levels, and employment figures of First Peoples in Canada. Manuel also met with Nyerere. Encouraged, Manuel continued to forge international connections. And, in 1975, the founding meeting of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples

was held on Vancouver Island.\(^9^9\) Manuel also carried Tanzanian ideals north, where Dene activists adapted Third World theory to local demands for self-determination in the Dene Declaration.\(^9^0\) If Third World and anti-imperial internationalism appealed to some mainstream Indigenous leaders, the same ideas influenced militants on the left. By the early 1970s, as was the case in Lesser Slave Lake, Red Power activists in Canada readily drew on Black Power and Third World liberation thought to attack domestic colonialism and inequalities.\(^9^1\)

By attending closely to this lively Tanzanian politics of anti-imperialism, CUSOTAN developed greater ties to southern African liberation movements. Initially, discussions between CUSOTAN staff and liberation movement representatives were tentative, exploratory, and slow-moving.\(^9^2\) By contrast, Jacques Roy’s own engagement ran counter to that caution. He walked into the MPLA office in Dar in 1967 and struck up a conversation with Agostinho Neto, who became Angola’s first postcolonial president. Following the encounter, Roy worked with MPLA on a radio system, keeping his activity secret from CUSO colleagues. When he left his teaching job to travel to Angola at MPLA’s invitation, Roy was confronted by CUSO’s staff person in Zambia and urged not to go on. Once returned to Dar, he had to quarrel with Shirley Baker to get CUSO to pay for his return flight to Canada, money Lawrence Cumming later briefly tried to recoup. Roy went on to participate in solidarity activism in Canada and do work for CIDA and SUCO. Neto was in fact in Canada in 1974 at the invitation of solidarity activists when a Portuguese military coup prompted plans to end colonialism in Angola.\(^9^3\)


\(^9^1\) See Scott Rutherford, “Canada’s Other Red Scare: Rights, Decolonization, and Indigenous Political Protest in the Global Sixties” (Ph.D. Diss. in History, Queen’s University, 2011).

\(^9^2\) Interview with Lawrence Cumming, 11 August 2015.

\(^9^3\) Lortie, Martin, Paquette, 36-37, 40, 50, 78, 87, 200, 209-210, 212, 219.
Despite such early concern, ECSA personnel notably pushed CUSO toward a more activist position on liberation within a few years. Former ECSA staff and volunteers, able to speak with better authority on apartheid and colonialism, introduced motions at CUSO annual general meetings in 1969 and 1970. The latter resolution noted Canada’s political and economic complicity in southern Africa and resolved that CUSO institute a program to support liberation movements. Clauses of the resolution – calling to educate the public, pressure the Canadian government and companies, and support Canadian solidarity groups – were passed by narrow majorities.\(^9^4\) CUSO affirmation of the legitimacy of liberation movements drew an immediate reactionary response. The *Globe and Mail* argued that CUSO was going dangerously beyond its mandate in engaging in the domestic politics of other countries. Meanwhile, some corporate donors withdrew their support, insisting that CUSO remain “non-political,” as it were.\(^9^5\)

Nonetheless, CUSO chose to address Canada’s ambivalent position on South Africa and respond to the Trudeau government’s White Paper on Foreign Policy.\(^9^6\) In 1971, Lawrence Cumming and former CUSOTAN teacher Brian Slattery helped deliver a statement before the Standing Committee on Foreign Relations. The CUSO paper argued that Canada’s policy was inconsistent, as it appealed to ‘social justice’ while supporting Canadian investment and business dealings in southern Africa. CUSO called on the federal government to lay down standards of Canadian corporate behaviour in South Africa, to assist refugees, to end arms sales to Portugal, and to provide non-military aid to liberation movements. Cumming was also a member of the


Ottawa Southern Africa Information Group. That group was part of the wider anti-apartheid solidarity network in Canada which articulated its opposition to prevailing Canadian foreign policy in the Black Paper, whose title alluded to the Indian Association of Alberta’s Red Paper and whose authors included Cranford Pratt and Hugh Winsor.97

Beginning in late 1971, CUSO field staff in Zambia and Tanzania began to provide discretionary contributions of food, medicines, and educational materials to liberation movements. Staff person Barry Fleming discussed various possibilities with Joaquin Chiasson, who ran FRELIMO’s office in Dar. Chiasson was cautious over an association with CUSO since ECSA staff also had some dealings with the International University Exchange Fund. The fund was a Geneva-based and Swedish social democrat-run scholarship provider to refugees, but FRELIMO knew it to be infiltrated by South African intelligence. CUSOTAN first provided FRELIMO with funds to buy watches. Having not followed up on the project, Fleming did not know if this was indeed how the money was spent. In 1973, CUSOTAN also bought office equipment for a network of trading posts in liberated northern Mozambique.98

From 1974, after volunteer placements in Zambia were stopped, CUSO’s Lusaka-based Liberation Support Project office maintained ties with liberation movements, fundraised, and disseminated information to Canadian solidarity groups. In the interest of public education, ZAPU (Zimbabwe), ANC (South Africa), and SWAPO (Namibia) militants were sponsored on

several speaking tours of Canada (until CUSO disallowed the practice in 1979). Incoming ECSA volunteers in 1976 were shown “The Last Grave of Dimbaza” (1973), an anti-apartheid film shot secretly in South Africa. More generally, in the late 1970s, ECSA funds went to subsistence, educational, and transportation projects sponsored by liberation movements among refugees in Zambia and Tanzania. As such, CUSOTAN expressed solidarity with southern African peoples, but carefully limited assistance to what it could claim was consciousness-raising activity and refugee-centric humanitarian, and therefore non-military, matters. Anything not explicitly humanitarian was unlikely to have been approved by CUSO officials in Ottawa.99

The involvement of CUSO members in Tanzanian and Zambian politics does appear to go a long way to explaining why southern African liberation became a defining social and political issue for the organization. By way of contrast, the Vietnam War – the primary focus of late 1960s and early 1970s anti-imperial activism in Canada – received scant mention from CUSO, with the closest volunteers stationed in Thailand. It was only between 1973 and 1976 that CUSO eyed joining the phalanx of international organizations prepared to intervene in postwar reconstruction in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.100

In this light, CUSOTAN opposition to colonialism and minority rule had everything to do with liberal internationalist deference to Tanzanian government policy. Support for the liberal democratic principles of self-determination and equal rights in southern Africa was prompted by engagement with liberationist Tanzania. Opinion, however, was decidedly split within CUSO over involvement in anti-imperialist politics. Though a handful of volunteers considered matters

99 Miller and Beer, “Independence for Zimbabwe and Namibia,” 9-11; CUSO East, Central and Southern Africa, Current Regional Plan, 1; Minutes of CUSO ECSA Regional Meeting, held at Likabula House, Mulanje, Malawi, 5-12 April 1976, 35, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 17, File 17-7; Interview with Barry Fleming, 12 August 2015.
100 Alison Norman to Jim McFetridge, Murray Thomson, Aurelio Elevazo, “Results of My Trip to Saigon, February 1-6,” 10 February 1975, 1-2, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 91, File 91-10; “Notes for Presentation to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Representing Asia,” [c. 1971], 3, 14-17, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 102, File 102-2.
of Pan-Africanism, Black Power, Indigenous politics, and armed liberation struggle more directly, CUSOTAN staff more generally pushed back against volunteer and organizational neglect of national liberation movements in southern Africa. What emerged was a carefully-defined program of support for national self-determination as a prerequisite to development, something that involved criticizing Canadian complicity in oppression in southern Africa. Where CUSOTAN and ECSA personnel succeeded in mobilizing political and material support for liberation movements, public education and humanitarianism were the main emphases.

**Conclusion**
CUSOTAN involvement in international development assistance in 1960s and 1970s Tanzania was driven by liberal internationalist attention to global poverty amidst the Cold War. CUSOTAN personnel believed that they might advance state-led development by serving as short-term members of the civil service. Almost half of volunteers worked as secondary school teachers and laboured at an ambivalent intersection of education, development, social inequality, race, language, and political philosophy. Despite several contradictions, CUSOTAN participation in formal instruction was justified by the idea that education for development meant teaching a generation of Tanzanians who might end the need for foreign personnel.

Liberal internationalist sentiment cut different ways. Though some Canadian volunteers sought to circumscribe their contribution to development by fulfilling their immediate jobs and eschewing political questions, other CUSOTAN people were drawn into a deepening engagement with postcolonial Tanzania. For field staff and some volunteers, growing support for Tanzanian political philosophy shaped program aims and principles. Inspired by anti-colonialism and opposition to minority rule in southern Africa, CUSOTAN staff came to view national liberation as a necessary condition for development. They sought to provide careful political and material assistance to southern African liberation movements and to support
measured anti-imperialist activism in Canada. Notably, it was left to black and Indigenous activists with CUSO associations to draw starker connections between imperialism abroad and racism and colonialism at home.

Figure 7.1 Cover of Zungumza, May 1979

Chapter 8

The Liberation of Peoples

Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) deference to, and sympathy for, state
development goals was evident in Tanzania as it was in other Third World countries where the
organization was active. But unlike elsewhere, affinity within CUSO’s program in Tanzania
(CUSOTAN) for \textit{ujamaa} and self-reliance prompted very different political trajectories.
CUSOTAN development thought was thoroughly influenced by Tanzanian philosophy. In turn,
CUSOTAN – and the East, Central, and Southern Africa program (ECSA) more broadly –
emerged as CUSO’s left wing because field staff and some volunteers took a Tanzanian path to
development, as well as the aspirations of southern African liberation movements, seriously.
Staff came to view national self-determination and personal freedom as prerequisites of
development. Indeed, amidst considerable debate over organizational aims, they succeeded in
reframing CUSO’s philosophy in terms of liberation. By 1974, some engaged members adopted
a neo-Marxist analysis of global power relations and Tanzanian class dynamics.

Within a global politics of poverty, liberal internationalists and New Leftists working for
CUSOTAN disagreed on what was necessary to end poverty through development. The two
sides in the debate, though, shared thematic ground. In both liberal and New Left iterations, the
animating spirit of CUSOTAN intervention in the 1960s and 1970s was a democratic
commitment to “the liberation of people” from all constraints on their autonomy, human dignity,
and social equality. Development, then, was not just a means of confronting poverty but also an
allusion to postcolonial freedom and to the work left to be done to secure greater global equality.
However, development proved an unsubstantial tool for securing social justice on a global scale.
**Tanzanian Socialism and CUSOTAN Development Thought**

CUSOTAN commitment to Tanzanian socialism and self-reliant development had to be fostered and sustained. Turnover was a built-in part of the program, and volunteers were new both to country and the organization. They experienced Tanzania through their jobs and daily lives, sometimes wrestling with social, cultural, and political questions. At the same time, field staff sought to draw them into deeper engagement with Tanzanian and CUSO aims. In the process, CUSOTAN and ECSA field staff managed in the early 1970s to establish freedom, however vaguely, as the central theme of CUSO’s development mandate.

In 1968, staff argued that their goal was “to supply manpower and related support to assist the country in achieving its goals,” particularly by conforming to “the socialist direction of Tanzanian development.”1 Again in 1973, the aim was “to cooperate with the People, Party, and Government in their efforts to achieve a socialist, self-reliant society.”2 Official government policy became that of CUSOTAN.

If staff affirmed state-led development, some found volunteers uninformed. At times, they conveyed unhappiness at the “attitudes” of volunteers who appeared more concerned with themselves than with development. In his letter of resignation, field staff Wayne Mullins suggested that, while there were “good” and “bad” volunteers, the average CUSOTAN member lacked sufficient “principles, empathy, resourcefulness, adaptability, enthusiasm, individuality etc.” Mullins felt that the Tanzanian situation demanded “that the CUSO person be particularly creative in order to minimize the damage which his mere presence causes.” Dennis September put matters more precisely. Observing ECSA teachers, he argued that: “the vast majority of CUSO personnel are not interested in ‘development’ per se, nor are they interested in the internal

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1 CUSO Tanzania, “Appreciation of the Situation,” [1968], 1, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 17, File 17-12.
functioning of CUSO as an organization, nor are they concerned with the struggle for liberation in minority controlled regimes. They are basically concerned with their immediate jobs as professional people and how to function best within the systems in which they find themselves.”

By contrast, field staff Barry Fleming, who likened his Cape Breton place of birth to “an underdeveloped country,” found such negative characterizations unfair. They might apply to a minority of volunteers, but many others were deeply affected by their Tanzanian experience. His successor, Richard Marquardt, commented that if many volunteers were young and naïve, they also thought that they were doing the “right thing” in going to Tanzania with CUSO.

That volunteers were concerned with the conditions of their work and lives was understandable, and it did not rule out active engagement with Tanzania. Certainly, volunteers faced a range of inconveniences. Some struggled to adapt to Tanzanian culture, language, and social norms. In 1971, likely responding to decency campaigns targeting women in Dar, field staff Jack Titsworth cautioned that items like bell-bottoms jeans and see-through blouses were inappropriate. Disease, including malaria, dysentery, and hepatitis, was a common occurrence. Shortages of material goods and high prices were an issue. Frustrations with bureaucracy also nagged. Cumulatively, everyday difficulties might “sap energy and can bring on depressions.”

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Volunteers often did recognize everyday class, race, and social inequalities. At times, they were self-aware and reflective on their position of privilege. But such occasional analysis did not stop many volunteers from defending a Tanzanian middle-class standard of living.

Indeed, financial and material security mattered to volunteers. From 1969, CUSOTAN provided pay supplements adjusted to the cost of living. While volunteers paid local taxes, they still saved, by one estimate, a sixth of their salaries and looked to repatriate the money to Canada – a policy that stood to strain Tanzania’s foreign currency reserves. Though their position amid eroding economic conditions was better maintained than many urban Tanzanians, shortages of goods and growing inflation worried volunteers. In 1971, Lawrence Cumming wryly noted that some newly-arrived volunteers were “suggesting/demanding” greater salaries and subsidies.7

On their arrival, some volunteers were inconvenienced by persistent housing shortages, particularly in Dar. While waiting for other foreign workers to depart, a few volunteers were put up in hotels. Once moved to permanent lodgings, volunteers in Dar discovered that class distinctions were racial ones, as they were housed with white non-Tanzanians and other elites along Oyster Bay. Dar’s tripartite racial segregation was clear to Richard and Donna Denham, and they led a “much more colonial” life than expected. In other signs of elevated social status, a few volunteers had their homes robbed and some volunteers and staff had house servants.8

Since housing was a perk of civil service employment, volunteers had disposable income. Some, wishing to cut their commutes, to travel, or to transport their children, looked to purchase

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cars and motorcycles. Both were in short supply given import restrictions, and Mercedes-Benz and Peugeot cars became key status symbols in the country. Notably, a CUSOTAN volunteer died in 1968 after crashing on a motorcycle and two others were in accidents in 1972.9

Social activities also spoke to socio-economic, and foreign, status. In 1967, volunteers in Dar regularly gathered at a hotel patio, attended parties at the Canadian High Commission, and socialized with a broad range of non-Tanzanian personnel. In 1971, Courtney and Elisabeth Bond took out a membership at the Kilimanjaro Hotel pool and found joining the Yacht Club in Dar to be inexpensive – even if Courtney described it as heavily British and somewhat cliquey, racist, and colonial. Their social world included fellow CUSO volunteers, CIDA personnel, and people from British, the United States, France, Australia, Holland, Bulgaria, and so on.10

Volunteers recognized racial, cultural, and social distinctions, and they were often self-aware of crossing those apparent lines. Walter Redekop observed that he and his wife, Christine, were “the only European types” in Arusha and they mixed with a variety of people. Gesturing toward his position of authority as an agrologist, Walter said that several of his field assistants provided an “in” to the “African” community. The Redekops also had social ties to other foreign experts and Walter wrote that “I must admit it is refreshing to exchange opinions with people of similar background to ourselves, on occasion.” Still, he concluded that “I feel that we, so far, have been able to maintain a reasonable balance of contact between the two communities.”11

Several volunteers believed, like some CYC members in Alberta, that cultural and social distance limited their possible contributions to development. Teachers Michael Prupas and Betty Palik never felt as if they integrated into the “majority society.” They remarked that “both what

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10 Denham, 33, 104-106; Bond, “His,” 6, 17.
we got out of Tanzania and what Tanzania got out of us were limited because we only operated within a certain stratum of the population – those with a secondary school education or in the process of getting one.” Richard Marquardt regretted that he did not became fluent in Kiswahili, having spent most of his leisure time with his wife or non-Tanzanians. He wrote: “In no way did I share a common situation with Tanzanians. I was there but not with them.” As an outsider, he did not think that he could participate in development “for development is a process of the people acting on their situation and transforming it to meet their needs.”

Beyond the anecdotal realm of everyday life, CUSOTAN field staff strove to deepen volunteer understanding of development and Tanzanian socialism by three means: participatory administration, development education, and the articulation of development principles. In the first instance, CUSO decentralized in 1971 and empowered field staff to make decisions in consultation with ECSA staff. But in 1972, volunteers dissatisfied with pay, housing, jobs, and training wanted greater say in administration. CUSOTAN Committee, a model borrowed from CUSO Thailand, resulted and comprised volunteer delegates, staff, and Tanzanian participants.

There remained questions about how much authority CUSOTAN Committee should have, whether volunteer members were only there to represent volunteer interests, and what role Tanzanians should play. Volunteer grievances often took up much time, while communication, travel, and turnover considerations constrained effectiveness. Richard Marquardt wrote: “At the risk of over-generalization, the CUSOTAN committee members appear to be hard-working, job-

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oriented people only peripherally interested in CUSO as such. There are, of course, significant exceptions.” The committee continued in the late 1970s and put out a newsletter, *Zungumza*.14

CUSOTAN also involved Tanzanians through employment. A series of Indo-Tanzania women did clerical work in Dar and a few immigrated to Canada. Kleist Sykes, who attended university in Canada, was added as a field staff person in 1975. He was a part of a prominent business family, had many useful connections in government, and later became mayor of Dar.15

“Development education,” more so than administrative matters, was a chief means of sensitizing volunteers to Tanzanian aims. Though understood as a way to improve the effectiveness of international development assistance, development education was more about social justice or cultural exchange than economics. Within CUSO, it emerged as a critique of whose wished to portray technical assistance as apolitical. In the wider frame, former volunteers contributed the burgeoning number of development education centres across Canada in the 1970s, seeking to improve public knowledge of Third World issues and the world at large.16

At a basic level, CUSO development education was an outgrowth of volunteer training. From 1966, sessions for East Africa recruits were put on by Loyola College’s Centre for African Studies. An orientation was held once volunteers arrived in Tanzania. Over time, development ideas and international power relations were a greater focus. At the 1969 Montreal event, a brawl ensued when Black Power speakers argued that CUSO volunteers were contributing to

neocolonialism by going to work abroad. Two years later, black American animators again opposed volunteers going to Africa. Meanwhile, some volunteers were disgruntled with all the talk of CUSO philosophy and simply wanted to get on with their jobs.17

CUSOTAN staff implicitly supported the effort to force volunteers to consider their motives and purpose. They warned that careful selection and training of volunteers would be required given Tanzania’s socialist policies. Information guides provided to volunteers, though largely blasé volumes akin to tourism guides, includes quotes from Nyerere on village, nation, and common cause. An edited volume of Tanzania readings was produced and CUSOTAN kept a library including works by the likes of René Dumont and Frantz Fanon.18

In 1972, a CUSO Development Education Department was set up to engage the Canadian public on Third World issues. Similar work continued among volunteers. Though while ECSA insisted that development education was an integral part of its efforts, a report in 1974 suggested that those activities remained weak both in Canada and in overseas programs.19 Malawi field staff Michael Murphy felt that CUSO, despite being populated by university graduates, was not an academically-inclined organization. He placed articles on current events and development in his monthly newsletter. He never heard any feedback. One month, he included excerpts of Hunter S. Thompson’s Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas and some volunteers immediately got in touch to request more of that and less of the development-minded stuff.20 The anecdote pointed

20 Michael Murphy was CUSO Field Staff in Malawi in 1972-1975 and ECSA Regional Director in 1975-1977. Interview with Michael Murphy, 3 September 2015.
to some of the ambiguity of development education. Did an uneven and varied intellectual exercise ensure a more critical outlook among CUSOTAN members? Did something pursued largely apart from the practical jobs of volunteers improve CUSO effectiveness or do anything to change its structural position? Did volunteers care?

CUSOTAN and ECSA were sites for refining CUSO development philosophy. Indeed, in April 1972, ECSA staff debated confronting volunteer expressions of self-interest (which had given rise to both CUSOTAN Committee and increased wage subsidies). Wayne Mullins and Jack Titsworth suggested that though many volunteers were unhappy due to the scarcity of goods in Tanzania, “most of the mature people in the program seem satisfied.” They felt that discontented volunteers needed to be challenged over their ongoing complaints. The discussion turned to whether CUSO needed some form of manifesto, code of ethics, or volunteer charter. ECSA staff agreed that a CUSO Development Charter “along the lines of the Arusha Declaration” should be drafted. Such a document would identify “the root causes of the inequitable development in the world” and outline the CUSO role in addressing the situation.21

Barry Fleming drew up a draft charter presented at an ECSA workshop in Dar in April 1973. He aimed to identify the core principles of a CUSO commitment to development and to solidarity with new nations. He sensed that no matter the contribution CUSO wished to make, the neo-colonial oppression inherent in international terms of trade as well as the dominance of multinational corporations was eroding potential gains. He wanted to foreground these larger political economy issues.22 Coined the Dar Declaration, Fleming’s charter argued that development was “the liberation of people, not just from the constraints of poverty, hunger and

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22 Interview with Barry Fleming, 12 August 2015.
disease, but also from constraints which inhibit a person’s control over his destiny, the pursuit of dignity and social equality.” For CUSO as an organization, the goal was “to participate in the global struggle for justice, equitable development and human progress.” Individuals were asked to raise their awareness of “the root causes of inequitable development in Canada and overseas,” to participate to the best of their abilities in culturally sensitive development action, and to identify “with oppressed peoples and further to recognize that his own country is culpable in the continuing exploitation of one people by another.”

The Dar Declaration defined development as freedom. Yet it did so vaguely and in such a way as to blur action for collective liberation and a defense of highly individualistic, and indeed liberal, liberation.

Though the title gestured toward the Arusha Declaration, the Dar Declaration echoed another key TANU statement, *Mwongozo*. The Portuguese invasion of Guinea and a military coup in Uganda suggested to Tanzanian leaders that the postcolonial state was threatened from without and within. Seizing the occasion, leftists sought to drive socialism forward with a January 1971 party statement. *Mwongozo* argued that revolution depended on the liberation of Africans from all forms of exploitation, colonialism, and imperialism. It declared that: “For a people who have been slaves or have been oppressed, exploited and humiliated by colonialism or capitalism, ‘development’ means ‘liberation.’” The party paper targeted minority rule, neo-colonialism, and elitist leadership alike. The latter point empowered Tanzanian workers who, in a wave of public sector strikes over several years, seized factories and opposed managers. However, Nyerere intervened in 1974, denounced strikes, and saw further ones repressed.

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The Dar Declaration fomented a significant restatement of CUSO principles as a whole. In late 1973, CUSO’s Board of Directors endorsed the statement. The most visceral reaction to this step came from the local committee in Sault Ste. Marie, which argued that it would not support CUSO if members engaged in politics and reasserted a liberal internationalist altruism. The committee exclaimed: “Surely CUSO’s basic humanitarian philosophy has been based on the concept that we can best help these people by helping to free them from disease, poverty, and ignorance. Free a man’s mind from ignorance and you free him from oppression – because once he recognizes that he is being oppressed and exploited he will take steps to free himself – but leave him self-determination.” More activist elements of CUSO won out over liberal internationalist humanitarians. The Dar Declaration served as the base text for the CUSO Development Charter and Operating Principles, endorsed at the annual meeting in fall 1974.

Within ECSA, more debate was generated over an attempt to inject further Tanzanian political ideas into organizational philosophy. Those present at an April 1974 meeting voted in favour of Lusaka Resolution No. 20. It defined CUSO’s foremost goal, in addition to taking an activist role on questions of development, freedom, justice, and equality, as: “To work with the victims of exploitation in support of their efforts to become more self-reliant and to transform the present inequitable system.” In response, CUSO Botswana volunteer T. Pidgeon felt that the focus should remain on filling short-term manpower needs. Pidgeon argued that those who

25 Minutes of the Twelfth Annual General Meeting of the Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) Held on November 30 - December 2, 1973 at Morisset Hall, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, 6, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 71, File 70-21.
wished to undertake political action should do so in Canada, believing it hypocritical “when members of CUSO resolve to undertake significant political and economic structural changes in any nation when they have absented themselves from their native country in which they can have the most impact in order that they may enjoy the travel/adventure/altruism offered by this upper middle class organization.” Five fellow volunteers warned that the Botswana government might reject CUSO due to its “overzealousness” in aligning itself with the victims of exploitation in southern Africa. By turn, G. Stewart noted (with sarcasm) that CUSO was “not even a drop in the development bucket,” clearly had an “inflated opinion of itself,” and was “presumptuous if not patronizing” in seeking “to set about righting wrongs in countries.” Stewart argued that rather than waste time seeking to work on behalf of oppressed peoples, CUSO people “should be spending doing effectively the job the government that requested their service wants them to do.”

These critics called attention to the contingency of working in foreign nations, to CUSO’s class character, and even to the organization’s hypocrisy.

Activists on CUSO’s left pushed back, calling attention to class and to Canadian complicity in the international system. Indeed, the debate over basic strategies and philosophy – the BS Debate, as it was christened – provided conditions for CUSOTAN and ECSA’s more pronounced left-ward turn from 1974. The shift was mirrored by politicization within SU CO, as the independentist and Catholic left joined Third World immigrants in denouncing Quebec and Canadian imperialism abroad. For ECSA, a key intervention came from William Luttrell, an American economist teaching in Dar. In a 1975 piece known as the Luttrell Papers, New Left

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class analysis displaced left liberal support for development. Luttrell argued that CUSO, via CIDA funding, was a human facade of Canadian capital in underdeveloped countries. And most CUSO people were drawn from the “capitalist, managerial, and conservative-liberal intellectual strata” and propagated “bourgeois or utopian ideas.” To free itself of its exploitative position, Luttrell argued that CUSO should reorganize as a cooperative, develop a base among Canadian workers and farmers, redouble development education, and focus on increasing labour skills and production in the Third World. An ECSA meeting endorsed his overall view in 1976.\(^{31}\)

CUSO’s executive director Murray Thomson weighed in on the basic strategies ferment to suggest that CUSO was an organization divided between, first, those who wanted greater identification with the poor, oppressed, and powerless as opposed to association with Third World elites and, second, those who wanted simply to post manpower abroad as had always been done. Come 1976, Thomson referred to these factions as “socialist roaders” and “pragmatist roaders,” respectively, yet suggested that they had middle ground. Historian Ruth Compton Brouwer has accepted Thomson’s suggestion that liberals and New Leftists within CUSO merely disagreed on the means to commonly desired ends.\(^{32}\) However, if the two sides agreed on the need for development, they fundamentally disagreed on capitalism and on what ‘development’ was and entailed. It was a substantive dispute. Thomson’s efforts to keep the peace aside, Chris Bryant observed that a considerable gap had emerged between CUSO’s Ottawa headquarters and ECSA on organization and development philosophy.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{33}\) Chris Bryant to Mike Murphy, Report on Trip to East, Central, and Southern Africa March 30 - May 1, 1976, 2, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 43, File 43-18.
But if most volunteers, as some staff recurrently noted, were not really interested in CUSO as an organization or development as a practice and theory, what gains could CUSOTAN make? After a trip through ECSA countries in mid-1974, CUSO’s Montreal coordinator Lance Evoy opined that varied or ignorant volunteer views on liberation movements, development, political economy, and Canadian participation in aid and trade was “a reflection of CUSO and the type of classical liberalism which can accommodate any ideology and which works against any direction. This makes it impossible to touch any basic issues and simply allows factions to pass the buck.” Of volunteers, Evoy wrote: “They have difficulty seeing what they could do to change inequities (including their own). This I feel partially stems from the frustrations they faced in their jobs, the cynicism which was evident, and their own inadequacies. These are dangerous feelings to be dragging back to Canada or staying with overseas.” Though he felt volunteers were mostly open to new ideas, he suggested that unless confronted, “the experience overseas doesn’t make them more sensitive and open to other cultures but rather reinforces false attitudes and values.” ECSA nonetheless stood out to Evoy for having “tried to articulate their stand which is a beginning which I’ve not seen in other parts of CUSO.”

In the course of their work, volunteers at times wrestled with issues of class, race, culture, political economy, and Tanzanian socialism. There was a mix of concern, ignorance, and ambivalence. Field staff sustained efforts to educate volunteers and to deepen individual and organizational commitment to development. Participatory administration, development education, and declarations of principles all animated CUSOTAN and ECSA, prompting increased debate in the early 1970s. Drawing on Tanzanian political philosophy and liberation movements in southern Africa, staff succeeded in establishing “the liberation of people” from all

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constraints on their autonomy, dignity, and social equality as CUSO’s development philosophy. Therefore, genuine commitment to self-reliance and self-determination led CUSOTAN and ECSA to occupy CUSO’s activist, left-wing. Still, the rollover of volunteers and differences in political opinion militated against clear commitment to a commonly shared CUSO direction. Development and volunteering, then, were potentially open to individual meaning.

Left-Leaning International Development Assistance
In the mid-1970s, CUSOTAN commitment to Tanzanian aims and to left interpretations of development were more pronounced. Drawing on a range of influences, field staff attempted to bridge development theory and concrete action. With a conviction that international development assistance could contribute to greater global equality, a CUSOTAN praxis for left-leaning international development assistance was elaborated.

Richard Marquardt was the leading actor. Seeking adventure, Marquardt quit a master’s program in history at University of Ottawa to join CUSO. He spent two years as a teacher in Morogoro. Back in Canada in 1970, he studied development at Carleton University and worked on a thesis applying Paulo Freire’s critical pedagogy to Tanzania and Canada. Marquardt wanted to return to Africa, but he worried about becoming too much of a “social science expert” and worked instead as an adult educator in Canada.35 In 1972, he explained his motivation:

One of the basic human needs I have is the need to act with people in transforming our world. I need to do this not only because we have such a long way to go in making this a decent place for human beings, but because I need to work together with other people… I need this sense of community for its own sake.

How to do this is still pretty much beyond me. But perhaps the beginning of an answer comes with the recognition that we are all already in a common situation. All my earlier talk of my situation and their situation… maybe it’s a red herring. This world is our situation.36

35 Marquardt, [Untitled], 8 May 1972, 179-180; Interview with Richard Marquardt, 8 December 2016.
36 Marquardt, [Untitled], 8 May 1972, 180.
Two years later, Marquardt became a CUSOTAN field staff person.

The redirection of the program was not prefigured, but rather worked out between 1974 and 1977. In Marquardt’s ideas and practices, the possibilities and limits of left development assistance in 1970s Tanzania were emergent. Marquardt was upfront about his doubts. He recognized that CUSOTAN’s work was small in size and effect. He also acknowledged that for all the practical, political, and theoretical attention paid to development, neither he nor volunteers genuinely knew what they were doing. But why participate? Marquardt and CUSOTAN’s brand of left-leaning development assistance relied on a commitment to the idea of helping people build conditions for a better life. Marquardt observed that “one is struck immediately and forcefully by the marginality (one is tempted to say, the utter insignificance) of our efforts. The development of Tanzania depends on Tanzanians.” Therefore, he concluded that CUSO provision of manpower and resources was “based as much on faith and hope as on reason.”

In January 1975, Marquardt wanted to further shape “the praxis of the liberation of man through the vehicle of a small, independent, government-funded, decentralized development agency.” He hoped that CUSO could outline a clear theory of social change to guide its activities and meets its aims. Sounding out his ideas with Colin Freebury, Marquardt recounted conflicting views on the meaningfulness of placing financial management personnel in Tanzania. Dave MacDonald felt that more postings like his with the National Development Corporation were needed. By contrast, former volunteers Van Hall and Bruce Garland dismissed the corporation, charged with stimulating industrial development, as nothing more than a useless bureaucracy spending more than half its budget on its own administration. Marquardt could not

decide if providing technical assistance to such an agency facilitated CUSO’s stated aims. He realized that he was “caught in the middle of two sets of opinions, with only a hazy opinion of my own.” Marquardt quickly added the punchline in parentheses: “(One of our major problems in facilitating the liberation of peoples is that we don’t know what the fuck we’re doing.)”

By 1975, a rising number of CUSO people argued that the organization had to become a development, rather than a placement, agency. What the shift meant was a bit ambiguous. But it appeared to signify going from passive fulfillment of technical assistance requests to allowing field staff prioritize what they felt worked best for development, according to their own analysis, experience, and political feeling. Marquardt backed such a transition. He thought that continued short-term manpower placements largely functioned to create a positive impression of Canada among Tanzanians. He argued that the practice had no overarching vision of development and that any development to occur was only by accident. By contrast, ECSA personnel defined a development agency as “an organization which has a coherent understanding of the causes of underdevelopment and which directly reflects this understanding in its activities, structure, and decision-making processes.” Marquardt believed that CUSO, with its Development Charter, had taken steps forward. Yet CUSOTAN needed a more activist program, one that sought out development opportunities. To a certain extent, strict deference to host government requests and earlier caution about the role of foreigners abroad had fallen away. Instead, there was a sense that CUSO itself could or should know what it was doing in development. Marquardt worked to shape such a program, drawing as he did on a range of intellectual resources.

As attention to “underdevelopment” began to suggest, dependency theory was important to left-leaning CUSO members trying to remake the organization. Dependency theory emerged among Latin American scholars who critiqued liberal modernization, protectionist, and orthodox Marxist models of development. Notwithstanding variation between theorists, dependentistas argued that development and underdevelopment were interconnected historical, social, and political processes taking place within global capitalist and geopolitical structures.\(^1\) Marquardt read Paul Baran (an American Marxist political economist who wrote on the underdevelopment) while an ECSA reading list also included works by André Gunder Frank (a German-American scholar who popularized dependency theory among English speakers) and Walter Rodney.\(^2\)

Dependency theory had currency across the Canadian political spectrum, though more among scholars than in places like Cape Breton and Lesser Slave Lake. Deployed by Marquardt, it was part of a neo-Marxist analysis of international power dynamics, capitalist social relations, and the political implications of development. Neo-Marxist social scientists, a generation fostered from the late 1960s by New Left mobilization, revived Marxist and radical analysis. During the 1970s and 1980s, their research focused on the capitalist state, class structure, the labour process, and international political economy. In the latter category, Third World socialisms influenced neo-Marxist views of global poverty, as Marquardt’s own ideas showed.\(^3\)

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In his initial plan in 1974, Marquardt suggested that Tanzania’s socialist project was in “serious jeopardy.” He felt that the state and parastatal sectors, those most able to use technical assistance, were encroaching on efforts to foster self-reliance. He wrote: “Let us stop supporting those actions and institutions serving to derail the Tanzanian revolution, especially the secondary school system.” Strikingly, Marquardt set out to realize Nyerere’s vision of development where the state was apparently failing by moving “critically, consciously, humanely, in the direction of facilitating the development of socialism and self-reliance in Tanzania.”

The broader strokes of Marquardt’s development model drew from Mao. In addition to providing railway and military aid, China had an intellectual, cultural, and material influence in Tanzania. Maoist ideas about self-reliance, mass politics, and rural development permeated Nyerere’s philosophy, and Mao’s views were carried by Tanzanian newspapers and radio. CUSOTAN volunteers noted that Mao’s Little Red Book circulated, and they encountered Chinese goods in shops as well as railway engineers. Marquardt quoted Mao in suggesting that if industrial development was key to growth, it had to build from the raw materials of agriculture. In turn, he felt that industry should respond to the needs of agriculture.

These sorts of domestic economic interconnections were important to Marquardt’s reading of self-reliance as the creation of “a self-sustaining economy which provides an increasing standard of living for all Tanzanians.” He argued that colonialism left the country with little internal economic cohesion and a dependence on foreign capital, markets, and skill.

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But he understood the Arusha Declaration as having been an effort to stop the outflow of surplus and to build an integrated economy through state-controlled industry.47

Marquardt further clarified his vision of self-reliant development in his analysis of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development document issued in 1974. Seeking to reshape the international terms of trade, NIEO was a defense of political and economic sovereignty by Third World countries. In 1976, Marquardt argued that capitalism was the root cause of underdevelopment in the Third World and that any international agreement was unlikely to rectify matters. Instead, he believed that severing ties to metropolitan countries and building internally integrated economies was the way forward. Such a rupture was not, however, Tanzanian policy. Marquardt believed that Tanzanian experience demonstrated that state capitalism marshalled by an elite reliant on international capitalism was not the way out of dependence. In fact, he believed that autarky could only take place once workers and peasants displaced Third World petit bourgeoisies.48

A CUSOTAN contingent felt “that the Tanzanian socialist revolution is, at best, not happening, or, at worst, nothing more than a mouth [sic] designed to mystify the Tanzania people.” Echoing the influential critique of domestic class relations made by Tanzanian neo-Marxist scholar Issa Shivji, it was suggested: “Tanzania is not developing. This is because initiative and creativity has been stifled by a ruling class which does not trust its own people, which rules in an authoritarian and oppressive manner, and which is not progressive or dynamic because of its bureaucratic nature.”49 Turning to class struggle, Marquardt insisted that

CUSOTAN should support peasants and workers. The proper role of a development agency was “to identify the social classes within the host countries that have the potential to challenge the hegemony of international capital and its local agents, and to support these classes in their efforts to develop their analytical, organizational, and productive skills.”

Drawing on government manpower policy, Marquardt accepted that the main constraint on development was a dearth of skill. But he added a class-aware critique. He argued that a lack of necessary skills among ordinary people “results in an inadequate level of production of goods and services, an underdeveloped indigenous technology, poor health, vulnerability to oppression by corrupt or negligent bureaucrats, managers, politicians, and businessmen, and little understanding of which local and national policies are likely to lead forward and out of this oppressive situation.” In this way, Marquardt settled on the idea of supporting activities which would increase self-reliance and raise the “productive skills” of the popular classes.

Even if CUSOTAN looked beyond the formal education system, its approach remained rooted in pedagogy. The educational principles, though, were now shaded by the ideas of Paulo Freire. In the mid- to late 1970s, the Brazilian educator’s work was influential within international development agencies – and his Pedagogy of the Oppressed was read by ECSA staff and the subject of volunteer discussion. Freire was a radical humanist influenced by Catholic liberation theology. In terms not unlike those articulated by community development activists (and, as we saw, Freire’s ideas inspired some social animators in Montreal), he advocated a process of learning to identify real world contradictions followed by work to change


50 Marquardt, Termination Report, 3.


immediately oppressive conditions. *Conscientização* was a participatory praxis of reflection and action for all, but also stressed the liberation and self-affirmation of the authentic individual.53

Marquardt assumed that action would need to take place on a small-scale. He insisted that CUSOTAN seek to “support local initiatives that represent more appropriate responses to given problems than existing solutions.”54 His emphasis on appropriate action related to the “small is beautiful” outlook popularized by economist Fritz Schumacher. Schumacher, a development consultant who spent time in Tanzania in 1968, became concerned by the social dislocation and ecological destruction caused by large-scale technologies. In a widely-read 1973 book, he advocated a kind of development driven by small-scale, intermediate technologies adapted to local people and conditions. Nyerere welcomed the emphasis as well as aid projects of the kind. In step, Marquardt saw a need for “indigenous technology” and Tanzanian agency.55 Self-reliant development, then, was construed as assisted self-help on a local scale.

Marquardt argued that, since development had to be attained by ordinary Tanzanians, foreign agency assistance was “marginal.” Nonetheless, in manner that appeared to minimize Tanzanian state leadership, CUSO had “a potentially valuable role” in “supporting the development of skills in the production of useful goods and services.” Even with such an emphasis, Marquardt conceded that CUSOTAN would remain in part a placement program, called upon by government “to fill manpower gaps as a matter of short-term expediency.”56

54 Marquardt, “CUSO Tanzania: Some Thoughts on Strategy and Tactics,” 2.
56 Marquardt, CUSO Tanzania, Country Plan and Budget 1976-77, 3-4.
To the developmental framework he erected, Marquardt appended a range of goals: more technical training, increased agricultural production, improved rural health services, responsive community development, and enhanced cooperative output. In practice, CUSOTAN development assistance was especially directed toward small towns and rural areas. And, in support of rural development, CUSOTAN partly turned – problematically, the next section will show – to the *ujamaa* villages Nyerere idealized.

Marquardt and other CUSOTAN personnel were nonetheless committed to thinking critically and not simply accept prevailing dynamics. Marquardt would remark that Tanzania was “a confusing, amazing, frustrating, inspiring environment for CUSOTAN workers.” In his engagement with complex and shifting conditions, Marquardt forged a left-leaning international development praxis between 1974 and 1977. In its bold strokes, it consisted of pursuing a CUSO mandate of “the liberation of peoples” and seeking to realize the ideals of Tanzanian socialism where the state had apparently failed. Drawing from dependency theory, it privileged breaking with international capitalism and building an integrated national economy. It envisioned Maoist-inflected rural development proceeding from *ujamaa* villages. And, with a critical wariness of government bureaucratic elites, it hoped to achieve self-reliance by advancing the interests of workers and peasants, teaching productive skill, and encouraging local, small-scale creative initiative. Such was CUSOTAN’s working development philosophy from the mid-1970s.

**Rural Development, Projects, and the Limits of CUSOTAN Praxis**

Turning development ideas into practice – insofar as what could be carried out abroad – meant doing what seemed possible in the context of mid-1970s Tanzania. CUSOTAN increasingly focused on rural development, which signified agricultural advancement as well as

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57 Marquardt, CUSO Tanzania, Country Plan and Budget 1976-77, 5-10.
improvements in rural services and industry. It did so by placing more technically skilled volunteers and by making selective capital contributions to projects directed at, but not generally instigated by, ordinary Tanzanians. These activities drew on efforts already underway in Tanzania and were pursued in collaboration with government agencies, cooperative organizations, and both domestic and international NGOs.

CUSOTAN people were critical of the Tanzanian government and the actually existing socialist project. Increasingly, staff took program ideas, placements, and material contributions into their own hands. Yet it was largely in Tanzanian developmental thought that CUSOTAN personnel continued to situate their aims. As a result, the break with the Tanzanian government was partial at most and illusory in the main. CUSOTAN resources were selectively committed to support government institutions and non-government organizations that backed small-scale production and community development among common people. Wedded to the concept of development, working with a broad range of partners, reliant on funds from the Canadian state, and immersed in development trends, CUSOTAN remained plainly within the shifting consensus of the international development assistance mainstream. CUSOTAN began to do things differently in the mid-1970s, but, in the larger scheme of global and Tanzanian development activities, it did not really stand out. All told, a praxis for left-leaning international development assistance was of limited utility in securing greater global equality and an end to poverty.

The early 1960s Tanzanian development strategy resembled that of most post-colonial nations: export cash crops to generate foreign currency reserves that might allow the importation of technology needed for industrial development. To those ends, the World Bank promoted villagization for Tanzania from 1961. As Nicole Sackley has argued, the universalized “village” was a category of Cold War development thought and made “peasants” the objects of reform.
The World Bank’s vision was tied to modernization theory. In new, expert-overseen villages, it was assumed (much like the rationale behind resettlement in Newfoundland), relocated rural Tanzanians could improve their productivity and access centralized infrastructure and services. The initial scheme had little impact on agricultural output. Yet Julius Nyerere – influenced by René Dumont, a French agronomist who argued that development must begin with agriculture – took up and modified the resettlement project by combining villagization and ujamaa.

The Arusha Declaration’s hopes for agricultural development were clarified in a further Nyerere paper, “Socialism and Rural Development.” Concerned with social stratification and rural-to-urban migration, Nyerere argued that national goals would only reached if Tanzanian life and work were rooted in rural economic and social communities. Specifically, he wanted ujamaa farms and villages – presumed sites of mutualism, cooperation, common property ownership, hard work, and self-reliance – to serve as the basis of social organization. In place of sometimes dispersed individual peasant farms, new ujamaa villages would enable increased agricultural output, joint enterprises, local government, and state provision of rural services.

Voluntary resettlement began at a slow pace in 1968. But from November 1973, it was carried out, if unevenly and often without much central direction, through coercion exerted by TANU Youth League. Far from socialism, a more intrusive state capitalism took shape in rural areas. Yet the state assumed a larger role in the economy without being able to raise output. Rural people often resisted cash crop initiatives, co-operative production, and aid-reliant state marketing monopolies which paid below market rates for produce. Politically alienated and


economically vulnerable, many cultivators retreated into subsistence. Passive resistance, disruptions caused by resettlement, and drought combined to produce a food crisis in 1974. The Tanzanian government drained its foreign currency reserves to import food for urban residents.\textsuperscript{61}

Villagization, which saw six million people relocated by 1976, conflated spatial form with social organization and was pursued without mass support. Several scholars have described it as a failed state project designed to improve the legibility of rural society and capture the peasantry. In this respect, villagization was consistent with colonial policy. For Issa Shivji, forced villagization signaled the end of socialist militancy and the onset of demagoguery.\textsuperscript{62}

From 1973, CUSOTAN increased its support for rural development and small industries, assisting activities in towns and \textit{ujamaa} villages in the process. Marquardt could see the effects of forced villagization when he travelled through the countryside. In 1976, he argued that the project contradicted government’s stated progressive aims and only marginally increased living standards.\textsuperscript{63} But, in figuring out how to proceed, practical considerations mattered. Most rural people had been pushed into \textit{ujamaa} villages. If CUSOTAN wanted to help rural people improve their conditions, to villages it would turn.

Yet to do so was problematic. Development scholar Michael Jennings has argued that coerced villagization was abetted by the financial resources and organizational support provided


\textsuperscript{63} Interview with Richard Marquardt, 8 December 2016; Minutes of CUSO ECSA Regional Meeting, 5-12 April 1976, 31.
by international development agencies attracted to Nyerere’s philosophy.\textsuperscript{64} Did acting on rural people and providing resources to boost local productivity strengthen state capitalism and Tanzania’s top-down rural development project? Or did it empower village residents? Certainly, even with a recognition of government compulsion, CUSOTAN plans accepted the official suggestion that development must come from Tanzanian villages. Much of the critique of villagization centered on a sense that too much was being done for, not by, villagers. Out-of-touch bureaucrats stifled the self-reliance of rural people, the thinking went, rendering them “apathetic or resistant.”\textsuperscript{65} Against a reading of existing practice, CUSOTAN personnel longed for \textit{ujamaa} to live up to its rhetorical ideal. Yet, in taking up rural development, CUSOTAN’s program, too, acted on rural people in ways only vaguely attached to participatory democracy.

Both volunteers and funds were directed towards rural development. Though secondary school teachers were by far the largest occupational group, CUSOTAN had from the start placed volunteers in a variety of fields. From 1969, at the behest of the Tanzanian government, staff tried to recruit more technically proficient volunteers. The shift mirrored that within CUSO more broadly, as the youth and lack of skill of many recruits appeared to some as one of the organization’s limitations. CUSO made “Development is Our Business” its slogan in an effort to attract more qualified and experienced personnel.\textsuperscript{66} Largely, skilled CUSOTAN volunteers were Canadian male professionals acting in functional, middle-management, research, or training positions of some responsibility, even if they were recent graduates. The at least twenty-one women who worked as scientists, librarians, and technicians were exceptions, as were nine

\textsuperscript{65} CUSO Tanzania, \textit{Country Plan and Budget 1977-78}, 9.
nurses. Marquardt felt that some government departments and agencies had a firmer grasp of their needs and could make better use of volunteer. Therefore, he sought to selectively respond to manpower requests.\(^6^7\) Notably, some volunteers worked at state and non-government training institutions set up in response to government’s accent on technical education.\(^6^8\)

CUSOTAN discovered that recruiting experienced and proficient Canadians in financial, agricultural, and trades fields – no doubt better paid and more secure in their careers than new B.A. graduates – was very difficult. Throughout the 1970s, field staff commented on the recurrent inability to fill many requests. Such was the case across CUSO. Lower volunteer numbers undercut the per capital funds paid to CUSO by CIDA.\(^6^9\) When combined with staff reluctance to place a large number of teachers in unhappy situations, the CUSOTAN volunteer contingent began to shrink in the early 1970s. By 1975, Barry Fleming argued that ECSA volunteers were also older in age and more professionally skilled than five years prior.\(^7^0\)

In mid-1970s, with far fewer volunteers in Tanzania, CUSOTAN field staff Richard Marquardt and Kleist Sykes spent much of their time on projects. Indeed, this was where Marquardt’s interests largely lay.\(^7^1\) Projects – that is, capital expenditure on development initiatives beyond the habitual labour contributions of CUSO volunteers – started on a small-scale. Beginning in 1971, field staff doled out funds on supplies or travel, largely connected to

\(\text{\textsuperscript{67}}\) Among technically-oriented volunteers were foresters, game wardens, economists, commercial teachers, mechanics, traders, managers, engineers, university lecturers, computer programmers, geologists, biologists, town planners, draughtsmen, journalists, biochemists, entomologists, agronomists, agrologists, ranchers, husbandry specialists, blacksmiths, research scientists, accountants, auditors, and doctors. Interview with Richard Marquardt, 8 December 2016.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{68}}\) CUSO Tanzania, Country Plan and Budget 1979-80, October 1978, 10-13, 16, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 14, File 14-17.


\(\text{\textsuperscript{71}}\) Marquardt, Termination Report, 11; Interview with Richard Marquardt, 8 December 2016.

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the work volunteers were doing. The discretionary money came from budget surpluses, the Canadian High Commission, or donations. Larger undertakings soon had an administrative framework. CUSO and CIDA agreed to set up a project fund and CUSO established a Projects Division in April 1972 to administer it. Major projects, those exceeding $CA1,000, were envisioned as partnerships between CUSO and local people. CUSO favoured spending on cooperatives, credit and loan schemes, and small-scale and agricultural processing technology. In its turn toward capital contributions to community development-style activity, CUSO came to more closely resemble official development agencies like CIDA as well as other Canadian international development NGOs. Only in its continued placement of volunteers did CUSO distinguish itself from fundraising- and donation-centric groups such as Oxfam Canada, Canadian Hunger Foundation, and Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace.

CUSOTAN field staff sought out projects that often stood apart from the placement of volunteers. They scouted proposed initiatives and selected ones according to their priorities and contacts. In 1974, ECSA argued that the aim was to transfer Canadian money to “people-centered” projects that might further self-reliance and liberation. However, projects were largely mediated by state and NGO actors. CUSOTAN staff noted that, almost universally, it was not “host nationals” who initiated them. Most visibly, projects were chosen to fit the goal of contributing to productive skill. Yet, concurrently, CUSOTAN’s project funding coalesced in an internationally-funded consensus on what (particularly, rural) self-reliant development in Tanzania required. And despite critiques of government and class relations, CUSOTAN funded

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initiatives that helped along state policy by encouraging production of needed goods and militating against rural problems and lack of services.

The connections of projects to ujamaa villages and to urban cooperatives were replete. Discretionary spending went toward the purchase of tools or equipment, the construction of facilities, and the acquisition of livestock. For example, in 1974, CUSOTAN funded the purchase of 100 chickens at the Ngorogo Ujamaa Village. Suggested by a Tanzanian official, the farm sold eggs and chickens. If intended to involve local youth, most young people migrated to Dar and the coops were minded by a middle-aged man. Still, Marquardt affirmed the principle of getting rural youth “working productively to produce food for themselves and the nation.”

Collectively, major projects sought to boost productivity, improve technical education, and contribute to rural health services. Commonly, capital contributions were made so that institutions, cooperatives, and ujamaa villages might purchase needed equipment and, in turn, peasants and workers might learn a trade. This was ‘small is beautiful,’ community development practice. A Dar cooperative – run by a non-Tanzanian and designed to train youth – was given funds to purchase power tools for making jewelry. Kilimanjaro Youth Technical Training Centre was granted money to buy tools and provide scholarships. Investment in the Ndiva Ujaama Village maize mill was made with an eye on expansion. The list of these sorts of projects goes well on. By 1976, CUSOTAN – critiquing rural patriarchy – also funded activities that might benefit women. A daycare run by the Marangu Branch of the National Union of Women of Tanzania and a women’s tailoring cooperative in Iringa were assisted. In the rural

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75 Evoy, 3; Marquardt, CUSO Tanzania Country Plan and Situation Report 1975/76, 18-19.
76 CUSO Tanzania, Country Plan and Budget 1977-78, 10-11; Richard Marquardt to Enid Hinchley, Discretionary Project Reports, 19 October 1976, 2-3, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 146, File 146-16. On efforts from the 1970s to
health field, state service provision was directly sponsored. Medical reference textbooks were bought for rural dispensaries, while child and maternal health programs were funded. Plus, five CUSOTAN doctors were posted at medical assistant training centres (such as one next to a Swiss mission hospital in Ifakara), where students were prepared for work at district dispensaries.\textsuperscript{77}

CUSOTAN also provided a grant for “Tanzania Year 16,” a 1973 film project run by the Canadian Hunger Foundation in association with TANU. The initiative was praised by the likes of René Dumont and Gunnar Myrdal (the Swedish social scientist) and received funding from international organizations (including CIDA) enthusiastic about \textit{ujamaa}. Canadian Gerald Belkin used a participatory film style pioneered by the National Film Board in Fogo, Newfoundland, and which paralleled the activist filmmaking seen in earlier chapters on Lesser Slave Lake and Montreal. Belkin involved residents in an exploration of development, village democracy, and cooperative production. Some participants voiced criticisms of government.\textsuperscript{78}

As the above activities suggest, CUSOTAN project funding flowed through collaboration with government agencies, cooperatives, and both domestic and international NGOs. Other monies went to sugar and publishing parastatals, agricultural training centres, church initiatives, and Community Development Trust Fund (CDTF) projects.\textsuperscript{79} Notably, volunteer Carol Sissons was posted as a coordinator on a Christian Council of Tanzania rural development project.\textsuperscript{80}


\textsuperscript{79} CDTF also accepted funds from Save the Children, Canada Hunger Foundation, United Church of Canada, Oxfam, Quaker Rural Development Fund, and others. Jennings, \textit{Surrogates}, 95.

Marquardt’s most favoured institutional partner was Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO). TANU and government established SIDO with the notion of making the fullest use of material and human resources and applying “appropriate technology” to small-scale production. It aimed to develop skills and employment, produce goods needed in Tanzania through import substitution, and promote cooperative ownership of industry. Rhetorically, worker-centric production of the kind was as an alternative to dependency on large-scale industries and foreign “whims and exploitation.” Marquardt supported SIDO because he viewed it as fostering cooperatives that “genuinely enrich their communities.” Ironically, CUSOTAN used foreign capital, equipment, resources, and personnel to support SIDO’s designs. SIDO strongly paralleled the concurrent aims and practices of DEVCO in rural Cape Breton, as well as recalling CYC-assisted projects such as the forestry cooperative in Faust, Alberta.

SIDO was a decentralized organization and CUSO participation depended on contact with regional planning officials. One such contact was volunteer James Tomecko, a regional economist for SIDO in Arusha who passed along proposed projects. Over time, SIDO came to know CUSOTAN as a willing donor. The result was piecemeal contributions to small initiatives. For example, in 1975, CUSO tried to recruit a boat builder for SIDO and CDTF-sponsored cooperative intending to produce motors for existing fishing vessels. It was assumed that if fishermen were able to travel further offshore, their catches would improve. Marquardt found the project as “exciting.” Other spending included the purchase of a kiln for a brick

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81 CUSO Tanzania, Country Plan and Budget 1979-80, 7-9; Marquardt, “The Next CUSOTAN Plan,” 4-5; Interview with Richard Marquardt, 8 December 2016.
82 James Tomecko was a regional economist with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning in Shinyanga in 1971-1972 and a regional economist with SIDO in Arusha in 1974-1976. Marquardt, CUSO Tanzania, Country Plan and Budget 1976-77, 17; CUSO Tanzania, Country Plan and Budget 1979-80, 8; Interview with Richard Marquardt, 8 December 2016.
making cooperative in Imara, of garment-making machinery for an Iringa cooperative, and of equipment for a metal workshop in Ufundi. By 1979, CUSOTAN had devoted more than $CA300,000 and eight volunteers to SIDO projects. Yet cooperative schemes had by then become less of a priority for SIDO, which dealt more with large projects and small businesses.84

With SIDO, some of CUSOTAN’s contradictions were evident. SIDO hit many of the themes Marquardt favoured: appropriate technology, cooperative production and ownership, small-scale activity, the imparting of productive skill, activities focused on workers and peasants, and apparent self-reliance. His development thinking thus drew on efforts underway in Tanzania. Yet SIDO was also a parastatal agency, part of the state and state-related sector he criticized most vocally. Support for SIDO represented selective acquiescence to state-led development that inconclusively involved acting on and enabling the masses.

As in the colonial period, community development and coercion were state-sponsored companions rather than clear-cut alternatives in 1970s Tanzania. Both cooperatives and forced villagization sought to stimulate increased market-oriented production on the part of ordinary Tanzanians. Unlike colonial and postcolonial designs for increased cash crop production for export, though, Marquardt’s support of ujamaa villages and small-scale industry was driven by the idea of creating an integrated national economy. More, he hoped to curtail the flow of economic surplus to elites and to genuinely assist workers and peasants by supporting cooperatives. Through collective ownership, he implied that capital and skilled production might directly benefit small groups of people on a local scale. Yet cooperatives were contradictory institutions, historian Tina Loo has argued. In teaching people about self-government and the

workings of the market, they were at once about capital accumulation and redistribution, about the processes of democracy and how to subvert established relations of power.\textsuperscript{85}

The foregoing issues point toward four prominent contradictions in CUSOTAN’s attempts to selectively support projects and to advance the interests of social classes Marquardt understood as progressive. The first was CUSOTAN’s relationship to ordinary Tanzanians. Was CUSOTAN empowering poor people or was it participating in attempts to reform them? Certainly, CUSOTAN had no popular base. It was removed from the operation of cooperatives and merely acted as a capital contributor. Plus, where CUSOTAN supported institutions other than cooperatives, worker and peasant agency was even less a motor. Most certainly, what cooperatives could not do was confront larger structural conditions and inequalities. Therefore, as a critique of Tanzania or global power relations, cooperatives were a tenuous proposition.

Second, CUSOTAN selective support for the Tanzanian state did not go unnoticed. A rebuttal was received through unofficial channels in 1978. Carleton University president Michael Oliver returned from a trip to Dar and wrote to CUSO’s Executive Director to express concern over what Tanzanian university and government officials had told him. According to Oliver, officials were puzzled about, and even hostile to, CUSOTAN’s insistence on deciding what assistance was appropriate for Tanzania. Oliver wrote: “I was told that it seemed fantastic that CUSO had decided to outflank President Nyerere on the left.” Oliver expressed disappointment that CUSO’s record was being put in question “by what is regarded by Tanzanians themselves as an incredibly arrogant piece of left-wing colonialism.”\textsuperscript{86}


\textsuperscript{86} Michael Oliver, President, Carleton University, to Robin Wilson, Executive Director, CUSO, 24 April 1978, 1, LAC, MG28 I 323, Volume 14, File 14-18.
Third, CUSOTAN also had an ambivalent relationship to the Canadian state. From 1965, CUSO depended on heavily on Canadian government subsidy. In 1973, 90% of CUSO’s budget came from CIDA.\textsuperscript{87} Indeed, CUSO budget crises in 1972-1973 and 1978-1979 were the direct result of lower-than-expected CIDA contributions. At decade’s end, CIDA used a quarter of its NGO-related budget to cover the full Canadian share of CUSO volunteer costs and three-quarters of the cost of CUSO projects.\textsuperscript{88} In these terms, project spending only heightened CUSO dependence on the Canadian government. In a very real sense, despite the autonomy it retained, CUSOTAN was effectively an on-the-ground sub-contractor of CIDA.

Marquardt paid particular attention to CUSO’s dependency on the Canadian state. Citing New Left political economists Wallace Clement and Cy Gonick, he argued that the Canadian state served the interests of capital and CIDA therefore worked on behalf of Canadian capital abroad. Marquardt believed that CIDA perpetuated underdevelopment by supporting projects of the Third World ruling classes and, in cooperation with international aid agencies, created a charitable facade for the exploitative relationship between the Third World and international capital. He insisted that CIDA’s support of CUSO had to be understood in this light. When he left his role in May 1977, Marquardt felt uncertain about CUSO’s direction, yet satisfied with the irony of his position. He wrote: “I cannot think of any other work I would have preferred to that of field staff officer for CUSO Tanzania during these past three years. In what other position could one denounce Canadian capital and still have so much of it to dispose of?”\textsuperscript{89}


\textsuperscript{88} The Treasury Board, Canadian International Development Agency File 325-70/C2-10, 2, LAC, MG28 1 323, Volume 109, 109-15.

\textsuperscript{89} Marquardt, Termination Report, 6-8, 14.
The fourth contradiction was CUSOTAN’s place within the international development assistance consensus. Even as Marquardt and his successors pursued a left-leaning understanding of development, it was very difficult to see where CUSOTAN’s provision of personnel and project funds genuinely distinguished the program from those of other aid agencies and international NGOs operating in Tanzania.

Multilateral and bilateral development assistance organizations supported rural development. In 1973, the World Bank called for efforts to increase the productivity of the rural poor and to improve rural infrastructure and services. It subsequently pursued so-called “redistribution with growth” and “basic human needs” approaches to poverty in Tanzania, as elsewhere. Likewise, from 1974, USAID focused its spending in Tanzania on the rural majority. By 1977, a broad consensus on the necessity of integrated rural development planning had taken shape. Twenty regions of Tanzania were split between aid agencies from countries including Britain, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Finnish planners, for example, eyed increasing the productive activities of peasants and providing improved infrastructure. CIDA participated in the effort and was responsible for an area covering Dar and the nearby coast.90

On the ground, a vast array of international development NGOs sympathetic to official rhetoric devoted funds to ujamaa-centric rural development in 1970s Tanzania. As CUSOTAN activity demonstrated, NGOs pursued international development projects in partnership with development agencies, local organizations, and state organs. CUSOTAN contributions were hardly dissimilar from what other organizations concurrently condoned. For instance, Oxfam

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sought to embolden *ujamaa* village viability and funded a range of beekeeping, fishing, poultry, livestock, and health clinic projects.\(^{91}\) Therefore, CUSOTAN supported institutions and projects within an international development assistance consensus so well established that it made insistence on selectivity seem a generally inconsequential sentiment.

To sum up, from the mid-1970s, CUSOTAN changed shape. Fewer, and more technically skilled, volunteers populated the program’s ranks. Capital spending on projects became an increasingly important part of activity. And, driven by Richard Marquardt, a left-leaning international development praxis animated its dealings.

CUSO members did what they thought was possible in the context of 1970s Tanzania. The limits of CUSOTAN practice militated against the prospect of contributing to an egalitarian Tanzanian, and global, society. In affirming rural development and small industries – as well those Tanzania government and NGOs programs that appeared to support them – CUSOTAN came to occupy a vulnerable position. If on one hand critical of the Tanzanian government and its socialist project, CUSOTAN supported initiatives devoted to peasant and worker production and technical skill – which were official aims of national development policy. CUSOTAN selectively supported state institutions and, in the process, contributed to efforts to spur cooperative production in urban places and new *ujamaa* villages. Equally, despite Marquardt’s New Left political outlook and efforts to navigate apparent contradictions, CUSOTAN development activities largely confirmed a reliance on the Canadian state and capital and were in agreement with a mid- to late 1970s international development assistance consensus. Support for community development and cooperatives represented an affinity for self-directed social and economic change. But those were tenuous means of securing redistribution in Tanzania or more

broadly. In the wider picture, CUSOTAN seemingly aligned itself with encouraging production under state capitalism while ostensibly supporting remedial efforts to counter the erosion of the standard of living of rural and small town people amidst worsening global inequality, government austerity, and state coercion.

**Tanzania, Neoliberalism, and CUSOTAN in Retrospect**

In the 1960s and early 1970s, CUSOTAN figured within a transnational development impulse shaped by Cold War tensions and attention to global poverty. CUSOTAN personnel believed that they might contribute to a state-led African socialist development project as short-term members of the Tanzanian civil service. Nearly half of volunteers worked as secondary school teachers and operated at an ambivalent intersection of education, development, social stratification, race, language, and political philosophy. Conceptually, participating in education meant teaching a generation of Tanzanians who might end the need for foreign personnel.

For CUSOTAN staff, a deepening engagement with Tanzanian political philosophy shaped program aims and principles. Inspired by anti-colonialism and opposition to minority rule, field staff argued that national liberation was a necessary condition for development. As a result, careful political and material support was provided to southern African liberation movements and measured anti-imperialism activism was undertaken in Canada. Equally, some CUSOTAN members immersed in Tanzanian socialist thought wanted to turn CUSO into a more effective development agency. Over the objections of some within CUSO, they associated development with liberation, an allusion to decolonization. Development was recast as freedom from all constraints on self-determination, human dignity, and social equality – poverty, in particular. This conception of development offered idealism, but also much ambiguity.

From 1974, CUSOTAN analysis of global and Tanzanian inequality took the form of New Left critique. Taking aim at the gap between aims and realities in Tanzania, field staff
Richard Marquardt elaborated a left-leaning praxis of international development assistance that paradoxically found most of its inspiration in Tanzanian developmental rhetoric as well as underway rural development and small industry schemes. Put in practice, a reworked CUSOTAN program sought to selectively promote cooperative production through community development-type interventions. In so doing, CUSOTAN remained largely consistent with the Tanzanian government’s general desire to mobilize increased productivity under state capitalism. Moreover, nothing in CUSOTAN’s approach did much more than participate in refocusing international development assistance on basic needs, the involvement of the poor, and a growing skepticism of state action. Therefore, when the Tanzanian state largely withdrew from the domain of rural and social welfare in the 1980s, NGOs like CUSO were already well positioned to ease the social consequences of economic crisis and, then, structural adjustment. Indeed, in the early 1980s, CUSOTAN positioned volunteers and project funds even more directly to support village-based development efforts.92

For all Tanzania’s ongoing economic difficulties, wide scale crisis began in 1979 with a costly war with Uganda and the second global oil crisis. The early 1980s saw economic and political instability, with commodities and foreign exchange scarce, corruption endemic, a thriving black market, and a near successful military coup. The legitimacy of the state was challenged, all while Tanzania faced an enforced debt crisis and an international neoliberal consensus. Nyerere resigned in 1985 and International Monetary Fund-scripted structural adjustment was agreed to the following year. Once economic liberalization began, a “wild capitalism” emerged and was marked by rent-seeking, land and resource appropriation, a large informal sector, and a reduced state. The mix of domestic constraints and imported goods saw

92 “Where Elephants Fight, it is the Grass that Suffers…” CUSO Forum, Winter 1983, 3-6.
the collapse of much of the craft-based manufacturing sector CUSOTAN had supported. The Tanzania government pursued a neoliberal populism, yet it actively invited foreign investment and the state became an uninhibited means of acquiring personal wealth.\(^3\) Beginning in the early 1990s, Canadian-based mining corporations – supported by Canadian government subsidies, tax-breaks, and diplomatic lobbying – partnered with the state to enclose mineral fields, expel small-scale miners, and extract for export.\(^4\) After foreign donors prompted a shift to multi-party democracy between 1990 and 1995, state-owned industries were privatized. By the 2000s, unrestrained neoliberal discourse had become politically respectable in Tanzania.\(^5\)

The demise of the Third World project, compelled as cuts to government social spending, and a resulting reversal of postcolonial improvements in standard of living provided the conditions for an explosion in the number of international and domestic development NGOs.\(^6\) In Tanzania, international NGOs like CUSO took an even larger role in funding rural social services and education amidst deepening economic crisis. And, as international donors bypassed the state and increasingly worked with domestic groups, local NGOs themselves often privatized municipal government functions and became sites for the middle class to draw salaries or receive

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capital with which to pursue accumulation. In participating in, and becoming part of, postcolonial social formations, development NGOs contributed to the depoliticization of poverty. Scholars Firoze Manji and Carl O’Coill argue that in seeking to alleviate poverty on a piecemeal development basis, NGOs undermined the collective struggle of African people to emancipate themselves from economic, social, and political oppression.

Among CUSOTAN personnel in the 1960s and 1970s, there were those who wanted to keep freedom from oppression in the frame. In both liberal and New Left variants, a democratic ethos aligned with “the liberation of people” from limitations on their autonomy, human dignity, and social equality figured into CUSOTAN’s participation in development activities. In those terms, development was not just an anti-poverty endeavour, but also a reference to postcolonial freedom and the remaining struggle for global social justice and equality. Yet no matter CUSOTAN’s critical appraisal of Tanzanian dynamics and global capitalism, the provision of international development assistance was essentially the sum of CUSO’s involvement in Tanzania. In its shifting content and justification, international development was always a poor substitute for politics and an unsubstantial – indeed, counterproductive – tool for securing desired aims.

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Conclusion

Development programs were at the centre of Canadian efforts to confront poverty and to democratize society both in Canada and abroad during the 1960s and 1970s. Liberals, in conversation with the New Left, sought to ‘help people help themselves.’ They advocated and pursued development initiatives which they hoped would empower people to reduce their own poverty and ensure that democracy became a more meaningful principle in everyday life.

The lay reader will ask – and several have asked – a question that cuts to the chase: did it work?\(^1\) Upon reflection, the question has three answers. Instinctively, the first is: that’s not the point!

The historical significance of poverty, development, and democracy – and their connectedness – are emphasized in analysis across three scales within a single transnational frame.

Between the late 1950s and mid-1970s, a global politics of poverty took shape. It turned on how to alleviate global poverty – and to what ends. The politics, enabled by the new legibility of inequality, became crucial in the context of decolonization and the Cold War. Poverty, many agreed, incubated revolutionary potential and the poor were therefore actors in the struggle for or against the extension of capitalism. At a general level, there was a remarkable degree of consensus that the alleviation of poverty required ‘development.’ That said, there were differences of opinion on how development should be understood and achieved. As this dissertation has revealed, development prerogatives and debates were taken up on a number of different scales. The global politics of poverty did not simply animate the international sphere. It permeated national, regional, and local politics as well.

In Canada, the global politics of poverty found expression especially from 1964. Socialist alternatives, decolonization, and the mobilization of popular movements built pressure for

\(^1\) Thanks especially to Patricia Lalor, Eoin Lalor, Evelyn McCallen, and Susan Scott.
greater democracy and an end to poverty. Policymakers, led by Tom Kent, created the welfare state in Canada and sought to demonstrate that capitalism could be a viable way to collective well-being. Liberal hopes were for an integrated liberal democratic capitalism involving all those hitherto excluded from affluence. New policies sought to develop, allocate, and distribute land, labour, capital, and resources. First, inclusive ambitions prompted an unprecedented series of social legislation which constituted the creation of a welfare state in Canada. Second, the state intervened to a considerably greater degree labour and capital markets.

More than any other form of welfare program, development promised to cohesively realize the goals of poverty reduction, economic expansion, and an ‘equality of opportunity’ for people no matter where they lived. To develop was to intervene in the processes shaping existing social relations and to seek to amend them. Development programs constituted the most concerted Canadian attempts to address poverty at home and abroad.

The new Canadian welfare state funded development on different scales and in varying ways. The previous chapters analyzed in detail three organizations with unique doctrines of development. The on-the-ground community development and animation sociale work of Company of Young Canadians (CYC) in Lesser Slave Lake, Alberta and St-Henri, Montreal was the least state-driven. CYC was a state agency, yet it was also a constrained framework for activists – who went as far as to advocate revolution – to foster localized anti-poverty organization and to pursue democratic social change from the grassroots. The regional development measures of Cape Breton Development Corporation (DEVCO) were the most state-marshalled. DEVCO was a crown corporation determined, in quasi-corporatist fashion, to reform an island’s socio-economic conditions by making job-creation and entrepreneurial action proxies for democratic political participation. The international development interventions of
Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO) in Tanzania fell somewhere in between. A non-governmental organization with a certain autonomy, CUSO was financed by Canadian and Third World states and largely involved Canadians in postcolonial development initiatives directed by state bureaucracy.

Development encompassed distinct foci in different contexts. The foregrounded issue shifted with each successive chapter, from community self-help on to anti-racism, housing, workplace organizing, industrial growth, economic renewal, education, and rural improvement. However, integrated transnational and multi-scalar analysis has revealed the purposeful connection between development and democracy. The interconnections across the three scales, and both within and beyond the nation, were multiple. Al Bromling was someone embodying the links. He was a CUSO volunteer in India, studied community development at the University of Alberta, worked for a provincial regional development authority, and became a CYC administrator in Lesser Slave Lake. More importantly, this dissertation has demonstrated that seemingly divergent development programs shared core themes, retraced here in the conclusion.

The parallel democratic ambitions of development programs at each level were striking. In Lesser Slave Lake and Montreal, CYC encouraged people to mobilize against unresponsive governments and exert a say in decisions affecting their own lives. In Cape Breton, DEVCO sought to involve residents in raising their standard of living and achieving a measure of socio-economic democracy. In Tanzania, CUSO strove to liberate people from all constraints on their autonomy, dignity, and equality. These were all democratic challenges, holding out and seeking to realize a more equal and participatory society.

There was a recurrent debate on what was required to end poverty. Liberal reformers worked to enlarge the social, political, and economic space of democratic capitalism, seeking to
accommodate the well-being and active political participation of marginalized people. They proactively promoted development, setting out against the prospect of a radical transformation of property relations that the global Sixties challenge to prevailing political and cultural authority made appear genuinely possible. Anti-poverty liberalism was elastic, accommodating many ideologies and directions. Yet in trying to shape more egalitarian societies within global capitalism, the political efforts of the likes of Tom Kent and Julius Nyerere had much in common. By contrast, radicals suggested that eliminating poverty necessitated a deeper and implicitly post-capitalist restructuring of the base and forms of democratic participation. They forged a New Left politics, often shaped by neo-Marxist analyses of inequality, capitalist social relations, and international political economy. In doing so, social democrats, socialist militants, and Indigenous and Black Power activists drew inspiration from, and contributed to, a global effort to remake democracy from below. Proponents of both liberal and New Left views agreed that social and economic change was dependent on the active political participation of the poor.

The case studies picked up the debate at repeated junctures. In Lesser Slave Lake, diffuse New Left ideas about stimulating social change joined hopes for more responsive government and revived rural economic activity. At the same time, Indigenous proponents of Indigenous-led integration were challenged by Red Power activists who insisted that confronting poverty required self-determination and anti-colonialism. In Montreal, animation sociale proved a changeable and contested anti-poverty concept. Liberals and social democrats believed that it was an amenable way to secure desired psycho-cultural and political change among St-Henri residents. Yet socialist militants reimagined animation as a means of radicalizing the working class toward eventual anti-capitalist transformation. In Cape Breton, a weakened left meant a less substantive dispute – although parliamentarians debating DEVCO’s creation explicitly
opposed socialism and capitalism. Still, regional development intervention stimulated considerable activity focused on reforming the island’s socio-economic structure. Clearer lines of dissension were evident among Canadians working in international development with CUSO. Liberals and New Leftists within the organization disagreed on capitalism and on what development was and entailed. Liberal internationalists identified with Tanzanian national aims. But New Left proponents developed a farther-reaching critique of global capitalism and Tanzania class relations. The liberal-New Left debate on poverty was not resolved.

Development involved common prescriptions. The modernization impulse was evident in each case study. In Cape Breton and Lesser Slave Lake, government agencies used capital incentives to attract manufacturing industry. In Montreal, the municipal government looked to rationalize space and foster modernity through urban renewal. Residents were relocated by the state, much as they were in rural Tanzania, in the name of improving their well-being. Indeed, the Tanzanian government sought to modernize the countryside through the creation of *ujamaa* villages, state-owned industries, and investment in productive technologies.

There were also emerging alternatives to modernization. Dependency theory, import substitution, workers’ self-management, and conscientization all cropped up. Two methods for mediating the effects of capitalist social relations were especially prominent. First, cooperatives were used to organize people, keep capital in communities, and meet needs. A Faust cooperative was meant to generate forestry employment. In Little Burgundy, cooperatives served to improve the position of consumers and workers. In Cape Breton, they drew Bras d’Or residents into aquaculture. In Tanzania, they were promoted to raise productivity and produce goods for domestic markets. Second, excepting Montreal, there were sustained attempts to renew economies and communities beyond the city. In Cape Breton and Lesser Slave Lake, back-to-
the-landers joined rural counterparts trying to sustain their livelihoods. DEVCO selectively backed entrepreneurial endeavours to raise rural incomes. CYC provided volunteers and resources to several forms of community self-help. Especially where these efforts involved craft industries and the application of ‘appropriate technologies,’ they resembled CUSO involvement in small-scale production and rural development.

Development programs markedly shared a pedagogical purpose. They strove to improve the economic activity, political awareness, and social belonging of ‘the poor.’ In Lesser Slave Lake, CYC encouraged residents to change their behaviour and to take collective action to alleviate their own poverty. In St-Henri, animators popularized means of citizen study and action, and they came to envision a learned process of politicization. In its own way, DEVCO sought to teach Cape Bretoners entrepreneurship and about presumed ideological requirements of regional development. In the international sphere, CUSO believed that its support for education would contribute to development. The conviction was evident in the provision of teachers to secondary schools, as well as in later hopes of imparting productive skill to rural Tanzanians. Centrally, development – in its focus on ‘helping people help themselves’ – attempted to raise the capacity of ordinary people to exert power.

Well, did it work? Yes, in a certain sense. Poverty politics prompted inclusive policies and the elaboration of the welfare state. And with the cases of CYC, CJC, DEVCO, and CUSO, development marked an extension of the state’s reach and a limited redistribution of state resources in a project of reconciling liberal democracy with the spatial, social, and economic consequences of the capitalist system.

Development programs did generate forms of citizen participation and degrees of democratic opening. As each case study explored, development initiatives involved acting on
Ordinary people were encouraged to internalize a possessive individualism and to integrate more fully in liberal capitalist economic and political processes. Yet these efforts also provided residents with an opportunity to participate in decision-making and to press for greater democracy. Therefore, as a political project, development was ambiguous.

So long as these programs were in place, there were debates over poverty and democracy – though often channeled into considerations of development itself. Part of this was intended; part of it was unexpected. Not only were some political processes democratized, conflict and new forms of challenge reshaped the bounds of existing practice. In Lesser Slave Lake, CYC aided community self-help projects and spurred a coalition lobbying government for development. It also contributed to the questioning of racial discrimination and to resurgent Indigenous political mobilization. In Montreal, CJC enabled St-Henri residents to exert a small power through citizens’ committees and to build a broader challenge to the existing municipal regime. It also prompted new forms of workers’ organizations as well demands for socialist or social democratic transformation. DEVCO stimulated a tentative corporatist attempt to reconcile class interests outside of electoral politics, while spurring the participatory and entrepreneurial hopes of some. In Tanzania, CUSO aligned itself with the postcolonial project and liberation struggles and, later, subordinate classes in the pursuit of social justice on a global scale. Over the short term and with limited effect, development programs generated attempts to press for greater economic equality and an enlargement of democratic possibilities.

So, did it work? No, not really. This much is clear if each of the dissertation’s component arguments are reprised.

In Lesser Slave Lake, community development was a means of integration. Though CYC intervention at first called attention to racial inequality and the deficiencies of local democracy,
community development channeled activism toward restoring a local economic base within capitalism. Local elites subscribed to a development imperative, something that occluded the importance of racial divisions and class inequalities in shaping poverty in north-central Alberta. Some Indigenous reformers, acting within significantly divided Indigenous politics, also advocated development. A local coalition, presuming shared community interests, lobbied government agencies to secure assistance for self-directed activity to meet immediate needs. Subsequent development programs neither remained under local control nor had the intended effects. Indeed, development – pre-empted by small business boosterism, government re-direction, and market limitations – was a loose, fleeting, and counter-productive focus for mobilization in the name of social justice. Forging onward, CYC supported a variety of self-help projects connected to a slow-moving reform movement for greater political and socio-economic democracy. Yet inward-looking community action militated against more radical politics concerning race, unequal property relations, and state support for a resource extraction economy dominated by corporations. Rather, CYC privileged the self-directed integration of marginalized northern residents into capitalism. In endorsing small-scale remedial activity, CYC supported locally-circumscribed action that neglected to address the ways in which inequality was perpetuated within community and the larger political, social, and economic system.

In St-Henri, animation sociale was an applied anthropology which rooted the possibility of change in the agency of the working and non-working poor. It was a shifting and contested concept through which progressives, radicals, and revolutionaries worked out visions for a more just and participatory democracy that would end poverty in Montreal. At the outset, CJC animators pursued psycho-cultural change and, amid urban renewal, looked to involve residents in bottom-up social renewal and a more pluralist liberal modernity. Hopes of involving residents
in participatory decision-making, though, were met by intransigence from city officials. Far left militants within CJC came to reject attempts to integrate the poor into capitalist society. Instead, they reimagined *animation sociale* as a tool for radicalizing popular dissent and eventual socialist transformation. Challenged on the left, other CJC animators shifted their own practice in a social democratic direction. They encouraged greater politicization and worked with citizens in an ultimately failed attempt to secure a redistribution of municipal power. Animators subsequently changed their focus to the labour and lives of St-Henri youth, encouraging small-scale self-activity which addressed immediate needs and validated working-class culture. Residents sought to shape democratic alternatives. But participatory projects were difficult to sustain and did not produce desired results.

In Cape Breton, regional development was an attempt to alter the processes of accumulation to make them more equitable and evenly distributed. DEVCO worked to overcome regional poverty all while using the power of the state to revitalize capitalism. In its earliest years, DEVCO sought to attract manufacturing industry. Capital incentives drew firms to two sites on the island. The practice assumed that Cape Bretoners would only participate in regional development as a low-wage labour force dependent on continental capitalism. DEVCO’s initial strategy – marked by contradictions, standing to exacerbate underlying socio-economic inequalities, and premised on unrealistic expectations of economic growth – was negated by recession. Modifying its approach, DEVCO sought regional redress through a participatory kind of development which worked to intensify the interactions of select Cape Bretoners with the market. The revised practice turned on imparting entrepreneurship, boosting production, and selling a special kind of Cape Breton. Discrete initiatives were marked by various economic, social, and environmental limitations and closures. But the greatest
significance of regional development activities was their political and ideological effect. They
demanded commitment and cooperation from Cape Bretoners, but deferred improvements in
standard of living, political alternatives, and anything more than a small reallocation of
government resources. The democratic and economic promise of regional development lay
somewhere in an unspecified future.

In Tanzania, CUSO provided international development assistance intended to improve
collective well-being and to realize aspirations for greater global equality. CUSO development
thought and practice took a leftward trajectory. Liberal internationalists – respecting self-
determination and wishing to contribute to state aims – went abroad as temporary members of
the Tanzanian public sector. Many CUSO volunteers worked as secondary school teachers,
labouring within postcolonial contradictions and seeking to teach a generation of Tanzanians
who might end the need for foreign personnel. Over time, CUSO members provided deepening,
if often cautious, political and material support to Tanzanian socialism and to southern African
liberation movements. But without considering the underlying processes of global capitalism,
and in continuing to subscribe to dominant development ideas, their hopes for a kind of liberal
liberation in Tanzania were frustrated. Some black and Indigenous activists with CUSO
connections pointed to sharper links between imperialism abroad and racism and colonialism in
Canada. And, increasingly, New Leftists analyzed global power relations and Tanzanian class
dynamics. They crafted a left-leaning international development praxis which was, with
contradictions, directed towards rural development. CUSO activists succeeded in making a
democratic commitment to “the liberation of people” from all constraints on their autonomy,
dignity, and equality the organization’s aim. Development became not just a means of ending
poverty, but also a somewhat vague allusion to postcolonial freedom and ongoing efforts to
realize global equality. Despite critiques and intentions, CUSO activities were aligned with a transnational development consensus essentially seeking to raise production under state-led capitalism. The practice of, and justification for, CUSO international development assistance in Tanzania shifted over time. But international development contributions remained piecemeal socio-economic interventions eschewing the collective political struggles of ordinary people. As such, the content of CUSO’s program was at odds with its liberationist aims.

Distilled further, the composite picture across the three scales and four case studies is clearer. If arising from political questions and generating new forms of participation, development diverted mobilization, absorbed activism, and worked to delay. It was a partial and circumscribed kind of welfare state-sponsored action which occupied debate and even depoliticized poverty. It recurrently fell short of amending capitalist social relations and the global, national, regional, and local political and economic hierarchies they engender. And development was of little use in attaining the democratic and anti-poverty ambitions that provoked its use in the first place.

Development was motivated by often laudable goals: social equality; a right to a just standard of living; meaningful political participation; the power to shape one’s own life; freedom from oppression. It was an attractive concept because it ensconced much idealism. It also supported much ambiguity. In the main, liberals – acting in dialogue with the New Left – believed that development could facilitate an enlargement of the political and economic space of liberalism so as to accommodate all. Recurrently, development marked an effort to rid liberalism of its social contradictions. Development interventions were always supposed to be temporary. Once local, regional, and international inequalities had been set right, state-backed activities could be curtailed. Yet anti-poverty liberalism sought to alter select conditions without
transcending the social relations and structures of liberal democratic capitalism producing persistent inequalities. Development allowed for a degree of creativity, but was dissipated by the very contradictions it sought to address. Often, people responded by proposing development anew. But for all the optimism and creative democratic activism of those who took up development to confront poverty, the intent to develop is deeply suspect and warrants rejection as a core concern of collective action.
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Appendix A

General Research Ethics Board Documentation
September 08, 2014

Mr. Will Langford
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of History
Queen's University
Kingston, ON, K7L 3N6

GREB Ref #: GHIS-053-14; Romeo # 6013521

Dear Mr. Langford:

The General Research Ethics Board (GREB), by means of a delegated board review, has cleared your proposal entitled "GHIS-053-14 ‘Helping People Help Themselves’: Democracy, Development, and the Global Politics of Poverty in Canada, 1964-1976" for ethical compliance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (TCPS) and Queen's ethics policies. In accordance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (article D.1.6) and Senate Terms of Reference (article G), your project has been cleared for one year. At the end of each year, the GREB will ask if your project has been completed and if not, what changes have occurred or will occur in the next year.

You are reminded of your obligation to advise the GREB, with a copy to your unit REB, of any adverse event(s) that occur during this one year period (access this form at https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_researcher/ and click Events - GREB Adverse Event Report). An adverse event includes, but is not limited to, a complaint, a change or unexpected event that alters the level of risk for the researcher or participants or situation that requires a substantial change in approach to a participant(s). You are also advised that all adverse events must be reported to the GREB within 48 hours.

You are also reminded that all changes that might affect human participants must be cleared by the GREB. For example you must report changes to the level of risk, applicant characteristics, and implementation of new procedures. To make an amendment, access the application at https://eservices.queensu.ca/romeo_researcher/ and click Events - GREB Amendment to Approved Study Form. These changes will automatically be sent to the Ethics Coordinator, Gail Irving, at the Office of Research Services or irvingg@queensu.ca for further review and clearance by the GREB or GREB Chair.

On behalf of the General Research Ethics Board, I wish you continued success in your research.

Yours sincerely,

Joan Stevenson, Ph.D.
Chair
General Research Ethics Board

c: Dr. Ian McKay and Dr. Karen Dubinsky, Faculty Supervisors
August 23, 2016

Mr. Will Langford
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of History
Queen's University
Kingston, ON, K7L 3N6

GREB Romeo #: 6013521

Dear Mr. Langford:

The General Research Ethics Board (GREB) has reviewed and cleared your request for renewal of ethics clearance for the above-named study. This renewal is valid for one year from September 8, 2016. Prior to the next renewal date you will be sent a reminder memo and the link to ROMEO to renew for another year. You are reminded of your obligation to submit an Annual Renewal/Closure Form prior to the annual renewal due date (access this form at http://www.queensu.ca/traq/signon.html; click on "Events"; under "Create New Event" click on "General Research Ethics Board Annual Renewal/Closure Form for Cleared Studies"). Please note that when your research project is completed, you need to submit an Annual Renewal/Completed Form in Romeo/traq indicating that the project is 'completed' so that the file can be closed. This should be submitted at the time of completion; there is no need to wait until the annual renewal due date.

You are reminded of your obligation to advise the GREB of any adverse event(s) that occur during this one year period. An adverse event includes, but is not limited to, a complaint, a change or unexpected event that alters the level of risk for the researcher or participants or situation that requires a substantial change in approach to a participant(s). You are also advised that all adverse events must be reported to the GREB within 48 hours. To submit an adverse event report, access the application at http://www.queensu.ca/traq/signon.html; click on "Events"; under "Create New Event" click on "General Research Ethics Board Adverse Event Form".

You are also reminded that all changes that might affect human participants must be cleared by the GREB. For example, you must report changes in study procedures or implementation of new aspects into the study procedures. Your request for protocol changes will be forwarded to the appropriate GREB reviewers and/or the GREB Chair. To submit an amendment form, access the application at http://www.queensu.ca/traq/signon.html; click on "Events"; under "Create New Event" click on "General Research Ethics Board Request for the Amendment of Approved Studies".

On behalf of the General Research Ethics Board, I wish you continued success in your research.

Yours sincerely,

John Freeman, Ph.D.
Chair, General Research Ethics Board

c.: Dr. Ian McKay and Dr. Karen Dubinsky, Supervisors
August 27, 2015

Mr. Will Langford  
Ph.D. Candidate  
Department of History  
Queen's University  
Kingston, ON, K7L 3N6

GREB Romeo #: 6013521  

Dear Mr. Langford:

The General Research Ethics Board (GREB) has reviewed and approved your request for renewal of ethics clearance for the above-named study. This renewal is valid for one year from September 8, 2015. Prior to the next renewal date you will be sent a reminder memo and the link to ROMEO to renew for another year.

You are reminded of your obligation to advise the GREB of any adverse event(s) that occur during this one year period. An adverse event includes, but is not limited to, a complaint, a change or unexpected event that alters the level of risk for the researcher or participants or situation that requires a substantial change in approach to a participant(s). You are also advised that all adverse events must be reported to the GREB within 48 hours. Report to GREB through either ROMEO Event Report or Adverse Event Report Form at http://www.queensu.ca/ors/researchethics/GeneralREB/forms.html.

You are also reminded that all changes that might affect human participants must be cleared by the GREB. For example you must report changes in study procedures or implementation of new aspects into the study procedures. Your request for protocol changes will be forwarded to the appropriate GREB reviewers and/or the GREB Chair. Please report changes to GREB through either ROMEO Event Reports or the Ethics Change Form at http://www.queensu.ca/ors/researchethics/GeneralREB/forms.html.

On behalf of the General Research Ethics Board, I wish you continued success in your research.

Yours sincerely,

Joan Stevenson, Ph.D.
Chair
General Research Ethics Board

c.: Dr. Ian McKay and Dr. Karen Dubinsky, Supervisors