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dc.contributor.authorMiller, Curtisen
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-12T16:33:31Z
dc.date.available2019-09-12T16:33:31Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/26544
dc.description.abstractThis thesis considers the metaphysics and logic of modalities. In the first section, I give a background to modal realism and present Lewis’ motivations for proposing such a view. In the second section, I explain what it means for a theory of modality to be ‘successfully reductive’, why a reduction of modality is important and why Lewis’ view is considered successfully reductive. In the third section, I explain Lewis’ commitments regarding trans-world individuals. In the fourth section, I explain Lewis’ views on impossibility. The final sections will be dedicated to clarifying Lewis’ metaphysical commitments towards the largest domain of possibility and working out their metaphysical, ontological and practical implications. To be clear, this thesis is not intended as a refutation of modal realism. Such a refutation is impossible. Lewis defends modal realism on the grounds of a cost benefit analysis. He believes that the benefits that come with accepting modal realism are enough to justify one’s belief in it. An empirical refutation is impossible because there is no way to verify or falsify the existence of Lewis’ plurality. Every possible world is spatiotemporally isolated from the actual world. Instead of attempting to refute modal realism, this thesis is intended to clarify the fundamental metaphysics of modal realism for the purpose of highlighting the fact that some metaphysical, epistemological and practical costs come with embracing modal realism. The costs I outline are aspects of modal realism that ought to be considered before embracing modal realism.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCanadian thesesen
dc.rightsQueen's University's Thesis/Dissertation Non-Exclusive License for Deposit to QSpace and Library and Archives Canadaen
dc.rightsProQuest PhD and Master's Theses International Dissemination Agreementen
dc.rightsIntellectual Property Guidelines at Queen's Universityen
dc.rightsCopying and Preserving Your Thesisen
dc.rightsThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.en
dc.subjectModal Metaphysicsen
dc.subjectPhilosophyen
dc.subjectModal Realismen
dc.subjectDavid Lewisen
dc.subjectCounterpart Theoryen
dc.titleLewis on the Construction of Worlds: the Metaphysical, Epistemic and Practical Costs of Modal Realismen
dc.typethesisen
dc.description.degreeM.A.en
dc.contributor.supervisorMercier, Adeleen
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.degree.grantorQueen's University at Kingstonen


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