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dc.contributor.authorBusuioc, Octavian Alexandru
dc.contributor.otherQueen's University (Kingston, Ont.). Theses (Queen's University (Kingston, Ont.))en
dc.date2013-05-29 10:01:52.496en
dc.date.accessioned2013-05-29T15:49:33Z
dc.date.available2013-05-29T15:49:33Z
dc.date.issued2013-05-29
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1974/8047
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-05-29 10:01:52.496en
dc.description.abstractIt is natural to think that in order to learn about the world from perceptual experience, a person does not need to do anything. All that is required is that she has her eyes open, or her ears unplugged, so that she can receive sensory input from without. On the basis of this input, she can form justified empirical beliefs. This way of thinking about experience is central to many philosophical views about perception. It is my contention that the approach is mistaken, and that in fact it cannot explain how perceptual experience justifies belief. This dissertation argues, in contrast, that perceiving is not something that merely happens to us, but something we do. On my view, experience is a source of justification in virtue of being an activity which aims at knowledge. In Chapter 1, I present the topic of the dissertation and provide an analytical overview. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes John McDowell's account of perceptual experience. I argue that McDowell is faced with a dilemma, as his original account mischaracterizes perceptual experience, and his later, revised account cannot explain how perception justifies empirical belief. The solution is to deny a claim common to both: that in experience we are passive. In contrast, I argue that experiencing is a full-fledged activity that is teleologically structured. In Chapter 3, I begin to substantiate my position by drawing on Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. Chapter 4 supplements this claim by appeal to some features of Alva Noe's enactive view of perception. The resulting account portrays experience as an activity that has knowledge as its end. This explains how experience justifies belief, for it shows how perceptual knowledge cannot but be the result of experiencing going well for one. Chapter 5 argues that perceptual activity can take different forms, varying in complexity, as one aims at knowing features of one's environment. I argue, however, that keeping track of an object is the fundamental mode of perceptual activity. I conclude the dissertation by considering two objections to my account.en_US
dc.languageenen
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCanadian thesesen
dc.rightsThis publication is made available by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner.en
dc.subjectPerceptionen_US
dc.subjectEpistemologyen_US
dc.titleTaking the World Inen_US
dc.typethesisen_US
dc.description.degreePh.Den
dc.contributor.supervisorBakhurst, Daviden
dc.contributor.departmentPhilosophyen


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