Public project, private developer: Understanding the impact of local policy frameworks on the public-private housing redevelopment of Regent Park in Toronto, Ontario

by

Trevor Robinson

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Abstract

This thesis examines Regent Park, a public housing community in Toronto, Ontario undergoing mixed-income revitalization through a public-private partnership (3P) since 2006. Much of the existing literature has studied the Regent Park revitalization from the perspective of public housing tenants, conceptualizing the project as a continuation of redevelopment efforts in the United States. However, this approach neglects the unique Canadian policy context and the point-of-view of industry professionals involved in the development process. Using Toronto as the primary lens of geographic analysis to study the revitalization, a qualitative, mixed-methods approach was employed in this thesis to focus on the local policy context and perspective of individuals involved in the Regent Park redevelopment process. Data was gathered, primarily, through interviews with 25 public and private sector professionals. Subsequent analysis generated several findings and recommendations for application at Regent Park and 3P redevelopment efforts in Toronto and other cities. Where many recent studies depict the Regent Park revitalization as having an overall negative outcome for public housing tenants and other public shareholders, this thesis, in contrast, found that the project is delivering notable social benefits to Regent Park and surrounding communities, while avoiding the displacement of low-income residents characteristic of public housing redevelopment in the US. Western governments have increasingly partnered with the private sector to deliver services and infrastructure over the last 30 years. It is therefore imperative to explore a diversity of perspectives to improve the outcomes of 3P social service delivery in the future, as this thesis does by understanding the viewpoints of development industry professionals in Toronto.

Keywords: Public-private partnerships, public housing revitalization, public policy, social mix, real estate development, urban planning.
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# Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... ii  
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... iii  
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. iv  
List of Tables .................................................................................................................... viii  
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... ix  
List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ x  

## Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................... 1  
1.1 Background ................................................................................................................ 2  
1.2 Existing Research ....................................................................................................... 5  
1.3 Gaps in the Research ................................................................................................. 6  
1.4 Research Objectives ................................................................................................. 7  
1.5 Methodology ............................................................................................................ 8  
1.6 Significance ............................................................................................................... 9  
1.7 Outline ....................................................................................................................... 10  

## Chapter 2: Public-Private Partnerships ...................................................................... 12  
2.1 Definition and Applications of Public-Private Partnerships ..................................... 12  
2.2 Public-Private Partnerships in Canada ..................................................................... 14  
2.3 Affordable Housing Public-Private Partnerships in Canada .................................... 17  
   2.3.1 Winnipeg, Calgary, and Other Medium-Sized Cities ........................................ 18  
   2.3.2 Montreal, Quebec ............................................................................................ 19  
   2.3.3 Vancouver, British Columbia .......................................................................... 20  
   2.3.4 Toronto, Ontario ............................................................................................ 21  
2.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 24  

## Chapter 3: The Differences Between Canada and the US ........................................ 27  
3.1 Canadian Versus American Cities ............................................................................. 28  
3.2 Public Housing Policy and Mixed-Income Development in the US ......................... 35  
   3.2.1 US Public Housing Policy, 1930s to 1980s ....................................................... 35  
   3.2.2 HOPE VI, 1992 to 2010 ................................................................................ 38  
   3.2.3 Post-HOPE VI Policies, 2010 to 2016 ............................................................ 39  
3.3 Public Housing and Social Mix in Canada and Toronto ......................................... 41  
   3.3.1 Establishment and Expansion of Public Housing, 1944 to 1973 ....................... 42  
   3.3.2 Third Sector Housing and Social Mix Policies, 1974 to 1985 ......................... 43  
   3.3.3 Devolution of Public Housing Responsibility, 1986 to Present ....................... 44  
3.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 47  

## Chapter 4: The Toronto Context ................................................................................ 51  
4.1 The History of Growth and Governance in Toronto ............................................... 51  
4.2 The History of Housing Development in Toronto .................................................... 55  
4.3 Contemporary Development in Toronto and “Condo-ism” ..................................... 59  
4.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 61
Table of Contents (continued)

Chapter 5: Regent Park ................................................................. 65
  5.1 History of Regent Park, 1900s to 1990s ........................................... 66
    5.1.1 Before Regent Park, 1900s to 1940s ........................................ 67
    5.1.2 Original Development of Regent Park, 1947 to 1959 ...................... 70
      5.1.2.1 Construction of Regent Park North, 1947 to 1954 .................... 70
      5.1.2.2 Construction of Regent Park South, 1957 to 1959 .................... 71
      5.1.2.3 Modernist Built Form of the Original Regent Park .................. 74
    5.1.3 Regent Park from the 1950s to the 1990s .................................... 76
      5.1.3.1 Decline of Inner-City Manufacturing in Toronto ....................... 77
      5.1.3.2 Changes to Tenant Selection Criteria ................................... 78
      5.1.3.3 Federal Immigration Policy Reform ...................................... 78
      5.1.3.4 Toronto’s Affordable Housing Crisis ..................................... 79
      5.1.3.5 Socio-Economic Divergence at Regent Park ............................ 80
  5.2 Revitalization Planning Policy Rationale ...................................... 81
    5.2.1 Phase 1 By-Law Amendment, 2005 ........................................... 82
    5.2.2 Phase 2 By-Law Amendment, 2009 ........................................... 85
    5.2.3 Phases 3 to 5 By-Law Amendment, 2013 ..................................... 86
    5.2.4 Revitalization Progress (as of May 2017) ................................ 89
  5.3 Rationale for Social Mix and Mixed-Income Revitalization ................... 90
  5.4 The Regent Park Revitalization in the Literature ............................. 91
    5.4.1 Social Mix, Moral Regulation, and Poverty Concentration ................ 93
    5.4.2 Neoliberalism, Space, and the Gentrification of Public Housing ........ 94
    5.4.3 Regent Park as a Failure of the Neoliberal Political Economy .......... 95
    5.4.4 Does the Regent Park Revitalization Only Benefit the Wealthy? ......... 96
    5.4.5 Territorial Destigmatization and New Urbanism .......................... 97
    5.4.6 Daniels as a Socially- Conscious Developer ................................ 98
  5.5 Conclusion ............................................................................. 102
    5.5.1 Establishing a Research Agenda ............................................. 105

Chapter 6: Methods ..................................................................... 107
  6.1 Research Design ..................................................................... 107
  6.2 Data Collection ...................................................................... 108
    6.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews .................................................... 109
      6.2.1.1 Selection of Potential Participants ....................................... 109
      6.2.1.2 Participant Recruitment ....................................................... 110
      6.2.1.3 Interview Process ............................................................... 110
    6.2.2 Document Review ................................................................. 111
  6.3 Data Analysis ......................................................................... 112
**Table of Contents (continued)**

Chapter 7: Insights from the Revitalization Process ........................................ 113
   7.1 Early Attempts to Redevelop Regent Park, mid-1980s to 2000......................... 114
      7.1.1 Rehabilitation Proposals, 1980s .................................................. 115
      7.1.2 1997 Request for Proposals ...................................................... 118
      7.1.3 1998 Request for Proposals ...................................................... 119
      7.1.4 Attempted Requests for Proposals, 1999 and 2000 .......................... 120
   7.2 Toronto Community Housing Consultation and Requests for Proposals, 2002 to 2005 .... 121
      7.2.1 May 2005 Request for Proposals ............................................... 122
      7.2.2 December 2005 Request for Proposals ....................................... 123
   7.3 Partnership Negotiation and Risk Division for Phases One and Two .................. 123
   7.4 The Switch to Land Transactions for Phase Three .................................... 127
   7.5 The Importance of a Single, Master Developer ...................................... 133
   7.6 Can Other Developers Emulate the Revitalization? .................................. 138
   7.7 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 141

Chapter 8: The Local Development and Policy Context ..................................... 145
   8.1 The Impact of the Toronto Planning and Development Context ..................... 147
      8.1.1 Canadian Values ........................................................................... 147
      8.1.2 History of Planning and Housing Policies and Practices in Toronto .......... 148
      8.1.3 Contemporary Development in Toronto ........................................... 150
   8.2 Alignment of the Local Political Climate Aided the Revitalization .................... 153
      8.2.1 The Creation of Toronto Community Housing .................................... 153
      8.2.2 Support from City Hall, 2003 to 2010 ............................................. 154
      8.2.3 Maintaining Project Momentum, 2010 to the Present .......................... 155
   8.3 The Impact of Municipal and Provincial Policies ......................................... 159
   8.4 Social Objectives of the Revitalization Can Be Emulated .............................. 169
      8.4.1 Objectives and Practices at Regent Park to be Emulated .................... 169
      8.4.2 Lessons Applied to Other Toronto Community Housing Revitalization Projects .... 171
      8.4.3 Lessons Not Applied from the Regent Park Revitalization ................... 172
   8.5 The Challenges with Improving Social Mix ............................................. 177
   8.6 Conclusion ......................................................................................... 181

Chapter 9: Conclusion .................................................................................. 187
   9.1 Purpose, Objectives, Background, and Methodology ................................... 187
   9.2 Findings ............................................................................................ 190
   9.3 Recommendations ............................................................................. 195
   9.4 Limitations of the Research ................................................................... 196
   9.5 Future Research ................................................................................ 197
   9.6 Contribution to the Literature ................................................................ 198
   9.7 Significance of this Research ............................................................. 199

References ................................................................................................. 202
Table of Contents (continued)

Appendix A: A Note About Terminology: "Affordable", "Social", and "Public" Housing .................. 233
Appendix B: “Gentrification” or “Revitalization” of Regent Park? ............................................ 235
Appendix C: Research Ethics Board Clearance Letter ................................................................. 239
Appendix D: Sample Recruitment Notice .................................................................................... 240
Appendix E: Letter of Information ............................................................................................... 242
Appendix F: Consent Form............................................................................................................ 246
Appendix G: Sample Interview Schedule ..................................................................................... 248
List of Tables

Table 1  Risk division between developer (Daniels) and public sector (TCH) for 1997 RFP, May 2005 RFP, and December 2005 RFP........................................................................................................125

Table A  Differences Between “gentrification” and “revitalization”....................................................237

Table B  Comparison of “revitalization” and the Regent Park revitalization........................................238
List of Figures

Figure 1  The corner of Parliament St. and Dundas St. W. in Regent Park in 2010, post-revitalization ........2
Figure 2  Built form of Regent Park prior to revitalization .................................................................3
Figure 3  Toronto, with Regent Park highlighted in blue ....................................................................5
Figure 4  Don Mount Court prior to revitalization, 1984 ....................................................................22
Figure 5  Average annual affordable housing commitments in Canada by period, 1950 to 2013 ..........42
Figure 6  Location of Toronto within Ontario (inset: Ontario within Canada) ....................................52
Figure 7  Toronto, including boundaries of former boroughs included in Metro Toronto (1954-1998) and incorporated into amalgamated City of Toronto in 1998 (inset: Greater Toronto Area) ..........53
Figure 8  St. Lawrence neighbourhood developed in the 1970s ........................................................58
Figure 9  Downtown Toronto, with Regent Park highlighted in blue ................................................66
Figure 10 Poor housing conditions in Regent Park area prior to original development, 1930s ..........66
Figure 11 Bathroom (in 1938) and backyard (in 1951) in the Regent Park area prior to original development ..............................................................................................................................69
Figure 12 Sketch of Regent Park North ...............................................................................................71
Figure 13 Regent Park South, 1968 ....................................................................................................72
Figure 14 Density of Regent Park area (outlined in blue), before (top) and after (bottom) original development between 1947 and 1959 ..................................................................................73
Figure 15 Le Corbusier’s 1925 plan to rebuild downtown Paris was deemed too radical to implement, but is emblematic of Modernism that influenced the original development of Regent Park ..........75
Figure 16 Regent Park in 1968, displaying elements Le Corbusier’s Modernism ................................76
Figure 17 Original concept drawing for the Regent Park revitalization .............................................82
Figure 18 Regent Park revitalization phasing plan, as of 2013 ........................................................88
Figure 19 Renovated houses for sale in Cabbagetown, 1981 ............................................................115
Figure 20 Proposed redevelopment of Regent Park, 1989 .................................................................118
Figure 21 Proposed redevelopment of Regent Park, 1996 .................................................................119
Figure 22 The Daniels Spectrum, an arts-and-cultural hub in Regent Park ......................................135
Figure 23 The Regent Park Athletic Grounds ......................................................................................136
Figure 24 The Regent Park Aquatic Centre .........................................................................................171
Figure 25 Social mix in Regent Park at present: Though one side of the street is market condos and the other is public housing units, the housing types are indistinguishable from each other ..........178
Figure A Housing continuum in Canada, with most in-need housing increasing toward left ............233
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3P</td>
<td>Public-private partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMHC</td>
<td>Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNI</td>
<td>Choice Neighborhoods Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTA</td>
<td>Greater Toronto Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOPE VI</td>
<td>Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTHA</td>
<td>Metro Toronto Housing Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHC</td>
<td>Ontario Housing Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHA</td>
<td>Public housing authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAD</td>
<td>Rental Assistance Demonstration</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request for proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RGI</td>
<td>Rent-geared-to-income</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCH</td>
<td>Toronto Community Housing</td>
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1 Introduction

Since 2006, Regent Park, a public housing\(^1\) complex in downtown Toronto, Ontario, has been undergoing revitalization\(^2\) through a public-private partnership (3P) between the city’s public housing provider, Toronto Community Housing (TCH), and Daniels, a private condominium developer (TCH, 2017i). By 2025, Regent Park will be rebuilt as a mixed-income community to integrate socio-economically isolated public housing tenants into the surrounding city (Dunn, 2012). To promote integration, about 5500 market condominiums will be added to the site by completion, while the 2000 existing public housing units at Regent Park will be reconstructed (City of Toronto, 2014).

With the Regent Park revitalization approximately halfway to completion (as of May 2017), opportunities to assess and learn from the project have emerged. A growing number of researchers have studied the Regent Park revitalization, mostly focusing on the perspectives of public housing tenants affected by the redevelopment process (e.g., August, 2014). Much of the existing research has conceptualized the Regent Park revitalization as an extension of similar mixed-income redevelopment projects that have taken place in the United States since the 1990s (e.g., Silver, 2011). Studies of the revitalization have yet to focus exclusively on the experiences of industry professionals involved in the public-private development process, nor have they analyzed the project primarily within a Canada- and Toronto-centric policy and development framework. This thesis will address these gaps in the research by examining the Regent Park revitalization from the perspective of the development process (as opposed to the experiences of tenants) and through the lens of the historic and contemporary policy and development context in Toronto. To do so, 25 public and private sector professionals currently or previously involved in the revitalization process were interviewed. These interviews were complemented with a review of archival and contemporary documents related to the revitalization process. The Regent Park revitalization is one of ten 3P projects recently completed or initiated.

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\(^1\) See Appendix A for a note about housing terminology used in this thesis.

\(^2\) See Appendix B for a note about the term “revitalization”, particularly with respect to gentrification.
by TCH with private sector partners (TCH, 2017). By contributing to the understanding of the public-private redevelopment of public housing communities, this thesis seeks to improve the application of 3Ps for addressing the ongoing affordable housing shortage in Toronto and other instances of public-private delivery of social services in western cities.

Figure 1. The corner of Parliament St. and Dundas St. W. in Regent Park in 2010, post-revitalization (City of Toronto, 2013).

1.1 Background

Built between 1947 to 1959, Regent Park originally replaced a neighbourhood of townhouses and cottages inhabited primarily by recent Irish immigrants (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). Progressive at the time, Regent Park was planned according to Modernist design principles: mid- to high-rise apartments focused inward on open green spaces and were connected by pedestrian-only pathways (Milgrom, 2000). In the subsequent decades, however, it became apparent that this inward facing layout had detached the
neighbourhood from the rest of Toronto (Sewell, 1993). The physical isolation of Regent Park led to its socio-economic isolation from the city and the physical neglect of the housing stock in the neighbourhood (Purdy, 2003). Regent Park became notorious for high rates of violence, drug-dealing, and other forms of criminal activity. The physical composition of Regent Park made it difficult to police, as hidden courtyards and lack of through streets inhibited active and passive surveillance in the neighbourhood (Caulfield, 1994).

Urban planning and real estate policies and practices in Toronto have changed significantly since the completion of Regent Park. Realizing the failures of Modernist projects in the 1970s, Toronto policymakers embraced development that promoted a mix of land uses, social mixing, conservation of heritage structures, and high-density, mid-rise buildings (Greenberg, 2011). In the 1980s, the City of Toronto began using 3Ps to develop waterfront communities, such as the downtown Harbourfront neighbourhood, converting existing industrial buildings into residential, commercial, and park spaces (Hodge & Gordon, 2014). Private sector-led, large-scale condo construction has characterized housing development in Toronto since the 1990s (Rosen & Walks, 2015).

Planning and development policies and practices in the city created the context surrounding the Regent Park revitalization, which launched in 2002 after almost 20 years of advocacy efforts (Nicholson, 2012). That year, a newly-created TCH identified the revitalization as one of the agency’s top priorities and
begun a consultation process with Regent Park residents (Kelly, 2015). In 2006, Daniels was selected as TCH’s private sector partner (TCH, 2017i). In addition to the 5500 market condos that Daniels will construct at Regent Park, new commercial spaces will be added to the neighbourhood, as will several public amenities, including an aquatic centre, an arts-and-cultural hub, and parks and athletic grounds (City of Toronto, 2014). The construction of market housing and the creation of new public amenities at Regent Park are intended to promote the mixing of individuals from diverse economic, social, and ethnic backgrounds (Dunn, 2012). At present (in 2017), the second of five phases of the revitalization is nearing completion, with the third phase underway and expected to finish by 2019 (TCH, 2017i).

Regent Park is not the only post-World War II public housing neighbourhood undergoing redevelopment globally. In Canada, the US, and several other western countries, entrepreneurial housing agencies are partnering with private developers to revitalize neglected mid-century housing projects into communities (Lees et al., 2011). Social mix policies are urban planning-based strategies that deconcentrate poverty by promoting the construction of market-owned properties in proximity to low-income rental housing (A. Smith, 2002). Policymakers argue that social mixing improves socio-economic outcomes and reduces criminal activity in low-income communities by providing a number of benefits, including access to higher-income social networks, improved behavioural accountability and modeling from wealthier individuals, and improved political economy of place resulting from the introduction of new condo-owners (Chaskin & Joseph, 2015).

Mixed-income redevelopments are indicative of the post-war adoption of neoliberal theories of urban governance and the decline in public spending on social service delivery since the 1970s in the west (Harvey, 1989). However, the degree to which neoliberal theories have been adopted is stronger in the US than in Canada (Bourne, Hutton, et al., 2011). Furthermore, public housing and social mix experiences have varied between Canada and the US. Public housing communities in the US have historically been sites of alternating periods of displacement and segregation of black families (Fraser et al., 2012). In comparison, Canadian public housing neighbourhoods have generally been home to successive waves of immigrants from
different regions around the world (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015). Similarly, key differences exist between the social mix policies applied to mixed-income redevelopment in the US and the policies applied at Regent Park, namely, the guaranteed right-of-return for existing tenants and the required one-for-one replacement of public housing units, which have not been components of most American projects (Hackworth, 2007).

Figure 3. Toronto, with Regent Park highlighted in blue (Google Maps, 2017).

1.2 Existing Research

Despite the variations in public housing experiences between Canada and the US, neoliberal critiques of the Regent Park revitalization have characterized the project as a continuation of social mix redevelopment in the US (e.g., August, 2014). Neoliberal-critical scholars contend that social mixing has been used by wealthy elites in Toronto and other western cities to justify the state-led gentrification of public land previously inaccessible to private development (Lees et al., 2011). Based primarily on interviews with public housing tenants, these
studies (e.g., Silver, 2011) have found scant evidence of the purported benefits of social mixing for public housing tenants implicated in mixed-income revitalization. These critics contend, that, overall, the Regent Park revitalization will result in an overall negative outcome for public housing tenants because of the loss of low-income socio-political power that is otherwise preserved where poverty is concentrated in an area (August & Walks, 2011).

Alternatively, inductive approaches to the study of Regent Park (e.g., Dunn, 2012) suggest that while the benefits of social mixing are noble goals to strive for, they are effectively impossible to achieve and highly difficult to measure. This line of inquiry contends that the greatest benefits of mixed-income redevelopment for public housing tenants result from changes in the built form, such as the improved appearance of their homes and reduced criminal activity in their neighbourhood (Centre for Research on Inner City Health, 2013). These built form changes have encouraged the destigmatization of Regent Park as a neighbourhood, and as a result, the destigmatization of the residents living in the neighbourhood, which may improve the socio-economic outcomes for those residents (Rowe & Dunn, 2015). According to these findings, the adoption of New Urbanist design principles, such as the promotion of social surveillance through “eyes on the street” design, are most responsible for these improvements (Dunn, 2012). Inductive approaches to the study of Regent Park have also determined that the developer and new condo owners in the neighbourhood exhibit benevolent, communitarian perspectives toward the project, having been eager to participate in what they perceived to be a socially-conscious endeavour (Kelly, 2015; Rosen, 2016).

1.3 Gaps in the Research

Based on existing academic inquiry into the Regent Park revitalization, two prominent gaps in the research can be identified. The first gap is the lack of understanding of the planning and development process for the revitalization. Much of the existing research has provided extensive information about the revitalization experiences of public housing tenants at Regent Park (e.g., Silver, 2011). This work has been important for
shedding light on the experiences of the most socially- and economically-vulnerable individuals affected by the revitalization. Critiques generated by this research have resulted in positive changes to revitalization strategies, such as improvements that reduce the burden of the temporary relocation process on public housing tenants (e.g., August, 2014). The focus on tenants, however, has left other aspects of the revitalization understudied, such as earlier failed attempts to redevelop Regent Park, revisions to the Regent Park partnership agreement since the start of the project, and the role and achievements of the private sector partner, Daniels, over the course of the redevelopment process.

The second gap in the research is the lack of understanding of the Regent Park revitalization within the Toronto- and Canada-specific policy and development context. Existing research has generally conceptualized the revitalization as a continuation of similar mixed-income redevelopment projects in the US (e.g., August & Walks, 2011). However, Canada and the US have divergent socio-cultural values, public housing practices, and urban planning policies (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015), meaning that the historic and contemporary policy and development context in which the Regent Park revitalization is taking place is not identical to the American context. As such, there is a strong need for the revitalization to be understood within the local Canada- and Toronto-centric framework, not the US framework.

1.4 Research Objectives

To address these gaps in the research, this thesis has embraced two primary research objectives. The first objective is to provide insights into public housing revitalization from the perspective of the public-private development partnership at Regent Park. Where existing research has examined the revitalization primarily from the perspective of the tenants, this thesis assumes the point-of-view of industry professionals involved in the redevelopment process. In doing so, this thesis will provide information about a variety of themes, including: the earlier failed attempts to revitalize Regent Park, the process of selecting Daniels as TCH’s private sector partner in 2005, changes to the partnership agreement over the course of the revitalization,
and the role of the private sector on a mixed-income project. In doing so, this thesis will contribute to existing understandings of the revitalization in the literature and convey recommendations that might aid future 3P revitalization processes.

The second objective of this thesis is to analyze the Regent Park revitalization using the local policy and development context as the primary geographic lens of analysis. While scholars have mostly conceptualized the revitalization as a continuation of US-style projects (e.g., Silver, 2011), this thesis factors in the influence on the revitalization of historic and contemporary cultural, political, and socio-economic forces in Canada and Toronto. In addressing the second research objective, this thesis attempts to answer the following two questions:

1. Which kinds of location-specific variables helped initiate and inform the nature and composition of the Regent Park revitalization? and,

2. What lessons can be learned about the local context in which the revitalization is taking place that could be applied to similar housing redevelopment projects elsewhere?

1.5 Methodology

To address the research objectives of this thesis, a qualitative, mixed-methods approach for data collection and analysis was employed. In human geography, qualitative research is used to answer questions about the experiences of individuals and society at-large (Winchester & Rofe, 2016). This approach was used because this thesis aims to understand the experiences of individuals involved with the redevelopment process, who are operating within the local historical, socio-economic, and political context of Toronto. Mixed-methods approaches combine different types of data, methods of analysis, or epistemological perspectives, incorporating historical and contemporary experiences and abstractions of frameworks of a given topic (Elwood, 2010). This thesis intends to describe historical and contemporary influences on the Regent Park
revitalization, so a mixed-methods approach that combined a document review and a semi-structured interview process was employed. The document review comprised a review of contemporary and archival political correspondence, policy documents, and planning studies related to the Regent Park revitalization. This review complemented the semi-structured interview process, which involved 22 interviews with 25 individuals currently or previously involved in the Regent Park revitalization.

Data gathered from the document review and interview process was analyzed using elements of the urban planning policy analysis framework outlined by Patton et al. (2013), which seeks to identify potential issues with current policy, assess the potential outcomes of policies, and identify alternatives that would improve the intended outcomes of a given policy. Together, the data collection and analysis processes provided an understanding of the local policy framework and development practices informing the Regent Park revitalization and allowed for the channelling of recommendations for improving public housing revitalization within the Toronto context and emulating the positive aspects of Regent Park and Toronto in other cities undertaking mixed-income redevelopment projects.

1.6 Significance

Over 82,000 families are currently on a waiting list for public housing in Toronto (Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association, 2016) and TCH is currently facing a $1.73 billion funding shortfall for repairs to its housing portfolio (TCH, 2017e). In Toronto and other western cities, 3P, mixed-income development represents an increasingly popular strategy to address this affordable housing crisis (Lees et al., 2011). The context in which the Regent Park revitalization is taking place differs, however, from housing revitalization experiences elsewhere, most notably, the US. It is important, therefore, to acknowledge these differences and learn about how they affect public housing redevelopment, so that the revitalization strategies used in a given location are most appropriate for that place.
This thesis identifies some of the unique aspects of the local policy and development context informing the Regent Park revitalization and discusses the implications of the differences between mixed-income redevelopment in Toronto and the US. In doing so, this thesis provides recommendations for developers and governments to improve the outcomes of housing revitalization 3Ps, not only in Toronto, but also in other cities, by highlighting aspects of the Toronto context that could be emulated in other areas. Ultimately, this thesis is written in the spirit of improving the outcomes of 3P, mixed-income revitalization projects for the public sector, the private sector, and most importantly, for benefit of the low-income families that rely on the effective continued delivery of public housing and other social services in the city.

1.7 Outline

Background on the themes examined in this thesis will be provided before the original research is presented. The next four chapters, Chapters Two to Five, supply contextual information on the topics relevant to the study of the public-private Regent Park redevelopment process. Chapter Two addresses 3Ps, providing an overview of the different applications of 3Ps and the use of 3Ps in Canada, particularly for affordable housing development. Chapter Three compares Canada and the US to demonstrate the differences between the Regent Park development context and the US framework in which it is often situated by the existing literature. The differences in political, cultural, and socio-economic characteristics of cities within Canada and the US are contrasted, as are historic public housing and social mix policies and practices between the two countries. Chapter Four further establishes differences between the US and the local context of the Regent Park revitalization by discussing the history and character of Toronto. Chapter Four also summarizes historic and contemporary housing development practices in Toronto. Chapter Five addresses all matters related to Regent Park, including the history of the neighbourhood, the urban planning rationale for the revitalization, and the various characterizations of the revitalization and similar mixed-income redevelopment projects in the literature.
Chapters Seven and Eight discuss the findings of the research conducted for this thesis. Following a description of methodology in Chapter Six, each of Chapters Seven and Eight address one of the two research objectives of this thesis, which are:

1. To provide insights into public housing revitalization from the perspective of the public-private development partnership at Regent Park (Chapter Seven); and,

2. To analyze the Regent Park revitalization using the Toronto policy and development context as the primary geographic lens of analysis, not the US (Chapter Eight).

To address the first objective, Chapter Seven builds on some of the literature reviewed in Chapter Five to provide new insights into the Regent Park revitalization from the development process. This chapter also provides recommendations about 3P, mixed-income redevelopment from individuals involved at Regent Park. Chapter Eight addresses the second research objective by providing an understanding of the impact of local planning and development policies and practice on public housing revitalization in Toronto, while also providing recommendations about how local factors integral to the success of the revitalization could be applied to future redevelopment projects in Toronto or other cities. Following this, Chapter Nine summarizes the conclusions from this thesis, reiterates recommendations generated from the research process, and discusses possible avenues for future research of the Regent Park revitalization or mixed-income redevelopment projects more broadly.

Prior to a discussion of these findings, however, the upcoming chapters address several themes related to the Regent Park revitalization, beginning in the next chapter, Chapter Two, with a definition and discussion of 3Ps, the method of service or infrastructure delivery used for the revitalization project.
2 Public-Private Partnerships

The revitalization of Regent Park is being conducted using a public-private partnership between Toronto Community Housing, the city’s public housing agency, and Daniels, a private real estate developer. The objectives of this research address the experiences of industry professionals involved in the 3P revitalization process at Regent Park within the Toronto policy and development context. This chapter provides relevant background information on 3Ps over the course of the following sections (followed by a conclusion section):

- **Section 2.1: Definition and Applications of Public-Private Partnerships.** This section provides a definition of 3Ps from the literature, summarizes the history and purpose of modern 3Ps, and briefly discusses the application of 3Ps across the world.

- **Section 2.2: Public-Private Partnerships in Canada.** This section includes an overview of the use of 3Ps in Canada and summarizes discussions of the different applications and effectiveness of Canadian 3Ps in the literature.

- **Section 2.3: Affordable Housing Public-Private Partnerships in Canada.** In this section, applications of 3Ps for affordable housing provision are reviewed in several Canadian cities, including Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Winnipeg, and Calgary.

2.1 Definition and Applications of Public-Private Partnerships

Public-private partnerships are collaborative projects between governments and private companies, in which the private company is usually involved in the provision of public services or infrastructure construction (Johnston, 2009c). In many cases, a special purpose vehicle, a distinct legal entity, is established by the public
and private sector partners to implement a 3P, in part, to limit the legal liability of the partners (Boardman et al., 2016). The level of involvement of each sector in a 3P can take many forms, with either the public or private sector partner assuming responsibility for initiating, leading, financing, owning, and/or operating a 3P project. Partnerships are often customized to meet the objectives of both partners (Stainback, 2000).

The first modern application of a 3P occurred in 1973, when the United States federal government passed legislation to redevelop Pennsylvania Ave. in Washington, DC through land-lease partnerships with private developers (Stainback, 2000). In the UK, 3Ps came into practice during the 1990s, reflecting the widespread adoption of 3Ps by the governments of many western nations to address a growing deficit in the provision of public services and infrastructure. This deficit was the product of an overall decline in funding availability that began during the neoliberal restructuring of western economies and retrenchment of state activities during the 1970s (Boardman et al., 2016). Public-private partnerships have increased in popularity in western nations for various reasons, including, but not limited to:

- Increased population, which necessitates new services and infrastructure;
- Increased service costs, which limit funds for capital improvements;
- Increased comfort with 3Ps from the public and private sectors following (perceived) successes;
- Increased comfort with 3Ps from lending markets;
- Increased sophistication of partnership deal structuring;
- Voter resistance to taxes;
- Public sector realizing the value of underutilized and surplus real estate;
- Private sector financing costs becoming competitive with public sector costs;
- Public sector requirements to explore the use of 3Ps before traditional procurement models (where government agencies select contractors following a bidding process); and,
- The inability of the public sector to complete large-scale, but necessary public service and infrastructure projects in weaker economies (Stainback, 2000).
In the US, 3Ps have been used mostly for roads and highways (Aziz & Migliaccio, 2016), water treatment plants, and prisons (Boardman et al., 2016). In the UK, 3Ps have been commonly used to build road, railway, and healthcare infrastructure (Hellowell, 2010; Asenova & Beck, 2016). The use of 3Ps has spread to a variety of other developed and developing countries (Pessoa, 2010; Parker & Figueira, 2010), as well as the United Nations (Bull, 2010) and the World Bank (Noumba-Um, 2010). In countries such as India (Laishram & Devkar, 2016), Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Columbia, 3Ps have been used to construct highways and public transit networks (Boardman et al., 2016). In Africa, including Nigeria (Dada & Oyediran, 2016) and South Africa, governments have turned to 3Ps to construct hospitals, government buildings, toll roads, and mass transit (Boardman et al., 2016). The Chinese government has also adopted the use of 3Ps (Ke & Wang, 2016), although the lines between the public and private sectors are often blurred in China (Boardman et al., 2016). Public-private partnerships have also been used in the following locations (however, this list is not exhaustive, as a review of the use of 3Ps globally is beyond the scope of this project): Australia; Belgium; Finland; Greece; Hong Kong; Indonesia; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Malaysia; Portugal; South Korea; Spain; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Turkey; Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe; and Scandinavia (e.g., see Akintoye et al., 2016; Hodge et al., 2010; Boardman et al., 2016).

2.2 Public-Private Partnerships in Canada

In the last three decades, 3Ps have increasingly been used to deliver public services and infrastructure in Canada. Between 1990 and 2015, over 220 projects in the country were delivered using 3Ps, with nearly 100 projects currently in planning or progress and over 100 3Ps in use to operate services or facilities (Siemiatycki, 2015). Despite the economic downturn of 2008, the popularity of 3Ps in Canada has remained strong (Siemiatycki, 2015); in some cases, governments in Canada have been more inclined to involve the private sector because of financial limitations brought about by the 2008 recession (Loxley, 2012). As 3Ps have become more common, they have also become more institutionalized, with specific government
agencies created to oversee 3Ps and consult other public agencies and bodies over the course of the 3P process (Siemiatycki, 2015; Boardman et al., 2016).

Most 3Ps in Canada have been used for infrastructure projects. Canadian governments have frequently partnered with the private sector to deliver transportation (Boardman et al., 2016), healthcare (Whiteside, 2015), and waste and wastewater facilities (Siemiatycki, 2015). In many cases, 3Ps are initiated by provincial governments for use in urban areas, particularly for transportation infrastructure (Boardman et al., 2016; Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). Ontario has been the most common adopter of 3Ps, often, to create transportation infrastructure, such as Highway 407 in the Greater Toronto Area and the Herb Gray Parkway in Windsor, and light rail transit lines in Toronto, Ottawa, and Waterloo (Boardman et al., 2016). Typically, the private sector provides management and operating services over the course of a long-term contract, while the facility remains publicly owned (Cohn, 2008).

The use of 3Ps in Canada can be understood as taking place within two fairly distinct phases. The first phase of 3Ps began during the 1990s and ended in the early-2000s. First phase 3Ps were planned by governments, principally, as a strategy to build infrastructure without incurring debt. Rather than financing projects using debt, public agencies provided funding to private sector partners through upfront leases or fees from future users of the service or facility constructed (Siemiatycki, 2015). Fiscally conservative governments, such as the Progressive Conservative governments under Premiers Mike Harris and Ernie Eves in Ontario, emerged during a period of fiscal austerity following the early-1990s recession. These governments promoted smaller government, deregulation, and outsourcing and privatization of services and infrastructure, including using 3Ps to leverage private financing for large-scale infrastructure projects (Loxley & Loxley, 2010; Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011). Examples of first phase 3Ps include Highway 407 and the Brampton and Royal Ottawa Hospitals in Ontario, Confederation Bridge and toll roads in New Brunswick, and various water treatment plants and sports complexes across Canada (Siemietycki, 2015a; Krawchenko & Stoney, 2011).
The first phase of 3Ps in Canada were met with significant criticisms, however, from voters, progressive politicians, and organized labour in the early-2000s (Loxley & Loxley, 2010; Siemiatycki, 2015). The criticisms were related to a lack of upfront assessment of 3P proposals, poor transparency of the 3P process, high private financing costs (which were passed on to the public sector), high private sector profit margins (which were not passed on to the public sector), the loss of public control of public assets, public opposition to user fees, and contract instability resulting in public sector concessions or contract termination (Canadian Union of Public Employees, 2010). Overall, this first phase of 3Ps were deemed not be in the public interest and became associated with the damaged political brand of privatization (Siemiatycki, 2015). Newly-elected, somewhat fiscally progressive governments, such as the Ontario Liberals under Premier Dalton McGuinty, initiated a series of reforms to the use of 3Ps in the early-2000s, including the creation of 3P proposal evaluation tools and special 3P implementation agencies (Cohn, 2008).

The reforms of the early-2000s resulted in a second phase of 3Ps that did not differ much from traditional procurement models that predated first phase 3Ps. Most second phase 3Ps are only considered by 3P agencies following approval from legislative bodies, and governments generally restrict private sector involvement to the design, construction, financing, and maintenance phases. Private firms are no longer typically allowed to own, operate, and/or control public facilities built through 3Ps, particularly those concerned with social service delivery, such as hospitals, prisons, and schools (Brown et al., 2009). Following these reforms, second phase 3Ps have generally been used by the provincial governments of Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec for roads and bridges, public transit, water and waste treatment facilities, cultural facilities, and selected healthcare, justice, and education facilities (with reduced private sector involvement in operation) (Siemiatycki, 2015).

Second phase 3Ps have not been used as significantly for infrastructure creation compared to first phase 3Ps. Due to public opposition, second phase 3Ps usually do not provide user fees or ongoing revenue streams to private sector partners, meaning that the public sector has assumed greater responsibility for operating costs (Siemiatycki, 2015). As a result, the private sector continues to benefit from partnerships
because of the lower financing rates available to the public sector, while the public sector maintains control over the long-term operation of services and infrastructure created through 3Ps (Siemiatycki & Friedman, 2012; Siemiatycki, 2015). Partnerships have shifted toward developing short-term projects and providing greater incentives for on-time and -budget completion to the private sector (Siemiatycki, 2015). With second phase 3Ps, the private sector is primarily responsible for construction, with ownership and control remaining with the public sector (Siemiatycki & Farooqi, 2012; Siemiatycki, 2015). Overall, the more conservative nature of second phase 3Ps has made them more fiscally and politically beneficial options for public sector agencies in Canada (Siemiatycki, 2015).

2.3 Affordable Housing Public-Private Partnerships in Canada

In Canada, 3Ps have only very recently begun to deliver affordable housing (Siemiatycki, 2015). In comparison, 3Ps have been used frequently in the US and UK for public housing development in the last 30 to 40 years (Stainback, 2000). In the US, 3Ps have become the dominant mechanism for the provision of low-income housing, with local, state, and federal governments encouraging private sector participation with grants, interest rate subsidies, mortgage insurance programs for developers (Moskalyk, 2008), and tax credits for investors (McClure, 2006). In the UK, private financing has supplemented public subsidies for low-income housing since 1988 (Lomax, 1996), and central and local governments routinely enter into long-term contracts with private firms to provide low-income housing in exchange for tax credits (Moskalyk, 2008).

The use of 3Ps for housing in Canada has not yet matched the scale of application for other infrastructure projects, such as transportation and healthcare facilities, because housing projects must often be “hand-crafted” for local circumstances. While the processes for traditional large-scale 3Ps used by the provincial and federal governments have become more standardized since the early-2000s (since similar services, such as hospitals, were needed in several locations), there is less similarity across small- to medium-sized housing development projects in terms of project scope, existing site conditions, or intended
development, among other factors. Additionally, these projects often involve the municipal government as the principal public sector entity, where expertise and experience may be lacking relative to the provincial and federal governments, who have established special 3P agencies to oversee partnerships (McKellar & Gordon, 2007).

While Canada has trailed behind the US and UK in the use of 3Ps for housing provision, public housing is one of the areas in which Canadian governments have increasingly been looking to expand private sector involvement (Siemiatycki, 2015). And, in recent years, examples of the use of 3Ps for low-income housing have become more common, including the Regent Park revitalization, with more projects planned in Toronto and other Canadian cities. The following sections describes some of the examples of 3Ps for low-income housing from the Canadian context.

### 2.3.1 Winnipeg, Calgary, and Other Medium-Sized Cities

In Winnipeg, Manitoba, two widely different collaborations between the public and private sectors have taken place. In the mid-1990s, a non-profit developer created the *Housing Opportunity Partnership*, which, on an ongoing basis, acquires deteriorating houses in the downtown area, renovates these houses, and sells the houses at discounted prices to low- to moderate-income buyers. To achieve financial viability, funding is provided by all three levels of government and through charitable contributions from local private developers. Real estate, planning, design, and construction expertise and services are provided at little to no cost from local developers, design firms, and construction companies (Moskalyk, 2008; Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation [CMHC], 1998).

In the late-1990s, a private developer entered into a partnership with a Winnipeg-based non-profit housing provider and was granted provincial and federal funding for subsidized rental units within an existing apartment building undergoing condominium conversion. The non-profit developer, *Ten Ten Sinclair*, was granted ownership of 15 of the 156 condo units in the building, which it provides to low-income, physically-disabled tenants (Kowalchuk, 2004; Ten Ten Sinclair Housing, n.d.).
Similar projects have taken place in other medium-sized Canadian cities, such as the **Bob Ward Residence** in Calgary, Alberta, in which mid-rise apartments for low-income, disabled tenants were constructed in 2003 through a partnership between three levels of government, non-profit developers, and local charities using financial contributions from private developers (Moskalyk, 2008; Horizon Housing, 2016). Similar projects have taken place at smaller scales in Kamloops, British Columbia and Saint John, New Brunswick (CHMC, 1998).

### 2.3.2 Montreal, Quebec

Since the mid-1990s, there have been many examples of public and private sector cooperation to develop and revitalize housing in Montreal. **Hochelaga**, a historically low-income neighbourhood east of the downtown core, has been the site of frequent collaborations between local activists, private developers, and all three levels of government (D. Rose et al., 2013). In 1995, the provincial government instituted a neighbourhood revitalization program that matched municipal funding to revitalize deteriorated low-income housing and introduce market rent housing in the neighbourhood (CMHC, 1998). To introduce greater social diversity, several former industrial sites in Hochelaga have been redeveloped through public and private sector collaboration into public housing and market condos as part of the revitalization program (D. Rose et al., 2013).

A redevelopment project similar the Regent Park revitalization took place at **Benny Farm**, a large, post-war housing complex east of downtown Montreal originally designed to house World War II veterans. In the intervening decades, Benny Farm transitioned to providing housing for a range of low-income tenants, but fell into severe disrepair. Following repeated failed attempts to redevelop the site in the 1990s, the revitalization of Benny Farm was initiated in 2002 by the Canadian Lands Company, a Crown corporation that manages land holdings, in partnership with non-profit developers and housing co-operatives. Major renovations were conducted on a third of the site, while the rest of the housing was demolished and higher-density rental units and condominiums were built, more than doubling the total housing on site and
preserving most of the existing green space. In 2010, the revitalization process was completed at Benny Farm (CMHC, 2011).

2.3.3 Vancouver, British Columbia

Vancouver has also become the site of collaborations between the public and private sectors to revitalize and develop affordable housing. These efforts were captured by the Vancouver Agreement (2000), an urban development compact between all three levels of government to revitalize the Downtown Eastside, an area that had become notorious for homelessness, drug abuse, and criminal activity (Mason, 2007).

The most prominent example of 3P development in the Downtown Eastside under the Vancouver Agreement was the revitalization of the Woodward’s Department Store site. Woodward’s had closed in 1993 after 100 years of operation, and was occupied by squatters when the property was purchased in 2003 by the City of Vancouver (Enright, 2010). Following a lengthy public consultation and partnership selection process, a pair of private developers were chosen as project partners. Construction began in 2006 and was completed in 2009. As part of the partnership agreement, the City transferred ownership of portions of the site to developers for the construction of 536 market-value condos. In exchange, the developers built 200 affordable rental apartments (MacDonald, 2010; Flanigan, 2010).

All three levels of government provided substantial capital contributions toward the redevelopment of the Woodward’s site, which had previously consisted of various mid-rise commercial buildings. Heritage attributes of the original buildings were conserved, while a series of high-rise towers were constructed to house the market and non-market housing. Commercial spaces were added, an indoor public atrium and an outdoor public square were built, and space was provided to several local service providers, such as the new Simon Fraser University School for the Contemporary Arts (Enright, 2010).

The Woodward’s development was one of the first of its kind at such a large scale, and was met with initial reluctance from developers; however, all of the condo units sold out on the first day of sales (Flanigan, 2010). There are many similarities between the Woodward’s and Regent Park revitalizations. Both
Woodward’s and Regent Park are large, centrally-located sites in major urban areas that had fallen into disrepair. Redevelopment at both sites has included the construction of affordable housing, and the government agencies responsible for redevelopment at both sites expressed strong interest in involving the private sector to mitigate public sector costs (Nicholson, 2012).

2.3.4 Toronto, Ontario

Since the creation of TCH in 2002, the housing provider has pursued a policy of revitalization to improve their existing housing stock by involving private sector developers (TCH, 2017). Regent Park, along with Don Mount Court, a subsidized housing community in downtown east Toronto, were the first two projects that TCH initiated under this policy direction. Toronto Community Housing’s revitalization efforts represent a slightly different type of 3P for low-income housing, as they strictly follow a pattern of revitalization of government-owned subsidized housing, not simply affordable housing provided by non-profits, co-ops, or private developers, and they involve market condominium development almost exclusively, with private condo developers being responsible for constructing public housing units.

Don Mount Court was the first 3P public housing revitalization project completed in Canada (TCH, 2017). Similar to Regent Park, Don Mount Court was built during the post-war period of Modernist urban design: mid-rise tenements facing away from the street were built in a park-like setting, enabling criminal behaviour by impeding informal surveillance (Nicholson, 2012). Construction of the original structures was completed in 1968, but poor building quality and insufficient maintenance spending led to major structural deficiencies. Shortly after TCH assumed responsibility for the site in 2002, the redevelopment process was initiated. Demolition began in 2004 and the project was completed in 2010 (TCH, 2017; August, 2015). All 232 subsidized housing units were rebuilt as “stacked” townhouses (townhouses comprised of multiple units layered, or “stacked”, on top of each other), with an additional 187 market condo townhouses added to the site (August, 2015; TCH, 2017). Upon completion, the area was renamed “Rivertowne”, in part to disassociate the community with the negative perception of Don Mount Court (August, 2014). Due to its
smaller size, Don Mount Court has been referred to as a “testing ground” for the Regent Park revitalization (Nicholson, 2012; August, 2015; 2014; James, 2010).

Since initiating the Don Mount Court and Regent Park revitalizations, TCH has pursued several other development projects (TCH, 2017]). In 2009, TCH began the process of revitalizing Alexandra Park, a post-war public housing community in west downtown Toronto (TCH, 2017c; Toronto Neighbourhood Guide, 2016). Demolition began in February 2014, with construction taking place over a series of phases until completion between 2026 and 2029. Thirty-three subsidized units will be replaced and 473 will be refurbished, with new amenities and retail space added to the site (TCH, 2017c). To fund the redevelopment and diversify the social composition of Alexandra Park, TCH has partnered with Tridel, the largest condominium developer in Toronto (Rosen, 2016), who will construct 1540 market-rate condo units (TCH, 2017c).
Construction began on the *Railways Lands* project in May 2010, a 41-storey high-rise building located within a neighbourhood of new condominium developments on former railway lands in downtown Toronto (TCH, 2017h; Urban Toronto, 2015). Built through a partnership with Context Developments, a Toronto-based developer, the building includes 133 new subsidized units and 294 affordable rental units, as well as retail space on the ground floor. The Railways Lands development was completed in September 2013 (TCH, 2017h).

Public consultations began in July 2010 for the redevelopment of *Allenbury Gardens*, a small, post-war public housing site in the Toronto borough of North York. Toronto Community Housing selected local developer FRAM Building Group as the private sector partner. Demolition of the existing 127 low-rise units began in 2015, initiating the first of two phases that will be used to redevelop the site. Allenbury Gardens will be densified to accommodate 900 new market condominium units by the expected project completion date of 2020 (TCH, 2017d).

In July 2010, Tridel was selected as the private sector partner for the redevelopment of *Leslie Nymark*, another small, post-war TCH site in North York. The 121 stacked townhouse units on the site will be demolished and replaced, and 540 market-rate condominiums and new amenity spaces will be added. Construction began in 2017, with completion expected in 2019 (TCH, 2017g; Sunshine, 2016).

*Lawrence Heights*, the largest public housing site in Toronto (by area), was selected for redevelopment by TCH in 2011 (TCH, 2017f). Located in western North York, Lawrence Heights is similar to Regent Park in that it is a large-scale, post-war, Modernist housing complex that had fallen into disrepair and become notorious for criminal activity harboured by its inward-facing design (Wingrove, 2009). Demolition of the 1208 subsidized units began in October 2015, initiating a process that will see the site intensified to accommodate 4092 new market condominiums, as well as new public parks, schools, and retail space. Context Developments and Metropia (another Canada-based developer) were both selected as private sector partners for the first phase of the project, which is projected for completion around 2035 (TCH, 2017f).
The most recent 3P that TCH has entered is the revitalization of 250 Davenport Road, a subsidized high-rise apartment constructed in 1969 in the Annex neighbourhood in downtown Toronto (Architectural Conservancy Ontario, Toronto Branch, 2016; TCH, 2017a). With the building falling into disrepair, TCH deemed an adjoining park on the site to be expendable, selling it to Metropia and Toronto-based developer DiamondCorp to develop into high-rise condominium buildings (Kupferman, 2015). The proceeds from the sale will be used to replace 11 subsidized townhouses on site and refurbish the 449 units in the apartment building. Construction on the project began in 2015, and is expected to continue until 2018 at the earliest (TCH, 2017a).

2.4 Conclusion

Chapter Two has addressed themes relevant to 3Ps, the method of service and infrastructure delivery currently being used to complete the Regent Park revitalization. The chapter defined and briefly reviewed the use of 3Ps globally and provided an overview of 3P experiences in Canada, including their application for affordable housing development.

Public-private partnerships are collaborative projects between the public and private sectors, in which private firms are usually involved in the construction and/or provision of public services or infrastructure (Johnston, 2009c) (Section 2.1). Modern 3Ps were first used in the US in 1973 (Stainback, 2000), spread to the UK in the 1990s, and have since been adopted in several developed and developing countries worldwide, reflecting the general retrenchment of state activity as part of neoliberal restructuring since the 1970s (Boardman et al., 2016). Globally, 3Ps have been used for roads and highways, rail transportation, water treatment facilities, hospitals, and prisons, among many other applications.

Public services and infrastructure in Canada have increasingly been provided through 3Ps over the last three decades (Siemiatycki, 2015) (Section 2.2). Most Canadian 3Ps have been used to build infrastructure, including transportation facilities, water treatment plants (Boardman et al., 2016), and
hospitals (Whiteside, 2015). During the 1990s and early-2000s, the first phase of 3Ps were principally used to build infrastructure without incurring public debt by relying on the private sector to fund and maintain the services and facilities created, such as Highway 407 in the GTA (Siemiatycki, 2015). First phase 3Ps were criticized for minimizing public control of public assets, poor transparency, and high financing costs for governments (among other factors), while providing significant control of public facilities and long-term profits to the private sector (Loxley & Loxley, 2010; Siemiatycki, 2015; Auditor General of Ontario, 2008). Government reforms across Canada in the early-2000s led to the rise of second phase 3Ps that do not differ significantly from traditional procurement projects, as they typically do not transfer significant control of services or infrastructure and associated long-term profits to the private sector (Siemiatycki & Farooqi, 2012; Siemiatycki & Friedman, 2012). Second phase 3Ps have been used less extensively than first phase 3Ps, but overall have been beneficial for government agencies and public users (Siemiatycki, 2015).

In Canada, the use of 3Ps for low-income housing provision is less common relative to other infrastructure projects, such as transportation and healthcare facilities, but has been expanding in recent years (Siemiatycki, 2015) (Section 2.3). In general, 3Ps involving land development in Canada have not been used extensively because they must be “hand-crafted” for local circumstances, such as project scope, site conditions, or the type of development intended, offering fewer opportunities for standardization. Similarly, real estate 3Ps often involve municipal governments, who may not possess the same expertise or experience with partnerships as provincial or federal agencies (McKellar & Gordon, 2007). Since the mid-1990s, however, affordable housing 3Ps of varying composition have been used across Canadian cities, including Montreal (D. Rose et al., 2013; CMHC, 2011), Vancouver (Enright, 2010), Calgary (Moskalyk, 2008), and Winnipeg (Kowalchuk, 2004). In Toronto, TCH has initiated several public housing development and redevelopment 3Ps since the early-2000s, beginning with the Regent Park and Don Mount Court revitalizations (August, 2015). Of the revitalization projects at which TCH has since broken ground, the projects at Alexandra Park, in west downtown Toronto, and Lawrence Heights, in the borough of North York, are two post-war sites most similar to Regent Park in scale, process, and pre-existing conditions.
Overall, this chapter has provided an overview of the use of 3Ps, with a strong focus on the application of 3Ps in Canada, including their use for affordable housing development. The increased use of 3Ps for affordable housing in Canada is a reflection, broadly, of historic and contemporary cultural, socio-economic, and political characteristics of the country (Walks, 2011). Concurrently, the application of 3Ps for affordable housing development in Canada is directly tied to national and local housing policy decisions (Hodge & Gordon, 2014). The next chapter, Chapter Three, describes the cultural, socio-economic, and political characteristics of Canada, over the course of a discussion of similarities and differences between Canadian and American cities. Chapter Three also reviews historic and contemporary housing policy decisions in Canada, including those related to partnering with private sector entities, again within the context of distinguishing Canadian experiences from those in the US. Chapters Four and Five will then include details about how public sector involvement with private developers in Toronto became a key component of efforts to revitalize Regent Park.
3 The Differences Between Canada and the US

The Regent Park revitalization needs to be examined through a local geographic lens of analysis because several differences exist between Canada and the United States. The following two chapters, Chapters Three and Four, provide evidence of these differences, as well as insight into the unique aspects of the local development context, with a strong focus on housing development policy and practices. This chapter, Chapter Three, reviews broad cultural, socio-economic, and political differences between Canada and the US. Chapter Three also provides an account of historic and contemporary public housing policies and practices in Canada and the US. Housing policy and social mix experiences from Toronto are described in greater detail within the chapter. Chapter Three is organized in the following structure (plus a conclusion section):

- **Section 3.1: Canadian Versus American Cities**: This section summarizes comparisons of Canadian and American cities in the literature, addressing similarities and differences in terms of cultural values, socio-economic character, political structure, and spatial organization.

- **Section 3.2: Public Housing Policy and Mixed-Income Development in the US**: This section describes historic and contemporary public housing and mixed-income development policies and practices in the US.

- **Section 3.3: Public Housing and Social Mix in Canada and Toronto**: In this section, public housing and social mix policies from Canadian experiences are discussed.

Following Chapter Three, the next chapter, Chapter Four, will provide greater detail about the unique policy and development context of Toronto.
3.1 Canadian Versus American Cities

There are several differences between Canadian and American cities in terms of their political, cultural, and socio-economic character. Understanding the differences between cities in Canada and the US is essential for contextualizing the unique local development framework for the Regent Park revitalization. This section engages with the contemporary discussions of the similarities and differences between cities in Canada and the US.

Contemporary comparisons of Canadian and American cities began in the 1970s, though the first conclusion, advanced by Yeates and Garner in 1976, was that there exists a “common” North American city. Yeates and Garner (1976) analyzed systems, structures, and policies in cities across Canada and the US, concluding that the common North American city is characterized by massive migration from Europe in the second half of the 19th century, capitalism-driven growth until the first half of the 20th century, and inner-city decline and economic decentralization favouring the suburbs in the latter half of the 20th century. Canadian and American cities were conceptualized by Yeates and Garner (1976) as being highly similar, due to common history and geography across the two countries.

The concept of the common North American city was heavily critiqued and challenged in the 1980s, however. Most notably, Goldberg and Mercer (1986), in their analysis of Canadian and American cities according to a series of economic, political, social, and value system variables, argued that Canada and the US exhibited distinct differences in terms of their economies, political systems, social policies, and value systems. Goldberg and Mercer (1986) identified cultural differences, namely, Canadians’ preference for collectivism and Americans’ embracing of individualism, as the most significant distinction between the two countries and a characteristic most responsible for the divergent political and economic paths followed by the two countries. Frisken (1986) agreed with Goldberg and Mercer that Canadian and US cities were not identical, but contended that differences between the two countries were the product of variations in institutional and political systems, not cultural distinctions.
Lipset (1990) argued that the distinctions between Canada and the US are the result of the different origins of the two nations. Where the US founding principles were “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”, Canada’s constitutional authors emphasized “peace, order, and good government”. This has resulted, broadly, in Canadians being less suspicious of state authority relative to Americans, permitting more substantial state involvement in business and welfare provision. The two countries’ constitutions reflected and reinforced a dichotomy between Canadian egalitarianism and American meritocracy. Canadians have traditionally been more class aware, and therefore more open to redistributive policies to bridge socio-economic disparity, while Americans have resisted more generous welfare provisions, as this would contrast with American reverence for competition and personal responsibility (Lipset, 1990).

However, recent comparison of Canadian and American cities has noted that the two countries remain similar in terms of their spatial systems and the built environment. In broad terms, Canadian and American cities consist of (from central to peripheral parts of the city):

- An older, central core, often based on a grid street system, that includes the tallest buildings in the city and is generally comprised of non-residential uses;
- An inner core of older residential areas;
- Moderately central industrial areas, which are likely to not be used extensively in recent decades or have been redeveloped for other uses;
- A ring of older suburban areas; and,
- An outer ring of newer suburban areas, connected to the inner city and other suburban areas by an extensive highway system (and a modest public transit system, in some cases) (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015).

Canadian and American cities are also similar in that they have continued to experience significant population growth in the 21st century, due to immigration, inexpensive energy, abundant land resources, and
a generally upward trending market economy. Cities in Canada and the US also share similar municipal governance structures, in that common planning systems and master plans are often used to develop urban areas (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015).

The literature has pointed to increasing similarities between Canadian and American cities, due to economic integration between the two countries and more widespread adoption of neoliberal economic and social policy in response to the pressures of globalization (Walks, 2011; Courchene, 2001). Some of these similar policies, broadly-speaking, include: scaling back the welfare state; lowering taxes; using targeted, as opposed to universal, social programs; privatizing state assets and services (though, to a higher degree in the US); and encouraging public agencies to adopt business models (Walks, 2011; Hackworth, 2007; Thomas & Biette, 2014).

Globalization has led to a convergence of social and economic policy across modern industrial nations, especially between Canada and the US, but continued analysis of Canadian and American cities in the literature has cautioned against conflating globalization-influenced convergence of public policy with the elimination of differences between Canada and the US (Walks, 2011; Mercer & England, 2000; Z. Taylor, 2015). Although Canadian cities have responded to the pressures of globalization by adopting neoliberal tactics, the specific form of policy responses and the degree to which governments have implemented neoliberal reforms have diverged from American responses, according to local social, economic, political, behavioural, and geographical contexts (Boudreau et al., 2007; Bourne, Hutton, et al., 2011; Mercer & England, 2000). While Canadian cities continue to reflect many characteristics of other western industrial nations, especially the US, a number of distinctions have continued to be identified in recent literature.

Segregation, particularly economic and racial segregation, is less evident in Canadian cities (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015), and inner-city “ghettos” are far less common in Canadian cities such as Toronto (Polèse & Simmons, 2011). Broadly-speaking, the scarcity of inner-city ghettos in Canada relative to the US is the result of divergent demographic and social histories and geographies. Many downtown neighbourhoods in the US have traditionally been home to racialized, in particular, black, families and their descendants, and have
therefore continued to perpetuate the oppressive, polarizing, and isolating legacy of plantation economies and slavery in cities (Polèse & Simmons, 2011). While socio-spatial polarization is not entirely absent in Canadian cities, lower-income areas in both inner-city and inner-suburban neighbourhoods in Canada are not nearly as racially segregated or in as extreme economic distress as American “ghettos” (Walks & Bourne, 2006). Further, lower-income families in Canadian cities are generally concentrated in higher-density apartment neighbourhoods within the inner suburbs, with higher-income residents living in the oldest residential areas closest to the downtown core (Walks & Bourne, 2006). Lower-income, racialized neighbourhoods in Canada, including Regent Park, have not become sites of intergenerational black poverty as in the US (Polèse & Simmons, 2011). In comparison, Canadian cities have generally experienced continuous settlement and integration of immigrants, both spatially and socially, which has reflected and reinforced a relatively stronger acceptance and openness toward immigrants in Canadian society (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015).

Economic polarization, especially between recent immigrants and native-born citizens, is also far less pronounced in Canada relative to the US (Polèse & Simmons, 2011). Greater equality of income in Canadian cities is the product of social and economic policies enacted at all levels of government that reflect wider social and cultural values in Canada, such as socio-economic equalization and the integration of economically, socially, and ethnically diverse populations (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015). In comparison, economic polarization is far stronger in the US, where high-income households are increasingly earning more income per year relative to middle- and low-income households, whose inflation-adjusted incomes have generally remained steady since the 1970s. Moreover, the middle class has shrunk over the previous five decades in the US (from 58% of households in 1970 to 47% in 2014), with more middle-income households moving to the lower-income brackets than higher (0.25% of middle-income households became high-income households since 2000, while 3.25% became low-income households) (Alichi et al., 2016). According to the Gini coefficient (one of many measures of income inequality), Canada experiences less economic polarization than the US, with a
Gini coefficient of 0.441, compared to 0.486 in the US in 2013\(^3\) (Conference Board of Canada, 2017). While income inequality has also increased in Canada since the 1990s, it remains low according to international standards, and is far less evident compared to the US (Walks, 2013; Bourne et al., 2011). Income polarization in Canada has not been as severe as in the US because government has played a stronger role in creating and regulating urban policies intended to address economic disparities. In Canada, policies related to urban growth, transportation, and infrastructure planning, implemented through spending, taxation, and regulation strategies, are all partly a component of addressing income inequality (Bourne, Hutton, et al., 2011).

There exists in the literature some debate with respect to both the definition and effectiveness of the current urban policy framework in Canada, however. One school of thought sees Canadian cities as being limited in their ability to initiate policy or projects independently, as municipalities operate within the legislative, political, and fiscal framework created by the provinces, and are highly influenced by budgetary decisions made at the federal level of government. Similarly, while federal policy decisions related to spending and taxation strongly influence urban policy direction, there is no explicit national urban policy, meaning that decision-making across municipalities is uncoordinated and could potentially result in contradictory or unintended outcomes (Simmons et al., 2011). For example, the provincial government recently prevented Toronto from implementing highway tolls due to opposition from suburban municipalities, even though Toronto is solely responsible for the cost of the highways (Moore, 2017). The effectiveness and form of spatial planning policy implementation has been characterized as varying strongly between Canadian cities, due to weak political arrangements across regional boundaries, strong local real estate industries, policy disagreement between upper and lower levels of government, and a diversity of local political culture and planning frameworks (Simmons et al., 2011). This segment of the literature conceptualizes Canadian cities, especially large cities like Toronto, as lacking both constitutional and fiscal authority to pursue new policies and projects. For instance, Toronto residents pay far more in provincial and federal taxes than the money spent within or transferred back to the city (Harris, 2008).

\(^3\) Where a Gini coefficient of 0 = total income equality and 1 = total income inequality.
A second school of thought sees urban policy creation and implementation in Canada in a positive light, characterizing recent policy efforts as being the product of regional cooperation of strong local governments. According to this view, municipal governments in Canada and the US were faced with a series of similar challenges during the 1990s, such as traffic congestion, ballooning infrastructure debt, and urban sprawl. In response, American cities used inter-municipal arrangements and public-private partnerships, while Canadian cities turned to greater provincial involvement in local planning institutions and decision-making. In the US, the absence of regional- or state-led policy strategies and greater private sector involvement has weakened the ability of many American municipalities to achieve consensus and make decisions with respect to urban planning. In comparison, Canadian urban policy, which is more strongly influenced by upper levels of government than in the US, is more coherent and authoritative. For example, the provinces have amalgamated neighbouring municipalities to create more powerful local governments and have created regional governance structures to oversee policy creation and implementation where it affects multiple municipalities. These arrangements have empowered local governments, both politically and fiscally, while also ensuring that local authorities are mandated to adhere to planning policies that can only be effective with widespread support and cooperation between municipalities. A notable example in Canada is greenbelt legislation, which has led to the creation of several greenbelts that border multiple neighbouring municipalities, and has only been effective because all adjacent municipalities are mandated to limit land use within the protected areas. This segment of the literature characterizes Canadian cities as being more effective than American cities at limiting urban sprawl, creating more coherent urban plans, and promoting greater social and economic equity across urban boundaries (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015). With respect to land use planning, in particular, the promotion of high-density development, both schools of thought agree that provincially-guided policy creation and implementation in Canada is far more effective than attempts at inter-municipal coordination without involvement from state legislatures in the US (Simmons et al., 2011; Tomalty & Mallach, 2015).
Stronger coordination of planning policy in Canadian cities has resulted in a number of different positive outcomes in terms of spatial structure when compared to American cities. A strong emphasis on mixing land uses in Canadian cities has resulted in a greater mix of residential and commercial buildings at a neighbourhood scale, somewhat negating the need for residents to own an automobile (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015). Mixing uses has also resulted in Canadian downtowns being used during both the day and night, whereas American downtowns are usually heavily comprised of office space, emptying out at the end of the business day (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015; Polèse & Simmons, 2011; Harris, 2008). Planning regulations in Canadian cities have also been more effective in encouraging smaller lots, fewer detached homes, and more dispersal of high-rise buildings across urban areas compared the US (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015). Canadian cities, generally, have fewer highways, roads, and parking spaces in central areas, and are better served by public transit and bike paths relative to the US (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015; Pucher & Buehler, 2006). Older suburbs are highly desirable for families in Canadian cities, and newer suburbs are more compact and better served by public transit. Families with children are as likely to live in central locations as they are in the suburbs, and school quality is equal between urban and suburban neighbourhoods, whereas better schools in suburban areas of US cities have continually encouraged the migration of families away from urban cores (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015).

Tomalty and Mallach (2015) summarize the difference between Canadian and American cities as being a difference in “vitality”, pointing to historic and contemporary factors that have led to greater “vitality” in Canadian cities relative to American cities. Historically, Canadian cities did not experience devastating urban renewal projects of the 1950s and 1960s to the same degree as American cities, Canadian cities have been far less subject to black/white racial conflict post-World War II compared to American cities, and Canadian cities have experienced greater immigration than American cities since the 1970s, allowing for more flow of human capital into Canadian urban areas. From a contemporary perspective, significantly lower crime rates, and generally successful public education systems in Canada have contributed to and been the product of greater “vitality” in Canadian cities relative to US cities (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015).
3.2 Public Housing Policy and Mixed-Income Development in the US

Public housing policies and practices are critical areas where Canadian and American experiences differ. Understanding these differences, particularly with respect to social mix policies, is essential for analyzing the Regent Park revitalization within a Canadian and Toronto-specific geographic context and outside of US-centric characterizations.

In the US, the level of support for public housing by the US federal government has alternated substantially since the 1930s. At times, it has received robust support and funding, while at other times, US public housing has been subject to severe funding cuts or even attempts to eliminate public housing altogether. Public housing policy and mixed-income development in the US can be conceptualized in the following three eras:

1. Public housing policies between the 1930s and 1980s;
2. Mixed-income redevelopment through the Homeownership Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) program, between 1992 and 2010; and,

This section will explore these three eras to understand the historic and contemporary public housing context in the US.

3.2.1 US Public Housing Policy, 1930s to 1980s

The US public housing system was developed within the context of the Great Depression. As part of Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation, the federal Public Works Administration was created in 1933 to fund and construct the first public housing projects in urban centres. The Housing Act of
1937 was passed by US Congress to provide adequate shelter for low- to moderate-income, working families living in poor-quality housing and create employment in the construction and real estate industries. The 1937 Act also established and funded the first public housing authorities (PHAs), city-level agencies that managed local housing complexes (Fraser et al., 2012). Between 1933 and 1949, approximately 170,000 public housing units were created in the US by the Public Works Administration and local PHAs (Schwartz, 2015; Hanlon, 2012).

The *Housing Act of 1949* authorized the expansion of the public housing stock by 810,000 units over six years in response to housing shortages for low-income families following World War II (Orlebeke, 2000). Passed with bipartisan support under the presidency of Democrat Harry Truman, the 1949 Act was partly the result of cooperation between the public and private sectors (Fraser et al., 2012). New construction provided employment for the building industry, and factory owners believed that their workers’ productivity was enhanced when living in adequate housing conditions, so the government was strongly lobbied to provide housing for both low- and moderate-income, working families (Orlebeke, 2000). New public housing was created through what was then termed “slum clearance”, whereby inner-city neighbourhoods in poor physical condition were demolished and replaced with large, high-density housing projects. In most cases, the demolished neighbourhoods were primarily inhabited by black, low-income families, who were relocated and concentrated within the new projects (Fraser et al., 2012).

The ambitious goals of the 1949 Act would not be achieved during its six-year timeline, however, as insufficient funding was provided by the US federal government. Concurrently, the efforts of PHAs to build public housing were slowed by local opposition in cities, who resisted the siting of new projects near middle-to high-income neighbourhoods. By 1959, ten years after the six-year, 810,000-unit goal of the 1949 Act was announced, less than a quarter of the planned units were constructed (Orlebeke, 2000). In total, there were 420,000 units of public housing in the US in 1959 (Schwartz, 2015; Hanlon, 2012).

The direction of public housing policy and development in the US underwent a series of dramatic shifts between the 1950s and 1970s. Each shift was often associated with a change in the political party in
control of Congress or the presidency: Republicans usually limited public housing spending and encouraged homeownership, while Democrats sought to expand and enhance the housing system (Orlebeke, 2000). The Housing Act of 1954, passed by Republicans, limited federal investment in public housing creation and shifted funding toward programs that enabled low-income families to achieve homeownership. The 1954 Act attempted to reduce reliance on public housing, recreating the housing system as a way to “prepare” low-income individuals for homeownership, following lobbying by the real estate industry. To encourage the modeling of behaviour suited for homeownership, the federal government required PHAs to adopt strict regulations mandating that tenants seek employment and avoid criminal activity to receive public housing. The rising fear of communism and socialism in the US also discouraged the federal government from promoting greater reliance on public housing, which was seen as being in opposition to personal responsibility (Parson, 2005). Housing eligibility shifted to reflect these changes, with the lowest income, single-parent families becoming the primary recipients of public housing, whereas working, two-parent families more capable of homeownership were transitioned out of the public system. These developments further slowed efforts to expand the public housing system by 810,000 units, as authorized by the 1949 Act (Fraser et al., 2012). Only by the late-1960s to early-1970s were the goals of the 1949 Act realized (Fraser et al., 2012; Hanlon, 2012).

A Democratic-controlled White House and Congress of the 1960s attempted to undo the previous retrenchment of the public housing system. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 created the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), elevating public housing to the cabinet level. Three years later, the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 reaffirmed the ambitious Housing Act of 1949 by authorizing building 1.6 million new public housing units, while avoiding displacement of existing residents. These attempts were short-lived, however, as the economic crisis of the 1970s led to Republican President Richard Nixon substantially cutting funding for public housing construction in 1973 (Orlebeke, 2000). Federal housing policy again placed a greater emphasis on private sector housing. Public housing tenants were provided with vouchers to acquire market rental housing at a discount and subsidies were
provided to private developers to rehabilitate and create housing for low-income families (Fraser et al., 2012). By 1980, there were just under 1.2 million public housing units in the US (Schwartz, 2015, Hanlon, 2012).

Under Republican presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush in the 1980s and early-1990s, federal funding for new housing construction was eliminated. The existing public stock fell into disrepair, partly as an outcome of the 1969 Brooke Amendment, which limited housing eligibility to the lowest of income earners, but resulted in PHAs having little funding available for maintenance and repairs. During the 1980s, the only subsidies available were tenant vouchers, while some public housing tenants were given the option to purchase their units. Due to the poor physical state of the housing stock, Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1989, which ultimately recommended the revitalization of public housing through the HOPE VI program (Fraser et al., 2012).

3.2.2 HOPE VI, 1992 to 2010

Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) was instituted in 1992 under Republican President George H.W. Bush in a Democratic-controlled Congress. As part of HOPE VI, multi-million dollar federal grants were provided to local PHAs to revitalize housing stock that had fallen into disrepair. In doing so, HOPE VI also aimed to desegregate racially and socially concentrated neighbourhoods. Between 1993 and 2010, a total of 262 grants were awarded to 133 local PHAs. The value of individual grants ranged from under $2 million to $50 million, with an average value of $24 million. Overall, over $6.2 billion was awarded through the HOPE VI program (HUD, 2011).

To receive HOPE VI grants, PHAs were required to redevelop high-density public housing sites into moderate-density, mixed-income communities using 3Ps (Fraser et al., 2011). By leveraging the value of public land previously unavailable for development, local PHAs secured additional financing from private sector lenders and developers (Fraser et al., 2011). To create a mix of income and tenure among residents, only a portion of existing public housing residents were moved back into new units on site, with the rest
given vouchers to find housing in the private rental market elsewhere in the city. HOPE VI initially contained a provision to replace demolished units one-to-one, but this rule was removed in 1995 following lobbying from the real estate industry and difficulties for PHAs in securing financing to replace all public units at their sites (Hackworth, 2007). In total, over 50,000 new public housing units were created through HOPE VI, but 200,000-250,000 net units of public housing are estimated to have been eliminated by the program (Hanlon, 2012, p. 375). From a peak of 1.4 million units in 1991, the public housing stock declined to under 1.2 million in 2008 (Hanlon, 2012, p. 376). A Republican government began scaling back HOPE VI in 2004, with the last grants awarded in 2010 (Hanlon, 2012).

### 3.2.3 Post-HOPE VI Policies, 2010 to 2016

Following the election of Democratic President Barack Obama in 2009, several initiatives were brought forward as successors to HOPE VI (DeFilippis, 2015). The *Preservation, Enhancement, and Transition of Rental Assistance Act* (PETRA), proposed in 2010, would have converted annual federal payments to PHAs into individual project-based rent contracts, in which guaranteed rental income could be leveraged by PHAs to secure private loans for capital improvements to existing housing. PETRA was similar to HOPE VI in that it would have allowed PHAs to leverage the value of existing public housing stock for private sector investment, but it differed in that the value came from guaranteed rent from the federal government, as opposed to construction contracts or access to publicly held land. PETRA also would not have resulted in the destruction of public housing or displacement of existing tenants. Despite the backing of President Obama and HUD, the initiative failed to reach Congress, due to opposition from tenants, academics, housing advocates, and Democratic congress members, based on the belief that it would lead to the privatization of the entire public housing system (J. Smith, 2015).

Following the failure of PETRA, in 2011, HUD received authorization from Congress to implement the Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program, a voluntary form of PETRA. As with PETRA, the federal government provides guaranteed rental income to PHAs that participate in RAD, allowing local housing
providers to leverage this income to secure private loans and partnerships with real estate developers to
revitalize existing housing. RAD encourages income mixing by placing a 50% cap on the number of units
eligible to receive guaranteed rent from the federal government (J. Smith, 2015). Critics have cautioned that
this provision may result in PHAs attempting to move 50% of families out of public housing projects during
redevelopment, since financial assistance is no longer available from the federal government for half of the
existing units (National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2012). Similar to HOPE VI, displaced tenants receive
vouchers to secure discounted private sector rental housing, as part of a strategy to deconcentrate racially
and socially segregated neighbourhoods (J. Smith, 2015).

While RAD represents a smaller-scaled public housing policy project, the Choice Neighborhoods
Initiative (CNI), introduced in 2010, was the centrepiece of a series of urban development projects pursued
by the Obama administration (Khare, 2015). As with HOPE VI, through CNI, PHAs are awarded grants with
values up to $30 million and are required to seek private sector financing and development partners. CNI
attempts to improve upon HOPE VI in a number of ways, however. Most critically, CNI mandates the
replacement of public housing units demolished on a one-to-one basis. CNI also differs from HOPE VI in that
it allows for any federally-assisted housing, such as private housing financed through vouchers, to be
redeveloped alongside public housing. CNI focuses on larger, neighbourhood-scale redevelopment, as
opposed to the site-specific projects targeted under HOPE VI (Pendall & Hendley, 2011). As part of this
neighbourhood development focus, CNI funds are invested in other areas beside housing construction,
including schools, social services, commercial property development, transportation, youth programs, or
recreational areas (Khare, 2015). Between 2010 and 2016, $620 million in CNI grants were awarded to PHAs
3.3 Public Housing and Social Mix in Canada and Toronto

The history of public housing and social mix policies and practices in Canada differ from experiences in the US. The Canadian- and Toronto-specific public housing context is a significant component of the local development environment surrounding the Regent Park revitalization; therefore, past practices with respect to public housing and social mixing in Canada must be understood to provide background to the analysis portions of this thesis, which discuss experiences within the unique, local development context of Toronto. This section, therefore, provides an overview of the local public housing policy history in which the revitalization has taken place.

In general, responsibility for public housing in Canada has continuously been passed down from higher levels of government to lower. The federal government of Canada assumed responsibility for public housing provision between the end of World War II and the early-1970s, playing its strongest role during the 1970s and 1980s. Downloading of responsibility for housing provision to the provinces in the 1980s, however, led to poor maintenance and little expansion of public housing in the subsequent decades. In Ontario, public housing was further devolved from the province to municipal governments in the 1990s, exacerbating pre-existing funding shortfalls for repairs and expansion (Moskalyk, 2008). Social mixing in public housing projects was indirectly promoted beginning in 1946, and became part of official federal government policies in 1973. In 1985, however, social mix policies were eliminated at the federal level, mirroring the withdrawal of the Canadian government from public housing over the next decade. As provincial, and then municipal, governments became responsible for public housing in Ontario, social mix policies persevered in Toronto, and have been strongly embraced over the last fifteen years as part of Toronto Community Housing’s revitalization efforts.
3.3.1 Establishment and Expansion of Public Housing, 1944 to 1973

The economic and military challenges brought about by World War II forced many western states into expansionist, activist, and managerial governance roles, establishing the welfare state that has persisted until the present in countries like the US, the UK, and Canada. Part of the welfare state strategies used by Canadian governments included making subsidized housing available, at first, to war veterans and their families, and soon after, to non-veteran low-income families in response to severe housing shortages across the country brought about by economic challenges following World War II (Nelles, 2008).

A Liberal federal government led by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King introduced the National Housing Act in 1944, consolidating existing housing policies and establishing a preeminent role for the federal government in public housing provision. In 1946, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) was created to oversee the federal government’s production and management of housing (CMHC, 2016). Between 1944 and 1973, almost all subsidized housing in Canada was built by the federal government, with costs shared 75-25 with the provinces (one of the exceptions being Regent Park North, which was funded by the City of Toronto) (Van Dyk, 1995; CMHC, 2016). This period saw the creation of the largest

Figure 5. Average annual affordable housing commitments in Canada by period, 1950 to 2013 (Sutor, 2016, p. 173).
public housing communities in the country, including Regent Park, Benny Farm in Montreal, and Strathcona Heights in Ottawa (CMHC, 2012). Less restrictive income requirements for tenants meant that a degree of mixing between residents of different social and economic groups took place within these projects. Those at the very lowest income levels lived alongside moderate-income households, with each group’s rent payments determined by their ability to pay (Kelly, 2015). Between 1950 and 1964, the first 14,000 public housing units were built in Canada (Suttor, 2016).

In 1964, recently elected federal Liberals under Prime Minister Lester Pearson (defeating Progressive Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, who had held the office since 1957), amended the National Housing Act to expand public housing construction by agreeing to pay for 90% of the capital costs and 50% of the operating costs of housing built by the provinces (Struthers, 2004). As a result, an average of 12,000 public housing units were created annually in Canada over the next eight years, bringing the total number of housing units in the country to approximately 110,000 in 1973 (Suttor, 2016).

3.3.2 Third Sector Housing and Social Mix Policies, 1974 to 1985

The 1973 oil shock and subsequent economic crisis led to fiscal austerity measures among governments in many western countries, including Canada’s federal government (Lightman, 2003; Lemon, 1993). As part of efforts to moderate spending on public housing, the Canadian government promoted the rise of a “third” sector of housing, implemented by community-based non-profit foundations and developers and operated by non-profit housing managers or co-operative rental associations (Thibert, 2007; Harris, 2012). Under Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, the federal government amended the National Housing Act in 1973 to introduce the Innovative Housing Program, a $200 million subsidy available to private and non-profit developers to create housing at a range of densities, ownership and operation structures, and tenure types (Van Dyk, 1995). Between 1974 and 1985, an average of 20,000 public housing units were created annually, mostly by the third sector, tripling the amount of public housing in the country to approximately 330,000 units (McAfee, 2015).
By the 1970s, the errors associated with large-scale public housing projects such as Regent Park were starting to be realized among policymakers and urban planners. These so-called “urban renewal” developments destroyed the social and physical character and fabric of pre-existing neighbourhoods by creating public housing sites that failed to acknowledge or integrate with surrounding land uses (K. Fernandes, 2011). In response, planners adopted a neighbourhood-scale lens for public housing development in the 1970s. Newer buildings were designed to be integrated with the scale and appearance of neighbouring structures. Urban planners attempted to avoid forcing interaction between residents or leaving open spaces shielded from formal and informal surveillance. Greater input was sought from low-income communities that would live in new affordable housing projects, and housing providers attempted to accommodate a wider variety of residents, such as the elderly, the disabled, and large families. Many of these projects involved the transformation of decommissioned industrial areas located close to the downtown cores in larger cities, such as St. Lawrence in Toronto, False Creek in Vancouver, and Angus Yards in Montreal (Thibert, 2007).

As part of the amendments made to the National Housing Act in 1973, a wider range of income levels were provided for in new housing communities (Thibert, 2007). This change followed the Canadian government’s declaration in 1972 that housing choice is a right, not a privilege (Pendakur, 1987). Between 1973 and 1985, social mix was an official part of federal housing policy in Canada, and criteria for affordable housing was relaxed to attract both low- and moderate-income residents (Thibert, 2007).

3.3.3 Devolution of Public Housing Responsibility, 1986 to Present

The election of a Progressive Conservative government in 1984 under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was the beginning of the end of the substantial role for the federal government in housing provision. Mulroney’s Conservatives sought to reduce the national deficit through spending cuts to government programs, including many of those administered by CMHC (Gladki & Pomeroy, 2007). Greater emphasis was placed on third sector housing provision during the Mulroney era, although funding was allocated only for the lowest-income households (Van Dyk, 1995). Similarly, spending on new housing construction and transfer payments to the
provinces for housing declined during the 1980s (Hulchanski & Shapcott, 2004). Annual production of public housing in Canada declined to 16,000 units per year between 1986 and 1993, despite the country’s growing population and housing need (Suttor, 2016).

In early-1993, the Progressive Conservative government withdrew entirely from providing new public housing. The Liberals returned to power later in 1993, but in the face of the early-1990s economic crisis, further reduced federal involvement in housing (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006). Between 1993 and 1996, responsibility for housing provision was transferred to provincial governments (McAfee, 2015). While some cost-sharing agreements between the federal and provincial governments were maintained, and some provinces, most notably, Ontario, continued with moderate levels of public housing construction, the provincial governments were unable to bridge the funding gap created by federal withdrawal (Simmons et al., 2011). Annual construction of housing fell dramatically between 1994 and 2001, with only 4000 units of housing created on average per year. From 2002 to 2013, public housing construction in Canada rebounded slightly to around 9000 units per year, but was still far below construction levels in the late-1970s and early-1980s (20,000 units per year on average) (Suttor, 2016).

The involvement of higher levels of government in housing provision in Ontario was further reduced in the mid-1990s. In 1995, the Progressive Conservatives under Premier Mike Harris were elected after promising to address the early-1990s recession with major spending and taxation cuts. The Progressive Conservatives held strong ideological opposition to state involvement in welfare provision, including housing, immediately ending spending commitments for new housing projects in-planning and -progress (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006). From 1995 to 2000, public housing responsibility was transferred to municipalities, making Ontario the only province in which municipalities hold this responsibility (Gladki & Pomeroy, 2007). The Progressive Conservatives also eliminated many regulatory barriers in the private housing market, such as rent control, further inhibiting housing access for those in lower income brackets. Many cities in Ontario, including Toronto, did not have the financial capacity to adequately maintain, let alone expand public housing, among the other responsibilities downloaded to municipalities during this time, such as public
transit (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006). Operating and maintenance budgets for public housing were reduced, further intensifying the deterioration of housing complexes, including Regent Park (Harris, 2008).

Only in the late-1990s to mid-2000s did Ontario give municipalities legislative and taxation capabilities somewhat equivalent to their new spending responsibilities. Following the forced amalgamation of Toronto in 1998 (discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four), TCH was created in 2002 to oversee public housing responsibilities in the former boroughs of Toronto, giving TCH greater financial and political clout to pursue housing redevelopment, including the revitalization of Regent Park (Nicholson, 2012). In 2006, the Liberal provincial government passed the City of Toronto Act, which gave the City greater policy-creation and tax collection powers (Government of Ontario, 2015a).

Federal funding for social mixing in subsidized housing was eliminated in the 1980s, but social mix policies persisted in Toronto into the early-2000s, when the concept was strongly embraced again in the city. In the early-1980s, the federal Liberals gradually reduced spending on housing projects that included a social or income-mix component, and in 1985, Mulroney’s Conservatives formally ended social mix policy, due to perceived financial inefficiency and a lack of political support (Pendakur, 1987; Thibert, 2007). Provincial governments retained the ability to promote social mixing in new projects, but federal subsidies could not be applied to social mix projects (Thibert, 2007). Ontario maintained a 60-40 ratio of subsidized to market housing units in new projects until the early-1990s, however, and a few social mix projects proceeded during the 1990s (Thibert, 2007; Ward, 2007). Meanwhile, income mixing became a necessity for non-profit developers between 1995 and 2002 when subsidies were lowest, as affordable housing construction was infeasible without profits from market unit sales (Boucher, 2007).

The downloading of housing responsibilities from the province to the municipalities from 1995 to 2000 meant that cities were granted more autonomy to pursue social mixing. With little funding availability or fiscal capacity, however, implementation of social mix policies was generally limited at the municipal level (Thibert, 2007; Moskalyk, 2008). Despite these limitations, inclusionary policies began to be employed in the City of Toronto in the late-1990s and into the 2000s. As condo development expanded in the city, urban
planners acquired more leverage to require private developers to include affordably-priced units in exchange for additional height and density on sites than permitted by by-laws (Cooper, 2007). With TCH beginning to pursue public housing redevelopment during this time, social mixing became an essential component to their projects, including the Regent Park revitalization.

3.4 Conclusion

Several broad differences between Canadian and American cities have been identified over the course of discussions in the literature dating back to the 1970s (Section 3.1). While cities in both countries share similar physical geography and experience similar population and economic growth trajectories in the 19th and 20th centuries (Yeates & Garner, 1976), strong cultural (Goldberg & Mercer, 1986) and political (Frisken, 1986) differences exist between Canada and the US. Canadians’ general preference for collectivism, egalitarianism, and state involvement differs from American inclination toward individuality, meritocracy, and suspicion of the state (Goldberg & Mercer, 1986; Lipset, 1990). According to the literature, these differences are the result of divergent founding principles between the two nations. In Canada, the principles of “peace, order, and good government” engendered government involvement, welfare provision, and class awareness; in the US, “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” fostered competition and restricted state authority (Lipset, 1990). Cities in Canada and the US, however, clearly exhibit similar spatial organizations and built environments, in that they are generally defined by an older, denser core surrounded by progressively newer and less dense development (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015). The countries also share similar municipal governance structures, due in part to increasing economic integration (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015; Walks, 2011) and the pressures of globalization, which has prompted neoliberal policy responses among both Canadian and American governments (Hackworth, 2007; Thomas & Biette, 2014).

Despite apparent globalization-induced convergence between Canadian and American cities, the countries nonetheless continue to differ in several keys ways (Walks, 2011). Canadian cities are less
economically polarized (Polèse & Simmons, 2011), less racially segregated (Walks & Bourne, 2006), and more welcoming of immigrants (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015) than American cities. These critical differences reflect and are reinforced by divergent urban policy regimes between the two countries, with Canadian governments generally emphasizing growth, transportation, and infrastructure planning that promotes social integration and reduces economic disparities (Bourne, Hutton, et al., 2011). Canadian municipalities are more legislatively restricted by the provinces than American municipalities are by state governments (Simmons et al., 2011), but the trade-off is stronger regional cooperation to address spatially dispersed urban challenges, such as preserving the greenbelt surrounding the GTA (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015). Stronger regional governance in Canada has been more effective at addressing socio-economic disparity, a trend that extends to land use planning and development policies (Polèse & Simmons, 2011). Canadian cities have more “vitality” than their American counterparts because planning and development policies have promoted land use mix, sustainable urban growth, public transit infrastructure, and strong public education systems (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015; Pucher & Buehler, 2006).

Public housing and social mix policies are a critical area of difference between the US and Canada with strong relevance to the study of Regent Park. In the US, government support for low-income housing has varied since the first public housing projects of the 1930s (Section 3.2). Between 1933 and 1953, the US federal government established and expanded the public housing system to provide shelter for low-income, working households, which was often achieved through “slum clearance” that permanently displaced black families in inner cities (Fraser et al., 2012; Orlebeke, 2000). From the mid-1950s until the end of the 1980s, the growth and generosity of the public housing system varied according to the political regime in power: Republicans generally limited housing spending and restricted housing availability to the poorest individuals without criminal histories, reflecting Americans’ value of personal responsibility, while Democrats expanded the housing stock and avoided displacing tenants (Hanlon, 2012; Orlebeke, 2000). The Republicans generally won out during the 1960s to 1980s, and the US public housing supply grew at a slower pace compared to the 1930s to 1950s (Schwartz, 2015), while the existing housing stock fell into disrepair (Fraser et al., 2012).
In 1992, HOPE VI was implemented by the US government to revitalize housing stock in poor repair and desegregate black neighbourhoods (HUD, 2011). HOPE VI provided grants to local housing providers to redevelop high-density housing projects into moderate-density, mixed-income communities using 3Ps (Fraser et al., 2011). Existing public housing tenants were not granted the right-of-return, nor were demolished units required to be rebuilt on a one-for-one basis (Hackworth, 2007), resulting in the permanent displacement of almost 200,000 mostly black families from inner-city neighbourhoods between 1992 and 2010 (Hanlon, 2012). President Obama phased out HOPE VI in 2010, initially failing to replace it with the PETRA initiative, which would have provided guaranteed rent (as opposed to cash or public land) to private developers and financiers to partner on mixed-income revitalization, before passing the RAD program in 2011 (DeFilippis, 2015). RAD, like PETRA, provided guaranteed rent to the private sector to partner on the redevelopment and desegregation of public housing, but unlike PETRA, did not mandate the wholesale conversion of transfer payments to guaranteed rental income (J. Smith, 2015). As with HOPE VI, however, RAD risked the displacement of existing public housing tenants (National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2012). CNI, introduced in 2010, was President Obama’s premier successor to HOPE VI (Khare, 2015). CNI provided federal grants to local housing agencies to form 3Ps with developers and financiers, but mandated replacement of public housing units on a one-to-one basis, while also promoting neighbourhood-scale improvements, such as new schools, social services, and public transportation infrastructure (Pendall & Hendley, 2011).

In Canada, public housing has historically received insufficient attention from higher levels of government, but, unlike US experiences, social mixing has been prioritized without the need to displace low-income residents (Section 3.3). Between 1944 and 1973, the Canadian government assumed primary responsibility for public housing (CMHC, 2016; Nelles, 2008). Physically deteriorated low-income neighbourhoods in major Canadian cities were demolished and replaced by high-unit volume, exclusively residential housing complexes, Regent Park being the first and perhaps most notable example (CMHC, 2012). In 1973, the federal government transitioned to supplying funding to a “third” sector of housing providers (non-profit and private developers) to build public housing, alongside other types of affordable and market
rental housing (Van Dyk, 1995). Third sector housing provision was introduced as a fiscal austerity measure in response to the 1973 oil crisis (Lightman, 2003), but it also instituted social mixing in Canadian housing policy and promoted development that integrated with existing neighbourhoods (Thibert, 2007), while ultimately tripling the national public housing supply (Suttor, 2016). However, public housing soon became a progressively lower priority for the federal government, beginning with spending cuts between the mid-1980s and the early-1990s (Hulchanski & Shapcott, 2004) and ending with the wholesale transfer of housing responsibility to the provinces by 1996 (McAfee, 2015). In 1995, the Province of Ontario enacted severe spending cuts to public housing (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006), and in 2000, fully devolved housing responsibility to municipal governments (Gladki & Pomeroy, 2007). New public housing construction in Canada dropped to historic lows during the 1990s and 2000s (around 7000 new units per year on average between 1994 and 2013, compared to 20,000 in the late-1970s to early-1980s) (Suttor, 2016).

A positive outcome to the downloading of public housing responsibility in Canada is that lower levels of government could continue to pursue social mix initiatives when higher levels of government were not. Federal social mix policy ended in 1985, but Ontario continued with social mix projects into the mid-1990s (Thibert, 2007). Then, when provincial support ended, Toronto maintained inclusionary planning and development policies established in the 1970s into the 2000s, such as mandatory inclusion of affordable units in larger developments, which eventually informed the strategies employed at the Regent Park revitalization (Moskalyk, 2008). In comparison, US public housing agencies have generally removed public housing tenants from their homes to achieve social mix, and displacement provisions, such as required one-for-one replacement of housing units, were only introduced at the federal level in the US in 2010, but have been a part of urban planning and housing policy in Canada since the 1970s. Ultimately, there are several differences in the cultural, political, socio-economic characters of the US and Canada, all of which have informed and reinforced differences in public housing and social mix policies between the two countries. It is important, therefore, to analyze the Regent Park revitalization within a uniquely Canadian context, as this thesis intends to, not the US policy and development framework the revitalization is often situated in by the literature.
Where Chapter Three highlighted differences between Canada and the United States, Chapter Four narrows in on aspects of the Toronto policy and development context in which the Regent Park revitalization is taking place. To provide an understanding of the Toronto context, Chapter Four proceeds in the following sections (followed by a conclusion section):

- **Section 4.1: The History of Growth and Governance in Toronto.** This section summarizes the history of growth, politics, and urban policy in Toronto.

- **Section 4.2: The History of Housing Development in Toronto.** Housing development eras in Toronto’s history are described in this section, beginning in the 19th century and extending until the 1990s.

- **Section 4.3: Contemporary Development in Toronto and “Condo-ism”.** Contemporary housing development in Toronto, dominated by the pre-eminence of condominium construction, is discussed in this section.

### 4.1 The History of Growth and Governance in Toronto

Toronto is located on the northwestern shore of Lake Ontario, on lands known to be inhabited by the Wyandot (Wendat or Huron) indigenous peoples for several thousand years before European contact, the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) during the 17th century, and the Mississaugas in the late-17th to early-18th centuries (Williamson, 2008; Schmalz, 1991). From the 1720s until the 1750s, sporadic French trading activity took place in the Toronto area, culminating in the establishment of Fort Rouillé in 1751. In 1758, the British Navy captured Fort Rouillé, and British trading and settlement along the northern shore of Lake Ontario gradually expanded between the 1760s and 1780s (City of Toronto, 2017b). The Town of York was founded in
1793 as the capital of Upper Canada, and was incorporated as the City of Toronto in 1834 (Careless, 1984). Canada experienced significant industrialization between the 1840s and 1890s, and Toronto became a manufacturing centre and railway and shipping hub for the rest of Canada and the US (Harris, 2008; Goheen, 1984). Toronto’s population grew considerably during the 19th century, from 9254 residents in 1834 to over 200,000 by 1900 (Goheen, 1984). Some growth came from natural increases and in-migration from other parts of Canada, as mechanization created demand for urban workers and eliminated substantial rural employment, but most of the population increase was the result of European immigration (City of Toronto, 2017b). England was a constant source of immigrants to Toronto; the Irish, fleeing the mid-19th century Irish Potato Famines, were the next group to arrive in significant numbers, followed by Scots, Eastern Europeans, and Russian Jews toward the end of the 19th century (Harris, 2008).

Toronto’s government developed a reputation for being well-run during the early- to mid-20th century (Harris, 2008). In 1954, a senior municipal level of government, Metro Toronto, was created by the
Province of Ontario to oversee governance across the City of Toronto, its neighbouring boroughs, and several small towns and villages within the contiguously populated area (Colton, 1990). Metro Toronto was initially deemed a success and the city continued to experience substantial economic growth, attracting new waves of immigrants from Italy and Eastern Europe during the 1940s and 1950s, and Portuguese, West Indians, and American draft dodgers during the 1960s (Harris, 2008).

In the 1960s, writer and activist Jane Jacobs moved to Toronto, providing support for grassroots efforts to block urban renewal projects similar to Regent Park and halt construction of the Spadina Expressway, which would have demolished historic neighbourhoods within the city core. Toronto continued to grow into the 1970s, overtaking Montreal as the banking, urban, and manufacturing capitals of Canada.

Figure 7. Toronto, including boundaries of former boroughs included in Metro Toronto (1954-1998) and incorporated into the amalgamated City of Toronto in 1998 (inset: Greater Toronto Area) (Lencer [Wikimedia Commons user], 2009).
Toronto’s population exceeded Montreal’s by 1981 (3.1 million in Metropolitan Toronto, 2.9 million in Montreal), fuelled by new immigration encouraged by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s generous immigration policies and promotion of multiculturalism in the early-1970s (Hiller, 2005; Harris, 2008). Immigrants came from non-European regions, including China, Africa, and Latin America, in substantial numbers in the latter half of the 20th century, moving the demographic composition of the city’s population farther away from its British origins. The economy and spatial composition of Toronto increasingly resembled other North American cities, though British characteristics did not disappear entirely: suburbs experienced sprawl as in the US, but household incomes remained lower, and rates of car ownership and public transportation usage more closely resembled British cities (Harris, 2008).

In 1972, a wave of socially-conscious politicians, known as the urban reformers, were elected to Toronto City Council. Emboldened by Jane Jacobs’ activism, the urban reformers protected heritage neighbourhoods in Toronto from new residential and commercial development, in part, by providing greater land use flexibility in older parts of the city (Ley, 1996; Caulfield, 1994). The Central Area Plan (1974), spearheaded by then councillor (later Mayor) John Sewell, encouraged investment and population growth in older downtown neighbourhoods by replacing single-use exclusionary zoning with flexible, mixed-use frameworks, eventually resulting in the conversion of various abandoned industrial buildings into residential lofts, design studios, and entertainment spaces (rather than their demolition) (Bourne et al., 2011). To preserve the character of heritage neighbourhoods, height and massing of new buildings were limited as part of the Central Area Plan (Sewell, 2015).

The City substantially deregulated height and zoning restrictions in certain downtown areas during the early- to mid-1990s in response to a deep real estate slump, a process that was eventually adopted into the city’s first Official Plan (2002) following the amalgamation of the two-tier Metro Toronto into a single-tier municipality in 1998 (Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009). Growing concerns about urban sprawl, such as traffic congestion, environmental degradation, and cost of infrastructure provision in post-amalgamation Toronto, led to the introduction of regional growth plans by the Province of Ontario in the mid-2000s (Bourne et al.,

Municipal governments, including the City of Toronto, are required to ensure that their official plans are compatible with these growth plans (Rosen, 2016; Bourne et al., 2011). Successive official plans for Toronto have included stronger planning regulations and incorporated new provincial growth policies, such as the *Big Move* (2008), a comprehensive public transportation plan for the Toronto region (Bourne et al., 2011; Metrolinx, 2017). In 2006, Toronto’s municipal government was granted stronger legislative power by the province to implement urban planning by-laws and pursue social and economic initiatives as part of the *City of Toronto Act* (Government of Ontario, 2015a).

Overall, Toronto’s history has been characterized by successive waves of immigration, such that it is now considered one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world (Harris, 2008). The city’s ethnic diversity has reinforced and been the product of a generally tolerant culture welcoming to migrants and the investment and entrepreneurship that have accompanied newcomers to Canada (Bourne, Hutton, et al., 2011). Since the urban reform wave of the 1970s, the city has, more often than not, elected socially-conscious politicians in favour of moderate economic redistribution and welfare provision. In the neighbourhoods closest to Toronto’s downtown, residents have been especially open to public services, such as public housing at Regent Park, and are generally more in favour of higher-density development and public infrastructure, such as parks and public transit (Walks, 2004). The growth policies that these politicians have introduced, such as the City’s official plans, have intended to manage and accommodate for continuous significant growth while also taking into account economic and environmental sustainability (Rosen & Walks, 2015).

### 4.2 The History of Housing Development in Toronto

Urban development in Toronto during the 19th century was heavily influenced by British cultural preferences in opposition to urbanism and in favour of suburban homeownership (Harris, 2008). Rapid industrialization in
the second half of 19th century generated substantial population growth in Toronto, but in the absence of zoning regulations, the physical expansion of the city was generally unregulated, resulting in a collection of unplanned neighbourhoods. Most of the commercial and industrial activity in Toronto was contained within a financial core, which was surrounded by an inner circle of “shantytowns” home to recent immigrants in low quality cottages and townhouses (Solomon, 2007). One shantytown was Cabbagetown, a neighbourhood with mostly Irish immigrants east of the city’s downtown that would eventually be demolished to make way for Regent Park (Milgrom, 2000). Surrounding these shantytowns was a “shacktown fringe” of self-built, mail order homes that housed mostly white, Anglophone workers, and an outer circle of neighbourhoods with wealthier residents that commuted to service sector jobs in the financial core (Solomon, 2007).

Between the 1900s and the 1920s, expanded immigration brought successive waves of new residents who settled in new, unregulated suburbs. New immigrants often began with smaller shacks, before continually improving their homes as their finances permitted. Cheap land allowed members of a range of income classes to build homes. By the 1920s, Toronto had one of the highest rates of homeownership in North America (Harris, 2008). In the 1930s, this explosion of development slowed with the onset of the Great Depression (Solomon, 2007). Newly-created suburban governments attempted to provide public services, such as water, electricity, and sewage, but with many houses already completed, the costs of doing so became highly expensive, with suburban municipalities taking on large quantities of debt. The additional financial stress brought on by the Great Depression led to many suburbs filing for bankruptcy and failing to provide adequate services without provincial involvement (Harris, 2008). At the onset of World War II, Toronto was comprised of many low-income neighbourhoods with poorly maintained structures where utility connections and municipal services were inconsistent.

Following the conclusion of World War II, the Canadian economy expanded rapidly, bringing with it rising birth rates and increased immigration. Expanding families and new citizens generally settled in newer, more organized suburban neighbourhoods (Harris, 2012). Meanwhile, Toronto’s downtown neighbourhoods continued to physically deteriorate, lacked connections with public utilities, and were home to high rates of
criminal activity, poor health, substance abuse, and single-parent families (A. Rose, 1958). In response to these challenges, physically-deteriorated neighbourhoods were bulldozed and replaced with high-rise public housing complexes as part of a policy of urban renewal. One of the most prominent examples of urban renewal was the original construction of Regent Park, where the deteriorated row houses of Cabbagetown were demolished and replaced with public housing (Milgrom, 1999). Initially supported by social reformers of the era, urban renewal fell out of favour by the 1970s, due to the displacement of original residents, destruction of established communities, high vacancy rates, and ensuing social and physical deterioration of urban renewal areas (Hodge & Gordon, 2014).

In the wake of the failures of urban renewal, Toronto followed a policy of neighbourhood development in the 1970s. Inspired by the ideas of Jane Jacobs, new housing projects promoted mixed uses, social mixing, greater density, the conservation of older buildings through infill, and the revitalization of historic neighbourhoods (Hodge & Gordon, 2014). The election of the urban reformers in 1972, coupled with the availability of federal and provincial housing subsidies, helped spur neighbourhood development projects such as the St. Lawrence neighbourhood, a high-density, mid-rise community that preserved the street layout of the previously industrial neighbourhood and adopted more open and democratic forms of community consultation prior to development (Sewell, 2015; Greenberg, 2011; Hume, 2014). New buildings were designed to mimic the look and feel of older buildings, which were not demolished (James, 2010; Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). Attempts to demolish historic neighbourhoods adjacent to Regent Park in the 1970s and 1980s to expand the public housing community were also blocked around this period (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). Neighbourhood development was seen as a major success during its time, and has continued to inspire housing policy and practice in Toronto into the present (Hodge & Gordon, 2014; Hume, 2014).
Due to the reduction in federal and provincial funding for housing in the 1980s, Toronto turned to private developers to expand the public housing stock (Hodge & Gordon, 2014). Through the use of public-private partnerships, Toronto tapped into the private development of downtown, waterfront land that had begun in the 1970s by rezoning waterfront lands for mixed-use development and providing infrastructure funding (Gordon, 1997). The success of these partnerships, however, is subject to debate: while many abandoned industrial sites were converted into residential use, poor planning coordination resulted in low concentrations of public housing. The Harbourfront neighbourhood is an example of the successful conversion of industrial buildings to other uses, but controversy over low amounts of park construction and taller than promised buildings limited the overall social benefit of the development for the city (Hodge & Gordon, 2014).
By the 1990s, public funding for housing development was non-existent, and Toronto began to rely on private mega-projects for housing construction (Harris, 2008; Hodge & Gordon, 2014). Private mega-projects became a prominent form of development in North America as corporations sold-off large areas of land that were proximate to downtown neighbourhoods, but no longer in use, such as railway yards. In Toronto, the railway lands located west of the downtown core were redeveloped as CityPlace, a high-rise neighbourhood comprised almost exclusively of 26 condominium towers housing over 13,500 residents (Hodge & Gordon, 2014; Bateman, 2013). While site plan guidelines mandated that a portion of the developed land needed to be reserved for public housing, the City was often unable to leverage further social benefits from private mega-projects because the City contributed little land or capital compared to previous development eras. CityPlace, for instance, had a lower concentration of public housing relative to Harbourfront (Hodge & Gordon, 2014).

4.3 Contemporary Development in Toronto and “Condo-ism”

“Condo-ism” is a term recently used in the literature to describe the substantial influence of condominium construction on contemporary development policy and practice in Toronto since the 2000s (Rosen & Walks, 2015). Economic factors and policy decisions have created a high-cost housing market in Toronto in the 21st century. A strong economy and substantial housing demand from recent immigrants, combined with the high cost of developing housing in existing built-up areas, has made the construction of adequate, yet inexpensive housing unfeasible for most developers in Toronto (Harris, 2012). As a result, developers have increasingly turned to condominium construction, which, when taking place at high densities, generally provides adequate revenue at moderate final sale prices (Rosen, 2016). Overall, almost half of new dwellings constructed in Toronto since the 2000s have been units in high-rise condominiums, making the city one of the top five condo markets in North America by price and volume (Harris, 2012; Rosen, 2016).
Policy decisions are a substantial component driving homeownership in Canada (Rosen & Walks, 2015). Low interest rates for mortgages have made homeownership more affordable for many Canadians. Homeownership is also favoured indirectly through Canadian tax policy, as the capital gains on home sales are not collected, and property taxes on single-family homes are usually lower per square foot compared to multi-residence buildings (Harris, 2012). Immigration policies have also encouraged housing development in Toronto. Inclusive immigration policies at the federal level in the 21st century have continued to supply Canadian urban centres, including Toronto, with large quantities of migrants, of which a greater ratio are wealthy relative to previous decades (Lehrer & Wieditz, 2009; Rosen & Walks, 2015). Municipal and provincial planning policies and initiatives have been generally successful in directing this housing growth toward existing built-up areas in the GTA since the 1980s. City policies have encouraged the highest amounts of growth in areas with the greatest utility and transportation infrastructure capacity (Rosen, 2016). A variety of other municipal policies, including favourable property tax and development charge policies, have made condominium construction more profitable for developers compared, for instance, to rental buildings (Walks & Clifford, 2015).

Changing consumer preferences, partly in response to economic factors, has created demand for condominiums in Toronto. While homeownership has been made more affordable with favourable interest rates and tax policy, the cost of detached and semi-detached homes in Toronto has increased substantially over the last 25 years because demand has outstripped limited supply (Harris, 2012). Municipal and provincial planning policies have been successful in directing growth toward urban centres by limiting suburban development, but the outcome is that urban land supply has become increasingly scarce (Rosen, 2016). Condos, therefore, offer ownership opportunities in Toronto for buyers that would otherwise not be able to afford detached or semi-detached homes in the city (Rosen & Walks, 2015). Worsening traffic congestion and the growing distance of commuters relative to central employment areas in the GTA has further incentivized downtown condo-living among younger Canadians, who generally prefer small, yet centrally located housing over the large, suburban homes favoured by older generations (Rosen, 2016).
Rosen and Walks (2015) coined term condo-ism to describe the increased demand for condominiums in Toronto and the pronounced impact of condo development on public policy in the city. Condo-ism is a mechanism of urban change and the ongoing outcome of relationships between “governing agents, institutions, and forms of knowledge, planning and land-use policies, and legislative arrangements” (Rosen, 2016, p. 2). For instance, as condos become an increasingly popular form of development in Toronto, the municipality has become more dependent on the social benefits extracted through bonusing (permitting building density above the allowable amount in the local zoning by-law in exchange for a developer providing public or private amenities) (Rosen & Walks, 2015).

The Regent Park revitalization is cited as a prominent application of condo-ism in Toronto, where a municipal agency, TCH, is increasingly reliant on the private sector for infrastructure improvements. The strategies employed for the revitalization are more complex than the traditional definition of bonusing, however, since the developer, Daniels, is directly constructing public housing for TCH in exchange for the right to build condos in Regent Park (Rosen & Walks, 2015). Housing development in Toronto during the 1980s and 1990s did not produce large quantities of public housing or public amenities (Hodge & Gordon, 2014). By sharing in the risks, responsibilities, and rewards of condominium construction, TCH hopes to exact greater amounts of social benefits for low-income tenants and the city at-large. The outcome, though, is that private and public development agendas become more intertwined (Rosen & Walks, 2015). In the results and discussion sections of this thesis (Chapters Seven and Eight), some of the implications of the convergence of public and private motives will be explored.

4.4 Conclusion

Chapter Four has aimed to describe the unique policy and development context in Toronto, building on the discussion of the differences between Canada and the US in Chapter Three. The history of Toronto is characterized by substantial immigration-fuelled growth, which, since the 1970s, planners and policymakers
have attempted to manage with sustainable development initiatives (Section 4.1). Toronto was incorporated in 1834 following a century of European trading and settlement in the area (City of Toronto, 2017b) and several millennia of inhabitation by indigenous peoples (Williamson, 2008). The city experienced substantial immigration from Europe in the 19th and early-20th centuries (Harris, 2008), which led to the creation of a senior level of government, Metro Toronto, to manage both population and economic growth (Colton, 1990).

In the 1970s, encouraged by federal multiculturalism and immigration policies, Toronto’s population expanded further with mostly non-European immigrants, eclipsing Montreal as the country’s largest population centre in 1981 (3.1 million in Toronto, 2.9 million in Montreal) and economic capital of Canada (Hiller, 2005; Harris, 2008). Socially-conscious politicians known as the urban reformers were elected to the municipal government in the 1970s and 1980s to manage growth by protecting heritage neighbourhoods, limiting building and massing heights, and promoting land use diversity (Ley, 1996; Caulfield, 1994; Sewell, 2015). Height and zoning restrictions in downtown areas were relaxed in the early- to mid-1990s in response to a recession in the Toronto real estate market, and were incorporated into the city’s urban planning framework when Metro Toronto was amalgamated into a single-tier municipality in 1998 (Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009).

Toronto rebounded from the real estate downturn in the mid-1990s, and has experienced strong growth into the present, necessitating municipal and provincial growth policies to limit urban sprawl and promote economically and environmentally sustainable development (Bourne et al., 2011).

Housing development in Toronto has reflected and reinforced wider economic, demographic, and policy characteristics in the city over the course of its history (Section 4.2). Generally unregulated growth during the 19th century and first three decades of the 20th century produced several poorly constructed neighbourhoods in the core of the city that experienced high rates of crime and disease (Solomon, 2007; Harris, 2008). Some of these neighbourhoods were demolished and replaced with large public housing complexes, including Regent Park, during the 1940s to 1960s as part of “urban renewal” policies (Hodge & Gordon, 2014; Milgrom, 1999). The failure of urban renewal became apparent by the 1970s, however, and the urban reformers at Toronto City Hall embraced a strategy of neighbourhood development (Hodge &
Historical neighbourhoods were conserved, built form density was increased with infill development, and, using federal and provincial subsidies, a mix of housing tenures and land uses were incorporated into new projects as part of neighbourhood development strategies (Hodge & Gordon, 2014; Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). In the 1980s, housing subsidies from higher levels of government declined, so Toronto’s municipal leaders embraced 3Ps, predominantly, to redevelop underutilized waterfront land into mixed-use communities (Gordon, 1997). Low amounts of public housing were included in these 3P projects, however, limiting the overall social benefits of the use of 3Ps in the 1980s relative to neighbourhood development strategies from the 1970s (Hodge & Gordon, 2014). Government housing funding dissolved in the 1990s, leaving most development to be handled by the private sector, often in the form of mega-projects near the downtown area (Harris, 2008; Hodge & Gordon, 2014). Because the City contributed minimal land or funding for private mega-projects, these developments included only nominal amounts of public housing (Hodge & Gordon, 2014).

“Condo-ism” describes the pre-eminence of condominium construction in Toronto and its influence on policy decisions in the city (Rosen & Walks, 2015) (Section 4.3). A strong economy, substantial immigration, smart growth legislation, and changing consumer preferences have driven strong demand for condos in Toronto (Rosen & Walks, 2015; Rosen, 2016; Harris, 2012). Economic policy in Canada has made homeownership more affordable (Harris, 2012), inclusive immigration policies have supplied Toronto with a large pool of buyers (Lehrer & Wieditz, 2009), and smart growth policies have directed development toward existing built-up areas in the GTA (Rosen, 2016). However, the cost of detached and semi-detached homes in Toronto has remained very high since the 2000s (Harris, 2012), and, when coupled with changing consumer preferences for downtown living (Rosen, 2016), have made condominiums the most favoured form of housing development in Toronto during the 21st century. As a result, planners and policymakers are increasingly relying on condo construction to extract social benefits, such as public housing construction, with Regent Park representing a more recent, advanced example of the convergence of public and private development agendas resulting from condo-ism (Rosen & Walks, 2015).
Overall, Chapters Three and Four have served to demonstrate the unique nature of the policy and development context in Toronto. Historic and contemporary socio-political, economic, and cultural frameworks in Canada differ from the US. Toronto has generally adopted development policies that promote construction of housing at a diversity of price and tenure levels. However, the strong local real estate market and the adoption of condos as the preferred method of development have made affordability impossible for many low-income families, while the private sector has profited significantly. The Regent Park revitalization represents an attempt to access some of the profits from private development to improve the public housing stock, and it is taking place within a local housing development and planning policy context that is generally more inclusionary than the US. Because of the unique nature of the Toronto context, this thesis has prioritized analysis of the Regent Park revitalization within a local lens of geographic analysis, avoiding the long shadow cast by mixed-income redevelopment studies in the American context.
5  Regent Park

This chapter addresses all content relevant to the study of the Regent Park revitalization, organized into the following sections:

- **Section 5.1: History of Regent Park, 1900s to 1990s.** The history of Regent Park, beginning with events leading to original development of the neighbourhood and extending until efforts to revitalize the area in the 1990s, are explored in this section.

- **Section 5.2: Revitalization Planning Policy Rationale.** This section reviews the urban planning framework for the Regent Park master plan created in 2005, as well as the revisions made to the planning of phase two of the project in 2009 and phases three through five in 2013.

- **Section 5.3: Rationale for Social Mix and Mixed-Income Revitalization.** Chaskin and Joseph’s (2015) overview of the common arguments used to justify social mix are summarized in this section.

- **Section 5.4: The Regent Park Revitalization in the Literature.** This section reviews the most recent and relevant academic studies of the Regent Park revitalization, highlighting common themes from the existing research.

Chapter Five concludes by summarizing the contents of the chapter and establishing a research agenda to guide this thesis based on gaps identified in the existing research of the Regent Park revitalization.
5.1 History of Regent Park, 1900s to 1990s

The original Regent Park was constructed in the 1940s and 1950s, mainly to provide shelter for recent Irish immigrants living in the area prior to development (Milgrom, 2000). Since the original development, the neighbourhood underwent substantial changes, most notably, transitioning to an ethnically and linguistically diverse community, where two out of three residents were born outside of Canada (James, 2010). Since the mid-20th century, however, Regent Park became increasingly marginalized, both socially and economically, from the surrounding city, in part because it was constituted as a self-contained, inward-looking area with little physical connection to the surrounding communities (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002).

The history of Regent Park has been described in expansive detail in a number of scholarly sources, including Kelly (2015) and Purdy (2003). While not intending to be as descriptive as sources that have focused specifically on the historical aspects of the neighbourhood, this section aims to provide a broad overview of
the events that have taken place at Regent Park. This description of the history of Regent Park will begin with a discussion of the social, cultural, political, and economic context proceeding the original development.

Next, this section will detail the process and outcome of the original development, between the late-1940s and 1950s. Finally, this section will provide an overview of the demographic changes, physical deterioration, and social stigmatization of Regent Park in the decades following its original development, up until the first attempts to redevelop the site during the 1990s.

5.1.1 Before Regent Park, 1900s to 1940s

The original development of Regent Park took place toward the end of a time when governments in western nations were increasingly asked by constituents to intervene where large groups were socially and economically disadvantaged (Kelly, 2015). Whereas the provision of social welfare was generally the responsibility of charities and religious groups in the 19th century, substantial economic growth in cities during the early-20th century led to disorganized urban expansion (Rutherford, 1984). The absence of state regulation of housing and land speculation practices, combined with the significant demand for housing from recent immigrants to urban areas, resulted in a situation where the existing housing supply was insufficient in both size and quality (Bacher, 1993). As a result, the growing cohort of low-income earners had no alternative but to live in substandard, high-cost housing in cities across North America, including Toronto (Kelly, 2015). As previously discussed, uncoordinated urban growth in Toronto resulted in the construction of low-quality cottages and townhouses around the financial core in “shantytowns”, including the Cabbagetown neighbourhood eventually replaced by Regent Park (Harris, 2008; Solomon, 2007). In Toronto, as in other western cities, all levels of government were pressured to address housing issues because of two principle concerns expressed by voters: 1) fear of agitation from low-income residents and immigrants in response to poor housing (Purdy, 1998; Valverde, 2008); and 2) widespread realization of the connection between poor public health and low-quality housing, an idea that had only recently emerged around the turn-of-the-century (Valverde, 2008; Lubove, 1963).
World War I temporarily paused momentum toward improving the affordable housing stock in Canada. However, with labour and materials allocated to support the war efforts, housing prices increased further in response to lower construction rates and increased immigration (Kelly, 2015). Economic growth and ensuing population expansion in Toronto in the 1920s and 1930s rekindled demands for housing reform (Bacher, 1993). In 1931, the city’s population was 631,000, triple the population of 208,000 in 1901 (Kelly, 2015; City of Toronto, 2016a; Demographia, 2003). A survey of the housing conditions and populations of “slum-like” areas in Toronto was commissioned by Ontario Lieutenant-Governor Herbert A. Bruce, producing the Bruce Report in 1934. The Bruce Report estimated that 2000 to 3000 houses in Toronto did not provide a “minimum standard of health” to their occupants, including: protection from the elements, electricity, indoor plumbing, kitchen space, and protection from vermin. The report found that low-quality housing was being demolished across the city, while at the same time, foreign and domestic immigrants were increasingly moving into “slums”. In total, over 17,000 households in Toronto were presumed to be homeless or living with other individuals or families (Bruce, 1934). Coupled with the onset of a post-war baby boom, the housing crisis reached a fever pitch in Toronto (A. Rose, 1958). To remedy the situation, the Bruce Report
recommended “reconstruction” through the demolition of existing, poor-quality housing and the public provision of adequate shelter for those unable to provide it for themselves (Bruce, 1934).

Figure 11. Bathroom (in 1938) and backyard (in 1951) in the Regent Park area prior to original development (“18 Regent Street”, 1938; “Rear of 622-628 Dundas Street…”, 1951).

In the years following the release of the Bruce Report, local activists and community organizations exerted stronger pressure on all three levels of government to address the housing crisis in Toronto by implementing the report’s findings (Kelly, 2015). The provincial and federal governments continued to delay addressing the housing crisis, however, and advocacy groups, sensing a more receptive social and political climate in Toronto, successfully lobbied the City of Toronto to hold a public referendum in 1947 to develop Regent Park (A. Rose, 1958; Bacher, 1993). The City prioritized Cabbagetown as the site of the project because of the critical degradation of the housing stock and an absence of open spaces, trees, and community facilities in the area (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). For political and social leaders of the time (e.g., A. Rose, 1958; Dearlove, 1955; McLean, 1953), “slums”, such as Cabbagetown, needed renewal because of the negative impact of poor-quality housing on a person’s moral well-being (Purdy, 2005; James, 2010). By improving the built form of the area, reformers believed that the character of the area’s residents could also be improved (Kelly, 2015). The citizens of Toronto proved receptive to this message: on January 1,
1947, 62% of voters approved the development of what would become Regent Park North using City tax revenues and debt-financing (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002).

5.1.2 Original Development of Regent Park, 1947 to 1959

Regent Park was developed over two phases: 1) Regent Park North, built between 1947 and 1954, in an area bounded by Gerrard St. E. to the north, River St. to the east, Dundas St. E. and Parliament St. to the west; and 2) Regent Park South, built between 1957 and 1959, in an area bounded by Dundas St. E. to the north, River St. to the east, Shuter St. to the south, and Regent St. to the west.

5.1.2.1 Construction of Regent Park North, 1947 to 1954

Construction on Regent Park North began in 1947 following the city-wide plebiscite, using funding only from the municipality, and with no financial support from the provincial or federal governments (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). A total of 42.5 acres of cottages and townhouses in the Cabbagetown neighbourhood were demolished and replaced by a series of brick, three-storey “dumbbell”, and six-storey “dog-bone”-shaped walk-up buildings designed by relatively unknown local architect J. E. Hoare (Kelly, 2015; Milgrom, 2000). The existing grid of local streets was almost entirely removed and replaced with many pedestrian-only pathways between buildings (Milgrom, 1999). Meeting the demand for more open space in downtown Toronto, 34 of the 42.5 acres were devoted to large, green parks (Kelly, 2015). Many of the first residents to occupy Regent Park North were low-income, mostly Irish families that lived in Cabbagetown prior to its demolition, of which 20% were homeowners before moving into public housing (Milgrom, 2000; Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). At a cost of around $16 million, a total of 1200 apartment units were constructed in Regent Park North, which became home to over 5000 people (A. Rose, 1958; Milgrom, 2000; Kelly, 2015).
5.1.2.2 Construction of Regent Park South, 1957 to 1959

Regent Park South was built between 1957 and 1959 following a funding agreement between the municipal, provincial, and federal governments (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). Under the agreement between the three levels of government, most of the construction costs were financed by the federal government under the National Housing Act (1944). Due to federal involvement, tenant selection for Regent Park South placed greater emphasis on affordability and income level than at Regent Park North. As a result, many of those housed in Regent Park South were at the lowest income levels and most in need of shelter, whereas Regent Park North was mostly home to individuals with low to moderate employment income (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002).

Regent Park South replaced city blocks of cottages and row houses south of Regent Park North (Kelly, 2015). The built form of Regent Park South differed somewhat from Regent Park North, in that a mixture of two-storey townhouses and fourteen-storey apartment towers were built on the site. J. E. Hoare was responsible for designing the townhouses, while the fourteen-storey buildings, known as the Maisonette Towers, were designed by Peter Dickinson of Page and Steele Architects, a well-regarded architectural firm in

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5 The total cost estimates for Regent Park South could not be found in academic or archival sources.
Toronto (Milgrom, 2000). The Maisonette Towers were oriented toward a large public square, and, while appearing to be scattered randomly when viewed from the ground, aligned with path of the sun (though this could only be seen from a bird’s eye view) (Chodikoff, 2000). The elevators within the towers could only stop at every-other floor, a design feature that allowed for the layout of large, two-storey apartment units for families (Milgrom, 2000). As with Regent Park North, most of the existing street grid was removed with the development of Regent Park South. Dead-end streets were built to connect major thoroughfares with the entrances of the apartment buildings (Chodikoff, 2000). Non-residential uses, such as social services or shopping facilities, were not included to a notable degree in either Regent Park South or North (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). A few small commercial facilities and a City-owned daycare were provided at the base of the Maisonette Towers, but most of the ground floor space was taken up by the buildings’ mechanical plant facilities, which the architect, Dickinson, designed to be visible to residents and visitors through a large glass wall (Kelly, 2015; Chodikoff, 2000). At the time of its completion in 1959, Regent Park South housed around 4000 tenants, bringing the total population of Regent Park to around 10,000 (Kelly, 2015).

Figure 13. Regent Park South, 1968 (Olsen, 1968).
Figure 14. Density of Regent Park area (outlined in blue), before (top) and after (bottom) original development between 1947 and 1959 (Goad, 1924; Myers, 1984).
5.1.2.3 Modernist Built Form of the Original Regent Park

The design of Regent Park was informed by the belief that physical surroundings predisposed individuals’ actions, a belief that was widespread among architects, urban planners, and policymakers in western nations during the post-war period (Milgrom, 2000). For instance, the large open green spaces included in Regent Park were intended to be “breathing spaces” within an otherwise congested city (Housing Authority of Toronto, 1951, p. 11), channelling prevailing beliefs that air and light were necessary for healthy physical development (Purdy, 2003; Kelly, 2015).

The desire for open space at Regent Park reflected elements of Modernist architecture, the dominant force in urban design following World War II (Kelly, 2015). Modernist architecture attempted to rationalize the chaotic built form of the industrial city (Guillén, 2006). Modernism rose to prominence during the 1920s in France, Germany, and the Soviet Union with the advent of new building technology, engineering, and materials (Crouch, 1999). Proponents of Modernism, such as Le Corbusier, a Swiss-French architect and urban planner, believed that overcrowding and physical deterioration of housing in Europe following World War I could be addressed through the construction of functional, affordable, and high-density housing, and a more rational, segregated organization of land use types (Le Corbusier, 2007 [1928]). According to Le Corbusier, existing structures, land uses, and road grids should be replaced with non-descript high-rise towers for distinct residential and industrial uses, located within large park-like settings, and organized across the city in segregated districts. The ground should be reserved for nature, with all pedestrian activities taking place in raised corridors, and cars travelling on raised roadways that connected each city district (Le Corbusier, 1967 [1933]; 2007 [1928]). Le Corbusier’s ideas gained traction until the 1960s, becoming adopted in North America for a variety of applications, including public housing, most notably in New York, Chicago, and St. Louis (von Hoffman, 1996).
Le Corbusier’s Modernist vision was best represented in the high-rise, non-descript Maisonette Towers and was also seen in the removal of through-streets, the segregation of pedestrian and vehicle activity, and the exclusion of non-residential uses from the original design of Regent Park (Milgrom, 2000; Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002; Kelly, 2015). Ultimately, the design inspired by Modernism was eventually blamed for the deterioration of Regent Park and the need to revitalize the built form of the community (Kelly, 2015).
5.1.3  Regent Park From the 1950s to the 1990s

The Regent Park of the 1950s and 1960s was initially seen as a model community by planners, policymakers, and residents (Purdy, 2003; Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009; Milgrom, 2000). The early success of Regent Park resulted in the use of a similar model to replace existing “shantytown” neighbourhoods in Toronto with public housing communities, at Moss Park and Alexandra Park to the east and west, respectively, of the downtown core (Sewell, 1993). Between the 1950s and 1970s, a total of 125 housing communities were constructed in Toronto using Modernist-inspired design pioneered in the city at Regent Park (Purdy & Kwak, 2007).

Soon after the completion of Regent Park, however, concerns with the implementation and design of the community were voiced by tenants. Many residents of Regent Park felt that the “moral management” of
their lives engendered by the design and policies of Regent Park was too invasive. For example, tenants were evicted for infractions such as hanging laundry on incorrect days, and, without any private spaces provided outside of the buildings, tenants could only retreat indoors to receive any privacy (Purdy, 2004). The flaws of Regent Park were acknowledged soon after its completion by Albert Rose, one of the leading proponents of the development, who determined that planners and architects adopted too simple, high-minded, and paternalistic of an approach in designing the community, failing to consider the needs of the residents (A. Rose, 1968; James, 2010).

With the initial design of the community already seen to be fundamentally flawed, the problems at Regent Park were exacerbated by a series of wider economic and political changes between the 1960s and 1990s in Toronto and across Canada. These changes included the decline of inner-city manufacturing in Toronto and shifts in demand and supply for housing due, in part, to changes in tenant selection criteria in response to federal immigration reform. These shifts were as compounded by an ongoing affordable housing crisis in Toronto during the latter half of the 20th century (Murdie, 1994) (that persists until the present). These processes took place within the wider retrenchment of the welfare state and neglect of public housing in Canada, and resulted in a number of changes to the demographic composition of Regent Park, creating a community that was increasingly headed by single-parents (predominantly women) born outside of Canada and more socially and economically disenfranchised (James, 2010; Purdy, 2003).

5.1.3.1 Decline of Inner-City Manufacturing in Toronto

Beginning in the 1960s, moderately-paying manufacturing jobs in or adjacent to downtown Toronto began to disappear, eliminating a source of employment for many residents of Regent Park (Murdie, 1994; Purdy, 2003). Toronto also experienced a period of increasing unemployment between the 1970s and 1990s that affected a wider range of industries, including the service sector, which employed many residents of Regent Park. As a result, many Regent Park residents were increasingly employed in lower-paying, less stable jobs relative to the Toronto population as a whole into the early-2000s (Purdy, 2003).
5.1.3.2 Changes to Tenant Selection Criteria

With respect to tenant selection criteria, the typical public housing tenants during the 1950s and 1960s were low- to moderate-income, two-parent households (Purdy, 2004). Between the mid-1960s and the 1980s, however, individuals with lower incomes were more heavily favoured during tenant selection (Purdy, 2003). These changes were made partly in response to tenant demands, and led to the admittance of a greater share of marginalized groups, including refugees, the physically and developmentally disabled, teenage parents, and domestic violence victims (Purdy, 2005). At the same time, tenant selection revisions had the effect of dis-incentivizing existing tenants from earning income and incentivizing tenants whose income increased to find accommodations on the private market, as they were required to pay increased rent in Regent Park because of their increased income (Purdy, 2003). Unemployment for existing tenants was also incentivized as a product of these revisions, and a greater share of unemployed individuals were admitted to Regent Park because of the greater emphasis that was placed on income level during tenant selection (Purdy, 2003). By the mid-1970s, 60% of residents in Regent Park received social assistance payments (Kelly, 2015), reflecting the overall shift toward Regent Park becoming home to a larger share of socially and economically disadvantaged households following its original development (Purdy, 2003).

5.1.3.3 Federal Immigration Policy Reform

Changes to tenant selection criteria represented a response, in part, to immigration reform by the federal government during the 1960s to remove exclusionary policies against potential immigrants based on race or nationality (Kelly, 2015). In the subsequent decades, Canada experienced a dramatic influx of immigrants from non-European countries, who were generally at lower income-earning levels and in greater need of social services relative to European immigrants. Regent Park became a reception area for new immigrants, who were attracted to the low rents, proximity to social services, and existing diasporic communities. Regent Park became home to waves of immigrants to Toronto from a number of successive regions, including the
Caribbean, China, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and most recently, Somalia. In 1961, about 20% of Regent Park residents were born outside of Canada; by 1981, almost 40% were (Purdy, 2003).

5.1.3.4 Toronto's Affordable Housing Crisis

Despite efforts to create affordable housing in the decades following World War II, a shortage of affordable housing in Canada has persisted until the present day. In the 1970s, many affordable rental programs were eliminated as part of neoliberal restructuring of state spending, even though tens of thousands of low-income individuals and families lacked financially-attainable shelter (James, 2010). Many economically disadvantaged households have continued to be unable to afford shelter into the 21st century, while at the same time, those living in public housing are unable to afford to rent or purchase market housing, “trapping” low-income households in public housing communities (Brushett, 2001).

This crisis of affordable housing was compounded in Toronto in the 1960s, when a period of growth in private apartment building led to a 22% increase in public housing applications, as single-family homes were demolished and replaced with higher-density, higher-cost apartments for smaller households (Brushett, 2001; Kelly, 2015). Since the 1960s, developers and public agencies have consistently acquired sizable properties across Toronto for large-scale commercial and residential development, further reducing available space for affordable housing construction (Kelly, 2015). Beginning in the 1980s, Regent Park residents lived in their accommodations, on average, for longer periods than average renters or homeowners in Toronto because of the affordable housing crisis (Purdy, 2003). By the 1990s, rental housing construction ceased almost entirely in Toronto. The resulting period of low rental vacancy and high rental and home prices provided even fewer opportunities for families in Regent Park to exit the community (Sewell, 1993; Purdy, 2003).
5.1.3.5 Socio-Economic Divergence at Regent Park

Regent Park experienced significant socio-economic divergence from the rest of Toronto from the 1960s onward because of wider political and economic changes Toronto. Single-parent households, generally led by women, increased during the 1960s and 1970s, because of relaxed divorce laws and changes in workplace and family roles for women (Purdy, 2003). Between 1951 and 1971, the share of single-parent families in Regent Park jumped from 7% to over 40%, four times the share citywide in Toronto, meaning that more units in Regent Park were inhabited by families with one income-earner instead of two (Purdy, 2003). While the 20th century has generally resulted in an expansion of economic opportunities for women, women nonetheless experience greater marginalization in the workplace compared to men, limiting their employment access, stability, and earning power. Single-parent, female-headed households continue to be located among the lowest income brackets, and these types of households became increasingly common at Regent Park in the decades following its construction (Murdie, 1994).

From the 1970s and onward, a greater share of senior citizens, foreign born residents, and individuals receiving long-term social assistance became residents at Regent Park (Murdie, 1994; Purdy, 2003). Women, ethnic minorities, and economically or socially vulnerable individuals—all of whom disproportionately faced stronger barriers to the workforce—made up a greater share of the Regent Park population. In the decades following the construction of Regent Park, the neighbourhood’s residents therefore held progressively lower-paying, less stable jobs, on average, relative to the rest of Toronto (Purdy, 2003). While Regent Park was home to a mix of low- and moderate-income households in the 1950s and 1960s, from the 1970s and onward, its residents were very poor overall, and were less connected to the social and economic activity in the city around them (James, 2010; Lemon, 1993; Brushett, 2001).

The built form of Regent Park declined in conjunction with the rise of socio-economic vulnerability in the neighbourhood. By the mid-1990s, many units needed significant repair work, with around 150 units uninhabitable despite Toronto’s public housing wait list containing tens of thousands of low-income families (Barber, 1995). Due to a lack of informal surveillance, personal safety became a significant issue for tenants,
as the unattractive and poorly-maintained community dissuaded outsiders from visiting or passing through, providing physical cover for criminal activity (Milgrom, 2000). The poor reputation and low income of the area caused many local supermarkets, banks, and other shops to close beginning in the 1970s (Purdy, 2003). By the 1980s, just over twenty years since Regent Park was first completed, community members, local activists, and policymakers began to explore yet another wholesale revitalization of the area that had become home to Regent Park.

Chapter Seven picks up the story of early attempts to redevelop Regent Park in the mid-1990s, informed by archival research and the interview process for this thesis. The remainder of Chapter Five, meanwhile, provides an overview of the urban planning policy rationale for the current revitalization and summarizes the characterizations of the revitalization thus far in the academic literature.

5.2 Revitalization Planning Policy Rationale

The urban planning and housing policy framework for Regent Park was established in early-2005 with the approval by the City of Toronto of Toronto Community Housing’s planning by-law and Toronto Official Plan amendment applications. The approval of the planning rationale was a culmination of efforts to revitalize Regent Park since the 1990s, emboldened by the creation of TCH in 2002 and its extensive consultation with Regent Park residents. These amendments created a master plan for the revitalization and included detailed planning for phase one of the project, receiving approval in advance of the selection of Daniels as the private sector partner. Since the initial approvals process in 2005, the planning framework has been amended twice: first, in 2009, as part of the phase two approvals process; and second, in 2013, as part of the approvals for phases three through five.
5.2.1 Phase 1 By-Law Amendment, 2005

The Toronto by-law and Official Plan amendments for phase one of the Regent Park revitalization were adopted by Toronto City Council in February 2005, providing a planning framework for the request for proposals (RFP) issued in May 2005 (City of Toronto, 2005a; 2005b). The 2005 amendments designated Regent Park as a secondary plan area, an area that receives more detailed planning and development policies that supersede existing Official Plan regulations (City of Toronto, 2005a).

A series of guiding principles for the revitalization were established by the 2005 amendments, including:

- Reconnecting Regent Park with adjoining neighbourhoods, using streets, parks, and open spaces;
• Promoting a diversity of housing sizes, tenures, and affordability levels;

• Promoting a mix of land uses;

• Improving safety and accessibility through building design and urban planning, creating a neighbourhood safe for pedestrians and with clear divisions between public and private space;

• Promoting environmental sustainability, through infrastructure and building design;

• Sustaining the economic health of the neighbourhood, by allowing for adaptation of design and planning for demographic, lifestyle, and technological changes; and,

• Reducing automobile usage (City of Toronto, 2005a; 2005c).

The redevelopment is also subject to several provisions of the provincial *Planning Act* (1990), including:

• *Section 33: Demolition Control Area*, in that demolition of existing housing should take part in phases to avoid displacing residents too early or exposing them to extended demolition nearby;

• *Section 36: Holding Provision By-Law*, which permits the City to set certain conditions that must be met before each phase is approved, allowing for enforcement of the phasing schedule;

• *Section 37: Increased Density Provision, etc., By-Law*, which allows a municipality to permit increased height and density of a development that exceeds allowances in the by-law in exchange for the provision of certain conditions, which, in this case, was the approval of TCH’s tenant relocation and construction mitigation and communication plans by the City;

• *Section 41: Site Plan Control Area*, in that development of each phase is contingent on City approval of building location and elevation drawings; and,

• *Section 51: Plan of Subdivision Approvals*, which requires City approval for the subdivision of the existing super-blocks into smaller blocks, new land parcels, streets, and parkland (Government of Ontario, 2015b; City of Toronto, 2005c).
The 2005 amendments revised the existing building density and land use provisions for Regent Park and provided new policy to guide the structure, form, and design of buildings and physical amenities for the site. In the Official Plan and existing City by-laws, Regent Park was zoned for low-rise residential development with a total area 1.0x the area of the site and a height limit of 10 m. Using the definitions provided by the Official Plan, most of Regent Park was rezoned as “Mixed Use” or “Apartment Neighbourhoods” areas, which permitted the inclusion of commercial uses in higher density settings. The remaining area of the site was rezoned as “Open Space” area, where parkland can be created (City of Toronto, 2005c).

The character of the built form in Regent Park was outlined in the 2005 Official Plan amendment as: “low-rise and mid-rise buildings fronting onto public streets, interspersed in appropriate locations with tall buildings” (City of Toronto, 2005a, p. 5). To achieve the built form, three types of buildings were expected:

1. Low-rise residential, including townhouses, stacked townhouses, and walk-up apartments;
2. Medium-rise residential and mixed-use apartments of six to eight storeys; and,
3. Point towers of 16 to 25 storeys on top of base buildings interspersed throughout the neighbourhood in select locations (City of Toronto, 2005c).

While the built form was planned to be taller and denser than the surrounding neighbourhoods, City Planning was content that the design protected the physical character of the adjacent areas while promoting higher density, in accordance with the City’s Official Plan (City of Toronto, 2005c; 2015).

Approval of the 2005 amendments was also contingent upon compliance with urban design guidelines that incorporated best practices and input from the Regent Park community (City of Toronto, 2005c). Toronto zoning by-laws do not provide many mechanisms for regulating the construction quality, environmental sustainability, and aesthetics of new development, but the provision of high quality, environmentally-friendly, and visually-appealing buildings and public spaces were highly prioritized by the revitalization partnership (Bozikovic, 2012; Gladki, 2014). As a result, the secondary plan mandated City
approval of various aspects of urban design, including building setbacks and step-backs, street design, parks and open spaces, public art, heritage commemoration, and tree planting and preservation (City of Toronto, 2005c).

The 2005 amendments adhered to several housing policies that guided the replacement of public housing and the creation of new affordable rental and ownership units. Consent from the provincial Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing was required under the Social Housing Reform Act (2000) before the revitalization could proceed. The housing provisions contained in the 2005 amendments were therefore consistent with the Social Housing Reform Act, in addition to the requirements set out in the City’s Official Plan, while also incorporating input from the community regarding the desire for a right-of-return for existing tenants (City of Toronto, 2005c). The 2005 amendments mandated replacement of every public unit demolished at Regent Park, with at least 85% of the units required to be constructed on the existing site. The remaining units not replaced at Regent Park were required to be built in the neighbouring communities, providing tenants with the choice to leave the community but remain in public housing, while also enhancing housing mix by creating space at Regent Park for non-rent-geared-to-income (RGI) affordable housing options. The right of existing tenants to return to the new Regent Park was enshrined in the 2005 amendments, which also dictated that replacement units must be of similar size to original units, public housing units must be maintained for at least 25 years following occupancy, and 20% of new ownership market units must be priced at affordable levels (City of Toronto, 2005a; 2005c).

5.2.2 Phase 2 By-Law Amendment, 2009

For the phase two amendment, approved in 2009, the zoning by-law was altered to allow for the construction of public amenities that were not included in the original plans or were intended to be constructed during the later phases. Funding from the City of Toronto was made available for the
construction of a central park\textsuperscript{6} and the Regent Park Aquatic Centre, which were originally planned for phase five, and the federal and provincial governments provided funding for the Daniels Spectrum, an arts-and-cultural facility, in 2009 (Kelly, 2015). Some low- and medium-rise buildings were eliminated to accommodate the new facilities, which required alterations to the street grid, and the units planned for these locations were transferred into other structures, including high-rise towers. An 88 m tower was added and some of the existing high-rises were slightly increased in height from 75 to 77 m for phase two. Some low- and mid-rise structures were also approved for increased heights, from 10-22 m to 20-40 m. The locations of towers in phase two were also revised to accommodate the new street grid and public facilities. While not required to do so, the revised plan aimed to exceed mandates in the City of Toronto’s \textit{Design Criteria for Review of Tall Building Proposals} (2006), particularly with respect to establishing minimum spacing of high-rise buildings (City of Toronto, 2009).

\textbf{5.2.3 Phases 3 to 5 By-Law Amendment, 2013}

In 2013, TCH and Daniels applied for additional changes to the zoning by-laws for phases three through five, principally, to build more market housing units to increase the total site density. The need to increase site density to accommodate more market housing was in response to requests from the City to improve the financial feasibility of the project (Kelly, 2015).

The 2013 amendments were also due, in part, to changes to the original vision for the redevelopment by Regent Park residents, which were expressed over the course of community consultation in anticipation of the amendment application. One of the principle messages expressed by the community was the desire to demolish 14 Blevins Place, the remaining Maisonette Tower, which they did not want to continue to be used for public housing because of physical accessibility issues, such as the elevator only stopping at every-other floor, and negative experiences and associations with the tower. The project team

\textsuperscript{6} While officially named “Regent Park”, the term “central park” will be used to avoid potential confusion.
also determined that it would be highly costly to repurpose 14 Blevins Place for non-public housing purposes, such as condos. 14 Blevins Place was preserved in previous site plans because it was recommended for heritage designation by City staff, which, if conferred, would provide legal protection from demolition. Despite this recommendation, the City's heritage advisory committee, the local community council, and City Council did not support the designation, and 14 Blevins Place was approved for demolition in the 2013 amendments (City of Toronto, 2014).

A series of changes to the built form planning framework to increase site density in phases three through five were approved by the City and agreed to by Regent Park tenants. These changes included:

- Adding two towers, at heights of 77 and 88 m, on Dundas St. E.;
- Adding one 60 m tower on Parliament St.;
- Adding two buildings, at heights of 22 and 32 m, on the former site of 14 Blevins Place;
- Altering the heights of some mid-rise towers, with two towers increasing to 75 m from 50 m, and three decreasing to 22 m, 30 m, and 40 m from 50 m; and,
- Adding a post-secondary student residence to the site.

The final site density is expected to be 4.3x the area of the site following the 2013 amendments, up from 2.8x the site area in the original planning framework. Despite this increase, City Planning stated that the overall built form conditions will provide adequate transitions to surrounding lower-density areas. The total number of public and market housing units at the site upon completion was increased from 5400 in the 2005 amendments to 7500 in the 2013 amendments, increasing the ratio of market to public housing from 60-40 to 75-25, and the total population at Regent Park upon completion from 12,500 to 15,000-17,000 (City of Toronto, 2014).

Revisions to the planning framework for phases three through five were also necessitated by the addition of the Regent Park Athletic Grounds, a 2.8 acre sporting complex, in the south-east portion of the
site. Funding for the Athletic Grounds was provided by the MLSE Foundation, the charitable arm of Maple Leaf Sports and Entertainment (owners of three major professional sports teams in Toronto) in partnership with the City of Toronto. Due to the various revisions to the land uses, lots, and street grid in the site master plan required to accommodate the park, the revitalization partnership used the opportunity to review the overall planning framework for the remaining phases (City of Toronto, 2014). In addition to the changes in site density, the 2013 amendments reduced the total number of phases from six to five and reconfigured the planned park space in the neighbourhood to accommodate the Athletic Grounds (Gladki Planning Associates, 2013). To better conform to Section 33 (Demolition Control) of the provincial Planning Act, the demolition phasing was also altered to shorten the period between demolition and construction and reduce the impact of displacement on tenants needing to be temporarily relocated (City of Toronto, 2014).

Figure 18. Regent Park revitalization phasing plan, as of 2013 (TCH, 2017i).
In approving the 2013 amendments, City staff noted that the revised plan was in better accordance with the secondary plan, in that it added more parkland (as well as a student residence) which will further the mixed-use character of the area. The amendments were also consistent with the *Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe*, a provincial planning guide for development in the GTA that took effect in 2006, in that it promotes population and employment intensification within existing built-up areas (City of Toronto, 2014).  

### 5.2.4 Revitalization Progress (as of May 2017)

Demolition for phase one of the redevelopment began in February 2006, just weeks after TCH and Daniels announced their partnership (Nicholson, 2012). Unique to the condominium market in Canada, the first market condo building was constructed before the sales period began, instilling confidence in buyers that may have been hesitant to purchase units in Regent Park off of drawings. Within three weeks, 85% of the condo units had been sold, signaling the market’s confidence in the project (Kelly, 2015). Phase one, which comprises part of the north-west portion of Regent Park, was completed in 2012, with phase two, comprised of a large area in the central portion of the site, expected to be completed during 2017. Several amenities were completed during the first two phases, including the Daniels Spectrum, the Regent Park Aquatic Centre, the Regent Park Athletic Grounds, and the central park. New retail spaces have been added; tenants include Freshco, Rogers, Tim Hortons, RBC, and Shopper’s Drug Mart. A total of 310 new affordable (non-RGI) rental units were also added over the course of phases one and two, with plans made to incorporate additional units in future phases if funding is available. A total of 1100 new jobs have also been created by the revitalization. Phase three began in 2013, and is expected to be completed in 2019, with phases four and five taking place between 2020 and 2025 (TCH, 2017i).

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7 The revitalization plans were no longer subject to approval by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, as the *Social Housing Reform Act* was replaced by the *Housing Services Act* in 2011. Under the *Housing Services Act*, plans to redevelop public housing can be approved by local service managers, which, in the case of Regent Park, is the City of Toronto, a revision that served to streamline the approvals process relative to the earlier development applications (City of Toronto, 2014).
5.3 Rationale for Social Mix and Mixed-Income Revitalization

One of the central goals of the Regent Park revitalization is to introduce a social mix to the neighbourhood by building housing for a diversity of income-earning households (University of Toronto & TCH, 2014). Social mix policies are used by cities to reverse the negative effects of poverty concentration and the spatial segregation of income brackets, and improve the economic outcomes of low-income residents (Joseph et al., 2007). Chaskin and Joseph (2015; Joseph et al., 2007) summarized the four primary reasons for social mixing used by politicians, planners, and policymakers to justify poverty deconcentration measures:

1. **Social networks and capital argument**: New interactions between socio-economic classes leads to the transfer of information and resources from higher- to lower-income residents (Joseph et al., 2007). For example, high-income condo owners provide access for lower-income renters to higher-income socio-economic networks, knowledge, and information (Chaskin & Joseph, 2015).

2. **Social control argument**: In many socially- and economically-deprived neighbourhoods, one of the main factors prohibiting local, community-led improvements is social disorganization, “the inability of a community to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls” (Chaskin & Joseph, 2015, p. 32), including behavioural accountability within a community. The introduction of higher-income residents improves accountability within a neighbourhood because homeowners are generally more willing to promote safety to protect their investment in the neighbourhood, and are more likely to develop closer social ties with residential and commercial neighbours, law enforcement, and political figures, all of whom are highly invested in preventing criminal activity (Joseph et al., 2007; Chaskin & Joseph, 2015; Coleman, 1988).
3. **Behavioural** argument: Improved connections between different income brackets lead to role modeling and mentoring, influencing behaviour toward better economic outcomes (Joseph et al., 2007).

4. **Political economy of place** argument: New middle-income residents in a community advocate for local service and infrastructure improvements that benefit all residents, including low-income tenants (Joseph et al., 2007). Improvements may include better schools, physical improvements in the neighbourhood, or expanded commercial and social services (Chaskin & Joseph, 2015).

Analysis of the efficacy of these arguments is beyond the scope of this thesis, though many sources within the literature have assessed the effectiveness of social mix arguments, generally in the US (e.g., Fraser et al., 2011; Chaskin & Joseph, 2013; Lees et al., 2011), with some related analysis taking place at Regent Park (e.g., Dunn, 2012; S. Fernandes, 2014; Greaves, 2011). The literature generally cautions that the effectiveness of social mix is difficult to assess because insufficient time has elapsed at most social mix projects to identify any socio-economic improvements. Based on the analysis that has been performed, however, the ambitious justifications for social mix, such as access to higher-income social networks and behavioural modeling, have not been observed to a significant degree, but social mix redevelopment has been found to deliver more practical benefits to low-income residents, such as improved housing conditions, safer neighbourhoods, and better social and commercial services.

### 5.4 The Regent Park Revitalization in the Literature

Academic study of the Regent Park revitalization has taken place since the inception of redevelopment efforts. In this section, the themes found within the literature most prominent, recent, and relevant to this thesis will be summarized. Understanding the research allows for an identification of the gaps in the research that this thesis intends to fill. Overall, much of the research generally adopts a tenant-centric perspective and
contextualizes the Regent Park revitalization as a continuation of similar efforts in the US. The public-private development process and perspective has been under-examined, and a Canada- and Toronto-centric lens has not fully been adopted when analyzing the revitalization. These gaps in the research formed the basis of the research objectives of this thesis, which are: 1) to understand the Regent Park revitalization from the perspective of the public-private development partnership, and 2) to examine the revitalization within the local development context of Toronto.

The exclusion of any academic (or trade or professional) publications from the following review is in no way an indictment of the value or importance of that research; rather, in-depth analysis in this thesis of existing research has been limited to articles most related to the themes discussed within the specific focus of this thesis. Studies of the Regent Park revitalization not reviewed comprehensively for this thesis but relevant to continued discussion and study of the redevelopment touch on a wide variety of topics, including: community consultation and environmental justice (de Schutter, 2009); community leadership (Brail & Kumar, 2017) and young persons’ (e.g., Leahy & Johnson, 2013) experiences of the revitalization; residents’ right-of-return experiences (e.g., Tehara, 2015; Johnson, 2016); public space and social mixing at Regent Park (S. Fernandes, 2014; Greaves, 2011; University of Toronto & TCH, 2014); architectural (Wilcox, 2014; Bozikovic, 2012) and urban planning (Gladki, 2014) approaches to public housing redevelopment; urban planning law and public housing (K. Fernandes, 2011); and criminology-related study of the revitalization (Thompson et al., 2013).

Based on the most relevant academic inquiry into the Regent Park revitalization, this section provides an overview of the most prominent themes that have emerged from the literature, including: 1) social mix, moral regulation, and poverty concentration; 2) neoliberalism, space, and gentrification; 3) revitalization being the outcome of failed neoliberal governance strategies; 4) revitalization only benefitting the wealthy, not low-income tenants; 5) territorial destigmatization and New Urbanism; and, 6) Daniels as a socially-conscious developer.
5.4.1 Social Mix, Moral Regulation, and Poverty Concentration

The Regent Park literature refers to the idea that public housing redevelopment and social mixing represent attempts to morally regulate low-income individuals. A Marxist perspective characterizes social mixing as efforts made by urban colonizers, including politicians, developers, and condo-buyers, to “civilize” the tenants living in concentrated public housing (Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009). Others see social mixing as representative of the paternalistic tendencies of the political and economic leaders in contemporary, progressive cities in the west (James, 2010; Kelly, 2015). By placing “normal” individuals, i.e., middle- to higher-income condo-owners, close to “deviant” lower-income public housing renters, the renters will be “normalized”, improving socio-economic outcomes and reducing crime in the process.

There also exists a debate within the Regent Park and wider public housing redevelopment literature over the positive and negative aspects of concentrated poverty. On one hand, the concentration of poverty within public housing complexes preserves low-income political power and provides a sense of community to cope with the challenges of living in poverty (August & Walks, 2011). On the other hand, concentrated poverty perpetuates the contextual or neighbourhood effect, the positive or negative impact of a local environment on an individual born to that environment (Johnston, 2009a; 2009b), as the stigmatization and segregation of low-income neighbourhoods limits the achievements of individuals raised in these areas (Dunn, 2012; Rowe & Dunn, 2015; Kelly, 2015).

Another theme underlying much of the Regent Park revitalization literature is that social mixing is not an effective tool for improving socio-economic outcomes for low-income residents in public housing complexes. Informed by recent US-based studies into social mixing (see Bridge et al., 2011), this line of scholarly work conceptualizes social mix policy as failing to achieve its goals of integration between different income brackets and improvement of socio-economic outcomes (as described by Chaskin & Joseph, 2015) for low-income tenants (Silver, 2011). Furthermore, considering the perceived benefits of concentrated poverty, some see social mix as having an overall negative impact on tenants, since it is a form of gentrification and
therefore displacement (August, 2014), and reduces the political power of lower-income individuals and stigmatizes them within their own neighbourhood (August & Walks, 2011).

5.4.2 Neoliberalism, Space, and the Gentrification of Public Housing

A theme common across the literature is that public housing redevelopment is a spatial manifestation of a neoliberal political economy. In the decades surrounding and immediately following World War II, western countries generally adopted Keynesian approaches to economic development, including the allocation of large portions of inner cities for concentrated public housing construction (Lees et al., 2011). During the 1970s and 1980s, however, western governments generally transitioned to neoliberal fiscal policies, such as privatization and reduced social service spending, in the face of heightened competition brought about by the globalization of the world’s economy. As part of this continued retrenchment of the welfare state, municipal government agencies have increasingly adopted entrepreneurial approaches to social service delivery and infrastructure expansion in the absence of funding from higher orders of government (Harvey, 1989). Lees et al. (2011) and others (see Bridge et al., 2011) have argued that mixed-income redevelopments of concentrated public housing neighbourhoods, usually using 3Ps, are examples of neoliberal, entrepreneurial approaches to social service delivery.

Academic inquiry is unanimous in understanding the Regent Park revitalization to be a spatial manifestation of the neoliberal political economy. This characterization has led to criticism of the redevelopment on the basis that the shift in governance in the west from a Keynesian welfare state to neoliberalism has been beneficial to the higher-income households at the expense of the lower-income earners (e.g., August, 2014; Silver, 2011; Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009). According to neoliberal-critical scholars, Regent Park was one of the last areas in downtown Toronto inhabited solely by low-income households, but is being invaded by middle- to upper-income condo-buyers.

Lees et al. (2011) have argued that mixed-income redevelopment is also a form of state-led gentrification. As inner-city land becomes more valuable and allocated for service sector employment,
wealthier individuals working in the service sector have become more attracted to living near to their jobs. This has resulted, primarily, in an increase in private housing construction in inner cities, where publicly-owned housing complexes were initially shielded from market development. According to this perspective, mixed-income redevelopments are used by wealthy elites to justify the gentrification of otherwise unattainable lands. Enabled by municipal governments affected by fiscal austerity measures, those arguing for public housing redevelopment to include new market-rate accommodations have used the supposedly virtuous outcome of social mixing to validate gentrifying policies.

5.4.3 Regent Park as a Failure of the Neoliberal Political Economy

A prominent critique of the Regent Park revitalization in the literature is that the redevelopment is an outcome of repeated failures of the neoliberal political economy. In the immediate years following construction of the original Regent Park, it was seen as a major success by the media, politicians, and academics in Toronto (e.g., A. Rose, 1958). However, within a couple decades, the project was unanimously considered a failure by these same voices (Purdy, 2003). The physical layout of Regent Park had cut off the neighbourhood from the surrounding city. Residents continued to live in poverty, crime returned to the neighbourhood, and the buildings fell into disrepair (Caulfield, 1994). Critics of neoliberalism attribute these developments not to any failings in the initial physical design of the neighbourhood, but instead to disinvestment in the buildings and the people living within them (Purdy, 2003). This ongoing disinvestment eventually fuelled the stigmatization and negative perceptions that preceded the revitalization and made redevelopment of the site seem inevitable (Silver, 2011; August, 2014). Were it not for the retrenchment of the welfare state in the second half of the 20th century, the vulnerable individuals living in Regent Park may have received adequate support through social services, mitigating the outcomes of crime, addiction, and unemployment the design of the neighbourhood was criticized for perpetuating (August, 2014). The housing stock itself was not adequately maintained due to disinvestment in public housing at various levels of government, leading the neighbourhood to need revitalization by the same actors that allowed it to degrade
(Silver, 2011; August & Walks, 2011). According to these critiques, the recent revitalization represents yet another failure of neoliberalism because it is not considered to be a comprehensive, long-term approach to reducing poverty (Silver, 2011). While the living conditions of the tenants may improve, this will not be accompanied by any additional funding of government services required by the residents of Regent Park, such as increased social assistance payments. According to Silver (2011), it is especially unfortunate that over $1 billion will be invested in the Regent Park revitalization, but no new public housing units will be added.

5.4.4 Does the Regent Park Revitalization Only Benefit the Wealthy?

Neoliberal-critical analysis of the Regent Park revitalization has also argued that the project only benefits middle- to high-income earners, with low-income tenants receiving no benefits or even being negatively affected by the project. Wealthier individuals benefit from the Regent Park revitalization because they are granted access to valuable land previously inhabited solely by low-income earners (August, 2014; Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009; Silver, 2011). Higher-income households also benefit in that the political power of public housing tenants is reduced because social mixing results in low-income households becoming the minority in the neighbourhood. Whereas public housing tenants, when concentrated in an area, could use their collective voice to influence politicians, they will now be one of many voices within a diluted constituency following the redevelopment. This also raises concerns that wealthier individuals will use their superior political and social capital to oppose any expansion of social services in the neighbourhood, such as homeless shelters or harm reduction centres, because of the perceived risks associated with public safety and loss of property value (August & Walks, 2011).

Public housing tenants may also stand to suffer from a diminished sense of community because of the redevelopment. In the original Regent Park, the concentration of individuals facing similar challenges associated with poverty fostered support structures to cope with issues, such as stigmatization, or to provide low-cost or free services to each other, such as childcare. Critics of neoliberalism also warn that low-income residents could become marginalized from public spaces within the new mixed-income community. Before
redevelopment, public spaces, such as community centres and recreational complexes, would have been used by tenants exclusively. However, with the influx of higher-income residents, tenants will be forced to share these spaces (such as public meeting spaces) and the benefits associated with using them with condo-owners that are not as reliant on public spaces for recreation or community-building and who may exclude tenants from these spaces (August & Walks, 2011).

5.4.5 Territorial Destigmatization and New Urbanism

Many scholars have characterized the Regent Park revitalization as having an overall negative impact on public housing tenants because it has failed to achieve social mixing between classes. In response to these concerns, Rowe and Dunn (2015; Dunn, 2012) suggest that the benchmark of close, interpersonal relationships between classes purported to indicate successful social mixing by Chaskin and Joseph (2015; Joseph et al., 2007) is too ambitious to achieve. Therefore, a redevelopment project that does not realize this goal should not be considered a failure. A realistic goal observed to be taking place at Regent Park is territorial (or, place) destigmatization. Territorial stigmatization is stigma directed towards individuals because of:

where they live, which can be the cause of direct discrimination e.g., literally discrimination by address and the cause of attenuated life chances due to endemic crime, poverty, hopelessness, joblessness, and more generally class and racial subordination. (Dunn, 2012, p. 89)

Recent Regent Park literature critical of social mixing characterizes territorial stigmatization as a tool used by political and economic elites to “prime” areas for redevelopment through negative portrayals of these neighbourhoods and their residents in the media, academy, and state (e.g., August, 2014; Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009); however, scholarly work less critical of social mix considers mixed-income redevelopments to be potentially useful approaches for reducing the territorial stigmatization experienced by public housing tenants (Dunn, 2012).
In particular, the adoption of design policies related to New Urbanism in public housing redevelopment is seen as an effective tool for reducing territorial stigmatization (Dunn, 2012; Rowe & Dunn, 2015; James, 2010). Based on the ideas brought to prominence by Jane Jacobs in the 1960s (Jacobs, 1961), New Urbanist planning and design strategies aim to create walkable, mixed-use, compact, and aesthetically-pleasing communities that easily connect individuals to various land uses and services and amenities within an urban landscape (Talen, 2012). New Urbanist planning tools have influenced mixed-income redevelopment of public housing, first, in the US, and more recently, in Canada, to reshape the urban environment to better support socio-economic diversity, social interaction, safety, and civic participation (Chaskin & Joseph, 2015). At Regent Park, New Urbanism has informed the design decisions to make public and private housing look similar, distinguish between public and private spaces to foster a collective sense of ownership and safety by providing “eyes on the street”, and integrate super-blocks into surrounding neighborhoods by reintroducing through streets. By “normalizing” the built form, New Urbanism eliminates the potential for places, and as a result, the people living in these places, to be stigmatized based on the negative perceptions of their surroundings (Dunn, 2012).

5.4.6 Daniels as a Socially-Conscious Developer

Daniels, the private sector partner for TCH on the Regent Park revitalization, has been characterized in recent analysis as “arguably...the most socially conscious” among private development firms in Toronto (Rosen, 2016, p. 13). A small group of urban geographers have studied private real estate developers and their actions, outlook, and influence on a city with respect to local political, cultural, and economic factors. The political, social, and fiscal actions and perspectives of developers in a city have been described in this literature as a product of local attitudes and policies (Charney, 2015; Coiacetto, 2000). Within a city itself, there are also differences in outlook between various developers (Rosen, 2016; Coiacetto, 2000). Certain developers may place greater emphasis on profit-seeking, with minimal regard for social objectives or best
planning practices, while others may sacrifice some profits to ensure that the projects they are involved in promote wider social and civic goals (Rosen, 2016).

In Toronto, many developers currently in operation have strongly emphasized profit-seeking within a booming real estate market that has not experienced a downturn in 25 years, but have not altogether ignored the social and environmental objectives identified by public and non-profit agencies. According to Rosen (2016), large developers responded positively to provincial smart growth policies enacted in the mid-2000s, such as the Places to Grow Act (2005) and Greenbelt Act (2005), which were designed to limit urban sprawl and protect green space outside the GTA. Most Toronto developers had been focused almost exclusively on suburban, greenfield development before the introduction of smart growth policies (Rosen, 2016). When the Greenbelt Act was enacted, however, 1.8 million acres of agricultural and forested land surrounding the GTA became restricted from residential development (Greenbelt Foundation, n.d.). The City of Toronto’s Official Plan (first approved post-amalgamation in 2002) also encouraged development in downtown “growth areas”, incentivizing construction in existing built-up areas, usually near public transportation networks (City of Toronto, 2015). While urban sites generally do not offer the same profit margins as rural sites, Toronto developers have shown interest and found success with inner-city development, such as at CityPlace, by Concord, various downtown developments by Tridel, and Regent Park, by Daniels (Rosen, 2016).

In his analysis of private development firms in Toronto, Rosen (2016) suggests that while all private developers in Toronto are profit-oriented, “they are not all purely profit-maximizing, and a variety of factors colour their decisions, targets, and practices” (Rosen, 2016, p. 16). Of the companies Rosen (2016) examined, those building on downtown, high value, or highly-accessible sites “adopt strategies characterized by a more reciprocal relationship between the firm and society” (Rosen, 2016, p. 16), whereby the communities developed are provided with public amenities as usually required for City approval, improving the experiences of local residents (though, also increasing sale prices paid by new residents, which provides reciprocal benefits to the developer).
Rosen (2016) suggests that Daniels is “arguably...the most socially conscious” developer in Toronto because it is more “fair” in its contributions to society relative to other firms (p. 13). Daniels has contributed “fairly” to society with a corporate agenda that pursues civic and social objectives in addition to profit-seeking. This agenda includes Regent Park, as well as large mixed-use intensification projects in Mississauga and Brampton, two suburban communities in the GTA. Daniels’ efforts to pursue civic and social objectives are a product of a corporate mindset that views social benefits as a form of “profit”, such that its total “profit” is measured, internally, in terms of both economic and social achievement. Daniels is content with somewhat lower financial profit margins relative to other developers. Rather than focusing exclusively on developing moderate-cost to luxury condominiums, the firm has attempted to construct mixed-use, mixed-tenure, and mixed-income communities that provide socially and economically diverse experiences for residents (Rosen, 2016).

The development agenda adopted by Daniels is a product of the experience of the firm’s top executives in building public and non-profit housing (Rosen, 2016). Daniels was founded in 1982 by John Daniels, who had been chairman of Cadillac Fairview, at the time the largest development company in North America (Hanes, 2012; Kelly, 2015). In 1984, John Daniels hired Mitchell Cohen, who was working in co-operative housing development before the federal government ended non-profit housing funding, as Daniels’ general manager. Cohen, who quickly rose to president of Daniels, created an internal construction division in 1986, after finding that the general contractors hired by the company were inattentive to quality and uncaring toward customers (Hanes, 2012). In 1987, funding for non-profit housing was made available by the provincial Liberal government, and between 1987 and 1995, Daniels constructed 3600 non-profit housing units, mainly in suburban locations (Kelly, 2015; Hanes, 2012).

Provincial non-profit funding was eliminated by the newly-elected Progressive Conservatives in 1995, however, cutting Daniels’ business by 65% (Kelly, 2015). Daniels instead constructed retirement housing and supported local charities (Hanes, 2012). In the late-1990s, Daniels began developing high-rise condominiums in built-up areas of Toronto, and Cohen initiated the company’s first attempts to partner with the public
sector to revitalize Regent Park (Kelly, 2015). The revitalization efforts were unsuccessful at that time, during which the provincial Progressive Conservatives were transferring public housing responsibility to the municipalities. Meanwhile, Daniels continued to pursue affordable homeownership objectives in the early-2000s. In 1999, Daniels launched the Home Investment Program, where a portion of the rent paid by a tenant in one of Daniels’ rental properties is directed toward a down payment for a Daniels home (Hanes, 2012). In 2004, construction was completed on the first of the company’s twelve FirstHome communities, which provide affordable homeownership to moderate-income earners by offering graduated deposit payment plans and special financing (Daniels, n.d.; Hanes, 2012). Unsurprisingly, when TCH restarted efforts to revitalize Regent Park in 2002, Cohen expressed considerable interest in involving Daniels, eventually leading to the selection of the company as TCH’s private sector partner (Kelly, 2015).

Daniels is a highly altruistic company, though it is nonetheless private and for-profit. Rosen’s (2016) analysis of Daniels’ development sites suggest that the company still must create fiscally sustainable projects to achieve both its social and economic objectives. Daniels’ developments are located in highly-accessible areas in Toronto, often along major roadways or public transit lines, and, similar to most developers, use substantial branding and marketing strategies to attract buyers (Rosen, 2016). The company’s social and civic minded outlook could be characterized as a “sophisticated strategy of market differentiation…and…branding” (Rosen, 2016, p. 14). Rosen (2016) builds on the concept that development decisions made by firms depend on the availability of alternative choices (i.e., opportunities to pursue social objectives), profit-satisfying factors (i.e., firms may sacrifice financial profit to achieve social objectives while still generating satisfactory profit), and firms’ motivations with respect to economic and social profit-seeking. Rosen (2016) therefore contends that Daniels’ strategy of creating socially and economically diverse experiences and opportunities for residents, which the firm achieves by accepting somewhat lower financial profit margins, is the outcome of a unique set of decisions made by Daniels across a set of criteria that all developers implicitly or explicitly consider in crafting an organizational outlook and perspective. Ultimately, Daniels’ choices have led them to
be highly socially-conscious, and therefore potentially the most appropriate private developer in Toronto to partner with TCH on the Regent Park revitalization.

5.5 Conclusion

Chapter Five has addressed all themes related to Regent Park, the site of the most prominent mixed-income revitalization project currently underway in Toronto. The history of Regent Park until the 1990s, the urban planning rationale for the Regent Park revitalization, and existing characterizations of the revitalization in the literature were discussed in this chapter.

The history of Regent Park dates back until the 1900s (Section 5.1). From the 1900s to the 1940s, all three levels of government in Toronto were increasingly asked by constituents to address shortages in housing supply that had persisted since the 19th century (Kelly, 2015). Housing advocates were emboldened by the Bruce Report of 1934, which described widespread “slum-like” conditions in the city (Bruce, 1934). The Bruce Report eventually led to the construction of the original Regent Park between 1947 and 1959 on the site of Cabbagetown, a neighbourhood of row houses and cottages inhabited primarily by recent Irish immigrants (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). The design of Regent Park was informed by beliefs that physical surroundings predisposed individuals’ actions, drawing inspiration from Modernist design to create a park-like community dominated by high-rise towers and pedestrian pathways (Milgrom, 2000). Initially lauded by observers, the design of Regent Park was held responsible for physically isolating the neighbourhood from the rest of the city (Kelly, 2015). Coupled with wider social, political, and economic developments in the decades following the completion of Regent Park, the physical isolation of the neighbourhood engendered its socio-economic isolation, and Regent Park became progressively poorer and crime-ridden (Purdy, 2003). By the 1980s, tenants, housing advocates, and politicians again called for revitalization of the neighbourhood (Kelly, 2015).
Approval of the urban planning and housing policy rationale for the Regent Park revitalization in 2005 represented a culmination of almost 20 years of efforts to redevelop the neighbourhood (described in greater detail in Chapter Seven). The 2005 approval created a master plan, designated Regent Park as a secondary plan area (an area that receives detailed planning and development policies), established guiding principles for the revitalization, and provided urban planning framework for phase one (of five) of the revitalization subject to City of Toronto by-laws and the Official Plan (2002), and provincial planning and housing legislation (City of Toronto, 2005a) (Section 5.2). The phase one amendments revised planning regulations for Regent Park to allow for spatial integration with neighbouring communities, a mix of land uses, a mix of housing tenures, and, overall greater site density and taller building heights, achieved by replacing existing structures with a mix of townhouses, mid-rise and mixed-use apartments, and 16- to 25-storey residential towers with mixed-use podiums (City of Toronto, 2005c). In 2009, the phase two plans were revised to incorporate new public amenities and allow for planned amenities to be constructed earlier in the revitalization process (Kelly, 2015). Portions of the street grid and some building plans were altered to incorporate these amenities, which included a new central park, the Regent Park Aquatic Centre, and the Daniels Spectrum (an arts-and-cultural centre) (City of Toronto, 2009). In 2013, the planning framework for phases three through five of the revitalization was revised to further increase site density to accommodate more market housing to improve the financial feasibility of rebuilding the public housing at Regent Park (City of Toronto, 2014). Currently, the revitalization has progressed to phases two and three (as of May 2017), with phases four and five expected for completion between 2020 and 2025 (TCH, 2017i).

A review of the rationale for social mixing and mixed-income revitalization in the literature was also provided in this chapter (Section 5.3). According to Chaskin and Joseph (2015; Joseph et al., 2007), social mixing is purported to provide opportunities for higher-income individuals to transfer benefits, such as social capital, social control, behavioural modeling, and political power, to low-income individuals. While these outcomes have yet to be identified in existing study of Regent Park (e.g., S. Fernandes, 2014) or similar mixed-income redevelopment projects in the US (see Bridge et al., 2011), the literature notes that less
ambitious outcomes of social mix, such as reduced criminal activity, higher quality housing, and better social and commercial services, have been observed at Regent Park (Dunn, 2012).

The final section of this chapter reviewed recent characterizations of the Regent Park revitalization in the literature most relevant to this thesis (Section 5.4). Historic, social, socio-economic, and political approaches have been employed in the literature to study the revitalization and various intellectual traditions have been applied to the study of Regent Park, including critical (resembling Marxist) geographies, neoliberal-critical approaches, and inductive approaches.

Neoliberal-critical scholars take an overall negative view of the revitalization. Critical geographers see social mixing as paternalistic attempts by higher-income earners to “civilize” or “normalize” low-income public housing tenants (e.g., Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009). Similar research acknowledges the benefits of concentrated poverty, which preserves low-income political power and provides a sense of community to cope with poverty (August & Walks, 2011). Despite concerns that concentrated poverty perpetuates the neighbourhood effect, brought about, in part, because of the segregation and stigmatization of public housing tenants (Johnston, 2009b), critics of social mix characterize it as having an overall negative impact on public tenants because it fails to achieve strong integration between high- and low-income individuals, displaces tenants, reduces their political power, and stigmatizes them in their neighbourhood (August, 2014; Silver, 2011). Neoliberal-critical scholars also conceptualize mixed-income revitalization as an entrepreneurial approach to social service delivery, reflecting the ongoing retrenchment of the welfare state in the west since the 1970s (e.g., Lees et al., 2011). According to this line of thinking, the Regent Park revitalization represents a spatial manifestation of the neoliberal political economy, since the former exclusively low-income place, and the benefits of inhabiting that place, have been transferred to middle- and high-income individuals (Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009). Neoliberal-critical scholars have also characterized the Regent Park revitalization as state-led gentrification under the guise of social mixing (e.g., August, 2014), and yet another failure of the neoliberal political economy (e.g., Silver, 2011). This critique rejects the idea that the deterioration of Regent Park was the product of poor design; rather, critics assert that disinvestment in the neighbourhood since its
creation has necessitated revitalization (Silver, 2011; August, 2014). As with the original development of Regent Park, the revitalization is merely a “quick fix” that fails to address the underlying causes of poverty, for instance, by expanding the social safety net (e.g., Silver, 2011). Overall, neoliberal-critical analysis of the revitalization sees the project as only benefitting the wealthy, while having a negative impact on low-income tenants (e.g., Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009; August & Walks, 2011).

Studies approaching the redevelopment inductively, as opposed to through a neoliberal-critical lens, have been positive in their characterizations of the project (e.g., Rowe & Dunn, 2015; Dunn, 2012; Kelly, 2015). This literature is ambivalent about the efficacy of social mixing, but points to the benefits achieved from the destigmatization of the neighbourhood. New Urbanist design principles, such as creating walkable, mixed-use, compact, and aesthetically-pleasing communities, have been used at Regent Park to make market and public housing indistinguishable, provide clear distinctions between public and private spaces to foster collective ownership of space, and improve safety by planning for passive and active surveillance. Thus far, tenants have expressed generally positive responses to the project because of territorial destigmatization, as well as their improved living spaces and increased safety in public places (Rowe & Dunn, 2015). Research has also highlighted how Daniels is the most socially-conscious private developer in Toronto, and is therefore best able to provide positive outcomes for low-income tenants (Rosen, 2016).

5.5.1 Establishing a Research Agenda

Based on the existing research of the revitalization, a research agenda was established for this thesis, leading to the creation of the two primary objectives of this research. The first research objective, which is to understand the revitalization from the perspective of the public-private development process, was established to provide a new perspective from which to understand the revitalization. Public housing tenants have been the most common research participants in recent studies into the Regent Park revitalization. New condominium owners, individuals from TCH and Daniels, as well as community workers, anti-poverty advocates, and local politicians have also been included in recent studies, but not nearly to the same degree
as public housing tenants (e.g., Silver, 2011). This thesis, therefore, seeks out the perspective of experts and professionals with knowledge of the redevelopment process.

The second research objective, to analyze the Regent Park revitalization using the Toronto policy and development context as the primary lens of analysis, is necessary because much of the recent research on mixed-income developments and social mix policies has been informed by public housing revitalization projects in the US (e.g., August & Walks, 2011). While some scholars have not used the US as the primary lens of geographic analysis (e.g., James, 2010; Kelly, 2015), they have not explicitly used Canada and Toronto as a lens. This thesis adopts a local lens of analysis because there are several contextual differences between Toronto and the US, including variations in local political, social, and economic frameworks and planning and housing policy regimes. For example, race is a significant factor in any conversation about housing policy in the US, considering that many American public housing communities have been historical sites of segregation and displacement of black households (Hackworth, 2007). In Canada, comparatively, public housing tenants are predominantly recent immigrants to the country, whose origins can vary from decade to decade (Tomalty & Mallach, 2015). Similarly, Toronto housing regulations require that demolished public housing units must be replaced on a one-to-one basis, which is not the case in most US cities (Hackworth, 2007). Underlying both research gaps is that the role of 3Ps in housing revitalization in Canada has not been extensively studied, as 3Ps have only recently been adopted for affordable housing provision in the country (Siemiatycki, 2015).

Existing research into the Regent Park revitalization is highly descriptive, in that it provides critiques or highlights positive aspects of the project, but it is not prescriptive in seeking out or providing suggestions for improving future mixed-income developments. One of the main aspects of this research is to learn lessons and convey recommendations from existing experiences for future uses of 3Ps for housing revitalization in Toronto or other western cities. The next chapter, Chapter Six, outlines the methodology employed to learn these lessons, elicit these recommendations, and, ultimately, answer the research objectives laid out in this thesis.
Methods

This chapter summarizes the methodology used to inform the discussion and analysis in this thesis. The chapter begins with a description of the central approach to the research: a qualitative mixed-methods approach that combined different types of data, methods of analysis, and epistemological perspectives (Section 6.1). The chapter proceeds to an account of the data collection process, which consisted of 22 semi-structured interviews with 25 individuals currently or previously involved in the Regent Park revitalization and a review of documents related to revitalization efforts (Section 6.2). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the method of data analysis that was used for this thesis: planning policy analysis similar to the framework outlined by Patton et al. (2013) (Section 6.3). Following this chapter, Chapters Seven and Eight will present the findings and themes generated from the data collection and analysis procedures.

6.1 Research Design

This thesis employed a qualitative, mixed-methods approach for data collection and analysis. Qualitative research in human geography is concerned with answering questions about the experiences of individuals and societal structures (Winchester & Rofe, 2016). A qualitative approach was the most appropriate method for addressing the research objectives of this project, which are: 1) to investigate the individual development process experiences of those involved with the revitalization of Regent Park; and 2) to describe the impact on public housing revitalization of the local historical, socio-economic, and political context of Toronto, as opposed to the United States-centric framework often applied to Regent Park in the literature.

Mixed-methods approaches combine different types of data, methods of analysis, or epistemological perspectives, taking into account both historical frameworks and contemporary experiences within these frameworks. This project used a mixed-methods approach in that information was primarily gathered through an interview process that was informed and supplemented by an analysis of historical and
contemporary planning policy documents. The document analysis allowed for an understanding of the local policy and development context in which the research participants operated, providing both historical and contemporary frameworks in which to conceptualize the information gathered during the interviews. Informed by this understanding of the policies and practices guiding the revitalization, the interviews elicited input about these policies and practices from participants, who, as contemporary actors, play a role in shaping planning and housing policies and practices (Elwood, 2010). In combining historical perspectives from archival research with contemporary perspectives from current housing policy documents, along with information from interviews with those knowledgeable of mixed-income redevelopment, the mixed-methods approach aimed not only to provide an understanding of the historical and contemporary mixed-income redevelopment context in Toronto, but also to elicit recommendations and input toward improving local housing and planning policy that will guide projects like Regent Park in the future.

6.2 Data Collection

Semi-structured interviews constituted the principle form of qualitative data collection for this thesis. Archival and contemporary document research was used to support the information and provide a broader context for the interviews.

To ensure the viability of this research, preliminary communication was initiated with professionals involved in the Toronto real estate development industry before undertaking the thesis. This communication revealed that a project of this nature would be viable, as many individuals expressed a willingness to engage in the project as participants and/or to serve as gatekeepers (those with access to potential participants) to other professionals in the private real estate sector, TCH, or the City of Toronto agencies and departments involved in the Regent Park revitalization.
6.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals previously or currently involved with the Regent Park redevelopment. Semi-structured interviewing is used to answer specific research questions, while also being exploratory, in that it seeks to elucidate opinions and recommendations to answer research questions. In community development research, semi-structured interviews are often used to improve public policy based on input from actors implementing or influenced by the policy (Silverman & Patterson, 2015). Semi-structured interviews were therefore used for this thesis, as the goals of the research are to understand the policy framework and development practices informing public housing redevelopment and to convey suggestions for improving future housing revitalization by development practitioners operating within the contemporary planning and housing policy context.

6.2.1.1 Selection of Potential Participants

Participant selection was “theoretically motivated” (Valentine, 2005), in that most participants are or were heavily involved in the Regent Park revitalization, working with Daniels, TCH, the City of Toronto, or consulting firms contracted for the redevelopment. Most potential participants were or are employed as urban planners, architects, developers, civil servants, or a combination of these professions. Some participants were approached because they possessed expert knowledge of the political, social, cultural, and economic climate surrounding public housing planning and development practices in Toronto. These participants were or are currently employed as politicians, academics, civil servants, private or public sector consultants, developers, urban planners, or architects. There is some overlap between these two loose participant groups, as many of the public and private sector professionals involved at Regent Park also possess expert knowledge of the planning policy and development climate surrounding mixed-income revitalization in Toronto more generally. Ultimately, the potential participants approached for this thesis fell into one or both of these loose groups.
6.2.1.2 Participant Recruitment

Potential participants were recruited directly or with the assistance of gatekeepers in the public and private sector. Snowballing (using one contact to help recruit another) was used to enhance the pool of participants when relevant potential participants were referenced by participants during interviews. Potential participants were initially contacted using a Recruitment Notice (see Appendix D for a sample), which was sent by mail or email. Follow-up contact took place by telephone call or email. Contact information for potential participants was collected from publicly available sources or existing participants.

A total of 33 potential participants were contacted; of those, 25 individuals (76%) accepted interview requests, while eight (24%) declined or did not respond to recruitment efforts.

6.2.1.3 Interview Process

In total, 22 single-session interviews were conducted with the 25 participants. Twenty interviews were conducted with a single participant, one interview was conducted with two participants, and one interview was conducted with three participants. Most interviews took 40-60 minutes to complete. Interviews were held in-person, at or near participants’ places of work. Twenty of the interviews were held in Toronto, Ontario, with two taking place outside of Toronto within Ontario. The interviews were conducted between December 2016 and May 2017, when phase two of the Regent Park revitalization was nearing completion and phase three was about halfway completed.

Each interview was guided by an Interview Schedule containing a series of questions related to the Regent Park revitalization (see Appendix G for a sample). Questions were selected for each interview according to individual participants’ previous professional experiences and nature of involvement at Regent Park or with revitalization efforts more broadly. For example, urban planners were asked more questions about applying urban planning policy in Toronto at Regent Park, while real estate developers were asked about the impact of policy on their development-related decisions. For later interviews, certain topics were
emphasized more-so or less-so in the questions selected based on the responses from earlier interviews. New questions were created to provide greater detail about ideas brought up in earlier interviews, while some questions were disregarded if found to be irrelevant or unable to produce suitable answers. That said, all participants were asked a similar set of questions about the Toronto urban planning and housing development context, their experiences working in a 3P, and the development process at Regent Park. This balance between both flexibility and standardization across the interview schedules ensured that the interviews touched on the most relevant topics according to the participants, while also focusing on finding answers to the specific research questions this thesis sought to answer.

6.2.2 Document Review

A review of bureaucratic and political correspondence, policy documents, and planning studies related to redeveloping Regent Park was conducted to support and provide context for the information gathered during the interview process. This review included both archival and contemporary document research.

Archival research includes the study of non-current records from governmental and corporate sources to gather information about past practices and make connections, verify, or provide context for contemporary frameworks (Lorimer, 2010). The documents reviewed for this thesis were created between 1972 and 2002, with the majority being sourced from the late-1980s to the mid-1990s, when discussion about revitalization became more serious among policymakers, urban planners, and consultants. These documents generally encompassed correspondence, planning studies, and policy reports from the City of Toronto, the Province of Ontario, and former public housing agencies, such as the Ontario Housing Corporation (OHC) and the Metro Toronto Housing Authority (MTHA). These documents were retrieved from the City of Toronto Archives, Archives of Ontario, and Library and Archives Canada.

Contemporary housing and planning documents were also reviewed to provide context for the current housing redevelopment environment in Toronto. These documents included the City of Toronto by-law and Official Plan zoning amendments for each phase of the Regent Park revitalization, which were
approved by City Planning and Toronto City Hall in 2005 (phase one of the revitalization), 2009 (phase two), and 2013 (phases three to five). Selected urban planning studies that accompanied these reports, such as urban planning rationale studies and development context plans, were also consulted. These documents were sourced from the City of Toronto website, with some also coming from the City of Toronto Archives.

From a practical perspective, the information provided by these documents served as source material for questions to ask the research participants. From a thematic perspective, these documents allowed for the comparison of contemporary housing policies and practices with past perspectives found in the archives, while also providing context for any potential alterations of housing policies or recommendations to improve the outcomes of future public housing revitalization efforts.

6.3 Data Analysis

The data gathered from the semi-structured interviews and historical and contemporary documents were analyzed using elements of the urban planning policy analysis framework outlined by Patton et al. (2013). Planning policy analysis seeks to identify potential issues with current policy and its impact on practices, assess the potential outcomes of policies, and identify alternatives that would improve the intended outcomes of a given policy (Patton et al., 2013). This aligns with the stated goals of the thesis, which are to identify any potential recommendations for improving the policies guiding the redevelopment of public housing through the use of 3Ps in Toronto and other western cities.
The research objectives of this thesis may be divided into two general categories:

1. To provide insights into public housing revitalization from the perspective of the public-private development partnership at Regent Park (as opposed to many previous efforts, which have focused on the perspectives of public housing tenants); and,

2. To understand the impact of local variables and policy frameworks on housing revitalization through an analysis of the Regent Park revitalization within the local development context of Toronto (where much of the previous research has envisioned the revitalization as a continuation of similar public housing redevelopment in the United States).

Chapter Seven begins by building on the information from the literature reviewed in the chapter about Regent Park, Chapter Five, before adding to existing knowledge about the revitalization process with original archive and interview research. The chapter includes the following sections:

- **7.1: Early Attempts to Redevelop Regent Park, mid-1980s to 2000.** This section adds to the history of Regent Park where Section 5.1.3 (Regent Park From the 1950s to the 1990s) left off by detailing the series of failed attempts to redevelop the neighbourhood.

- **7.2: Toronto Community Housing Consultation and Requests for Proposals, 2002 to 2005.** This section provides an account of the community consultation and RFP processes conducted by TCH between 2002 and 2005, culminating in the selection of Daniels as its private sector partner.
• **7.3: Partnership Negotiation and Risk Division for Phases One and Two.** This section reviews the negotiation process and risk division for the partnership agreement between TCH and Daniels for phases one and two of the revitalization.

• **7.4: The Switch to Land Transactions for Phase Three.** This section addresses TCH’s decision to alter the partnership agreement with Daniels for phase three of the Regent Park revitalization.

• **7.5: The Importance of a Single, Master Developer.** This section discusses the benefits offered to public housing agencies from partnering with a single, master developer for housing revitalization.

• **7.6: Can Other Developers Emulate the Revitalization?** The question of whether private developers other than Daniels can deliver social benefits is considered in this section.

### 7.1 Attempts at Revitalization, mid-1980s to 2000

By the 1970s, tenant organizations at Regent Park were lobbying for improvements to Regent Park’s built form (Purdy, 2005). In the early-1970s, the provincial government authorized moderate improvements to the area, constructing a hockey rink, a pool, ball fields, and playgrounds, and improved the landscaping, at a cost of $4 million. More extensive changes were also proposed, including additional improvements to recreational facilities, architectural features, and landscaping, but few of the recommendations were ultimately adopted (King, 1985).

In communities neighbouring Regent Park, additional Modernist-style developments were proposed but halted following opposition from residents. Don Vale, a low-income neighbourhood north of Regent Park, was to be redeveloped with high-rises in the 1960s, but was conserved when higher-income earning individuals purchased and renovated some of the 19th century townhouses in the area (James, 2010). The new owners lobbied for the conservation of the neighbourhood to the urban reformers at Toronto City Hall in the 1970s, who were already in the process of implementing heritage conservation policies (Ley, 1996;
Caulfield, 1994). In the decades following its conservation, Don Vale was renamed “Cabbagetown” in reference to the neighbourhood that had stood in place of Regent Park before its original development (James, 2010). Further attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to expand Regent Park into adjacent communities, such as Trefann Court, another “working poor” neighbourhood built in the 19th century, were blocked by activists and urban reform politicians (Caulfield, 1994).

Figure 19. Renovated houses for sale in Cabbagetown, 1981 (Brennan, 1981).

7.1.1 Rehabilitation Proposals, 1980s

In the 1980s, the Ontario Housing Corporation and the Metro Toronto Housing Authority explored redeveloping parts of Regent Park North. At this time, OHC was responsible for the maintenance and management of Regent Park North. Ownership of the housing was retained by MTHA, which was chaired by former mayor John Sewell between 1986 and 1988.
Initial recommendations for revitalizing Regent Park centred around implementing the open space improvements first proposed in the 1970s. Residents felt that they did not have safe, private spaces for recreation in the outdoor areas at Regent Park, which sometimes resulted in confrontations between the community and the police (Pepino, 1986). By implementing landscape improvements, residents, particularly those living in high-rise apartments, would have outdoor private spaces created for them (King, 1985; C. Smith, 1986). This meant that they could meet and socialize outside of strictly public areas, where certain activities, such as drinking, were illegal (Pepino, 1986). The large square in the middle of the Maisonette Towers and the areas immediately surrounding the towers were to be redeveloped to reflect these recommendations (Regent Park Advisory Committee on Police Community Relations, 1986). Maintenance to the common grounds and buildings, including electrical, plumbing, and elevator repairs, and glass refitting would also take place as part of this work, which would have been funded through contributions from all three levels of government. Ultimately, however, leadership at OHC saw the proposal as “unrealistically ambitious”, and did not move forward with implementing the recommendations (C. Smith, 1986).

The Ontario Housing Corporation commissioned several reports on the feasibility of a wider-scale redevelopment of Regent Park North between 1985 and 1988. A 1985 report recommended that Regent Park be redeveloped by the City of Toronto with private sector involvement, as neither OHC nor MTHA had the capacity to undertake the proposed improvement. Redevelopment would have taken place over phases, and would reintroduce the street grid, include non-residential uses, and provide clear definitions of public and private spaces. Some existing buildings would have been renovated, while new, one- to two-storey buildings would be constructed in unused spaces. Tenants would be able to purchase units at discounted prices with mortgage assistance from MTHA or CMHC, and responsibility for the completed project would be divided among several owners, including the City, co-ops, and non-profit housing providers (King, 1985). An internal study by OHC in 1985 concluded that it would be financially feasible to redevelop Regent Park North, finding existing operating costs to be very high, the site generally underutilized, and the proposed revitalization to be cost effective (“Context of Issues Around Redevelopment”, 1987). Redevelopment discussions resumed in
1987, when another OHC report recommended the revitalization of west Regent Park North. The 1987 report recommended introducing commercial properties and increasing residential capacity from 1397 to 2200 units by adding market housing (“Context of Issues Around Redevelopment”, 1987). Private financing and future maintenance cost savings were predicted to cover the cost of replacing the public housing without requiring government expenditure (Comay, 1987). The Chair of MTHA, John Sewell, rejected these proposals, however, due to his reservations about financial feasibility, private sector involvement, and the lack of consultation with residents (“Context of Issues Around Redevelopment”, 1987).

In 1988-1989, John Sewell developed a new proposal for revitalizing Regent Park following consultations with community members. Regent Park North and the Maisonette Towers in Regent Park South were targeted as part of Sewell’s proposal (Regent Park Community Redesign Group, 1989). The existing structures were proposed to be demolished and replaced with townhouses and medium-rise buildings. The new structures were to be no higher than seven storeys, but overall site density would increase with the addition of market housing. The street grid would be reintroduced, with housing oriented back toward the street to facilitate informal surveillance and policing of public spaces (Regent Park Community Redesign Group, 1989). Open space would be facilitated by a large park within the centre of the neighbourhood, and buildings along arterial roads would integrate commercial activities at grade (Regent Park Community Redesign Group, 1989). This proposal from Sewell and MTHA required funding from all levels of government, and when the federal government was unable to fulfill funding requests, revitalization efforts did not proceed (“Context of Issues Around Redevelopment”, 1987).
7.1.2  1997 Request for Proposals

John Sewell was fired as the Chair of MTHA in 1989, but he continued to organize and advocate for the revitalization of Regent Park into the 1990s (Contenta, 2009). Sewell spearheaded the establishment of the Regent Park Working Group, which worked with OHC to draft a redevelopment proposal for an eastern portion of Regent Park North (as opposed to the western portion in previous plans) (Nicholson, 2012; Hall, 1995). In 1997, OHC issued the first RFP from private developers to partner with the provincial government to revitalize Regent Park North, after determining that redevelopment would only be financially feasible with private sector funding (Abbate, 1997; Chiesa, 1996). The proposal terms required that proposals be expenditure neutral, as the province had no funding available for the project. The province also stated that they would consider additional redevelopment of the remaining portions of Regent Park North if the first stage was successful (“North Regent Park Request for Proposals Briefing”, 1997). Five development companies were shortlisted, with Arcadia Group selected as the private sector partner (“North Regent Park Redevelopment Evaluation Team Meeting”, 1997; Philp, 1997). Arcadia’s CEO died during the project
negotiation stages, however, and OHC was unable to come to an agreement with Arcadia’s new leadership (Nicholson, 2012). In early-1998, the relationship between OHC and Arcadia was terminated, and OHC staff were instructed to draft a new RFP for issue later that year (OHC Support Branch, 1999).

Figure 21. Proposed redevelopment of Regent Park, 1996 (North Regent Working Committee, 1996, p. 3).

7.1.3 1998 Request for Proposals

In December 1998, a new RFP was issued by OHC to redevelop an eastern portion of Regent Park North (OHC Support Branch, 2000). Three developers were shortlisted, and negotiations continued into early-1999 (OHC Support Branch, 1999). One of the proposals was submitted by the “Regent Park Development Group”, led by Mitchell Cohen of Daniels, Derek Ballantyne, who would later become the first CEO of TCH, and Mark Guslits, an urban planner, developer, and architect with experience in the private, public, and non-profit development sectors. Under the Regent Park Development Group’s proposal, public housing units on the site would be rebuilt by Daniels, with future responsibility transferred to the City. Public housing replacement would be financed through the sale of market condominiums, which would be sold by Daniels (Request for Proposals Review and Evaluation Committee, 1999). All three proposals were ultimately rejected by OHC, however, because none met the requirements of the RFP without necessitating funding from the province,
which continued to be unavailable. In June 1999, the RFP process ended, and OHC staff were instructed to look for alternative funding sources in drafting a new RFP, with the province also concluding that it was unfeasible to complete the project without government subsidy (OHC Support Branch, 2000).

### 7.1.4 Attempted Requests for Proposals, 1999 and 2000

In 1999, OHC launched an unsuccessful attempt to issue a new RFP to redevelop Regent Park North (Nicholson, 2012). A 1999 RFP did not proceed because the transfer of public housing responsibility from the Province of Ontario to the municipalities seemed imminent, and OHC did not want to invest resources in a project that they were unlikely to complete (Krivel, 1999). In 2000, OHC continued to explore redevelopment, but only of a small portion of the site, where a private developer would build affordable ownership condos for low- to moderate-income buyers using government funding, in contrast to the revenue neutral proposals from earlier. When this proposal was considered, the decision to transfer public housing responsibilities to the municipalities had already been made, and the project would therefore require a complex partnership between the City, the province, and the private sector developer (OHC Support Branch, 2000). Once again, the concept did not reach the RFP stage.

Early attempts by the province to revitalize Regent Park failed, in part, because of insufficient political will and institutional capacity. The failure of OHC to revitalize Regent Park has been attributed to the lack of financial feasibility of the proposals, which was due to the province’s inability to provide funding for the redevelopment. The absence of a clear jurisdictional mandate at OHC in the late-1990s was predominantly the result of efforts by the provincial Progressive Conservatives to minimize state involvement in public housing. These actions culminated in the downloading of public housing, including Regent Park, to the City of Toronto, eliminating any incentive for the province to revitalize the neighbourhood (Nicholson, 2012). However, the devolution of public housing would result, somewhat ironically, in the creation of TCH, a politically progressive agency with sufficient jurisdictional capacity to pursue large initiatives, the first of which being the revitalization of Regent Park.
7.2 Toronto Community Housing Consultation and Requests for Proposals, 2002 to 2005

Toronto Community Housing was created in 2002 following the amalgamation of Metro Toronto in 1997 and the transfer of public housing responsibility from the province to the new City of Toronto in 2000 (Nicholson, 2012; TCH, 2017b). Regent Park was championed by TCH’s first CEO, Derek Ballantyne, as one of the top priorities for the organization (Nicholson, 2012). A working committee consisting of urban planners, architects, public housing experts, and construction consultants was formed by TCH (Regent Park Collaborative Team, 2002). Toronto Community Housing also initiated preliminary, informal consultations with developers, including Daniels, to solicit feedback on early redevelopment plans. At the same time, Daniels undertook preliminary discussions with Regent Park tenants and local groups to understand the community’s wishes for the redevelopment (M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017).

Toronto Community Housing initiated community consultations for the revitalization in late-2002 (Nicholson, 2012). The consultation process found that most area residents did not feel safe, and that there was significant support for demolishing the existing buildings, re-integrating a street grid, introducing commercial spaces and community facilities, and welcoming condo-owners to create a mixed-income neighbourhood (Meagher & Boston, 2003). The planning process at Regent Park was influenced by the model used for the development of the St. Lawrence neighbourhood in the 1970s, in that input from community members was heavily considered in designing the preliminary master plan (James, 2010; GHK International, 2003). The master plan for the revitalization produced from the consultations called for a doubling of the number of units on the site to accommodate market condominiums, which would take place in six phases over fifteen to twenty years. Existing residents would be guaranteed the right-of-return to the completed development (G. Taylor, 2002; Nicholson, 2012).

John Sewell, initially a member of the Regent Park working committee, advocated for Regent Park to remain 100% affordable housing, with half of the existing public housing units becoming affordable ownership units (J. Sewell, personal communication, April 11, 2017). The other members of the working
committee did not support Sewell’s proposal, however, nor did most of the residents consulted (M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017). Sewell eventually resigned from the working committee, based on his belief that the revitalization, as imagined during the early stages, would not be successful, and that the community was not being appropriately consulted (J. Sewell, personal communication, April 11, 2017). Residents overwhelmingly supported the master plan, however, which received strong praise from the planning community and was supported by Jane Jacobs (Meagher & Boston, 2003; Canadian Institute of Planners, 2017; Blackwell, 2002). In 2003, Toronto City Council approved the master plan, and City Planning and TCH were instructed to begin the process of issuing an RFP to select a private development partner (TCH, 2017i; Nicholson, 2012).

7.2.1 May 2005 Request for Proposals

In May 2005, TCH issued an RFP for the development of phase one of Regent Park to five shortlisted developers: Concert Properties, Cresford, Daniels, Menkes Developments, and Tridel (“Brief”, 2005). In September, Cresford was selected as the private sector partner, but negotiations between TCH and Cresford ended in November when it became clear that Cresford was unable to create a redevelopment plan at the price required by the RFP without external funding (Lu, 2005; Nicholson, 2012). Cresford’s proposal required government financing that would be difficult to secure, and the firm wanted completion of the deal to be contingent on securing this additional funding. This condition was rejected by TCH, however, on the grounds that it was unfair to the other developers, since they had responded to the RFP without knowledge that that approval of their plans could be contingent on securing external funding (Nicholson, 2012). At the end of the due diligence period, Cresford withdrew from consideration, and TCH began the process of drafting a second RFP to be issued to the remaining shortlisted developers (Lu, 2005; Nicholson, 2012).
7.2.2 December 2005 Request for Proposals

A second RFP was issued in December 2005, which was revised to reduce financial risk for the private sector partner and allow for the developer of phase one to receive an option to complete phase two (Nicholson, 2012; Kipfer & Petrunia, 2009; Lu, 2005). The RFP also contained a small stipulation that “alternative development models” would be considered. Daniels considered their response to the May 2005 RFP to already have been an “alternative model”, in that it proposed a joint development partnership with TCH, as opposed to conducting redevelopment using land transactions from TCH to the private sector partner selected, as other shortlisted developers had proposed. In responding to the December 2005 RFP, Daniels resubmitted an identical proposal to the one submitted for the May 2005 RFP (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017). In March of 2006, Daniels was selected as the developer for phase one, with Daniels and TCH coming to a partnership agreement shortly thereafter (Moloney, 2006).

7.3 Partnership Negotiation and Risk Division for Phases One and Two

Daniels was enthusiastic about taking part in the Regent Park revitalization following their selection as private sector partner for TCH in December of 2005, but the two potential partners needed to agree on a fairer division of risk to avoid the failures of the May 2005 RFP (Kelly, 2015; Nicholson, 2012). As Nicholson (2012) explained in her detailed analysis of the 2005 RFP processes, risk division between the public and private sector partners was a significant factor in determining the success or failure of all four RFPs issued between 1997 and 2005. After the failed negotiations between TCH and Cresford, it was apparent to TCH that the organization needed to assume more of the project risk because of the damaged reputation of the project in the opinion of the Toronto real estate development community. As a result, the partnership negotiations that

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8 The RFP document is confidential and could not be retrieved and cited for this thesis. Multiple interview participants, however, quoted the phrase “alternative development models” from the document.
followed the December 2005 RFP produced an agreement that differed substantially in terms of risk division compared to the agreements conceptualized for the first three RFPs (in 1997, 1998, and May 2005). In particular, the December 2005 RFP negotiations produced a partnership agreement in which the public sector assumed a far greater share of the market factor risks, for example, by taking on some of the financial responsibility in the event that the project did not generate substantial sales. As per Nicholson (2012), the decision by TCH to assume the market risk for the redevelopment resulted in the creation of a “true partnership” with Daniels, and ultimately, an overall positive project outcome (p. 60).

While the details of the partnership agreements between TCH and Daniels are confidential, information about the partnership terms and funding arrangement has since become accessible in the public realm. Furthermore, general terms of the partnership agreement were disclosed during the interview process for this thesis. Interview participants employed at Daniels confirmed that the partnership agreement for phases one and two was a joint venture between Daniels and TCH, whereby both partners were responsible for the costs of the redevelopment, but both would also profit from the sales of the market condominiums (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017; M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017). Each partner received approximately a 50% share of the costs and profits, with some minor provisions, including a “waterfall” clause that allowed TCH to receive a greater share of the profits if the project was more profitable than anticipated. According to Daniels vice-president Martin Blake, Daniels “left a lot of money on the table” for TCH by not buying the land for phases one and two. Daniels chose not to use land transactions because it would not create a “true partnership” between TCH and Daniels (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017). In 2009, before the completion of phase one of the revitalization, TCH awarded the remaining phases of the project to Daniels.

The detailed analysis of the partnership agreement performed by Nicholson (2012) organized the partners’ roles according to the type of risk for which each partner was responsible or shared with the other partner for the December 2005 RFP, compared to the 1997 RFP and the May 2005 RFP, as seen in Table 1:
Table 1. Risk division between developer (Daniels) and public sector (TCH) for 1997 RFP, May 2005 RFP, and December 2005 RFP (Nicholson, 2012, p. 50.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Risk Division</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design</td>
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<td>Market</td>
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<td>Operating</td>
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<td>Service Provision</td>
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<td>Political</td>
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*D = Developer*

*P = Public Sector*

As discussed, TCH assumed more risk following the December 2005 RFP negotiations, most significantly by assuming *market factor risks*. Specifically, TCH became responsible for the sale of the market condominium units, absolving Daniels from financial insolvency if the new units failed to generate significant revenue. Daniels was limited to providing market advice and sales personnel and infrastructure to sell the units in phase one, but was provided with an option to consider profit sharing from the sale of market units as a form of compensation, which the company is believed to have exercised. To further mitigate market risk for Daniels, TCH commissioned a market study to better understand the marketability and potential sales revenue from the condos. In 2006, there was significant concern within the development community that condos would not sell because of the poor reputation of the neighbourhood, so the decision by TCH to assume the risk of market failure was critical in the public and private sectors coming to an agreement to proceed with the project (Nicholson, 2012).

Another important risk acquired by TCH for the December 2005 RFP was the *financing risk* of the redevelopment. In previous RFPs, the private sector partner was expected to provide project financing; however, by December 2005, it was apparent that uncertainty surrounding the marketability of condos at Regent Park was hindering the ability of potential development partners to secure construction financing.
With TCH being a much larger corporation than most private firms, it was better able to secure construction funding, removing another barrier to private sector involvement (Nicholson, 2012).

Additional risks assumed by TCH during both the May 2005 the December 2005 RFPs included the environmental, tenant relocation, political, and operating risks. Environmental risks were a moderate risk borne by TCH that could have had a moderate impact on the outcome of the project and the stability of TCH, as the agency would have been responsible for soil remediation costs required if the land was contaminated. Tenant relocation risks included interruptions in public housing service provided by TCH due to any error or delays associated with the tenant relocation plan, which may have led to political or community opposition to the redevelopment. The redevelopment included political risks for TCH, as any project delays, lack of market interest, or community opposition would have reflected poorly on TCH as an organization. Operating risks included any increased costs associated with current and future operation of public housing at Regent Park due to the revitalization, though this is a low impact risk, as operating costs per unit are expected to be significantly lower after the redevelopment is completed because of future maintenance and repair cost savings (Nicholson, 2012).

The sole risk for which Daniels was primarily responsible in phase one of the revitalization was construction delay risk, which was shifted to the private sector for the December 2005 RFP. The total risk associated with construction delays was reduced relative to the May 2005 RFP as part of the shift of construction risk from the public to the private sector because of the establishment of a Guaranteed Maximum Price (GMP) for each public and private housing unit built by Daniels. The GMP was determined to be the construction cost paid by TCH for each unit constructed to Daniels, who would be responsible for any budget overruns above the GMP. In other words, Daniels was paid an agreed-upon price for each unit, regardless of any delays, such as community opposition or worker strikes. If construction delays led to move-in delays for temporarily relocated tenants, however, Daniels would have been required to compensate TCH for finding alternative accommodations for the tenants affected. The revised terms of the December 2005 RFP had the effect of reducing the risk of cost overruns, particularly with respect to the risk of cost overruns...
delaying the reconstruction of public housing, by providing clarity with the establishment of a predetermined developer fee and substantially dis-incentivizing construction delays or price increases (Nicholson, 2012).

Daniels and TCH shared some project risks as part of the partnership agreement. The responsibility for gaining urban planning approvals from the City, and the risks associated with not receiving approvals (planning risks) were initially taken on by TCH, who secured most approvals for phase one prior to issuing the December 2005 RFP. For the subsequent phases, however, Daniels was responsible for applying for planning approvals from the City on behalf of the partnership. Design risks were also shared, as TCH was responsible for creating a master plan, but it was Daniels’ responsibility for implementing the plan to the specifications required by City Planning (Nicholson, 2012).

Funding for phases one and two of the revitalization was shared between Daniels, TCH, and all three levels of government. As discussed, Daniels was responsible for the construction costs, and was paid a predetermined cost per unit (the GMP) by TCH. Funding for new market condos was secured by TCH through private financing, while the costs for replacing public units were sourced from a combination of rental income from public housing, loans, and future operating costs savings. The City of Toronto agreed to absorb the costs of building new roads, parks, sewage, and other pieces of infrastructure associated with the redevelopment. The City is also assumed to have waved development fees and realty taxes on the rebuilt public housing units.⁹ A total of $1.61 million was also provided by the federal and provincial governments under the Canada-Ontario Affordable Housing Agreement (Moskalyk, 2008). As of February 2017, the total cost of the revitalization was expected to be over $1 billion (Spearn, 2017).

7.4 The Switch to Land Transactions for Phase Three

During the negotiations in 2012 between TCH and Daniels for the phase three to five partnership agreement, TCH reversed its 2009 decision to award Daniels the remaining phases of the revitalization, only committing

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⁹ This information could not be confirmed for this thesis, since the details of the partnership agreement are confidential.
to Daniels as the development partner for phase three, while reserving the ability to retender phases four and five to other developers. Interview participants in both the public and private sectors disclosed that this decision was made by TCH in response to political pressure from the newly-elected fiscally conservative Mayor Rob Ford and his allies on City Council to reduce public spending perceived as “risky”.Toronto Community Housing also shifted from partnering with Daniels on a joint venture to selling parcels of land to Daniels in phase three at fixed values, a departure from the “true partnership” lauded by Nicholson (2012) and many of the participants in this thesis.

Heather Grey-Wolf, former TCH Development Director for Regent Park, explained that while the decision to re-open phases four and five of the project for proposals was affected by the political environment surrounding the negotiations, there were other factors considered by TCH. The successes of the redevelopment had not been fully realized in 2012, according to Grey-Wolf, and retendering phases four and five will improve the transparency of the revitalization process. Grey-Wolf asserted that the decision was not an indictment of Daniels’ performance at Regent Park, but that other developers in Toronto could also be capable of completing the revitalization process (H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017).

Daniels president Mitchell Cohen believes that selecting another developer to complete the revitalization would be an “enormous mistake”. Reissuing a new RFP and initiating a new development approvals process would significantly delay project momentum, potentially forcing public housing tenants in the last phases to receive new units far later than tenants in earlier phases. The switch from a joint venture for phases one and two to land transactions for phase three was of similar concern to Cohen and several other participants, who stated that TCH gave up considerable potential development profits by settling for fixed values of market condos (M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017).

A subset of interview participants held views that diverged from Cohen’s with respect to TCH using land transactions for phase three of Regent Park. These participants, generally employed in the public sector, were ambivalent or supportive of the switch to land transactions. According to Heather Grey-Wolf, one of the

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10 The political context surrounding the revitalization is discussed in greater detail in Section 8.2.
reasons TCH originally entered into a joint venture with Daniels was because public funding sources were not available at the time. The switch, explained Grey-Wolf, means that TCH is building infrastructure in the same way as other public agencies in the City, which are not funded from the profits of market condominiums. Says Grey-Wolf: “We don't build community centres because we sell condos next door, and we can only build the community centre if the condo sales go well”. In general, the private sector is not as involved in infrastructure provision as it has been at Regent Park, continued Grey-Wolf (“we don't do sewer replacements based on the sale of t-shirts in the store next door”) (H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017).

Switching to land transactions reduced the financial risk of the project for TCH, insulating the rest of the organization’s housing portfolio from a potential real estate market downturn, explained Sean Gadon, Director of Affordable Housing at the City of Toronto. Gadon stressed that reducing project risk for TCH is of extreme importance for the organization, given that the current funding shortfall for capital repairs to TCH buildings is $1.73 billion (as of July 2017) (S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017; TCH, 2017e). Heather Grey-Wolf added that ending the joint venture reduced the amount of money TCH needed to borrow from lenders, freeing up cash flow for other revitalization efforts (H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017). In general, the reasons offered by the participants for TCH’s decisions to use land transactions varied considerably. One participant from the public sector speculated that the switch may have been because the housing profits for TCH were lower than expected with the joint venture (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). Alternatively, a private sector participant suggested that the success of Regent Park has improved private sector developer confidence in TCH revitalization projects, negating the need for TCH to take on the risks of entering into a “true partnership” necessary in the early stages of Regent Park (anonymous private sector development executive, personal communication).

11 For participants that requested anonymity, interview citations will reflect these requests by referencing only the identifying factors approved by participants (e.g., “urban planner” or “public sector participant”) and withholding the date of the interview.
The switch to land transactions has resulted in a variety of challenges and opportunities. From the perspective of employees at TCH, land transactions provide the organization with more control over the planning and timing of the delivery of public housing buildings and community services because TCH does not have to wait to earn income from market housing sales to spend on public sector commitments. Heather Grey-Wolf admitted, however, that the benefit of greater control for TCH is provided mostly in theory, rather than in practice, as the construction phasing at the site is still nominally controlled by Daniels, who are responsible for building the roads and utilities that must be provided before public housing buildings can be constructed (H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017).

A TCH employee conceded that the switch to land transactions may have been politically motivated in the wake of Rob Ford’s election as mayor in 2010, which resulted in greater public scrutiny of the revitalization and TCH’s operations as a whole (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication). City Hall, despite perhaps being responsible for encouraging the switch to land transactions, is “not happy” with the decision, explained a public sector participant, as the withdrawal of private sector financing has necessitated additional public investment in the revitalization (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). Another public sector participant remarked that the financial model for both the City and TCH has become more difficult since the switch, as the condo sales were previously covering a substantial share of the project costs (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). The decision appears to be “counterintuitive”, added a third public sector participant, considering that the joint venture was a high risk, high reward model that worked successfully. After proving that the high reward model worked, this participant said, TCH switched to land transactions, which are less risky, but provide lower rewards (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). Land transactions may also present challenges for pursuing social objectives, noted several participants. Grey-Wolf cautioned that the switch from joint ventures risks creating “a little bit of a misalignment” of interests between TCH and Daniels, with Daniels having more control over the development agenda at
Regent Park during phase three compared to earlier phases (H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017).

Public and private sector participants generally differed in their overall assessments of the decision by TCH to shift from conducting the Regent Park revitalization using a joint venture to using land transactions. Public sector employees were mostly ambivalent about the switch. A development manager at TCH mentioned that there have been no specific challenges for TCH employees working on the Regent Park revitalization since using land transactions (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication). Other employees at TCH stated that in the short-run, it is yet to be determined whether the switch has had a positive or negative impact on the revitalization, though one participant employed at TCH conceded that the switch could present challenges in the long-run, since public funding has not yet matched the income that the joint venture earned for TCH (anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication). Adam Vaughan, a former city councillor and current Member of Parliament from downtown Toronto, added that the switch to land transactions is “more of an accounting process”, stating that “at the end of the day, it’s the planning that matters, not really the land ownership model” (A. Vaughan, personal communication, March 13, 2017).

For TCH, the decision of whether to use a joint venture or land transactions to conduct public housing revitalization depends on local market conditions and a cost-benefit analysis, explained a TCH development manager (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication). A TCH urban planner noted that the upcoming decision about the partnership structure for phases four and five of the Regent Park revitalization could be informed by comparing the outcomes of the joint venture for phases one and two with the outcomes of using land transactions for phase three (anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication). A private sector participant, however, strongly cautioned TCH against extensive use of land transactions on successive revitalization efforts at Regent Park and elsewhere in the city, as using land transaction may result in a misalignment of interests between TCH and their prospective development partners (anonymous private sector development executive, personal communication).
Toronto Community Housing has not yet made a decision about their course of action for phases four and five, but Mitchell Cohen disclosed that Daniels has made a proposal that would be a “100% win-win” for both TCH and Daniels by going back to the joint venture of phases one and two. Daniels has already received development approvals from the City and has created a detailed plan for the remaining phases that includes placing TCH and condominium townhomes side-by-side and converting an existing steam plant on the site into a Regent Park museum and housing revitalization knowledge exchange, where developers, consultants, public sector officials, and researchers could share research about the Regent Park revitalization and other public housing redevelopment projects in Toronto and elsewhere. If TCH were to retender phases four and five, a new developer would need to return to the preliminary stages of the planning process, and, as many participants asserted, any developer other than Daniels might not be as considerate of the needs of TCH and the tenants of Regent Park (M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017).

Regent Park is unique in that Daniels is more socially-conscious as an organization compared to most for-profit development firms in Toronto: despite the switch to land transactions, Daniels’ interests have generally remained aligned with TCH. At other sites, however, land transactions may incentivize developers to maximize profits above other factors to recoup the costs of purchasing their land, rather than taking a broader account of social development. Certain social objectives may not be achieved because a developer becomes narrowly focused on the profit associated with the parcel of land they purchased. For example, a hypothetical alternative developer who purchased the lands potentially affected by the Daniels Spectrum when proposed might be against giving back the land because they would not receive any profits from it. The result is that the Daniels Spectrum may not be built, reducing the total amount of social benefits received by the community from the revitalization efforts. In contrast, a developer in a joint venture would be in favour of the Daniels Spectrum, because:

1. The proposition is not simply a win for TCH and a loss for the developer, since both parties would be affected by proposed site changes and must work together to accommodate the plan;
2. The adjacent sites, on which the developer is also partnered with TCH, become more valuable because of the Daniels Spectrum; and,

3. The wider social objectives brought about by sacrificing the site will provide benefits not only to TCH and the public housing community, but also to the developer, as social improvements to the neighbourhood will increase the market value of condos within it.

Overall, the benefits to TCH and public housing tenants are potentially far greater than the risk assumed with a joint venture. Research participants from both the public and private sectors were unanimous in their assessment that this has been the case at Regent Park. Ultimately, however, it appears that TCH has avoided the moderate amount of risk associated with joint ventures, thereby giving up considerably greater rewards to Daniels and other developers and not maximizing social development by switching to land transactions at successive revitalization sites.

7.5 The Importance of a Single, Master Developer

The use of a single, master developer for the Regent Park revitalization has probably delivered far greater project outcomes for TCH and its public housing tenants compared to using several partnerships with different private sector firms. This sentiment, expressed by several research participants, runs contrary to traditional 3P research and practice in Canada and the US, which dictates that it is more prudent for the public sector to partner with multiple developers on a large-scale project than a single developer (Stainback, 2000; GHK International, 2003; CMHC, 2011). According to the literature, using multiple developers preserves competition, promotes architectural diversity, insulates the entirety of a project from the failure of a single developer, and avoids potential complacency or poor performance that may arise at a firm with strong guarantees on a project (Stainback, 2000).
Despite the potential benefits of partnering with multiple firms, a substantial contingent of public and private sector employees that were interviewed expressed strong support for using a single, master developer at Regent Park and similar large-scale public housing revitalization projects. Mitchell Kosny, former Chair of TCH (2004-2007), explained that initially, TCH did not want to award the entirety of the Regent Park revitalization to a single developer. Awarding phases to separate developers, TCH believed, would preserve the incentive of the developer selected for each phase of the project, because strong performance on an earlier stage might lead to selection for later phases (M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016). Before construction of phase two, however, Daniels was awarded the remaining phases of the revitalization, based on Daniels’ strong performance and the benefits realized by TCH of using a single, master developer. John Gladki, Director of the Regent Park Collaborative Team and urban planning consultant, explained that in Toronto, few firms conduct both residential and commercial development simultaneously, limiting the pool of expertise available for a mixed-use project like the Regent Park revitalization to a few large developers. Moreover, large firms capable of mixed-use development are not as likely to be as interested in a smaller section of a revitalization project compared to the entire project itself (J. Gladki, personal communication, January 12, 2017). It is therefore possibly more advantageous for TCH to attract a single, large firm capable of mixed-use development such as Daniels, as these types of companies are better able to support TCH’s goal of socially and economically integrating Regent Park and other isolated public housing communities with the rest of the city, compared to multiple smaller developers with less mixed-use experience. A large firm such as Daniels also possesses the clout needed to attract and persuade other partners to support revitalization efforts, such as non-profit developer ArtScape, who partnered with Daniels and TCH to create the Daniels Spectrum, and Maple Leaf Sports and Entertainment, who provided funding and expertise for the Regent Park Athletic Grounds. Several interview participants described that Daniels has provided the strong continuity and coordination needed for a project as spatially and temporally expansive as the Regent Park revitalization.
Most critically, according to participants, is that a single, master developer can take a wide-angle view of a redevelopment to promote decision-making at each phase and individual site that supports the overarching goals of the project. For example, Daniels president Mitchell Cohen advocated for a shift in location of phase one of the revitalization to a more visible and desirable area that would enhance market confidence and sales, and in turn, improve public opinion of the redevelopment and neighbourhood (M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017). Similar to using a joint venture rather than land transactions, a single, master developer is able to sacrifice individual sites for the benefit of the entire project. A developer is unlikely to sacrifice a single site for the benefit of the rest of the project if they are one of several developers operating on the site. For instance, as Daniels VP Martin Blake explains, if the proposal to accommodate the Regent Park Athletic Grounds came forward and multiple developers were working on
the revitalization, one firm might need to sacrifice property they had purchased, whereas Daniels was easily able to reallocate the lost development density from the Athletic Grounds by adding a few floors to a series of buildings they were building across the site (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017). Adding the Athletic Grounds to the redevelopment resulted in positive outcomes for the private sector, public sector, and Regent Park residents because a single, master developer was on site. In comparison, if multiple developers were used for the revitalization, the Athletic Grounds proposal may not have resulted in positive outcomes for all parties. For example, the request for the land might have been denied by the affected developer. Or, if TCH unilaterally rescinded or revised the offer to purchase a particular plot of land, private sector confidence in the project might decline. Overall, a single, master developer was perceived by industry professionals as being more able to allow for greater planning flexibility to accommodate additions to the project that improve the social and economic outcomes for Regent Park residents and the development partnership itself.

Figure 23. The Regent Park Athletic Grounds (photograph by Trevor Robinson, 2017).
From the perspective of the public sector, partnering with a single, master developer promotes accountability from the chosen firm, as the developer must make decisions that promote the long-term success of the project. In contrast, multiple developers on a project may attempt to maximize height, density, or massing of their individual sites regardless of the relationship of the individual sites to the built form of the rest of the community. A City of Toronto planner noted that Daniels’ long-term commitment to the project meant that all sides were invested in making planning-related decisions that were of overall benefit to the community, despite any potential disagreements that might arise (anonymous urban planner at the City of Toronto, personal communication). The use of a single, master developer might better tie together the outcomes of the private and public sectors, in that the success of the project as a whole depends on the single developer making decisions that improve social and economic outcomes of existing residents. For example, a private developer may promote initiatives that address crime and poor housing conditions, because these types of neighbourhood improvements also increase market confidence in the area, and in turn, condominium sales profits.

In contrast to the existing research on 3Ps, the use of a single, master developer in Daniels was seen by participants as far more advantageous for the Regent Park revitalization compared to using multiple developers across each phase or site. The benefits achieved by using a master developer, such as stronger socio-economic integration, the adoption of a wide-angle lens for the project, and stronger private sector accountability, suggests that master developers may be more effective than multiple, different developers when conducting public housing revitalization. Public housing revitalization differs from infrastructure creation and other traditional 3P projects, meaning that different types partnerships or relationships with the private sector may deliver greater benefits for public housing agencies. While much of the previous 3P research concluded that using multiple private sector firms on a large project is more beneficial for the public sector (e.g., Stainback, 2000), this research has generally focused on traditional 3P projects, such as hospitals or public transportation. Public housing revitalization has different needs relative to traditional projects, such as creativity and flexibility in planning. The use of a single, master developer may be better able to meet
these needs. Public housing agencies, including TCH, should strongly consider partnering with master developers on future public housing revitalization efforts.

7.6 Can Other Developers Emulate the Revitalization?

Not all private sector developers are identical: some place greater emphasis on financial profits above all other considerations, while others place varying degrees of emphasis on social development. Considering that Daniels has been characterized in the literature as “arguably...the most socially conscious” of all private development firms in Toronto (Rosen, 2016, p. 13), it is fair to ask whether the outcomes at Regent Park could be emulated by less socially-conscious developers on other projects. Interview participants offered a mix of responses when questioned about the ability of other developers to fully embody the socially-conscious outlook of Daniels. Interestingly, it was the employees at Daniels that were most confident that other developers could effectively take part in public housing redevelopment, pointing out that the ability of public housing agencies to provide access to large, well-situated sites such as Regent Park is powerful leverage to incentivize private sector firms to promote social development objectives as a condition of a partnership agreement.

The public and private sector professionals interviewed for this thesis generally agreed with the notion that Daniels is a socially-conscious developer well-suited to partner with TCH on the Regent Park revitalization. Gregg Lintern, Director of Community Planning for downtown Toronto at the City Toronto, explained that Daniels has a strong reputation for producing quality housing and public spaces and has extensive experience working with the public sector (G. Lintern, personal communication, March 14, 2017). Shirley Blumberg, an architect and member of TCH’s Design Review Panel for revitalization projects, added that Daniels differs from other developers in Toronto in that they build quality, affordably-priced condos for a diversity of buyers, including first-time homeowners and large families (S. Blumberg, personal communication, February 17, 2017). Executives at Daniels concurred with many of the statements made by
interview participants in the public sector, stating that their interest in the Regent Park revitalization stemmed from their previous experience with public and co-operative housing construction in the 1980s and 1990s. Daniels VP Martin Blake agreed with Rosen’s (2016) assertion that Daniels is able to place greater emphasis on social development because it is not a publicly-traded company beholden to shareholders (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017), though multiple other participants noted that Daniels is still a private company that needs to make a profit from the redevelopment to continue operating.

Participants were unanimous in stating that Daniels has continued to demonstrate its socially-conscious ethos at Regent Park. Since the preliminary stages of the project, Daniels and TCH have had “mutually compatible bottom lines”, according to former TCH Chair Mitchell Kosny (M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016). Daniels has continued to be a strong partner for the public sector because of the company’s emphasis on social development, as mentioned by a current development manager at TCH (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication). As per Daniels president Mitchell Cohen, the company has led the charge for implementing the principles of the Social Development Plan in the absence of by-laws mandating that they do so. Cohen’s campaign to build the Daniels Spectrum and the Regent Park Athletic Grounds directly extended from Daniels’ desire to see certain principles in the Social Development Plan implemented, such as arts-and-cultural and sports and active recreation facilities, respectively (M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017). Participants in both the public and private sectors pointed to other actions that reflect favourably on Daniels’ conduct with TCH and the public sector, including promoting the hiring of local community members, providing affordable homeownership units to low-income residents, allocating staff toward community engagement and social development objectives, lobbying retailers to lease commercial space in Regent Park, and constructing the first condominium building before selling the units, which, according to Sean Gadon, the City’s Director of Affordable Housing, showed “real gumption” and instilled market confidence in the redevelopment effort at large (S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017). Overall, said Member of Parliament Adam
Given Daniels’ acclaimed performance at Regent Park, the question of whether other private developers in Toronto would be able to provide a similar level of social benefits at other revitalization projects remains. Rosen (2016) broadly described Toronto developers as “not all purely profit-maximizing”, with many adopting “strategies characterized by a more reciprocal relationship between the firm and society” by building on downtown, high value, and highly-accessible sites and providing a wide array of public amenities to new residents (p. 16). According to architect Shirley Blumberg, there are a few other socially-conscious developers in Toronto similar to Daniels, such as Context, but most firms are focused solely on profit, provide similar products, adhere to conservative design philosophies, and produce low-quality housing (S. Blumberg, personal communication, February 17, 2017). Urban planner John Gladki stated that Toronto doesn’t “have a tradition of developers who care about architecture, about physical form...who really want to make an impact, a difference”, while citing Context as one of a “very few exceptions” along with Daniels among developers, who otherwise “want to come in and out, and make a buck, and leave” (J. Gladki, personal communication, January 12, 2017). Blumberg concurred, adding that the Toronto development context is “great for making profit, but it’s really terrible for producing good housing” (S. Blumberg, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

Participants employed at Daniels were more optimistic that other developers could conduct public housing revitalization, as long as other developers are willing to adopt the social objectives of TCH. Critically, as Daniels VP Martin Blake explains, if TCH required that developers place a strong emphasis on social objectives, developers would have no choice but to provide social outcomes through revitalization to access the high value land previously restricted from private sector development (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017). The consensus from the participants was that if a development partner is willing to adopt social objectives, and, as one participant added, is able to provide the organizational
capacity, such as capital and staffing, for social development, then other developers could emulate Daniels at other revitalization projects (anonymous private sector development executive, personal communication).

The ability of private developers to strongly pursue social objectives at revitalization projects is, as was noted by several participants, partially the result of a very healthy real estate market in Toronto. Large profit margins in the Toronto market allow for greater portions of these margins to be allocated for social development. While other cities may not be experiencing the booming real estate market in Toronto, public housing agencies in those cities should still mandate that private firms provide as many social development outcomes as possible. This has not necessarily been the case with successive TCH revitalization projects, however, even though the real estate market has continued to be very strong in Toronto. Considering this, Martin Blake cautions that the social outcomes at other TCH projects may not be equal to those achieved at Regent Park (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017).

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to provide insights into the Regent Park revitalization from the public-private development process in the hope that the lessons learned from the process can be applied to future public housing redevelopment efforts. The chapter discussed past attempts to redevelop Regent Park from the mid-1980s to 2000 (Section 7.1). These attempts failed, in part, because of low political will and a lack of institutional capacity, resulting in a shortage of funding, knowledge, and clarity with respect to jurisdictional responsibility to initiate redevelopment. The newly-created TCH restarted revitalization efforts in 2002, conducted an extensive community consultation process until 2003, and issued two proposal calls for private developers in 2005, ultimately selecting Daniels as the development partner for Regent Park (Section 7.2). A second proposal was required because the developer selected by TCH following the first RFP was unable to agree to a revitalization plan within the financial requirements of the RFP without first securing external funding. For the second RFP, Daniels
resubmitted the “alternative development proposal” they had proposed during the first RFP. Daniels’ proposal was to revitalize the site using a joint development venture between the firm and TCH, meaning that both parties were responsible for the costs of the market housing built, but also the profits associated with the sales of the market housing. Reiterating the findings of Nicholson (2012), it was determined in this chapter that the joint venture constituted a “true partnership” that shared the risks and rewards fairly between TCH and Daniels (Section 7.3).

Chapter Seven presented several thematic arguments about the revitalization process. These arguments generally centred around the decision by TCH in 2012 to end the joint venture with Daniels and potentially retender the final two phases of the revitalization (out of five total phases) to other developers. The first theme addressed the decision by TCH to end the joint venture and switch to using land transactions—selling each parcel of land to Daniels at a predetermined price to generate revenue, not from condo sales, thereby allowing Daniels to realize all of the profits from the market housing (Section 7.4). The switch to land transactions was a politically-motivated decision to avoid the risk associated with a market downturn, but the potential rewards for TCH and public residents, in the form of social development objectives, may also be limited. After proving that the riskier, but more rewarding “true partnership” worked, TCH moved to a more conservative revitalization model, creating a slight misalignment of interests between TCH and Daniels. While this may not result in negative outcomes at Regent Park because Daniels is a socially-conscious developer, the use of land transactions at other revitalization projects may limit social objectives where developers are traditionally focused on profit motives. Based on the information provided from interviews, it was argued that TCH should return to joint ventures for the remaining phases of Regent Park and their successive revitalization projects.

The second theme related to the revitalization process was that the use of a single, master developer has likely been more advantageous for TCH in terms of social development at Regent Park,
compared to using multiple smaller developers (Section 7.5). A single, master developer at Regent Park probably provided better outcomes for public housing revitalization because:

1. Larger developers undertaking large-scale revitalization projects may be better at facilitating social and economic integration through mixing land uses because they have more experience, more expertise, and stronger relationships with other corporations to attract commercial tenants, relative to multiple, smaller developers working together;

2. A master developer may be better able to take a wide-angle view of the revitalization, promoting decision-making at each site and project phase that is to the benefit of the project as a whole, whereas smaller, multiple developers may use a smaller lens, more likely focusing on decisions related to their individual sites, not the project more broadly; and,

3. A master developer may be more accountable in its decision-making to a public housing agency and public housing tenants because the financial and social objectives of a mixed-income revitalization project are tied together, in that socio-economic improvements in a community increase the value of the housing sold by developers in the community.

The third and final original theme discussed in this chapter was an attempt to determine whether other developers could replicate the actions of Daniels on the Regent Park revitalization, considering that the firm has been characterized as being socially-conscious in the literature (Section 7.6). Toronto is not home to many other developers that focus on social objectives in a similar way to Daniels, raising concerns that other developers would not be as successful in delivering social benefits as Daniels has at Regent Park. While the opinions of participants were mixed with respect to answering this question, Daniels employees themselves were most optimistic that other developers are capable of
delivering social objectives. However, these participants noted, TCH must first require that developers do so. The access that TCH and other housing agencies can provide to high-value, previously inaccessible land at a low cost is a significant incentive for private developers to place a strong emphasis on social development at revitalization projects. Toronto Community Housing and other housing agencies should advocate as strongly for social development in soliciting development partners as local real estate market factors allow. However, according to interview participants, it appears that TCH has not done this with its successive revitalization projects.
This chapter addresses the second general research objective of this thesis: to understand the impact of local policy and practices on public housing redevelopment. Where much of the previous research on the revitalization of Regent Park conceptualizes the project as a continuation of public housing redevelopment in the United States, this thesis conceptualizes the project within the Canadian context. The Regent Park revitalization, in effect, can be used as a case study to understand the effect of development practices and urban planning and housing policies in Toronto on housing revitalization in the city. This objective generates two related, yet distinct overarching questions that are addressed in the following chapter:

1. Which kinds of location-specific variables induced and informed the characteristics and outcomes of the Regent Park revitalization? and,

2. What lessons can be learned about the local context in which the revitalization is taking place that could be applied to similar housing redevelopment projects elsewhere?

Local factors surrounding the revitalization can be considered at both broader and narrower geographic scales. At the broader scale, the revitalization is taking place within Toronto, a city with distinct characteristics (as described in Chapter Four); at a narrower scale, Regent Park is located within a particular area of Toronto. Toronto-specific variables include (but are not limited to): local social, political, and cultural values; past and current real estate development practices in the city; the municipal political climate; and municipal and provincial urban planning and housing policies. Variables specific to the Regent Park neighbourhood include (but are not limited to): the proximity of the site to employment, entertainment, and public amenities; existing infrastructure and public transportation connectivity; exiting urban planning guidelines for the area; the built form of the surrounding communities; and the relationship between public housing tenants and surrounding communities.
Based on the information shared by the research participants for this thesis, Chapter Eight includes discussions of the following themes:

- **8.1: The Impact of the Toronto Planning and Development Context.** Historical and contemporary aspects of the urban planning and real estate development context in which the Regent Park revitalization has taken place are detailed in this section.

- **8.2: Alignment of the Local Political Climate Aided the Revitalization.** The inception and nature of the revitalization are the result of an alignment of favourable political forces in Toronto, which are discussed in this section.

- **8.3: The Impact of Municipal and Provincial Policies.** This section considers the influence of municipal planning and housing policies and provincial urban growth plans on the Regent Park revitalization.

- **8.4: Social Objectives of the Revitalization Can Be Emulated.** This section discusses: social objectives from the revitalization that can be replicated, lessons from Regent Park already applied to other TCH revitalization sites, and the implications of not emulating social development.

- **8.5: The Challenges with Improving Social Mix.** This section describes the factors prohibiting in-building mix identified by participants, while considering possible methods to overcome these barriers on future revitalization efforts and the importance of doing so.
8.1 The Impact of the Toronto Planning and Development Context

Several aspects of the local real estate development and urban planning context in which the Regent Park revitalization has taken place were identified by participants as positively influencing project outcomes. These factors include:

1. Broader socio-cultural values in Canada;
2. Public housing history and practices in Toronto, particularly the St. Lawrence development of the 1970s; and,
3. Contemporary development practices in Toronto, such as building heights and density.

Overall, participants expressed that the legacy of mixed-income, socially-conscious urban planning and development in Toronto, culminating with the St. Lawrence development of the 1970s, laid the groundwork for the strategies employed at the Regent Park revitalization, though the scale and density of the revitalization reflects contemporary real estate development practices in the city.

8.1.1 Canadian Values

Participants involved in the early stages of the Regent Park revitalization discussed the influence on the project of broad social, cultural, and political values that are generally present in Canada. John Gladki and Ken Greenberg, both members of the Regent Park Collaborative Team, pointed to the general acceptance of diversity in Canada of people from different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. This general acceptance of diverse people somewhat weakened potential barriers to convincing individuals from different income levels to live together in a mixed-income environment (J. Gladki, personal communication, January 12, 2017; K. Greenberg, personal communication, December 21, 2016). Gladki also expressed that it is easier
to gain widespread approval for public housing-related projects in Canada because of the country’s tradition of providing a social safety net (J. Gladki, personal communication, January 12, 2017). Former TCH Chair Mitchell Kosny added that the Regent Park revitalization reflects Canada’s guiding constitutional principles of “peace, order, and good governance” (M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016).

8.1.2 History of Planning and Housing Policies and Practices in Toronto

According to participants, the broad influence of Canadian social, cultural, and political values is reflected in the history of urban planning and public housing policies and practices in Toronto. Participants from the public sector highlighted the strong emphasis on social equity, community engagement, community building, social development, and safety in Toronto’s urban planning policies not necessarily achieved through traditional planning practices. The impact of Jane Jacobs’ relocation to Toronto, explained Mitchell Kosny, fundamentally influenced urban planning in the city, giving rise to a generation of planners, developers, and politicians inspired by her ideas of mixing uses, passive surveillance, and moderate building density who embedded Jacobs’ ideas in the mentality of the municipal government (M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016). The long lag time between urban renewal in the US and proposals for similar projects in Canada meant that planners and policymakers in Toronto could witness the failures of American housing practices of the 1940s to 1960s, said John Gladki, and therefore avoid replicating US efforts to a significant degree. According to Gladki, Toronto did not fully experience the destructive impact of urban renewal (with Regent Park and a few other projects being the exception) because when political forces aligned in Canada to expand public housing during the 1970s, housing providers were inspired by Jane Jacobs’ ideas on urbanism, not Le Corbusier’s Modernism (J. Gladki, personal communication, January 12, 2017).

The St. Lawrence development of the 1970s represented a high-water mark in mixed-income, socially-conscious urban planning in Toronto, and many individuals involved in the creation of the Regent Park master plan were inspired by St. Lawrence. Interview participants pointed to several aspects of St. Lawrence that were emulated during preliminary planning for the Regent Park revitalization, including:
mixing land use, housing tenure, and household income; implementing a grid of streets and blocks with connections to neighbouring communities; a mid-rise environment; passive surveillance; a pedestrian-friendly environment; ease of physical access to buildings; the provision of schools and community services; and a large central park (e.g., M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016; K. Greenberg, personal communication, December 21, 2016; R. Borooah, personal communication, February 14, 2017).

Despite the inspiration provided by the St. Lawrence development for the Regent Park revitalization, participants noted several ways in which the two projects differ. Ronji Borooah, an architect and member of the Regent Park Collaborative Team, describes how in the preliminary stages of the revitalization, there was interest in replicating the co-operative housing buildings from St. Lawrence, but the federal funding that made co-op housing possible in the 1970s was no longer available in the 2000s. Low public funding availability also meant that Regent Park could not be solely mid-rise, as high-rise towers would need to serve as “density carriers” for market condos to offset the public housing replacement costs. Another difference noted by Borooah was that there was no existing commercial activity at Regent Park and only a few stores adjacent to the neighbourhood, whereas St. Lawrence was located near the historic St. Lawrence Market and numerous shops and restaurants along King St., Front St., and The Esplanade. Integrating additional land uses into Regent Park meant that the project was more complex than St. Lawrence, explained Borooah (though he noted that this provided opportunities to add employment to the community) (R. Borooah, personal communication, February 14, 2017). Adding to the complexity of the Regent Park revitalization was the existing public housing community on site, which triggered the need for extensive community consultation, integration of the community’s ideas into the master plan, and creation of a detailed tenant relocation plan.

In comparison, explained Sean Gadon, Director of Affordable Housing at the City of Toronto, St. Lawrence was developed from abandoned industrial lands (S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017).

Due to the differences between the Regent Park revitalization and the St. Lawrence development, most notably the absence of co-operative housing units, there are fewer tenure options available to existing or potential residents at Regent Park. Residents of Regent Park mostly live in shelter at opposite ends of the
housing spectrum (see Appendix A for housing spectrum discussion), with new condo owners on one end, and existing public housing tenants on the other. The risk is that mixing of individuals at a diversity of income levels will not be as widespread at Regent Park as it is at St. Lawrence, where accommodations are available and subsidized accordingly for low-, middle-, and high-income households. Another potential risk, highlighted by Member of Parliament Adam Vaughan, is that, if TCH tenants begin earning a higher income, they may no longer qualify for a housing subsidy, forcing them to leave Regent Park if they cannot yet afford to immediately transition across the housing spectrum by purchasing a condominium (A. Vaughan, personal communication, March 13, 2017). John Sewell (who offered the strongest criticisms of the revitalization out of any participants) considered the deviations from the St. Lawrence model to be a strong indictment of the entire Regent Park revitalization. For Sewell, the absence of public funding meant that project planners were forced to turn to the private sector and consent to conducting the revitalization in the way that the development industry recommended, at the expense of providing the greatest social benefits to existing tenants (J. Sewell, personal communication, April 11, 2017).

8.1.3 Contemporary Development in Toronto

Regardless of the influence of St. Lawrence on the Regent Park revitalization, the project ultimately reflects contemporary real estate development practices in Toronto. While the master plan for the revitalization and phase one planning framework drew on the St. Lawrence model, St. Lawrence was acknowledged, but not cited directly during planning approvals for phases two and three, according to an urban planner at the City of Toronto familiar with the approvals process (anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication). The City urban planners currently working on site approvals at Regent Park see no similarities to the St. Lawrence development, and expressed surprise that others had claimed to be inspired by St. Lawrence when creating the Regent Park master plan (D. Oikawa, personal communication, January 31, 2017; T. Rees, personal communication, January 31, 2017; J. Renaud, personal communication, January 31, 2017).
The built form of the Regent Park revitalization reflects the growing demand for density in Toronto. As noted by Daniels VP Martin Blake, approximately 100,000 individuals move to the GTA every year, generating enormous demand in the local real estate market, and in turn, demand for intensification projects like the Regent Park revitalization (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017). In recent decades, explained urban planner John Gladki, residents of Toronto have become more accepting of greater density and “city living”, and in downtown neighbourhoods, such as Cabbagetown, opposition to intensification is generally quite low (J. Gladki, personal communication, January 12, 2017). During the community consultation stages for the revitalization, public housing tenants, residents in neighbouring communities, and local politicians did not express significant concern with the proposed density increase on the site, said Chris Brillinger, Executive Director of Social Development, Finance, and Administration at the City of Toronto; rather, shareholders were most interested in the preservation or demolition of existing buildings, with residents hesitant about the demolition of a community centre, but eager to see the despised Maisonette Towers torn down (C. Brillinger, personal communication, January 26, 2017).

According to Daniels president Mitchell Cohen, the density and height increases necessitated during the phase three development approval process to accommodate the Regent Park Athletic Grounds became more acceptable to communities and politicians since the initial conception of the master plan (M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017). However, there remain “checks and balances” on density at Regent Park, explained architect Ronji Borooah. New towers have been carefully spaced apart, said Borooah, building heights have been modelled after other developments in downtown Toronto, and a design review panel has ensured that new buildings reflect appropriate scale, massing, and architectural innovation (R. Borooah, personal communication, February 14, 2017). Cohen and Borooah agreed that additional density, in many cases, is in the public’s best interest at Regent Park, where the increased income and planning flexibility of additional building density has facilitated the addition of new community services, such as the Regent Park Athletic Grounds and Daniels Spectrum.
The relationship between density and community services has been reciprocal at Regent Park. An urban planner with the City of Toronto explained that City Planning approved greater density for phases two and three because more community facilities had been provided on the site than anticipated during the phase one approvals process (anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication). Notwithstanding, project planners are cognizant of making the site “too dense”, according to participants in both the public and private sectors, since there is a limit to what the community and neighbours will permit. According to Dave Gordon, Director of the Queen's School of Urban and Regional Planning, the site has trended toward becoming a “tower neighbourhood”, and if density increased much further, resistance could arise from a community that approved plans that more closely resembled the mid-rise character of the St. Lawrence development (D. Gordon, personal communication, January 11, 2017).

Ultimately, the density increases over the course of the revitalization reflect the prevailing development context in Toronto. An urban planner with the City of Toronto stated that Regent Park will be of similar mass and density to recent large developments in Toronto, such as the West Donlands and the Railway Lands (anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication). City planners currently working on the project consider the scale of Regent Park to be “modest” compared to most downtown development, adding that density in phase one would likely be higher if the project started today (D. Oikawa, personal communication, January 31, 2017; T. Rees, personal communication, January 31, 2017; J. Renaud, personal communication, January 31, 2017). Gregg Lintern, Director of Community Planning for downtown Toronto at the City, characterized the density at Regent Park as “sensible, but at its tolerance.” With heritage neighbourhoods surrounding the site, explained Lintern, Regent Park is an appropriate location to allocate height in the eastern portion of downtown Toronto, where zoning regulations otherwise limit buildings to two storeys in many areas (G. Lintern, personal communication, March 14, 2017). Overall, interview participants in both the public and private sectors were in strong agreement that the density of Regent Park was appropriate considering the development context of Toronto, and that similar heights and massing could be replicated at other public housing revitalization sites in similarly healthy real estate market contexts.
8.2 Alignment of the Local Political Climate Aided the Revitalization

The character, successful outcomes, and resiliency of the Regent Park revitalization are the product of a favourable alignment of political forces at Toronto City Hall and TCH, according to interview participants. Toronto Community Housing operates at arm’s length from the City of Toronto, and as such, the revitalization and the partnership between TCH and Daniels has been affected by the political situation at City Hall. The amalgamation of the City of Toronto of 1998, the downloading of public housing responsibility from the Province of Ontario to municipalities in 2000, and the creation of TCH in 2002, produced a public agency with the scale and capabilities to initiate a project like the Regent Park revitalization. Strong support at Toronto City Hall for the project from Mayor David Miller (2003-2010) and City Council were essential during the planning and initial construction stages of the revitalization. The momentum for the revitalization generated by early political support ensured that the project continued despite active opposition from Mayor Miller’s first successor, Rob Ford (2010-2014), and tepid support from current mayor John Tory (2014-Present).

8.2.1 The Creation of Toronto Community Housing

Toronto Community Housing was created in 2002 from a series of amalgamations of public housing providers in Toronto, including: the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Corporation (formerly the Metro Toronto Housing Authority, or MTHA), which was responsible for administering housing formerly operated by the province, such as Regent Park; the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Company, responsible primarily for senior’s housing; and Cityhome, a municipally-administered developer and operator of affordable housing (TCH, 2017b). The provincial Progressive Conservative government created TCH to achieve economies of scale and bureaucratic efficiencies as part of wider efforts to promote fiscal austerity in government spending; however, the outcome of these measures, explained former TCH Chair Mitchell Kosny, was the creation of a politically
progressive public housing corporation with the scale and organizational capabilities second only in North America to the New York Housing Authority (M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016). The creation of TCH streamlined jurisdictional issues associated with multiple housing providers operating in the city and allowed for greater flexibility and local autonomy over decision-making, according to several interview participants. When the first CEO of TCH, Derek Ballantyne, prioritized the revitalization as one of the housing agency’s top objectives, he was able to leverage this new organizational strength to begin conceptual planning work (Kelly, 2015). Many participants asserted that the organizational clout and autonomy associated with TCH allowed the organization to successfully initiate the Regent Park revitalization where the provincial OHC and former MTHA Chair John Sewell were unable to, mirroring Nicholson’s (2012) findings (e.g., M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016; D. Miller, personal communication, May 1, 2017; K. Knoeck, personal communication, February 23, 2017).

However, the creation of TCH was not a perfect process. According to former mayor David Miller, TCH was, and continues to be, faced with several challenges arising from its formation, such as the difficulty for a large corporation engaging with thousands of tenants, the organizational challenges associated with mixing senior’s housing with low-income housing, and the need to address the disrepair of the former provincially-operated housing (D. Miller, personal communication, May 1, 2017). Despite these potential barriers, participants from the public sector were generally in strong agreement that the revitalization of Regent Park would not have happened without the amalgamation of the City of Toronto in 1998 and the subsequent creation of TCH in 2002 (e.g., D. Miller, personal communication, May 1, 2017; S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017; K. Knoeck, personal communication, February 23, 2017).

8.2.2 Support from City Hall, 2003 to 2010

Conceptual work on the Regent Park revitalization began during the term of Mayor Mel Lastman (2000-2003), the first mayor of the amalgamated City of Toronto. Mayor Lastman, a fiscal conservative, was receptive to the need for low-income housing, remarked one participant from the public sector, but the
Regent Park revitalization was not one of Mayor Lastman’s highest political priorities (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). However, the election of fiscally progressive David Miller to Toronto’s mayoralty in 2003 proved critical in the eventual successes of the Regent Park revitalization. Mayor Miller held similar political views as TCH CEO Derek Ballantyne (Kelly, 2015) and saw the revitalization as one of his top priorities early on in his term, advocating for the project to move toward a RFP and building consensus among city councillors, explained several participants (e.g., D. Miller, personal communication, May 1, 2017; M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017; M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016). Mayor Miller’s office and Toronto City Council instructed City Planning to cooperate with TCH on creating the master plan, *Official Plan* amendment, zoning by-law amendment, urban design guidelines, and other planning documents required for the revitalization to proceed. Mayor Miller used his position to advocate for the master plan to include strong connectivity with surrounding neighbourhoods and employment for residents, and he expressed opposition toward strictly using land transactions to redevelop the site (D. Miller, personal communication, May 1, 2017). From a fiscal perspective, it was not surprising that the revitalization received strong support from City Hall, explained one participant with knowledge of the preliminary planning, considering that most of the project funding was coming from TCH, not the City directly, and the project itself would likely result in a property tax base improvement in Regent Park and the surrounding neighbourhoods (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). Overall, the supportive political climate in Toronto played a critical role in allowing the redevelopment to proceed and influencing the way in which the revitalization took place.

### 8.2.3 Maintaining Project Momentum, 2010 to the Present

The momentum for the Regent Park revitalization generated during Mayor Miller’s term allowed the project to weather the mayoralty of Rob Ford (2010-2014), who engaged in direct efforts to stall or cancel the project. In 2009, Ballantyne left TCH to become Chief Operating Officer at Build Toronto, an agency tasked with the management and development of City land, and was succeeded as CEO by Keiko Nakamura (Vincent,
2009. Rob Ford, an outspoken city councillor from the suburban borough of Etobicoke, became mayor in 2010 after promising to use funding cuts and restructuring of City services, including the privatization of TCH, to derail the “gravy train”, his term for unnecessary spending at City Hall he alleged was widespread. Mayor Ford wanted to be viewed as a “hands on” mayor delivering tangible, noticeable improvements to city residents without increasing property taxes. Budget space, according to Ford, could instead be found by ending the “gravy train” (Kelly, 2015).

Mayor Ford was not supportive of the revitalization, seeing the project as an opportunity to attack his opponents on City Council and within the City bureaucracy, as well as their political supporters (August, 2014). In 2011, an Auditor General report discovered inappropriate expense management and procurement practices at TCH, which Ford used to justify the firing of CEO Keiko Nakamura and the entire TCH board of directors (Kelly, 2015). Ballantyne was also implicated in the report and stepped down from Build Toronto (Paperny, 2011). Following the dismissal of Nakamura and the TCH board, a newly appointed, corporate-leaning board of directors attempted, but failed, to retender the Regent Park project (Kelly, 2015; August, 2014). During this time, a series of articles by reporter Sue-Ann Levy in the Toronto Sun, a tabloid-style newspaper, accused Daniels and former TCH leadership of conspiring to sell the most desirable condo units at Regent Park to employees of Daniels and TCH and local city councillor Pam McConnell (e.g., Levy, 2012). A provincial investigation of the allegations by Levy found no evidence of impropriety, instead concluding that TCH and Daniels “may be proud of their accomplishment” at Regent Park (Lesage, 2012, p. 24). Levy’s articles have been characterized as a deliberate attack on TCH and the revitalization partnership by Mayor Ford and his allies to remove Daniels from the project and award it to associates of Ford (August, 2014). Ultimately, the period following the dismissal of Nakamura was challenging for Daniels and the relationship between the

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12 In 2012, Gene Jones Jr., previously the CEO of the Detroit Housing Commission, succeeded Keiko Nakamura as CEO of TCH on the recommendation of Mayor Ford. Jones was forced to resign in April 2014, however, when the City Ombudsman identified inappropriate hiring practices, salary raises, and other inappropriate personnel decisions at TCH (Alemciaj, 2014; Alemciaj & Pagliaro, 2014). Following Jones Jr.’s departure, the CEO position was held on an interim basis by Greg Spearn (April 2014-April 2017) and Kevin Marshman (April 2017-September 2017) (Pagliaro, 2017), before the appointment of Kathy Milsom as CEO in September 2017 (Powell, 2017). Since the start of the revitalization in 2002, TCH has been led by six different CEOs, of which the first three were accused of impropriety while in power.
two partners at Regent Park. Public housing revitalization had suddenly become vilified within the municipal political climate, and the actions of Mayor Ford and his allies were seen as a major threat to redevelopment efforts at the time (Kelly, 2015).

While the revitalization would not be cancelled, the corporate-leaning board of directors at TCH was ultimately responsible for the decision to end the joint venture with Daniels and switch to land transactions in 2013, which several participants characterized as a politically motivated decision to mitigate the organization’s risk, but as a result, also the success and reach of TCH at Regent Park (e.g., M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016; M. Cohen, personal communication, April 27, 2017). Echoing Kelly’s (2015) findings, public sector employees interviewed for this report felt besieged by Mayor Ford’s allegations of wasteful spending and potential cost-cutting measures. One public sector participant summarized the situation by stating that when Mayor Ford “personally changed somebody’s lightbulb”, which he often did during well-publicized visits to TCH buildings, “he got lots of people saying, ‘isn’t that great?’ And then the next day would vote to cut the lightbulb budget” (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). Meanwhile, urban planners assigned to the project at City Hall “were a little bit cautious” during Ford’s mayoralty, explained one City planner, who added that “you just want to stay under the radar, you just want status quo...you don’t want anybody to get any wind of anything in the news and turn it into a ‘gravy train’ story or something like that” (anonymous urban planner at the City of Toronto, personal communication).

In October 2014, John Tory was elected mayor after a year-long period in which Ford had been stripped of most of his powers following a series of personal scandals and controversies. Mayor Tory has provided greater political stability at City Hall compared to Ford, and Tory has offered public support for the Regent Park partnership and TCH’s revitalization efforts more broadly, while expressing caution about the financial risks for the municipality associated with public housing redevelopment (Kelly, 2015). According to some public sector interview participants, Tory’s fiscal caution should be interpreted as an insufficient reintegration of public housing initiatives into the municipal political agenda following the attacks on public
housing by Mayor Ford (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication; anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). These participants see Mayor Tory’s reticence for public housing spending as a product of his need to maintain political support from fiscal conservatives at all three level of government for his re-election efforts. (Tory was the former leader of the Progressive Conservatives in Ontario). One participant characterized Mayor Tory as taking a purely business case view of the Regent Park revitalization as a result of his fiscally conservative views: while continued funding in the short-term makes sense financially (since the revitalization is already underway), long-term, substantial spending on public housing replacement should be avoided. This participant added that Mayor Tory’s office has not been “creative” with policy solutions for funding the revitalization, such as using funds earmarked for environmental retrofitting to replace environmentally inefficient public housing buildings (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication).

Other public sector participants defended Mayor Tory’s decisions with respect to public housing and the Regent Park revitalization. Chris Brillinger, Executive Director of Social Development, Finance, and Administration at the City, pointed to the Mayor’s Task Force on TCH, which, in 2016, presented 29 recommendations for improving the governance and impact of TCH, following extensive public consultation (City of Toronto, 2016b). Brillinger also highlighted the City’s decision to provide TCH with an additional $37 million of funding in January 2017 as another example of Mayor Tory’s support for public housing and the growing realization at City Hall that TCH has never been provided with appropriate financial capacity (C. Brillinger, personal communication, January 26, 2017). Overall, interview participants employed at TCH and City Planning were unanimous in stating that Mayor Tory and the current City Council have been strongly supportive of their efforts at Regent Park (e.g., C. Brillinger, personal communication, January 26, 2017; anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication; anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication). That said, while Mayor Tory has exhibited stronger support for public housing than Rob Ford, Tory has not committed long-term funding from the City for repairs to or the replacement of TCH housing, nor has he secured long-term financial commitments from the provincial or federal governments,
however limited the mayor’s office is in terms of taxation and legislative power. Mayor Tory has also not advanced the approval of phases four and five of the Regent Park revitalization, and it is fair to ask whether the revitalization would have proceeded or would have achieved the same level of success if it was initiated during Tory’s term.

The Regent Park revitalization was initiated because of an alignment of several political factors, and the manner in which it has taken place has been influenced by the politicians and public officials charged with leading the project. According to participants, the revitalization has been a product of the amalgamation of TCH, the championing of the project by TCH’s first CEO, Derek Ballantyne, and the strong support from Mayor Miller, which helped the project weather attack during the mayoralty of Mayor Miller’s successor, Rob Ford, and tepid support from current mayor John Tory. The outcomes and success of public housing revitalization projects, including those initiated by TCH since Regent Park, are the product of the political climate surrounding the projects, particularly during the earliest stages. To match or exceed the successes at Regent Park, political forces should embrace social development and avoid taking a purely business case approach at future public housing revitalization efforts. Considering the changes in political climate since mayoralty of David Miller, however, it could be argued that this has not necessarily been the case with revitalization efforts in Toronto.

8.3 The Impact of Municipal and Provincial Policies

The Regent Park revitalization takes place within the context of several municipal and provincial urban planning, housing, and community development policies (some of which were discussed in Section 5.2). Interview participants for this thesis generally agreed that the municipal and provincial planning policies that inform the Regent Park revitalization support the partnership’s efforts to replace the existing public housing with a mixed-income community. However, the participants also revealed that specific policies related to mixed-income redevelopment of public housing generally did not exist during the early stages of the Regent
Park revitalization, requiring planners and policymakers to either create new policies, expand upon existing policies, or adapt existing planning and policy strategies to the context of the revitalization process. In general, the broad municipal planning policies laid out in the city’s Official Plan (first approved following amalgamation in 2002) did not impede efforts to redevelop Regent Park, but planners and policymakers were required to innovate when it came to specific planning strategies applied to the project. Provincial growth policies, which have been attributed as having encouraged intensification of built-up areas in Toronto (e.g., Rosen, 2016), meanwhile, were found to not have been a direct catalyst for the Regent Park revitalization.

Participants employed at TCH explained that there are no planning or housing policies that specify how the housing agency should conduct mixed-income revitalization. For example, there are no policies that dictate the terms or nature of the partnership structure between the public and private sector. Internal policies at TCH provide a degree of guidance, however, explained a TCH development manager. For example, TCH has policies that require buildings to be fully accessible to persons with disabilities, exceeding the requirements within municipal or provincial legislation. The development manager stated that TCH has also sought guidance for the revitalization from the organization’s corporate mandate, which is to create safe, vibrant communities that all residents feel at home in (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication). An urban planner employed at TCH added that where municipal or provincial policies are unclear, in disagreement with each other, or unaligned with the phasing or logistics of the construction process, TCH, Daniels, and the City have been able to creatively resolve policy conflicts and unclear policy directives over the course of the revitalization (anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication).

Despite the absence of explicit revitalization policies, urban planning guidelines and tools accessible to urban planners at the City of Toronto and TCH provided broad support to the Regent Park revitalization. The urban planning tools included in the provincial Planning Act (1990), have been sufficient to allow the revitalization to unfold, according to Gregg Lintern, Director of Community Planning for the downtown area at the City. These tools, explained Lintern, include built form zoning requirements, a master plan, and a plan of subdivision for the existing site (G. Lintern, personal communication, March 14, 2017).
In Ontario, planning rules and guidelines are established by the provincial government and implemented and enforced by the municipalities. Municipalities are required by the provincial Planning Act (1990) to establish overarching plans that apply to the geographic areas municipal governments oversee. These plans must meet the minimum guidelines established by the province, but municipalities are able to establish stronger, more restrictive, or more descriptive urban planning guidelines (Government of Ontario, 2015b). The Official Plan, first approved following amalgamation in 2002, is Toronto’s provincially-mandated master plan for the city. Toronto’s Official Plan has provided broad support for urban planning objectives at the revitalization. For example, the Official Plan requires developers to conduct community consultation for large-scale projects, which aligned with the existing objectives of the urban planners working on the Regent Park master plan, noted Heather Grey-Wolf, former Development Director for Regent Park at TCH (H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017). Similarly, as expressed by the City planners currently assigned to planning approvals at Regent Park, the Official Plan requires that large-scale developments include several elements incorporated into the revitalization, such as community amenities and services, housing for seniors and families, and public transit connectivity (D. Oikawa, personal communication, January 31, 2017; T. Rees, personal communication, January 31, 2017; J. Renaud, personal communication, January 31, 2017).

Participants employed at the City of Toronto discussed how housing and mixed-use policies in the Official Plan have also supported the revitalization process. Housing policies in the Official Plan have facilitated the objective of the revitalization to minimize the disruption and displacement of public housing tenants, explained City Planning Director Gregg Lintern. Additionally, the Official Plan mandates the one-to-one replacement of public housing units, stated Sean Gadon, Director of Affordable Housing at the City. In comparison, said Gadon, Chicago has a two-to-one replacement policy for public housing redevelopment (for every two units demolished, one must be rebuilt), and residents are not guaranteed the right-of-return to old units as with Regent Park (S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017). Mixed-income policies are also highly integrated into the Official Plan because of previous experiences in the city, most notably the St.
Lawrence development of the 1970s, according to Chris Brillinger, Executive Director of Social Development, Finance and Administration at the City of Toronto (C. Brillinger, personal communication, January 26, 2017). Kyle Knoeck, a City planner that oversaw the phase one approvals process, stated that broad support for mixed-use development within the Official Plan offered planners appropriate planning rationale to change the land use designation at Regent Park from “Neighbourhood”, which precludes significant alterations of existing residential structures, to “Mixed Use” and “Apartment Neighbourhoods”, which permitted the necessary demolition and rebuilding efforts (K. Knoeck, personal communication, February 23, 2017).

Community development initiatives enacted by the City before and during the Regent Park revitalization have also supported redevelopment efforts. Former mayor David Miller pointed to the Community Safety Plan enacted by City Council in 2004, which included a range of criminal enforcement and prevention initiatives, such as programs and services aimed at steering low-income youth away from gang involvement (City of Toronto, 2017a). In subsequent years, City Council introduced and expanded the Community Safety Plan into the Priority Neighbourhoods Initiative (2005-2013) and Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 (2014-Present) to promote social development in “priority neighbourhoods” (areas with a higher proportion of low-income households and higher crime rates) across the city, said Miller. The social and community development strategies deployed in priority neighbourhoods, such as working with the private and non-profit sectors to create employment opportunities and construct community facilities, directly influenced the strategy adopted for the Regent Park revitalization, according to Miller. The Regent Park Athletic Grounds and the Daniels Spectrum were cited by Miller as examples of social development initiatives similar to those encouraged by the Priority Neighbourhoods Initiative and Toronto Strong Neighbourhoods Strategy 2020 (D. Miller, personal communication, May 1, 2017).

Affordable housing initiatives pursued by the City have provided additional support for the revitalization efforts at Regent Park. For instance, the Housing Opportunities Toronto Action Plan (2009) supplied municipal funds for the creation of affordable housing and financial assistance for households in existing affordable housing units (City of Toronto, 2009). As part of the Action Plan, explained City Affordable
Housing Director Sean Gadon, he has the discretion to direct housing funding from all three levels of government to affordable housing priorities, including the Regent Park revitalization, without first requiring TCH or other affordable housing providers to apply for the funding. In doing so, said Gadon, the City can maintain local control over affordable housing decision-making while somewhat reducing the barriers for housing agencies to receive funding (S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017).

While urban policies in Toronto provided broad support for the Regent Park revitalization, the unique nature of Regent Park meant that certain policies or strategies were not applicable or available at the start of the project, requiring planners and policymakers to create new or adapt existing policy strategies for the revitalization. As previously mentioned, the land use designation for Regent Park needed to be changed from “Neighbourhood” to “Mixed-Use” and “Apartment Neighbourhoods” to allow for demolition and rebuilding. City planner Kyle Knoeck explained that while the change in designation was informed by appropriate planning rationale, urban planners and policymakers needed to create original zoning by-laws for the site, since the previous “Neighbourhood” designation would not have provided the height, massing, and density guidelines needed for the revitalization. The process of creating new zoning by-laws required a considerably greater investment of time and resources compared to non-“Neighbourhood” designated sites, where by-laws for mixed-use, moderate-, or high-density development are more likely to already have been established (K. Knoeck, personal communication, February 23, 2017).

With the Regent Park revitalization being the first large-scale public housing revitalization project in Toronto, there were no fully applicable built form precedents that urban planners could refer to during the process of creating the master plan, explained David Oikawa, Manager of Community Planning for downtown Toronto at the City. Recent large-scale development sites, such as the Railway Lands and West Donlands, were brownfield sites without existing residents, said Oikawa; Regent Park, in comparison, required significant consideration of tenant input and temporary relocation planning in creating the master plan. And, while the City had overseen development projects that included tenant relocation, the scale of the Regent
Park relocation efforts dwarfed other projects, which have usually been restricted to a single building (D. Oikawa, personal communication, January 31, 2017).

Additionally, significant concern existed within the Planning department at the City with respect to setting a strong, rigorous precedent for public housing replacement in the revitalization, as the project was the first large-scale example of mixed-income revitalization in Toronto. According to City planner Kyle Knoeck, City Planning wanted to avoid setting a relaxed precedent for replacing public housing that might allow a private developer in the future to justify removing or relocating housing units or placing an excessive burden on tenants that needed to relocate temporarily, even though a public agency (TCH) was responsible for the revitalization. The Social Housing Reform Act (2000) mandated provincial approval of large-scale alterations to public housing sites, and, as discussed in Chapter Five, the Act was invoked at Regent Park. However, Knoeck notes, the province had only invoked this mandate a few times before Regent Park, and not at the same scale as the proposed revitalization. This meant that Knoeck and his colleagues were required to create rigorous housing replacement policies for the revitalization, not only to set a strong precedent for future redevelopment projects, but also to allow the province to make an informed decision about replacing the public housing at Regent Park (K. Knoeck, personal communication, February 23, 2017).

One of the strategies deployed by City Planning to ensure that public housing units were replaced in an appropriate manner was the use of Holding Provisions in the provincial Planning Act (1990). Holding Provisions may be used by municipal planning departments to restrict development on a site until certain conditions are met (Government of Ontario, 2016). Holding Provisions are rarely used by the Toronto Planning department, explained City Community Planning Director Gregg Lintern. With the Regent Park revitalization, however, City Planning opted to use Holding Provisions to require TCH and Daniels to demonstrate an appropriate strategy for building community facilities and public housing replacement for each proposed building site before demolition and construction could begin. Lintern considered this application of Holding Provisions as “innovative”, since City Planning had adapted an existing planning tool for a new type of use without needing to wait for the revision or creation of planning policies (G. Lintern,
Another urban planner involved with the revitalization at the City described how Holding Provisions allowed City planners to “check in on the process” and learn from experiences over the course of the redevelopment. For example, the first public housing replacement buildings included units with interior bedrooms (bedrooms without exterior windows) to accommodate large families. However, City Planning became aware that residents moving into interior bedroom units disliked the layouts. In response, City planners used the Holding Provisions to slow construction and work with TCH to re-plan building layouts to avoid interior bedrooms. Without the use of Holding Provisions, disclosed this City planner, it is possible that the issue would not have been resolved until the next phase of the revitalization, after which many buildings would have already been constructed with interior bedrooms (anonymous urban planner at the City of Toronto, personal communication).

Participants described other innovative planning strategies that were used for the Regent Park revitalization. For instance, the pre-zoned master plan created at the beginning of the project has had a positive impact on the revitalization process. While considerable resources were invested upfront in creating the zoning by-laws for the site, the master plan provided direction and a level of comfort for public and private investors in the project, and allowed the City to anticipate and pace the financing and construction of new infrastructure, according to Gregg Lintern (G. Lintern, personal communication, March 14, 2017).

Thomas Rees, a Community Planner at the City currently assigned to Regent Park, notes that a pre-zoned master plan allows for individual site applications to be processed more efficiently because there is greater certainty of the built form context surrounding a proposed building (T. Rees, personal communication, January 31, 2017). The creation of a master plan also improves the efficiency of planning approvals because the plan was created following consultation and approval from the community, meaning that separate community consultation does not have to take place for each individual building site prior to approval by the City, added David Oikawa, Manager of Community Planning for the downtown area (D. Oikawa, personal communication, January 31, 2017). The Regent Park secondary plan, which included more detailed urban planning and development policies, was one of the first of its kind in Toronto, and, like the master plan,
allowed the City to anticipate and provide infrastructure for the community as it redevelops over time, said another urban planner at the City of Toronto (anonymous urban planner at the City of Toronto, personal communication).

Prior to the Regent Park revitalization, explained former mayor David Miller, City housing revitalization strategies (at smaller scales) generally consisted of providing tax breaks to private developers to create or revitalize affordable housing. This strategy, said Miller, did not result in a net positive benefit for the City, as politicians and officials would always need to limit public services to accommodate the decline in tax revenues. The planning strategies employed at Regent Park, however, such as the use of Holding Provisions, the creation of a master plan, and the creation of a secondary plan, represent a significant advancement in policy creation at the City that is delivering net benefits not only to public housing communities but Toronto more broadly, said Miller (D. Miller, personal communication, May 1, 2017). A private sector development professional added that while planning framework for Toronto has “stymied” housing development at times by limiting architectural creativity and creating similar looking communities, the secondary plan and master planning framework have created a suitable system of “checks and balances” between adherence to City built form policies and architectural creativity at Regent Park (anonymous private sector development executive, personal communication).

The information gathered through the interviews for this thesis may support the notion that policies alone cannot encourage public housing revitalization or dictate how it takes place. Interestingly, interview participants somewhat disagreed with some of the findings in Rosen’s (2016) study of private real estate developer preferences and decision-making in Toronto, particularly with respect to the impact of smart growth legislation on development patterns. In Rosen (2016), the development industry professionals interviewed discussed how provincial policies, such as the Places to Grow Act (2005) and Greenbelt Act (2005), encouraged local developers to shift their focus from suburban greenfield development to urban infill, high-rise projects in the mid-2000s. Participants for this thesis concurred that provincial smart growth policies support many of the objectives of the Regent Park revitalization, including mixing uses, intensification
of the built form, public transit connectivity, and walkability (e.g., K. Greenberg, personal communication, December 21, 2016; anonymous private sector development executive, personal communication; anonymous urban planner at the City of Toronto, personal communication); however, participants took exception with the premise that provincial policies were the primary driving force, instead arguing that intensification at Regent Park is predominantly the result of several other factors (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017; D. Oikawa, personal communication, January 31, 2017; T. Rees, personal communication, January 31, 2017). One factor, explained Daniels VP Martin Blake, is the significant, sustained immigration to the GTA, which has supported ongoing high demand for housing in the region. Immigration, combined with dwindling land supply in the early-2000s (before smart growth policies were introduced) and real estate consumers increasingly preferring urban locations, provided strong incentives for Daniels and other developers to build centrally-located, high-density, infill projects in the 2000s (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017). A private sector participant noted that Daniels was already a high-rise developer in 2005 when the Places to Grow Act was introduced, adding that while the Act has been important for improving clarity around land supply, identifying growth areas, conserving heritage neighbourhoods, and protecting forests and farmland, it did not exert a strong influence on development-related decisions at Daniels (anonymous private sector development executive, personal communication).

Participants in the public sector also noted that municipal planning policies encouraging intensification predated provincial smart growth policies. Said former Toronto mayor David Miller, the first Official Plan (2002) for Toronto already had “legitimized development in the urban core”, by establishing the principle that “you should be able to live in Toronto without having to own a car”. “Radical” at the time, according to Miller, the plan played a strong role in guiding the planning process for the Regent Park revitalization, most of which took place after the Official Plan was adopted in 2002, but before the passing of the Places to Grow Act and Greenbelt Act in 2005 (D. Miller, personal communication, May 1, 2017). Urban planners employed at the City of Toronto also downplayed the impact of provincial smart growth plans on Regent Park and intensification in Toronto, noting that the provincial growth targets have been far exceeded
anyway because strong housing demand, not policy, is the major driver of growth in the downtown area (D. Oikawa, personal communication, January 31, 2017; T. Rees, personal communication, January 31, 2017).

The Regent Park revitalization has taken place within a policy context where overarching guidelines, such as the Official Plan (2002), provide broad support for the revitalization’s objectives, namely, the creation of a mixed-use, mixed-income community that is well served by social services and public infrastructure. Where policies or strategies specific to public housing revitalization do not exist, existing regulations may be created, changed, or adapted if the broad policy objectives support these alterations, such as the use of Holding Provisions by City Planning to ensure that housing replacement and infrastructure creation provisions are being met, and the creation of a secondary plan to provide more information about the timing and scale of revitalization efforts. Policies alone cannot encourage public housing revitalization or control the way in which it takes place, however. A strong local real estate market and private development company invested in the success of public housing were critical factors in launching the Regent Park revitalization. Provincial smart growth policies enacted in the mid-2000s were intended to encourage intensification in existing built-up areas to protect forests and farmland, but high-density development was already taking place in Toronto when these policies were introduced, and residential growth in the city has surpassed provincial goals due to significant housing demand in the local real estate market. Overall, this section has pointed to the unique aspects of the local planning and development policy context in which the Regent Park revitalization is taking place. This does not necessarily mean that the successes of Regent Park cannot be emulated outside of the favourable policy context in Toronto; rather, larger cities with healthy real estate markets may be able to emulate the revitalization by creating a similar policy context as Toronto—one that encourages higher densities, income mixing, land use mixing, social service provision, and architectural excellence.
8.4 Social Objectives of the Revitalization Can Be Emulated

Participants shared many of the lessons learned from the Regent Park revitalization that can likely be applied to similar projects in Toronto and other cities, though they cautioned that Regent Park is a unique case. The economic aspects of the development context of the revitalization are far more favourable relative to many other public housing sites, as Regent Park is centrally-located, highly-accessible, and therefore highly-valuable for real estate development. That said, some of the lessons learned from Regent Park have been applied at successive revitalization projects initiated by TCH. Alexandra Park, in the western portion of downtown Toronto, and Lawrence Heights, in the suburban borough of North York, were two revitalization projects most frequently cited by participants. Other lessons have proven difficult to apply, however, while certain successful aspects of the Regent Park revitalization have been ignored altogether, due, in part, to organizational changes at TCH. Participants discussed the implications of both the differences between Regent Park and other public housing revitalization sites and the changes in decision-making at TCH for the future of revitalization projects in Toronto and elsewhere.

8.4.1 Objectives and Practices at Regent Park to be Emulated

Participants listed several aspects of the Regent Park revitalization that can likely be replicated by TCH in Toronto, or, in certain cases, by public housing providers in other cities. One lesson that may be applied to any public housing revitalization project is to adopt current best practices in urban planning, such as the use of a design review panel to ensure architectural quality, as one participant noted (anonymous private sector development executive, personal communication). A second lesson to apply, according to another participant, is the use of Holding Provisions or similar planning tools to strictly monitor the housing replacement process (anonymous urban planner at the City of Toronto, personal communication).

Revitalization sites should be chosen by public housing providers based on location, such as good public
transit access, said a pair of participants from the public sector (S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017; anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication). Those same participants also
pointed out that conducting revitalization in an area with a strong real estate market, such as Toronto,
improves the economic feasibility of redevelopment, as fewer market housing units need to be built and sold
for each public housing unit created or replaced.

However, a strong real estate market may not always be present when attempting to revitalize
public housing, cautioned many participants, nor any of the other favourable aspects of Regent Park, such as
the site’s central location and proximity to existing public infrastructure, services, and amenities, including
the Dundas St. streetcar, the Ryerson University campus, and the Don Valley (e.g., K. Greenberg, personal
communication, December 21, 2016; J. Gladki, personal communication, January 12, 2017 anonymous urban
planner at the City of Toronto, personal communication). Neighbouring communities that generally support
redevelopment efforts, such as the Cabbagetown and Trefann Court neighbourhoods adjacent to Regent
Park, cannot always be relied upon, as several participants advised (e.g., K. Greenberg, personal
communication, December 21, 2016; D. Miller, personal communication, May 1, 2017).

Despite potential differences in development context between Regent Park and other public housing
sites, a common theme across interviews was that the social objectives of the Regent Park revitalization can
and should be adopted for any future housing revitalization efforts. As summarized by an urban planner at
the City of Toronto, social objectives that can likely be replicated from Regent Park include: creating a social
development plan, consulting with both public housing tenants and members of the surrounding
communities, and building community services and amenities toward the beginning of the redevelopment,
which was the case with the Aquatic Centre, Daniels Spectrum, and new central park, among other facilities
at Regent Park (anonymous urban planner at the City of Toronto, personal communication). Creating a
master plan that connects with surrounding neighbourhoods and adopts best practices in urban planning was
also recommended by several participants in the public sector (e.g., D. Miller, personal communication, May
1, 2017; H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017; anonymous development manager at TCH,
Ronji Borooah, architect and member of the Regent Park Collaborative Team, added that large-scale tenant relocation during the redevelopment process should be avoided—a key lesson conveyed by residents at Regent Park disrupted by temporary relocation during phase one of the revitalization (R. Borooah, personal communication, February 14, 2017).

Participants listed the various ways in which the lessons from Regent Park have been applied to two of TCH’s more recent revitalization projects: Lawrence Heights, in North York, and Alexandra Park, in west downtown Toronto. At Lawrence Heights, a site similar in scale to Regent Park, TCH and the City conducted an extensive community consultation process, explained City planner Kyle Knoeck (K. Knoeck, personal communication, February 23, 2017). This process revealed, for example, that Lawrence Heights public housing residents...
strongly favoured units with balconies, which were not in the preliminary master plan for the community. Balconies had been omitted from initial revitalization plans because TCH wanted to avoid replicating the poor visual perception many in the public have of their buildings due to residents leaving items on balconies. The strong demand from public housing tenants at Lawrence Heights for balconies, however, pushed architects to design perforated metal balconies that allow for airflow but blocked items from outside view (S. Blumberg, personal communication, February 17, 2017). Community feedback also resulted in no off-site buildings being constructed with the Lawrence Heights revitalization, explained Sean Gadon, Affordable Housing Director at the City (S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017). Community consultations also resulted in no temporary relocation, which, according to several public sector participants, was achieved by creating vacancies on the site prior to redevelopment (e.g., S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017; H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017; G. Lintern, personal communication, March 14, 2017).

Chris Brillinger, Executive Director of Social Development, Finance, and Administration at the City, added that the City and TCH attempted to be clearer about financial responsibilities during the planning stages of the Lawrence Heights revitalization to avoid the ongoing debate over fiscal obligations that have persisted at Regent Park (C. Brillinger, personal communication, January 26, 2017).

At Alexandra Park, the Regent Park community consultation process was also emulated, explained Member of Parliament Adam Vaughan, during which residents expressed their opposition, for instance, to temporary relocation and stacked townhomes. Both requests were accommodated in the eventual master plan for the community (A. Vaughan, personal communication, March 13, 2017). Planners and politicians also responded to one of the criticisms of Regent Park by making a stronger attempt to integrate tenures at Alexandra Park by placing co-operative housing within a condominium building (TCH, 2017c).

8.4.3 Lessons Not Applied from the Regent Park Revitalization

Several differences were highlighted by participants between Regent Park and TCH’s other revitalization projects at Lawrence Heights and Alexandra Park, however. With Lawrence Heights, the overall land value is
lower than Regent Park because the site is not in the downtown core of Toronto (C. Brillinger, personal communication, January 26, 2017). This presents a challenge for replicating the Regent Park model, explained multiple participants, as more market units need to be sold to pay for each public housing unit replaced (e.g., C. Brillinger, personal communication, January 26, 2017; J. Gladki, personal communication, January 12, 2017; M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017). Site conditions also differ at Lawrence Heights. A highway splits the community in half, and building height is limited because of an overhead flight path, explained Chris Brillinger (C. Brillinger, personal communication, January 26, 2017). “Backyard-to-backyard conditions” with neighbouring properties makes building transitions to the surrounding communities more contentious, said Heather Grey-Wolf, who also worked on the Lawrence Heights project as a development manager at TCH. In comparison, major arterial roads separate Regent Park from adjacent properties, meaning that zoning by-laws can permit higher buildings and the risk of conflict with nearby property-owners over building height and privacy concerns are mitigated (H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017). The absence of a previous streets and blocks plan at Lawrence Heights also hindered the ability of planners and politicians to build consensus within the community and between Lawrence Heights and the surrounding neighbourhoods, stated Kyle Knoeck. Knoeck compared the planning process to Regent Park, where he and his colleagues generally reintroduced the road grid that existed in Cabbagetown in the 1940s (K. Knoeck, personal communication, February 23, 2017).

According to some participants, despite efforts to build on the Regent Park revitalization community consultation process, the consultation process and subsequent planning process at both Lawrence Heights and Alexandra Park have differed greatly. One private sector employee with experience on all three projects remarked that the “lessons of Regent Park were left behind at the door” (anonymous participant from the private sector, personal communication). The development approach employed by TCH at Lawrence Heights and Alexandra Park has changed since Regent Park, with each of the newer projects using a segmented phasing approach, whereby each phase is a standalone project. In contrast, explained Chris Brillinger, Regent Park was approved by the City as a single project that was broken into multiple phases (C. Brillinger, personal
communication, January 26, 2017). Another participant remarked that City of Toronto Planning practices, particularly in Lawrence Heights, reflect suburban-style urban planning, including an aversion to building height and an affinity for arterial roads with few crossings, which, the participant warned, facilitate drive-by shootings because drivers can easily drive away without encountering any stoplights (anonymous participant from the private sector, personal communication).

Part of the planning-related critiques of the Lawrence Heights revitalization stem from the homogeneously middle-income composition of the neighbouring communities, according to participants. At Regent Park, heterogeneous communities comprised of low-, middle-, and higher-income households were more accepting of the physical integration of their neighbourhoods with a public housing community. The surrounding middle-income neighbourhoods at Lawrence Heights, in comparison, were generally opposed to roads, pedestrian pathways, or parks that connected to the site. Unfortunately, urban planners and local politicians at Lawrence Heights were willing to acquiesce to demands for less integration, which has not been the case with revitalization sites in downtown Toronto, including Regent Park and Alexandra Park (anonymous participant from the private sector, personal communication; anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication).

Anti-integration sentiment was eventually incorporated into the secondary plan created for Lawrence Heights, reflecting, as many participants disclosed, a wider shift by TCH toward placing too great an emphasis on community demands during the consultation processes for revitalization projects after Regent Park (anonymous participant from the private sector, personal communication; anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). Participants involved with the Lawrence Heights planning process described how consensus could not be achieved between the public housing residents, adjacent neighbourhoods, politicians, and urban planners, leading to a protracted eight-year community consultation and planning process (compared to about three years for Regent Park) (e.g., anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). While participants were cognizant of the need to develop community consensus, they characterized the protracted Lawrence Heights consultation process as being the
result of an unwillingness on the part of local politicians and urban planners to move the revitalization process forward if doing so meant antagonizing neighbouring communities (anonymous participant from the private sector, personal communication).

The outcome of the Lawrence Heights planning process was a master plan that recreates the segregated nature of the existing neighbourhood. The streets and blocks pattern does not provide enough connections to existing neighbouring streets and includes several planning elements worthy of criticism, including a suburban-style arterial road, poor physical connections with surrounding communities, and several semi-open green spaces, often cited as providing visual cover for criminal activity. Multiple participants saw these outcomes as the result of planners and politicians not being able to stand up to economic and racial stereotypes and discrimination directed toward Lawrence Heights residents, as well as a failure to apply best practices in urban planning learned from the Regent Park revitalization and elsewhere (e.g., anonymous participant from the private sector, personal communication; anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication). Architect Shirley Blumberg’s firm, KPMB Architects, were, after a protracted debate with local City planners, able to eliminate many suburban-style elements in their revisions to the plan for phase one of Lawrence Heights. The revised plans increased site density, improved tenure integration, and better connected the community with the surrounding neighbourhoods. However, since the revisions do not apply to the rest of the site, Blumberg expressed concern that the poorly-conceived master plan could present challenges in later phases (S. Blumberg, personal communication, February 17, 2017).

At Alexandra Park, TCH and the City were similarly acquiescent to community wishes, though in this case they gave in to the demands of the public housing tenants. According to one participant, many in the community wanted to preserve the insulated layout of Alexandra Park because of their familiarity and comfort with the existing built form.\(^\text{13}\) Planners at TCH and the City ultimately created a master plan that relied heavily on the community’s desires, preserving existing pedestrian-only pathways, limiting through

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\(^{13}\) Allegedly, drug dealers in the neighbourhood took part in the consultation process and advocated for a master plan that did not include visual access and social surveillance, thereby protecting their business interests (anonymous participant from the public sector, personal communication).
streets, and creating hidden open spaces. One participant saw this as a self-imposed repudiation of professional expertise, resulting, as with Lawrence Heights, in a plan that replicated the segregated built form that revitalization ostensibly aims to eliminate (anonymous participant from the private sector, personal communication). The decision to avoid temporary location at both Alexandra Park and Lawrence Heights, while made in response to community advocacy, also increased development costs and extended completion timelines, another trade-off that one participant disclosed was the case at both sites (H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017).

In response to some of these critiques, one participant from TCH explained that each revitalization has a different partnership agreement and relationship between the public and private sectors, reflecting, in part, the different objectives of each project (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication). While there are similarities across public housing sites, said Heather Grey-Wolf, former TCH Development Director, there are various site-specific factors of which public housing agencies must be aware, such as the relationship between the public housing tenants and the surrounding neighbourhoods (H. Grey-Wolf, personal communication, March 9, 2017).

Based on the information gathered from these interviews, many of the best practices from the Regent Park revitalization can likely be emulated at other public housing redevelopment projects, particularly the social objectives of the revitalization, such as conducting extensive community consultation and providing a variety of public amenities and services. The willingness of TCH to emulate the Regent Park revitalization, and the corporation’s effectiveness at doing so, however, have varied. Based on the positive aspects of Regent Park cited by participants, TCH runs the risk of not providing similar social outcomes for tenants at its other revitalization sites by not adopting many of the strategies that have made the Regent Park revitalization as successful as it has been thus far.
8.5 The Challenges with Improving Social Mix

Kelly (2015) discussed how Daniels attempted to construct buildings that contained both public housing and market condominium units side-by-side within the same structure, but that existing condominium regulations, such as the Condo Act (1998), inhibited these efforts. For some (e.g., August, 2014; Levy, 2012), the project’s inability to achieve in-building mix is a strong area for criticism, since the revitalization is unable to maximize the benefits of social mixing, such as territorial destigmatization and reduced criminal activity.¹⁴

Participants for this thesis restated earlier claims (e.g., Kelly, 2015) that Daniels advocated for in-building mix at Regent Park early in the revitalization process, but was opposed by TCH leadership and some city councillors. Adam Vaughan, a current Member of Parliament and a former city councillor, explained that some of his colleagues at City Hall blocked attempts to revise City of Toronto policies that would have allowed in-building mix, based on the ideology that the public sector should not be too closely aligned with private corporations (A. Vaughan, personal communication, March 13, 2017). Vaughan also noted that there was a pervading belief among politicians and bureaucrats that public housing tenants should have their own spaces, which, former TCH Chair Mitchell Kosny added, was informed by the notion that condo-buyers would be perceived as “interlopers” in the existing community of low-income tenants (A. Vaughan, personal communication, March 13, 2017; M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016). Participants made note of several other reasons for Daniels and TCH being unable to provide in-building mix. One reason was that there are no current government funding mechanisms for providing in-building mix. In comparison, during the 1970s and 1980s, federal and provincial funding was available to private and non-profit developers to build co-operative housing with rental units priced according to tenants’ ability to pay. Some participants from the public sector also recalled that there existed some concern about the marketability of

¹⁴ A development manager at TCH challenged the notion that in-building mix is absent at Regent Park, however, pointing out that TCH has introduced units where 20% of the rent is subsidized into their buildings, and some renters have been able to purchase condos in Daniels buildings through grants and mortgage assistance programs. That said, the development manager conceded that mixing at Regent Park does not consist of TCH owning condo units in private buildings (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication).
condominiums within mixed buildings at the onset of the project (M. Kosny, personal communication, December 20, 2016; S. Gadon, personal communication, February 24, 2017). However, as Kelly (2015) found, many condo-buyers were disappointed to discover that there was no in-building mix at Regent Park.

Echoing Kelly’s (2015) findings, participants in the public and private sectors cited policy constraints as a major factor in limiting the creation of buildings with mixed tenures side-by-side. In Kelly’s (2015) work, Daniels VP Martin Blake stated that the Condo Act presents challenges for providing in-building mix because it gives condominium boards the ability to sell units with tenants perceived as “disruptive” and because TCH would not have significant control over condo decisions (as each owner receives one vote for each unit owned). Blake expanded on his comments for this thesis, noting that the Condo Act requires each condo board to hold a reserve fund to cover 20 years’ worth of repairs to the building, a cost to buyers that TCH is not required to pay when constructing its own units (M. Blake, personal communication, January 6, 2017).

Figure 25. Social mix in Regent Park at present: Though one side of the street is market condos and the other is public housing units, the housing types are indistinguishable from each other (photograph by Marcus Létourneau, 2016).
Additionally, a development manager at TCH highlighted a policy constraint in the *Residential Tenancies Act* (2006) which requires public housing providers to be fully responsible for common spaces on their properties; with condos, in comparison, common spaces are jointly owned by the owners of each condominium unit, so public ownership of condo units would therefore appear to conflict with this provision (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication). Other participants pointed to the *Housing Services Act* (2011), which contains several requirements for public housing providers such as TCH that might conflict with how condos are built and operated, including clauses regarding the configuration of bedrooms in units (certain rooms, such as interior rooms, might be considered “bedrooms” in condos, but not in public housing buildings) and owners’ responsibility for maintenance (condo boards with condos, but housing agencies themselves with public housing) (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication; anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication).

According to many of the TCH employees interviewed, funding presents another significant limitation to in-building mix. As per TCH employees, in-building mix would not result in economies of scale with respect to maintenance costs, as the per-unit maintenance costs of units in buildings owned by TCH and serviced by in-house contractors would be lower than monthly maintenance fees paid to a condo board (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication; anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication; anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication). One TCH development manager also made the point that TCH might lose some control over decisions related to the construction of the buildings housing the units they own, and the resulting costs of these units. For instance, certain amenities are usually included in condominium buildings to appeal to market condo owners, such as exercise rooms, but exercise rooms are not typically present in TCH buildings, and TCH would be responsible for the upfront and ongoing costs to maintain those amenities (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication). Employees at TCH were not opposed to TCH owning condominium units in private buildings at Regent Park and at other public housing revitalization sites in principle, but the current roadblocks would likely need to first be overcome with adequate funding and policy revisions to allow for
financially feasible in-building mix (anonymous development manager at TCH, personal communication; anonymous urban planner at TCH, personal communication).

Member of Parliament Adam Vaughan believes that the mixing of condo owners and public housing tenants should be strongly pursued at Regent Park and other public housing revitalization sites, regardless of the additional cost to the public sector. Vaughan expressed that despite the potential added costs of in-building mix, better social outcomes can be provided to tenants living in mixed buildings, and the many residents of TCH buildings that have expressed support for in-building mix should not be ignored by planners and politicians. Vaughan sees the barriers to in-building mix as being the result of ideological opposition, on one hand, from the private sector, who generally want to minimize and segregate public housing from private, and on the other hand, from politicians and public officials, who want to preserve tenant-only spaces and maximize the amount of public housing constructed, but at the expense of the quality and integration of the housing (A. Vaughan, personal communication, March 13, 2017).

The key to successfully providing in-building mix through public housing revitalization, said Vaughan and several other participants, is to find middle ground between private and public sector perspectives, which Daniels has consistently attempted to do (e.g., A. Vaughan, personal communication, March 13, 2017; K. Greenberg, personal communication, December 21, 2016; J. Gladki, personal communication, January 12, 2017). Housing policies, such as the Condo Act, can be changed, and funding mechanisms can be created to overcome the existing barriers to in-building mix, according to these participants. Opposition to these changes comes from an unwillingness by factions in both the public and private sectors. It is imperative that these barriers be overcome at Regent Park and on future projects, considering that the justification for conducting public housing revitalization is to improve social mix. While the benefits of social mix have been overestimated by some, positive outcomes have nonetheless been detected at Regent Park, such as reduced stigma of local residents and decreased criminal activity (Dunn, 2012; Rowe & Dunn, 2015). By not moving forward with in-building mix, the full benefits of social mixing may not be realized, and the reasons used to justify public housing revitalization therefore might not be maximized.
8.6 Conclusion

Chapter Eight has addressed the second primary research objective of this thesis, which is to understand the Regent Park revitalization within the context of Toronto-specific policy and real estate development practices. Where much of previous study of the revitalization has analyzed the project as a continuation of public housing redevelopment in the US, this thesis sought to examine the revitalization through the lens of a primarily local context.

This thesis used a Toronto-specific lens to understand the revitalization apart from US public housing redevelopment efforts and housing policies. Mixed-income revitalization in the US since the 1990s (discussed in Chapter Three) has taken place within a historical mistreatment of black families living in public housing (as well as countless other issues dating back to plantation slavery). This legacy has included: the displacement of black households from inner-city neighbourhoods to create public housing projects between 1940s and 1960s, the subsequent segregation of generations of black families within these projects, and the displacement of black households from inner-city projects to peripheral neighbourhoods to facilitate mixed-income revitalization since the 1990s. The displacement of black households by mixed-income revitalization in the US is the result, in part, of housing policies that do not guarantee the right-of-return of public housing tenants to revitalized communities or the one-to-one replacement of demolished public housing units. The absence of such policies reflects and reinforces socio-cultural values in the US, such as a distrust of government and a privileging of personal accountability (discussed in greater detail Chapter Four). Socio-cultural values differ in Canada, potentially engendering a divergent housing policy regime relative to the US. The Regent Park revitalization therefore has taken place within a development context that is not identical to the US: the right-of-return was guaranteed to Regent Park tenants, and the public housing units that were demolished were required to be replaced on a one-to-one basis. This chapter has attempted to consider the revitalization outside of the US context, and instead within the Toronto- and Canada-specific traditions of housing, planning, and development policies and practices.
In seeking to understand the impact of the local context on the Regent Park revitalization, Chapter Eight addressed two overarching questions:

1. Which kinds of location-specific variables induced and informed the characteristics and outcomes of the Regent Park revitalization? and,

2. What lessons can be learned about the local context in which the revitalization is taking place that could be applied to similar housing redevelopment projects elsewhere?

To answer these questions, the chapter started with a discussion of several aspects of the historical and contemporary urban planning and real estate development contexts in Toronto identified by interview participants as influencing the Regent Park revitalization (Section 8.1). According to participants, Canadian socio-cultural values, such as the acceptance of people from diverse backgrounds and support for a social safety net, made it more possible for proponents of the revitalization to obtain public approval of mixed-income public housing redevelopment. Historical urban planning and development practices in Toronto, highlighted by the mixed-income St. Lawrence development in the 1970s, also facilitated the conception of the Regent Park revitalization. Prior experience with mixed-income development in Toronto offered lessons and provided a blueprint for the Regent Park master plan, such as the mixing of tenures and community consultation, though several differences between St. Lawrence and Regent Park were noted, including lower public funding availability, the need to integrate non-residential uses, and higher building heights and densities for the Regent Park revitalization. The differences between St. Lawrence and Regent Park are the result, in part, of the transition to contemporary development practices in Toronto, which were also cited by participants as heavily affecting the outcomes of the Regent Park revitalization. Real estate demand in Toronto has been far higher over the previous 25 years than it was in the 1970s, driven by significant immigration to the city. As a result, building heights and densities are far higher at Regent Park, giving rise to concerns that the resulting “tower neighbourhood” may not be as architecturally inviting to both residents
and outsiders compared to the lauded mid-rise St. Lawrence development. Despite these concerns, Regent Park is now well-served by public amenities, such as the Regent Park Athletic Grounds and the Daniels Spectrum, careful planning policies have generally ensured that architectural best practices are followed on the site, and building densities and heights are at a similar scale to other development taking place in Toronto. In a large city with a somewhat healthy real estate market, the scale of Regent Park could be emulated at future public housing revitalization efforts, as greater density for market housing provides more income for public housing replacement and better opportunities to create public amenities as part of the redevelopment process.

Chapter Eight then analyzed the favourable political climate surrounding the Regent Park revitalization (Section 8.2). According to several participants, the redevelopment would likely not have taken place without the creation of TCH in 2002, as the newly-formed public housing agency was more politically progressive, autonomous, and powerful compared to its predecessor organizations. The support of Mayor David Miller (2003-2010) and Toronto City Council for TCH’s plans emboldened revitalization efforts, providing funding, operational support, and political backing to advance the redevelopment and ensure that the interests of public housing tenants were protected. The political momentum generated in the early stages of the revitalization allowed the project to carry on despite active opposition from Mayor Rob Ford (2010-2014) and tepid support from Mayor John Tory (2014-Present). To replicate the successful aspects of the revitalization, politicians and housing providers should focus on the social aspects of redevelopment, not simply the economic or business-case concerns. In doing so, those in charge of future potential revitalization efforts are ensuring that public housing tenants, often the most in-need members of the community, are of highest concern, even if individual decisions, such as rebuilding the Regent Park Community Centre, do not provide the highest short-term fiscal rewards. Providing positive outcomes for community members, such as community centres or employment opportunities, ensure that a project is viewed by the public as a net benefit, thereby helping revitalization efforts withstand potential political opposition.
This chapter also sought to understand the effect of municipal and provincial planning, housing, and community development policies and strategies on Regent Park (Section 8.3). The public policy context surrounding the revitalization exerted considerable influence on project outcomes. Interview participants discussed that while there are no highly-specific public housing revitalization guidelines in Toronto, TCH, municipal, and provincial guidelines provided broad support for the redevelopment efforts. Toronto Community Housing’s internal policies and corporate mandate offered a degree of support to the organization’s planners and executives in conceptualizing the revitalization, as TCH strives to provide accessible, safe, and vibrant housing to residents from diverse backgrounds. These objectives are strongly represented in the Regent Park revitalization plans. Existing policies and tools in the provincial Planning Act (1990) available to City planners allowed for the redevelopment to achieve its urban planning objectives. Participants discussed how elements of the Planning Act, such as built form zoning requirements, master planning, and creating a plan of subdivision, were deployed with success at Regent Park.

The municipal Official Plan (2002) also offered broad support for the revitalization, since the Plan calls for several objectives emulated at Regent Park, including community consultation, provision of public amenities, and housing of individuals from diverse backgrounds. From a housing policy perspective, the Official Plan mandates the one-for-one replacement of public housing units and avoidance of permanent relocation or onerous temporary relocation for public housing tenants, and strongly encourages mixed-use and mixed-income development. Community development initiatives pursued at the municipal level supported and modelled the redevelopment strategies at Regent Park, such as creating employment opportunities and public amenities in low-income neighbourhoods. Where policies to guide the revitalization were absent, planners described how the existing policy framework provided opportunities to “innovate”, such as using Holding Provisions to restrict development until housing and public amenity provisions were met. Provincial smart growth plans, such as the Places to Grow Act (2005) and Greenbelt Act (2005), did not directly influence the revitalization, according to participants, as immigration-driven intensification in Toronto was already a powerful force by the mid-2000s when the plans were passed, and the Official Plan
had already laid the groundwork for infill projects similar to the Regent Park revitalization. Ultimately, the revitalization took place within a unique policy context, but there is potential for lessons from the revitalization to be applied to similar projects taking place in Toronto and other cities looking to improve public housing tenant outcomes through revitalization. Where real estate markets are adequate, larger cities can likely emulate the Toronto policy context by enacting policies that encourage high built form densities, income mixing, land use mixing, public amenity provision, and architectural excellence.

This chapter then discussed the economic context of the Regent Park revitalization and the feasibility of emulating the project outside of the strong real estate market in Toronto (Section 8.4). Regent Park is centrally located in the city and highly-accessible by public transportation, giving it high real estate value in an already booming Toronto market. Public housing sites in locations outside of the downtown area of Toronto, or in cities without as strong a real estate market, may not have these elements in their favour, but the social objectives of the Regent Park revitalization may be emulated at other sites. Creating a social development plan, consulting with public housing tenants and the neighbouring communities, building public amenity spaces, promoting spatial integration with surrounding neighbourhoods, and avoiding large-scale tenant relocation are lessons from Regent Park that can be applied to many other public housing revitalization efforts. In Toronto, TCH has applied some of these lessons to revitalization projects that have followed Regent Park, such as emulating the extensive community consultation process and eliminating temporary relocation. Toronto Community Housing has failed in certain respects, however, to emulate the Regent Park revitalization at successive projects, and the implications associated with these failures were also discussed in this chapter. Some issues with more recent TCH projects disclosed by participants include: master plans that do not provide adequate integration with surrounding communities; approval only of phases, not entire projects; suburban-style built form and planning practices; and the prioritizing of public opinion over best practices in urban planning. Participants cautioned that continued failure to build on the Regent Park revitalization in these ways means that future mixed-income redevelopment projects may not provide as robustly positive social outcomes for low-income tenants.
This chapter concluded by addressing one of the strongest critiques of the Regent Park revitalization: that public housing units and market condominiums are not integrated within the same buildings (Section 8.5). The absence of in-building mix means that the benefits of social mixing, such as territorial destigmatization and reduction of criminal activity, are not maximized. Participants detailed the reasons behind the lack of in-building mix at Regent Park with an aim to understanding how barriers to in-building mix can be overcome in the later stages of the revitalization and future mixed-income redevelopment projects. Barriers to in-building mix noted by participants included: a lack of public funding; housing policy barriers, most notably, to the ownership of market condos by public housing agencies in Ontario; diseconomies of scale for TCH associated with the construction, operation, and maintenance of dispersed public housing units; and potential loss of public control over the creation of low-income units. A lack of political will is the root cause of an inability to overcome these barriers, however, considering that policies can be changed, funding mechanisms can be created, and private sector developers can be more strongly mandated by governments to provide public housing units. Regardless of the barriers noted, it is imperative that in-building mix continues to be pursued at Regent Park and at public housing redevelopment projects in Toronto and elsewhere, despite the potential additional costs.

Over the course of efforts to better understand the impact of the local development context on public housing revitalization, an overriding conclusion of this research became clear: due to the revitalization taking place within Canada, as opposed to the US, the Regent Park revitalization is likely to be far more beneficial, overall, to public housing tenants than similar redevelopment efforts in the US. While critiques of the revitalization are very important to improving project outcomes, these criticisms often stem from the idea that the Regent Park revitalization is a continuation of mixed-income redevelopment in the US. The differences between housing revitalization at Regent Park and in the US are significant, and they justified an analysis of the project primarily from a local perspective. In providing this perspective, this thesis has been able to understand the Regent Park revitalization in a manner that much of the previous research has not.
9 Conclusion

This thesis has studied the ongoing revitalization of Regent Park, a public housing complex in downtown Toronto, Ontario. This chapter, Chapter Nine, first summarizes the content of this thesis, including the purpose, objectives, background, and methodology for the research (Section 9.1). The findings from the previous two chapters, Chapters Seven and Eight, are then reviewed in this chapter (Section 9.2). Chapter Nine also presents recommendations based on the thesis’ findings (Section 9.3), describes the limitations of the research (Section 9.4), identifies potential avenues for future research (Section 9.5), and highlights this thesis’ contributions to existing research (Section 9.6). The chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance and implications of the approach and findings of this research (Section 9.7).

9.1 Purpose, Objectives, Background, and Methodology

Construction on the Regent Park revitalization began in 2006, following an agreement between the City public housing provider, Toronto Community Housing, and Daniels, a private condominium developer, to revitalize Regent Park through a public-private partnership.Completion of the revitalization is expected in 2025, at which point 2000 existing public housing units will have been rebuilt, 5500 new market housing units will have been constructed, and a series of public spaces and amenities will be added to Regent Park, including an aquatic centre, an arts-and-cultural hub, and parks and athletic grounds. With the project approximately halfway completed, this thesis has sought to contribute to the growing body of research on the revitalization in an effort to apply the findings toward improving the outcomes of revitalization at Regent Park and other public housing sites in Toronto and other cities undergoing 3P redevelopment.

Most of the existing research into the Regent Park revitalization has focused on the perspectives of public housing tenants involved in the neighbourhood (e.g., August & Walks, 2011). Based on tenants’ perspectives, prior research has generally characterized the revitalization as a continuation of mixed-income
redevelopment in the United States since the 1990s (e.g., Silver, 2011). However, study into the revitalization has yet to provide a comprehensive understanding the revitalization from the perspective of the public-private development partnership between TCH and Daniels. At the same time, existing research has not studied the revitalization using Canada and Toronto as the primary geographic lens of analysis. This thesis, therefore, intended to fill these gaps in the research by pursuing two primary research objectives.

The first objective was to provide insights into public housing revitalization from the point-of-view of individuals involved in the public-private development process at Regent Park. In pursuing this objective, this thesis aimed to complement existing study of residents’ perspectives of the revitalization with information gathered from industry professionals in the public and private sectors involved in the redevelopment process.

The second objective was to understand the influence of the local policy and development context on the mixed-income revitalization of Regent Park, using Toronto as the primary lens of geographic analysis. In contrast to existing abstractions of the revitalization as a continuation of US-style redevelopment in the literature, this thesis acknowledged the differences between Canada and the US in terms of history, culture, politics, and planning and housing development policies and practices. To pursue the second objective, two research questions were generated that this thesis sought to answer:

1. Which kinds of location-specific variables and events induced the recent Regent Park revitalization and informed the characteristics and outcomes of the revitalization process? and,

2. What lessons can be learned about the local context in which the revitalization is taking place that could be applied to similar housing redevelopment projects elsewhere?

To address these objectives, this thesis first provided background information and reviewed relevant literature to provide context for this research. Chapter Two addressed 3Ps, summarizing the history and definition of 3Ps and reviewing the use of 3Ps in Canada, including their use for housing development.
Chapter Three made the case for examining Regent Park outside of the American context by discussing the differences between Canada and the US. The first portion of Chapter Three reviewed broad comparisons of Canadian and American cities in the literature, determining that, despite similar spatial systems, population growth, and upward-trending economies, cities in Canada experience somewhat less racial and economic segregation and are better able to coordinate regional policy implementation relative to their American counterparts. The latter portion of Chapter Three contrasted historic and contemporary public housing practices in Canada and the US, demonstrating that, while support from higher levels of government for public housing has varied over time in both countries, housing policies have been more inclusionary and less likely to displace low-income tenants in Toronto compared to American cities.

Chapter Four described the unique policy and development context in Toronto with greater detail. The chapter began with a summary of the history, political framework, and socio-cultural character of the city, and proceeded to a discussion of historic and contemporary housing development practices in Toronto.

Chapter Five focused on Regent Park, beginning with a summary of the history of the neighbourhood before proceeding to an overview of the urban planning policy rationale for the revitalization efforts. The chapter concluded with a review of the characterizations of Regent Park and similar mixed-income revitalization projects in the literature, allowing for an identification of openings in the existing study of the revitalization to guide the research agenda for this thesis.

Chapter Six outlined the qualitative, mixed-methods approach used for the thesis. The methodology included a document review and 22 semi-structured interviews with 25 public and private sector professionals currently or previously involved in the revitalization, which was analyzed using elements of urban planning policy analysis outlined by Patton et al. (2013).
9.2 Findings

The document review and interview process generated several findings about the Regent Park revitalization and recommendations for future mixed-income redevelopment projects. These findings and recommendations were presented in greater detail in Chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis, and can be summarized as follows.

Chapter Seven addressed themes related to the public-private development process at Regent Park. The chapter began by summarizing the earliest attempts to revitalize the neighbourhood in the mid-1990s. Archival research conducted for this thesis, building on Nicholson’s (2012) analysis of the requests for proposals issued to redevelop Regent Park between 1997 and 2005, showed that early revitalization efforts failed because of insufficient political will and institutional capacity at the government housing agencies responsible for Regent Park (Section 7.1). In 2005, TCH selected Daniels as its private sector partner at Regent Park, with both partners soon reaching an agreement to establish a “true partnership” that allowed both parties to receive a fair share of the rewards of the revitalization, while also recognizing that, as the first mixed-income project in Toronto, involvement in the project would be highly risky for Daniels (Sections 7.2 and 7.3) (Nicholson, 2012).

The interview process for this thesis revealed that TCH decided to end the “true partnership” with Daniels in 2012 (Section 7.4). Potentially in response to political pressure from City Hall, TCH terminated the joint development partnership used for phases one and two of the revitalization, switching instead to using a series of land transactions for the remaining phases. The joint venture had been created so that TCH and Daniels could share the costs of construction, while also splitting the profits from the condominiums sold at Regent Park. According to most research participants, the joint venture had been successful for TCH. Despite the upfront investment in the construction, the profits from the condo sales were far higher than anticipated, allowing TCH to cover most of the costs of replacing public housing on the site. The switch to land transactions, which provided TCH with income from the sale of land to Daniels upfront while allowing Daniels
to realize all of the condo sale profits, was generally characterized in a negative light by participants. While the decision reduced the financial risks to TCH of a downturn in the local real estate market, the trade-off has disproportionately reduced the rewards of the revitalization process for the housing agency, as TCH has been less able to cover housing replacement costs and there is now a slight misalignment of interests between the agency and Daniels. Overall, the joint development partnership for phases one and two was likely a more effective method of conducting public housing revitalization compared to the land transactions used for phase three.

As part of TCH’s decision in 2012 to switch to using land transactions, the housing agency also rescinded their commitment to partner with Daniels on all five phases of the project, instead only guaranteeing the partnership for the first three phases. Interview participants similarly offered criticism of TCH for this decision, asserting, instead, that it may be more advantageous for public housing providers to partner with a single, master developer for mixed-income revitalization projects (Section 7.5). In contrast to past research on 3Ps (e.g., Stainback, 2000), participants were in wide agreement that a single, master developer is better able to promote social development objectives than multiple, smaller developers for three primary reasons:

1. Master developers are often larger developers, who are more effective in facilitating socio-economic integration through the mixing of land uses because they have more experience, more expertise, and stronger relationships with the private sector to attract commercial tenants;

2. A master developer can adopt a wide-angle view of revitalization, making decisions for each site and phase that will benefit the project as-a-whole, whereas multiple developers will each make decisions that maximize returns of the individual sites they are responsible for, potentially to the detriment of the rest of the project; and,
3. A master developer is more accountable to a housing agency and public housing tenants because the financial and social objectives of mixed-income revitalization are connected: social development in a public housing neighbourhood, such as reduced crime, better living conditions, and more public amenities, increase the value of market housing sold by the developer in that neighbourhood.

The second and third reasons for using a master developer can also be interpreted as reasons for using a joint development venture instead of land transactions (as discussed in Section 7.4). A developer that is both the sole partner for a public agency and has entered into a joint venture with that agency is similarly incentivized to take a wide-angle view of revitalization and promote both social and financial objectives of a project, since the social development outcomes for the public sector and the profit-seeking objectives for the private sector are inseparable when both parties have an equal stake in the risks and rewards of mixed-income revitalization. The benefits for a public housing provider in using a joint venture with a single, master developer to conduct mixed-income revitalization suggests that public housing 3Ps may require a different approach than 3Ps used for other infrastructure projects, such as building hospitals or wastewater facilities.

Chapter Seven concluded by addressing whether other private sector developers are capable of emulating Daniels’ involvement at Regent Park, since the firm has been described as “arguably…the most socially conscious” of all private developers in Toronto (Rosen, 2016, p. 13) (Section 7.6). Participants were mixed in their responses to this question, as most private developers in Toronto and other western cities do not typically incorporate social development into their corporate missions to as strong a degree as Daniels. Employees at Daniels, however, were far more optimistic that other firms can embrace social development, since the financial benefits of gaining access to previously inaccessible public housing land is a strong incentive to pursue social objectives. These findings suggest that many private developers are capable of providing social development objectives, but public agencies must make private sector involvement in mixed-income revitalization contingent on doing so.
Chapter Eight discussed Regent Park within the local development and policy context in Toronto. The findings from the chapter were the result of an attempt to answer two overarching questions, namely:

1. Which kinds of location-specific variables induced and informed the characteristics and outcomes of the Regent Park revitalization? and,

2. What lessons can be learned about the local context in which the revitalization is taking place that could be applied to similar housing redevelopment projects elsewhere?

The first section of Chapter Eight addressed these questions by discussing the impact of historical and contemporary aspects of the urban planning and real estate development context in Toronto on the revitalization (Section 8.1). These factors included: socio-cultural values in Canada, public housing practices in Toronto, urban planning in Toronto, and contemporary development practices (for example, the height and density of recent development). This thesis found that industry professionals generally believe that Canadians’ acceptance of diverse peoples and support for a social safety net, the history of income mixing in Toronto, and current planning and development practices that favour higher-density construction, were all factors that influenced the creation and outcomes of the Regent Park revitalization.

In the second section of Chapter Eight, findings from the interview process with respect to the political climate surrounding the Regent Park revitalization were presented (Section 8.2). According to participants, the revitalization likely would not have taken place without the creation of TCH in 2002. Additionally, it was determined that support from Toronto City Hall in the early stages of the revitalization generated political momentum that may have allowed to the project to weather opposition from future City leadership.

The influence of the public policy context surrounding the revitalization was explored in the third section of Chapter Eight (Section 8.3). This section summarized research findings related to the influence of municipal and provincial urban planning, housing, and community development policies on the Regent Park
revitalization. It was determined that while there were few policies specific to public housing revitalization within existing government policies, TCH’s corporate policies, policies and urban planning tools in the provincial Planning Act (1990), and municipal urban planning, housing, and community development policies, all lent broad support to the revitalization of Regent Park. And, in contrast to the findings by Rosen (2016), this thesis found that provincial smart growth policies from the mid-2000s probably did not exert direct influence on the revitalization or intensification efforts more broadly in Toronto, since immigration-driven intensification, emboldened by infill-friendly development policies in Toronto’s Official Plan (2002), was already taking place in the city before smart growth policies were introduced.

Chapter Eight then addressed the economic context surrounding the Regent Park revitalization (Section 8.4). These findings were based on participants’ perspectives on the feasibility of emulating the project at other sites within Toronto or in cities other than Toronto. Regent Park benefits from Toronto’s profitable real estate market, central location, and strong connectivity with various transportation networks. While other public housing communities may not be located in as advantageous economic contexts, the social development objectives of Regent Park, such as conducting extensive community consultation and providing various public amenities, can possibly be emulated on future revitalization projects. Participants cautioned, however, that, due to TCH’s decision to switch to land transactions and move away from using a single, master developer at Regent Park and successive revitalization efforts, the housing agency risks failing to match the social development outcomes observed at Regent Park for their other public housing tenants affected by mixed-income revitalization.

The concluding section of Chapter Eight addressed the lack of in-building mix at Regent Park, one of the most prominent critiques of the revitalization efforts (Section 8.5). The lack of in-building mix means that the potential benefits of social mix, such as destigmatization and reduced criminal activity, may not be maximized. Participants made note of the various roadblocks to providing in-building mix, including a lack of public funding, housing policy barriers, diseconomies of scale for TCH, and potential loss of control over the construction of public housing units. Despite these potential limitations, participants asserted that
overcoming the roadblocks to providing in-building mix, such as changing policies and securing adequate funding, can likely be achieved with sufficient political will. While this has yet to occur in Toronto, it is imperative that the pursuit of in-building mix continues.

9.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings from this thesis, the following recommendations could be applied to current or proposed 3P, public housing revitalization projects in Toronto or similar western cities:

1. Public housing agencies may find more success by using joint development partnerships, not land transactions, to conduct mixed-income revitalization;

2. Public housing agencies might conduct more successful mixed-income revitalization projects by partnering with a single, master developer, not multiple, smaller developers;

3. Public housing agencies should only select private sector partners willing to fully embrace social development objectives;

4. A middle- to high-rise built form should be used for mixed-income redevelopment where real estate market factors allow, as it balances the architectural and environmental aesthetic of mid-rise construction with the financial capacity for public housing replacement attained by selling market condos in high-rise “density carrying” towers;

5. Political will and institutional capacity at the onset of a project, coupled with fair 3P agreements, generates strong political momentum for mixed-income revitalization that may allow a project to weather future public opposition;
6. Public housing agencies in cities similar to Toronto, i.e. larger urban centres with reasonably strong real estate markets, should attempt to emulate aspects of the Toronto policy context that exerted a positive influence on the Regent Park revitalization, such as promoting a middle- to high-rise built form, income mixing, mixing of land uses, social service provision, and architectural excellence;

7. Social development objectives of the Regent Park revitalization, such as conducting extensive community consultation and providing several public amenities and services, should be pursued as strongly as possible at future public housing redevelopment projects, despite less favourable economic factors surrounding such projects; and,

8. In-building tenure mix should continue to be pursued in mixed-income revitalization projects and residential development at-large, despite apparent policy roadblocks.

9.4 Limitations of the Research

As with any research, the findings and recommendations in this thesis have been limited by temporal, spatial, methodological, and structural constraints. This thesis has been conceived during a discrete moment in time; while it can be assumed that its findings and recommendations will be applicable in the present and near- to mid-future, unanticipated developments or radical changes in the development framework informing the Regent Park revitalization could diminish the applicability of this thesis. In a similar sense, while this thesis is intended for application in other western cities besides Toronto, it is fair to concede that the findings are most relevant for the location in which the revitalization is taking place.

Methodology also presents inherent limitations to the depth and breadth of research. Strong efforts were made to interview a diverse range of industry professionals for this thesis, but the findings generated from the interview process are constrained by the reality that the participants represent only a sample of those involved in the Regent Park revitalization process. The semi-structured nature of the interviews
provided flexibility that allowed for discussions to focus on areas in which participants were best able to contribute to the thesis, though a lack of pure standardization across the questions asked to participants may have allowed for a degree of inconsistency to responses. While not intended by this thesis (and effectively impossible), a quantitative, highly-structured interpretation and analysis of the interview data did not take place. And, since participants were selected because of their involvement in the Regent Park revitalization, they may have provided unreasonably positive (or negative) responses to questions asked of them due to optimistic (or pessimistic) interpretations of their personal experiences, or their own self-interest.

Structurally, this thesis has intended to be one of the first efforts to examine the Regent Park revitalization from the public-private development perspective and within the Toronto policy and development context. Out of necessity, this thesis has been exploratory in its methodology and broad in its analysis. A deeper understanding of the themes discussed in this thesis could be provided through additional research of the Regent Park revitalization in the future.

9.5 Future Research

Future avenues of research could expand upon several themes examined in this thesis. Additional exploration of the public-private development process could focus on other mixed-income revitalization projects in Toronto that were touched on briefly in this thesis, including Alexandra Park in downtown west Toronto and Lawrence Heights in the borough of North York. Future research could compare development experiences and outcomes across revitalization sites in Toronto, or between Toronto and other western cities. Alternatively, research could compare public and private sector experiences of mixed-income revitalization.

Additional analysis of Regent Park or other public housing sites within the Toronto policy and development context would provide a deeper understanding of the local factors informing mixed-income redevelopment in the city. Possible future research could consider several aspects of the local development context in greater depth or more broadly, such as urban planning policy, real estate market factors, or the
influence of political actors. Alternatively, future research could look beyond Toronto, by providing a richer comparison of Toronto and US housing redevelopment frameworks, or by adopting a wider geographic lens, for example, by examining public redevelopment across regional, provincial, or national contexts.

When considering both the conclusions and potential areas for future research in this thesis, questions inevitably arise about the feasibility of applying the findings and recommendations of this research in other cities or countries. A natural extension of this research, therefore, would be to assess the viability of adapting the lessons learned from the thesis to other locations currently embracing mixed-income housing revitalization projects. Potential future research projects could assess the feasibility of applying these findings to smaller cities in Canada, other countries with different planning and development policy frameworks, or areas with weaker real estate markets. Potential projects could also determine the viability of adapting positive aspects of the Toronto housing and planning policy context, such as the mandatory one-to-one replacement of public housing units during revitalization, to other locations. Ultimately, there are several areas for future research that could be informed by the conclusions of this thesis.

9.6 Contribution to the Literature

This thesis has made several contributions to the study of 3Ps and mixed-income redevelopment. This thesis has expanded on existing studies of 3Ps (e.g., Stainback, 2000), which already have increasingly focused on the applicability of 3Ps in Canada (e.g., Boardman et al., 2016), in some cases for land development (e.g., McKellar & Gordon, 2007), but not on public housing revitalization to a significant degree. This thesis also contributed to the growing body of literature that has focused on the Regent Park revitalization. This thesis expanded the diversity of conceptualizations of the project by interviewing industry professionals (as opposed to public housing tenants). The thesis also examined the revitalization within the Toronto policy and development context. In exploring the development process behind the Regent Park revitalization, this thesis built on the work of Nicholson (2012), who focused almost exclusively on the series of RFPs to redevelop
Regent Park between 1997 and 2005. The thesis also provided depth to the development process perspectives touched on by Kelly (2015), who had conducted interviews not only with Daniels employees, but also TCH staff and both public and market housing residents. Where most of the previous research has focused on the perspectives of public housing tenants at Regent Park (e.g., August & Walks, 2011), this thesis instead focused on the experiences of public and private sector employees directly or currently involved in the revitalization process, including developers, urban planners, and politicians.

By adopting Toronto as the geographic lens of analysis of the Regent Park revitalization, this thesis has intended to compliment research that has characterized the project as taking place within US housing redevelopment frameworks (e.g., Silver, 2011). The thesis has also sought to build on work that has studied the revitalization from an inductive lens, that, by nature of the project taking place in Toronto, has not adopted a US-centric perspective, but has not explicitly applied a Toronto lens of analysis to the revitalization (e.g., Kelly, 2015; James, 2010). In particular, this thesis expanded on studies of the political climate surrounding redevelopment (e.g., Kelly, 2015; August, 2014), Rowe and Dunn’s (2015) analysis of place destigmatization at Regent Park, Kelly’s (2015) discussion of in-building mix within the local policy context, Rosen’s (2016) discussion of Daniels as a socially-conscious developer, and Rosen and Walks’ (2015) study of the influence of provincial growth policies on private developers’ decisions, which, according to participants, was not as strong a factor as it has been described in the literature.

9.7 Significance of this Research

The research conducted in this thesis, and all research into the Regent Park revitalization and mixed-income redevelopment, is of considerable significance given the poor state of public housing in Canada and other western nations. In Toronto, over 82,000 households are currently on the waiting list for public housing (Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association, 2016), and TCH is facing a $1.73 billion funding shortfall for repairs to its housing portfolio (TCH, 2017e). Limited availability of public funding for housing has led to housing
agencies increasingly employing 3Ps to redevelop or expand public housing complexes (Bridge et al., 2011). Toronto Community Housing, for example, has recently completed or initiated ten 3P revitalization projects, including Regent Park (TCH, 2017)). Research into mixed-income redevelopment, therefore, is necessary for ensuring that the continued use of this method of public housing revitalization delivers the best possible outcomes for housing agencies, private developers, and most importantly, the public housing tenants affected by redevelopment projects.

With the Regent Park revitalization currently around the halfway point of completion (as of May 2017), opportunities to learn from the revitalization are increasingly presenting themselves. As the first large-scale example of mixed-income redevelopment in Canada, the Regent Park revitalization offers several lessons to future redevelopment efforts, especially large projects like TCH’s Lawrence Heights revitalization in North York, a suburban borough of Toronto. This thesis has outlined how much of the existing research of Regent Park, and the lessons and recommendations provided by that research, has centred around the experiences and perspectives of public housing tenants, while conceptualizing the revitalization as a continuation of US-style mixed-income redevelopment. Previous study of the Regent Park revitalization has offered several critiques of the project based on concerns expressed by tenants, while also highlighting the negative aspects of mixed-income redevelopment in the US adopted at Regent Park. These critiques have been essential to improving project outcomes, such as changes to tenant temporary relocation program that reduced disruptions to affected tenants.

It is also important, however, to examine the revitalization from a diversity of perspectives. This thesis has intended to expand this diversity by analyzing the revitalization from the point-of-view of the industry professionals involved in the public-private redevelopment process. The thesis also adopted a geographic lens of analysis that differs from previous US-centric characterizations of Regent Park, namely, by examining the revitalization primarily within a Canada- and Toronto-centric policy and development framework. Assuming different positions from which to assess the revitalization is important for learning new lessons and eliciting a new set of recommendations about the project that can be applied at Regent Park, as
well as other public housing sites in Toronto or other western cities. The experiences of public housing tenants differ from industry professionals involved at Regent Park, but exploring both perspectives leads to findings and recommendations that can positively affect both groups. Similarly, there are several differences between Canada and the US in terms of policy and development frameworks. By acknowledging these differences and examining the revitalization using Toronto as the primary geographic lens of analysis, this thesis has developed a stronger understanding of the way in which these differences have been expressed at Regent Park. Doing so has generated a new set of lessons and recommendations for public housing revitalization within Toronto, while also discerning which aspects of the Toronto context could be emulated in other places, including the US.

Ultimately, the significance of this research is predicated on an acknowledgement of the importance of understanding different perspectives and ways of conceptualizing a given topic. In approaching the Regent Park revitalization from a perspective unique to the existing literature, this thesis has endeavoured to grow the geographic understanding of the revitalization and present new findings and recommendations that might improve the outcomes of 3P, mixed-income redevelopment in the future.
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Appendix A: A Note About Terminology: “Affordable”, “Social”, “Subsidized”, and “Public” Housing

There are various types of housing (for example, market versus public), and there are various terms used to describe the same or similar types of housing (“public” versus “subsidized”). As such, it is important to establish and describe the terms for housing used throughout this thesis and conceptualize these housing descriptions within the context of the variety of shelter and housing options available to persons living in Canada. Housing exists on a continuum in Canada, with those most in immediate need of housing on one end and those most able to supply their own housing on the other (see Figure A) (CMHC, 2016). Temporary emergency shelters, for example, which are municipally-run shelters used by the homeless during extreme weather events, are at the most in-need end of the continuum, while private market rental and ownership housing, for example, such as condominiums sold by private developers, are at the end of the spectrum where individuals are most able to afford and provide their own housing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency Shelters</th>
<th>Transitional Housing</th>
<th>Supportive Housing</th>
<th>Subsidized Housing</th>
<th>Market Rental Housing</th>
<th>Market Homeownership Housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Figure A. Housing continuum in Canada, with most in-need housing increasing toward left (CMHC, 2016).*

**Affordable housing** is a broad term that includes housing supplied by the private, public, and non-profit sectors, as well as different types of housing tenure, such as ownership, co-operative ownership, or rental (CMHC, 2016). The defining characteristic of affordable housing is that it is more “affordable” relative to other housing in a particular market, but there is wide variability in terms of the definition of “affordable” used (for example, rental housing that is fully subsidized by government versus market ownership priced slightly below the average price in an area) and way in which affordability is achieved (for example, government provides rental subsidy versus private sector sells condominium units at more broadly attainable
prices). Affordable housing encompasses many parts of the housing continuum, from emergency shelters to private rental or market housing (CMHC, 2016).

In Canada, **affordable rental housing** includes rental housing provided by the private, public, and non-profit sectors that receives full or partial rent subsidies from government coffers (CHMC, 2016). Affordable rental housing in Toronto is specifically defined as housing where the total shelter costs per month (including rent and essential utilities) for a unit with a given number of bedrooms is equal to or below one times the average rent in the City of Toronto, as updated annually by CMHC (City of Toronto, 2005a).

**Public housing** is a type of affordable rental housing. Also referred to as “social” or “subsidized” housing, public housing is specifically defined in Toronto as rental housing owned by TCH or on behalf of TCH to provide accommodation to low- to moderate-income persons (City of Toronto, 2005a). In Ontario, the provincial or municipal governments allocate funding to local housing providers (for example, TCH in Toronto) on a subsidy-per-unit basis at a range of subsidy levels. For example, many units are subsidized such that the renters pay 60% or 80% of local average rent. The highest subsidies are provided for **rent-g geared-to-income housing**, where the rent paid by a resident is entirely determined by their monthly income and ability to pay, with the use of these units generally restricted to those at the lowest income levels (Government of Ontario, 2014). Many of the large-scale housing projects built in Toronto around the middle of the 20th century are comprised exclusively of RGI units (Suttor, 2016). Before the revitalization process was initiated at Regent Park, all the units on the site were RGI units, and as such, this thesis refers to RGI units whenever the terms “public”, “subsidized”, or “social” housing are used, unless otherwise noted.
Appendix B: “Gentrification” or “Revitalization” of Regent Park?

The Regent Park revitalization has been described as both “gentrification” and “revitalization” within public and academic discourse. In corporate press releases and most media publications, the project is referred to as a revitalization, as this is how the project has been conceptualized and branded by its leaders. In the academic realm, the project is sometimes characterized as gentrification, most often in the context of criticizing the project.

Gentrification can be described both narrowly and broadly; narrowly, in the sense that gentrification represents a series of actions undertaken by middle-income earners to renovate housing in traditionally low-income neighbourhoods, and broadly, in that gentrification is a product of wider demographic, social, and economic changes that are altered and reciprocated by gentrifying processes (Castree et al., 2013a).

More narrowly, gentrification has been defined as the renovation or upgrading and settlement of middle- and high-income households in older, downtown neighbourhoods generally occupied by low-income households (Ley, 2009). The social character of gentrified areas, including shops, restaurants, and open spaces, change to meet the needs of new residents. Building, planning, and tax code changes are also likely to accompany gentrifying processes (Castree et al., 2013a). More broadly, gentrification is seen as part of a shift from an industrial to a post-industrial economy in western nations during the latter half of the 20th century, which has resulted in the introduction or return of capital investment to certain urban areas, particularly in inner cities (Ley, 2009; Castree et al., 2013a; N. Smith, 1996). These changes have produced a cohort of service professionals attracted to the convenience and amenities of the inner city, compared to previous generations of middle-income earners that had moved to the suburbs (Ley, 2009).

Gentrification was first identified by Ruth Glass in London during the 1960s (Glass, 1964). “Pioneer” middle-income residents purchased old housing in historic inner-city neighbourhoods and renovated the housing using their own labour (Lees, 2012). In the 1970s, gentrifying processes were predominantly led by property developers, spreading into the United States and Canada, and affecting suburban and rural areas in
addition to cities. Gentrification was more organized under developers, with older properties undergoing renovation and new properties constructed in historical neighbourhoods (Lees, 2012). In the 1980s and 1990s, the main processes of gentrification were well-established in the US and Canada (Ley, 2009). More recent efforts are seen as extensions and intensifications of gentrification in new forms; for example, the conversion of factories to lofts, and often involve state-run organizations (Ley, 2009; N. Smith, 1996; Lees, 2012). Due to significant deindustrialization in the developed world, city governments have pursued forms of gentrification through redevelopment to reconfigure and improve the local economy and land use (Ley, 2009; N. Smith, 1996). Included in this strategy is the attempt to establish a “social mix”, where new, middle-income residents may live alongside their longer-term, low-income neighbours (Ley, 2009).

The positive and negative outcomes of gentrification are well-described in the literature and beyond the scope of this thesis, though a discussion of the implications of state-led gentrification takes place in Section 5.5.3, as the Regent Park redevelopment has been characterized as such. In general, the positive aspects of gentrification include new investment in areas requiring land use improvement, enhancement of the local tax base, and the creation of new (usually low-income) service jobs, such as restaurant servers (Ley, 2009). The significantly negative outcome of gentrification has been the loss of affordable downtown housing, ultimately resulting in the displacement of low-income households from the inner city (Bridge et al., 2011; Ley, 2009; Castree et al., 2013a).

“Revitalization”, as well as “redevelopment” and “regeneration”, are terms that have been used to describe land development that revitalizes the physical, economic, and social condition of an urban area (Basolo, 2005; Castree, 2013b). Redevelopment generally includes large-scale efforts to upgrade the inner core of a city, often with wide public support, in situations where at least one of the following conditions is met: 1) current land is underutilized, 2) the built environment is deteriorating, and 3) local economic opportunities are limited (Basolo, 2005). Redevelopment takes a variety of forms, but generally involves the replacement of the existing built environment with new uses or the rehabilitation of older buildings to preserve heritage value (Castree et al., 2013b).
In the late-1980s to early-1990s, revitalization was pursued more commonly at the state/provincial and city level due to a reduction in federal funding in the US and Canada for larger-scale urban renewal projects. Mixed-use redevelopment became popular, first, with downtown mall development in the 1980s and 1990s, and later with more general mixed-use projects (Vidal, 2012). In the 2000s, significant funds for redevelopment of public housing were made available by the US government for municipalities through the HOPE VI program. The use of 3Ps for redevelopment, which first emerged in the 1990s, became more widespread during the 2000s for larger-scale renewal projects in western cities (Basolo, 2005).

Overall, there has been a shift in the manner in which redevelopment efforts have been pursued. Early federal redevelopment projects in the US and Canada focused on improving housing conditions for low-income residents of a neighbourhood. More recently, city-led efforts to redevelop communities have instead placed a greater emphasis on economic development (Basolo, 2005).

Gentrification and revitalization are associated both with positive outcomes, such as growth of the local tax base, improved land utilization, and social mixing, and negative outcomes, such as displacement of low-income residents. The differences between gentrification and revitalization are identified in Table A:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gentrification</th>
<th>Revitalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Principal agents are individuals, to lesser degree, corporations</td>
<td>Government is principal agent; corporations may be partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development occurs with little intervention from government</td>
<td>Government must pursue development and assume associated costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvements in local/regional economic climate initiate development</td>
<td>Existing local land use and/or economic environment inhibit development without government initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An effort to improve the local economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slower, gradual process; multiple, small developments, e.g., detached home renovations</td>
<td>Quicker, sweeping; smaller number of large-scale developments, e.g., neighbourhood redevelopment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results in “social mix” without directed action</td>
<td>“Social mix” used as justification to pursue redevelopment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A. Differences between “gentrification and revitalization”.

237
The Regent Park redevelopment is an act of revitalization more than it is gentrification when comparing the processes used at Regent Park with the common aspects of redevelopment described in the literature, as seen in Table B:

Table B. Comparison of “revitalization” and the Regent Park revitalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revitalization</th>
<th>Regent Park</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government is principal agent; corporations may be partners</td>
<td>The City of Toronto is the principle agent, with Daniels and other corporations acting as partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government must pursue development and assume associated costs</td>
<td>City of Toronto initiated development, and has assumed many associated costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing local land use and/or economic environment inhibit development without government initiative</td>
<td>Would not have been possible to redevelop site to address social and economic issues without government involvement, as Regent Park is owned by City of Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An effort to improve the local economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quicker, sweeping; smaller number of large-scale developments, e.g., neighbourhood redevelopment</td>
<td>Revitalization is taking place over one large project designed to address issues that are neighbourhood-wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Social mix” used as justification to pursue redevelopment</td>
<td>“Social mix” has been used as justification to pursue redevelopment at Regent Park</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This thesis refers to the Regent Park project as “revitalization”, as opposed to gentrification, because of the strategies currently employed at Regent Park. However, this thesis also acknowledges the relationship between and the negative implications associated with these two terms. The most notable distinction at Regent Park, in contrast to many of the redevelopment efforts pursued in the US, is that the project will not result in the permanent displacement of existing residents because of housing policies that restrict government agencies and corporations from eliminating or relocating public housing units in Canada.
Appendix C: Research Ethics Board Clearance Letter

September 09, 2016

Mr. Trevor Robinson
Master’s Student
Department of Geography and Planning
Queen's University
Kingston, ON, K7L 3N6

GREB Ref #: GGEOLP-208-16; TRAQ # 6019114
Title: "GGEOLP-208-16 Public project, private developer: Understanding the impact of policy frameworks on the Regent Park housing redevelopment in Toronto, Ontario"

Dear Mr. Robinson:

The General Research Ethics Board (GREB), by means of a delegated board review, has cleared your proposal entitled "GGEOLP-208-16 Public project, private developer: Understanding the impact of policy frameworks on the Regent Park housing redevelopment in Toronto, Ontario" for ethical compliance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (TCPS 2 (2014)) and Queen's ethics policies. In accordance with the Tri-Council Guidelines (Article 6.14) and Standard Operating Procedures (405.001), your project has been cleared for one year. You are reminded of your obligation to submit an annual renewal form prior to the annual renewal due date (access this form at http://www.queensu.ca/traq/signon.html; click on "Events"; under "Create New Event" click on "General Research Ethics Board Annual Renewal/Closure Form for Cleared Studies"). Please note that when your research project is completed, you need to submit an Annual Renewal/Closure Form in Romeo/traq indicating that the project is 'completed' so that the file can be closed. This should be submitted at the time of completion; there is no need to wait until the annual renewal due date.

You are reminded of your obligation to advise the GREB of any adverse event(s) that occur during this one year period (access this form at http://www.queensu.ca/traq/signon.html; click on "Events"; under "Create New Event" click on "General Research Ethics Board Adverse Event Form"). An adverse event includes, but is not limited to, a complaint, a change or unexpected event that alters the level of risk for the researcher or participants or situation that requires a substantial change in approach to a participant(s). You are also advised that all adverse events must be reported to the GREB within 48 hours.

You are also reminded that all changes that might affect human participants must be cleared by the GREB. For example, you must report changes to the level of risk, applicant characteristics, and implementation of new procedures. To submit an amendment form, access the application by at http://www.queensu.ca/traq/signon.html; click on "Events"; under "Create New Event" click on "General Research Ethics Board Request for the Amendment of Approved Studies". Once submitted, these changes will automatically be sent to the Ethics Coordinator, Ms. Gail Irving, at the Office of Research Services for further review and clearance by the GREB or GREB Chair.

On behalf of the General Research Ethics Board, I wish you continued success in your research.

Sincerely,

John Freeman, Ph.D.
Chair
General Research Ethics Board

c: Dr. Marcus Letourneau and Dr. Betsy Donald, Supervisors
Dr. George Lovell, Chair, Unit REB
Ms. Joan Knox, Dept. Admin.
Appendix D: Sample Recruitment Notice

Recruitment Notice

Public project, private developer: Understanding the impact of policy frameworks on the Regent Park housing redevelopment in Toronto, Ontario

Dear Potential Participant,

My name is Trevor Robinson, and I am a Master of Arts student in the Department of Geography and Planning at Queen’s University. I am writing to invite you to participate in my Master’s thesis research titled, “Public project, private developer: Understanding the impact of policy frameworks on the Regent Park housing redevelopment in Toronto, Ontario”. This research is being conducted under the supervision of Associate Professor Dr. Betsy J. Donald and Adjunct Assistant Professor Dr. Marcus R. Létourneau. The goals of this research are: 1) to provide insights into public-private partnership housing revitalization from the perspective of the developer, and 2) to identify the impact of local historical, socio-economic, and political culture and policy on public-private partnership redevelopment. This study will require a single session, semi-structured interview, which will take no longer than one hour to complete. There are no known physical, psychological or emotional, economic, or social risks associated with this study.

Given the role you played in the Regent Park revitalization, your participation would be an excellent and essential contribution to my Master’s thesis research.

More information about the study will be provided in a Letter of Information, which will be sent to you by email upon your agreement to participate. Signing a Consent Form at the time of the interview will ensure your confidentiality is protected.

Thank you in advance for your consideration of participating in this research project and I look forward to speaking with you.

Sincerely,

Trevor Robinson
Principal Investigator
Trevor Robinson, BA (Hons), MA Candidate
Department of Geography and Planning
Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario
trevor.robinson@queensu.ca

Supervisors
Dr. Betsy J. Donald, Associate Professor
BA, MES, MScPl, PhD, MCIP, RPP
Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario
betsy.donald@queensu.ca

Dr. Marcus R. Létourneau, Adjunct Assistant Professor
Dipl (PACS), BA (Hons), MA, PhD, MCIP, RPP
Queen’s University and Letourneau Heritage Consulting Inc.
Kingston, Ontario
marcus.letourneau@queensu.ca
Appendix E: Letter of Information

Letter of Information

Public project, private developer: Understanding the impact of policy frameworks on the Regent Park housing redevelopment in Toronto, Ontario

Principal Investigator

Trevor Robinson, BA (Hons), MA Candidate
Department of Geography and Planning
Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario
trevor.robinson@queensu.ca

Supervisors

Dr. Betsy J. Donald, Associate Professor
BA, MES, MScPl, PhD, MCIP, RPP
Queen’s University
Kingston, Ontario
betsy.donald@queensu.ca

Dr. Marcus R. Létourneau, Adjunct Assistant Professor
Dipl (PACS), BA (Hons), MA, PhD, MCIP, RPP
Queen’s University and Letourneau Heritage Consulting Inc.
Kingston, Ontario
marcus.letourneau@queensu.ca

This research is being conducted by Trevor Robinson under the supervision of Dr. Betsy J. Donald and Dr. Marcus R. Létourneau in the Department of Geography and Planning at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario.

This letter is an invitation to participate in a research study about the Regent Park revitalization, public-private partnerships, and public housing redevelopment in Toronto.
What procedures and methods are involved?

Semi-structured interviews will be conducted with professional employees previously or currently involved with the Regent Park redevelopment process. Each participant will take part in a single session, semi-structured interview, in which the participant will be asked questions related to public-private partnerships, public housing redevelopment, and current housing and planning policies in Toronto. Interviews will be held in person, in or near participants’ places of work. In-person interviews will be taped using audio recording equipment. Participants may decline to have their interviews recorded; in this case, interviews will be recorded by note-taking.

Please note that no special research techniques will be employed for this research project.

What is the anticipated time duration for participation?

The study will require participation in a single semi-structured interview, which will take approximately one hour to complete.

Are there any potential risks associated with participation?

There are no known physical, psychological or emotional, economic, or social risks associated with this study.

What are the benefits of participation?

We cannot guarantee or promise that you will receive any direct benefits from participating in the study. The results of the study may, however, contribute to a better understanding of the private sector partner’s perspective of the Regent Park redevelopment and the local policy frameworks informing the mixed-income redevelopment of public housing through public-private partnerships. The study has the potential to influence policy directions and services in relation to public housing, condominium development, and public-private partnerships. Benefits may be provided to society at-large by contributing to improving the expansion of public housing or other social service infrastructure through public-private partnerships.
Is my participation voluntary?

Yes, participation is voluntary. Although it would be greatly appreciated if you answer all questions candidly, you should not feel obliged to answer any questions that you find objectionable or that make you feel uncomfortable.

You may also withdraw at any time from the interview process if you change your mind about participating. No mention of your withdrawal will be mentioned in the final project report. To withdraw from the study at the time of participation, please verbally express your desire to terminate your participation to the Principal Investigator (Trevor Robinson). Your collected information will be destroyed in your presence with no further questions asked.

To withdraw from the study at a later date, please contact the Principal Investigator at trevor.robinson@queensu.ca. The last possible date to withdraw is the date that the results of the research are published and disseminated, approximately in the spring or summer of 2017.

Upon confirmation of your desire to terminate your participation, all data collected during your participation will be destroyed, including both digital and hard-copies of information.

What kind of information will be collected about me?

Your name, occupational title, and organizational affiliation is some of the information that will be collected about you. You may request to have your identity replaced with a pseudonym and your occupational title or organizational affiliation replaced with a general occupational title.

What will happen to my responses?

Your responses will be kept private and confidential. Only the Principal Investigator and the Supervisors will have access to your personal identifying information and the data collected about you during the study.

The electronic data collected from this study will be encrypted and stored on a password-protected computer. Any digital audio recordings will be locked in a secure filing cabinet stored in the Principal Investigator’s office. All data, including audio recordings, interview notes, and transcriptions will be retained securely and destroyed a minimum of five years from this date.

The data will be published in Trevor Robinson’s Master’s thesis, and may be published in professional journals, presented at conferences, or published in public documents. Any
publications and presentations will never breach individual confidentiality of those participants who choose not to be identified. Should you be interested, you are entitled to a copy of the findings.

What if I have any questions or concerns?

If you any questions about study participation, please contact the Principal Investigator, Trevor Robinson, at trevor.robinson@queensu.ca, or the Supervisors of this research, Dr. Betsy Donald, at betsy.donald@queensu.ca, or Dr. Marcus Létourneau, at marcus.letourneau@queensu.ca.

If you have any ethical concerns or complaints, you may contact the Chair of the University General Research Ethics Board at 613-533-6081 or chair.GREB@queensu.ca.

Again, thank you. Your interest in participating in this research study is greatly appreciated.

This study has been granted clearance by the General Research Ethics Board according to Canadian research ethics principles (http://www.ethics.gc.ca/default.aspx) and Queen's University policies (http://www.queensu.ca/urs/research-ethics).
Appendix F: Consent Form

Semi-structured Interview Consent Form

Public project, private developer: Understanding the impact of policy frameworks on the Regent Park housing redevelopment in Toronto, Ontario

Name (please print clearly): __________________________________________________________

1. I have read the Letter of Information and have had any questions answered to my satisfaction.

2. I understand that I will be participating in the study titled, “Public project, private developer: Understanding the impact of policy frameworks on the Regent Park housing redevelopment in Toronto, Ontario”. I understand that this means that I will be participating in a semi-structured interview.

3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw at any time during my participation in the study.

4. I understand that my responses will be kept private and confidential. I understand that only the Principal Investigator and the Supervisors will have access to my personal identifying information and the data collected about me during the study. I understand that: electronic data collected from this study will be encrypted and stored on a password-protected computer; any digital audio recordings will be locked in a secure filing cabinet in the Principal Investigator’s office.; and all data, including audio recordings, interview notes, and transcriptions will be retained securely and destroyed a minimum of five years from this date. I understand that any publications and presentations will never breach individual confidentiality of those participants who choose not to be identified.

5. I understand that there is no compensation for participation in this research study but that a copy of the findings will be made available to me if I so choose.

6. I am aware that if I have any questions about study participation, I can contact the Principal Investigator, Trevor G. Robinson, at trevor.robinson@queensu.ca, or the Supervisors of this research, Dr. Betsy J. Donald, at betsy.donald@queensu.ca, or Dr. Marcus R. Létourneau, at marcus.letourneau@queensu.ca. Or, if I have any ethical concerns or complaints, I can contact the Chair of the University General Research Ethics Board at 613-533-6081 or chair.GREB@queensu.ca.
I want my name to be replaced with a pseudonym.

a. Yes  B. No

I want my occupational title to be replaced with a general occupational title.

a. Yes  B. No

I want my place of employment or affiliation with an organization to be kept confidential.

a. Yes  B. No

I agree that the interview can be audio recorded.

a. Yes  B. No

I have read the above statements and freely consent to participate in this research:

Signature:_________________________ Date:_________________________
Appendix G: Sample Interview Schedule

Semi-Structured Interview Schedule – Sample Questions

*Not all questions in the interview schedule will be used during a given interview. The questions selected for each interview will depend on the interviewee and direction of the interview.*

1. What was your role and responsibility in the Regent Park revitalization?

2. There has been a fair amount of research as of late into the Regent Park revitalization process, with many of the key lessons from the project having already been conveyed from individuals involved in the revitalization process, such as John Gladki, Ken Greenberg, and Mark Guslits. These lessons include:
   i) Conducting extensive public participation and consultation;
   ii) Building a transparent tenant relocation plan, including the right-of-return to new units;
   iii) Leveraging of land assets to pay for the replacement of social housing;
   iv) Building strong, creative partnerships between the public and private sectors;
   v) Selecting a private sector partner that embraces the social and financial objectives of the public sector agency pursuing redevelopment;
   vi) Emphasizing social and community development as part of the redevelopment process;
   vii) Allowing for flexibility to the planning framework; and
   viii) Prioritizing quality, sustainable architecture, public spaces, and public realm.

   The questions that I will be asking today will be focused more specifically on the planning and housing policies and Toronto-specific factors informing the partnership agreement and redevelopment process. Before we discuss these more targeted questions, are there any additional general lessons to be learned from Regent Park that were not mentioned in the previous list?

Partnership Agreement

As discussed, I will now ask you some questions about the partnership agreement and the relationship between the public and private sector partners on the redevelopment.
3. If you and your organization had an opportunity to take part in Regent Park revitalization again, are there aspects of the partnership agreement that you would recommend be changed or improved?
   a. Would your organization take part in the revitalization process again?
   b. Were there any potential ‘deal-breakers’ that would have significantly inhibited your organization’s participation in the revitalization process?
   c. Were there aspects of the partnership agreement that ‘sealed the deal’?

4. For Public Sector Professional only: Much has been written in the literature about the political risks for TCH in taking part in the Regent Park revitalization. Despite these risks, why did your organization take part in the partnership?
   a. Were there any trade-offs, political, financial, or otherwise, for your organization associated with taking part in the Regent Park revitalization?
   b. Ultimately, how did your organization benefit from the partnership agreement?

5. For Private Sector Professional only: Much has been written in the literature about the financial risks for developers in taken part in 3P. Despite these risks, why did your organization take part in the partnership?
   a. Were there any financial trade-offs for your organization associated with taking part in the Regent Park revitalization?
   b. How did your organization benefit from the partnership agreement—financially, economically, or otherwise?

6. For Private Sector Professional only: Recent analysis by researcher Gillad Rosen at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem suggests that Daniels is arguably the most socially conscious developer in Toronto, due to the social-justice aspect its developments, including the Regent Park revitalization. Rosen also suggests that the ‘profit’ earned by Daniels comes not only in the form of economic gain, but also the social benefits provided to society. Because social objectives are part of Daniels’ profit, its financial profit margins are lower. Does the fact that Daniels is a privately-held company enable this type of profit seeking, in that it does not need to be beholden to shareholders?
   a. Does this mindset make Daniels better oriented to take on a project like the Regent Park revitalization?

7. Research by Michele Nicholson in the Queen’s School of Urban Planning in 2012 suggested that there were many aspects of the December 2005 RFP and its surrounding context relative to earlier attempts to redevelop the site—including the 1997 RFP and May 2005 RFP—that resulted in the successful selection as Daniels as the private sector partner. For example, based on interviews with developers involved in the RFP process, Nicholson concluded that the December 2005 RFP was successful because of the following factors:
i) The public sector acquired the market and financial risks of development, creating a fair division of risk between the public and private partners;
ii) The project scale was increased and plans were made to develop the entire site, improving developer confidence in the project;
iii) Market studies conducted by the public sector were provided to proponents;
iv) TCH obtained most of the planning approvals before the RFP process; and
v) The winning developer would have the option to take part in the successive phases if phase one was successful.

Do you think that any of those factors more significant than others?
a. Are there additional factors that made the December 2005 RFP successful and the project more feasible relative to previous attempts at redevelopment?
b. Were there specific, deliberate actions taken by your organization to encourage a successful outcome in 2005 relative to earlier attempts?
c. Did the change in location for redevelopment in the first phase of the project—from River and Gerrard in the 1997 RFP to Dundas and Parliament for the 2005 RFPs—have an impact on the outcome of the 2005 RFPs and/or the project as a whole?
d. Did the presence of a strong champion for redevelopment in Derek Ballantyne have a positive impact on the outcome of the project?

8. For Public Sector Official Only: Was there concern that attempting to add RGI units to site would lead to over-extension of TCH, financially, politically, etc., risking the well-being of residents living in other TCH units?

Policy Context

Next, I will be asking you some questions about the policy context and Toronto-specific aspects of the revitalization.

9. Are there aspects of the Toronto policy context informing the revitalization that have allowed for more positive outcomes of the partnership agreement?
a. Are there aspects of the policy context that have made it difficult to achieve the goals of the agreement and the revitalization?

10. Are there other conditions in Toronto surrounding the redevelopment process that allowed for a positive outcome of the Regent Park revitalization?
a. Are these conditions unique to Toronto, Ontario, or Canada?
b. Were there certain conditions that inhibited the outcomes of redevelopment?
c. Were these conditions addressed during negotiation of the partnership agreement? Within the partnership agreement? Over the course of the partnership?

11. Michelle Nicholson also suggested that the Places to Grow Act, passed in June of 2005, encouraged greater developer interest and therefore better responses to the 2005 RFPs because it encouraged developers traditionally focused on greenfield development to divert their efforts towards projects in more urban locations. Similarly, what impact, if any, did the new Provincial Policy Statement passed in March of 2005 have on the Regent Park revitalization process?

12. The revitalization has not resulted in the mixing of TCH public housing units and condo units within the same building, despite the interest of TCH and Daniels in doing so. Some scholars have been highly critical of the project for not achieving in-building social mix, while others, such as Jim Dunn at McMaster University and Sharon Kelly at the University of Toronto, see this as a missed opportunity to maximize the benefits of social mixing. In response, Martin Blake and Mitchell Cohen of Daniels have stated that current condo policies, in particular, the Condo Act, inhibit in-building mixing because there are no clear rules for governing common spaces in buildings or representation on condo boards. Do you agree with this, or do you believe there are other factors inhibiting in-building mixing?
   a. Do you have any suggestions or recommendations for improving social mix within buildings within the existing policy context? (E.g., creating unique condo agreements for each project.)
   b. Or, do the current policies need to be altered to allow for in-building tenure mix?
   c. Could Inclusionary Zoning, currently under consideration by the Province of Ontario and already publicly supported by Daniels, be used to permit and encourage tenure mix within buildings?

13. Can the Regent Park revitalization process be emulated on future redevelopment projects in Toronto, such as Lawrence Heights?
   a. Could the process be emulated in other cities in Canada? In other countries?
   b. If so, what is it about the Regent Park revitalization process that would make it applicable in other places?
   c. Are there only certain types of places or situations in which the process could be emulated?
   d. Should the partnership agreement be emulated? Are there alternative processes or partnership agreements that might provide more positive outcomes?

14. I’ve asked a series of more specific questions about the revitalization process. To ensure that I don’t miss any crucial points or pieces of information, I will ask you some more general, open-ended questions about the revitalization. First, are there
any other aspects of the Regent Park partnership agreement, development context, or policies informing the project that resulted in positive and/or negative outcomes?

a. Second, do you have any suggestions or recommendations for improving or changing the policies informing the redevelopment or the partnership agreement itself that would lead to a more positive outcome of the Regent Park revitalization or similar projects?

b. Do you have any suggestions for improving or streamlining the negotiation and/or development process for future 3P housing redevelopment projects?

Closing Questions

15. We have covered a lot of ground related to your thoughts on the Regent Park revitalization process. Before we finish, can you provide me with a brief summary of your professional history with respect to housing planning and development?

16. Finally, would you like to discuss elaborate on any of your responses to these questions or any other topics or issues that we didn’t cover?

Thank you very much for your participation in this study. The results from this study are expected to be made available in Fall of 2017. If requested, I will provide you with a copy of my dissertation; alternatively, I can direct you to a link online. As discussed, the contact information for myself, my research supervisors, and the Chair of the University General Research Board has been provided to you. Please do not hesitate to contact the appropriate person if you have any questions or concerns about the research process. Thank you again.