Post-Islamism Redefined:
A Genealogy of Political Islam in Iran

By:

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Abstract:

Challenging the current academic conception of the term "post-Islamism," this dissertation provides an alternative definition of the concept, having in mind the case of Iran. In contrast to Asef Bayat's deployment of "post-Islamism," as a secular rejection of an Islam that informs political consciousness, this dissertation, following Michel Foucault, situates Islamism within a larger genealogy, in order to investigate the relationships between religious and political traditions, from early Islamic eras to modern responses to an emerging Iranian state in the twentieth century. The dissertation specifically argues for a distinction between a statist Islamism and a non-statist understanding of Islam as a political ideology. To interpret this dynamic, Gill Deleuze and Felix Guattari's characterization of non-statist "war machines" and centralist logics of the State Apparatus, is invoked to help explain how a modernist religious and political ideology and movement like Islamism developed before, during, and after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. After defining Islamism, through a critical engagement with scholarship on political Islam, the dissertation provides an analysis of the early Islamic antipathy to statism that characterized the community and movement established by the Prophet Muhammad. The dissertation then applies genealogical analysis to the doctrine of *velāyat-e faqih* that authorized the clerical domination of the Islamic republic. It then examines the formation of the modern nation-state in Iran and the role Iranian Islamism played in its formation and asks questions about how Islamism as a war-machine turned into a State Apparatus. This dissertation then calls for a revival of Islamism and concludes that the consequences of the state appropriation of Islamism have come to necessitate new cultural and political movements which support religious approaches to politics, yet they resist identifying with Islam as an ideology of state domination. This dissertation, calls the intellectual process of non-statist Islamist revival: post-Islamism.

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Note on Transliteration and Translations:

- The system of transliteration adopted for Persian and Arabic is that used by the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES).
- All passages in Persian and Arabic, unless directly quoted from secondary sources in English, are the translations of the author. For most passages in Persian, translated by other scholars, translations have been examined to ensure faithfulness to the original. For instance, Hamed Algar's translations of Ayatollah Khomeini's *Velāyat-e Faqih* have been used while the original text has been consulted to ensure accuracy.

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Introduction: Why Genealogy of Political Islam?

After locating the discursive status of Islamism as colonialized, this dissertation calls the intellectual and political process of freeing Islamism from state and colonial subjugation *post*-Islamism and argues that post-Islamist politics will not be possible without first exposing the metaphysics of the notion an Islamic state, which has colonized Islamism as both subject and object of study.

A few decades before the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), there emerged a social crystallization of a certain oppositional discourse to the state with a religious flavour. This discourse, which had its nucleus in the national political parties supporting Mohammad Mosaddeq (1882–1967), was anti-imperialist, anti-despotic, and mildly anti-capitalist. Proponents of this discourse were nationalist and socialist Muslims, an identity radicalized after a CIA sponsored coup d'état (1953) that removed Mosaddeq from office and restored authoritarian monarchism in Iran. Depending on the political and social crisis at stake, Marxist, nationalist, and religious discourses were mixed together producing various groups and organizations similar in strategy but different in tactics. Some opted for a more Marxist orientation, hence becoming Islamic Marxists, and some became Muslim liberal nationalists, and those from highly traditional religious backgrounds but inclined towards metropolitan politics found themselves either supporting these groups or at least sympathizing with them. This Muslim-socialist-nationalist oppositional discourse may be called *Islamism.*

"Islam is nothing but a movement; Islam is a social movement for change and transformation of society and people living in that society. In general, an Islamic movement has

two qualities: it operates at the level of society and it is also a revolutionary movement."[1] These words were uttered by the Islamist Ebrāhim Yazdi (1931–2017) in 1977 in a speech addressed to Muslim students abroad. Here, Yazdi provides an oral history of modern Islamic movements in Iran and describes the ideological tenets of the movement. The content of speech, which was later published as a pamphlet, reflects very well the characteristics of Islamist discourse at the time. Yazdi was a member of *Nehzat-e Azādi* (Freedom Front), a pro-Mosaddeq Muslim nationalist party, whose members had supported Ayatollah Khomeini in their struggle against the Shah. The objective of the speech, as Yazdi himself declares, is to show that the Islamic movement in Iran has a history of at least a hundred years, hence he offered support for the credibility of Islamism as an oppositional discourse. In the speech, Yazdi appreciates the revolutionary activities of the left but stresses that the radicalism and sacrifice of Islamists have equaled that of Marxist elements, if not exceeded them. Much like Ali Shariati, Yazdi's discourse is under the influence of Marxism, though he labels the Muslim converts to Marxism in the Mojāhedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) *monāfeghin* (the hypocrites). Yazdi sets out to draw attention to contributions made by some members of the clergy in the movement, but constantly ensures to differentiate between the uncompromising revolutionary clergy and the reactionary, conservative, pro-despotic, state-sponsored clergy. He even mentions the concept *velāyat-e faqih* in passing; he understands the concept not as the rulership of a *faqih* but as a progressive politicization of the clergy. Yazdi despises traditional Islam for its mere concern with religious rituals and support for despotism and differentiates this Islam from the modern quality of the Islamic movement that opposes *Tashayyo'-e Safavi* (Safavid Shi'ism), a term

[1] Ebrāhim Yazdi, *Barrasiye Jonbesh-hāye Islami va Mo'arrefi-e Chehrehāye Nāshenākhteye Rohāniyyat-e Mo'āser.* [A Study on Islamic Movements and Introducing Unknown Contemporary [Political] Clergy] (Nashr-e Mojāhed, year and place of publication unknown), 33.

coined by Ali Shariati to describe Shi'ism as an ideology of power, not resistance. Yazdi traces the history of Islamism to Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839–1897), who encouraged Mirza Shirazi (1814–1895) to issue a *fatwa* opposing Nāser al-Dīn Shāh's concession of tobacco rights to the British. He then traces the movement to the Constitutional Revolution and then the anti-British nationalist activism of Mosaddeq. In general, Yazdi mentions various anti-despotic, anti-imperialist, and anti-exploitative struggles to make a case for the presence of a progressive religious ideology in all these movements. Yazdi highlights the importance of self-purification (*tazkiyeh*) but does not shy away from declaring his statist aspirations. He critiques the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jama'at-i Islami in Pakistan for failing to aspire to state power. Yazdi is by no means scholastic in his narrative. He draws an image of the Prophet as a democratic and fallible being; Yazdi openly says that even the Prophet made mistakes, and not only did he not impose his will on others, he did not oppose the consensus of the majority. Yazdi invokes the Prophet and the free government (*hukumat-e azād*) and society he created in Medina as role models for state building and stresses the importance of Islamists' taking charge of the state apparatus. In his account, Yazdi draws on Quranic verses and the tradition of the Prophet to provide an Islamist philosophy of history in which people are required to be in a constant state of movement through awareness and self-purification. According to Yazdi, the Quran opposes a static society.

Drawing on the case of Yazdi, it is apparent that Islamism is a complex system of thought. This discourse is religious, yet it is modern and anti-scholastic. It is a specific interpretation of a religion, one that emphasizes a search for social justice, political egalitarianism, spirituality, and national independence. The Islamism that Yazdi expounds does not seek to implement *shari'a* law; rather it aspires to turn traditional Islam into a "liberation theology," a theology that seeks to

rely on prophetic traditions to solve the problems of the modern world. Most importantly, Islamism has a "history," one that, as Yazdi mentions a few times in his speech, has dark moments. "There is still much that we don't know about the movement," Yazdi exclaims, and he believes that further discovery of that history only better situates the position and aspirations of Islamism.[2] The Islamist discourse, as explained by Yazdi, is a modern theology of liberation with its own history and philosophy of history. This discourse was very influential in the history of modernity, constituting the integral discursive weight in the formation of Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Yazdi and his comrade activists of *Nehzat-e Azādi* joined the first cabinet after the Revolution. Yazdi became minister of foreign affairs until the head of the cabinet, the liberal-leaning Mehdi Bāzargān (1907–1995), resigned as prime minister. The resignation of Bāzargān was concurrent with an increase in power of the clerics and the institutionalization of *velāyat-e faqih* in the Iranian Constitution. Bāzargan and his *Nehzat-e Azādi* front, along with many Marxist and Islamist factions, were then completely eliminated from the political scene. Yazdi and his friends in *Nehzat-e Azādi* were specifically accused of being "liberal" for not abiding with the doctrine of *velāyat-e faqih* and were disqualified from running for office on many occasions. The Islamist state that Yazdi had supported to come to power did not lend its trust to him. It is natural that Yazdi saw his political aspirations as having failed. He died last year.

But why is the fate of Yazdi, his Islamist worldview, and a genealogy of his movement relevant now? And more specifically, why Islamism now, let alone its genealogy? How is understanding Islamism even relevant when news from Iran indicates that a political system supposedly based on Islamist premises is failing? Has not the failure of political Islam already

[2] Yazdi, *A Study on Islamic Movements*, 76.

been announced by Oliver Roy in *The Failure of Political Islam* in 1992? Has not Islamism been replaced by Asef Bayat's notion of "post" Islamism, that which denotes the end of Islamism? Why does Islamism deserve attention in the post-Islamist world? And why study political Islam once again when there is no shortage of books, scholarly articles, and even movies shedding light on different aspects of political Islam in Iran during the past four decades? Why invoke this understudied "failed" project?

This dissertation holds that Islamism deserves attention for the exact reasons that point to its irrelevancy. At one level, studying Islamism certainly helps to evaluate the causes of its "failure." Studying Islamism from new angles may inform an investigation of the underdeveloped themes, the contradictions, the "wrong" assemblages, both political and discursive, that prevented Islamism from becoming a viable alternative within modernity. Revisiting Islamism poses the following questions: what assumptions and presuppositions within Islamism, which were not found in the modern world order, hindered the success of the project? What would have been the fate of Islamism if the Iranian Revolution had unfolded in the way it did? Could Islamism have survived differently if it had not resorted to state-capture?

But besides the "pathological" approach—that is, searching for where things went "wrong"—casting doubt on the dominant conception of "post-Islamist" premise also invites for a rigorous engagement with Islamism. The term post-Islamism was first deployed in the academy by Asef Bayat in 1996 and then in 2016 to describe those who have willingly abandoned Islamism and instead adopted a search for spirituality and liberal values. Post-Islamists, according to Bayat, are those who no longer aspire to rule society based on *velāyat-e faqih*, those who no longer remain adamantly "fundamentalist" and seek to reconcile faith with the modern

world.[3] But is it the case that the characteristics Bayat ascribes to "post-Islamism" are actually better seen as belonging to Islamism proper? What was Ebrāhim Yazdi then? Was he an Islamist or a post-Islamist? Given that there is no consensus on what Islamism is, does this not intensify the need to challenge Bayat's theorization of post-Islamism and to more fully engage with the meaning of Islamism itself?

But the third and most important reason Islamism requires further study is the discursive status of Islamism as a colonialized discourse. Islamism, as both a certain theology—that is, a subject of study—and an area of scholarly investigation—that is, an object of study is appropriated by colonial narratives. Islamism as both a "regime of truth" and a regime of truth concerning a religiously inspired political movement has been colonized by the state or by imperialist narratives.

It is natural that the Iranian state would have a hold on the discourse of Islamism. There has to be an official narrative that confirms and reifies the state's position, one that justifies the appropriation of Islamism for state ends and subjugates those regimes of truth that challenge the state discourse. This does not make the official discourse entirely flawed; there are in fact some merits in the state narrative, especially when juxtaposed against the orientalist or politically motivated Western narratives of Islamism. For instance, Rasul Jafariyan's *Jaryānha va Sazmānhāye Mazhabi-Siyasi-e Iran* (2012) does provide certain insights concerning the history of the Islamist movement that are otherwise unattainable. However, Jafariyan, as the head of Majlis and then Tehran University library, and in his position as a trusted historian within the state, maintains rather a "monopoly" of access to data. Once this data makes its way to the surface, it becomes public knowledge, and hence free of state control. Nonetheless, the data is

[3] Asef Bayat, *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

still not completely free from the official rendering because state presuppositions as to what constitutes the "truth" unfold within the narrative ascribed to the data, discouraging alternative accounts of Islamism from emerging.

There is also the proximity factor: that is, the temporal relations between the Islamist discourse and present political actors that render a scholarly investigation of Islamism obsolete. The state assumption already is: "We know what Islamism is. It is us. We know ourselves." In other words, Islamism, despite its complexities, is assumed to belong to the "present," hence it is not yet worthy of study. An Iranian historian in Iran for instance is more inclined to study the Constitutional Revolution (1905) than the historical rise of an organization such as Mojāhedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO). In the case of MKO, as an organization in opposition to the state, not only do political hazards make it difficult to provide an alternative account of this organization, MKO continues to exist, and thus is not seen as a viable object of historical study.

There is also the colonialism of state theology. Islamism, as the appropriated discourse of the modern Iranian state, is a colonialized theology. Islamism, as a theological base, must serve the status apparatus, but, as was the case with Abdolkarim Soroush, the moment that theology challenged the state, it became heretical and subject to elimination. Islamism as a theology can no longer thrive freely; it must serve "the apparatus of capture," it must "justify," it cannot resist. Hence, not only does the state have a monopoly on Islamism as an object of study, it has control over Islamism as a subject of theological investigation.

Then there are the Western accounts of Islamism, which may not have the state narrative's flaws. Those Western narratives concerning Islamism, while free from the bias of the state narrative, have tended however to adopt a new set of biases, mainly due to the political and moral interests of those undertaking the study of Islamism. In general, the discursive regimes

concerning Iran and the events of the Iranian Revolution in particular have either been produced by authors with political motivations, and hence imbued with orientalism, or by a predominantly liberal moral lens whose narrative, however ethically and objectively constructed, is not free from political presuppositions. Politically motivated narratives are often constructed by right-wing political associations located in the West and Iranian pro-Shah or Marxist historians residing abroad.[4]

The latter approach, which adopts a liberal moral lens, is taken up by scholars in the Western academy who seek to research the phenomenon objectively, yet they cannot resist expressing dissatisfaction with the fate of the object under study. Presupposing democracy and liberal freedoms as "good," and the aftermath of Islamism, being the antithesis to liberal democracy, as something "bad" seems to characterize the moralist stance of such scholars studying political Islam. In their account, though sometimes very subtlety expressed, there is always something "wrong" that needs to be fixed. One only needs to consult Hamid Dabashi's *Shi'ism* (2011) or Said Amir Arjomand's *The Turban for the Crown* (1988) or Bassam Tibi's *Islamism and Islam* (2012) to realize that in these accounts there is always a moral predicament and some disguised sympathy for those who suffered and continue to suffer from the triumph of Islamism. In these narratives there is also always a teleological hope for the end of Islamism, for emancipation, and the restoration of liberal democracy. And here Asef Bayat's post-Islamism is a prime case. In his work, Bayat concludes with points regarding the exhaustion of Islamism and its replacement with liberal post-Islamism. The discourse pertaining to post-Islamism explicitly expresses dissatisfaction with Islamism and provides good news: Islamism is ending or is about to end. And then there is the celebratory anticipation of the rather imminent rise of democracy

[4] Mehdi Khalaji, the Qom-trained employee of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is an example of someone routinely offering such a discourse.

and regime change in Tehran. If the right-wing narratives await regime change, the liberal narratives have always already promised it. To suggest that Asef Bayat's post-Islamism is part of a larger colonial project may appear bold, but his narrative ends up not challenging and even reifying the colonialist political discourse, and hence serves colonialism from distance.

Therefore, the dominant discourse concerning Islamism has emerged from a certain colonial trajectory, whether political or cultural; Islamism, then, as both object or subject of study, is always colonized by a broader narrative. There is always a discussion of Islamism because it is politically useful. The state reproduces its own narrative of Islamism, it expounds its own Islamist theology, and Western scholarship as a whole produces a counter discourse. Ultimately, Islamism is always discursively colonialized.

But decolonizing Islamism has its own challenges, the main one being the complex interplay between Islamism as an object and subject of study. In the case of Soroush, for instance, when he made advancements in the theology of Islamism, his intervention inspired those such as Asef Bayat in his delineation of post-Islamism. Here an intervention from the inside influenced if not challenged the perspectives offered from the outside. In fact, Soroush's call to reform Islam provided him with a unprecedented spotlight among those in the West with intellectual interests in Islamism, those who were previously and coincidentally called "Islamists" for choosing Islam as their object of study. This means that the intervention of an Islamist in Islamist discourse influenced "Islamists"—those who study Islamism—and their mode of interaction with the subject at hand. And when scholars in the West or "Islamists" began to write about the history of Islam, whether portraying it as a golden civilization or an anomaly to Western civilization, their intervention directly influenced the theology of Islamism. One only needs to remember Al-Afghani's exchanges of letters with the French historian Ernest Renan

(1823–1892) or Ayatollāh Sayyid Noureddin Shirāzi's (1895–1933) borrowing from Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) to make a case that the West adopted its lessons on democracy from Islam.

The complex interplay between outside and inside is partly due to the modernist intellectual and theological ambitions of Islamism. For instance, Yazdi's account appeared as a case in which Islamism was both the subject and object of analysis. Similar to scholars of political Islam, Yazdi offered a history of Islamism and also expounded a certain modern philosophy on how the contemporary world should be governed. Yazdi was not a fundamentalist Muslim aiming to destroy modernity and restore medieval norms. He was the product of modernity and aimed to produce an alternative account of modernity. Similarly, in the same way that the works of Marxist sociologists can been interpreted as offering contributions to both Marxism and the academic study of Marxism, a scholar of political Islam cannot avoid making an intervention in the theology of Islamism. This reversal of interaction between the Islamist, the holder of Islamist convictions, and the "Islamist," the scholar of Islamism, enters a new phase of complexity when decolonizing Islamism becomes the agenda.

As noted above, the Islamist Yazdi also had a great interest in the history of Islamism; he too was interested in a "genealogy" of his own movement, and he would have certainly engaged in a conversation with a genealogist of Islamism. A genealogist of Islamism, particularly one with decolonizing objectives, may or may not hold Yazdi's convictions, but by virtue of entering into a conversation with Yazdi would find her/himself making a contribution to Islamist discourse. Decolonizing a certain regime of truth always assumes the subjectivity of "the indigenous." In the case of studying Islamism, the subjugated indigenous is the silent Islamist. Hence decolonizing Islamism as an intellectual process already places the genealogist with Islamists, encourages the two to enter into conversation to learn from each other, and this blurs

the dividing line between the scholar and the Islamist.[5] Therefore, intervention within Islamism as an object of study, with decolonization as the objective, invariably calls for a reorganization of the theology of Islamism, and any intervention in Islamism as a subject of study challenges assumptions in the organization of the knowledge concerning the study of Islamism from outside, particularly when the method of decolonization is genealogy.

Foucauldian genealogy aims to expose the metaphysics imbedded in a certain discourse; genealogy takes as its task not telling the "truth" but demystifying the dominant assumptions about a certain truth. Genealogy seeks to be "effective," to challenge power, to be political.[6] Genealogy distances itself from traditional history and becomes inclined towards mythology. Like ancient mythologists, whose task it was to tell a story as a challenge to the status quo, the task of a genealogy is to tell the "the history of the present." Like Michel Foucault's account in *Discipline and Punish*, *The History of Sexuality*, and his governmentality lectures, genealogy may be full of factual errors—a critique often launched against Foucault—but his narrative sets out to question assumptions about the origins of events, where they came from, and how they constitute the present. A genealogist, like an ancient mythologist, is less careful with facts; rather, s/he is mindful of patterns, those patterns that, in their continuity and discontinuity, once articulated adopt the task of challenging power.

If the outside narrative of Islamism impacts the dynamics inside and vice versa, this reversal of impact becomes even more intensified with genealogy. To be clear, genealogy, because of its recognition of the interplay between knowledge and power and the task of a genealogist to expose "the metaphysics of the present," already implies the dissolution of subject

[5] A similar case can be made regarding settler scholars wishing to decolonize discourses concerning indigenous peoples.
[6] Michel Foucault, (1984) "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).

and object in a given study. Within the genealogical model, a genealogist already admits the biases, the political objectives, the conceptual framework, the apparatus of power under which knowledge is produced, and hence his/her overall allegiance is not to "objective" historical inquiry but to the political cause at hand, which becomes evident from the outset. And when this method is invoked for the study of Islamism, with its own thick grey areas between subject and object of study, the recognition of the dividing line between Islamism, as subject and object of study, becomes even more difficult. And it is for this reason that an Islamist who attempts to rescue Islamism from the colonialism of the state and the "Islamist"—the anti-orientalist scholar who attempts to rescue Islamism from colonial narratives—find themselves at times conducting similar tasks. An Islamist that needs to challenge the state narrative must expose how the story of Islamism has been told thus far, conducting a task similar to that of an "Islamist." One only needs to consult the work of Mohammad Tavakoli Targhi, Farhang Rajaee, and Behrouz Ghamari Tabrizi as instances of the genealogical study of Islamism to locate similarities in intellectual posture between these scholars and an Islamist like Ali Shariati.[7] The scholars' attempts to challenge the orientalist narratives have acted as an intervention in Islamist discourse, and conversely the work of an Islamist such as Ali Shariati has been taken seriously in the academy, at least as a certain narrative about Islam.

Given the interplay between the study of Islamism as subject and object, the philosophical, political, and theological quality of Islamism, and the inherent political quality of genealogy, two phenomena have become inevitable: one, for decolonizing Islamism to have theological implications/queries, two, making the Islamist and scholar of Islamism sound

[7] Here one may refer to Rajaee's *Moshkeleye Hoviyat-e Iranian- e Emrūz*, or Tavakoli's Targhi's *Refashioning Iran*, or Ghamari Tabrizi's *Foucault in Iran Islamic Revolution after the Enlightenment,* as three scholarly works that may also very well be read as interventions in contemporary Iranian Islamist discourse.

identical at times. These factors make it safe to state that decolonizing a religiously inspired political discourse already involves engaging with the theology and the political aspirations of that discourse even if theological/political inclinations were not intended at the outset. The attempt to expose how the story of Islamism was told challenges the logic of the story itself, and challenging the premises of the story has an impact on the way the story must be told. When one says, "Islamism is not this, it is that," whether that is stipulated in a mosque in Tehran or in a Western academy, that assertion is already theological and political. And similarly, if a person defiant of state theology holds that the entire theology of Islamism is a sham, s/he has positioned her/his discourse as "satanic" in relation to those with Islamist convictions. Once Islamism becomes the object of study, it becomes the subject, and when it becomes the subject, it influences its study as an object.

Therefore, the theological and political implications of decolonizing Islamism evade Islamism to become the subject of a "pure" historical investigation. Rather, decolonizing Islamism becomes an "effective history," a history with a certain cause, a history that fails to be history and instead leans towards theology, if not mythology. It becomes a sophisticated extension of Yazdi's historical narrative. It becomes an extension of Ali Shariati's intellectual venture. Decolonizing Islamism already involves theology, that which does not scrutinize the accuracy of facts but rather seeks to offer a different interpretation of facts. Decolonizing Islamism and its genealogy does not concern replacing one series of facts with others, rather it entails denouncing one set of myths and paving the way for new ones to emerge.

This dissertation proposes to call the attempt to decolonize Islamism through genealogical investigation "post-Islamism." Unlike Bayat's notion of post-Islamism, through decolonizing Islamism from state and colonial narratives, the notion of post-Islamism proposed

here aims to revive Islamism, as both subject and object of knowledge. Within the post-Islamist framework, Islamism as a subject must resist the subjugation of state control, and hence revive and thrive and once again enter into conversation with modernity; as an object of study, post-Islamism must set out to decolonize Islamism from colonial narratives, from those narratives that capture Islamism as something inherently "bad," as a certain brand of fundamentalism, as an anomaly to be avoided.

This dissertation is also an experiment with the proposed version of post-Islamism. Here, Islamism has become the object of study that once exposed to genealogical investigation produce results that affirm and challenge the theology of Islamism. Post-Islamism is a process of decolonializing, and consequently revival of, Islamism such that (post)Islamism takes as its object, once again, resistance to, transformation of, and creating alternatives to the state. For the Islamism to be disentangled from the state, however, first there has to be discursive war against the "Islamic state," meaning that for post-Islamism to be able to confront the state, first the very metaphysics of the "*hukumat-e Islami*" must be exposed. This means that the attempt to decolonize Islamism from the state narrative inevitably led the genealogist to ask questions about the notion of the "Islamic state" and *velāyat-e faqih* in their medieval and modern manifestations. Also, the attempt to decolonize Islamism from colonial narratives put the genealogist on the defensive about Islamism, seeing it not as something "bad," but quite the contrary, as something with unexplored potentials. And decolonizing as a whole has encouraged this author to implicitly call for an Islamist subjectivity that resists the appropriation of Islamism by the state. In this process, the clear divide between Islamism as an object and subject of study has become blurred to the extent that the reader may ask, as was the case with the author, what is the agenda at play here? Is this a theological/political intervention or an academic study of a

phenomenon that involves the interaction of religion and politics in modernity? Here the Islamist and the "Islamist" were hard to distinguish.

Given the theological quality of the subject at hand, the slipperiness and political ambitions of genealogy as method, the complex interplay between Islamism as an object and subject of study, and the overt and hidden political agenda at play, this dissertation may have become incongruous with the disciplinary conventions of the Western academy, making cultural studies, with its interdisciplinary and inherently political agenda, perhaps the only suitable "discipline" for such an intellectual venture. In cultural studies, "a project involves less an object of study—indeed objects might themselves strategically disappear in such a project. Even less does it involve reading…[and instead] it involves a *pragmatics*, the creation of 'psychic tools' with which to recover our 'selves' and our world."[8]

There is no periodical focus in this dissertation as there is no claim for scholarship in the conventional categories, such as modern or medieval (Islam), political science, history, or sociology. It is even possible that the traditional historian, the conventional sociologist, or the orthodox political scientist may critique some aspects of the piece for its factual blind spots or even marginal discrepancies. This mode of critique is already welcomed with a cautionary note that one must not allow orthodox conventions of production and presentation of knowledge, with their colonial premises, to hinder the experiment of decolonizing a religiously inspired political discourse that is currently appropriated by state and colonial narratives. There has to be a compromise, not one that takes the form of a retreat, but a progressive one allowing (post)Islamism as subject and object of study to assert itself in the academy.

[8] Simon O'Sullivan, "Cultural Studies as Rhizome – Rhizomes in Cultural Studies," in *Critical Studies* 20 (2002), 84.

Post-Islamism must be taken seriously not for offering new facts or new data, but rather for its particular mode of interpretation of facts, for its conceptual framework, for its concept creations, for its theoretical intervention, and for its "style" of knowledge production. After all, genealogy provides nothing but a certain style, that which is "dynamic, mobile and relatively open ended… To speak of style is to register the fact that producers have a certain creative latitude…; that there is drift and play in the way a style takes shape over time."[9] In the same vein, this piece must not be read as a bundle of facts that were not already available in scholarship. Rather, the merit of *Post-Islamism, Redefined* is its attempt to redefine Islamism as an object and subject of study, to intervene in its theology, to challenge the dominant academic conception regarding the interaction between religion and politics, and as a whole, to offer a rather fresh way of thinking about Islamism, in the same way that Islamism attempted to offer a new perspective on how the world and in particular modernity must be interpreted and engaged with. This dissertation is political with theological implications and is only in conformity with what in the West is known as cultural studies. This dissertation seeks to be an intervention in the realm of culture, that which is governed by mythologies, theologies, schizophrenia, and not facts, state rationality, and strict disciplinary approaches.

Inspired by Deleuze and Gutattari's *Thousand Plateaus*, every chapter has been treated as a plateau. This way, while there is an underlining premise throughout the whole dissertation, every plateau "may be read independently of one another, except the conclusion, which should be read at the end."[10]

In chapter one, while offering a literature review on secondary scholarly sources on

[9] William Walters, *Governmentality* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 117.
[10] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1988), Authors' Notes.

political Islam, primary sources will be consulted in order to forge a definition for (Iranian) Islamism. In chapter two, a conceptual framework for this dissertation will be put forward by exploring the way in which the binaries of institute/movement, State Apparatus/war-machine, state/non-state societies may shed light on the notion of "state" in the early history of Islam. In particular, the ideas of Ibn-Khaldun, a fourteenth-century Muslim historian, will be examined in relation to contemporary findings on the interaction between state and non-state societies. In chapter three, the metaphysics of *velāyat-e faqih* will be explored by locating moments of transformation in Shi'ism from a sectarian anti-establishment movement (war-machine) to a faith making claims to rule the modern State Apparatus. In the following chapter, the historical and discursive conditions through which *velāyat-e faqih* was able to make itself available to the Iranian post-revolutionary situation will be examined. Drawing heavily on Michel Foucault and his governmentality approach, chapter four will set out to provide a sketch of modern Iranian governmentality in order to illustrate the modalities through which various arts of government were born, how they influenced each other and sought to establish a rather stable assemblage through Islamist discourse. And in the final chapter, the relation between religion and the modern state in post-revolutionary Iran will be examined. Specifically, attention will be paid to how the invocation of the concept *maslahat* by Ayatollah Khomeini and his disciplines not only hid areas of conflict between religious and political power, it also set the stage for an implicit secularization and coming to terms with the ethics of bio-power. A series of questions will then be posed in order to challenge the precise historical period and the political players that Asef Bayat has identified as "post-Islamists." After challenging Bayat's premise, mostly for undermining the agency of the modern state in transformation of the theology of the Iranian modern state, this chapter will offer an alternative definition of post-Islamism.

Chapter 1: What is Iranian Islamism? [Literature Review]

What is Iranian Islamism? While there may not be a prompt academic response to the question, there may already be a series of concepts and images that average citizens in both Iran and the Western world can evoke in relation to this question. For the average Western adult citizen, Iranian Islamism elicits memories of the American hostage crisis, televised live on news channels in the early 1980s. For journalists, perhaps daily news items on either Iran's nuclear program or women wearing headscarves ring a bell. For academics, images of the Iranian Revolution, best exemplified by the personality of Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–1989), may raise a flag. And for devout Iranian Muslims, if the concept has any meaning at all, it may be in the imminent rise of the utopian Mahdi State.

Such a general understanding of Iranian Islamism, along with vast academic scholarship on modern Iran, produces the assumption that the scrutiny of Iranian Islamism has long passed its initial stage, and readers and researchers are able to start with a basic definition of the concept. This hypothesis finds even stronger support with the recent deployment of the concept of *post*-Islamism in the academy, which implicitly creates the impression that there is already a consensus on the meaning of *Islamism* among scholars. However, a broad survey of literature on modern Islam and Iran rejects this hypothesis and affirms the need to rigorously engage with the topic. This of course is not to close one's eyes to the rich scholarship that is currently in existence on topics related to political Islam in Iran. Scholars with various agendas have long studied related themes, but there is barely any consensus in the literature as to what exactly constitutes "Islamism" in relation to the Iranian context.

Among scholars who have specifically written on the subject, there are those such as Nikki Keddi and Ali Mirsepassi who deploy "Islamism" without seeing the need to provide a

definition.[1] In these accounts not only it is assumed that the reader has a clear understanding of the concept, Islamism is also treated as a static phenomenon, or to use Michel Foucault's words, a "ready-made object" without its own history and evolution.[2] Further, one finds that in these accounts all expressions of political Islam are referred to as Islamism, and the long period between the nineteenth century and the present time, during which various historical events impacted the nature of Islamism, is largely ignored.

Asef Bayat, the protagonist of the post-Islamist scene, provides a narrower definition for the concept and stresses that central "to Iran's Islamism was the establishment of an Islamic state based on *wilayat al-faqih*, or the supreme rule of jurists."[3] With this state-centred approach, Bayat chooses not to characterize movements such as Fadā'iyān-e Islam—which emerged long before the text *Velāyat-e Faqih* was complied—or Marxist-inspired Muslim movements—which never fully complied with Khomeini's doctrine—as Islamists. In simple terms, Bayat chooses to ignore the long history of political Islam in Iran before the Iranian Revolution and that limits his definition to the moments in which Islamism has adopted state qualities.

Farhang Rajaee, author of *Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran*, reserves the term for Iranian state violence between 1989 and 1997, and views Islamism and state radicalism as synonymous.[4] Ali Mirsepassi echoes Rajaee in his predominantly pejorative

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[1] See Nikki R. Keddie, "The Revolt of Islam, 1700 to 1993: Comparative Considerations and Relations to Imperialism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. Vol.36, No3 (July 1994) and Ali Mirsepassi, *Political Islam, Iran and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). Mirsepassi deploys the term Islamism without defining it. He also treats Islamism and political Islam as synonymous. He mostly has post-revolutionary Iran in mind when using the concept.

[2] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 118.
Here Foucault expands on his method of historical inquiry. He explains that throughout his work he has refused to take historical objects as given. He instead sets out to search for origins and the evolution of objects. Having Foucault's method in mind, one may state that in most academic deployments of "Islamism" the concept is treated as a given.

[3] Asef Bayat, *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 38.

[4] Farhang Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism: The Metamorphosis of the Islamic Discourse in Iran* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2007), 3.

deployment of the concept, but goes one step further and views Islamism as a phenomenon that has nothing to do with Islam. Instead, he views Islamism as a Third-World nativist intellectual aspiration influenced by Counter Enlightenment Western philosophy.[5] To the list one may add Mehdi Mozaffari's widely cited article: "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept," in which the author offers a very broad definition of Islamism and frames Shi'i Ayatollah Khomeini next to Sunni Al-Qaeda members.[6]

There is no need for an exhaustive account of various invocations of the concept in order to illustrate the lack of coherency and consensus as to what exactly defines Islamism. This disparity of opinion, however, is not specific to Iranian studies. In the broader literature, specifically in political science, history, and religion, where political Islam is studied in a global context, one is able to identify the lack of consistency in the way the concept is deployed.

This broader literature is important as it concerns the question of Islamism while taking into account the similarities of political Islam produced in multiple locations. Ideally, one should be able to extract a comprehensive definition for Islamism from this literature and then explore how the adjective *Iranian* reveals something specific about this particular brand of Islamism. This means that scrutiny of Iranian Islamism would not be possible unless one first elucidates a definition of Islamism in the literature before attending to Iranian studies. After consulting various definitions of Islamism, the question then would be: how does the Iranian version of the concept express features peculiar to the Iranian national context? But as alluded to before, there is no single coherent definition of Islamism in the academic literature, and this lack of a coherent definition has led scholars to debate the very utility of the concept.

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[5] Ali Mirsepassi, *Political Islam,* 5-16.
[6] Mehdi Mozaffari,"What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Vol. 8, No.1 (Routledge, 2007):17-33.

For instance, in the edited collection *Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam*, Donald K Emmerson and Daniel Varisco offer arguments in favour and against using "Islamism" when discussing political Islam. While both scholars take the association, popularized in Western culture, between Islamism and violence for granted, Emmerson highlights the non-violent expressions of Islamism, and Varsico holds that negative connotations associated with Islamism makes any attempt to employ the concept in a positive light futile.[7] Emmerson writes in favour of using Islamism and Varsico takes the opposite perspective. Emmerson stresses that while Islamism and political terror are closely related to each other, there are also many Muslims who "endorse or engage in: social work to improve the welfare of Muslim communities; economic activities…[and] cultural undertakings to Islamize literature, theater, film."[8] According to Emmerson, organizations that pursue such activities fall under the category of Islamist groups. Emmerson then stresses that "the tendency to caricature Islamism as necessarily violent ... reflects a perception of threat more than a knowledge of reality."[9] Varisco, absolutely not convinced by Emmerson's rationale, insists that Islamism has been simply replaced by the term "fundamentalism" without much divergence in connotation. Islamists, he argues, still refers to those "conservative Muslims who reject Western values," and since "the underlying assumption in contemporary use of the term *Islamism* is that the violent behavior of certain Muslims is directed against Western targets," scholars must abandon the concept all together.[10] He does not offer an alternative but welcomes John Esposito's use of words such as Islamic "revival" and

[7] Donald K. Emmerson, "Inclusive Islamism: The Utility of Diversity," in *Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam,* eds. Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 29.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Daniel M. Varisco, "Inventing Islamism: The Violence of Rhetori," in *Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam,* eds. Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2010), 40, 46.

"resurgence" in reference to Islamism with the rationale that these concepts do not carry the dominant association between Islam and violence.

Although these scholars make notable assertions, they do not take into account that this debate takes place in the political atmosphere created by Western media in the post-9/11 period. It was after the fall of the twin towers in New York that media outlets such as Fox and CNN began to call Al-Qaeda terrorists Islamists, a term that is still loosely used in reference to ISIS or its supporters, or members of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda who reside in the West.[11] Furthermore, both Emmerson and Varisco take political Islam and Islamism as synonymous, hence failing to acknowledge various expressions of political Islam produced in diverse temporal and local situations.

In fact, most scholars in the field acknowledge the existence of *Islams* and *Islamisms*, yet they surprisingly share the assumption that one concept must explain the diverse ways in which Islam has manifested itself politically in the modern period. Scholars such as Emmerson, Mozaffari, and Graham Fuller have made ambitious attempts at uniting all expressions of political Islam under the banner of Islamism. Emmerson invokes James Piscatori's definition and introduces Islamists as "Muslims who are committed to political action to implement what they regard as an Islamic agenda," and he adds, "Islamism is a commitment to, and the content of, that agenda."[12] Fuller states that an Islamist is one who believes that "Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered … and seeks to implement this idea in some fashion."[13] Mozaffari invokes William Shepard's definition and agrees with Shepard's outlook. Shepard views Islamists as those who believe that realizing

[11] Mozaffari, "What is Islamism?", 18.
[12]. Emmerson, "Inclusive Islamism: The Utility of Diversity," 27.
[13] Graham E. Fuller "The Spectrum of Islamic Politics," in *Islamism: Contested Perspectives on Political Islam,* eds. Richard C. Martin and Abbas Barzegar (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 52.

Islam's potential in economic, political, and social behaviour must be materialized only through the creation of an Islamic state, the essential quality of which is the reign of *shari'a* law.[14] Peter Mandaville echoes Shepard by viewing Islamism as a form of "political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions and legal system drive directly from the *Shari'a.*"[15] Mozaffari himself defines Islamism as "a religious ideology with holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means."[16]

Despite the merits and flaws in each of these definitions, it is clear that they all appear to face the same the kind of problem as Emmerson and Varisco in expecting a single signifier to produce various meanings and satisfy scholarly and popular linguistic expectations. To provide an example for the problematic nature of such broad theorizations of Islamism, according to these definitions, Mehdi Bāzargān (1907–1995), an Iranian engineer educated in the United States with a national democratic outlook, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdādi, the self-identified leader of ISIS with a Salafi outlook, are both categorized as "Islamists." Evoking Emmerson and Varisco here, when Bāzargān and al-Baghdādi are both considered as Islamists, Emmerson is forced to stress that Islamism is not limited to al-Baghdādi, while Varisco insists that since media outlets only identify Islamism with al-Baghdādi, we must stop using the term altogether. In other words, the attempt to employ a singular concept in reference to all expressions of political Islam has proved very problematic and has prevented scholars from engaging with political Islam with the caution and specificity it deserves.

[14] Mozaffari, "What is Islamism?" 20.
[15] Peter Mandaville, *Islam and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2014), 74.
[16] Mozaffari, "What is Islamism?", 21.

Oliver Roy, the author of the seminal *The Failure of Political Islam*, has provided clues that may solve the problem. He published the book in 1992, hence many violent expressions of political Islam that emerged after 9/11 are not studied in his book. Yet he has provided general outlines that allow one to trace at least three different expressions of political Islam. He understands the politics of the *ulamā*, the Salafists, and Islamists as distinct; this categorization allows for differentiation of phenomena that may look very similar from the outside.[17] Roy stresses that while Islamism aims to bring Islam and modernity together, for the Salafists, modernity remains a "purely external phenomenon."[18] With this outlook, Roy views Islamism as a latently anti-clerical movement and differentiates between Islamism and Wahhābism.[19] Despite his various uses of the word fundamentalism to include oppositional movements, in most contexts Roy reserves fundamentalism to either refer to the *ulamā* or those traditionalists who object to women's participation in public life. Hence, Roy begins by listing various expressions of political Islam and uses the concept of Islamism to describe only *one* of these expressions. For Roy, unlike the *ulamā* and those with Salafi-Wahhābi leanings, Islamists are not fundamentalists, and in their position on women, for instance, they "see women as people, and no longer as mere instruments of pleasure or reproduction."[20] He continues: "Observers have all noted the presence and activism of women in the Islamist movement: recall the demonstrations of armed and veiled women in Iran."[21] With Roy, therefore, one is presented with a rather distinct definition of Islamism. Given the importance of his definition/description, it is worth quoting him at length:

> [Islamism] is the product of the modern world. The militants are rarely Mullahs; they are young products of modern educational systems and those who are university educated

[17] Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 46.
[18] Ibid., 21.
[19] Ibid., 87.
[20] Ibid., 58.
[21] Ibid., 59.

> tend to be more scientific than literary… They receive their political education not in religious schools but on college and university campuses where they rubbed shoulders with militant Marxists, whose concepts they often borrowed… For them taking over the state will allow for the spread of Islam in a society corrupted by Western values and for a simultaneous appropriation of science and technology. They do not advocate a return to what existed before, as do fundamentalists in the strict sense of the word, but a re-appropriation of society and modern technology based on politics. The masses who follow the Islamists are not traditional or traditionalists either; they live with the values of the modern city—consumerism and upward social mobility... they live in a world of movie theaters, café, jeans video and sports… [Indeed] the guerrillas of the contemporary Muslim world are city dwellers.[22]

With this sociological framework, Roy paints a particular picture of Islamism that matches political movements in Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, a picture that hardly has any relevance for movements such as Al-Qāeda or the Taliban, where the platforms of emergence have been in rural and village areas, and where invocations of religion follow puritanical and fundamentalist inclinations.[23] What is common about movements such as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS is the fact that they are followers of Salafi-Wahhābi ideology, while Islamists, in Roy's definition, to a large extent find themselves at odds with proponents of this ideology. To follow Roy and Mandaville, one may refer to this Salafi-Wahhābi strand of political Islam, with a very intense literal interpretation of the faith and which takes root in less-developed areas, as *Salafism*.[24] Islamism and Salafism, then, are two different expressions of political Islam with rather distinct origins. In fact, Salafism and Islamism emerged as two different responses to modernity.

Islamism/Salafism:

In order to better understand the difference between the origins of Islamism and Salafism, one must pay attention to two major early reform movements in the Muslim world, Islamic revival (*tajdid*) and Islamic reform (*islāh*), initiated by Mohammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhāb (1703–

[22] Ibid., 3-4.
[23] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 307-313.
[24] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 48.

1792) and Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839–1897), respectively.[25] Pondering the predicaments facing Muslim societies, Abdul-Wahhāb preached the necessity of reviving the tradition of the Prophet Mohammad and his close companions.[26] He argued that contemporary Islam had veered off the correct path by means of various innovations (*bid'a*) throughout history.[27] He thus concluded that Muslims should purge all non-Islamic influences, particularly mystical, Sufi, and Shi'i practices, from Islam.[28] He also argued for an intense literal reading of the Quran and maintained that reviving the example of righteous individuals from the past (*salaf*) would rescue Muslim societies from decline.[29] Later on, Abdul-Wahhāb formed an alliance with Mohammad Ibn Saud (1710–1765), and with his military support prepared to make Wahhabism the state religion of Arabia.[30] Wahhabism was initially a religious doctrine but later turned political and proved inspiring to adherents of a version of political Islam that sought a very puritanical and fundamentalist reading of the religion.[31]

Similar to Ibn Abdul-Wahhāb, Jamāl al-Afghāni advocated reviving the example of the *salaf*. The difference, however, was that Al-Afghāni wanted the *salaf* to be at the service of the present. Al-Afghāni is known as the father of Islamic reformism (*islāh*). It was his desire to reform Islam so that the faith would be compatible with modern civilization.[32] A political activist and reformer, Al-Afghāni travelled across the Muslim world and Europe and preached a pan-Islamist, anti-imperialist, and reformist understanding of Islam.[33] Unlike the inclinations of

[25] See John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998), 33-61 and Mandeville, *Islam and Politics*, 56-63.
[26] Ibid., 46.
[27] Ibid., 47.
[28] Ibid., 58.
[29] Ibid., 47.
[30] Ibid., 58.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid., 60.
[33] See Nikki R. Keddie and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghāni. *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1983).

Abdul-Wahhāb, he did not reject modernity as a whole. Instead, he identified certain flaws in modernity, such as a lack of spirituality, and it is here that, according to him, Islam could enter the scene and ameliorate European modernity.[34] Unlike Ibn Abdul-Wahhāb, strict religious observation was not his primary concern. In fact, there were disputes about the strength of his religious convictions. Al-Afghāni rigorously defended the revival of Islamic philosophy and rationalist deduction of religious teachings known as *ijtihad.*[35] In this respect, Al-Afghāni offered a radically different version and vision of Islam from that of Ibn Abdul-Wahhāb. The contrast between these doctrines had major political ramifications and led to distinct expressions of political Islam in the twentieth century.

The Egyptian heir to Al-Afghani's reformist Islam was Mohammad Abdu (1849–1905), whose ideas went on to inspire Rashid Rida (1865–1935), Ali Abd al-Rāziq (1888–1966), Hassan al-Bannā (1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), and gave rise to the movement known as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.[36] In Iran, Al-Afghāni proved very influential in orchestrating the Constitutional Revolution. His ideas inspired later intellectuals and activists that sought to bring together modernity, anti-imperialism, and Muslim unity.[37] Inspired by Mohammad Abdu, Turkey's Said Nursi (1877–1960) advocated the compatibility of Islam and science, an attempt that paved the way for the rise of a reformist-minded generation that founded the Justice and Development (AKP) party.[38] In Pakistan, Al-Mawdūdī (1904–1979), the founder of Jama'at-i Islami, embarked on an intellectual project that echoed that of Al-Afghāni and contemplated issues pertaining to Muslim unity, reform, and the social and political relevance of

[34] Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 49.
[35] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 61.
[36] Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 50.
[37] Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism,* 3.
[38] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 164.

Islam.[39] The common feature of all the movements inspired by Al-Afghāni is that their support emerged not from the *ulamā* in traditional religious centres but in major modern metropolitan hubs in the Muslim world. Having in mind Roy's description of Islamism, one may characterize Al-Afghāni as the godfather of Islamism and Ibn Abdul-Wahhāb as the godfather of Salafism.

These two figures operated on distinct grounds mainly because their medieval points of reference were different. Ibn Abdul-Wahhab invoked the works of Muslim theologian Ibn-Taymiyya (1263–1328), who was a Hanbali jurist with a staunch anti-Sufi and anti-Shi'i stance, and who advocated traditionalism or hadithism (reliance on *hadith*).[40] Ibn-Taymiyya was a zealous scholar with activist tendencies who issued fatwa (religious ruling) of *jihad* against the infidel Mongols. He also sought to find a *shar'i* base for the state, the aim of which, according to Ann K. S. Lampton, was "the triumph of the word of God and establishment of a society devoted to the service of God."[41]

Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, on the other hand, had training in Islamic philosophy and mysticism, and was influenced by the radical members of the Babi movement in the nineteenth century.[42] Babism was a heretical "Shi'i millenarian movement whose theological ideas and political aspirations can be traced back to the political philosophy of Sheikh Ahmad … al-Ahsā'i (1703–1791) and even further back to the transcendental philosophy of Mullā Sadrā … (1571–1640)."[43] Al-Ahsā'i had broken off from the scholastic Shi'i establishment known as *Usūli* Shi'sm and blended *Akhbāri* Shi'ism with Islamic mysticism.[44]

Usūlism:

[39] Ibid., 80-81.
[40] Ibid., 46.
[41] Ann K. S. Lampton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1981), 146.
[42] Nikki R. Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism,*10-11.
[43] Hamid Dabashi, *Islamic Liberation Theology: Resisting the Empire* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 40.
[44] Abbas Amanat*, Resurrection and Renewal, The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850* (London: Cornell University Press, 1989), 48.

The *Akhbāri-Usūli* rift had a long history in Shi'ism and it once again gained momentum in the eighteenth century upon the victory of *Usūlis* over *Akhbāris*.[45] *Usūlism* was charactized by rationalist tendencies within Shi'ism and framed the Shi'i *ulamā* as representatives of the hidden Imam and hence leaders of the Shi'i community.[46] The *Akhbāri* trend questioned the *Usūli* political ambitions and argued that the stated traditions or *akhbār* from the Imams would be sufficient for directing religious affairs and that there was no need for the intermediary position between the Imam and the community.[47] Al-Ahsā'i's *Akhbāri* inclinations, along with his unconventional invocation of Mullā Sadrāa's philosophy, "invited the troubling wrath of the Usūli clerics, who sensed in him a deeply dangerous threat to their powerful status, cozy arrangements with the Qajars, and vested interest in the status quo," and that eventually led to his excommunication.[48] The followers of Al-Ahsā'i formed the *Shaykhiah* movement, from which emerged the figure of Sayyid Ali Mohammad Shirāzi (1819–1850)—known as the Bab—the founder of the radical Babi movement which questioned both the authority of the Usūli ulamā and the Qajar kings.[49] The radical Babis were close associates of Al-Afghāni, and they did not hesitate to assist Al-Afghāni in his pan-Islamist agenda.[50] These associations make Islamism the heir to a blend of Shi'i *Akhbāri* and mysticism, and prove Salafism to be an offspring of Sunni traditionalism.[51]

The third expression of political Islam that Roy implicitly makes reference to is the

[45] Ibid., 35.
[46] Ibid., 34. For more on Usulism, see Ch.3.
[47] Ibid., 35.
[48] Hamid Dabashi, *Shi'ism, A Religion of Protest* (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 178.
[49] Amānat, *Resurrection and Renewal*,48.
[50] Sayyid Meghdād N. Razavi, *Tarikh-e Maktum* [Hidden History] (Tehran: Pardise Danesh, 2014), 111.
[51] This is, of course, not to deny the presence of other theological influences on these movements. But there is a case to be made as to how Shi'i and Sunni traditionalist strands were behind two distinct political movements in the Muslim world.

political role of *ulamā* or the traditional clergy. It must be noted, however, that the politicization of the religious clergy in the modern period is a Shi'i phenomenon, and that the kind of clerical activism that one sees in modern Shi'ism did not have a counterpart in the Sunni world.[52] Shi'i clerical authority was forged during the Safavid Empire in Iran. While its main task was to help the new dynasty solidify its authority, over time, and specifically in the post-Safavid era, the clergy was able to gain some autonomy from the state. "Financial and geographic independence…; the right to interpretation, even to innovation, on all questions; delegitimization of the state (this was new since the time of Safavids); strong hierarchy and structures: all operated to make the clergy a political force" in the post-Safavid era all the way to the nineteenth century.[53] Shi'i clergy that were predominantly part of an *Usūli* movement in the nineteenth century became a strong force of protest, the most important example of which was Ayatollah Shirāzi's (1814–1895) fatwa in 1891 that forbade the use of tobacco for as long as the British maintained a monopoly on the commodity. The *Usūlis* played an active role in the Constitutional Revolution, and since then they have asserted themselves as a powerful force in the Iranian political scene.[54] As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, one begins to see debates on discussion of *velāyat-e faqih*, which speaks to the fact that the *Usūli* claim for political power was present in public intellectual discourse.[55] Ayatollah Na'ini (1860–1936) wrote the first treatise on the compatibility of Islam and Constitutionalism, and reasserted *Usūli* claims for political power in the twentieth century.[56] One must note, however, that the Islamic Revolution in Iran was "not the revolution of [*Usūli*] ayatollahs, but of … young Islamists of secular origin,

[52] Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 51. For more elaborate discussion of this theme, see Ch. 3.
[53] Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam.* 171.
[54] Hamid Dabashi, *Shi'ism, A Religion of Protest,* 264.
[55] Rasul Jafariyan, *Jaryānha va Sazmānhāye Mazhabi-Siyasi-e Iran* [Religio-Political Currents and Organizations in Iran] (Tehran: Khāne Ketāb, 2012), 51.
[56] Hamid Dabashi, *Shi'ism,* 265

who saw in [Ayatollah Khomeini] the synthesis they were seeking between political radicalism and religious conviction," something they were not able to find, for instance, in a figure like Ayatollah Khoei (1899–1992).[57] The fact that *Usūlis* were not the leading influence in the making of the Islamic Revolution must not downplay the political role that the *Usūli* apparatus played in modern Iranian politics. Ayatollah Hassan Modarres (1870–1937), Abu'l-Qāsem Kāshāni (1882–1962), Sayyid Hossein Boroujerdi(1875–1961) and Mohammad Kāzem Shariatmadāri (1906–1986) are only four examples of religious scholars whose careers took them beyond religious circles. Emphasizing the political influence of Shi'i *Usūli* clergy and the fact that their socioeconomic background and agenda is distinct from Islamists allows one to recognize *Usūlism* as the third expression of modern political Islam.[58]

Differentiating between *Islamism*, *Salafism*, and *Usūlism* does not necessarily mean that these discourses have always remained apart. In fact, it was the fusion of Islamism and Salafism that led to the political expression of the latter's ideology. For instance, as the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb became more radicalized after enduring brutal torture by Nasser's regime, he distanced himself from social justice issues and began to see the world in the dichotomy of *jāhiliyya* (ignorance) order and a society governed by the *shari'a*.[59] Peter Mandaville stresses that Sayyid Qutb's radicalization led him to see no middle ground between the two worlds.[60] It was here that the concept of *jihad* was invoked to put an end to a world filled with *jāhiliyya*. In the 1960s, when followers of Qutb went to Saudi Arabia to teach at universities, they produced a fusion of Salafi-Islamist discourse, combining the activist Islam of Al-Afghani with the ideology

[57] Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam.* 174.
[58] See the section on the non-clerical quality of Islamism in the present chapter.
[59] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 102.
[60] Ibid.

of Ibn Abdul-Wahhāb.[61] In this context, whenever Salafism had the upper hand, the burgeoning of groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS became inevitable. Meanwhile, whenever Islamism had an upper hand, one sees the rise of recent political parties such as Hizb al-Benna, w'al Tanmia, Hizb Al-Asala, and Hizb al-Watan—all Egyptian parties that became visible in the wake of the 2011 Egypt Revolution.[62]

A similar situation applies to the fusion of Islamism and *Usūlism*, exemplified in the case of Ayatollah Khomeini. He had training in scholastic *Usūli* dogma, yet he was a master of Islamic mysticism and had an appreciation for Sayyid Jamāl al-Afghānī.[63] Scholars have also registered facts about the influence that he received from figures such as Ali Shariati (1933–1977), Jalāleddin Farsi, and Jalāl-e Ale-Ahmad (1923–1969).[64] So Khomeini's thought may be seen as an expression of Islamist-*Usūlism*. One of Khomeini's role models, Navvāb Safavi, must be seen in the same vein. Navvāb Safavi (1924–1956) was a young political activist with *Usūli* clerical training who was also influenced by the writings of Al-Afghāni.[65] The fusion of these influences led his religious movement, Fada'iyān-e Islam, to have strong political implications in the history of modern Iran, the most important of which was helping Mohammad Mosaddeq (1882–1967) come to power in 1951.

As stated earlier, Islamism, Salafism, and Usūlism were the three expressions of political Islam that were already implicit in Roy's work and only needed further elucidation. The fourth expression of political Islam may be explained by identifying Roy's main blind spot.

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[61] Ibid., 50.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ruhullah Khomeini, *Sahifeh-ye Imam* [Leaves of illumination: Collection of Imam Khomeini's Writings] (Tehran: The Center for Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, 2000, 1981-89), Vol. V, 286. Speaking to a university professor from the United States, Ayatollah Khomeini says: "Al-Afghāni was a qualified person, but he lacked a national and religious base."
[64] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 738.
[65] Ayatollah Ali Davāni, *Bidārgare Shargh* [The Awakener of the East], Tebyan.net, accessed September 1, 2018, https://goo.gl/QfKcuU.

Neo-Islamism:

What remains problematic about Roy's narrative of political Islam is its state-centred approach, and the fact that he assesses the success/failure of Islamism solely based on Islamists' performance in the state apparatus. He charges Islamists with an obsession with the state and adds that the states they have taken over "reflect first and foremost the failure of the Western-style state model, which was imported and commandeered by single parties and patronage networks."[66] Roy attentively notices Islamists' performance in charge of the state, but he does not acknowledge the difference between Islamism before and after the state takeover. Clearly there is a distinction between the two assemblages: Islamism as a movement and Islamism as a state apparatus. Islamism as a protest movement/ideology and Islamism as a state/ideology operate as two distinct phenomena, but this fact is barely noticed not only in Roy's work but also in the current literature on Islamism. In the case of Iran, neither Mirsepassi, Rajaee, nor Bayat acknowledge this dichotomy, and they neglect to take the state factor into account when considering Islamism. Even Iranian scholars writing on political Islam share the same blind spot.[67]

French theorists Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari believe that once a movement turns into an institution, the institutional logic will prevail and the discourse of the movement will be "appropriated" for institutional objectives.[68] Institutions, they would argue, are not neutral carriers of ideologies; they embody their own discourse and techniques of governance, and they require the ideology of the movement to conform to the ideology of the institution. To put it

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[66] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam,* xi*,* 195.
[67] See S.M.A. Hosseinizadeh, the author of *Islam-e Siyāsi dar Iran* [Political Islam in Iran]. He expresses no regard for the difference between Islamism as liberation theology and Islamism as discourse of state control.
[68] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 418.

simply, Deleuze and Guattari believe that it is not the movement that uses the state as a tool, quite the contrary—it is the state that appropriates the movement for its survival.[69] Having the case of Iran in mind, Sami Zubaida asks, "Is Iran an Islamic State?"; in answering his own question, Zabaida reveals state co-optation of the Islamist movement. He concludes that "the basic process of modernity in socioeconomic and cultural fields, as well as in government, subverts and subordinate Islamization" in Iran.[70] In other words, Zubaida realizes that in the post-revolutionary condition, Islamism was appropriated by the modern state. Other than the rhetorical gestures of the state, "the form of organization of the state and its institutions have no particularly Islamic features," and Muslim authorities are "often forced to adapt their policies and discourses to practical considerations" of the modern state.[71]

This framework may guide researchers to realize that scholars of political Islam have often focused on the "Islam" factor of Muslim states at the expense of completely downplaying the state itself as an "apparatus of capture."[72] In other words, it may very well be that it is not the Islamic aspect of state that makes the Islamic state worthy of attention; rather, the state that has claimed Islam as its ideology must be under scrutiny. As Foucault writes: "Concerning the expression Islamic government, why cast immediate suspicion on the adjective 'Islamic'? The word 'government' suffices in itself to awaken vigilance. No adjective—whether democratic, socialist, liberal or people's—frees it from its obligations."[73] In a series of speeches at the Collège de France, partly informed by the Iranian experience, Foucault pondered the question of

[69] Ibid., 466.
[70] Sami Zubaida, "Is Iran an Islamic State?" in *Political Islam.* eds. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 105.
[71] Ibid, 118, 105.
[72] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 424.
[73] Michel Foucault, "Open Letter to Prime Minister Mehdi Bāzargān." In Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, Gender and the Seduction of Islamism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 260.

the modern state and showed how the implications of biopolitics eventually supersede the modern state regardless of its ideological claims.[74]

Assessing Roy's stance on the "failure" of Islamism against Foucault's outlook, one may state that Islamism was bound to "fail" upon the takeover of the state, even if it did have an alternative vision for the state. In other words, following the Iranian Revolution, Islamism had to conform to the realities of modern governance. What Roy and other scholars such as Mozzafari and Bayat do not take into account is that by framing Islamism as an inherently statist movement, they tend to exclude those Islamist currents with a social and cultural outlook. This exclusion will be investigated more thoroughly later in this chapter, but for now it must be stressed that Roy's outlook must not be dismissed entirely. To be sure, one must acknowledge that there were/are Muslim currents that have shown an "obsession" with the modern state and they continue to view the state as a mere vehicle for social and political change. Further, when critiquing those who have overlooked the modern state's impact on Islamism, one should not disregard the agency of Islam as a discourse for changing the behaviour of the state. Islamist attempts to Islamicize the nation-state may have failed in the long run, but in the short run, a Muslim outlook has left its mark on the way that Muslim nation states have behaved both locally and internationally.[75]

The expression of political Islam that explains the search for a Muslim political agenda through the official apparatus of the modern state may be called *Muslim statism* or *neo-Islamism*. The term *neo-Islamism* helps to differentiate between Islamism as a movement and Islamism as

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[74] See Michel Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 118. Here Foucault makes reference to socialism and argues that governing a state involves series of techniques, and even the socialist state is bound to respect those techniques.

[75] In the case of Iran, one identifies the obligation of women to wear a headscarf in public or the exercise of power in presidential and parliamentary elections by the Guardian Council as ways in which the "Islamic" factor of the state manifest themselves.

the supporting ideology of the modern state. Neo-Islamists are statist Islamists that find themselves not in opposition to, but in charge of, the modern state. *Neo-Islamists* believe that through Muslims' control of the modern state, Islamist ideals will be realized. In other words, neo-Islamism explains the condition in which the biopolitics of the modern state have appropriated Islamism as its ruling ideology. The concept helps explain the politics of post-revolutionary Iran, the AKP in Turkey and those factions of the Muslim Brotherhood that have taken the statist route.[76]

So far, four major expressions of political Islam have been identified: *Islamism*, *Salafism*, *Usūlism*, and *neo-Islamism*. With these distinctions one may see the difference between Ali Shariati and Al-Baghdādi, Mehdi Bāzargān (1907–1995) and strict *Usūli* figures such as Ayatollah Golpaygāni (1899–1993) and Ayatollah Khomeini before and after the Islamic Revolution. Islamism here is not a signifier pointing to all expressions of political Islam; rather it is only *one* among others, whose definitions are as follows:

Salafism: Influenced by Ibn Abdul Wahhāb, Salafism is that expression of political Islam with a more puritanical and fundamentalist reading of the religious texts. Salafism has often emerged in non-modern rural and village settings and has tended to have global aspirations.

Usūlism: As post-Safavid Shi'i clerical authorities, Usūli clerics make scholastic claims for representing the twelfth Imam in the era of occultation, and exercise political power through their influence over a religious population.

Islamism: Influenced by Sayyid Jamāl al-Afghāni, Islamists have tended to emerge in modern metropolitan settings as oppositional movements to both the state and to clerics, and their project

[76] This dissertation has reserved the term Islamism for Islamic movements that have yet to become a ruling ideology even though they may aspire to capture state power. The prefix "neo" denotes recentness and similarity with Islamism yet making its difference with Islamism intelligible.

consists of making Islam and modernity compatible.

N**eo-Islamism**: A situation in which former Islamists have been able to take over the modern state. Neo-Islamists share the ideology of Islamists, yet they believe that through state control it is possible to create a society based on Islamic principles.

With this more nuanced picture of Islamism, then, one may investigate its particular Iranian qualities. Those discursive regimes and movements that are identified as employing Islamic concepts to further their cause in the period roughly between the Constitutional and Islamic Revolutions in Iran may be considered Iranian Islamism. Discursively Iranian Islamism starts with the writings of Sayyid Jamāl al-Afghāni and continues with the works of Abdolkarim Soroush. This means that Iranian Islamism is about a century old; it started a few years before the Constitutional Revolution and it lasted a few years after the Islamic Revolution. In order to arrive at a definition of Iranian Islamism, there is a need for its qualities to be elucidated. Here attention must be paid to the works of Islamist theorists (primary sources) and the works of scholars who have studied both Iranian and non-Iranian Islamism (secondary sources). Relying on scholars of Islamism is useful, as they have often conducted comparative studies of Iranian, Turkish and Arab Islamism, and although the frameworks employed in their works may differ, often their results do shed light on the particularities of Iran. Similarly, critical engagement with scholars who have studied political Islam in Iran contributes to a better understanding of Iranian Islamism. Here, features of Iranian Islamism will be introduced under a heading and discussed in detail in order to finally forge a comprehensive definition of the concept.

Modernity:

There is a consensus among scholars about the *modernity* of Iranian Islamism, both as a

sociological phenomenon and as an ideological construct.[77] The sociological approach to Islamism argues that adherents of Islamism emerged not in rural and village areas but in modern metropolitan centres.[78] Islamism found roots among the "young intellectuals, educated in government schools following a westernized curriculum and in many cases … recently urbanized families," and they were able to "offer the oppressed … the dream of access to the world of development and consumption, from which they feel excluded."[79] Roy has best summarized the promise of and condition of Islamism: "*shari'a* plus electricity."[80] An anthropologist undertaking field research in Iran in the aftermath of the Shah's aggressive modernization program known as the White Revolution was able to identify the rise of a new educated middle class whose loyalties were not directed towards Western values, but towards the "religious and cultural tradition of the old Iran."[81] Identifying with "old Iran," however, must not be mistaken as a desire to return to the past. In fact, the children of this new middle class attended engineering programs in universities and were eager to adopt technology and modern sciences.[82] They wrote a great deal on the compatibility between Islam and modern sciences, and they were keen to adopt technology for Islamist ends.[83] It is true that Islamists were "very vocal in their opposition to the [modernizing] government" of Iran, but their problem was less the modernity of the Shah's program than the way in which the plan was implemented.[84] In fact, the last generation of Islamists partaking in the Iranian Revolution was the product of the Shah's White Revolution,

[77] See Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam,* 195, and Farhang Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism*, 5.
[78] Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution, *"Theory and Society*. Vol. 11 No.3 (May, 1982), 271 and Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam,* 53.
[79] Ibid, 49, 52.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Raymond D. Gastil, "Middle Class Impediments to Iranian Modernization," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 22, no. 3 (October, 1958): 325.
[82] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam,* 52.
[83] The young Mehdi Bazargān is a good example here.
[84] Raymond D. Gastil, "Middle Class Impediments," 325.

and in that sense, "rather than a reaction against the modernization of Muslim societies, [one may say that] Islamism is a product of it."[85] It is therefore wrong to think of the advent of Islamism as a "return of a medieval, obscurantist clergy crusading against modernity."[86] Islamists' main outcry was not against the achievements of Western civilization but aggressive Westernization, a theme that is best illustrated in Jalāle Ale-Ahmad's *Gharbzadegi.* In *Gharbzadegi*, Ale-Ahmad laments Iranians' lack of agency in relation to Western modernity. According to Ale-Ahmad, a subservient relation to the West, embodied in power relations, cultural norms, and technological innovations, must be identified as "being stricken" by the West. He prescribes not countering modernity but adopting its elements such that it will not cause the complete erosion of local cultural values. He writes:

> We are not talking about the abolition of machines or their rejection, i.e. what supporters of utopian societies in the beginning of the nineteenth century fancied. Never! The world is caught up in the machines of historical determinism. Our discussion, rather, is on the way we deal with machines and technology... The fact is that until we have actually grasped the essence, basis, and philosophy of Western civilization and no longer superficially mimic the West in our consumption of Western products, we shall be just like the ass who wore a lion skin.[87]

"The disease" then, is not the West, but a blind imitation of the West without an exercise of agency on the part of Muslims. For Islamists, the West had come to "represent a denial of Islam, imperialism, state repression, economic mismanagement [and] cultural erosion" that must be countered through the use of modern machines.[88] In fact, Islamists leaned towards a critique of the West, ironically invoking postmodern thinkers such as Fredrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger in order to respond to questions concerning "which type of modernization strategy to

[85] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam,* 50.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Jalāle Ale-Ahmad, *Gharbzadegi* [Plagued by the West]. Translated from Persian by Paul Sprachman Delmar (Carvan Books Modern Persian Literature Series No. 4, 1982), 346.
[88] Bobby S. Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London: Zed Books, 2003), 119.

pursue," and on how to turn Muslims into subjects within the history of modernity.[89] Islamism therefore deprived the West of an exclusive claim to modernity, and through decentring the West it opened up a space for Islam in the vessel of the Enlightenment project.[90] This process, however, did not take place without Islam having to give concessions to modernity. The Islam of the traditional seminary schools needed to be transformed to not only comply with the realities of the modern world, but also to provide solutions to its crises. In other words, Islam must be reformed.

Reformism:

Islamism and Islamic reformism are synonymous.[91] In fact it may be stated that Islamism is a byproduct of Islamic reformism. Sayyid Jamāl al-Afghānī was among the first generation of Islamic reformists whose ideas had great political ramifications and acted as precursors to the rise of Islamism. What Al-Afghāni initiated became a trend in the twentieth century to the extent that one is not able to locate an example of a prominent Islamist thinker whose main preoccupation has not involved reformulating Islamic discourse such that it is attentive to contemporary perspectives. Charles Adams, an early observer of Islamic reformism, has defined the trend as:

> an attempt to free the religion of Islam from the shackles of a too rigid orthodoxy, and to accomplish reforms which will render it adaptable to the complex demands of modern life. Its prevailing character is that of religious reform; it is inspired and dominated chiefly by theological considerations.[92]

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[89] Ali Mirsepassi, *Political Islam*, 6 and Bobby S. Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear*, 98.
[90] Ibid., 110.
[91] There is a perception among reformist Muslim elites that Islamism is a regressive ideology. This stance forgets that the birth of political Islam and the reformist Muslim agenda were very much concurrent. In fact one led to the other, making the distinction between the two rather difficult.
[92] Charles C. Adam, Islamism and Modernism in Egypt (NewYork: Russell and Russell, reissued in 1968, first published in 1933), 1, quoted in Forough Jahanbakhsh, *Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran (1953-2000): From Bāzargān to Soroush* (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2001), 51.

The evolution of Islamic reform, however, went in a slightly different direction in Shi'i Iran in comparison to the Sunni world. In Sunni Egypt, Mohammad Abdu adopted Al-Afghani's legacy and initiated the Salafiyya movement—not to be confused with Salafism—and paved the path for the rise of Egyptian Islamism.[93] The difference between the Salafiyya movement and Salafism was that Abdul Al-Wahhab's Salafism prescribed a return to the *salaf* while rejecting modernity, whereas Mohammad Abdu invoked the *salaf* such that Islam would be "relevant to contemporary social challenges thorough the creative and judicious exercise of reason and human ingenuity."[94]

Despite this major difference, however, the two movements had one agenda in common, and that was purifying Islam from corruptions, superstitions, and cultural innovations. Islamism advocated cleansing Islam from popular and superstitious elements with a bias towards modern rationality, whereas Salafism advocated the same project with a bias towards strict traditionalism. This common agenda, albeit motivated by, and implemented in, two entirely different paradigms, at times brought the two projects together, which either made them appear very similar from the outside—hence the confusion of Western scholars about the actual differences between the two—or led the two projects to merge together. An example of this "merger" is Rashid Rida (1865–1935), an Islamic modernist and a devout student of Abdu, who started his intellectual career by attempting to bring modern and Islamic sciences together, but later, after attacks from Egyptian secular forces, Rida adopted a more conservative and literalist approach. "Where Abdu had advocated a general spirit of intellectual rejuvenation inspired by the model of the Prophet's early companions, Rida … [chose] a more constrained normativity

[93] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 48.
[94] Ibid., 62.

based on the Quran and the traditions of the Prophets and his companions."[95] Rida's transition from Islamism to Salafism took place because the impulse of the return to the *salaf* had already taken place in the Sunni world, but Shi'ism was hostile to Salafism due to the fact that one of Salafism's main targets was Shi'i doctrinal beliefs and practices.[96] Salafism had framed Shi'i rituals, doctrines, and beliefs as examples of innovations imbued with superstitions that must be eradicated in the process of returning to the model of the *salaf*.[97] This Salafi stance was a direct challenge to Shi'i *Usūlis*, as they were the main guardians and beneficiaries of popular Shi'ism and it was natural for them not to welcome the Salafi position with open arms. This, however, does not mean that Salafism did not make inroads into Shi'i Iran.

With the advent of Islamism and the adoption of rationalist tendencies on the part of Muslim activists, Iranian Muslim reformists found themselves at odds with Shi'i folk rituals and beliefs perceived as superstition, such as the divine status of the Imams, their intercession, and the return of the soul.[98] Hence, they launched a campaign against *ghuluww*, or exaggerated/extremist Shi'i views, and made an effort at rationalizing Shi'ism.[99] In this process they did not deprive themselves of the work already undertaken by Salafi reformists. An example of a Shi'i reformist scholar who adopted the Salafi critique of Shi'ism was Shariat Sanglaji (1892–1943), an anti-*ghuluww* preacher who discouraged reliance on hadith attributed to Shi'i Imams and called for sole reliance on the Quran for understanding Islam. He was a champion of fighting supposedly superstitious Shi'i beliefs, and the content of his book, *Tawhid*, evidenced strong similarities with Abdul-Wahhāb's thinking. He wrote:

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[95] Ibid., 67.
[96] Mozaffari, "What is Islamism?", 26.
[97] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 48.
[98] Ali Rahnema, *Shi'i Reformation in Iran: The Life and Theology of Shari'at Sanglaji* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 100.
[99] Ibid.

> One must abandon imitation and close-mindedness and ensure that we do not come to understand the Quran from those interpreters who each followed the agenda of their own sect. These sects all appeared in the second century and each sect interpreted the religion according to their own sectarian doctrine and if we were to follow them, we will sure be led stray. We must adopt the religion not from our ancestors (*khalaf*) and instead from the *salaf*; those who existed before the rise of philosophy, Sufism, Ash'ari and Mu'tazili sects, we must learn the religion from them.[100]

Although cast in Salafi terms, the context in which Sanglaji spread his ideas was the modern city, and his followers were among "military and government mid-rank position holders, poets, writers, managers of the press and the educated youth."[101]

Salafism was therefore decontextualized in the Iranian context, and its literal anti-superstitious impulse came to serve a modernist agenda and found support among the religious middle class dissatisfied with traditional clerical readings of the Islam. Hence the import of Salafi thought neither served the conservative agenda of Sunni Salafism nor did it enhance the authority of the Shi'i clergy. It was, therefore, natural for clerics to condemn Sanglaji, which they did, but as an observer in the 1960s stated, Sanglaji's "endeavor was a timely, socially responsible and conscious Islamic reaction against the danger of European civilization and its thoughts."[102] Sanglaji thus offered a middle ground between the secularity of the emerging Iranian intelligentsia and the scholastic tendencies of the *Usūli* clerics, and this intellectual middle ground formulated the discursive stance of Iranian Islamism for decades to come. Mahmoud Taleghani (1911–1979), Mehdi Bāzargān (1907–1995), Ezatollah Sahābi (1930–2011), and Heidar Ali Qalamdārān (1913–1989), all important figures in the making of Islamist thought and practice, were influenced by Shariat Sanglaji, a fact that further connects Islamism

[100] Shariat Sanglaji, *Tawhid* (date and the publisher unknown), quoted in Noroddin Chehardehi, *Wahabbiat va Rish-e-hay-e Aān* [Wahhabism and its Roots] (Tehran: Fathi, 1984), 169. Ash'ari and Mu'tazili are two opposing theological schools that flourished between the eighth and tenth centuries.
[101] Ibid., 174.
[102] M.H Saheboz Zamani, *Dībācheyi bar Rahbari* [An Introduction to Leadership.] (Tehran: Atāi Press: 1966), 137.

with reformism.

Sanglaji was not an Islamist per se, but his reliance on the Quran as the sole authority for deriving knowledge and his independence from the clerical apparatus has encouraged scholars to identify similarities between his reform project and the early Protestant reformism of Martin Luther and Jean Calvin in Europe.[103] Sanglaji encouraged a generation of Muslim thinkers and activists to not only ponder reforming Islam but also the social and political relevance of the religious text.[104] Ali Shariati, an indirect heir to Shariat's reformist project, spoke of Islamic Protestantism two decades later.[105] He stated:

> To emancipate and guide the people, to give birth to a new love, faith, and dynamism, and to shed light on people's hearts and minds and make them aware of various elements of ignorance, superstition, cruelty and degeneration in contemporary Islamic societies, an enlightened person should start … an Islamic Protestantism similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages, destroying all the degenerating factors which, in the name of Islam, have stymied and stupefied the process of thinking and the fate of the society, and giving birth to new thoughts and new movements... Such a movement will unleash great energies and enable the enlightened Muslim to: 1-Extract and refine the enormous resources of our society and convert the degenerating and jamming agents into energy and movement… And finally, eliminates the spirit of imitation and obedience, which is the hallmark of the popular religion, and replaces it with a critical revolutionary, aggressive spirit of independent reasoning (Ijtihad). All of these may be accomplished through a religious reformist movement, which will extract and refine the enormous accumulation of energy in the society, and will enlighten the era and will awaken the present generation. It is for the above reasons that I, as a conscientious teacher who has risen from the depth of pains and experience of his people and history, hope that the enlightened person will reach a progressive self-awareness. For whereas our masses need self-awareness, our enlightened intellectuals are in need of "faith."[106]

Shariati views Islamic reform as a precursor to political activism, and his project is concerned less with strict observance of religion and more with offering a socially relevant

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[103] Rahnema, *Shi'i Reformation in Iran,* 7.
[104] Yannn Richard, "Shari'at Sanglagi: A Reformist Theologian of the Rida Shah Period," in *Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism*, ed. Sa'id Amir Arjomand (State University of New York Press, 1988), 159-178.
[105] Ali Rahnema, *Elahiat va Siasat-e Roshanfekri-e Irani* [Theology and Politics of Iranian Enlightenment] (Printed in Tehran: Andishe Pouya), accessed September 1, 2018, http://akharinkhabar.com/Pages/News.aspx?id=174454.
[106] Ali Shariati, *Az Kojā Āghaz Konim* [Where Shall we Begin?]. *Shariati.com*, accessed September 1, 2018, http://www.shariati.com/english/begin/begin7.html.

reading of Islam. Shariati notes that while the clerical interpretation of religion does not provide a religious basis for social and political activism, secular intellectuals see religion as an obstacle for progressive social change. In order to resolve the problem, Shariati calls for a new interpretation of religion, hence, reforming Islam, that neither suits the conservative agenda of the clerics nor the secular pursuits of the secular intellectuals. Ali Mirsepassi notes a similar project in his study of the series of reformist attempts on the part of the Iranian clergy that operated as counterparts to Shariati's project. These clergy members, who may be referred to as *Islamist-Usūlists* or *Usūli-Islamists*, depending on their prevailing discourse, sought to reform traditional Shi'i institutions in response to the secular and Islamist impulses of the day. Mirsepassi conducts a close reading of two journals, *Maktab-e-Tashayyo'* and *The Monthly Religious Societies*, and concludes that contributors "paid little attention to the Koran and the Prophet's tradition. They were evidently more concerned with increasing the attractiveness of Shi'ism for youth and in making a political impact rather than merely spreading religious propaganda."[107] Mohamamad Tavakoli Targhi identifies a similar approach in his discursive analysis of Islamist reformist projects. He sees the process through which Islamists adopted the discourse of modern medicine in their attempt at making Islamism a socially and politically relevant discourse.[108] He shows how Islamists borrowed from the scientific achievements of Louis Pasteur and framed Islam as a "cure" for the social and political "disease" of a society in transition from tradition to modernity.[109] "In the constitutionalist discourse, critics identified and cured the disease of *the nation*, and in the discourse that led to Islamism, intellectuals attempted

[107] Ali Mirsepassi, *Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization: Negotiating Modernity in Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 91.
[108] Mohammad Tavakoli Targhi, "Tajaddode Roozmareh va Aāmpoole Tadayyon," *Iran Nameh*, 24, No. 4, (Winter 2008), 420-458.
[109] Ibid., 423.

to diagnose and treat the disease of *society*."[110] Hence the rise of Islamist discourse became possible "through the invocation of health and medical concepts."[111] Both Mirsepassi's and Tavakoli Targhi's research reveal a much more creative and complex process of Islamic reformism from that adopted by Shariat Sanglaji in the early stages. Despite its nuances and different manifestations, however, the ethos of Islamic reform remained consistent, and it was able to construct a middle ground between staunch secularism and traditional scholasticism, therefore making Islam attentive to the social and political questions of the time. Through reform, Islam was no longer a discourse monopolized by the clergy and only suitable for rituals and daily functions; rather, Islam was to be seen as the answer to "to problems facing Iranian individual[s] and society at the time."[112] It is here that Islam moves "closer to the concept [of] ideology in a secular sense than to a religious promise of human eternal salvation."[113] At the heart of Sanglaji's project, one sees a transformation of Islam from religion to an ideology.

Ideology:

If there is one theme that all scholars of modern political Islam agree on, it is the ideological quality of Islamism. They argue that that Islamism is not only a religion but an ideology.[114] Some would even go further and deny its religious character and merely characterize it as a modern ideology comparable with Marxism, fascism and the like.[115] While scholars have often ascribed a negative connotation to the ideological quality of Islamism, for Islamists themselves, ideological Islam was seen as a sign of its progressive character and relevance to the

[110] Ibid., 446 (emphasis added).
[111] Ibid.n
[112] Ali Mirsepassi, *Intellectual Discourse*, 90.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Rajaee *Islamism and Modernism,* 4.
[115] Meghnad Desai, *Rethinking Islamism* (I.B Tauris, 2007), 45.

modern world.[116] Shariati is famous for offering an ideological reading of Islam, and he himself saw that as the strength of his project. Shariati differentiated between Islam as an ideology and Islam as culture: "Islam as an ideology produces Abu-Dar, and Islam as culture produces Avicenna. Islam as an ideology produces a militant, whereas Islam as culture produces *mujtahed*. Islam as an ideology produces an intellectual and Islam as culture produces a mere scholar."[117] Mehdi Bāzargān, while defining ideology as a "goal, path, method, tactic, plan and a dominant criteria of thought and social actions," ensured that "the only credible and sustainable ideology is the one inspired by religion and the divine."[118] Ayatollah Khomeini, being more assertive, spoke of the comprehensive nature of the Islamic canon. In his famous *Velayāt-e Faqih* he argued:

> The laws of the shari'a embrace a diverse body of laws and regulations, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of law, all the needs of man have been met: his dealings with neighbors, fellow citizens, and clan as well as children and relatives; the concerns of private and martial life; regulations concerning war and peace and intercourse with other nations, penal and commercial law; and regulations pertaining to trade and agriculture.[119]

What one identifies here is a flavour of universalism that, according to Roy, stems from the "modernity of Islamist thought" and not so much from the universalist claims of Islam.[120] Surely, the Quran had made it clear that its message is universal for all people and all times, but the claim that Islam is the solution to all wordily affairs is certainly a modern phenomenon arguably rooted in the universalist qualities of the Enlightenment as reflected in "the militant

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[116] For a negative characterization of Islamism as a political ideology see Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam* (Yale University Press, 2012). On page seven he writes: "[T]he politicization of Islam is a process by which this religion is used for the articulation of political concerns that are not in line with Islamic faith. Political religion becomes a means for the pursuit of nonreligious ends. I keep repeating that Islamism is not Islam." Tibi's assertion best exemplifies the perspective that does not recognize the inevitably of Islam adopting ideological positions upon its encounter with modernity.
[117] Ali Shariati, *Hossein Vares-e Ādam* [Hossein the Inheritor of the Earth] (Tehran: Qalam, 1981), 209.
[118]Mehdi Bāzargān, *Mabāhes-e'Elmi, Ejtemā'i, Islāmi, Majmoo'e Āsār*, (Vol 8), quoted in S. Mohammad Ali Hosseinizadeh, *Islam-e Siasi dar Iran* [Political Islam in Iran] (Qom: Mofid University Publications, 2006), 197.
[119] Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini,* translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 43.
[120] Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 20.

rationalism" of Islamists.[121] After all, for centuries the *ulamā* saw the function of religion as specific to the domain of the holy, and they were willing to relegate the profane to heads of states, but the need for Muslim reformists to reform Islam necessitated the adoption of modern reason as a mode for thinking through worldly concerns.[122] All modern ideologies, such as Marxism, liberalism, and fascism, were founded through the use of modern reason, hence it was natural for Islamists, who believed their ideology to be based on the same structure of thought, to claim that they possessed all the answers and to use Islam as "a clear blueprint that requires only mechanical implementation."[123]

While many critics of Islamism have held Bāzargān, Khomeini, and, most important of all, Shariati responsible for turning Islam into an ideology, and have thus implicitly denoted the ideological quality of Islamism as a relatively recent invention, a further look at the history of Iranian Islamism indicates that the ideological qualities of Islamism were embedded into the very ethos of this modern discourse at its moment of its inception.[124] The attempt to make Islam and modernity compatible already implied the ideologization of the faith, which means that Islam could not have resisted becoming an ideology if it were to survive as a force within modernity. In addition, turning Islam into an ideology was not a conscious project taken up by group of opportunists using religion for political ends, as some scholars are inclined to argue; rather, as the case of Iran shows, any bold participation of religious forces in contemporary events would have rendered the metamorphosis of the faith into an ideology.[125]

In Iran, Shi'i clergy played an influential role in the making of the Constitutional

[121] Ibid., 21.
[122] Sa'id Amir Arjomand, *The Shadow of God & the Hidden Imam* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 99.
[123] Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism,* 4.
[124] See Abdolkarim Soroush. *Farbeh-tar az Edeology* [Weightier than Ideology] (Tehran: Serat Publication, 2001), 97.
[125] Bassam Tibi, *Islamism and Islam* (London: Yale University Press, 2012).

Revolution. Assadollah Kharaghāni (1838–1937), a *faqih* from the city of Kharaghān and an associate of Al-Afghāni, was among the active clergy members in the Revolution whose reformist ideas gave birth to the rise of ideological Islam. Influenced by Al-Afghani, Kharaghāni played a key role in encouraging the clerical forces in Najaf to support the Constitutional Revolution.[126] Satisfied with the process in the beginning, he was eventually dismayed with the Revolution due to its secular outcome. However, he did not abandon his constitutionalist convictions and continued the project of reconciling Islam with modern *raison d'État.* He was perhaps the first to speak of an "Islamic democracy" in order to resolve the situation wherein "if one spoke of *Islamiyyat* [Islamism], he would be associated with despotism, and if one spoke of freedom, he would be associated with secularism."[127] Kharaghāni stressed that he saw this antagonism as a construct and as "fundamentally anti-Islamic, and if some Muslims are playing a part in this antagonism, that is either because of their ignorance, or desire for powerful or personal complexities."[128] Reacting against the *Usūli* figures that rejected constitutionalist values and against the secular forces that saw Islam as outdated, Kharaghāni sought to draw out Islamic conceptions of political freedom. But first he had to refute stances that did not see any political potential in Islam. He wrote: "That people say religion has nothing to do with politics, is a false statement … and I acknowledge that some tend to reduce Islam to ablution, prayers and fasting … but that is not the case with Islam and all its political rulings."[129] With this assumption, he boldly argued that democracy was a gift from Islam to the world. He wrote:

> From the perspective of politics, Islam competes with all scholars and books written on the subject of politics in the world. And one must state with a loud voice that: the spirit of

[126] Razavi, *Tarikh-e Maktum*, 63; Rasul Jafariyan, *Asadaollah Kharaghāni* (Tehran Markaz-e Asnād-e Enghelāb-e Islami, 2003), 72.
[127] Asadaollah Kharaghāni, "Resāleh Hoviyat al-Tamaddon va Hoviyyat al-Islam" [A Treatise on the Quality of Religion and Civilization] in Rasul Jafariyan, *Asadaollah Kharaghāni* (Tehran Markaz-e Asnād-e Enghelāb-e Islami, 2003), 82.
[128] Ibid., 144.
[129] Ibid., 158.

> Islamic politics consists of freedom, equality and equity and the faith preserves the laws comparable with all national states and democracies in the world. This means, the equality before the rule of law, which is the precondition for democratic states, was in fact extracted from Islam. The spread of democracy was the fruit of Islam and that is what distinguishes Islam from other religions. One may go as far and state that the rise of a national state was a promise of the twelfth hidden Imam and this is by no means an erroneous claim.[130]

Kharaghāni's stance regarding the universality of Islam is not limited to politics. Similar to later Islamists, he introduced Islam as a comprehensive system of knowledge with specific instructions in matters related to law, politics, society, justice, wealth, and economics.[131]

What explains this urge for universality is undoubtedly the hostile secular environment created in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution. From the stance of the secular elite, the Revolution was seen to have failed, and the religious establishment, best exemplified in the character of Sheikh Fazlollah Nūri (1843–1909), was to take the blame.[132] A few years later, Ahmad Kasravi and Ali Akbar Hakamizādeh, both secular thinkers, became the voice of the secular elite and published a series of treatises and articles challenging clerical authority.[133] Ali Akbar Hakamizādeh wrote the famous *Asrār-e Hezār Sāleh*, in which he harshly criticized the *ulamā* for their authoritarianism, promotion of superstitious beliefs and apathy regarding the masses.[134] Hakamizādeh's stance was met with different reactions from religious figures, two of whom were Ayatollah Khomeini and Sheikh Mohammad Khālesizādeh (1891–1963).[135] Ayatollah Khomeini wrote *Kashful-Asrār* in 1943 and refuted Hakamizādeh's assertion by

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[130] Ibid.,153.
[131] Ibid.,124.
[132] Sheikh Fazlollah Nūri was a prominent and controversial clerical figure during the course of the Constitutional Revolution who supported the Revolution in its initial stage but later on deemed constitutionalist ideals heretical. He was eventually hanged by the secularist supporters of the Revolution. See Chapter 4 for more context on Nuri's political activism.
[133] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 46. Both Kasravi and Hakamizādeh had clerical training and. initially had strong religious beliefs, but later on they abandoned their convictions and turned secular.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid, 51.

making a case for Islam as a comprehensive religion. He stressed that Islam had answers for modern problems, and this marked the beginning of a project that later culminated in *Velāyat-e Faqih*. Khālesizādeh also reacted to Hakamizādeh, though he adopted a middle ground between the secular and clerical positions in a way similar to Kharaghāni, and for this reason his response was not received well by the *Usūlis*.[136] Nonetheless, similar claims for the universality of Islam are identifiable in his work. He too held that "only Islam can manage the world and bring humanity to ultimate happiness."[137]

Hence, Kharaghāni's project to universalize Islam was doomed to repeat itself in the following generation.[138] Kharaghāni's antagonists, aside from *Usūli* clerics, were the secular constitutionalist activists and later on Iranian Marxists who entered the scene and issued new challenges to the world of Islamists. In the process, these challenges brought Islamists to the realization that in "order to become politically and ideologically competitive with the secular forces," they had to undertake the "the task of politicizing Islam."[139] Islam becoming ideology, then, was a reaction against secularism and also a desire to forge a Muslim subjectivity in Iranian modernity. The secular intelligentsia framed Islam as a metaphor for tradition, primitivism, and

[136] Ibid. Mohammad Khālesizādeh was an anti-British and anti-Reza Shah activist who was among the early defenders of the notion of Islamic Government. While holding firm convictions on the role of *fuqaha* in politics, he held unconventional views on the women's headscarf, arguing that it should not be compulsory. Similar to Sanglaji and Kharāghani, he rejected some Shi'i popular beliefs, deeming them superstitious. He wrote *Kashful-Astār* in response to Kasravi, but distribution of his book was restricted by the clergy in Qom due to some of its anti-clerical content. He was also known for his staunch anti-Bahā'i stance.
For more on Khālesizādeh see: Encyclopedia Iranica entry on Khālesizādeh, accessed Sept 1, 2018, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/khalesizada
[137] Hosseinizādeh, *Political Islam in Iran*, 515.
[138] Kharaghāni hugely influenced Mahmoud Tāleghāni. Dissatisfied with the autocracy of Mohammd Reza Shah and the silence of the religious establishment, Taleghani edited and published the work of another influential figure of the Constitutional Revolution, Ayatollah Nāi'ini (1860–1936). Similar to Kharaghāni, Nāi'ini held that that Western civilization extracted its foundation from the laws of Islam, a position that seems to capture the views of progressive Muslim constitutionalists. In the introduction of Nāi'ini's book, entitled *Tanbih Al-Umah va Tanzih Al-Mellah Ya Hukumat Az Naza-re Islam* [*State From Islamic Perspective*], Tāleghāni highlighted the importance of anti-despotic activism with religious motivation; the same stance was adopted by Kharaghāni a few decades before.
[139] Jahanbakhsh, *Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran*, 55.

anti-modernity in order to depoliticize Islam, but as Sayyid puts it, "by removing it from the center of their constructions of political order, they politicize it; unsettling it and disseminating it into the general culture, where it became available for re-inscription."[140] This process began with Kharaghāni, if not Al-Afghāni, and Shariati was not the last to take up this project. The modernity of Islamism, its reformist project, and its competition with secular ideologies left Islamism with no choice but to make claims for the universality of its doctrine and thus to turn religion into an ideology.

But the case of Kharaghāni provides other clues about the qualities of Islamism. Though a Shi'i cleric, Kharaghāni did not share the contemptuous view that Shi'i orthodoxy conventionally holds toward the first three Rashidun caliphs, and that brought him closer to the Sunni position. In fact, Shariat Sanglaji was a student of Kharaghāni and it is probable that his teacher inspired Shariat's Sunni inclination. Also, in Kharaghāni's Islamist discourse, one sees constant reference to modern concepts such as a "national state," or "democracy," which speaks to his discursive exchange with other modern liberation discourses. A strict implementation of *shari'a* does not seem to be the main concern of Kharaghāni's writings; rather, his defense of the notion of Islamic politics puts the emphasis on the egalitarian aspects of the Islamic polity. For him, Islamic politics means good democratic government. This Sunni-inclined, discursively facile, and non-fundamentalist denotation of Islamic politics that one identifies in Kharaghāni's discourse was also found in the texts produced by future generations of Iranian Islamists.

Sunni Inclination:

Influenced by Al-Afghāni, Kharaghāni pondered the question of Muslims' civilizational decline and concluded that "abandoning the political ordinance of Islam" had led to the declining

[140] Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear,* 73.

status of Islam relative to the West.[141] He held the silence of the *ulamā* and their tacit support of despotic kings responsible, and argued that kings not only lost their status as protectors of the religion, they were the embodiment of *tāghut*.[142] To better craft his argument, Kharaghāni drew on the early history of Islam and argued that Islamic decline happened once before, and that was when Muslims abandoned the egalitarian ethos of the religion upon the rise of the Umayyad dynasty.[143] He saw the reign of the first four Rashidun caliphs as the embodiment of Muslim democracy, wherein Islamic teachings pertaining to equality were implemented at their best. In particular, he believed the rule of Abu-Bakr and Umar acted in accordance with the "justice-oriented tradition of the Prophet" and emphasized that it was after the first forty years that the Muslim political community experienced a gradual decline. [144] With this stance, Kharāghani distanced himself from the orthodox Shi'i position known for its uncompromising criticism of the first three Caliphs. Kharaghāni even went further and critiqued the doctrine of waiting for the appearance of the twelfth Imam and argued that the famous authority verse in the Quran had to be interpreted beyond the status of infallible Shi'i Imams.[145] In fact, he invoked the early Sunni political experience in order to draw a model for Muslim politics and provide a solution for the declining status of Muslims in the modern period.

With Kharaghāni one begins to see a slight shift from the orthodox *Usūli* Shi'i position to what may be called a *Sunni political episteme*. Khālesizādeh held similar views to that of

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[141] Jafariyan, *Asadollāh Kharaghāni,* 119.
[142] Ibid., 128. *Tāghut* is a Quranic concept that denotes a person or an entity that rebels against God. In Islamist literature the concept was invoked to refer to an illegitimate government. During the course of the Islamic Revolution, the Shah's regime was referred to as "regim-e tāqhut."
[143] Asadaollah Kharaghāni*, Resāleh Hoviyat,* 150-151.
[144] Jafariyan, *Asadollāh Kharaghāni,* 73; Kharaghāni*, Resāleh Hoviyat,* 150.
[145] Jafariyan, *Asadollāh Kharaghāni,* 120-121. "Authority verse" is a famous and perhaps the most quoted Quranic verse by classic and modern theologians when justifying inclusion of religious authority in temporal politics. The verse states: "Obey God and obey the Prophet and those among you who hold authority." The latter part of the verse prescribes obedience to an authority of religious persons/institutions after the Prophet.

Kharaghāni and became very influential for a young thinker named Heidar Qalamdārān, who combined the teachings of Kharaghāni, Khālesizādeh, and Sanglaji, and boldly defended the Rashidun's model as a paradigm for an ideal Islamic state.[146] Like Sanglaji, Qalamdārān saw the elements of exaggeration (*ghuluww*) in popular Shi'ism as the root cause of civilizational decay, and with militant language he called for purifying the religion of non-rational teachings.[147] He framed *inhetāt* (decline) as his main concern and argued that Muslim progress would not be possible without seriously engaging with the question of the state.[148] He then critiqued the Shi'i position that reserves authority only for the infallible Imams.[149] He assessed the implication of this Shi'i stance as negative, because according to him, subjects are encouraged not to obey their rulers, which leads to anarchy and opposition and forces rulers to go on the offensive. He held Imam Ali in high regard, yet he adopted Sunni-style pragmatist language and defended the affairs of the community upon the Prophet's death.[150] Qalamdārān differentiated the Shi'i concept of *Imāmat* from the practical implementation of religious law and held that the latter was more pertinent in the contemporary context:

> We shall here explain the concept of Imam that has recently found a particular meaning among the Shi'is.[151]
>
> [Imam] means a political leader, one who can implement the permissible and forbid the impermissible; one that can implement the *hudūd* and protect God's religion. From the hadith one may dissect the importance of government, and this is against the teachings that views the state authority as only the provision of the infallible Imam and argues that since the Imam is absent we must abandon the implementation of the religious law. There

[146] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents*, 903.
[147] See Heidar-Ali Qalamdārān, *Rāh-e Nejat az Sharre Ghulāt* [The Path to Get Rid of the *Ghulāt*](pdf. Downloaded from Aqeedeh.com). www.aqeedah.com is an online Farsi library with a Sunni missionary agenda that contains books written by Shi'i authors who were critical of aspects of Shi'ism. The "About Us" section the website specifically justifies inclusion of Qalamdaran's works in the library. The website mentions censorship and the labeling of authors as "Wahābis" in Iran as reasons why works of authors such as Qalamdaran have being included in the website.
[148] Heidar-Ali Qalamdārān, *Armaghān-e Asemān* [The Gift of the Sky] (pdf Downloaded *from* Aqeedeh.com, 219).
[149] Ibid.
[150] Qalamdārān *Armaghān-e Asemān*, 55.
[151] Ibid., 63.

> is no doubt that the governor of Muslims must first and foremost be an infallible person, but in case that he was not present or he was not willing to hold political power, this incumbent duty of state affairs must not be abandoned and it is essential for the community to help the qualified individual and bring him to power and … obey him in affairs related to the religious law.[152]

Coming very close to a classic Sunni position, Qalamdārān held matters of the community and state affairs above the supernatural qualities of Shi'i Imams. Contrary to the orthodox Shi'i position that held the execution of religious law by the first three Rashidun caliphs as illegitimate, for Qalamdārān the implementation of religious law had priority over the executor of the law.[153] This position reminds one of similar assertions made by Ayatollah Khomeini in *Velāyat-e Faqih*, where he assigned more weight to the law than to the executor of the law, and went as far as to implicitly assume an equal status between the Prophet, Imam Ali, the Rashidun and the *faqih.* Khomeini wrote:

> Can there be any distinction in … respect [to religious law] between the Most Noble Messenger, the Imam and the *faqih*? Will the *faqih* inflict fewer lashes because his rank is lower? ... The ruler supervises the executive power and had the duty of implementing God's laws; it makes no difference if he is the Most Noble Messenger, the Commander of the Faithful or the representative of the judge he appointed to Basra or Kufa, or a *faqih* in the present age.[154]
>
> It is evident, then, that to assume the function of government is to acquire a means and not a spiritual station, for if government were a spiritual station, nobody would be able to either usurp it or abandon it. Government and the exercise of command acquire value only when they become the means for implementing the law of Islam and establishing the just Islamic order; then the person in charge of government may also earn some additional virtue and merit.[155]

But this is not the only area in which Khomeini's and Qalamdārān's thinking overlaps. Qalamdārān reserved the position of the ruler for a *faqih* who has knowledge of God's laws. As with Khomeini, for Qalamdārān, the *faqih*-ruler must be in charge of executing religious duties

[152] Ibid., 72.
[153] Ibid., 63.
[154] Khomeini. *Islam and Revolution*, 63.
[155] Ibid., 66.

such as *jihad* (holy war) and *shūra* (consultation), and his religious righteousness will protect him from turning despotic.[156] Comparing Qalamdārān and Khomeini illuminates strong similarities between the two authors, although Qalamdārān's account is argued in much more detail. There is no evidence whether Qalamdārān influenced Ayatollah Khomeini, but scholars have noted Qalamdārān's influence on Ayatollah Montazeri (1922–2009), Khomeini's student and a developer of the thesis of *velāyat-e faqih*.[157] Qalamdārān is also said to have influenced Islamists such as Mehdi Bazārgān and Ali Shariati.[158]

In the popular Iranian Islamists' scene, Qalamdāraān did not leave a broad impact, but his influence on the elite must not be disregarded. What appeared more influential in the line of Qalamdārān's project was Iranian Islamists' direct access to the translated works of Sunni political thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb and Mawdūdī. Iranian Islamists showed little concern towards the Sunni background of these authors, mainly because they were more interested in the political and social ideas developed in these texts than their doctrinal differences.[159] Ayatollah Khāmeini was a reader of Mohammad Iqbal and Sayyid Qutb, and his brother, Mohammad Khāmenei, translated the works of Sayyid Qutb into Farsi.[160]

Besides political relevance, there was another factor that brought Shi'i and Sunni thinkers together, and that was the concept of Muslim unity advocated by Al-Afghāni. His pan-Islamist ideas were never realized, but they encouraged both Shi'i and Sunni sides to downplay their sectarian differences and imagine themselves as a united *umma* fighting the imperialist powers. For instance, in Egypt, rather than "adopting an official school of jurisprudential thought (one of

[156] Ibid., 69, Qalamdārān *Armaghān-e Asemān*, 192.
[157] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents*, 905.
[158] Ibid., 905.
[159] Ibid., 381.
[160] Ibid., 383.

four Sunni *madhahib*), Bannā and the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] instead disavowed these as unnecessary obstacles to the singularity of" Islamism.[161] A similar stance was adopted in Iran, and an Iranian Islamist, Navvāb Safavi, made alliances with the Muslim Brotherhood and travelled to Egypt and supported their cause in the face of opposition from Nasser's regime.[162] The two strands of Islamism, Egyptian and Iranian, came close together, and the issue of Palestine and anti-Zionism became the hallmark of global Islamist discourse.[163] After all, the members of these movements identified more with Islamism as a global ideology instead of focusing on their sectarian inclinations.

Henceforth, Kharaghāni's positive invocation of Rashidun's Caliph, the priority of the implementation of religious laws over Shi'i Imams on the part of Khomeini and Qalamdārān, the import of the works of Sunni Islamist thinkers, and pan-Islamists' stress on the concept of unity brought about a slow transition of Iranian Islamism towards a Sunni political episteme. One must note that these Sunni-inclined Iranian thinkers never abandoned Shi'ism, yet their attempt at reconciling Shi'i doctrinal heritage with Islamic statism—the process that Ernest Gellner calls the transition from Low Islam to High Islam—brought them closer to Sunni political thought.

For Gellner, High Islam is the religion of "scholastic theology, legal casuistry," and "puritanism and scripturalism" espoused by "urban scholars, recruited largely from the trading bourgeoisie…[and that] reflects the natural tastes and values of urban middle class," and Low Islam is the religion of "hysteria, religious brotherhood and fraternities" and that "provide[s] invaluable services in the semi-anarchic rural conditions."[164] Gellner then applies these concepts to various expressions of the two sects and identifies Sunni and Shi'i Islam with High and Low

[161] Mandeville, *Islam and Politics*, 91.
[162] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents*, 381.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Ernest Gellner, *Postmodernism Reason and Religion* (London: Routledge, 1992), 12, 14, 11.

Islam respectively. Forgiving Gellner's essentialism and orientalism, and accepting his rather general dichotomy at face value, one may state that the rational, modernist, and urban quality of Islamism brought the Islamist discourse in greater resonance with the High Islam of Sunnism than the esoteric, mystical qualities of Shi'ism. Finding themselves in the middle of a very rationalist environment, Iranian Islamists had to cleanse Shi'ism of its romantic and *ghuluww* qualities and forge a discourse suitable to the predicament of the Muslim middle class, which struggled to remain religious in modern Iran. This new discourse had to meet questions related to power and state, and the Shi'i history of esoteric quietism and abstention from worldly power did not lend itself as a fully available resource. It is here that Shi'i Islamists became inclined towards Sunni political thought, and Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamism "shifted Iranian Shi'ism firmly in the direction of a kind of Sunnification ... [and he] took it very close to the puritan version of Sunni High Islam."[165] Islamism was the embodiment of High Islam and it needed to invoke medieval instances of High Islam in order to survive, and that was made possible through a rather subtle Sunnification of Shi'ism. This Sunnification, however, did not go unchallenged. Traditional *Usūli* authorities who did not approve of the direction adopted by Iranian Islamism labeled Islamists "Wahhābis" or "Sunnis" and stirred various campaigns against them, to the extent that there was almost no influential Islamist figure who was able to escape being labelled as a Sunni or a Wahhābi.[166]

Similar to the case of Sanglaji, Sunni concepts such as the Islamic state were imported to Shi'i Iran in the context of a rising urban middle class, and Islamic concepts were juxtaposed against various emerging discourses such as constitutionalism, nationalism, and Marxism, which

[165] Ibid., 17.
[166] A prime example here is the case of Ne'matollāh Sālehi Najaf-Ābādi, which will be discussed later. Even Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati did not escape being labeled as Wahhābis.

thus made Islamism active in a discursive exchange with other modern discourses.

Discursive Exchange:

Qalamdārān's teacher, Khālesizādeh, wrote in defense of what he called a "national government" and "freedom," but as Hosseinzadeh points out, he was never clear as to what he meant by these concepts.[167] What is evident is that for Khālesizādeh, a national government was synonymous with an Islamic order in which its ruler "can unite the country and bring about a true national unity."[168] For Khālesizādeh, "it is then that a true national government will be formed and a national government will focus on the national economy."[169] Throughout his writings and activism, Khālesizādeh aligned modern concepts such as national government, national economy and freedom to Islamic concepts, thus making his Islamism open to signifiers from other non-Islamist discourses. In fact, critics mockingly called him (whose last name literally means "being born pure") *Makhlootizādeh* (literally meaning being born impure; *makhloot* meaning mixture) for his perceived borrowing of concepts from discourses other than Islam.[170] Setting aside the intended irony of Khālesizādeh's critics, this accusation of *makhloot* operates as an effective metaphor here for the discursive status of Islamism.

Understanding Islamism as a modern discourse, as scholars of discourse analysis indicate, already implies the non-fundamentalist, mobile, and unfixed nature of Islamism and its openness to exchange signifiers from discourses with which it comes into contact. As Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Philips show: "Discourses are incomplete structures in the same un-decidable terrain that never quite become completely structured."[171] Within the Iranian context,

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[167] Hosseinizadeh, *Political Islam in Iran*, 515.
[168] Mohammad Khālesizādeh, *Islam va Mafhūm-e Haghighi-ye Hokūmat-e Melli* [Islam and the Real Meaning of a National Government], quoted in Hosseinizādeh, *Political Islam in Iran*, 517.
[169] Ibid.
[170] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 901.
[171] Marianne Jorgensen and Louise J. Philips, *Discourse Analysis and Theory and Method* (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 29.

Islamists "were influenced by the discourse they set out to challenge, [while] incorporating certain of its crucial elements," making "analysis of revolutionary thought and practices" a rather delicate task.[172] As is evident in the cases of Kharaghāni and Khālesizādeh, in its initial stages Islamism was influenced by constitutionalist and nationalist discourses, but as many scholars have pointed out, with the advent of Marxist and Third World discourses in Iran, Islamism gained a new momentum. Hosseinizadeh argues that Marxism had a great influence on Iranian Islamism, and Roy goes so far as to frame the discourse of the Iranian Revolution as a "Third World continuity of the Islamist movement by expressing the North-South opposition in religious terms."[173] Shariati, as a theorist, and Mojāhedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), as an Islamist movement, are useful examples mentioned by scholars for studying the incorporation of Marxist signifiers into Islamist discourse.[174] Through discursive analysis, one is able to identify many concepts that originally belonged to Marxist or other liberation discourses which were later imported into Islamist discourse.

A similar but lesser known example of the importation of signifiers into Islamist discourse is found in the work of Jalal-e-din-Farsi. A Muslim activist and theorist, Farsi traveled widely to countries in the Middle East and was a reader of Marx and Arab political thinkers.[175] During the coup in Iran he was a follower of Mohammad Mosaddeq and a member of the Muslim constitutionalist-leaning party, *Nehzat-e Azādi* (Freedom Front).[176] In his influential *Enqelāb-e-Takāmoli-e-Islam,* Farsi combined democratic and Marxist concepts, and made a case for the revolutionary character of Islam and its evolution throughout history. Teleologically,

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[172] Farzin Vahdat, *God and Juggernaut, Iran's Intellectual Encounter with Modernity* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 132.
[173] Hosseinizadeh, *Political Islam in Iran*, 191; Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 4
[174] Ervand Ebrahamian, *Iran Between two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1982), 467.
[175] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 737. Farsi made multiple trips to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon beginning in 1960 and made contacts in activist and intellectual circles in the Sunni world.
[176] Ibid.

befitting the Marxist and Hegelian influence on his work, he made a case for an Islamic state by drawing on the early history of Islam. He writes:

> In the history of politics and society, two competing political systems have been recognized: one is *Royal Despotism* and the other one is *Constitutional Republicanism.*[177]
>
> We are set out to show how the political order of Islam was able to dismantle Royal Despotism and bring about an order that contains elements of Constitutional Republicanism, if not more [advanced than constitutionalist features]… In order to succeed in a political revolution, the *revolutionary* movement of Islam first set out to change the *superstructure* of society embodied in beliefs and values before attending the question of *base* … The *ideological* essence of Royal Despotism was polytheism and ignorance and through a revolutionary change, the political system underwent a transition.[178]
>
> [After that] the state that was dominated by authoritarian or colonial groups transformed and served the cause of the *oppressed* and it enforced justice. With this transition, the features of [an] Islamic state appeared very different from other states. In contrast to an authoritarian, profit-seeking, slave-oriented state, Islam brought about a *constitutional state* in which consultation, kindness, altruism and brotherhood were the defining values of the state.[179]

Farsi's language demonstrates how signifiers from various modern liberation discourses made their way into Islamist discourse.

Ayatollah Khomeini was a reader of Farsi's works, and upon Khomeini's request, Farsi compiled Khomeini's lectures on *velāyat-e faqih*, edited the texts, added two chapters, and published it under Khomeini's name.[180] Therefore, the text known today as *Velāyat-e Faqih* was co-authored by Khomeini and Farsi, and in sections where the text turns from theology toward contemporary political themes, Farsi's influence, if not authorship, is quite evident. But Farsi was not the only influence on Khomeini's discourse. The Ayatollah was also a reader of Shariati and Ale-Ahmad, among many others, and his discourse did not contain traditional religious

[177] Jalaleddin Farsi, *Enghelāb-e-Takāmoli-e-Islam* [Evolutionary Revolution of Islam] (Tehran: Asia, 1965), 117.
[178] Ibid., 121.
[179] Ibid., 132 (Italics added).
[180] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 740.

concepts.[181] Hosseinizādeh has conducted an analysis of Khomeini's writings and speeches in the years between 1978 and 1979, and locates the following concepts in Khomeini's discourse: "freedom," "welfare," "democracy," "women's rights," "ethnic rights," "independence," "land reform," "reviving the industrial sector," "eradication of poverty," "equitable distribution of wealth," and "economic growth."[182]

The implication of this discursive relation of Islamism with other modern liberation discourses is twofold. First, Islamism was not stagnant, fundamentalist religious dogma drawing solely on signifiers from a religious discourse. Second, specifically concerning the question of the state, Islamism did not seek to dismantle all modern institutions and go back to the past to implement a strict *shari'a* state modeled on the rule of the Prophet. Also, the concept of an Islamic state or Islamic Republic was not a call for the clergy to take over the state and enforce *shari'a* law; instead it embodied "an empty signifier, one that contain[ed] the dreams of all in [a] repressed nation."[183] Hosseinizādeh writes: "On the one hand, Islamic state signified the progress of political and economic institutions, welfare and overall condition of life, and on the other hand, it meant an urge for Iranians to go beyond the material and bring about a spirit in a spiritless world."[184] The modern and worldly desires for an Islamic state were not a recent invention; as early as the 1950s, when Fadā'iyān-e Islam first began to publicly call for *hukumat-e Islami*, their demands were not solely constructed on religious terms. In advocating for an Islamic state, they envisioned a society in which all forms of corruption could be eradicated, and then the state would operate in an efficient and healthy manner.[185] They in fact wrote policy

[181] For instance, Ayatollah Khomeini borrowed the concept *gharbzadeh* from Ale-Ahmad.
[182] Hosseinizādeh, *Political Islam in Iran*, 191.
[183] Ibid., 264.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 229.

sheets for each government ministry and most of their prescriptions assumed the ethics of biopower.[186]

"Thus when Islamists claim that the best government is an Islamic government, here Islamic refers to the incarnation of goodness, so that the claim becomes: the best government is the good government," writes Sayyid. He continues: "it is precisely at this point where Islam is strongest, because, for a majority of Muslims, Islam must be the definition of good," and *hukumat-e Islami* becomes the embodiment of an efficient constitutionalist modern state that will allow good ethics and spirituality to reign.[187]

In the Usūli clerical mindset, though, the meaning of *hukumat-e Islami* was rather different. For them a strict implementation of *shari'a* while preserving the monarchy was a priority, and this position made them appear as enemies of the Islamists. It is here that Roy stresses that "there was an anticlerical tendency in Iranian Islamism that contested the clergy's religious monopoly; this tendency was embodied in the thinker Ali Shariati and in extremist groups such as People's Mujahidin."[188]

Non-clerical:

Though most Islamist ideas originated from people and places outside the established religious apparatus of Shi'i clerics, and they often took an anti-clerical position, there were still Islamists among the clergy; Usūlis either became hostile to Islamism or they joined the movement. Similar to the Babi movement of the nineteenth century, clergy forces either converted to the new movement or they found it heretical and hence worthy of *takfīr*

[186] Ibid., 228. The content of the policy proposals made to the government on the part of Fadā'iyān-e Islam stresses the well-being of the population and not so much ideological considerations. It is in this context that a Foucauldian concept of bio-power finds relevance. For more on Fadā'iyān-e Islam see Chapter 4.
[187] Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear,* 48.
[188] Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam,* 169.

(excommunication). The difference was that this time Islamism was able to formulate its language in a rather conventional Islamic discourse, though the social and political aspirations of Islamists were still in contrast with that of Usūlis. It may be said that the Islamists' agenda was heretical from the Usūli stance but not its language. And this indeed left traditional Usūlis in a rather ambiguous position as to how to relate to Islamists.

While Shariati's famous slogan "Islam minus the clergy" is the most prominent example of the hostility between Islamism and Usūli clericalism, one must note that the non-clerical stance of Islamism preceded Shariati.[189] Besides early figures such as Kharaghāni, Khālesizādeh, and Sanglaji, whose ideas were not welcomed by the Usūli clerics, the next generation of Islamists too found themselves in a rather antagonistic relationship with the Usūlis. From an Islamist stance, clerics were the embodiment of the status quo, which manifested itself in support of an oppressive, despotic king, social conservatism, political expediency and medieval scholasticism.[190] For instance, when Fada'iyān-e Islam found themselves in the midst of radical Islamist activism, not only did they not receive the support of the Usūli apparatus, their movement was barely even recognized as Islamic by Ayatollah Boroujerdi (1875–1961).[191] Fighting back, a section of a Fada'iyān-e Islam newsletter spoke directly to Ayatollah Boroujerdi in rather offensive language:

> Oh you so called scholar of Islam! Oh you disloyal friends of ours! ... Alas, a dog is more loyal than you, I wish you had learned loyalty from a dog. You have worked so hard for your religious position, but you have not put a fraction of that endeavor to protect the basis of Islam. You are not even willing to undertake the slightest risk for your position and put yourself amidst all kinds of charges, *takfirs* and excommunications. Unless you find your own position at risk, you would not take a position even if the worst tragedies will be inflicted upon those who are the followers of the Prophet.[192]

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[189] Shireen T. Hunter, *Iran Divided: The Historical Roots of Iranian Debate on Identity, Culture in Twenty Firth Century* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 75.
[190] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 878-881.
[191] Ibid., 209.
[192] E'lāmiyye-ye Fadā'iyān-e Islam, quoted in Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents, 209.*

This hostility was not only exercised at a rhetorical level. Strategically, Islamist elites distanced themselves from Usūlis in order to secure prestige in the eyes of their followers and secular intellectuals. Part of this cleavage was due to the fact that Islamists found Usūli teachings incapable of producing social and political mobility.[193] They took up the reformist heritage of Islamism and relied solely on the Quran and *Nahj-ul Balāgha*, and thus undermined the hadiths as a source of religious inspiration.[194] They referred to clerics as forces of *irtijā* (regression) and ensured that they would not receive credit for the revolutionary momentum of Islamism. In a pamphlet published by an Islamist organization after the Revolution, the author attempts to frame Ayatollah Tāleqāni as an Islamist in the face of what the author views as attempts to appropriate his credentials as a Usūli clergy:

> The thoughts and activism of Tāleqāni had roots in the movement initiated by Sayyid Jamal [Al-Afghāni]… Tāleqāni [similar to Al-Afghāni] was present in all anti-colonial and anti-despotic struggles and after the Revolution he was able to locate the forces of *irtija* and stand against them. Tāleqāni started his activism at a time when religion was a monopoly of clerics; those clergy who did not bother with true struggle and even sent "May God Protect the King" to the Shah after the coup d'état. … It is obvious then that the background and ideological struggles of Tāleqāni had nothing to do with the clerics.[195]

Here the distinctions that Islamists made between their movement and that of the clergy are quite evident. Islamists themselves understood Al-Afghāni as their main source of inspiration and saw Islamism as a non-clerical movement. It was in this context that Islamists debated the case of Ayatollah Khomeini. The author of the lines above continued by analyzing Khomeini's status:

> It is obvious for us that the dogmatic Islam of the clergy is in no way qualified to enter society … and galvanize the mass to peruse human ideals. The dogmatic Islam of the clergy does not contain the science of struggle, life and movement; it is the opposite, and history has shown that the clergy has been the cause of stagnation, intellectual downfall

[193] Hunter, *Iran Divided*, 74.
[194] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents*, 472.
[195] Author Unknown, *Tāleqāni, Sangari ke Mostazafeen az ān Bar Imperialist-Irtija Shooridand!* [Tāleqāni, a Platform That Enabled the Oppressed to Rebel against Imperialism and Regression!] (1981, online reprint 2012), 33.

> and cultural backwardness. It is here that similar to the question of Tāleghāni one may ask: how was Khomeini who emerged from dogmatic Islam able to become a supporter of the oppressed and become an anti-imperialist militant? Is it not the case that the dogmatic Islam of the clergy has produced figures such as Boroujerdi, Khānsāri, Khoei and Shariatmadāri? Is it not the case that these figures are the opposite to struggle and movement and even today they stand against Khomeini? ... It is therefore, obvious that the seminaries are not able to create a figure like Khomeini, but they can certainly create figures like Khoei and Shariatmadāri. What made Khomeini was not the Islam of the clergy but his personal qualities…[196]

While there is an excessive stress on the personal qualities of Ayatollah Khomeini, the author has a point in differentiating Ayatollah Khomeini from the mainstream clerical establishment. On a number of occasions throughout his career, Khomeini had expressed discontent with his religious counterparts, and his inclination towards mysticism and philosophy was also highly frowned upon in the traditional setting of religious seminaries.[197] Unlike Boroujerdi, Khomeini was fond of Fadā'iyan-e Islam and, as one of his students observed, he carried both the qualities of the Islamism of Fada'iyān-e Islam and the status of *marja'iyyat* (source of emulation).[198]

At best it may stated that Khomeini was an Islamist-Usūli, with his Usūlism playing a lesser role in making him the leader of one of the biggest Islamist movements of the twentieth century. One of the events that best exemplified the rift between the Islamism of Khomeini and the clerical establishment was the quarrel over a book published by Sālehi Najafābādi, a student of Khomeini, titled *Shahid-e Jāvid*. This book depicted Imam Hussein, the third Shi'i Imam, as a rational individual in search of the creation of an Islamic state, a narrative that certainly challenged the Shi'i scholastic position on the status of Imams with semi-divine qualities.[199]

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[196] Ibid.
[197] Behrooz Moazami, "The Islamization of the Social Movements and the Revolution, 1963-1979," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 29:1 (2009), 60.
[198] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents*, 213.
[199] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents*, 933-948. From the perspective of the scholastic Shi'i position, Imam Hussein was an all-knowing individual who anticipated his martyrdom. Najafābādi's account suggested that the Imam had a worldly pursuit, that is: creation of an Islamic state. Hence, according to Najafābādi, if the Imam knew that martyrdom was his fate he would have not embarked in such political struggle. Despising Najafābādi's account,

Many clerics who did not approve of the text removed themselves from revolutionary Islamist activities and came to view Islamism as being at odds with classic Shi'i clerical teachings.[200] A person sympathetic with Khomeini's cause but worried about religious issues sent the following message to Khomeini:

> Please let Mr. Khomeini know that some are promoting Wahhabism under the guise of supporting him … please let him know that Khomeini's supporters disapprove visiting the shrines, *rowzeh-khāni*, and other holy affairs … to sum [up], I should say that those who like you and support you promote Wahhabism, Marxism and anti-religious creeds. Please ask him to take these points into account.[201]

The sender of this message had correctly identified the contrast between the Islamist momentum of Khomeini and the traditional religious teachings of *Usūli* clerics. He had also identified rationalism, inclination toward Sunnism, and the discursive exchange of Islamism with Marxism and other "anti-religious creeds." Roy is correct to state that "Khomeini never favored the clergy as an institution: on the contrary he sought the support of Islamists … rather than that of high clergy."[202]

It must be stated, however, that Islamists did appreciate clerical authorities on one issue: the anti-imperialism and anti-authoritarianism of some Shi'i clerics.[203] Arjomand notes that Islamists "were aware of the influence of Shi'i hierocracy on the masses and sought to use it

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many Shi'is, denounced his book. It is stated that the Shah's secret service (SAVAK) reprinted copies of the book in order to create a rift in the Muslim community.

[200] Ibid., 937.

[201] *Ayatollāh Meshkini be Ravāyat-e Asnād-e Sāvāk*-Ketāb-e Chehellom-e Yārān-e Emām be Ravāyat-e Asnād-e Sāvāk (Qom: Dārolhadith Institute, 2013), quoted in Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 937.

[202] Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 173.

[203] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents*, 739. Previously it was mentioned that Usuli clerics were despised by Islamists for their authoritarianism, and here it is stated that the anti-authoritarianism of some clergy was appreciated by Islamists; these assertions may suggest a contradiction. To be clear, Islamists were aware of the oppositional role of a fraction of religious authorities in anti-colonial and anti-despotic movements. Yet Islamists were also aware of a charge put forward, particularly by secular elites, that behind ulama's political struggle lay a pursuit of state power and the goal of enforcing strict *shari'a* law. Islamists, henceforth, adopted a middle position. They distanced themselves from the ideological and political agenda of the clergy, yet they did not deprive themselves of taking advantage of ulama's influences on the masses. Further, Islamists only supported the political clergy or those with a radical anti-state stance.

against the Pahlavi regime... [In addition,] they were impressed by the oppositional role of the *ulamā* to the state in recent Iranian history and [they were] full of unrequited admiration for them."[204] Ale-Ahmad acknowledged the historical role of the *ulamā* "as a base and danger against imperialisms," Shariati appreciated their standing against imperialism, and Farsi appreciated their oppositional role towards state power.[205] Islamists were careful not to offend the clerics when unnecessary so as to not exhaust their oppositional potential for their own Islamist cause. Though Islamists ideologically distanced themselves from Usūlis, they did not fail to see the clerics as tactical allies in their political agenda. Hence, through acknowledging Usūlis' strength in anti-authoritarian struggles, Islamists aimed to appropriate the Usūlis' clerical oppositional credentials for their own agenda while maintaining a line between themselves and the Usūlis.[206]

Theology of the nation state:

Aware of the anti-clerical tendencies of Islamists, Ayatollah Khomeini not only put a ban on clerics' involvement with state power in the early stages of the Islamic Revolution, he also approved the first draft of the constitution, which made no mention of *velāyat-e faqih.*[207] It was later on and due to contingent circumstances, mostly related to crises of state sovereignty, that Khomeini revoked his initial stance and appeared as an ardent advocate of *velāyat-e faqih.*[208] This post-revolutionary contingency refutes the position taken by scholars such as Bayat who define Islamism in relation to an authoritarian desire on the part of Iranian Islamists to constitute

[204] Sa'id Amir Arjomand, *Turban for the Crown, The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 98.
[205] Jalal-e Al-e Ahmad, *Gharbzadegi* [Plagued by the West], 256; See Ali Shariati, *Nāmeyi va Pāsokhi az: Mo'allem-e Shahid Ali Shari'ati be Āghāy-e Nāser Makārem* [A Letter and Response from Martyr/Teacher Ali Shariati to Mr. Naser Makarem], (year and place of publication unknown).
[206] See Chapter 4 for more on the interaction between Islamist Farsi and Usuli clerics.
[207] Arjomand, *Turban for the Crown*, 150.
[208] Ibid., See chapter 4 and 5.

the state based on *velāyat-e faqih*. This is not to deny the fact that Islamists did pursue the creation of an Islamic state, but, as alluded to before, not only were they very vague as to what exactly that constituted. At best, what they had in mind was a socialist-leaning constitutionalist state that observed the religious and spiritual values of its constituents.[209] Islamists did not call for a rejection of the modern nation-state, and to use Piscatori's words, they sought an "Islamicized nation-state."[210] It is this statism on the part of Islamists that encourages Roy to view Islamism as a movement with the sole agenda of state capture. But what Roy and others do not take into account is the fact that Islamism was not only a by-product of the rise of the nation state, it had a role to play in its making.

As Mandaville correctly points out, it is "in the aftermath of the establishment of nation-states in the Muslim World that we can begin to speak of the emergence of Islamism as a distinctive form of Muslim politics."[211] The reverse is also the case, as one is able to identify a process in which Islamists participated in the making of the nation-state. In the case of Iran, it was the activism of Al-Afghāni, Kharaghāni, and Islamist clerics that had a huge part in the initial success of the Constitutional Revolution and the birth of Iranian *raision d'Etat*. Later on, however, clerics appeared as an obstacle in the making of the modern state, and with the failure of the secular nationalist front to secure a constitutionalist state, Islamists distanced themselves from the Usūlis and forged an Islamic-Marxist constitutionalist discourse. With this non-clerical Marxist-constitutionalist discourse, Islamists appeared to cultivate the strongest anti-Shah position and presented an unbeatable discursive candidate to rule the post-revolutionary state.

Of course, the post-revolutionary state eliminated both radical Marxists and

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[209] Michel Foucault, "What Are Iranians Dreaming about?" in Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, Gender and the Seduction of Islamism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 206.
[210] James Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1986), 140.
[211] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 74.

constitutionalist Islamists and made concessions to clerical authority, but the nation-state was able to claim full authority in the Iranian territory while enjoying a modern division of power: the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches of government.[212] Post-revolutionary Iran recognized elements of a free market economy, suppressed Marxist forces, and held presidential and parliament elections every four years, all of which solidified the modern state and its ethics of biopower. Clerics did little to disrupt the affairs of the state. The element of *shari'a* played only one role among many "other secular legal provisions and government." The post-revolutionary state was even allowed "to disregard shari'a provisions in legislation and policy 'in the interests of the Islamic community,'" which meant that "secularization ha[d] not been reversed, but disguised behind imposed symbols and empty rhetoric."[213] Paradoxically, this implies that Islamism was helping the rise and maintenance of a secular project of the nation state with *neo-Islamism* acting as its dominant ideology. Hence, what Roy undermines is the reverse relationship between Islamism and the nation state and the way that Islamists contributed to the making of the nation state in Iran. Both Islamism and the Iranian nation state were not separate ready-made objects waiting for one to claim the other. They were coproduced; at times they cancelled each other out, but eventually they came to one another's assistance.[214] One, however, must not forget that Islamists would not have been able to take over the state by means of a popular revolution without first constructing hegemony in civil society.

Liberation Theology:

Volpi is correct to assert that the political nature of Islamism "must be seen as a re-interpretation of various social activities that were previously not considered to be political, by

[212] Sami Zubaida, "Is Iran an Islamic State?", 109.
[213] Ibid., 119, 105.
[214] The relation between Islam and the nation-state will be discussed thoroughly in chapters 4 and 5.

the state authorities and by those analyzing social life from a statist perspective."[215] In other words, as Sayyid has put it, "The political is the moment of the institution of the social. It may involve the capture of the state apparatus by a dedicated vanguard, but it may also include a more diffused strategy of intellectual reform of civil society as a precursor to acquiring state power."[216] Having the Iranian case in mind, one may even go a step further and identify Islamist currents whose ideology forbade capturing the state. The anarchist-leaning Islamist group *Forqan*, under the influence of Shariati, believed in "Islam minus the clergy," and went as far as to assassinate clerics whom they associated with the new Islamic state.[217] They were also firm believers of Shariati's doctrine of "perpetual revolution," and they were not impressed with the democratic referendum after the Revolution nor with empowering the Iranian army in post-revolutionary conditions.[218] They saw themselves as the embodiment of the red, or Alavid Shi'ism, opposing the power apparatus that they associated with Safavid Shi'ism. They took these concepts too from Shariati, who also believed that:

> Islam is a religion which makes its appearance in the history of mankind with the "no" of Mohammad (PBUH)... Shi'ism is the Islam which distinguishes itself and determines its direction in the history of Islam with the "no" of the great Ali (as) ... a "no" which he gives to the council for the election of the caliphate in answer to Abdul Rahman, who was the manifestation of Islamic aristocracy and compromise. This "no," up until pre-Safavid times, is recognized to be part of the Shi'a movement in the history of Islam, an indicator of the social and political role of a group who are the followers of Ali, known for their attachment to the kindness of the family of the Prophet. It is a party based upon the Quran and the Traditions, not the Quran and the traditions proclaimed by the dynasties of the Umayyads, Abbasids, Ghaznavids, Seljuks, Mongols and Timurids, but the one proclaimed by the family of Mohammad. The history of Islam follows a strange path; a path in which hoodlums and ruffians from the Arab, Persian, Turk, Tartar and Mongol dynasties all enjoy the right of the leadership of the Moslem community and the caliphate of the Prophet of Islam, to the exclusion of the family of the Prophet and the rightful Imams of Islam. And Shi'ism, which begins with a "no," a "no" which opposes the path chosen by history, rebels against history. It rebels against a history which, in the

[215] Frederic Volpi, *Political Islam Observed* (London: Hurst and Company, 2010), 12.
[216] Sayyid *A., Fundamental Fear*, 17.
[217] Cohen Renon, *Revolution Under Attack. Forqan Group of Iran* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 12.
[218] Ibid., 14.

> name of the Quran, Kings and Caesars, follows the path of ignorance and in the name of tradition, sacrifices those brought up in the house of the Quran and the Traditions! Shi'is do not accept the path chosen by history.[219]

Comparing Shariati's prose—notably, in the way he confronts authority—with his Christian liberation counterparts in South America, Dabashi frames Islamist discourse as a "liberation theology." Dabashi identifies similarities between the two theologies, specifically in their struggles against "colonial and imperial savageries," and "their respective conversations with nationalist and socialist ideas in general and with Marxism in particular—so much [so] that ideas and aspiration of Gustavo Gutierrez are almost identical with those of Ali Shari'ati."[220] Dabashi mentions nationalist and socialist ideas, but in his framing of Islamism as a liberation theology, he remains focused on the anti-colonial aspect of Islamism. Here one may expand the scope of Islamic liberation theology to include struggles within the nation state and thus view it as a set of various religiously inspired "counter-conducts" or resistance to authorities and relations of power deemed oppressive or illegitimate within the boundaries of the nation state.[221] According to Foucault, the history of state power "and the history of counter-conducts opposed to it, are inseparable from each other," and various counter-conducts make possible the decentralization of the state and that paradoxically leads to more efficient control of the population by the state.[222] Through discursive exchange with other liberation discourses such as Marxism, constitutionalism, nationalism, and even secularism (in the case of anti-clericalism), Islamism appeared as a counter-conduct to various sites of power that the Iranian masses identified as authoritarian and hegemonic. These various counter-conducts invoked an Islamist

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[219] Ali Shariati, *Red Shi'ism: The Religion of Martyrdom, Black Shi'ism: The Religion of Mourning*, Shariati.com, accessed May 1, 2018, http://www.shariati.com/english/redblack.html.
[220] Dabashi, *Islamic Liberation Theology*, 49.
[221] Foucault, *Security, Territory Population*, 356.
[222] Michael Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 357.

discursive regime that elevated Islamism into an inflated oppositional discourse capable of creating social solidarity contesting the Shah's power.

Islamism had the upper hand in comparison with other liberation discourses because of its spiritual potential. Islamists were able to bring "mysticism and western philosophy together to form a powerful revolutionary discourse."[223] This discourse brought together post-modern, post-colonial and mystical potentials and produced a subject with radical, revolutionary, and mystical potentials. That is perhaps why Michel Foucault found the Islamist movement and its liberation theology impressive. The emergence of a spiritual form of counter-conduct to an authoritarian regime led Foucault to describe Iranian Islamism as "the spirit of the world without spirit."[224] He identified Islamists' politics as "political spirituality," and of course by politics—to take his famous assertion that power is dispersed—he did not only have the state in mind.[225]

Surveying various currents of Islamism throughout the early and mid-twentieth century, one sees numerous Islamic civil institutions, NGOs and social movements, one of which in fact impressed Foucault, which did not have capture of the state as their main agenda.[226] Rather, these movements focused on cultural and social affairs such as raising historical awareness, promoting education, pursuing charity activities, fighting corruption, ensuring health and housing, and calling for national unity.[227] Two figures that engaged in such activities were Seraj Ansari (1895–1961) and Mohammad Taghi Shariati (father of Ali Shariati) (1907–1987). Seraj Ansari, comparable with Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) in Egypt, was a Muslim reformer and journalist

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[223] Roxanne Varzi, "Iran's French Revolution: Religion, Philosophy, and Crowds," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 637:1 (September, 2011), 54.
[224] Michel Foucault, "The Spirit of the World without Spirit," in Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, Gender and the Seduction of Islamism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 250.
[225] Michel Foucault, "What Are Iranians Dreaming about?" in Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, Gender and the Seduction of Islamism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 209, 207.
[226] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction* (New York: Random House Inc., 1978).
[227] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 94, 81, 85, 67, 95, 111, 127, 67.

and an active contributor to Muslim publications in the early stages of Islamism.[228] He also founded *Jam'iat-e Mobārezeh bā Bidini* (The Society of Fighting Irreligiosity), which moved beyond religious concerns to place issues such as education, social solidarity and charity activities at the top of its social agenda.[229] Taghi Shariati founded *Kānoon-e Nashr-e Haghāyegh-e Islami* (The Centre for Propagation of Religious Truth), also known as *Kānoon*, in 1942, with the aim of framing Islam as a practical and socially relevant religion.[230] Reviewing the objectives of *Kānoon* provides a useful snapshot for understanding the ethos of Islamism as a social and cultural movement in its middle stage. The objectives of *Kānoon* were:

> Proving the necessity of religion and its this-worldy benefits; proving the truth of Islam and the fact that implementing Islam is the only path to human salvation; proving the wrong approach adopted by Muslims for not making their religion practical and making a case for the essential and urgent need for abandoning the dominant apathy; enticing religious energy; encouraging social solidarity among Muslims, engaging in a war struggle against all kinds of corruptions that have endangered national and religious foundations of society; promoting and teaching the Quran and its interpretation; promotion of encouraging good and forbidding evil; reviving religious symbols, proving the compatibility of Islam and true [modern] science and civilization and responding to hostile forces, raising the level of public opinion, introducing the status of clergy to society and have people ... respect the clergy that truly deserve this title, centralizing sporadic activities and organizing lecture and debating sessions.[231]

With minor divergence, the next generation of Islamists adopted the same core principles, making their discourse appealing to a modern Muslim middle class that emerged after the Shah's White Revolution. As alluded to before, the members of this middle class were educated in modern institutions, and for them Islamism operated as a liberation theology promising to free religion from the scholasticism of Usūli clerics, and the nation from oppressive secular despotism. In the process, Islamism was also expected to bring about not only a free Muslim

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[228] Ibid.
[229] Ibid., 66.
[230] Ibid., 111.
[231] Pajoom, Ja'far. *Yādnāme-ye Mohammad-Taghi Shariati* (Qom: Khorram, 1991), quoted in Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents*, 111.

democracy but also an ethical and spiritual society.[232] It almost goes without saying that the objectives pursued by Taghi Shariati in *Kānoon* were not supported by Usūli figures.[233] Taghi Shariati was frowned upon for dressing up in suits and wearing a tie and a hat, and "traditional clerics in Mashhad spread rumors that Taghi Shariati was a Sunni, a 'Wahhabi' and perhaps even a 'Babi.'"[234] Besides Sunnism, Babism was the most common epithet ascribed to early Islamists in order to discredit their new liberation theology. After all, the Islamists' theology of liberation competed with Usūli theology at some level, and Usūlis did not hesitate to use any propaganda tactic at their disposal in their rivalry with Islamists. But was the charge of a Babi inclination totally flawed and baseless? This question opens inquiries into the genealogy of Islamism: Islamism at its point of "emergence."

Babi Influence?

Morteza Motahhari (1919–1979), an Usūli-Islamist thinker and theorist, had once compared Ali Shariati and his followers to the Babi movement of the nineteenth century.[235] While this comparison may have been motivated by the rivalry of the two thinkers, the resonance Motahhari identified was not historically baseless.

Beside Taghi Shariati, Kharaghāni was also charged with Babi inclinations, a fact that raises questions about the relevance of Babism to Islamism.[236] Of course, Kharaghāni's ideas were rather avant-garde for his time, and while the Babi label was a convenient outlet for his

[232] Hosseinizādeh, *Political Islam in Iran*, 496.
[233] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents*,112.
[234] Ervand Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin* (IB. Tauris, 1989), 106.
[235] Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents,* 584. Babism was a messianic religio-political movement in nineteenth century Iran and Iraq. It was founded by Mohammad Ali Shirazi, who claimed to be the gate (Bab) to the twelfth Shi'i Imam. Babism was initially characterized as a Shi'i movement but later on developed its own theology, holy book, and following. Babism challenged both the reign of Shah and the authority of Usuli Shi'i clergy, and its followers were consequently identified as "heretical" by the adherents of popular Shi'ism. Fearing *takfir* and political persecution, some later radical Babi elements known as Azalīs kept their Babi convictions private.
[236] Jafariyan, *Asadollāh Kharaghāni*, 54.

critics to discredit his convictions, early Islamists undoubtedly left clues about their disguised Babi inclinations.

In addition to Sayyid Jamāl al-Afghānī , Kharaghāni was influenced by a controversial Shi'i scholar named Hadi Najmābadi (1871–1941).[237] Although a clergy member, Najmābādi had a mass following among members of various creeds, and his footsteps were traceable in both the assassination of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shāh (1831–1896) and also the making of the Constitutional Revolution.[238] Najmābādi was friends with Al-Afghāni and Malkum Khan, and was highly respected by radical Babi figures whose activism was directed against the Qajar dynasty.[239] He was also known for his "liberal" attitude and receiving "people of all classes and all faiths, statesmen and scholars, princes and poets, Sunnis, Shí'ís, Bábís, Armenians, Jews, Alí-Iláhís, etc., with all of whom he discussed all sorts of topics with the utmost freedom."[240]

There are strong speculations that Najmābādi was a Babi in disguise given some of his odd theological maneuvers and the close network of Babi activists who regarded him with utmost respect.[241] Whether Najmābādi was in fact a full convert to the Babi creed remains a subject of historical inquiry, but what is certain is that there is a close alliance to be identified between the Pan Islamist ideas of Al-Afghāni, the unconventional theological stance of Najmābādi, and the radical Babi elements fighting the Qajar and liberal intellectuals such as Mirza Malkam Khan (1834–1908) in the years prior to the Constitutional Revolution in Iran.[242]

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[237] Razavi, *Tarikh-e Maktum*, 63.
[238] Abd al-Hadi Ha'iri, *Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran* (London: EJ Brill, 1977), 73-77.
[239] Ibid. Also See Ali Rahnema, *Shi'i Reformation in Iran*, 13.
[240] Edward G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909* (Cambridge University Press, 1910), 406.
[241] Razavi, *Tarikh-e Maktum*, 67. Some have seen Najmābādi's style of writing in *Tahrir al-Uqala* [The Liberation of Wisemen] very similar to, and in support of, Babi discourse despite the passages critical of Babi beliefs. Whether Najmābādi was in fact a Babi is open to historical speculation, but the formidable contacts between him and the radical anti-Shah Babi elements, and his open defiance of both the Shah and the clerical discourse, greatly differentiates him from the conventional Shi'i clerical discourse.
[242] Ibid., 111.

Babi intellectuals and activists saw the Qajar dynasty as the embodiment of the Umayyad rule which, once toppled, would be replaced with a fusion of enlightened despotism and republicanism.[243] In a Babi political manifesto known as *Hasht-Behesht* (Eight Heavens), the authors borrowed from Islamic and modern political concepts to make a case for their ideal political system. They wrote:

> A despotic regime is the embodiment of domination and a republican government is the embodiment of representation. Both are problematic and forbidden. The solution then is something in between as has been instructed in *Bayan* [the Babi holy book]. The instruction is that the power of the state and the power of the nation must be equal and they must stand steadfast. The head of the state must be infallible and he must be cleansed from error in rulings that are his provision. In private and other matters, affairs must be governed with the vote of the majority.[244]

Without knowing the Babi conviction of the authors, one could imagine the lines above to have been written by either an Islamist figure in the 1960s or a theorist of an Islamic Republic headed by a *faqih*. What may explain this line of continuity is drawing a branch chart of Islamist figures and their influences with Sayyid Jamāl al-Afghānī and Hadi Najmābādi at the top beside Na'ini.

[243] Ibid., 20.
[244] Kirmāni, Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi and Mirza Aqā Khān Kirmāni[?]. *Hasht Behesht (*Tehran: year and the publisher unknown*)*, quoted in Razavi, *Tarikh-e Maktum*, 32.

Islamists Influences:



To be sure, the chart above does not suggest the direct emergence of Islamism from Babism. What it does suggest, however, is that given the close alliance of Babi, Islamist, and liberal figures, an outright denial of any association between Babism and Islamism in the last stage of the latter and the early stages of the former is rather naive. As Keddie suggests, Al-Afghāni's activism was certainly inspired by the radical and revolutionary posture of Babis of the nineteenth century. "Babism was one of several activist religious movements that Afghāni had a chance to witness in the Muslim world, and which probably contributed to his understanding of the power of religious appeals to the Muslim masses."[245] Moreover, Babism "appealed to 'craftsmen and merchants,' namely city-dwellers and artisans," the same class that later on adopted the liberation theology of Islamism.[246] In addition, Hādi Najmābādi was perhaps

[245] Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*. 11.
[246] Dabashi, *Shi'ism*, 200.

the first Muslim reformer to launch a campaign against Shi'i scholasticism and popular Shi'i beliefs, particularly *ghuluww*, for which he received the *takfir* of Usūlis.[247] Despite this censure, his rejection of hadith and reliance on the Quran inspired the young Sanglaji, and set the tone for future Islamist reformist thinkers.[248] And the political imagination of Babis, in viewing a combination of spiritual despotism and republicanism as an alternative to the Umayyad-like Qajar, certainly did influence Kharaghāni; it was an influence that Kharaghāni carried to Usūli figures in Najaf so that they might back the Constitutional Revolution.[249]

There is also one more fact to be considered, notably, that "Bab was a student of Sayyid Kazem Rashti, who was a student of Shaikh Ahmad Ahsa'i, who was a student of … Mulla Sadra (1572–1640)," and that "his epistemic fusion of mysticism and philosophy on Shi'i jurisprudential and doctrinal grounds" must be taken into account. Al-Afghāni too was a student of Islamic mysticism, as was Ayatollah Khomeini.[250] The leader of the Islamic Revolution was an avid reader of Islamic mysticism and philosophy, and he too was fond of Mulla Sadra's mystical philosophy.[251] At the heart of mysticism is the "destruction of the distinction between subject and object," the implication of which is "a sense of fearlessness toward everything external, including all the seemingly coercive political powers of the world."[252] These trends may indicate that in situations in which mysticism is politically charged, the quietist awaiting of the hidden Imam calls for its representative to act on his behalf in order to bring about a government suitable to the Imams' teachings and become a precursor to the hidden Imam's

[247] Razavi, *Tarikh-e Maktum*, 259.
[248] S. Meghdad N. Razavi, *Negāhi Tahlili be Takāpoohay-e Fekri-e Shariat* Sanglaji (Faslnāme Imamat Pajoohi. Sale Aval. Shomareh 4), 249- 271.
[249] Razavi, *Tarikh-e Maktum*, 262.
[250] Dabashi, *Shi'ism*, 200,175; Roy Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet, Religion and Politics in Iran* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 183.
[251] Ibid.
[252] Ibid.

immediate rise.[253] It is for this reason that an "activist response to bad government cannot easily be divorced from the problem of justification through the advent of the Imam or his representative," and the concept of *na'ib al-imam* played a role in both Babi and Islamist activism.[254] In that sense, as Dabashi argues, "Babism was the link that brought medieval Shi'i revolutionary reason to meet the evident fact of a public reason," and it set the stage for the "anticipation of the anticolonial Tobacco Revolt of 1891, and then the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911."[255] The same logic may be applied to Islamism, as Shariati and his concept of Red Shi'ism reproduced medieval Shi'i revolutionary momentum in the twentieth century, and Ayatollah Khomeini acted as *na'ib al-imam* and led an Islamist Revolution to create a Muslim state in order to set the stage for the rise of the Mahdi. In both Babism and Islamism, Mulla Sadra did not sit still.

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The above-mentioned qualities provide an overall image of Islamism not often discussed or categorized in discussions of political Islam. With this account, one may venture the following definition:

> *Islamism is a Shi'i-inspired, Sunni-inclined, modern, reformist, non-clerical, non-fundamentalist, universalist, anti-authoritarian liberation theology that emerges within the nation state with the objective not of implementing shari'a law, but of creating a fusion of anti-imperialist, Marxist, constitutionalist, nationalist and Islamic discourse; the implication of which was the rise of a modern Muslim subjectivity and the solidification of the Muslim nation state.*

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[253] Dabashi, *Shi'ism*, 137.
[254] Denis McEoin, "Aspects of Militancy and Quietism in Imami Shi'ism." *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies.* Bulletin, 11:1, 18-27, 26.
[255] Dabashi, *Shi'ism*, 200.

The above definition has the following merits. First, it is not too broad and ambitious so as to include other expressions of political Islam such as Salafism and Usūlism. Second, it resists simply depicting a group of authoritarian Muslims who hope to Islamicize society through state capture. Third, the definition remains attentive to the counter-intuitive, paradoxical, complex and collage-like image that emerges only with a genealogical investigation of Islamism. Fourth, it recognizes the contribution of Islamism in the making of the nation state and vice versa. Fifth, it differentiates Islamism as a movement from neo-Islamism as an ideology of state control.

Conclusion:

When Emmerson and Varisco debate the association of Islamism with violence, for the most part they confuse Islamism with Salafism, and when scholars view Shi'i clerics as the hallmark of Iranian Islamism, they fail to differentiate between Islamism and Usūlism. Also, when Asef Bayat and others speak of post-Islamism, or when Roy identifies the current status of Islamism with "failure," they are in fact describing the process of the appropriation of Islamism by the modern state, or the rise of neo-Islamism. When Bayat and Roy remain limited to a very state-centred understanding of Islamism, they tend to ignore the reciprocal relation between Islamism and the nation state, and also the liberatory cultural, social, and, in a nutshell, horizontal potentials of Islamism. The definition offered here not only helps to clarify such confusions, it also sheds lights on the state factor in the evolution of Islamism and invites the re-evaluation of Islamism as a liberation theology with potentials for the twenty-first century.

Chapter 2: The Problem of the Islamic State
[Conceptual Framework]

Almost all twentieth-century theorizations of the concept of an Islamic state have presupposed the existence of a political entity resembling the state during the golden period of Muslim politics, that is, seventh-century Arabia, where the Prophet of Islam created a polity in Medina. In these accounts the Prophet is assumed to have founded the first Islamic state, produced the first Islamic constitution, and introduced divine laws for state governance. In early twentieth-century Shi'i Iran, Asadollāh Kharaghāni (1936–1838) downplayed his Shi'i convictions and went so far as to frame the rule of the Prophet and the first four caliphs as a model for Muslim democracy.[1] He even saw the first forty years of Muslim political rule as one of the early human experiences of democracy.[2] Ayatollāh Nā'ini (1860–1936) drew on the rule of the Prophet and Imam Ali to make a case for Islamic constitutionalism.[3] Ali Shariati (1933–1977) drew on the early history of Islam to theorize a form of directed democracy (*democracy-e hedāyat-shode*), while Ayatollāh Khomeini (1902–1989) drew heavily on Islamic legal doctrine and the model of the Prophet's governance to make a case for a *faqih* to rule the modern state.[4] While these ideas met with opposition on the part of some secular elites, they did not prompt a serious backlash among Muslim thinkers themselves. Perhaps this was due to the revolutionary momentum of the experience of Iranian Islamism and the way in which some Islamists' defence of the concept of an Islamic state, with its divine and classic endorsement, operated as an alternative to the autocratic, secular rule of the Pahlavi. It was not until almost a decade after the Islamic

[1] Rasul Jafariyan, *Asadollāh Kharaghāni* (Tehran: Markaz-e Asnād-e Enghelāb-e Islami, 2003), 152.
[2] Ibid., 153.
[3] Mohammad Hossein Nā'ini "Government in the Islamic Perspective," in *Modernist Islam, 1840-1940*, ed. Charles Kurzman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 116.
[4] Ali Shariati, *Ummat va Imamat* [Umma and Imamat] (Pdf version downloaded from tribon.ir); Imam Ruhullāh Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini,* translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizān Press, 1981).

Revolution that the premise of an Islamic state underwent bold scrutiny for the first time; thinkers such as Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar started to challenge the political relevance of Islam in the modern period. On the other side of the aisle, Ayatollāh Mohammad-Taghi Misbāh Yazdi and his intellectual allies and disciples did not sit still. They fired back in defence of the concept of Islamic state by rearticulating what was framed as a Shi'i notion of an Islamic state, and this debate is still more or less ongoing in Iran.[5]

In contrast to the case of Iran, defence of the concept of an Islamic state met with early opposition in Egypt. Upon the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century and the dissolution of the institution of the caliphate, Rashid Rida (1865–1935), a modernist Muslim thinker and theologian, attempted to revive the classical caliphate in the modern world, and advocated the notion of *al-Hukuma al-Islamiyya* or "Islamic state."[6] Having extensively borrowed from classical Sunni political thought and observing the emerging realities of the rise of modern states, he attempted to reconcile Islam and the modern state. Though he left many important questions concerning the compatibility between Islam and the modern state unresolved, he undoubtedly had a major influence on future generations of Muslim political thinkers, including Iranian Islamists.[7] Rashid Rida's ideas, however, did not go unchallenged. His contemporary, Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966), published a controversial book: *Islam is a Religion, Not a State; a Message, Not a Government*, which refuted Rashid Rida's stance. Abd al-Raziq used traditional Islamic sources to argue against the obligatory notion of an Imamat/caliphate and maintained that the Quran "supports the argument that the Prophet

[5] Mohammad Taghi Misbah Yazdi, *Porsesh-ha va Pasokh-ha* [Questions and Answers] (Qom: Imam Khomeini Publication, 2000), 27.
[6] Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 69.
[7] Rasul Jafariyan, *Jaryānhā va Sāzmānhāye Mazhabi-Siyāsi-e Iran* [Religio-Political Currents and Organizations in Iran] (Tehran: Khane Ketab, 2012), 304.

Muhammad…had nothing to do with monarchy or politics."[8] He saw the Prophet's objective as not directed towards the creation of a state but instead towards reviving "the conscience of people." A prophet in Abd-al-Raziq's account was a spiritual leader and not a head of state.[9] With this framework Abd-al-Raziq influenced many later generations of liberal Muslims, who more or less adopted his ideas to advocate the separation of religion and state in the Muslim world.

The rivalry between Rashid Rida and Abd al-Raziq may be identified as a key to understanding Muslim political debate because it captures the two competing discourses concerning the relation between Islam and the state in the Muslim world. In Iran these discourses emerged as a Misbāh/Soroush debate. While the Iranian context relied heavily on Shi'i political thoughts, their conclusions proved to diverge little from those of their Sunni counterparts. Advocates of an Islamic state refer to the primacy of religious law (*shari'a*) and the necessity of its implementation through an executive body and Muslim secularists refer to a lack of evidence in the Quran regarding any form of social and political organization pertaining to the state. Abd al-Raziq maintained that the Prophet's judicial interventions provide no model for a comprehensive legal system suitable for a state, while Islamic statists rely on the Prophet's role as a judge, as well as rather abundant legal Quranic verses, to make a case for a state that must govern society through Islamic laws.[10] Although Abd al-Raziq holds that "leadership of the message and the leadership of the king" must not be confused, Islamic statists point to the polity created by the Prophet in Medina as a source of inspiration for combining religious and political

[8] Ali Abd al-Raziq. *AL-Islām wa Usul al-Hukm: Bahth fi al-Khilāfah wa al-Hukumah fi al-Islam* (Cairo: Matba'at Misr, 1925), quoted in Ali Souad Tagelsir, *A Religion, not a State: Ali Abd al-Raziq's Islamic Justification of Political Secularism* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2009), 77.
[9] Ibid., 77.
[10] Ibid., 87.

practices. Islamic statists draw upon politically and socially textured Islamic practices, such as *jihād* and *zakāt*, as supporting evidence for the necessity of an Islamic state, but Abd al-Raziq argues that *jihad* was prescribed by the Prophet only "to spread the message" and that it lacked "political" significance.[11]

Muslim statists and secularists have never arrived at a point of reconciliation; the Rashid Rida/Abd al-Raziq dichotomy has remained a strong and widespread symbol of opposition between the two bodies of thought. Muslim statists have never resolved how to justify Muslim state sovereignty on the basis of prophetic rule in Medina, since prophethood and kingship were assumed to be separate paradigms in the classic Islamic tradition.[12] Similarly, Muslim secularists have never resolved their silence on the question of power in the face of many legal and political teachings in the Quran and the *sunna.*

Despite their contrasting views, however, Muslim statists and secularists share one feature in their thought, and that is their state-centred understanding of power. Rashid Rida, being a Sunni political theorist, was naturally inclined towards the state given Sunni political theorists' long involvement with the question of the state. Abd al-Raziq too, despite his secularist views, understood politics only in relation to what Deleuze and Guattari call *State-form*. By refuting the Prophet's social engagements as being synonymous with state, he constructed a binary of the religious and the political, and advocated a secular Muslim state.

This mode of exclusivity, or limiting power to *State-form*, however, is not a particularly Muslim intellectual problem. Many modern historians of Islam have reached the conclusion that Islam is a religion of state, or that the Prophet Mohammad was the first statesman in the history of Islam. Even those who have somewhat refuted the Prophet's political rule based on *State-form*

[11] Ibid., 76.
[12] See Crone, Patricia, "Ninth Century Muslim Anarchists," *Past & Present.* No.167 (May, 2000), 3-28.

have not withdrawn from using the concept of the "state" in relation to the Prophet's model of governance.[13] This similarity between Muslim intellectuals and modern historians is striking because it speaks to a wider outlook in academic discourses that fails to understand formations of power in a plurality of forms. To be clear, Muslim intellectuals and modern historians of Islam are not alone in their statist thought; a dominant faction among educators in the humanities and social sciences perceives the state as the only form of human organization, which has raised concern among dissenting scholars.

Barclay (1982) highlighted the flaw in failing to account for power outside the state apparatus. Pierre Clastres (1989), a political anthropologist, critiqued historians for viewing non-state societies as "incapable" of creating states. Patricia Crone (1986) engaged critically with historians and highlighted her conclusion that non-state societies had an alternative organizational form to that of state societies. Michel Foucault (1978) argued for a non-state-centred understanding of power, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) dedicated much of their theoretical work to theorizing an organization of power separate from *State-form*.
But what are alternative organizations of power to *State-form*? How do societies govern themselves without states? What mechanisms do they employ? What are they called? How do they address the question of power? Why is it that they do not form states to begin with? Do they always remain non-state societies? If not, how do they make the transition from non-state to state societies?

[13] See for instance: Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Medina* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956) or Davoud Feirahi, *Tārikh-e Tahawũl-e Dawlat dar Islam* [History of State Evolution in Islam] (Qom: Mofid University Press:2005) as two works by non-Muslim and Muslim scholars wherein the Prophet's polity is referred to as "state" or *dawlat*. This is despite the fact that the two authors have commented on the nomadic and tribal quality of the Prophet's rule in Medina. This means that there is a consensus among scholars about the transition of governance from one form to another in the early period of Islam but they would still reserve the term state or *dawlat* to describe both conditions.

These questions are pertinent, as they allow us to engage with the relation between Islam and the state. Does Islamic political rule pertain to state or non-state societies? Can the early Muslim polity be called an Islamic state, having in mind both the classic and contemporary definition and practice of state? If not state, then which organizational model characterized the early Muslim political experience? Is the classic paradigm of Muslim politics within or *exterior* to *State-form*?

Before addressing these questions, it should be stressed that Muslim political organization was not a static apparatus, and as many classic historians have pointed out, it experienced an evolution from one form to another. But, as Davoud Feirahi holds, research on this "evolution" has not yet been exhaustive, and hence there are still many ambiguities as to exactly which model the Prophet's political community emulated and how it underwent a shift.[14] Part of the reason perhaps goes back to Deleuze and Guattari's conviction that any attempt to differentiate between state and non-state societies is inherently "difficult to conceptualize."[15] They are correct in that the similarities between state and non-state societies, specifically in their forms, can be very misleading. One can easily locate a chief and king in non-state and state societies respectively and conclude that a similar form of authority exists in both cases. One can locate a series of rules and regulations in non-state societies and perceive them in relation to state laws and simply conclude that there is barely any difference between the two forms of legal organization. Similarly, one can look at the presence of war, dispute resolution mechanisms, and political negotiations in non-state societies, and assert that the nature of these phenomena is the same as those found in state societies. And, as stated before, this is not a layperson's problem;

[14] Feirahi, *History of State Evolution in Islam*, 21.
[15] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 354.

even scholars tend to fail in this differentiation between state and non-state societies. This, however, was not the case with Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), a Muslim Arab philosopher of history who was among the first to theorize the difference between state and non-state societies in an anthropological fashion.[16]

But what is this non-state society like? Different scholars have used different names and rightly so because there is a diversity of non-*State-forms* just as there is a plurality of *State-forms*. Barclay called non-state societies anarchic, Clastres referred to them as counter-State, and Patricia Crone called them tribal societies. Ibn Khaldun used the term "societies of Bedouins," and Deleuze and Guattari called non-state societies different names in different contexts. Inspired by Ibn Khaldun and his delineation of nomadic life, Deleuze and Guattari located certain formations of power outside *State-form*; they referred to these non-state modalities of power as *war machine.* Deleuze and Guattari subverted Hobbes's vision, which held that the state was against war, and asserted: "*war is against the State.*"[17] They also referred to non-state societies as primitive and segmentary societies. (At times, they used *primitive*, *segmentary* and *war machine* interchangeably). For them, *war machine* belonged exclusively to nomads, and tribal societies fell into the category of primitive and segmentary. For Deleuze and Guattari, *war-machine* is any movement, social or political, that maintained a degree of exteriority to the state. This exteriority can either materialize itself in the form of a protest, rebellion against the state, or in the form of cultural and political autonomy outside the control of the state.

Following Deleuze and Guattari's invention of the concept *State-form*, one may use the term *Tribe-form* to refer to non-state political organizations. To envision a *Tribe-form* and *State-form* is not to construct a binary. The use of the word *form* implies a multiplicity of possibilities

[16] Ideas of Ibn Khaldun will be explored in more detail in this chapter.
[17] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 357.

and a wide spectrum of forms between these two poles. There is diversity of *Tribe-forms* just as there is plurality of *State-forms*. There are, however, a series of techniques and rationalities specific to each pole that mark a dividing line between *State-form* and *Tribe-form*, a dividing line that is not always so easy to draw.

In order to address the differences between *Tribe-form* and *State-form*, it is perhaps best to define what state is. Max Weber's famous definition of state is an organization that claims a monopoly on legitimate violence in a given territory.[18] One can take up Weber's definition and read it against features of the tribal form of organization in an attempt to coin a definition for *Tribe-form*. Foucault, however, was interested not in definitions but instead in what he called *genealogy*. By this he had different meanings in mind, but he maintained a consistent vision of genealogy in relation to the study of mechanisms of power.[19] For him genealogy meant studying a structure from the outside, and identifying strategies, tactics, and technologies of power when studying an assemblage of power.[20] In this approach, one needs "to move outside the institution and replace it with the overall point of view of the technology of power."[21] "This study of power from the point of technologies of power and also the emergence of a particular type of rationality" in managing a given community or society provides useful methodological clues for understanding both *State-form* and *Tribe-form*.[22] In this approach one searches not for origins or definitions, and instead investigates the strategies, tactics and technologies of power (and lack thereof) in human social organizations. In his lecture series at the Collège de France in 1978–

[18] Max Weber . *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society,* translated and edited by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters (London: Palgrave Books, 2015), 136.
[19] William Walters, *Governmentality* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 114.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 117.
[22] Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 4.

1979, Foucault identified three major technologies of power pertaining to *State-form*: *sovereignty*, *territory*, and *population*.

Sovereignty

State sovereignty is usually embodied in the image of an imperial or despotic king along with a "jurist-priest" whose function is to legislate and manage the population within a given territorial boundary.[23] The king is the "fearsome magician emperor, operating by capture, bonds, and knots" and has a bird's-eye-view over his territory.[24] A king is absent in *Tribe-form*. What one finds there instead is a leader or a chief. In *State-form*, the relationship between the king and population is that of the ruler and the ruled, while in *Tribe-form* the relationship is that of a leader and the led.[25] While a king's authority means superiority and the power to rule by force, a leader is obeyed, but he has no power to force others to accept his rulings.[26] What fuels a leader's authority is charisma, and without the subjects' recognition of a leader's charisma this form of authority would not be validated; "this recognition is freely given and guaranteed by what is held to be proof . . . or absolute trust in the leader."[27]

While the power of a king is usually that of domination, in *Tribe-form* a chief is "forced to rule [the community] kindly and to avoid antagonizing them. Otherwise, he would have trouble with the group spirit, resulting in his undoing and theirs."[28] Through domination, a king "manages to block a field of relations of power, to render them impassive and invariable and to

[23] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 351.
[24] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 424.
[25] Harold Barclay, *People Without Government: An Anthropology of Anarchy* (London: Halston &Co. Ltd, 1982), 141.
[26] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah, An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1377/2005), 108.
[27]Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (University of California Press, 1978), 242.
[28] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 120.

prevent reversibility of movement."[29] In *Tribe-form* if "proof and success eludes the leader for long, if he appears deserted by his God or his magical or heroic power, above all, if his leadership fails to benefit his followers, it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear."[30] A king resorts to laws and violence, while a chief maintains his charisma by strong rhetorical skills. A chief needs to have the power of speech, otherwise his power will be withdrawn from him. A chief is also a peacemaker. Clastres writes:

> A chief is responsible for maintaining peace and harmony in the group. He must appease quarrels and settle disputes—not by employing a force he does not possess and which would not be acknowledged in any case, but by relying solely on the strength of his prestige, his fairness and his verbal ability. More than a judge who passes sentences, he is an arbiter who seeks to reconcile. The chief can do nothing to prevent a dispute from turning into a feud if he fails to effect a reconciliation of the contending parties.[31]

Genealogically speaking, if sovereignty operates as a technique of power in *State-form*, charismatic leadership over a community with little recourse to domination is a technique of power in *Tribe-form*. Charismatic leadership relies on "magical powers, whether of prophets, persons with a reputation, therapeutic or legal wisdom, [success . . . in the hunt or . . . heroism] in war" in order to assert "conduct of conduct."[32] This form of leadership takes up the classic definition of *governing*, which according to Foucault originally meant "the control one may exercise over oneself and others, over someone's body, soul and behaviour"; it never meant to "govern a state, a territory or a political structure."[33]

This non-state form of power, which Foucault called *pastoral*, perceives divine charismatic leaders or shepherds as rivals of the kings.[34] According to Foucault, "the royal art of

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[29] Michel Foucault, *The Ethics of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom: an Interview with Michel Foucault*, accessed 2015, 285. http://www.michel-foucault.com/dulwich/freedom.pdf, 285.
[30] Weber, *Economy*, 242.
[31] Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State* (Brooklyn: Zone Books, 1989), 30.
[32] Weber, *Economy*, 241.
[33] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 122.
[34] Foucault, *Security, Territory*, *Population*, 145.

prescribing cannot be defined on the basis of pastorship [because] . . . the demands of pastorship are too trifling to be suitable for a king."[35] The pastor remained a figure exercising power over the mystical world; the king remained someone who exercised power over the imperial world.[36] In that sense "the pastor is not fundamentally or primarily a judge; he is essentially a doctor who has to take responsibility for each soul and for the sickness of each soul."[37]

Territory

One of the main differences that Foucault located between charismatic leadership and state sovereignty is that in the former "power is not exercised over a territory, but by definition over a flock and more exactly over the flock in its movement from one place to another."[38] Weber calls this flock in movement a *charismatic community*, and Deleuze and Guattari call it a *number* or a *special body*. According to Deleuze and Guattari, while state power is territorial and geometrical, in *Tribe-form* power's operation is numerical; that is, it is enforced not on a given territory, but over a collective or a community. In state societies, space is "striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads," while a special body "is the constancy of fuzzy aggregates: it is in this sense that it stands in opposition to the law or the polis, as the backcountry, a mountainside, or the vague expanse around the city."[39] In other words, *number* or *charismatic community* opposes the territorial notion of power because *number* "is the mobile occupant, the movable in smooth space, as opposed to the geometry of the immovable in striated space."[40] *Tribe-form* can reside in a given territory, but power is not perceived in relation to the walls of the territory, but in terms of membership of the *Tribe-form.*[41] That is why in *Tribe-form*, group solidarity becomes very

[35] Ibid.,147.
[36] Ibid.,155.
[37] Ibid.,174.
[38] Ibid.,125.
[39] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 381, 380.
[40] Ibid., 389.
[41] Barclay, *People Without Government*, 31.

pertinent. Ibn Khaldun calls this group solidarity *Assabiyah.* Five centuries before Kropotkin, Ibn Khaldun was able to identify that the presence of strong group feelings among nomadic communities makes possible the formation of communities, irrespective of the territory on which residence takes place. Similar to Kropotkin's ideas, this form of group solidarity, he argued, was conducive to mutual aid, and was at odds with state societies.[42] States destroy communal solidarity and replace them with citizenry, and hence subjection to a sovereign's authority.[43] Thus, if a technique of power in *State-form* is to capture the milieu and striated space, in "special bodies" or "number" the technique of power operates through *Assabiyah*. Group solidarity can include clan lineage or, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, *the esprit de corps* of any collective formation that aims to transcend clan lineages and build solidarity based on new lines, values or ideas. "The specificity of numerical organization rests on the nomadic mode of existence and the *war machine* function. The numbering number, [therefore] is distinct both from lineal codes and state over-coding."[44] It is for this reason that autonomy of the *number* becomes absolutely essential. *Tribe-form* perceives autonomy not in relation to territory but in relation to protecting a group's solidarity. Commenting on the autonomy of *number* and its differential relation to *State-form*, Kropotkin believed that life in *Tribe-form*s:

> is divided into two sets of actions, and appears under two different ethical aspects: the relations within the tribe, and the relations with the *outsiders*; and . . . the "inter-tribal" law widely differs from the common law. Therefore, when it comes to a war the most revolting cruelties may be considered as so many claims upon the admiration of the tribe. …. We Europeans have realized some progress—not immense, at any rate—in eradicating that double conception of ethics; but it also must be said that while we have in some measure extended our ideas of solidarity in theory, at least over the nation, and

[42] Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid A Factor of Evolution*, accessed 2015, 98. http://www.complementarycurrency.org/ccLibrary/Mutual_Aid-A_Factor_of_Evolution-Peter_Kropotkin.pdf.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 390.

> partly over other nations as well, we have lessened the bonds of solidarity within our own nations, and even within our own families.[45]

Nations comprise a population bound within territorial lines, and they share very little of *Assabiyah* common to *Tribe-form*. *State-form* finds itself in no need of maintaining *Assabiyah*, because the king "governs the city-state, but not the men of the city. The object or target of . . . [power in *State-form*] is the city-state in its substantial reality, its unity, and its possible survival or disappearance."[46] Foucault called this analytic of power—which sets as its ultimate target the interest, protection, and the survival of the *State-form—raison d'Etat* (reason of state).[47] "To govern according to the principle of *raison d'Etat* is to arrange things so that state becomes sturdy and permanent, so that it becomes wealthy, and so it becomes strong in the face of everything that may destroy it."[48] In *raison d'Etat*, realpolitik supersedes; the objective of the sovereign is first to protect the interest of the state and then the population within the state's territory. The chief, the charismatic leader or the shepherd, however, has as his target not governing the territory but the individuals. A charismatic leader of pastoral power "thinks only of his flock and of nothing else," and for this reason in both *Tribe-form* and "pastoral [forms], power is a power of care," and power is "exercised over multiplicity rather than a territory."[49] The purpose of power is "those on whom power is exercised, and not a purpose for some kind of superior unit like a city, territory, state or sovereign."[50]

Population

In *State-form*, population is managed through (a) law, (b) discipline of the body, and (c) capturing the "molecular lines" of power.

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[45] Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, 68.
[46] Foucault, *Security, Territory*, *Population*, 123.
[47] Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 4.
[48] Ibid.
[49]Foucault, *Security, Territory*, *Population*, 127-128.
[50] Ibid., 128.

Law

The difference between legislative mechanisms in *State-form* and *Tribe-form* is perhaps the most difficult to conceptualize given the similarities at the exterior level. The prominent difference is that states govern the population through "policemen, justices of court, jailers, executioners and lawmakers," while in *Tribe-form* "there is no system of formal rules, of abstract legal principles… [Here c]oncrete judgments are newly created from case to case and are originally regarded as divine judgments and revelations."[51] This, however, does not mean an utter absence of regulation in *Tribe-form*. Deleuze and Guattari refer to *Tribe-form* regulations as *codes*, and Barclay calls them "social sanctions."[52] According to Barclay, tribe's *codes* consist of two major elements: "diffused sanctions" and "religious sanctions."[53] Diffused sanctions consist of the values and rituals of the community that must be upheld, celebrated, and promoted. These sanctions are not necessarily written down, they have ritualistic and ethical qualities, and all members find themselves obligated to respect them. Since these sanctions are not enforced from above, it remains the task of the community to maintain and disseminate these values through rituals, horizontal moral surveillance, and ethical teachings.[54] Religious sanctions on the other hand are more concrete. They are the written laws of the tribe that provide a point of reference for an arbiter to judge between parties in dispute. Religious sanctions can include terms and conditions for marriage, blood money, financial transactions, war, etc. As stated earlier, diffused and religious sanctions both comprise a tribe code.

Tribe-form combines diffused and religious sanctions, that is, community values are held and promoted by all members, and an arbiter enforces rules, fines, and punishments, while in

[51] Barclay, *People*, 26; Weber, *Economy*, 254.
[52] Barclay, *People*, 24.
[53] Ibid., 24-25.
[54] Ibid.

State-form there is an apparatus that enforces the law through a monopoly of violence (legal sanctions, according to Barclay).[55] In *State-form*, legal norms are enforced by a judge, and in *Tribe-form* there is an absence of formal judgement, and what one sees is the figure of the arbiter. Barclay, in conversation with Evans-Pritchard (1902–1973), provided many case studies of mechanisms of ruling and mediations in different tribes. It is worth including a long quote by him as it serves to better demonstrate the difference between managing the population in *State-form* and *Tribe-form* as far as legal mechanisms are concerned:

> Disputes, including feuds, are regulated and usually ultimately settled through the mediation of a man known as the leopard skin chief… [He is first and foremost a] ritual specialist, [and someone] who commits murder first goes to the chief whose residence is a sanctuary. The chief cuts the arm of the murderer as a mark of Cain. He may then act as meditator between the kin of the killed and of the killer. He insures that the latter are willing to pay blood money so as to avoid feuding and then persuades the other group to accept compensation. The leopard skin chief collects the blood money in the form of cattle, from 40–50 animals and takes them to the dead man's home. The leopard skin chief does not rule and judge but [is a] mediator....[56]

The leopard skin chief incidentally decides appropriate compensations in accord with well-established Nuer custom, but as Evans-Pritchard makes clear this is different from a state legal system, "for . . . there is no external power to enforce such a decision were it given."[57] Hence while law in *State-form* is enforced through a complex legal apparatus with the presence of judge, in *Tribe-form* codes are enforced less formally by both an arbiter and the community itself.

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[55] Ibid., 25.
[56] Meyer Fortes and EE EVANS-PRITCHARD, *African Political Systems* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), quoted in Barclay, *People,* 86.
[57] Ibid., 87.

Discipline and the Molecular

Beside legal systems, states manage their population through what Foucault called "discipline" of the body, and Deleuze and Guattari called abstract machines of "machinic enslavement" in archaic forms, and "social subjection" in the modern form.[58] Discipline regulates the body to operate in a way conducive to the objectives of the sovereign. In *Tribe-form*, however, there is almost no discipline of the body. What operates instead are various modes of subjectification through diffused sanctions and technologies of the self.[59] According to Foucault, technologies of the self are what

> permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.[60]

In *Tribe-form*, in the absence of major technologies of domination, various technologies of the self and diffused sanctions allow for self-governing (Foucault) or self-regulating (Deleuze and Guattari). These technologies also operate as "weapons," maintaining autonomy and opposing the rise of *State-form*.[61] According to Ibn Khaldun, there is a direct correlation between the rise of *State-form* and deterioration of technologies of the self: "Bedouins live far away from the laws of government instructions and education" because state technologies of power "weaken their souls and diminish their stamina."[62] Hence, when Bedouins take over the state, they lose their nomadic qualities and become used to "laziness and ease. They are [then] sunk in well-being and luxury."[63] Once they no longer practice technologies of the self, they entrust "the defence of their

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[58] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage Book, 1979); Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 451.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Michel Foucault, *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault,* ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988).
[61] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 400.
[62] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 96.
[63] Ibid., 94.

property and their lives to the governor and the ruler who rules them and to the militia which has the task of guarding them."[64] It is here that, according to Deleuze and Guattari, a certain "fascism" is born "in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us."[65]

It is perhaps more precise to speak not of the demise of technologies of the self in the face of the birth of the state, and instead speak of transformations of technologies of the self such that they would correspond with *State-form*. In other words, governing a state would not be possible unless there is a contact point between technologies of domination and those of the self. Technologies of the self must conform to those of domination, and this becomes possible when state operates as an "Apparatus of Capture."[66]

Beliefs and desires, which constitute major parts of technologies of the self, belong to a line of power which Deleuze and Guattari call *molecular*. This molecular line "coexists and crosses over into" a "molar line."[67] Molecular and molar lines define the micro and macro politics of state power respectively. Molecular lines constitute "quantum flow, [and] assures the connection-creation of flow and emit new quanta," and molar lines constitute the "rigid lines" that ensure a striation of the space over which the state reigns.[68] Molar lines ensure state hegemony and domination, by establishing "a zone of rights over the entire exterior, over all of the flows traversing ecumenon," but molecular lines whose origins belong to "nomads … come in off the steppes, venture a fluid and active escape, sow de-territorialisation everywhere, [and] launch flows whose quanta heat up and are swept away."[69] Molar lines are vertical lines of

[64] Ibid., 95.
[65] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1977), xiii.
[66] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 424.
[67] Ibid., 213.
[68] Ibid., 223, 219.
[69] Ibid., 385, 222.

power ensuring the resonance of different parts of the state, and molecular lines have the potential to defy state rigidity. Molar lines are "arborified" and molecular lines are "rhizomatic."[70]

While *State-form* is comprised of both molar and molecular lines, *Tribe-form* has either no molar lines or only "relatively supple line of interlaced codes."[71] Since molecular lines have nomadic origins, they can only function within *State-form* if they are captured or appropriated (Deleuze and Guattari) or governed (Foucault). Thus *State-form* manages the population not only through law and discipline of the body, but also through a very complex capture or control of quantum and molecular flows.

This is precisely why Michel Foucault refused to understand and explain *State-form* solely in relation to juridical and disciplinary modalities of power and advocated an understanding of the function of (modern) *State-form* in relation to the complex mechanism of capture and governing of flows. He named the process of capture, which takes place through diverse techniques, rationalities, and strategies, *governmentality*. In short, governmentality takes as its objective managing both the molar and molecular of lines of power. Dominant techniques of power in *Tribe-form*, however, are not that of capture simply because *Tribe-forms* operate as molecular lines. *Tribe-form* manages the flock by various modes of subjection through diffused sanctions, religious sanctions, and affect.[72] *Tribe-form* constantly invokes various techniques in order to seed community values among members, and it provides a series of rulings for addressing disputes and arbitration.

[70] Ibid., 212.
[71] Ibid., 222.
[72] Ibid., 400.

War machine and the Pastoral

For Deleuze and Guattari the relation between *Tribe-form* (*war machine*) and *State-form* is that of exteriority. *Tribe-form* "is of another species, another nature, another origin than the state apparatus," and it operates as "external to the apparatus."[73] At times the *war machine* also operates "against sovereignty … against the apparatus." Historically, while the city-state of the Greeks imposed "a geometrical or linear reason of state including a general outline of camps and fortifications … a laying-out of territories [and] in short an increasingly rigid segmentarity," the people of the Israelites, with Moses as their leader, adopted nomadic qualities of war and went against the apparatus of the pharaoh.[74] While citizens of states are taught to obey the law, nomads *follow* because they are in "search of the 'singularities' of a matter, or rather of a material, and not out to discover a form."[75] Nomads learn to "undo things, and to undo oneself," and this "undoing of the subject" is specific to a *war machine* and not to citizens of a state. While nomads engage in "undoing the subject," citizens obey "the legal model, one [that] is constantly reterritorializing around a point of view, on a domain, according to a set of constant relations," and they isolate themselves from "the conditions of intuition."[76]

Foucault made similar comparisons between the pastoral power of Judeo-Christian origins and the city-state model of the Greeks. He identified a "contrast between the shepherd of the Bible with Plato's weaver, the Hebraic pastor with the Greek magistrate."[77] While the Greek god was a territorial god, Foucault held that "the presence of the Hebrew God is more intense and visible when his people are on the move . . . in his people's wanderings."[78] Pastoral power is

[73] Ibid., 354.
[74] Ibid., 212, 392.
[75] Ibid., 372.
[76] Ibid., 400, 372, 373.
[77] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 164.
[78] Ibid., 125.

less about one's submission to the law and more about "establishing a structure, a technique of, at once, power, investigation, self-examination and the examination of others . . . through which the pastor's power is exercised [and] by which obedience is practiced."[79] This practice of obedience, unlike the Greek model, is not for self-mastery; rather it is for the "renunciation of egoism" and the "destruction of the self."[80]

The similarities between *war machine* and pastoral power allow one to identify pastoral power as a form of *war machine*. Much of what Foucault described as characteristics of pastoral power resonates well with Deleuze and Guattari's modalities of power exterior to *State-form*. The stance of Deleuze and Guattari in relation to this comparison, however, is not clear. On the one hand, Deleuze and Guattari identified monotheistic religions as those that "have promoted an ideal of sedentraization" with the aim of establishing "a solid and stable centre of for the global." And on the other hand, they referred to "religion as an element in a *war machine* and the idea of holy war as the motor of that machine."[81] Echoing Foucault, they saw Moses's model of pastoral power as being against territorial lines and referred to prophets—including the Prophet Mohammad—as those who were "opposed to the state of personality of the king and the religious personality of the priest."[82] Yet, they held that all monotheistic religions have the "dream of an absolute State."[83]

It is not clear as to what exactly fuels this paradox, yet, given Deleuze and Guattari's numerous invocations of Ibn Khaldun, it is probable that their paradoxical stance towards religion was informed by the Arab historian, because Ibn Khaldun also made contradictory

[79] Ibid., 183.
[80] Ibid., 178, 180.
[81] Ibid., 383.
[82] Ibid., 383.
[83] Ibid., 384.

gestures towards nomadic religions in general and early Islam in particular. Like Deleuze and Guattari, he argued for the exteriority and "remoteness" of nomads from *State-form*.[84] He even saw *State-form* as that which "requires superiority and force, which expresses the wrathfulness and animality (of human desire)," and nomads as "those [who] find it difficult to subordinate themselves to each other, because they are not used to (any control)."[85] He held that nomads, "as compared with those of sedentary people . . . are closer to the first natural state and more remote from evil habits [and]. . . clearly, the[y] . . . are closer to being good than sedentary people."[86] Nonetheless, Ibn Khaldun held that the ultimate goal of the nomads is to take over the state apparatus; this desire according to Ibn Khaldun is a "natural" one.[87]

Thus, Ibn Khaldun ascribed a negative connation to *State-form* and a positive one to that of nomadic existence, yet he saw the rise of *State-form* among Arab Muslims, in a later period of the emergence of Islam, as a "noble and enjoyable position."[88] Deleuze and Guattari's position on religion, if not directly influenced by Ibn Khaldun, captured this paradox. This remains at odds with Deleuze and Guattari's genealogical model of thought in general. Unlike Ibn Khaldun, Deleuze and Guattari refused to see the change of the *war machine* to *State-form* in an evolutionary fashion. Instead, they adopted the model of appropriation and capture. They treated the *war machine* and state apparatus genealogically; that is, they saw them as two different arts of governing. In their view, *war machines* do not become states: they become appropriated by states. It is not clear, then, why Deleuze and Guattari failed to adopt the model of appropriation

[84] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 121.
[85] Ibid., 120.
[86] Ibid., 94.
[87] Ibid., 109, 138.
[88] Ibid., 123.

(i.e., genealogy) to religious power. They saw religions as *war machines* who all "dream of an Absolute state," and in that sense they sound very much like Ibn Khaldunian.[89]

But Foucault did not make the same mistake. He maintained that the dichotomy of pastoral versus Greek power did not mean that these two forms of power had always stood apart from each other. Pastoral power, according to him, "no doubt shifted, [was] broken up, transformed, and integrated in various forms."[90] Between pastoral and political power there was always a "series of conjunctions, supports, relays and conflicts . . . [and] intertwining." But Foucault stressed that despite this, "pastoral power, its form, type of functioning, and internal technology, remains *absolutely specific* and *different* from political power."[91] Reading Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari in resonance with each other allows one to conclude that pastoral power is a form of *war machine*; it remains as a constellation of power that resists state apparatus, but it can also be appropriated by *State-form*. Pastoral power is "broken up, transformed, and integrated in various forms" in different contexts, but it remains as a force "absolutely specific and different [and exterior] from political [state] power."[92]

The Transformation: *Tribe-form* to *State-form*

How are states born? Through which modality, rationality, and practice can one begin to locate traces of *State-form*? What characteristics allow one to identify the slow demise of *Tribe-form* and the rise of the *State-form*? For Marx and his disciples, the rise of the state was subordinate to certain modes of production and economic relations. Many later historians of the state and critics of Marx have criticized and dismissed him for failing to take into account the

[89] Ibid., 384. Pastoral power can take up juristic and legal forms. Perhaps what Deleuze and Guattari had in mind was the juridical function of religion and not for instance mystical orders in monotheistic religions that defy state control.
[90] Foucault, *Security, Territory*, *Population,* 148.
[91] Ibid., 154.
[92] Ibid., 148, 154.

political factors that were influential in the rise of the *State-form*.[93] Deleuze and Guattari took a middle stance, recognizing both economic and the political factors, yet giving primacy to the political. After all it is "not the state that presupposes a mode of production; quite the opposite, it is the state that makes production a 'mode.'"[94]

States, before anything other factors, emerge as a certain mode of thought. State is an idea or a way of thinking before it is a practice because only "thought is capable of inventing the fiction of the State that is universal by right, of elevating the State to the level of de jure universality."[95] While State-thought is prone to subjugation, binaries, and centres, nomad-thought is like "a tribe, the opposite of a State."[96] Nomad-thought operates through relays, event-thought and problem-thought, and it "appeals to a people instead of taking itself for a government ministry."[97] In fact, State-thought translates itself in practice and brings about "hierarchical authority, the power relation, and the subjugation of men—in a word, the state."[98] In nomad-thought, however, "centres already act as so many *knots*, *eyes*, or *black holes*; but they do not all resonate together, they do not fall on the same point, they do not converge in the same black hole. There is a multiplicity of animist eyes..."[99] But usually, through the hand of a chief, a shaman or the successor of a charismatic leader, nomad-thought loses momentum and is replaced with State-thought. It is then that one sees the process in which a mechanism "draws lines between all points or spirits, outlines constellations, a radiating set of roots tied to a central tree. This is the birth of centralized power with an arborescent system to discipline the outgrowth of

[93] This is essentially Pierre Clastres's thesis in *Society Against the State* (Brooklyn: Zone Books, 1989).
[94] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 429.
[95] Ibid., 375.
[96] Ibid., 377.
[97] Ibid., 378.
[98] Clastres, *Society Against the State*, 203.
[99] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 211.

the primitive rhizome."[100] The will, the desire, and the practice of creating centres, resonating the dispersed lines, and bringing about "flows under the dominance of a single flow capable of over-coding them" all call for a transformation of a modality of power from *Tribe-form* to *State-form*.[101] In this context a certain rationality is introduced which attempts to "to turn the tribe into the instrument of [the chief's] desires, whereas, before by virtue of his competence as a warrior, he was the tribe's instrument."[102] Here, police violence and not the violence of war is first introduced, and one begins to see the emergence of a monopoly of exercising violence over what is becoming a striated territory.[103] These processes "transform the chiefs into law-making kings" because, as Weber held, in some cases a charismatic leader "cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both."[104] Community codes become laws of the state through the emergence of bureaucracies, judges, courts, and various mechanisms of transferring/overcoding codes into laws. Gradually, the "concept of divine right is fundamentality altered and now comes to mean authority by virtue of a personal right which is not dependent on the recognition of those subject to authority. In the new situation personal "charisma may be [even] totally absent."[105] Hence a routinization of charisma takes place and tribes and towns become states. But, contrary to Ibn Khaldun's vision, this transformation is not a "natural" one. There is always a certain mechanism, rationality or process that operates as a negative power in the formation of the *State-form*. Non-state societies had a

> very early premonition that power's transcendence conceals a mortal risk for the group, that the principle of an authority which is external and the creator of its own legality is a

[100] Ibid., 211.
[101] Ibid., 220.
[102] Clastres, *Society Against the State*, 211.
[103] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 448.
[104] Clastres, *Society Against the State*, 217. Weber, *Economy*, 246.
[105] Ibid., 248.

> challenge to the culture itself. It is intuition of this threat that determined the depth of their political philosophy.[106]

That is, what remained at the heart of the political philosophy of *Tribe-form* was a series of concepts and practices that formed a certain regime of truth that warded off the *State-form*. In *Tribe-form* philosophy there was a constant reminder to the chief that "*You are worth no more than others*," and this helped the tribe to keep the chief "under a close watch" and prevent his transformation to a king.[107]

But as Deleuze and Guattari correctly pointed out, to "ward off is also to anticipate."[108] *Tribe-forms*, whether intuitively or through observations of neighbouring state societies, are aware of the potential inclination towards state. "These societies simultaneously have vectors moving in the direction of state, mechanisms warding it off and a point of convergence that is repelled, set outside, as fast as it is approached."[109] Thus, there is a certain "threshold" created between "collective mechanisms that simultaneously ward off and anticipate the formation of a central power" that if crossed, creates the conditions for the rise of *State-form*. The threshold between *Tribe* and *State-forms* is both political and economic.[110]

The political threshold is crossed with the rise of hegemonic practices and the "traditionalization and legalization" of power.[111] Economic thresholds constitute elements of stockpiling, taxation, and appropriation of the land.[112] One tribe may conquer another tribe, but through State-thought, stockpiling becomes a practice, and instead of the logic of exchange,

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[106] Clastres, *Society Against the State*, 44.
[107] Ibid., 207.
[108] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 431.
[109] Ibid., 431.
[110] Ibid., 436.
[111] Weber, *Economy*, 249.
[112] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 437-448.

taxation through the centre becomes compulsory and land becomes territorialized. Deleuze and Guattari summarized these political and economic thresholds:

> A state apparatus is erected upon the primitive agricultural communities, which already have lineal-territorial codes, *but it overcodes them*, submitting them to the power of a despotic emperor, the sole and transcendent public property owner, the master of surplus or the stock, the organizer of large-scale works (surplus labour), the source of public functions and bureaucracy. This is the *paradigm* of the bond, the knot. Such is the regime of signs of the state: overcoding, or the Signifier. It is a system of *machinic enslavement*: the first "megamachine" in the strict sense, to use Mumford's term.[113]

To this assemblage of thresholds one must also add the threshold of desire. As noted earlier, *Tribe-form* requires certain affects or technologies of the self pertaining to its modality of power. Thus any transition from *Tribe-form* to *State-form* would naturally mean a transformation within the technologies of the self. Deleuze and Guattari called this assemblage of desire corresponding to *State-form,* Oedipus; Ibn Khaldun called it worldly or animalistic desires. Through self-mastery and the "undoing of the subject," nomads warded off Oedipal desires and hence defied the *State-form*.[114] Only when desire is crystalized in Oedipal fashion does the state go from a virtual concept to an actual practice. Thus, there is an interlocking relation between desire and power; one corresponds with the other. Desire forms the molecular lines and when the molecular is filled with Oedipal desires, it manifests itself in molar lines of power. In a sense, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the molar line of power is the embodiment of the molecular practice. Hence, for instance, "fascism is inseparable from a proliferation of molecular focuses in interaction, which skip from point to point *before* beginning to resonate together."[115] One cannot ward off the *State-form* without releasing desire from its Oedipal subjugation; similarly, there would be no rise of the state without animalistic desires proliferating the molecular.

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[113] Ibid., 427-8.
[114] Ibid., 400.
[115] Ibid., 214.

In sum, hegemony and subjugation in a) desire, b) thought, c) political, and d) economic practices must be introduced to *Tribe-form* for it to be transformed to *State-form*. While there is a vector of inclination in *Tribe-form* towards *State-form*, a vector also operates in opposition to state formation. These two vectors operate as "anticipation–prevention mechanisms" and the decisive moment is when political, economic, and personal thresholds are crossed.[116] Only then is state born.

To remain within the tradition of genealogy, it is perhaps preferable not to speak of origins or the birth of the state and instead follow the approach Deleuze and Guattari adopted as their model of explaining the relation between *Tribe-form* and *State-form*. As alluded to before, they tend not to speak of a tribe becoming state, but a state that appropriates the *war machine*/*Tribe-form*. A state can be either actual or virtual.[117] That is, it can already be in existence or its emergence is anticipated. Initially a *war machine* does not take war as its object. It only does so when it collides with the *State-form*.[118] The rise of *State-form* is a moment in which a virtual state appropriates a *war machine*, and then it directs the state "against the nomad and all [other] state destroyers." Thus "War produces the State only if at least one of the two parts [despotic power and legislative body] is a preexistent State; and the organization of war is a State factor only if that organization is part of the State."[119] It is here that a *war machine* "takes war as its object, and that war becomes subordinate to the aims of the state."[120]

Therefore, based on the distinctions made above, it may be then stated that *Tribe-form* and *State-form* operate as two distinct models of human organization and political community.

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[116] Ibid., 437.
[117] Ibid., 359.
[118] Ibid., 418.
[119] Ibid., 427.
[120] Ibid., 418.

While sovereignty, territory, and control of the population are the main elements of governing a *State-form*, in a *Tribe-form*, charisma of the chief, membership in the tribe, and various social and religious sanctions operate as the constitutive governmental features. The fact that a community or any political assemblage operates according to *Tribe-form* does not disqualify it from being political. Power relations, hierarchies, struggles for more access to resources, and discipline exist in *Tribe-form*, but are of an alternative quality from that of *State-form*. In other words, tribal communities are political, but their mode of politics excludes features of state societies. As Crone holds, states do not become *Tribe*, but tribes do tend to dispense with their qualities and gradually adopt state characteristics.[121] The birth of political hegemony and subjugation, often carried out by a successor of a leader, acquisition of land, centralized taxation and stockpiling, and transformation of subjects and their desires, all account for the gradual transition of a Tribe to State, and this transition does not take place without resistance. While there is a tendency on the part of some to transform a tribe into a state, there will appear forces of resistance which will either go to war against the state or will eventually be subjugated by it. With this framework, one may consider early Muslim political experience and ask a series of questions regarding its correspondence with *State-* and *Tribe-form*.

Islam: Tribe- or State-Form?

As alluded to earlier, Muslim statists have long argued that Islam is a religion of the state, while Muslim secularists have taken the opposite view, that Islam is an ethical religion of private citizens of the modern state; this debate has yet to be resolved. For medieval Muslims, however, such confusion was barely in existence. If Christians and Buddhists had renounced worldly politics due to its profanity, for Muslims, politics and religion could not be perceived unless

[121] Patricia Crone, "The Tribe and the State," in *States in History*, ed. John A. Hall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 48-77.

joined together and within some organization of power.[122] The Quran contains many verses that pertain to power struggles, and the Prophet Mohammad was seen not only as a mystical prophet, but also as one who intervened in the realm of worldly power.[123] But the nature of the political community created by the Prophet Mohammad has barely been a subject of Muslim statists' and secularists' inquiry.

Based on the image drawn by scholars of medieval Islam of the early Muslim political community, it may be stated that the political community envisaged by the Quran in its ideal form, as well as the one created by the Prophet Mohammad in practice, had more in common with *Tribe-form* than with *State-form*. Given the stateless nature of the historical context in which Islam emerged, this stance does not at all appear unsubstantial.[124] Arabian society in the sixth and seventh centuries had a tribal and nomadic social structure, and peoples of this region rarely created centralized forms of authority.[125] Most tribes were constantly on the move in search of better resources, and "even people settled in the agricultural oases or in commercial towns tended to be organized as 'settled Bedouin,' to keep camels, and to think of themselves as if they were in principle pastoralists."[126] While competing over access to non-plundered resources, tribes maintained their autonomy, thus making Arabia the land of diverse nomadic tribes.[127] "Such a society rejected authoritarian political forms and based itself instead on individual leadership prowess and prestige and on close lineage group loyalties."[128] The head of the tribe exercised no authoritarian control over members of the tribe, and like chiefs in non-state

[122] Patricia Crone, *God's Rule* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 12.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Antony Black, *The Political History of Islamic Political Thought* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 10.
[125] Davoud Feirahi, *History of State Evolution in Islam*, 56.
[126] Marshal G.S Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, Volume I (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 149.
[127] W. Montgomery Watt, "Islamic Conceptions of the Holy War," in *The Holy War*, ed. Thomas Patrick Murchy(Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1976), pp. 146.
[128] Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 149.

societies, he was chosen based on experience, eloquence, and leadership qualities. Specifically, in relation to chiefs, community members believed:

> [They] should not be envisaged as petty kings. Their role was to keep their tribes together by engaging in dispute settlement, helping the needy and presiding over discussions of public issues in which all or most male adult tribesmen would participate and in which the chief would formulate the consensus as he saw it emerge. Chiefs might or might not be military leaders too, but they neither coerced nor protected their fellow tribesman after the fashion of kings. Every tribesman defended himself and his dependents.[129]

Inspired by Foucault's notion of pastoral power, Feirahi compares the formation of power within Arab tribes with that of the Greek city state and concludes that features of Arab tribes had more in common with the pastor-flock model of Judaism than with the city-states of the Greeks.[130] Arabic tribes had no equivalent understanding of the notion of territory, and power was enforced on members. Tribes were constantly in movement and the role of the chief was to maintain the community and not the city.[131] Freedom among the Greeks was partially realized in relation to an escape from state power, while for Arabs no such understanding of freedom existed. Arabs saw their chiefs as responsible for their relative protection, and that is why justice and injustice appeared more crucial to them than freedom.[132] Arabs, unlike the Greeks, did not perceive land as a means of creating wealth; they either relied on pastoral economics or war spoils. For the Greeks, wealth was a determining factor in power relations, while among tribes, lineage and virtue were essential, and wealth barely operated as a crucial factor in the accumulation of power.[133]

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[129] Crone, *God's Rule*, 2.
[130] Davoud Feirahi, *Ghodrat, Dānesh va Mashroo'iyyat dar Islam* [Power, Knowledge and Legitimacy in Medieval Islam] (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1999), 130.
[131] Ibid., 132.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid., 133.

It was in this nomadic and tribal setting that the Prophet Mohammad emerged and found his political community. On the one hand, the teachings of the Prophet denounced clan lineages, and on the other, he employed techniques of power common to *Tribe-form* to build his polity. For instance, tribal groupings of the pre-Islamic era came to greatly help the Islamic army, which was organized strictly on tribal affiliations. Arab tribal system identified "members of a group by their shared patrilineal blood descent from a common ancestor," a trait particular to "tribally organized peoples in general and nomadic groups in particular," and which was distinct from those who "shared residence in a specific locale, a form of organization more common among settled peoples."[134] In other words, non-territorial conceptions of group organization came to the service of Islam and its political formation. Rasul Jafariyan has conducted a close study of early Muslim community political practices and discusses many Islamic political concepts that had their roots in pre-Islamic Arabian tribal practices. He shows that concepts such as *bay'ah* (allegiance), *ukhuwwah* (brotherhood), and *amr* (order), pertinent to early Muslims' understanding of political power, were in fact Islamicized notions of tribal interactions.[135] Prior to Islam, Arabs had their own pagan religions, but clan lineage superseded religious beliefs. What defined an Arabic tribal community was the triangle of lineage/war spoils/belief, in that order of importance. In the new community, the triangle remained the same; the only thing that changed was the order in which these three factors shaped the community. The Prophet's *umma* operated based on belief (in Islam)/war spoils/religious solidarity, and in that sense the Prophet's Medina "maintained the model of tribal existence in the concept of umma."[136] One must note

[134] Khalid Yahya Blankinship. *The End of the Jihad State: The Reign of Hishām Ibn Abd Al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads* (New York: State University of New York, 1994), 42.
[135] Rasul Jafariyan, *Tārikh-e Tahawũl-e Dawlat va Khelāfat az Barāmadan-e Islam tā Baroftādan-e Sufiyāniyān* [The History of Change of Government and Caliphate from the Advent of Islam to the Fall of the Sufyanids] (Qom: Markaz-e Chāp va Nashr-e Tablighāt-e Hawza Ilmiyya Qom, 1999), 28-44.
[136] Feirahi, *Knowledge, Power*, 140.

that "a situation in which members of different tribes were linked to one another on the basis of religious affiliation" was not entirely an Islamic phenomenon. "What was unique in the concept of umma was, then, not the idea of … community defined by religion, but rather the uncompromising monotheism of the Islamic community that ... in essence laid the claim for the umma to the souls and bodies of the whole pagan population."[137] The Prophet was soon able to bring nomadic groups under his control, but the "the real vehicle of authority was not in fact Muhammad, but rather the community as a whole and the divine law that guided it."[138] As reflected in the Pact of Medina, once in power, the Prophet did not lean towards creating a centralized state; rather, he recognized the autonomy of the tribes and allowed them to maintain their value systems as long as they did not interfere with the new religion.[139] The Medina polity then was not a state, instead it was:

> like a federation of nomadic clans or tribes. … In this case, however, it was not Muhammad's military prestige that drew men to accept him as a leader, but his prophethood. The community thus had a religious basis … Muhammad like a nomadic chief, received a share of any booty taken on raids, but only a fifth instead of a quarter. … Muhammad was by no means the ruler of this community. The Emigrants were treated as a clan, and he was their chief, but there were eight other clans with their chiefs.[140]

Hence, the image of the Prophet as a sovereign of an imperial state, as suggested by some medieval and modern Muslim scholars, is not an accurate one. In the Pact of Medina—which some historians have wrongly referred to as the first Islamic Constitution in keeping with their narrow conception of the state as the sole model for human organization—there was no mention of the word state, or *dawlat*.[141] "It could, [then,] be said that Muhammad created a new tribe, a

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[137] Fred M. Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 56.
[138] Ibid., 61-63.
[139] Ibid., 141.
[140] Montgomery Watt, *Prophet and Statesman* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 94.
[141] Both Jafariyan and Feirahi insist on using the word *dawlat* in reference to the polity first created in Medina. They also see the Medina Pact as comparable with classic and modern state constitutions.

super tribe of believers," and while being aware of the difference between nomadic/Islamic and state techniques of governance, he made a distinction between prophethood and kinghood, stressing that he was not a monarch and resisted being one.[142] According to Prophet Muhammad's teachings, other than the examples of Solomon and David, kings were oppressive rulers, and prophets who found themselves at odds with their rule. The Quran envisages the kingdom (*Mulk*) as only belonging to God and deems worldly rulers as rebels in relation to God's power (*tāghut*).[143] To be sure, the Quran does mention prophets that were given the status of *Mulk*, but certainly the Prophet of Islam was not one of them.[144] On various occasions too, as Abd al-Raziq adamantly showed, the Prophet clearly differentiated his political rule from state societies such as Persia and the Byzantine Empire, and this is in line with overall Arab political tastes that recognized the title *malik* (king) as "so abhorrent that it was applied almost exclusively to non-Arab potentates."[145]

Ibn Khaldun too stressed that the Prophet Mohammad's modality of power barely resembled *Mulk-form*. He held that the Prophet was able to create forms of group solidarity that transcended lineage and family, and created a new community based on "truth and the fulfilment of divine commands."[146] "When Muslims got their religion from Mohammad," according to Ibn Khaldun, "the restraining influence came from themselves, as result of encouragement and discouragement he gave them in the Quran. It was not a result of technical instruction or scientific education" as was prevalent in State/Mulk societies. Arab Bedouins' "fortitude remained unabated, [because] it was not corroded by education or authority," and it was "far

[142] Crone, *God's Rule*, 12.
[143] Jafariyan, *Government and Caliphate*, 60.
[144] Ibid., 61.
[145] Philip K. Hitti, *History of Arabs* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 197.
[146] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 121.

away from laws of government, instruction and education."[147] Ibn Khaldun called this mode of leadership of the world, which "substitutes for Mohammad as it serves, like him, to preserve the religion," *Imamat* or *caliphate*. This form of rule was antithetical to Mulk societies, since the "Prophet Mohammad had blamed [Mulks] . . . because of their enjoyment of good fortune, their senseless waste, and their deviation from the path of God."[148] According to Ibn Khaldun, the Mulk system "belongs only to those who dominate subjects."[149] Mulk "requires superiority and force, which expresses the wrathfulness and animality (of human desire). The decision of the ruler will therefore, as a rule, deviate from what is right. [He] forces … [people] to execute his intentions."[150] Ibn Khaldun also referred to Mulk societies as those accustomed to control, luxury and worldly occupation. In contrast to Mulk society, a mosque with very simple architecture rather than a royal palace was the centre of the Prophet's super-tribe. In the mosque the Prophet conducted daily prayers, acted as judge and arbiter and led the Muslim army.[151] The poor and the needy also found the mosque as their resort, and for all its functions it may be stated that the mosque was more like a social centre and a public institution than a political headquarters.[152] The Prophet encouraged communal consultation (*shurā*), and in his revelations God often stressed, "you are simply a messenger," and hence politically worth no more than others. "The new community was to have no priesthood, no hierarchy, no central see," and it was as such that "by one stroke, the most vital bond of Arab relationship, that of tribal kinship, was replaced by a new bond, that of faith, [and] a sort of Pax Islamica was instituted for Arabia."[153] The *umma* was a non-territorial super-tribe, the Prophet—being an Imam—was the chief of the new super tribe

[147] Ibid., 96, 97.
[148] Ibid., 160.
[149] Ibid., 152.
[150] Ibid., 154.
[151] Feirahi, *History of State Evolution*, 116.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Hitti, *History of Arabs*, 121.

leading his "flock," and his teachings constituted the path (*shari'a*). Crone's use of the metaphor of *caravan* to demonstrate key Islamic political concepts is striking:

> [It] helps to envisage the community (umma) as a caravan. The early Muslim saw life as a journey through a perilous desert in which one could all too easily go astray and perish. To survive one needed to band together under the leadership of a guide (*imam al-hudā, hādi, Mahdi*) who knew the right path, often called the path of guidance . . . that is the right thing to do; the terms *sunna* (normative custom), *sira* (exemplary behavior) and *shari'a* . . . are all derived from roots to do with traveling and roads.[154]

The *shari'a* consisted of instructions for technologies of the self and self-control (*taqwā*); social sanctions and rituals such as prayers, fasting, and pilgrimage; and "religious sanctions" comprised of bodies of codes that later on became *fiqh* and allowed Muslim arbiters to judge disputes between parties. The *shari'a* then was not the law of the state; rather it was a body of "laws and precepts of the religion that …[Muslims] received orally and which their firmly rooted belief in the truth of the article of faith caused them to observe."[155]

Crone's caravan concept and Feirahi's delineation of Islam transcending clan lineages brings the Prophet's political community in close resonance with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of *war machine* and Foucault's pastoral power. One can assert that the Prophet Mohammad's religious formation had both pastoral and *war machine* qualities—although, as indicated earlier, these concepts have much in common. Nevertheless, in this context the pastoral concept can highlight aspects of care and prophetic guidance, while *war machine* can stress the non-territorial, non-statist, war-spirited yet politically materialized formation that was attached to this pastoral form of power. The *Tribe-form* of the *umma* certainly had a huge impact on its military success. The warrior quality of members of Arab tribes was now channelled to a divine cause, helping Islam to make "full use of the tribal system for its military purposes. It divided the army

[154] Crone, *God's Rule*, 21.
[155] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 96.

into units based on tribal lines, settled the colonists in the conquered lands in tribes, and treated new converts from among the subjugated people as clients."[156] The Muslim army of the Prophet was not an organized state military; people from all ranks and backgrounds joined the army with both spiritual and worldly motives. The *umma*, then, was a war machine by definition and its governance followed nomadic models of war by embracing non-territoriality and social anti-authoritarianism. This *war machine* had to ward off "two things simultaneously: a return of the lineal aristocracy and the formation of imperial functionaries."[157] This process of warding off, however, did not last long.

Transition from Tribe to State in Islam

In his famous book *Introduction,* Ibn Khaldun entitled a chapter, "The Transformation of Caliphate/Imamate to Mulk," in which he identified a transition from the *Tribe-form* of the Prophet to a virtual and then an actual *State-form* in the post-Prophet era. The ability to identify a major change in modalities of power from tribe to state, however, was not the genius of Ibn Khaldun. As early as the mid-seventh century, there was awareness among Muslims that the polity created by the Prophet had been undergoing a radical transformation. There was also a *hadith* by the Prophet in circulation that had prophesized the demise of the Imamate and the birth of Mulk in Islam.[158] Later on, Abbasid took full advantage of this charge by claiming that the Umayyad had changed the Imamate to a Mulk, though the Abbasids were perhaps more successful in creating an imperial state.[159] Jahiz and Abu Yusuf (AD 738–AD 798), medieval Muslims scholars before Ibn Khaldun, also noted the change and wrote partly in condemnation

[156] Hitti, *History of Arabs*, 27.
[157] Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 393.
[158] Feirahi, *Knowledge, Power*, 170.
[159] H. A. R. Gibb "The Evolution of Government in Early Islam," *Studia Islamica* 4 (1955), 6.

of the process.[160] Ibn Khaldun, however, is important for not only noting the change, but also for setting out as his objective to investigate the very socio-political condition in which this transformation took place. Ibn Khaldun noticed the process through which after the Prophet's demise, "people were forced to render the oath of allegiance to anybody who seized power," hence the birth of political domination and a paving of the path for the later rise of the Sultān in Islam.[161] Soon after Abu Bakr (AD 573–AD 634) took charge as Caliph, certain tribes did not recognize the rule of Medina and abstained from paying *zakāt.* While there "are no reports of any force used against tribes failing to pay" *zakāt* during the rule of the Prophet, a "radical change of policy" was introduced, and "physical coercion," and if needed "shedding blood," became mechanisms to maintain and expand political power.[162] Abu Bakr subdued the rebellious (*ridda*) tribes, thus gradually making the caliph "the ruler of all Arabs, commanding their obedience in the name of Islam."[163] Here Umar (AD 579–AD 644) played a key role not only in assisting Abu Bakr to expand the domination of the Quraysh, but also securing the succession of the Prophet for Abu Bakr and then for himself.

While some scholars are divided as to which figure, Abu Bakr or Umar, played a more decisive role in the unfolding of events in the post-Prophet era, one must be certain of the remarkable influence of Umar in the transition period between the demise of the Prophet and the birth of the Ummyad dynasty.[164] Most of what later became the founding principles of the Umayyad dynasty were initiated by the second caliph. During his reign, new territories were conquered, a land tax modelled after the Persian bureaucracy was introduced, and the institution

[160] Jafariyan, *Government and Caliphate*, 200. Gibb, "The Evolution of Government," 17.
[161] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 155.
[162] Wilferd Madelung, *The Succession to Muhammad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 47.
[163] Ibid., 49.
[164] Ibid., 4.

of *diwān* or "public registers of receipts and expenditures" came into effect.[165] The system of *diwān* "recognized that conquest was the keynote of the Muslim state, and helped perpetuate this situation. With distribution of booty as the most attractive physical resource of the state, it was obviously desirable to continue the conquests," the result of which was taking control of Persia, Iraq and Syria.[166] Umar, in spite of Ali's disagreement, created a centralized tax system to make district revenues the property of the Medina apparatus.[167] Umar effectively pursued the policy of precedence (*sābiqa*) in which family lineage and one's previous contribution to Islam counted as criteria for distribution of revenues of the emerging state.[168] Despite the criticism levelled against him for erecting anti-egalitarian practices, his policy remained in effect and continued during Uthmān's (AD 577–AD 656) reign and led to the rise of new social hierarchies.[169] Umar also "established the institution of judgeship" and chose men who "were able to see the long-term problems of finance and administration in agrarian society," which meant less reliance on Bedouins and the hiring of those with more management skills, even if their Islamic convictions were not as strong.[170] He appointed Mu'āwiya (AD 602–AD 680), later founder of the Umayyad, governor of Syria, and paved the way for members of the Umayyad family to gain a strong influence in early Muslim politics. He also ensured that another member of the Umayyad family, Uthmān, would be selected as his successor, rather than Ali ibn Abi Talib (AD 601–AD 661), an event that proved very influential in the transformation of the apparatus of power from *Tribe-form* to *State-form* in early Islam.

[165] Hitti, *History of Arabs*, 172.
[166] Ibid., 208.
[167] Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 213.
[168] Asmā Afsaruddin, *The First Muslims: History and Memory* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2013), 32.
[169] Ibid., 34.
[170] Hitti, *History of Arabs,* 173; Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam,* 209.

The reign of Uthmān was characterized by the increased influence of the Umayyad, particularly Mu'āwiya, nepotism and the birth of luxurious practices. Uthmān brought royal lands under the possession of the caliph, and with his nepotism helped the Umayyad to control and take ownership of these lands. This "attempt to reconvert communal land into crown property was a major step towards turning the caliphate into a traditional kingship. His aim was fully realized by Mu'āwiya during his caliphate as he brought all *sawafi* land throughout the empire under his direct control."[171] Uthmān's policy brought about significant class stratification, which resulted in the rise of a new aristocracy at the expense of the misery and economic hardship of a lower class. All of these changes had socio-cultural ramifications; for the first time, late night parties at luxurious houses and palaces, leisure sports, and other extravagant practices emerged in Medina, which signalled the loss of the nomadic ethos and its replacement with a sedentary lifestyle.[172] Like all sedentary people, Arab Muslims were now "accustomed to luxury and success in worldly occupations and to indulgence in worldly desires," and as a result they "entrusted the defence of their property and their lives to the governor and ruler who rules them, and to the militia which has the task of guarding them."[173] The birth of the state had become inevitable, which helps to explain the overall failure of Ali, Uthmān's successor.

Viewing himself as a true heir to the Prophet, Ali despised the state model of governance.[174] He opposed many policies adopted by Umar and Uthmān, and because of his unwillingness to "compromise his principles for the sake of political expediency" at the state level, Umar charged him with political naiveté.[175] Ali, however, "stood not merely for a negation

[171] Madelung, *The Succession to Muhammad*, 85.
[172] Feirahi, *History of State Evolution*,188.
[173] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 94 - 95.
[174] Jafariyan, *Government and Caliphate*, 199.
[175] Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 213. Madelung, *The Succession to Muhammad*, 149.

(i.e. opposition to the Umayyads, or to the exploitation of the empire by the great Meccan families), but had also a positive vision of a structure of government which should embody the social and ethical values of the Islamic ideology."[176] Committed to the principles of Islam, his vision included the revival of the Prophet's *Tribe-form* of government.[177] He compared the time of state rule to that of *jāhiliyya,* and assumed "teaching religion" as one of the main functions of his caliphate.[178] His refusal to play by the rules of the nascent state, however, cost him gravely. During his five-year reign he got involved in three battles on different fronts and was eventually murdered.

The removal of Ali from the political scene brought about the end of the Rāshidun Caliphate and the birth of the Umayyad dynasty. Shrewd Mu'āwiya, who was involved in governmental affairs since the time of Umar, was under no illusion that the implications and reality of the Muslim power structure had drastically changed. He openly admitted that he was not elected by the Muslim community, but that he instead took charge through force, seduction, and political domination.[179] Given the stage set by some of his predecessors, Mu'āwiya's policies, however, were by no means an anomaly. In many ways, he followed Umar and Uthmān and brought the direction of their policies to their logical conclusions. Modelled after the Persian and Byzantine empires, Mu'āwiya expanded various *diwāns* (bureaucracy) and enforced major reforms in the army.[180] He knew that he could no longer trust Bedouin voluntary zeal for any military expansion; hence, he created a salary-based army at the service of the first *mālik* in Islam.[181] In the process, he "rid the military machine of its archaic tribal organization, a relic of

[176] Gibb, "The Evolution of Government," 12.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Jafariyan, *Government and Caliphate,* 169.
[179] Feirahi, *Knowledge, Power*, 173.
[180] Feirahi, *History of State Evolution*, 211.
[181] Ibid.

the ancient patriarchal days. … [and] abolished many traditional features of the government and on the earlier Byzantine framework built a stable, well-organized state."[182] For the first time, a Muslim ruler lived in a palace; he had bodyguards, dressed in luxurious cloth, and made himself similar to Persian kings.[183] "The Umayyad caliphate was therefore, in a manner, forced into becoming the symbol of a certain type of political organization, sometimes called etatisme or pursuit of the interests of the State," which meant "thrusting the interests of Islam down to [a] secondary plane of consideration."[184]

During the reign of the early caliphs the Muslim super-tribe became the instrument of Quraysh power ambitions, police violence was enforced on rebels, charisma was routinized, lands were territorialized, taxation became centralized, direction of desires underwent a shift, luxurious practices became the norm, and the sedentary implications of life replaced a Bedouin ethos, all of which brought about a gradual but effective transition from one mode of governance to another. "Ecological factors, the bureaucratic traditions of several of the conquered peoples, as well as some strategic decisions taken by Umar and others … had all pointed in the direction of an 'etatist mode of production'" which superimposed a "'control-based' mode of production by the State both on the agrarian sector…and on the commercial sector."[185] Ibn Khaldun described this transition in the following terms: "the caliphate at first existed without royal authority. Then, the characteristic traits of the caliphate became mixed up and confused. Finally, when its group feelings had separated from the group feelings of the caliphate . . . [Mulk] came to exist alone."[186] Through this narrative, Ibn Khaldun marked the metamorphosis of power relations

[182] Hitti, *History of Arabs*, 195.
[183] Feirahi, *History of State Evolution*, 205.
[184] Gibb, "The Evolution of Government," 6.
[185] Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam, Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991), 27.
[186] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 166.

from an *umma-machine* to one where the Mulk had appropriated the *umma*. The Imamate had become Mulk, and the *State-form* had appropriated the *Tribe-form*. The virtual state, to borrow from Deleuze and Guattari, had become actual. In fact, with the emerging state, control of the wandering nomads became the concern of the ruling apparatus because nomads were perceived to be "a potential danger to the integration of the state and the political ascendancy of the elite."[187] The proposed solution was "recruitment of nomadic tribesman into the Islamic armies and their settlement in garrison towns away from the desert and the home territories of their tribes."[188] By enacting these solutions, an existing threat to the state was warded off, and "the nomads became integrated into the state organization as employees and were gradually transformed into sedentary citizens, effectively cutting them off from their former desert life and from the opportunities for secluded opposition to Islamic rule it had allowed."[189] The state had set its goal to appropriate all war-machines.

War Machine and State Apparatus in Early Islam

Whilst Ibn Khaldun located the transition of power from *Tribe-form* to *State-form*, or from a *war machine* to a state-appropriated war machine, he failed to account for the mechanisms warding off the *State-form*. In his *Muqaddimah* he correctly identified the transition that led to the rise of the state, but he boldly refused to engage critically with the comprehensive analysis of this transition, and when he did, despite his scolding view of Mulk, he sounded utterly apologetic in its favour. For instance, he asserted that Mu'āwiya, the inventor of the state in the history of Islam, "wanted the truth, but missed it," and then offered the justification that "it was not for Mu'āwiya to deny (the natural requirement of royal authority) to himself and his

[187] Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, *264*.
[188] Ibid., 265.
[189] Ibid., 266.

people. (Royal authority) was a natural thing that group feeling, by its very nature, brought in its train."[190] At one moment Ibn Khaldun stated that early caliphs "renounced royal authority and kept apart from its ways."[191] But then, throughout his writing, he refused to pass a value judgment upon the process and mechanisms that brought about the rise of Mulk-form through Mu'āwiya and his predecessors. He praised Ali's refusal to play power politics and viewed it as emblematic of "improving . . . religion at the expense of . . . worldly affairs," yet he viewed the statist practices adopted by the early Umayyad as a necessity, because there was "fear that the whole thing might face dissolution."[192] Hence, not only did Ibn Khaldun sound Machiavellian at times, he fell prey to a major paradox, perhaps the very paradox that informed Deleuze and Guattari's conception that all monotheistic religions, despite their desert origins, aspired to become "Absolute States."

In addition, Ibn Khaldun refused to engage with what Deleuze and Guattari called mechanisms of "warding off" in relation to the Mulk-form. He mentioned Ali's refusal to adopt the politics of the state, and also his contrasting method of governance to that of Mu'āwiya, but he barely acknowledged these instances of resistance to the Mulk-form. As alluded to earlier, since the commencement of the caliphate, Ali disagreed with Umar and Uthmān in many of their state-inclined policies. In fact it was Ali's refusal to abide by the policies of Abu Bakr and Umar that disqualified him from becoming the third caliph.[193] Ali "was known as a mighty warrior and was felt to be a spokesman for the malcontent," and for that reason he later became "a symbol of the party of protest."[194] It was towards the end of Uthmān's reign that the concept of a follower

[190] Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah,* 164.
[191] Ibid., 162.
[192] Ibid., 165, 164.
[193] Feirahi, *History of State Evolution*, 180.
[194] Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 213.

(Shi'i) of Ali began to register.[195] Although Ali did not have a part in the murder of Uthmān, his followers saw his mode of governance as an antithesis to that of Uthmān's state-inclined policies. The rivalry between Ali's "malcontent" supporters and Uthmān reproduced itself in the confrontation and civil war between Ali and Mu'āwiya.[196] Throughout the civil war Ali was forced to make a series of difficult choices that reduced the number of his followers while increasing their loyalty. Ali was eventually murdered, but his uncompromising stance against the emerging state policies and his attempt to revive the *Tribe-form* of the Prophet both as an activist and as a ruler marked him as the icon of resistance for those "against the logics of events, as well as against the injustices of a centralizing government. Very early his story came to be written as that of the noble man ruined by the inconstancy of his friends as much as the malice of his enemies and finally by the power of brute force."[197] Ali's son Husain ibn Ali (AD 626–AD 680), motivated by Shi'i momentum, led the first anti-Umayyad rebellion, and was massacred in a land near Mecca along with his family. Husain certainly had ambitions for power, but he made it very clear that his main agenda was to abolish the practice of state (Sultanate) and revive the communal practice of holding rulers accountable.[198] The "martyrdom" of Husain, as Shi'i understood it, marked a very important event in the Shi'i calendar and inspired future Shi'i movements in their fight against oppressive states.

Shi'ism, however, was not the only movement that emerged as a process to ward off the State-form. Kharijites and Mu'tazili movements shared Shi'i anti-state sentiment, although they differed from Shi'is in their understanding of what constituted an alternative to *State-form*.[199] But

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[195] Madelung, Wilferd, "Shi'ism in the Age of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs," in *Shi'ite Heritage: Essays on Classical and Modern Traditions,* Lynda Clarke, ed. (New York: Global Academic Publishing, 2001), 9.
[196] Crone "The Tribe and State," 460.
[197] Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 217.
[198] Sālehi Najaf-Ābādi, Ne'matollāh. *Shahid-e Jāvid* [The Eternal Martyr] (Tehran: Omid-e Fardā), 199.
[199] Patricia Crone, "Ninth-century Muslim Anarchists," *Past & Present* 167, 1 (2000): 3-28.

Muslim war machines did not manifest themselves only in political opposition movements. As Marshal Hodgson shows, the anti-state attitude prompted Muslim elites to ask a series of fundamental questions about the place of Islam in their lives. They saw that their rulers' palaces:

> were decorated in the usual Hellenistic fashion, the taxes they raised were essentially the same taxes as those raised by the governments before them, and [that] if their records were [in Arabic, they were] after [the] Greek or Pahlavi manner. What else could they do? There did not exist even a pagan Arabian pattern for doing these things, let alone, a purely Islamic one. Nevertheless, because of their un-Islamic "innovation" they were labelled impious by the opposition and sometimes accused of betraying Islam itself; the task of working out the social implications of Islam was to be carried out as much as possible without them.[200]

To resolve this identity crisis various cultural initiatives were pursued by different fractions in the Muslim community. Hasan al-Basri (AD 642–AD 728), while critical of the state, initiated the first currents of Sufism in Muslim history.[201] The "Quran reciters began to develop a complex intellectual discipline," as reports about the tradition of the Prophet (*hadith*) started to be collected, and out of egalitarian concerns, Islamic legal teachings known as *fiqh* started to be elucidated from the Quran and prophetic teachings.[202] This means that Islamic mysticism, *hadith*, *fiqh*, and reliance on the Quran and development of *shari'a* as a whole emerged as cultural responses to the state, and continued to operate as a war machine positioned outside the *State-form* for centuries. Describing the exterior quality of the *Tribe-form* of Islam in relation to *State-form*, Wael Hallaq writes:

> [T]he Community, the common social world, organically produced its own legal experts, persons who were qualified for a variety of legal functions that in total made up the Islamic legal system. The jurists of Islam lived with and in the norms and values of the common social world and on average hailed from the lower and middle social strata. Their mission was defined by these norms and values, which were heavily inspired by the pervasive egalitarianism of the Quran, which is to say they saw themselves as advocates of society, the weak and the disadvantaged having first priority. They were called upon to express the will and aspirations of those belonging to the nonelite classes, interceding on their behalf at

[200] Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 217.
[201] Ibid., 249.
[202] Ibid., 254; 252-267.

> the higher reaches of power. The jurists and judges thus emerged as the civil leaders who found themselves, by the nature of their "profession" involved in the day-to-day running of civil affairs. Jurists and judges felt responsibility toward the common man and woman and, on their own, frequently initiated action on behalf of the oppressed without any formal petition being made by these social groups or their individual members.[203]

This exteriority of *shari'a* as a general body of legal and moral teachings in relation to the state asserted itself throughout the period before the encounter of Muslims with colonial modernity.[204] Building on this premise, Hallaq questions the very existence of something called an "Islamic state," and instead calls for recognizing "Islamic governance" in Muslim political experience. He develops the same line of thinking to conclude that "[t]he 'Islamic state' judged by any standard definition of what the modern state represents, is both an impossibility and contradiction in terms." In fact as Afsaruddin stresses none "of the pre-modern sources—the Qur'an, hadith, historical works, exegeses—refers to the recurrent …terms of *al-Dawla al-Islamiyya* ("the Islamic State"), *al-Hukuma al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Government), or *al-hākimiyya*."[205] The concept used to describe Muslim political organization was *umma*, and specifically the term *Dawla* first began to be used in reference to the Abbasid state.[206] Reading Hallaq as being in line with the assertions made in this chapter, it may be stated that what Hallaq calls "Islamic governance," in reference to civil spheres where *shari'a* was grounded in Muslim history, is in fact the *Tribe-form* of the early polity. What Hallaq's work reveails, is that the *Tribe-form*'s energy and structure never disappeared but was channelled to non-state spaces in later Muslim state societies. Therefore, "[t]he political pattern of Islam makes some sense if we identify it as a post-tribal society, one which has recently remerged from tribalism[, hence borrowing features of

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[203] Wael Hallaq, *Impossible State: Islam, Politics and Modernity's Moral Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 52.
[204] Ibid.
[205] Afsaruddin, *The First Muslims*, *184.*
[206] Ibid.

Tribe-form]. This helps explain why it never developed formal state structures or constitutions."[207] Once the state emerged in the history of Muslim politics, the *Tribe-form* (war machine) of the Prophet was either appropriated by the state, redirected into a project pursued by Sunni political jurists, or it informed various resistance movements that set themselves up as opposition forces outside the State-form. Having in mind the case of Shi'ism, it may be then asked: how did Shi'ism, as one of the early war machines in opposition to the State-form, become conducive to the rise of the first Islamic state in modern times? This is the question that will be addressed in the following chapters.

Conclusion

Drawing on the works of political anthropologists specializing in non-state societies allows one to develop *Tribe-form* as a concept and account for its differences with *State-form.* Reading the history of the emergence of the early Muslim political community reveals avid resonances between that community in terms of political governance with the *Tribe-form* as opposed to *State-form*. However, as Ibn Khaldun revealed, in the years following the death of Mohammad, early political organization underwent a transition from Imamate to Mulk. Through an introduction of political domination, an alteration of desires, the centralization of taxation, and the territorialization of land, the super-tribe of the Prophet, or *umma*, headed by an Imam whose task was to show the path (*shari'a*), was transformed into *State-form* during the Umayyad. While the state triumphed, both as thought and practice, there were various mechanisms attempting to ward off its formation. Although these did not succeed, they transformed into various cultural and political protest movements, one of which was Shi'ism. The *Tribe-form*/*State-form* framework in particular also helps to resolve a long debate on the relation between Islam and

[207] Black, *The Political History*, 13.

state. The notion of a *Tribe-form* confirms the political quality of the early Muslim polity, and thus radically questions the attempt on the part of Muslim secularists such Abd al-Raziq to deny the political status of the Muslim community in its formative period. Equally, the concept challenges the arguments of Muslim statists who, by envisioning the Prophet's polity as a State, have attempted to forge various models for Islamic state formation in the modern period. Hence the concept Islamic state was an anomaly in the first forty years of Muslim politics until the ruling elite found themselves comfortable enough to call for the end of *Tribe-form* and ushered in the birth of Mulk in Islam. By completely disregarding *hukumat* (governance) based on *Tribe-form* in the early period, theorists of the modern Islamic State have sought to superimpose *Tribe-form* as a form of political organization on the modern nation-state. In fact, the egalitarian features of community rule in the *Tribe-form* of Islam appeared to have some external similarities with Western democratic practices such as constitutionalism, paving the way for Muslim theorists to introduce Islam as the inventor of democracy. What theorists of the Islamic State in the twentieth century ignored was the alternative organization of *Tribe-form* in relation to *State-form*. Hence they failed to understand that the medieval *Tribe-form* is not imposable on the modern state without committing theoretical errors. The concept of *Tribe-form* and its resonance with Deleuze and Guattari's notion of war machine and Foucault's pastoral power also provides a conceptual framework for the study of various movements—whether social, cultural or political—taking place either outside or in opposition to the state in Muslim history. The concept allows for the study of the ways in which the politicization of pastoral power could create war machines of various sorts that could later become subordinate to the state-machine.

Chapter 3: Genealogy of *Velāyat-e Faqih*

Ayatollāh Khomeini (1902–1989) delivered a series of lectures in the Iraqi city of Najaf in 1969 that influenced the theoretical foundation of the sovereignty of the jurist, or *velāyat-e faqih*, in post-revolutionary Iran. Before the Revolution, the lectures were compiled as a book entitled *Hukumat-e Islami*, which was secretly distributed among Iranian Islamists. *Hukumat-e Islami* was published in two different editions, one that contained technical juristic content and was part of a larger project named *Ketāb al-Bay'* (Book of Sale) and a second and more accessible version. According to some accounts, Jalāleddin-Fārsi, a young Islamist whom Khomeini met in Najaf, had a role to play in the authorship and distribution of this second version.[1]

Before the complete solidification of his hold on power, Khomeini either defined his role as a guide to the Revolution (rather than a ruler), or framed *velāyat-e faqih* as a continuation of the tradition of Constitutional Revolution, in which the *ulamā* were assumed to have a supervisory role over governmental affairs. He stated explicitly that "The role that they have is one of supervision, not of assuming executive positions without the proper expertise… In summary, the religious leaders do not wish to be the government, but neither are they separate from the government."[2] Khomeini's careful attempt to not frame a *faqih* as the most supreme executive force within the state, however, was neither in line with the way the doctrine materialized in the post-revolutionary situation nor was it in concord with Khomeini's early

[1] Rasul Jafariyan, *Jaryānhā va Sāzmānhāye Mazhabi-Siyāsi-e Iran*, [Religio-Political Currents and Organizations in Iran] (Tehran: Khāne Ketāb, 2012), 291.
[2] Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini,* translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 343.

elucidation of the concept. In the published *Velāyat-e Faqih* lectures he boldly defended the case for the *faqih* being in charge of state affairs:

> A body of laws alone is not sufficient for a society to be reformed. In order for law to ensure the reform and happiness of man, there must be an executive power and an executor… [The Prophet] headed the executive and administrative institutions of Muslim society. In addition to convening the revelation... he undertook the implementation of law and the establishment of the ordinance of Islam, thereby bringing into being the Islamic state.[3]
>
> The authority that the Prophet and the Imam had in establishing a government, executing laws, and administering the affairs exists also for the faqih... [therefore] it is necessary that the *fuqaha* proceed, collectively or individually, to establish a government in order to implement the laws of Islam and protect its territory.[4]

Though Khomeini's concept appeared to simply emphasize the *faqih's* capacity to execute Islamic laws, the implication of his theory was for a *faqih* to assume the authority of a sovereign within the nation-state paradigm. In *Velāyat-e Faqih* he clearly departed from his earlier position in *Kashful-Asrār*, written in 1945, where he had categorically denied the status of state sovereignty (*saltanat*) for religious scholars.[5] In confrontational yet careful language he had asserted: "No *faqih* has ever stated that we are kings or *saltanat* is our right… if there has ever been a disagreement it has been directed to the specific individual in charge not the institution of *saltanat* itself."[6] In *Velāyat-e Faqih*, however, Khomeini abandoned his cautious regard for *saltanat* and stepped in the direction of calling for its removal and replacing it with a *faqih* in charge of state sovereignty.

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[3] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 40.
[4] Ibid., 64.
[5] See Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 21-26. Abrahamian speculates about factors that may have influenced Khomeini's change of attitude in relation to political power.
[6] Imam Khomeini. *Kashful-Asrār,* (Year and place of the publication unknown), 186.

While Khomeini's revolutionary audience did not deem his ideas to be religiously unconventional at the time, some scholars, both in the academy and traditional Shi'i institutions, have since identified Khomeini's stance, specifically in *Velāyat-e Faqih,* as a deviation from orthodox Shi'i positions on political power.[7] For instance, Hamid Enayat acknowledged the novelty and unprecedentedness of Khomeini's theory.[8] Mojtaba Mahdavi perceived Khomeini's thesis as a "radical departure from dominant traditional trends in Shi'ism."[9] Mangol Bayat described the doctrine as a threat to "the very foundation of Shi'i Islam as expounded by the sixth Imam."[10] Behrooz Moazami called it an "innovative theory," and Norman Calder perceived Khomeini's approach as an "extreme version" and a "relatively unstable one" compared to those expounded by his predecessors. This is only to mention some of the scholarly reactions to Khomeini's doctrine of *velāyat-e faqih.*[11]

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[7] One must differentiate between two sets of audiences in relation to Khomeini's theory of *velāyat-e faqih:* the traditionalists and the revolutionaries. Traditionalists, mostly with Akhbari inclination, denounced the book and some even burned copies of *Velāyat-e Faqih*. But they were low in numbers. See Behrooz Moazami, "The Islamization of the Social Movements and the Revolution, 1963-1979," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 29, no. 1 (2009): 50-56. Describing the reaction among the revolutionary audience, however, is rather complex. Islamists welcomed *Velāyat-e Faqih* as a sign of politicization of the clergy but certainly did not appreciate the overly theological flavour of discussions pertaining to *velāyat-e faqiq*. For instance, in a lecture delivered to Muslim students abroad before the Revolution, Ebrāhim Yazdi (1931–2017) spoke in defense of *velāyat-e faqih,* but, in Yazdi's discourse, the concept seems to carry meanings related to politicization of clergy, which was in fact the topic of his lecture. To be clear, Yazdi appreciated the concept *velāyat-e faqih*, not as a rulership of *faqih* in charge of the state, rather, for him, the concept was synonymous with the active presence of *ulamā* in revolutionary politics. See Ebrāhim Yazdi, *Barrasiye Jonbesh-hāye Islami va Mo'arrefi-e Chehrehāye Nāshenākhteye Rohāniyyat-e Mo'āser.* [A Study on Islamic Movements and Introducing Unknown Contemporary [Political] Clergy] (Nashr-e Mojāhed, year of publication unknown), 33. For Islamists' reception of *velāyat-e faqih*, see also*:* Sayyid Hamid Rouhani, "Bāztāb-e Enteshār-e Dars hāy-e Velāyat-e faqih-e Imam Khomeini" in Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period* vol.2 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 658-659.

[8] Hamid Enāyat, "Ayatollāh Sayyid Ruhullāh Moosavi Khomeini," in *Expectation of the Millennium. Shi'ism in History*. Edited and Annotated and with an Introduction by Sayyid Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi and Sayyid Vali Reza Nasr (State University of New York Press, 1989), 342.

[9] Mojtaba Mahdavi "Ayatollāh Khomeini," in *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, eds. John L. Esposito and Emaduddin Shāhin (Oxford University Press, 2013). pp.184.

[10] Mangol Bayat, "Ayatollāh Sayyid Ruhullāh Moosavi Khomeini," in *Expectation of the Millennium. Shi'ism in History*, Edited and Annotated and with an Introduction by Sayyid Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabāshi and Sayyid Vali Rezā Nasr (State University of New York Press, 1989), 354.

[11] Behrooz Moazami, "The Islamization of the Social Movements and the Revolution, 1963-1979," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 29, no. 1 (2009): 51; Norman Calder "Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence: Khomeini and the Classical Tradition," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 18, no. 1 (Jan, 1982): 15.

Critics make a case for the novelty of Khomeini's assertion by highlighting Shi'is' long-held suspicion of political authority, their abstinence from rebellion, and viewing political rule as the provision of an infallible Imam. Also, given the long pattern of Shi'i authorities' interaction with political power, Khomeini's call for both rebellion and the creation of a Shi'i government headed by a *faqih* is perceived, by some, as a big step toward the Sunnficaiton of Shi'ism. Khomeini seemingly relied on Shi'i theology to make his case, but as Enayat holds, "there is nothing specifically Shi'i or sectarian about his case of the 'obligatoriness' of an Islamic state [in comparison to] say, by al-Ghazali—that the implementation of… religious injunctions… is impossible without the creation of a state."[12] Khomeini even expressed comfort recognizing the political status of Sunni Caliphs and refused to limit legitimacy of political authority to the Shi'i Imam. There were in fact striking similarities between Sunni Rashid Rida's (1865–1935) notion of *Hukumate-Islami* and Shi'i Ayatollāh's Khomeini's Sovereignty of the Jurist, as both envisioned a ruler in charge of executing Islamic laws in the context of the modern state.[13] Sunni Rashid Rida called the ruler "caliph," and Shi'i Ayatollāh Khomeini called the ruler "*faqih*," but their functions were very similar. With *velāyat-e faqih*, then, as Tamim al-Barghouti points out, "Khomeini brought Shi'ism and Sunnism one step closer to each other, as the Sunni consensus of the Umma, and the now Shiite rule of the scholars, practically amount to the same thing."[14]

But was Khomeini's *velāyat-e faqih* a novel innovation in Shi'i political thought? Did he call for a "break" from the way the Shi'i *ulamā* related to political power for centuries? Why did the first successful call for a *fiqih*-based Islamic state in the modern period emerge from

[12] Enayat, "Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhullah Moosavi," 336.
[13] Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 71.
[14] Tamim Al-Barghouti, *The Umma and The Dawla. The Nation State and the Arab Middle East*. (London: Pluto Press, 2008), 45.

Shi'ism? And how may scholars' assertions regarding the Sunnification of Shi'ism by Khomeini be weighted?

In order to address the above questions, investigating a genealogy of *velāyat-e faqih* appears essential. In his famous governmentality lectures at the College de France, Foucault delineated a framework for the genealogical investigation of the interaction between religious and political power. Incidentally influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, to which he was a witness, Foucault differentiated pastoral (religious) from State (political) power. According to Foucault, while pastoralism is a power of care enforced by a shepherd on a wandering flock, state power is enforced on a population striated in a given territory.[15] "The king is not a shepherd," and while the king's task is the protection of the body of the subject, the pastor must lead the flock to truth and direct the conscience of the people.[16] One's relation to the shepherd is through obedience, and this obedience is not for achieving a particular result, rather the act of obedience is an end in itself. Similar to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of *war machine*, pastoral power is "broken up, transformed, and integrated in various forms" in different contexts, but it remains as a force "absolutely specific and different [and exterior] from political [state] power."[17] Hence, the relation between pastoral/*war machine* to State is that of exteriority, although the two forces can come together in different assemblages and even form the two heads of sovereignty, that is, magician king and the jurist-priest.[18]

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[15] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 129.
[16] Ibid., 147.
[17] Ibid., 148, 154.
[18] Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 351. The authors write: "George Dumezil, in his definitive analyses of Indo-European methodology, has shown that political sovereignty, or domination, has two heads: the magician-king and the jurist-priest… Undoubtedly, these two poles stand in opposition term by term… But their opposition is only relative: they function as a pair, in alternation, as though they expressed a division of the One or constituted in themselves a sovereign unity." Here Deleuze and Guattari refer to a certain mode of interaction of religious and political institutions in which pastoral power serves State sovereignty while maintaining a degree of exteriority to kings. Here the pastor

These Foucauldian concepts, which act as models to explain the relation between religious and state authorities, may contribute to understanding the interaction between the pastoral and the political in undertaking the genealogy of *velāyat-e faqih*. As stated before, the Prophet's polity in Medina contained pastoral qualities and it resonated more with a *Tribe-form* than a *State-form* of government. Upon the Prophet's demise, Muslim political structure underwent a shift, and the *Tribe-form* (pastoral) of the Prophet was transformed to State-form during the Umayyad era. Translating these conceptual categories to Khomeini's doctrine, one may state that Khomeini, to speak in Foucauldian terms, superimposed a pastoral mode of governance on state-sovereignty. For Khomeini, a pastor/shepherd whose main task was previously to lead his flock in multiplicity was now assumed to govern citizens of the state within a territory, despite the incommensurability of pastoral rule within modern State-form sovereignty. What also sits at the heart of Khomeini's argumentative technique is framing the Prophet's rule in Medina as an embodiment of state sovereignty. Echoing many medieval political theorists, Khomeini drew on the famous "authority verse" in the Quran, in which submitting to the Prophet's rule is assumed to be incumbent on the faithful, to make a case for the community's submission to the rule of the *faqih*.[19]

Surveying modern and medieval Muslim political thought, however, indicates that the assumption that the Prophet was the head of state was not novel to Khomeini. Not too long before Khomeini, Sheikh Fazlollāh Nūri (1834-1909), an influential cleric active in the Iranian political scene, maintained a similar logic:

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may oppose the king, but pastoral power is positioned in relation to the State such that it serves the sovereignty of the State as a whole. In this study the concept "the magician-king and the jurist-priest" is invoked when referring to cases where the *fuqaha* and Sultāns have found themselves in different but equal status as far as holding power over the population. Here pastoral power is no longer exterior to the State apparatus, rather it has being appropriated by the State apparatus.

[19] Ibid., 90. The verse states: "Obey God and obey the Prophet and those among you who hold authority."

> For different Prophets, the combination of *nabovvat* [Prophethood] and *saltanat* [Sultanate] was different. In the case of the dear Prophet of Islam and the caliphs, *nabovvat* and *saltanat* were combined entities, but later on and in the matter of months due to various circumstances… the two entities, that is religious rulings and enforcing power and security were placed in separate positions. This means that the basis of Islamic polity contains two simultaneous and complementary entities: *nabovvat* and *saltanat* and without representatives in these two affairs upholding Islamic laws will be impossible. In fact *saltanat* is the executive force for uploading religious law... and justice will only prevail if the two forces come together.[20]

In Nūri's account the Prophet's exercise of political power was accomplished through combining pastoral (*nabovvat*) with the Sultanate, and he suggested the two forces of "magician king" and the "jurist-priest" come together for the exercise of state sovereignty. While Khomeini shared Nūri's conception of the Prophet as the head of state, he went one step further in positioning the relation between the state and the pastoral. For Khomeini state and pastoral were to become *one* entity, while for Nūri the two were to be combined while maintaining a degree of separateness.

Comparing Nuri with Khomeini, what one identifies is a change in the location of pastoral power from exteriority to interiority. For Nuri, pastoral power was *relatively* exterior to the state, although it was to serve sovereignty as a whole. If one, however, compares Nuri's conception of religious power with the dominant post-Safavid's interaction between religious institutions and political power in Imami Shi'ism one realizes that there is no major divergence in the way the status of religious power is perceived. In the post-Safavid era, Shi'i *ulamā* maintained a degree of autonomy from the state while viewing themselves as legitimizers and helpers of the state. Nonetheless, if one compares the post-Safavid's conception of political power with the rather hostile interaction of Shi'is with state authorities in the pre-Occultation

[20] Sheikh Fazlollāh Nuri, *Rasā'el, E'lāmiyeh-hā, Maktūbāt va Rūznāmeh-hāye Sheikh-e Shahid*, [Books, Publications and Writings of Sheikh Fazlollāh Nuri] ed. Mohammad Torkaman (Tehran: 1983), Volume I, 110-111. Sheikh Fazllollah Nuri was an adamant enemy of the constitutionalist movement and identified it as inherently anti-religious. His utter distrust of the emerging secular ideas of the movement led him to lean towards the Shah and withdraw the support that he had initially lent to the constitutionalists.

era, then one identifies a divergence. If any association with state power was forbidden for members of radical Imami Shi'i in the early period, in the post-Safavid era some Shi'i *ulamā* even viewed helping the Sultān in state affairs as incumbent (*vājib*). This means that if pastoral power was seen as positioned absolutely outside the state apparatus in the pre-Occultation era, in the post-Occultation era this exteriority of pastoral power to sovereign power had lessened.

Hence, what one identifies in the history of the Imami community is a constant move in location of pastoral power from exteriority to interiority. Linearly speaking, the position of Shi'i pastoralism moved from outside the state to inside. At first pastoral power is positioned outside the state, but then it becomes part of the state, and then through Khomeini's call it becomes *the* state. In his study of Imami political thought, Abdul'aziz A. Sachedina has divided the history of Shi'ism into four parts.[21] Inspired by Sachedina, but using a slightly different categorization, this study suggests investigating a genealogy of *velāyat-e faqih* through the following four periods:

1) **Pre-Occultation** [Imam Baqir (677) to Occultation (941)]
2) **Post-Buyid** [Buyid era (945) until the Safavid era (1501)]
3) **Post-Safavid** [Safavid era (1501) until the Constitutional Revolution (1905)]
4) **Modern Period** [Constitutional Revolution onwards (1905–Present)]

The reason pre-modern Shi'ism appears pertinent in understanding *velāyat-e faqih* is the evolution of the Shi'i *fuqaha*'s claim for political authority in the medieval period. There is an agreement among some scholars that *velāyat-e faqih* was an "old ambition" of a certain strand of the Imami *fuqaha*, particularly the Usulis, that only awaited its materialization, and for that reason Khomeini's project must be contextualized within a wider history of Imami political

[21] Abdul'aziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, *The Just Ruler in Shi'ite Imam. The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 233. Sachedina divides the periods slightly differently: 1) The Buyid era (945–1055), 2) The Seljuq and the Ilkhanid era (twelfth to fourteenth centuries), 3) The Safavid era (1501–1786), 4) The Qajar and the post-Qajar era (eighteenth to twentieth centuries).

theory.[22] As Sachedina holds, although the authority of the *fuqaha* "went through further elucidation and elaboration during subsequent periods of Imamite history when Shi'i dynasties like those of the Safavids and the Qajar came to power... there were no [major] deviations from any of the political theological tenets already formulated."[23] The question of how power should be divided between state and religious institutions in the absence of the twelfth Imam remained consistent, and those taking up the question, namely the *fuqaha*, did not deprive themselves of a share of power, especially when classical Shi'ism already provided enough doctrinal material to identify the Sultān as usurpers of the Imams' position.

Genealogy, however, as Foucault contends, does not mean the study of continuities in a given historical inquiry. In fact, genealogy concerns accidents and the way alien forces and doctrines come together to constitute a certain discourse. Therefore, as much as attention must be paid to lines of consistency, moments of transformation and the import of contagious influences must be identified. Also, since studying the evolution of arts of government is the main task of this study, the discursive and material contingencies that led the pastoral art of government to adopt State qualities will be under investigation here. Specifically, concerning discursive transformations, there is one more dimension that may be added to this genealogy and that is the status of thought itself.

As Deleuze and Guattari note, "the exchange that takes place between the State and reason is a curious one... because realized reason is identified with the de jure State, just as the State is the becoming of reason."[24] According to these philosophers there are two modes of thinking: one that leads to the rise of the state and another that encourages opposition to the state.

[22] Enāyat, "Ayatollāh Sayyid Ruhullah Musawi," 334.
[23] Sachedina, *The Just Ruler,* 92.
[24] Deleuze and Guattari *A Thousand Plateaus*, 375.

They call the former State-thought and the latter nomad-thought. In their approach, State-thought is embodied in rationalist thinking and nomadic or rhizomatic thought is a mode of thought adopted by members adhering to social movements, protests, and non-state spheres.[25] The former makes possible the rise of the state and it serves laws, institutions, and contracts, while the latter serves resistance movements and alternative spaces. Rationalism is a precursor to the rise of the state, and psychotic and schizophrenic minds that operate in a nomadic fashion find momentum in resistance movements.[26] In the case of religious uprisings, the nomadic subjectivities of "schizos" are often expressed in mystical orders, and a form of politicized mysticism becomes a vehicle through which resistance to the state takes place.[27] From the standpoint of State-thought, the schizophrenic mystical expressions are deemed as "non-rational" and in need of "treatment," elimination, or appropriation.

Hence, in search of moments of transformation from pastoral to sovereign power, one must also locate the status of "reason." One must suppose that in the transition from pastoral to state sovereignty the status of thought underwent a shift and conversely political and discursive influences transformed the form of thought. Starting as a movement outside of the state apparatus, the form of thought of Imami Shi'ism must have transformed for it be able to claim the sovereignty of the state in the modern period.

One must note, however, that questions concerning discourses pertaining to *velāyat-e faqih* have previously been subject to academic inquiry. Particularly since the Islamic Revolution and the consolidation of power under the rule of *velāyat-e faqih*, scholars from different

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[25] See Saul Newman, *From Bakunin to Lacan, Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power* (Lexingston Books, 2001), 104-107.
[26] See also: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
[27] Laura U. Marks, *Enfoldment and Infinity. An Islamic Genealogy of New Media Art* (London: MIT Press, 2010), 17.

backgrounds have investigated the theological and political contingencies that informed Shi'i *fuqaha'*s claim for political power. One only needs to mention Sachedina's *The Just Ruler*, a primary-source-based investigation of Imami political theology, or Said Amir Arjomand's seminal *The Shadow of God & the Hidden Imam,* in which a Weberian approach is invoked in the study of the routinization of Shi'i charisma over a long history between the seventh and nineteenth centuries. One can also mention Hamid Enayat's early commentary on the notion of *velāyat-e faqih* and most scholarly study of medieval Shi'ism, such as the works of Andrew Newman and Heinz Halm, or those that have in hindsight considered the quality of the *fuqaha*'s claim for political power.

One must also mention that even the meeting point between the Foucauldian approach and the study of *velāyat-e faqih* is not without precedent. Davoud Feirahi in his *Ghodrat, Dānesh va Mashroo'iyyat dar Islam* (Power, Knowledge and Legitimacy in Medieval Islam) was the first to have employed the Foucauldian paradigm of knowledge/power to study the ways in which discursive regimes concerning religious power emulated and reflected the apparatus of power within which they interacted. Specifically, Feirahi was concerned with modalities through which religious texts (*matn-e dini*), in both Shi'i and Sunni political theology, follow the image of Sultān as the Shadow of God on Earth, hence failing to adopt democratic qualities. The driving force behind Feirahi's thesis was an exploration of the rise of autocratic tendencies in Shi'i political thought. Overall, imbedded in Feirahi's approach was a liberal agenda which led him to search for a "democratic faqih," and this assertion is confirmed by his later turn to the works of Ayatollah Na'ini, a modern Shi'i faqih that sought to reconcile constitutional values with Shi'i fiqh to provide a more democratic reading of religious texts.[28] For Feirahi, the Prophet was the

[28] See Davoud Feirahi, *Dar Astāne Tajaddod; Sharihi bar Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Millah [*At the Verge of Modernity; Explaining Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Millah] (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 2015).

head of state, but a democratic state, whose political legacy concerning state management was tarnished later on due to various meeting points between Persian, Sunni, and Shi'i conceptions of power.

The Foucauldian governmentality approach as adopted in this dissertation, while drawing inspiration from Feirahi's framework, confirms some of his findings in the study *velāyat-e faqih.* But, while a governmentality approach appreciates and invokes the existing scholarship on *velāyat-e faqih*, it departs from the approach of Feirahi and others in significant ways. By studying the evolution of *velāyat-e faqih* from the perspective of the interaction of arts of government, that is pastoral and state sovereignty, this dissertation conceptually distinguishes between religious and political institutions, naturalizes the tension between the two, and sets out to explain the conditions in which one appropriates the other for its survival. With this approach, not only is *velāyat-e faqih* not a "given-object" to be invented in modernity, for instance, but rather different rationalities, "alien" discourses, and hostile challenges between pastoral and sovereignty, as arts of government, had a role to play in its discursive formation. In contrast to Feirahi's approach, this study does not start with the assumption of the Prophet as the head of state. Rather, through envisioning his rule as more consistent with pastoral power, this study reveals the modes in which pastoralism adopted state qualities both in the thought and the practice of Imami political doctrine. This study presupposes moments in which the Prophet's rule in Medina was identified as the embodiment of state sovereignty in Imami Shi'ism, making the pastoral power of the *fuqaha* only anomalous to the ideal Prophetic governance, and hence the birth of a certain model of Shi'i pastoralism that resisted in an attempt to remain pastoral. Modern scholars' differentiation between religious (sacred) and political (temporal) realms has been a useful one, but it presents an image of the two as rather static forces without evolutionary

qualities. Whereas a Foucauldian narrative, allows for a discursive "revolution" in each entity, that is, state and pastoral, and one adopting the techniques of the other for objectives of governmentality. For *velāyat-e faqih* to be put forward as a thesis, Shi'i pastoralism, unlike, broadly speaking, Sunni pastoralism, must have adopted the image of state, with its sovereign territorial and legal characteristics, hence becoming statist in aspiration. The State as both certain content and "form" of rationality—specifically the status of reason—must have been present, although subjugated and not apparent, in the thinking of Shi'i *fuqaha* for Imami pastoralism to move from exteriority to interiority. Therefore, the question here is not how autocratic medieval political institutions formulated "undemocratic" religious knowledge, as that which in Foucauldian convention is called the "archeology" of knowledge, rather the approach here is "genealogy," one which invites for study of State, in its abstract *and* material form, in the evolution of *velāyat-e faqih.* The approach is not to read a text to identify its undemocratic undertones influenced by the presence of oppressive political powers. The inquiry is conducted to identify "the program of political action" pertaining to State that a religious text embodies, that in turn comes to reconstitute a pastoral image of itself taking the state as its model.[29] In crudely dichotomic terms, Feirahi's archeological model adopts a lens that is predominantly "liberal," whereas the genealogical model follows what Foucault calls "anarcheology," that is, being "anarchic."

Given the scope of this piece, the expertise of the author, and the agenda involved, not only it is impossible to conduct an exhaustive study of more than fourteenth centuries of religious tradition, most of which lies in the medieval period, such a task is not urgent. Specifically, the objective here is to locate moments of transformation in the discursive and the

[29] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population,* 36.

political that resulted in the transformation of a schizophrenic/nomadic/ pastoral model of thought to that of the *State-form* while relying on modern scholarship on Imami Shi'ism and also primary sources when required. Through a genealogical lens, a mode of superimposing pastoral on state sovereignty will be investigated in the four periods suggested above, having also in mind, in broad terms, the Sunni experience. The comparison between the Shi'i and Sunni status of pastoral-State institutions helps to better position the Shi'i *fuqaha* claim to political power and also helps to investigate the charge brought upon Khomeini that he stepped in the direction of the Sunnification of Shi'ism. Attention will also be paid to the status of "thought" and its transformation in order to explore the relationship between form of thought, discursive formations, and political constructs.[30]

1) Pre-Occultation:

The history of Imamism begins with the career of Mohammad al-Bāqir (AD 677–AD 733) and his refusal to adopt a confrontational stance towards the state, a move that was considered a deviation from the overall revolutionary zeal of Shi'is at the time. The Battle of Karbala and the martyrdom of Husain had proved inspiring to the Shi'i movement and encouraged a series of

[30] Employing the concept "State" in reference to medieval sovereignty may be deemed contentious as the term is often reserved for understanding power in political modernity, i.e., the modern state. It must be stressed that the concept of State here follows the theoretical foundation developed in Ch. 2. While State here refers to medieval royal authority and political sovereignty, a more abstract notion of the concept is intended. Expanding on Deleuze and Guattari's conception of State, Saul Newman writes: "The State is not only a series of political institutions and practices, but also comprises a multiplicity of norms, technologies, discourses, practices, forms of thought, and linguistic structures. It is not just that these discourses provide a justification for the State, they are themselves manifestations of the State form in thought. The State has penetrated and coded thought, in particular rational thought." Hence State is invoked in this study as a certain mode of organization of thoughts and apparatuses that although transformed in various historical situations, it shares certain features. Those *similar features* allow this study to identify a particular structure of power: State apparatus. As Deleuze and Guattari held, "there have been States always and everywhere." See Saul Newman, *War on the State: Stirner and Deleuze's Anarchism*. The Anarchist library. http://library.uniteddiversity.coop/More_Books_and_Reports/The_Anarchist_Library/Saul_Newman__War_on_the_State__Stirner_and_Deleuze_s_Anarchism_a4.pdf

revolts known as *Tawwābūn*, whose objectives were to dismantle the Umayyad regime and restore a government inclined towards the "household of the Prophet."[31] Despite some sporadic success in battles, the *Tawwābūn* were suppressed as a whole, forcing the next generation of Shi'i elites to rethink their strategy of combat and survival. Here al-Bāqir parted ways from the revolutionary stance of his half-brother, Zayd (AD 695–AD 740), and radical Shi'is supporting al-Zayd. The revolutionary leader, al-Zayd, believed the Imam must take up the sword and rebel against the injustices of the state.[32] In contrast to Zayd, according to al-Bāqir and his son, al-Sādiq (AD 702–AD 765), the Imamate was to be detached from de facto political engagement and must only concern the spiritual conduct of the Shi'is.[33]

In the Imami perspective, holding state authority did not count as a criterion for the Imamate, rather, being descended from the family of the Prophet and a divine designation decided the status of the Imamate. In the Imami conception the existing political establishments were deemed illegitimate, but Shi'is were not required to rebel against the government. This stance discouraged confrontation with the state, hence implicitly acknowledging its rule yet actively searching for an alternative authority for spiritual guidance. In this approach, control of the body was conferred to the state, but directing souls was the responsibility of the Shi'i pastor, the Imam. According to al-Bāqir, the person without the spiritual guidance of the Imam is "like a lost sheep who searches in vain for its shepherd and flock until eventually it is devoured by the wolf who takes advantage of … confusion [of the flock]."[34] In order to justify full submission to the spiritual Imam, al-Bāqir also interpreted the authority verse such that "those in authority"

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[31] Arzina Lalani R., *Early Shi'i Thought: The Teachings of Imam Mohammad Al-Bāqir* (Londom: IB Tauris, 2004), 31.
[32] Ibid., 46.
[33] Hossein Modarressi, *Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi'ite Islam* (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1993), 7.
[34] Al-Kulayni, *al-Usul min al-Kafi*, quoted in Lalani R., *Early Shi'i Thought*, 75.

would be the Shi'i Imams.[35] For al-Bāqir, Shi'i Imams were the actual Caliphs of the Prophet, even though not in power, and the enemies of the Shi'i Imams will eventually perish and those submitting to Imams' orders will acquire salvation.[36]

Hence with al-Bāaqir one begins to identify a new theory of the Imamate, that which attempts to take charge of the flock in need of guidance without resorting to state power. The flock must submit to the spiritual conduct of the pastor, as that is the only path of survival in the age of illegitimate rulers. Al-Sādiq developed al-Bāqir's theory of the Imamate, and while he had the opportunity to assume political authority, he refused and adopted a position similar to that of al-Bāqir in relation to the community.[37] The non-political attitude of both al-Bāqir and al-Sādiq, which some scholars have referred to as a "quietist" stance, however, did not amount to complete silence in the face of state power. In fact, both al-Bāqir and al-Sādiq discouraged their followers from associating with state authorities, deeming the state at the time as the embodiment of *tāghūt* (tyrannical forces rebelling against God). According to al-Sādiq, the "fuqaha are the trustees of the Prophet but if one sees a faqih that associated with Sultān, one must accuse him."[38] Mūsā-al Kazim, the seventh Shi'i Imam, also discouraged his followers from providing services that would benefit the state.[39] Hence, in the Imami conception, discouraging rebellion against the state did not lead to accepting the legitimacy of the state, and quietism meant only the rejection of a revolutionary attitude towards the state.

One must note that the adoption of Shi'i pastoral power, while discursively hostile yet

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[35] Ibn Bābūya, *Amāli*, quoted in Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism* (Yale University Press, 1985), 148.
[36] Al-Majlisi, Muhammad Baqir, *Bihār al-Anwār,* quoted in Rasul Jafariyan, *Hayāt-e Fekri Siāsi-e Imāmān-e Shia* [The Political and Intellectual Life of Shi'i Imams] (Tehran: Nashr-e 'Elm, 2001), 345.
[37] See Patricia Crone*, God's Rule, Government and Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 112-116.
[38] Irbili, 'Ali Ibn 'Isā. *Kashf al-Ghumma fi Ma'rifat al-A'imma,*quoted *in* Jafariyan, *The Political and Intellectual Life of Shi'i Imams,* 451.
[39] Al-Toosi, Mohammad Ibn Hassan. *Rejāl Koshi or Ekhtiyār Ma'refat al-Rejāl, ,*quoted *in* Jafariyan, *The Political and Intellectual Life of Shi'i Imams,* 493.

practically passive towards the state, was concurrent with the rise of a certain spiritual extremism among Imami followers. The failure of *Tawwābūn* led to the rise of messianic movements, extremist views, and mystical inclinations in a community suffering from execution, political suppression, and psychological trauma.[40] Those with exaggerated views, or the *Ghulāt*, manifested in various circles, and while the Imams never received their ideas favourably, *Ghulāt* played a substantial role in making Shi'ism sectarian.[41] "The Ghulāt were carriers of a wide range of ideas, mostly Gnostic, but shading off into Jewish and Christian esotericism on the one hand and pagan ideas of cosmic kingship on the other, and all operated with a superhuman savior figure."[42] From the standpoint of later Imamis, the *Ghulāt* had unorthodox views, yet as Moezzi holds, it would be erroneous to differentiate the early Shia doctrinal views as highly different from those of the Ghulāt. Moezzi stresses that "the distinction made between moderate and extremist Shi'ism, at least in the early period in the 'esoteric non-rational tradition,' proves to be artificial."[43] The main doctrinal feature of the Ghulāt's was their esoteric and mystical inclination, and in that respect they were pioneers of preferring mysticism over rational inquiry in Islam prior to Sufism. "Though Sufism was no doubt not immediately connected with the Guluww[;]…the mystical states of the soul as well as the relative ranks of various mystics, have been endlessly discussed in Sufism ever since the closing of the classical period of the early Ghulāt," and therefore the Ghulāt were pioneers in holding esoteric beliefs concerning the question of the soul, death, and the spiritual status of religious leaders.[44] The Ghulāt's extremist views even forced the Imams to dissociate themselves from their highly exaggerated praises, but

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[40] Rasul Jafaryian, *Tārikh-e Tashayyo' dar Iran* [The History of Shi'ism in Iran] (Tehran: Nashr-e 'Elm, 2001), 53.
[41] Marshall GS Hodgson, "How Did the Early Shi'a Become Sectarian?" *Journal of the American Oriental Society* (1955).
[42] Crone*, God's Rule,* 112.
[43] Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, *The Spirituality of Shi'a Islam, Belief and Practice* (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2011), 120.
[44] Hodgson, "How Did the Early Shi'a Become Sectarian?", 8.

the Ghulāt only saw the Imams' stance as form of *taqiyya* (dissimulation) in a society hostile to the Shi'is.[45]

What one identifies in the Ghulāt is form of schizophrenic/nomadic thought specific to mystical inclinations, which is absolutely despised from the standpoint of rational thought. In fact as Andrew Newman notes, one of the early backlashes to *Ghulāt* dominance appeared in ninth-century Baghdad, where there was an alliance between "the court, the Mu'tazili and the Shi'a."[46] During the reign of Al-Ma'mun (AD 786–AD 833), the relationship between the Shia community and state authorities had improved to the extent that some Shi'i figures were able to assume posts in the state apparatus. The good relations struck between the Shi'is, the rationalist Mu'tazili, and state authorities, occasioned through the liaisons of the Banu-Nawbakhti family, made Shi'ism prone to rationalist inclinations and consequently denouncing the Ghulāt's doctrinal items.[47] While excessive attempts were made to refute the Ghulāt, there were also attempts made by the Banu-Nawbakhti to exercise authority over the Shi'i community, and that led to organizing "the community along hierarchical lines and... [seeking] an accommodation with the established political authority."[48] Through close interaction with the state and Mu'tazili rationalists, Shi'i elites adopted a rationalist and state-friendly attitude and downplayed the Ghulāt's radical and extremist tendencies.

This situation, however, did not go unchallenged. In reaction to "this combination of rationalist, hierarchical and accommodationist discourse prevailing among Baghdad's Imami elite,"[49] Shi'i Qummi hadith compilers actively collected the traditions of the Shi'i Imams to

[45] Jafaryian, *The History of Shi'ism in Iran,* 51-62.
[46] Andrew J. Newman, *The Formative Period of Twelver Shi'ism. Hadith as Discourse Between Qum and Baghdād* (Oxon: Routledge, 2000), xix.
[47] The Banu-Nawbakhti family was an influential Shi'i family of Persian decent residing in Baghdad with good relations with the Abbasid court.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., 196.

implicitly critique the rationalist and state-accommodationist stance of the Baghdādis. They formed a community of "Qummi traditionists," and through the material they complied and disseminated, they rejected the accommodationist stance towards the state and they took a militant position on the subject of believers' interactions with established political institutions. As Newman notes, Qummis' rejection of the rationalist tendencies of the Baghdādi Shi'i was concurrent with their hostile stance against the Caliphate in Baghdād.[50] Qummis had created a semi-autonomous Shi'i community, and the body of traditions they collected contained thoughts on the mystical and esoteric qualities of the Shi'i faith and also a non-compliance stance in relation to the state.[51]

The main figure representing the Qumi school of hadith was an Imami scholar known as Al-Kulayni (AD 864–AD 941), who named his collection of hadith *al-Kāfi* (sufficient) to denote that the teachings of the Imams suffice for directing one's conscience and also stressing that one does not need to rely on reason and state in order to manage the affairs of the community. According to Newman, examining the content of *al-Kāfi*'s traditions indicates that Qummi traditionalism implicitly rejected the Baghdādi's emphasis on '*aql* and instead embraced the Imam as the source of *ilm* (knowledge). The content of the hadith also "disavowed any institutionalized, hierarchical structure to the process associated with various practices of daily import to the life of the community," and in the realm of politics the Qummi stance "was also militant, if realistic, on the subject of believers' interaction with non-believers generally and the established political institutions in particular."[52]

One particular tradition that best exemplifies the pre-Occultation Shi'i prescription on how

[50] Ibid., 42.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid., 96.

to relate to the state in general, and al-Kulayni's ideal model of Shi'i self-governance in particular, is known as the *maqbūla* of Umar b. Hanzala. While stressing its authenticity, this hadith was cited in different centuries by numerous scholars after al-Kulayni, making the *maqbula* of Umar b. Hanzala the most canonical of Shi'i hadith in formulating the Shi'i interaction with the state. In this hadith, Imam Sādiq instructs his close associate, Umar b. Hanzala, when questioned about a scenario in which two Shi'i Muslims are forced to seek judgment from a Sultān or a judge working for the state. The Imam responds:

> whoever refers to… [State] for a judgment in a matter, whether in the right or in the wrong, has actually referred to *tāghut* [a tyrannical and insolent leader] to give judgment… They should refer to one among you who relates our tradition and who has examined what is lawful and what is unlawful according to us and has a deep insight into our decrees. They should take him as their arbiter since I have appointed him a hākim [judge]. If such a person judges according to our ruling and the person concerned does not accept it, then he has shown contempt for the ruling of God and rejects us: and he who rejects us, actually rejects God and such a person is close to [committing the sin of] associating (shirk) [a partner] with God. [53]

Hence at first the Imam strongly admonishes those seeking help from the state and deems it "forbidden," and then instructs the two individuals to resolve the situation by taking the affair into their own hands. The Imam holds that in the case of such confusion, that "which is agreed upon by your associates should be accepted as our ruling and that which is rare and unknown among your associates should be abandoned, for that which is agreed upon is not subject to doubt."[54] In follow-up questions, the Imam also warns the Shi'is not to consult Sunni scholars on legal affairs.

A. Sachedina notes al-Kulayni invoked this hadith in order to make a case regarding the question of authenticity: in "usūl al-fiqh the *maqbula* of Umar b. Hanzala has been cited as evidence for resolving the difficulty of authentication of a 'single, individual' (wāhid) tradition

[53] Al-Kulayni, *al-Usul min al-Kāfi,* quoted in Sachedina, *The Just Ruler,* 140-141.
[54] Ibid.

that has preponderance but is weak in transmission."[55] In fact, the hadith appears in a section entitled *ikhtilāf al-hadith* (disagreements over hadith), and it is likely that al-Kulayni did not have the political implications of the hadith in mind when narrating it. Reading the hadith, however, in its political context, provides clues as to how the Shi'i community in the pre-Occultation era perceived itself politically. As alluded to earlier, the process through which al-Kulayni collected *al-Kāfi* was part of a Qummi-based intellectual project that was "a comprehensive rejection of the Baghdādi Imami community's rationalist, hierarchical and accommodationist discourse, as well and as such, challenging both Sunni rationalism and Sunni traditionalism."[56] Qum was an autonomous Shi'i community that had resisted the rule of the Caliph in Baghdād, as well as the Shi'i intellectual tradition that associated with that power. It is in this context that Umar b. Hanzala's hadith was to become intelligible to the believers since it instructed members of the remote autonomous community of Qum not to associate with the state, even when necessary, and to take affairs into their own hands. Umar b. Hanzala's hadith prescribed a hostile rejection of established political institutions, namely the state and a careful adoption of techniques of power pertaining to *Tribe-form* (i.e., local arbitration). *The maqbula* of Umar b. Hanzala in this context operates as a political statement envisioning a political community of Shi'is alternative to or outside of the state apparatus through the Imam and those upholding his teaching exercising pastoral power over individuals. The *maqbula* of Umar b. Hanzala, however, was not the only hadith highlighting the scornful nature of working with the state. In general, in *al-Kāfi* seeking worldly leadership was discouraged and the concept "Sultān" was given a negative connotation.[57] In *al-Kāfi* the Prophet is said to hold that the "fuqaha are the

[55] Ibid., 139.
[56] Newman, *The Formative Period of Twelver Shi'ism,* 197.
[57] Ibid., 154.

trustees (umanā) of prophets as long as they do not become involved in the world." According to the hadith, the Prophet was asked: "What do you mean by their 'becoming involved in the world ...?" He Said: "Compliance with (ittibā') al-Sultān."[58] In his compilation, al-Kulayni deemed rational methodologies such as *qiyās* and *ra'y* as innovations, and in general he attempted to downplay the stress put on *al-'aql* by the Baghdād school and instead highlighted *al-ilm* (knowledge) as the sole authority in directing the Shi'is in their daily life.[59]

It is striking that al-Kulayni's rejection of rational methodologies was concurrent with forbidding association with state power, a fact that confirms Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that "realized reason is identified with the de jure State, just as the State is the becoming of reason."[60] The more Imami elements associated with state power, the more they were inclined towards rationalism, and the more they adopted mystical and esoteric tendencies, in which full submission to the Imam was encouraged, the more hostile the stance of the tradition was in relation to the state. The dialectic between the rational/mystical and State/pastoral was not specific to the early Shi'i experience as it continued in the later period. In the pre-Occultation era, however, despite the presence of a rationalist-statist mindset, the mystical-pastoralist inclinations were able to produce their own discursive regime, hence positioning Shi'i pastoralism outside the state apparatus. Through the teachings of Al-Bāqir and al-Sādiq, State was deemed illegitimate, but state takeover through revolution was discouraged, and instead emphasis was put on creating an alternative community with the Shi'i Imam as the pastor. In the Imams' teachings emphasis was also put on the notion of *taqiyya*, which indicated the alternative community of Shi'i must not have overt manifestations and operate as a quasi-secret society.

[58] Al-Kulayni, *al-Usul min al-Kafi*, quoted in Newman, *The Formative Period of Twelver Shi'ism*, 105.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 375.

Here the non-rationalist esoteric and mystical beliefs of the *Ghulāt* only reinforced the Shi'i distance from state power as one does not see a comprehensive theological attempt on the part of Shi'i elites to introduce certain elements as representative of the Imam in his absence.[61]

While in the early Imami political thought, the relation between pastoral and state sovereignty was that of exteriority; on the state side, Sunni theorists attempted to forge a theory for combining Islamic pastoral power with the state. In the absence of an "Islamic" theory of state sovereignty, Ibn al-Muqaffa' (AD 724–AD 759) (d. 756), a state bureaucrat from Fars, was first to translate the famous Sassanid political treatises, *Treatment of Ardashir* (AD 180–AD 242) and *the Letter of Tansar*, in order to develop a theory for the religious state.[62] Having worked for both the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, through this translation, Ibn al-Muqaffa' introduced the Islamic world to a model in which state sovereignty based on religious creed could be imaginable. In these documents state sovereignty and religion are introduced as having been born from the same "womb." One section of the tract reads:

> Know that kingship and religion are twin brothers; there is no solidity for one of them except through its companion because religion is the foundation of kingship and kingship the protector of religion. Kingship needs its foundation and religion its protector as whatever lacks a protector perishes and whatever lacks a foundation is destroyed.[63]

These Sassanid political ideas, in which the duality of religion and state sovereignty was naturalized, enabled Sunni jurists to legitimize kings wishing to reign in Muslim lands for centuries to come. The powerful concept of *tu'amān* (togetherness) of state sovereignty and

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[61] There was the case of the Imam's representatives in the short-Occultation, but they only asserted themselves as agents in charge of collecting tax and transmitting important news from the Imam to the believers. They were not to replace the Imam as was the case later on with the *fuqaha* claiming to be the successors of the Imam.
[62] Ann Lampton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 45.
[63] Sa'id Amir Arjomand, *The Shadow of God & the Hidden Imam* (London: The University Chicago Press, 1984), 93. Arjomand has translated the passage from a source in French. The source is: M. Grignaschi, "Queleques specilmens de la litterature sassanide conserves dans bibliotheques d'Istanbul," *Journal Asiatique* 254 (1966), Arabic text, p.49, French trans.,p 70.

religious institutions helped the state to justify its rule on the basis of protecting religion and employ Persian political heritage to combine pastoral authority with the state apparatus. Al-Kulayni's ideal Shi'i society community, with its pastoral power remaining exterior to the state apparatus, remained an anomaly to this model until the Buyid's seizure of Baghdād, whereupon the "Sassanid idea of kingship could then be seen as the most effective means for the legitimatization of temporal power."[64] Unlike the Umayyads and the Abbāsids, the Zaydi-inclined Shi'i Buyid did not claim to represent the Prophet nor the Shi'i Imam, and through support of Imamism they invited the Imami pastoralism to put an end to its exteriority from the state apparatus.[65]

2) Post-Buyid

Though Qummis were successful in countering both the state and rationalist tendencies of the Baghdādi Shi'is, soon after the state takeover of the Buyid, Shi'i intellectual pursuits similar to those in Baghdād were restored. Partly due to Imami "quietism," the Shi'i-inclined Buyid supported the Imamis and "patronized Imami scholars, officially celebrated Imami festivals, and rebuilt Imami shrines."[66] Imami figures were offered posts in the government and in fact important Imami scholars had family connections to those Imamis working for the state.[67] Concurrent with maintaining good relations with the state, Shi'i jurists adopted rationalist methodologies, suppressed what they deemed as non-rational ideas, forged a hierarchical relationship with the community, and began to put forward ideas that were reminiscent of the authority of a *faqih* during the long occultation.

As Moezzi stresses, during this period the concept of reason (*'aql*) underwent a shift in

[64] Arjomand, *The Shadow of God*, 94.
[65] Crone*, God's Rule,* 120.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Tamima Bayhom-Daou, *Shaykh Mufid* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2012), 20.

Shi'i thought. The opposite of the classic Islamic conception of '*aql* was ignorance (*jahl*), while in Greek philosophy the opposite of '*aql* was madness (*junūn*).[68] By the third century, the Islamic notion of '*aql* had been gradually replaced with the Greek one, making *'aql* "rationalized and humanized, in a culture where reason and man cannot be conceived of except through their relation with God."[69] Among the Imami jurists, al-Mufid (AD 948–AD 1022) and al-Sharif- al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) were first to have adopted the Greek notion of *'aql*, and while in theory they remained faithful to the early conception of *'aql* as developed by the Imams, they nevertheless felt "forced to adopt the same usage as the Mu'tazilis in order to be able to confront them in theological polemics."[70] The new conception of '*aql* allowed al-Mufid to criticize "his master Ibn Bābawaih [AD 918 –AD 991] in the name of reason. Al-Sharif al-Murtaḍā, even more intransigent, goes so far as to censure al-Kulayni and others, accusing them of having introduced into their compilation a great number of traditions which appear absurd in the light of reason."[71] Al-Mufid even "condemned his own teacher's citing of traditions that censured *al-jadal* (dialectics) and its practitioners. He argued that, in fact, the practice of *al-kalām* (theology and theological debate) was required of those who were masters of the discipline."[72] By adopting the Greek notion of reason, the "rationalist tendency became, thereafter, the majority and dominant view within Imamism," and the schizophrenic minds of the Shi'i were to be contained by reason.[73]

This process not only coincided with a downplaying of hostilities towards the state but also led to the elitisms of the Shi'i *fuqaha*. Al-Mufid in particular maintained an elitist status for those

[68] Mohammad Ali Amir-Mo'ezzi, *Divine Guide in Early Shi'ism, The: The Sources of Esotericism in Islam* (SUNY Press, 2016), 1-12.
[69] Ibid., 12.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid., 13.
[72] Newman, *Twelever Shi'ism*, 81.
[73] Amir-Moezzi, *Divine Guide in Early Shi'ism*, 12.

with religious knowledge and held contemptuous views towards the Bedouin and common people.[74] He declared that the Imams had entrusted the *fuqaha* to be in charge of implementing the *hudūd* (religious rulings), thus rendering judgments and gathering the community for the daily prayers, though he did not offer citations for his claims.[75] In general, he sought to forge a theological grounding for the *fuqaha* to take certain administrative responsibilities within the state in the absence of the twelfth Imam.[76] Given the positive interaction between the Buyid and the Imami *fuqaha*, there was now a new question posed to the Imami elite and that was the permissibility of of cooperating with the state. The question was a difficult one. On the one hand, according to Shi'i traditions all those in charge of political authority were usurpers of the Imams' rights, and on the other, a formidable relationship with the Buyid state not only limited the explicit hostility of the Shi'i towards the state but also presented the opportunity for the Imamism to assert itself as a fully-fledged school (*madhhab*) able to compete with other Sunni schools.[77] Implicit in the search for finding a theological ground for working with the state, the *fuqaha*, as a class of learned individuals, also sought to expand their authority. Al-Mufid was first to have explored the question of relationship with the state, although he was not as explicit in his treatment of the problem as Shari-al Murtaḍa. For instance, in a theological piece called *al-Muqni'a*, while commenting on the question of *hudūd* and the quality of enjoying the good and forbidding the evil, al-Mufid expanded on the relation between the pastoral and State apparatus. Al-Mufid wrote:

> The responsibility of implementing the *hudūd* is the provision of Sultān al-Islam, who is chosen by God. Sultān al-Islam are the Imams and those chosen by the Imams such as the *umerā* and *hukkām*, and the Shi'i *fuqaha* to whom such tasks have been delegated. If one wants to implement the *hudūd* on his son or slave [for instance] and is not fearful that the

[74] Newman, *Twelever Shi'ism*, 81.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Feirahi, *Knowledge, Power and Legitimacy*, 311.
[77] Newman, *Twelever Shi'ism*, 81.

> Sultān al-juwr [illegitimate] will harm him [or the process,] then he must go ahead. However, if there is a fear that the Sultān al-juwr will castigate him for implementing the *hudūd*, or that either himself or his faith will be harmed, then he may not undertake such activities.[78]

Here al-Mufid introduced the *fuqaha* as the successors of the Sultān-Islam (the Imams), yet he adopted a cautionary stance in relation to the state apparatus, ensuring that his prescribed legal jurisdiction would not interfere with the state. Al-Mufid regarded the state as theoretically illegitimate, yet he implicitly acknowledges its practical legitimacy and "considered *saltanat* (power) as a requirement in the fulfilment of... [religious obligations] in the public interest."[79] He wrote:

> It is incumbent on the part of individuals to forbid evil when convinced that evil will be eradicated. However, one may not engage in such tasks if they involve murder or violence without the permission of the Sultān al-Zamān, who is in charge of managing affairs (*li-tadbir al-anam*). If one does not have permission from the Sultān, he may only engage in forbidding evil with the heart and tongue….[80]

While al-Mufid defined the Sultān as illegitimate, he acknowledges the role of the state in managing the affairs and prescribes obedience to the state. For al-Mufid the state is illegitimate (*al-juwr*) but necessary (*al-zamān*), and he suggests, although implicitly, that a faqih is a legitimate Sultān (Sultān-Islam). Al-Mufid's assertion characterizes the Shi'i *fuqaha* stance in the Buyid period. The Shi'i were not yet comfortable enough to claim equal status to the Sultān, though al-Mufid strides in that direction, but they are searching for theological as well as practical legitimacy to engulf Shi'i pastoral power within the state apparatus. Through applying the term "Sultān -Islam" to the Imams, al-Mufid imagined the Imams as heads of state whose position had been usurped by Sultān al-juwr, and one only needs to bring Sultān-'Ādil to power,

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[78] Shaykh al-Mufid, *al-Muqni'a.* (Ketābkhāne-ye Madrese-ye Feqāhat [Online Library of School of Jurisprudence]), accessed September, 1, 2018, http://lib.eshia.ir/15114/1/810.
[79] Sachedina, *The Just Ruler*, 104.
[80] Shaykh al-Mufid, *al-Muqni'a*, 809, accessed September, 1, 2018, http://lib.eshia.ir/15114/1/809.

a position adopted by al-Tūsi.[81] Hence, Imams, in al-Mufid's theoretical conception, not only exercised pastoral power on members of the community, they, like Sunni Abbāsid Caliphs and Buyid Sultāns, were in charge of both the body and the soul of individuals. With this perspective then, al-Mufid was willing to renounce the absolute hostility of the Qummis towards the state or at least to recognize the relevance of the state in managing the affairs. Al-Mufid also specified that believers should deliver the zakāt and *khums* revenues to the *fuqaha*, and on the whole, attempted to claim the "authority of senior clerics in matters of daily legal practice during the occultation."[82] Sharif al-Murtaḍā followed a similar agenda. Being a wealthy theologian and owner of eighty nearby villages and large schools, he shared the elitist views of al-Mufid and made a case for the *fuqaha* to represent the Imam during the occultation. He viewed the *fuqaha* as being in charge of collecting the *zakāt* and defended the permissibility of implementing the *hudūd*, though he too, like al-Mufid, did not offer citations to support his view.[83]

Al-Murtaḍa speculated on the permissibility of working for the state by responding to an imaginary interviewer in a treatise known as *Fil'amal Ma'al Sultān* (Legality of Working for the Government). Writing in favour of the state, he attempted to put an end to Shi'is' suspicious views towards political power and elucidated principles to legalize Shi'i interactions with the Sultān's office. The content of the questions al-Murtaḍa set out to entertain spoke of a hostile Shi'i stance toward the state, which al-Murtaḍa aimed to soften by granting the state religious legitimacy. Two of al-Murtaḍa's questions were:

> How can it be known that this man who in appearance is holding office on behalf of the unjust ruler is rightful so that to resist and oppose him is illicit, while apparently he is holding office on behalf of an unjust ruler against whom fighting the religious war (jihād) is obligatory and whose orders it is improper to confirm?

[81] Sachedina, *The Just Ruler*, 104.
[82] Newman, *Twelever Shi'ism*, 82.
[83] Ibid., 86.

> What is the correct interpretation of the statement transmitted from al-Sādiq, peace be upon him: The atonement for working for the government consists in taking care of the needs of the brethren? Does this not necessarily imply that working on behalf of it is in an act of disobedience toward God and a sin to that an atonement is needed for it?[84]

The questions that al-Murtaḍa saw himself obliged to address reveal a degree of militant and radical zeal that must have existed among the Imami community toward the state at the time, a zeal which challenges the scholarly interpretation of the Imami community as politically "quietist," especially in the post-al-Sādiq era.[85] Newman is correct to note that "from early in the Abbāsid period the Qummis took a clearly militant, separatist line toward central political authority," and this line seems to have continued at least as an intellectual and theological inquiry among Shi'is during the Buyid era. Based on the questions that al-Murtaḍa set out to address, there appears to have been a great animosity towards the state on religious grounds. Al-Murtaḍa, being a staunch rationalist and on good terms with the rulers of the time, aimed to contain the radical zeal of the Shi'is and bring about a community subservient to the state. He rationalized:

> It is obligatory [for one to work for the state] if the one accepting office knows, or considers it likely on the basis of clear indications, that he will through the tenure of the office be enabled to support a right and to reject a false claim or to order what is proper and to forbid what is reprehensible, and if it were not for this tenure, nothing of this would be accomplished.[86]
>
> Pious men and scholars have always at various times accepted office on behalf of the unjust ruler for some of the reasons which we have mentioned… In that regard, sound tradition has been transmitted that it is permissible for anyone in this situation to administer the legal punishments, cut the hands of thieves, and do whatever the law

[84] Sharif al-Murtaḍa, *Mas'ala Fil'Amal Ma'al Sultān Sultān* [Legality of Working for the Government], translated by Wilfered Madelung, *Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 28.
[85] See Sa'id Amir Arjomand, *The Shadow of God & the Hidden Imam* (London: The University Chicago Press, 1984), 101. Arjomand equates Shi'i quietism to "acceptance of 'the world'," and he tends to frame the pre-Occultation Shi'ism as strictly passive. Yet, the hostile attitudes toward the State seem to still have prevailed even in the Buyid period. The term "quietism" may be an acceptable term describing pre-Occultation Shi'ism if the intention is to name a non-revolutionary but not a passive stance in relation to State.
[86] Ibid., 25.

requires on these matters.[87]

> If the unjust ruler has gained control of the religion, it is inevitable for everyone who is in his country and belongs in appearance to his subjects that he extol him, display reverence to him, and submit to his orders as if obedience to him were a religious duty.[88]

Hence, al-Murtaḍa not only refuted questions concerning the illegitimacy of government, he defended administering legal punishment and drew theological foundations that justified subservient relations to the state. Implied in al-Murtaḍa's discussion was also the acknowledgment of the authority of de facto power, for he was inclined to prescribe obedience to power. He even went as far as to accept the authority of those taking up power through force and reprimanded resistance to such authority.

It is striking that in his treatment of the authority of state power, al-Murtaḍa comes very close to his contemporary Sunni scholars such as al-Māwardi (AD 972–AD 1058) and Abu al-Farrā (AD 909–AD 1066). The two Sunni scholars wrote books similarly titled, *al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyya*, in defense of obeying those forces that gained control over the state through its seizure. Al-Māwardi differentiated between *imārat al-istifā* (the conferred emirate) and *imārat al-istilā* (the emirate of usurpation).[89] The second type was that which was captured by conquest or usurpation, and Māwardi and al-Farrā found these types of rule legitimate and necessary for Muslims to obey. Al-Farrā wrote: "If one dominates over Muslims through the sword and calls himself Caliph, no believer may sleep even a night without acknowledging him as the Imam. This person, good or unjust, is the amir of the believers."[90] Al-Māwardi took a similar position

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[87] Ibid., 26.
[88] Ibid., 27.
[89] Lampton, *State and Government*, 100.
[90] Ibn Al-Farrā, *al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyya,* quoted in Mehdi Fadāyee Mehrabāni, "Nazarieh-ye Istilā dar Andishe-ye Siyāsi-ye Abū Ya'la Ibn-e Furrā." [Theory of Istilā in Political Thought of Ibn Farrā] Bi-seasonal Research and Scientific Journal of "Researching Political Theory," Dore Jadid, Shomāre Hashtom, Tābestān va Pāyeez-e 1389[2009], 89.

throughout his work, because for him, similar to other Sunni political jurists, the state is what protects religion. Al-Māwardi quoted the famous authority verse and stressed: "God thus makes it an obligatory duty upon us to obey those in authority—and they are the imams who have been appointed over us."[91] He, like Ibn al-Muqaffa', invoked the Sassanid notion of a religious-based state and sought to reconcile Islamic jurisprudence with state sovereignty.

Comparing *al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyya*, written by Sunni authors, with *Fil'amal Ma'al Sultān*, written by a Shi'i scholar, does not indicate a major divergence in the way Shi'i and Sunni scholars conceived state power. If al-Mārwardi was to accept the authority of rulers out of pragmatic considerations, al-Murtaḍa prescribed that reverence must be paid to rulers out of dissimulation (*taqiyya*). Similar to al-Mārwardi, Al-Murtaḍa also implicitly acknowledged the Sultān as the protector of religion and sought to justify the presence of pastoral power within the state apparatus. This similarity between Shi'i and Sunni scholars is pertinent because it indicates that pragmatic relationship with the state more than ideological considerations informed political theology in this era. For scholars from both sides of aisle, the state was an entity that needed to be tolerated, worked with, and legitimized. Eradication of the state by no means constituted the agenda of these scholars. In fact, al-Murtaḍa sounded al-Māwardian when he asserted: "If the unjust ruler has gained control of the religion, it is inevitable for everyone who is in his country and belongs in appearance to his subjects that he extol him, display reverence to him, and submit to his orders as if obedience to him were a religious duty."

There was, however, one difference between the two theologies. While both Shi'i and Sunni scholars did not draw back from providing pragmatic legitimacy to the state, Shi'i scholars aimed to insert their authority within the state. In drawing pragmatic legitimacy for one to work

[91] Lampton, *State and Government*, 86.

under an unjust ruler, the Shi'i *fuqaha* had their own authority in mind; such a gesture was not prevalent among Sunni jurists. Comparing Shi'i and Sunni political thought, Sachedina writes:

> Sunni jurists writing during the absence of the legitimate power of the caliph in the eleventh century had to rationalize the existence of de facto rulers who were not qualified to exercise such discretionary authority to implement and supplement the principles established by legal doctrine for the exercise of supreme judicial power. On the other hand, the Imamite jurists… had to deal with a persistent problem of justifying the holding of office under de facto governments while preserving the doctrinal underpinnings of the Imamate.[92]

Hence, the two schools did not diverge in bestowing practical legitimacy on political authorities, but they differed in that, in the Shi'i perspective, in theory, the *fuqaha* were the legitimate rulers, and this difference, as will be seen, had ramifications for future interactions between pastoral and State power in Shi'ism. The argumentative logic set out by al-Murtaḍa provided a model for future Shi'i theologians to conceptualize the question of authority in relation to state.[93] In these accounts the state itself was no longer under scrutiny; rather, finding religious grounds for ways of working with the state became the subject of theologians' inquiry. Al-Tūsi adopted al-Murtaḍa's line of reasoning and al-Hilli (1250–1325) adopted Al-Tūsi's, leading to a widespread assumption that any "ruler recognizing the Imams, i.e. any Imami ruler, who obeys and applies the Imami sharia is also acting on behalf of the Imam and must be considered a rightful and just ruler."[94] Certainly al-Murtaḍa did not speak of a rulership of a *faqih*, but the Imami conception of power abandoned its hostility towards the state, and through a realistic approach sought to incorporate Shi'ism into an existing state.

The scholarly contribution of rationalist theologians like al-Mufid, al-Murtaḍa, and al-Tūsi constituted a school that was later called Usūli Shi'ism.[95] Usūlis were contrasted against another

[92] Sachedina, *The Just Ruler*, 148.
[93] Madelung, *Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam*, 30.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Jafariyan, *The History of Shi'ism in Iran*, 606.

strand of Shi'ism referred to interchangeably as *Akhbāri*, *Hashfi*, and *Ghāli*.[96] The former identified themselves as moderate and rationalist, and they recognized the latter group as extremist, unorthodox, and even illegitimately mystical.[97] Members of the *Akhbāri-Ghāli* strand were not impressed with the Usūlis' rationalist and authoritarian inclinations, and they categorically rejected the hierarchical initiatives of the *fuqaha.*[98] They saw no need for a mediating position between the hidden Imam and the ordinary believer, and held that traditions, or *akhbār*, from the lived examples of Imams would suffice as guidance for the pious administration of daily life.[99] They also did not share the positive views of the Usūlis towards state power, and through what Arjomand calls "Mahdistic" tendencies became a force for insurrections and various forms of political disobedience until the nineteenth century. "The Mahidistic tenet, when fully activated, has been shown to render the ethically rationalized normative order inoperative," and they caused the "ethically undisciplined extremist religiosity... [to be] channeled into chiliastic action under the charismatic leadership."[100] This certainly does not mean that non-Usūli mystical forces were always participants in anti-establishment movements, but rather that the Usūli-Akhbāri dichotomy helps to differentiate between the rationalist *fuqaha* seeking to incorporate Shi'ism within state reason from radical mystical Shi'is with little appreciation for the *fuqaha* and state authorities. To be more exact, the attempt to frame the *fuqaha* as the representatives of the hidden Imam in charge of implementing the *hudūd*, and possibly even helping the Sultān in the management of state affairs, is particular to Usūlism and its adoption of the Greek notion of '*aql*. Through this "rationalized and humanized"

[96] Ibid., 607.
[97] Ibid., 613.
[98] Newman, *Twelever Shi'ism*, 133.
[99] Newman, *The Formative Period of Twelver Shi'ism*, 196.
[100] Arjomand, *The Shadow of God*, 82.

‘*aql*, the opposite of which was madness and not *jahl*, the Usūlis aimed to “treat” the “madness” of Imami Shi’ism and bring it under the instigation of “reason,” the political implication of which was the growth of the authoritarianism of the *fuqaha*, the increasing statism of Shi’ism, and the containment of opposition to the state.

Introducing samples of *Akhbāri-hashwiyya* discourse, al-Hilli expressed discontent over the spread of their ideas and charged them with being overly emotional and promoting false beliefs.[101] Through these theological gestures, al-Hilli sought to contain discourses such as Akhbārism and diminish “challenges to the authority of the *faqih* generally and of himself specifically.”[102] Al-Hilli, however, was very successful in forging “a hierarchical structure of the authority within the community during the occultation, as it had in the past, an especially politically quietist/accommodationist form of theology and practice.”[103] Being on good terms with state authorities, he advocated dividing the community into *mujtahid* (legist) and *muqallid* (lay believer), and stressed that it was incumbent on the latter to follow the former. While he described the Sultān as the king of kings of the Arab and Persian peoples, he introduced the concept of *ijtihād* (legal rulings) in Shi’i theology, although traces of the practice were seen among previous scholars such as al-Mufid and al-Murtaḍa.[104] In a sense, al-Hilli brought the works of previous rationalist theologians to their logical conclusion: working with the state, dividing the community into elite and ordinary categories, and centring the *faqih* as the representative of the hidden Imam in charge of the community. Through *ijtihād* a lay believer had become dependent on the rulings of the *mujtahid* and was “obliged to subject himself to the

[101] Newman, *Twelever Shi’ism*, 133.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid., 126.
[104] Ibid., 125.

expert's authority."[105] This led to the ever-increasing power of the *fuqaha* and "the entire later development of the Imami clergy, the mullahs and ayatollāhs."[106]

Specifically concerning religious rulings, unlike al-Mufid's cautionary tone, al-Hilli employed *ijtihād* to explicitly advocate the *fuqaha*'s implementation of the hudūd.[107] In *Qawā'id ul-Ahkām*, al-Hilli, wrote:

> Implementing the *hudūd* is the right of the infallible Imam or a person with permission from him. During the occultation, this right belongs to the Shi'i *fuqaha*… [those with necessary qualifications such as: faithfulness, justice, understanding the shari'a and capabilities for reasoning]. Given safety from the oppressors, and the *fuqaha*'s role in managing and distributing zakat and *khums*, it is for the *fuqaha* to *hukm* (judge) among people.[108]

In al-Hilli's conception a *faqih* is no longer only the transmitter of Imams' teachings, but rather through *wilāyat al-qaḍa* (authority on judgeship), he is to "undertake the role of functional Imam, beyond their traditional role of the interpreters of Islamic revelation as the general deputy (*nā'ib al-'āmm*) of the Hidden Imam," and, as Sachedina notes, this transformation in the function of the *fuqaha* was only possible based on rational elucidation from the religious text.[109] But the text or the *naql* that Al-Allāma relied on to make his case was the same *maqbula* of Umar b. Hanzala mentioned earlier that al-Kulanyni had included in his *al-Kāfi*. Al-Allāmah referred to the concept *al-hākim* in Imam Sādiq's assertion in order to make his case: "[People] should refer to one among you who relates our tradition and who has examined what is lawful and what is unlawful according to us and has a deep insight in our decrees. They should take him

[105] Heinz Halm, *Shi'ism* (Columbia University Press: 2004), 70.
[106] Ibid., 67.
[107] Newman, *Twelever Shi'ism*, 129.
[108] 'Allāma Hilli, *Qawā'id ul-Ahkām* (Ketābkhāne-ye Madrese-ye Feqāhat [Online Library of School of Jurisprudence]), 525. http://lib.eshia.ir/10114/1/525
[109] Sachedina, *The Just Ruler*, 172, 171.

as their arbiter since I have appointed him a hākim [judge]."[110] As previously mentioned, this hadith was compiled in the context of the autonomous and state-hostile community of Qum. The hadith that was to censure individuals' involvement with the state now came to serve a completely different agenda, that is, naturalizing the *fuqaha*'s involvement in state affairs as judges. If al-Kulayni was hostile towards the central authority in Baghdād, al-Hilli was on good terms with Ilkhānid Sultān, Öljeitü Ilkhan, also known as Mohammad Khodābandeh (1278–1316), with whom the scholar had a role to play in his conversion to Islam. Al-Hilli attributed his books to the Sultān.[111] Al-Hilli's discourse of *ijtihād*, as Feirahi has correctly identified, embodied the logic of state; *ijtihād* had not come to challenge the state, rather, through a hierarchical division of the community, the suppression of radical mysticism, and the authoritarianism of the *fuqaha*, al-Hilli set the ground for the *fuqaha's* expansionist claim for religious and political authority.[112] The *fuqaha*'s claim regarding the *hudūd* was a step toward putting an end to the complete exteriority of Shi'i pastoral power from the centres of power and sliding this pastoralism towards the state. If "the Imam's permission could be established in one general administrative sphere such as *al-hukm*, its extension to other areas of similar consequences would not be problematic."[113] Pastoral power was no longer absolutely exterior to the state apparatus.

3) Post-Safavid:

Upon ascending to the throne, Shah Isma'il Safavid declared himself the representative of the twelfth Imam.[114] The Shah's declaration was not accompanied with extensive juridical and

[110] 'Allāma Hilli, *Mukhtalaf al-Shi'a* (Ketābkhāne-ye Madrese-ye Feqāhat [Online Library of School of Jurisprudence]), 464, accessed September, 1, 2018, http://lib.eshia.ir/10148/4/464.
[111] Jafariyan, *The History of Shi'ism in Iran*, 702.
[112] Feirahi, *Knowledge, Power and Legitimacy*, 321.
[113] Sachedina, *The Just Ruler*, 151.
[114] Halm, *Shi'ism*, 77.

political work to justify the legitimacy of a king claiming to be *nā'ib* of the Imam, but the claim was certainly meaningful given the hostility, which had declined during the Buyid era, between pastoral and state institutions. This was the first time that the head of state claimed to be a direct representative of the Imam in hiding, if not the Imam himself. Shah Isma'il, however, did not deprive himself of pastoral endorsement. At his invitation, Ali al-Karaki (1461–1534), a graduate of the curriculum set by al-Hilli in Hilla school, came to Iran and assumed an official position in the government during the reign of Shah Isma'il and his successor Shah Tahmāsb. "Through al-Karaki's action, the Hilla school received official recognition and emphatic support from a ruler for the first time, thus mapping out the future path for the development of Shi'ite clergy in Iran."[115] Now the ideas of the rationalist theologians from al-Mufid to al-Hilli could fully come into practice under a state with Imamism as its official religion. And indeed, whenever al-Karaki fell short in his line of argumentation, he could rely on the rich traditions of his Usūli predecessors.[116] Al-Karaki took the project of the rationalist jurists one step further by putting forward the idea of *faqih* as *nā'ib al-'āmm* (general deputy) of the absent Imam. The concept of *nā'ib al-'āmm*, as Feirahi notes, "implied, in theory, the final dropping of any limits to the exercise of the Imam's prerogatives by the *faqih*." Al-Karaki wrote:

> Our fellow friends in the faith have reached the consensus that a just Imami *faqih* with comprehensive qualifications who is also known in religious matters as mujtahid must be the representative of the hidden Imam during occultation. This representation holds true in all matters in which *niyābat* (vice-regency) is relevant, henceforth, it is incumbent on the part of the believers to pay attention to his rulings and obey him… Indeed the faqih with the mentioned quality is chosen by the infallible Imams and in matters of *niyābat* acts as their representative.[117]

[115] Halm, *Shi'ism*, 83.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Al-Karaki, Mohaghegh. *Rasā'el al-Mohaghegh al-Karaki.* Eshrāf Sayyid Mahmud al- Mar'ashi. Qom: Āyatollāh Mar'ashi Library, quoted in Feirahi, *Knowledge, Power and Legitimacy in Medieval Islam*, 312.

In fact, the state apparatus was comfortable with providing such a status to the prominent members of the clerical apparatus. Shah Tahmāsb called al-Karaki the "the seal of Mujtahidin." The Shah also described the representative of pastoral power in the following terms:

> Heir to the sciences of the Lord of the Messenger, Protector of the Religion of the Commander of the Faithful [i.e., Shi'ism], the Kibla of the pious faithful, the Exemplar of expert ulamā, the Proof of Islam (*hujjat al-Islam*) and of the Muslims who directs the people unto the clear path, Erector of the banner of the indelible Law (shari'a) who is obeyed by the great governors in all times, and Guide (*muqtadā*) of all the people of the time, the Clarifier of the permissible and the forbidden, the Deputy of the Imam (*nā'ib al-imam*)—peace be upon Him—who has clarified the difficulties of the rules of the community of believers and the rightful laws.[118]

Al-Karaki assumed the position as the head of Sadr, an institution in charge of managing mosques, endowments, prayers, collecting *khums*, raising land tax, and taking charge of courts. Through the institutions of Sadr, the Shi'i clergy became rather institutionalized and reached a degree of autonomy from the state.[119] This autonomous relation to the state, however, did not denote the exteriority of religious institutions from political power; rather, it meant the realization of the classic Sassanid conception of religion and the state operating *tu'amān* (together) like two brothers. The religious institutions headed by the *fuqaha* and the political institutions headed by kings, as Deleuze and Guattari maintain, undoubtedly stood "in opposition term by term, as the obscure and the clear, the violent and the calm… But their opposition is only relative, they function as a pair, in alteration, as though they express a division of One or constituted in themselves a sovereignty unity."[120]

Now the *faqih* along with the king was the representative of the hidden Imam, enabling the state to bring its two heads—"magician-king" and "jurist-priest"—together. Since al-Karaki, the

[118] Shah Tahmāsb, "The Decree Concerning Shaykh Ali al-Karaki," in *Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism*, ed. Sa'id Amir Arjomand (State University of New York Press, 1988), 252-256.
[119] Arjomand, *The Shadow of God*, 132.
[120] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 351.

fuqaha were able to imagine themselves as one of the poles of state sovereignty, sometimes even being placed above the state as legitimators and protectors of kings' reigns on behalf of the hidden Imam.

Mohammad Bāqer Majlesi (1627–1699), a renowned Shi'i clergy, did not hesitate to endorse Shah Sultān Hossein on behalf of the hidden Imam. Throughout his writings and speeches, he mentioned the division of the task of sovereignty between the *umarā* and the *fuqaha* and stressed that the community should obey the Sultān, providing the Sultān protected the administration of religion.[121] In fact, as a French traveler to Isfahan during the Savafid era noted, there was already a Shi'i conception of an infallible *mujtahid* that "is entitled to rule the Moslems while the Shah is only required to observe and implement reports of the supreme pastor."[122] He wrote:

> According to this, the modschtehed properly speaking decides for war and peace; without his advice no matters of importance can be undertaken in governing the believers…. The Shah... [therefore] to whom God has entrusted his people and the guidance of his state, should draw his decision from the words of the modschtaheds of his time.[123]

The French traveller noted that a radical preacher who disseminated these ideas, was "seized and put away" by state authorities.[124] If the ideas of the radical preacher were theoretical doctrinal beliefs, two centuries later, in the Qajar period, a staunch anti-Akhbāri activist, Shaykh Ja'far Kāshif al-Ghiṭa (1775–1848), materialized the theory in practice by asserting himself as the authority to give permission to the Qajar king, Fath-Ali Shah (1772–1834), to engage in war against Russia. "He explained that his power to authorize the king rested on the *mujtahids*' collective office of *niyabat-i 'āmma* (general viceregency)… He also explained that it was his

[121] Mohsen Kadivar, *Nazariye ha-ye Dolat dar Fiqh-e Shi'a* [The Theories of State in the Shi'i Jurisprudence] (Tehran: Ney Publishing House, 2001), 64.
[122] Halm, *Shi'ism*, 91.
[123] Kaempfer, Engelbert, *Am Hofe des Persischen Grosskonings*(1684-85), quoted in Halm, *Shi'ism*, 91
[124] Ibid.

duty, and his recognition as a *nā'ib 'āmm* that empowered him to authorize the sultan."[125] In line with other Usūli rationalists, he saw the *fuqaha* as representatives of the hidden Imam, hence they were not to be disobeyed, since disobeying a *faqih* would in fact be considered disobedience to the Imam.[126] In Kāshif al-Ghiṭa's conception, a *faqih* was now no longer a knowledgeable community leader, but the embodiment of the hidden Imam on earth and in charge of state army.

Mullāh Ahmad Narāqi (1771–1829), a contemporary to Kāshif al-Ghiṭa, continued the same line of reasoning and offered introductory outlines to the twentieth century theory of the *velāyat-e faqih*. He was the first to employ the concept of *velāyat* to mean rulership in relation to the authority of a *faqih*. He held that:

> A just faqih may intervene and assert his authority in two main areas: first, in the affairs and legal jurisdictions of Islam over which the Prophet and the Imams, as Sultāns of the people, possess authority (*velāyat)*; second, those fields on which people's lives are dependent, that is the administration of religious and worldy affairs. These are the duties of the faqih and they may not be abandoned.[127]

Already in Mullāh Ahmad's conception, the Prophet and the Imams were viewed as heads of state (Sultān) and a *faqih* was to inherit their status in order to administer the lives of the members of the community. Mullāh Ahmad did not advocate the complete removal of secular authorities, but he certainly stepped in the direction of placing the *faqih* above the Sultān in state affairs. He endorsed *Sultān-e-'Ādil* (a just Sultān) as one that imitates (*taqlid*) the *faqih* and follows his rulings in order to implement the *shari'a*.[128] With Narāqi, the *faqih* was no longer to be imitated only by ordinary community members, but also by the head of state. As such, a king

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[125] Said Amir Arjomand, "The Qajar Era," in *Expectation of the Millennium. Shi'ism in History*, Edited and Annotated and with an Introduction by Sayyid Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabāshi and Sayyid Vali Rezā Nasr (State University of New York Press, 1989), 197.
[126]Sheikh Ja'far al-Ghiṭā. Kashf-ul-Ghiṭā. (Isfahan: Mahdavi-Sangi Publication), 394.
[127] Ahmad Narāqi, '*Avā'ed-el-'Ayyām* (*Ketābkhāne-ye Madrese-ye Feqāhat* [Online Library of School of Jurisprudence]), 188. http://lib.eshia.ir/13036/1/188
[128] 'Abdul Hādi Hā'iri, "The Legitimacy of the Early Qajar Rule as Viewed by the Shi'i Religious Leaders," *Middle Eastern Studies* 24, no.3 (1988): 279.

was to follow the *faqih* while sharing the status of the Prophet's sovereignty.

One must note that in both the cases of Kāshif al-Ghiṭā and Mullāh Ahmad, while there was a willingness on the part of the *fuqaha* to endorse and legitimize the rule of state, ultimately in theoretical terms, they only envisioned the faqih as the true *nā'ib* of the Imam entitled to take charge of state affairs.[129] In other words, they only considered practical realities as a motivation for legitimizing state rule if conditions were appropriate; mujtahids, and not kings, were legitimate rulers. This implied that in this period the relative exteriority of Shi'i pastoralism from the state apparatus had come to an end; pastoral power, at least in theory, not only imagined itself within the state, it saw itself as in charge of the state. What prepared the mujtahids to advance such a claim regarding the legitimacy of a *faqih* to take charge of the state apparatus was undoubtedly the image that saw the Prophet and the Imams as heads of the state whose rule had been later divided between political and religious institutions. Sayyid Ja'far Al-Kashfi (1775–1850), another Qajar jurist, was certainly not the first to have imagined the Prophet and Imams' rule as a harmonious combination of state and pastoral institutions, but he offered the clearest elucidation of the ideal form in which religious knowledge and political power must come together. Al-Kashfi wrote:

> Mujtahids and Sultāns hold the same office: the office of Imamate, which was transferred to them from the Imam through *niyābat* [vice regency]. The Imamate consists of two pillars [rukn]: knowledge of the prophetic matters, which is called religion; and the implementation of that knowledge through imposing order upon the world, which is called *mulk* or *saltanat*. The two pillars are also referred to as the sword and the pen.... Both of these pillars where found in combination in the Imam… and they should similarly coexist in the person who is his deputy. But since confronting the Sultāns would have led to sedition and anarchy, the ulamā and mujtahids abandoned *saltanat* and the organ of the sword. Similarly because of the inclination of Sultāns toward the material world... they have forgone the acquisition of the knowledge of religion and understanding of the prophetic matters, and have only relied on the science of politics. Thus, the function of *niyābat* inevitably became divided between the *ulamā* and the Sultāns.[130]

[129] Ibid., 275-280.
[130] Sayyid Ja'far Kashfi, *Tuhfat al-Muluk*, ed. 'Abdulwahhāb Furāti (Qum: Enteshārāt-e Boostān, 2003), 899.

In Kashfi's account, the sovereignty of the Prophet and the Imams were divided into two departments, the "sword" and "pen," with the king representing the sword and the *ulamā* representing the pen. Al-Kashfi continued that these two *rukns* were sometimes separated from each other and sometimes worked in harmony (*movāfeqat*) and partnership/deputyship (*mo'avenat*) with each other, but in an ideal situation they must come together (*din va mulk bāyad bā ham tu'am va be ham peyvaste bāshand*). This perspective of Kashfi is important because it theoretically justified the presence of the *fuqaha* not only within the state but also to be in charge of the state institutions. Al-Kashfi had realized that before the *fuqaha* were able to claim a status above the kings, first they had to claim a status equal to kings.

It is certain that during the Safavid era, Shi'i *ulamā* did legitimatize the rule of Persian kings on behalf of the hidden Imam, as was the case with al-Karaki and al-Majlesi, but with al-Kashfi's account, pastoral power was able to claim equal status to that of state sovereignty; this was an unprecedented positioning in the history of Shi'i political thought. To be clear, in earlier accounts, while pastoral power was paradoxically envisioned as being above state sovereignty, it effectively functioned within it. But with al-Kashfi, a *faqih* is able to view himself as inheriting the pen aspect of the Prophet's state, hence equalizing the status of a *faqih* with that of a Sultān. According to Arjomand, al-Kashfi's theory is a reconciliation of traditional Persian theories of kingship and the Shi'ite doctrines of imamate and occultation, and as such "it represents not only the removal of the anomalies of Safavid legitimacy but also the definitive reconciliation of the secular and the religious cultures of premodern Iran."[131] Al-Kashfi, like Sunni jurists, invoked the Sassanid political tradition in which the "togetherness" of religion and politics was underscored and put that tradition at the service of *fuqaha* searching to assert their legitimacy in

[131] Arjomand, *The Shadow of God*, 228.

state affairs. In fact Al-Kashfi's style of writing, particularly in *Mizān al-Muluk*, resonated with Persian Mirrors for Princes such as Nizām al-Mulk's (1018–1092) *Siyāsat-Nāmeh* and Al-Ghazāli's *Nasihat al-Muluk.*[132] The similarities are so striking that Feirahi is convinced that the Shi'i al-Kashfi was a reader of al-Ghazāli, and al-Kashfi's *Tuhfat al-Muluk* was a Shi'i adoption of Al-Ghazāli's *Nasihat al-Muluk.*[133]

Drawing on Sassanid political heritage, al-Ghazāli (1058–1111) had put forward the proposition that "dīn (religion) and dawlat (temporal power) were twins." He held that: "if religion was the base, dawlat (temporal power) was its guardian and charged with its preservation," and with this line of reasoning he ardently advocated the participation of the *ulamā* in state affairs.[134]

He named the overall process of managing the state according to religious laws *Imamate*. He believed that state laws had to be drawn from theology (*Usūl-al-dīn*) and juridical methodology (*Usūl-al-figh*) and that they had to be enforced through an executive body.[135] It is here that Al-Ghazāli "brings in the sultanate, which provided this power, and concludes that the imamate (the executor of the shari'a)... [and] the sultanate (coercive power) was required" in order to fulfill the "the objective of the prophet (the establishment and institutionalization of shari'a)."[136] The laws of the state, or the *qānun*, were also to be provided by *fiqh*. "The faqih therefore performed an essential function in the state. Without him order and justice would not reign."[137] With this framework, Al-Ghazāli saw the imam, the Sultān, and the *ulamā* as three

[132] Mehdi Fadāyee Mehrabāni, *Vojooh-e Erfāni dar Andishe-ye Siyāsi-ye Sayyid Ja'far Kashfi* [Mystical Aspects in the Political Thought of Ja'far Kashfi], Faslnāme-ye Siyāsat, Majalle-ye Daneshkade-ye Hoqouq va 'Olūm-e Siyāsi 46, no 1. (Spring 2016), 175, accessed September 1, 2018, https://journals.ut.ac.ir/article_57327_0914bed6ce829e3b0c771f4ed5fcc43e.pdf.
[133] Feirahi, *Knowledge, Power and Legitimacy*, *97.*
[134] Lampton, *State and Government*, 108.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid., 113.
[137] Ibid., 109.

main elements of authority exerting power on behalf of the Prophet. Al-Ghazāli argued that the Prophet himself was in charge of both the imamate and sultanate, and these entities were later divided between the *ulamā* and the king; this same stance informed Kashfi's view of the Imams' rule in the pen-sword dichotomy of state power.

After imagining the Prophet and the Imams as heads of state whose rule had been divided into pastoral and political institutions, it was natural for Shi'i theoretical idealism to imagine the two departments united once again as a pastor in charge of the state. One must stress that this theoretical advancement could only take place in the context of Shi'i political thought. While the Shi'i *fuqaha* gradually asserted themselves within the state apparatus, and were ready to provide kings with conditional legitimacy, overall state institutions were deemed as illegitimate. This was certainly not the case in the Sunni world; since Ibn al-Muqaffa' and until al-Ghazāli, the attempt was concentrated on providing legitimacy to kings as representatives of the Prophet's rule. Sunni jurists invoked the authority verse and various prophetic traditions to prescribe public obedience to kings and not the jurists. At best, Sunni jurists were interested in engulfing Sunni pastoralism within the state apparatus, but given the pre-Occultation political heritage in Imamism, kings could never find legitimacy based on religious grounds. The absence of legitimacy on the part of kings left only the *fuqaha*, as the king's partner in political rule, to claim the state apparatus as the legitimate representative of the hidden Imam.[138] Even al-Kashfi considered the possibility that, in some mujtahids, pen and sword would come together and a minority would follow their

[138] One must also not undermine the relative financial independence of the Shi'i *ualmā* from State in their ability to advance their claim to rulership. See Sachedina, *The Just Ruler*, 61. Describing the financial status of Shi'i *ulamā*, Sachedina writes: "The *khums* tax… was the main source of revenue for Shi'i leaders with which to manage the affairs of the community. It was also a financial source independent of state control, and as such it preserved the independence of Shi'i leaders from government control." Nikki Keddie is also convinced that financial factors had a huge role to play in differentiating Shi'i scholars from their Sunni counterparts in their ability to oppose the state. See Nikki Keddie, "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective," *The American Historical Review.* 88, no. 3 (June 1983): 582.

rule.[139] Therefore, if the Prophet was the head of state whose rule was divided between illegitimate kings and legitimate *fuqaha*, the logical and legitimate unity of the two would have only taken place with a *faqih* becoming the head of the state, as was prescribed by Ayatollāh Khomeini.

The expansionist and authoritarian initiative of the *fuqaha* in this period was also promoted by the reliance of the Usūli *fuqaha* on *ijtihad*. Once again, the *maqbulah* of Umar b. Hanzala served as a basis for the *fuqaha* to make claims for political power valid through reliance on *akhbār.* Sheikh Mortezā Ansāri (1781–1864) was a prominent Usūli *faqih* who most influenced Khomeini's political thought. In fact, Khomeini borrowed the title of Ansāri's book, *Ketāb al-Bay'*, for his own. If for al-Hilli the concept *al-hākim* justified the Shi'i *fuqaha*'s implementation of *hudūd*, for Ansāri *al-hākim* meant going beyond judicial authority; he reminded his readers that the concept has executive connotations and the authority of the *faqih* is comparable to a Sultān:

> The influence and legality of al-faqih's authority pertains to all social and private fields that *shari'a* has provided rulings for. This [stance regardling the rule of a faqih] is drawn from the hadith [: the *maqbulah* of Umar b. Hanzala] in which the term 'al-hākim' is referred to the person with absolute authority over a certain jurisdiction. Al-hākim is comparable to a person with authority chosen by a Sultān. As the representative of the Sultān, al-hākim has authority over all micro and macro affairs.[140]

After ensuring that the authority of the *faqih* is the same as the Shi'i Imams, Ansāri drew on the image of the Sultān as a paradigm for imagining power relations. With Ansāri, the authority of the *faqih* was no longer limited to judgeship; rather the *faqih's* provisions had been extended to State metaphors. With Ansāri, a *faqih* inherits the comprehensive pastoral qualities of the Imam,

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[139] Kasfhi, *Tuhfat al-Muluk*, 899. After expressing sorrow over the fact that both holders of pen and sword lost their status as representatives of the Imam, he writes: "those knowledgeable mujtahids who are themselves in minority and a minority follow and obey their rule may claim the status of *niyābat.*"

[140] Mortezā Ansāri, *Al-Qaḍā va al-Shahādāt* (*Ketābkhāne-ye Madrese-ye Feqāhat* [Online Library of School of Jurisprudence]), 48, accessed, September, 1, 2018, http://lib.eshia.ir/10031/1/48.

and since the Sultān also is representative of the Imam's position, *velāyat* of a *faqih* over state affairs is very well naturalized. Khomeini only responded to a question that Ansāri and nineteenth century Usūli *fuqaha* did not address in full. The question was: "If a Sultān can… exercise temporal authority in the name of the twelfth Imam… then is not a well-qualified faqih a more fitting candidate for the position, especially when he has exercised most of the Imam's authority as a legitimate functional Imam… during occultation?"[141] The same hadith complied by al-Kulayni to justify the exteriority of pastoral power from the state apparatus was now invoked to place the pastor in charge of the state apparatus.

4) Post-Constitutional Revolution:

The events of the Constitutional Revolution and the dress rehearsal of that event, the tobacco crisis, opened a new chapter in the *ulamā's* intervention in the realm of politics. Despite formidable relations between some *ulamā* and Fath-Ali Shah, overall, the relationship between *ulamā* and the state in the Qajar period was a challenging one. Each entity sought to subdue the other because unlike the Buyid period they exercised not similar but almost an equal weight of power in the social arena. Following the tobacco concession to the British, Mirzā Hassan Shirāzi (1815–1896) issued a *fatwā* (religious ruling) declaring that "the use of tobacco in any form [is] tantamount to war against the Hidden Imam, i.e. harām," and people abandoned the consumption of tobacco, eventually leading the Shah of Qajar to revoke the concession.[142] "The agitation was not merely a protest against a specific measure taken by the government… it was essentially a confrontation between people and the state, in which the leadership exercised by the ulamā

[141] Sachedina, *The Just Ruler*, 229.
[142] Hamid Algar, *Religion and Sate in Iran 1785-1906. The Role of the Ulamā in the Qajar Period* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1969), 212.

showed a new determination and sense of direction."[143] Similar trends emerged during the Constitutional Revolution whereupon the *ulamā* and religious forces played an influential role in challenging peoples' frustration with the state with respect to religious expressions. The *ulamā* could not take full control over the leadership of the Constitutional Revolution, partly because of the liberal undertones of the Revolution. The *ulamā* realized that their anti-Shah sentiments only served the secular intellectuals who appreciated neither the Shah nor the clerical apparatus. The hesitancy of the *ulamā* to build a full alliance with the liberal elite led them to be charged with the accusation that they too belonged to the despotic apparatus (*istibdād*). To rid themselves of such accusations, they adopted a tendency to provide a religious interpretation of constitutionalist values while maintaining a staunch anti-despotic stance.[144] Ayatollāh Na'ini is the most prominent *faqih* in this era to put forward a treatise that provided a compatible reading between Islam and the democratic ideals of constitutionalism. In his *Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Millah*, he wrote in rejection of *istibdād* and stressed that between the two models of government, that is, despotic and constitutional, Islam is certainly inclined toward the latter.

> The nature of [a constitutionalist, unlike an autocratic]… government is analogous to loaning and delegating, and it can survive only in the absence of usurpation and violations of trust. That which protects this form of government and prevents it from degenerating into an absolute and arbitrary rule is none other than the principle of accountability, vigilance, and responsibility. The most exalted means of ensuring that a government will not betray the trust of the nation in any way, is, of course, having infallible rulers. This is the same principle that we Shi'is consider as a principle of our religion. It is necessarily evident that anyone who partakes of the exalted status of an infallible leader will be innocent of base passions, blessed with wisdom, and endowed with many moral attributes (whose explanation falls beyond the scope of this essay). Due to divine protection, such a leader is immune even to the slightest oversight and neglect.[145]

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[143] Ibid., 205.
[144] See A.H. Ha'iri, *Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran* (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1977).
[145] Mohammad Hossein Na'ini, "Government in the Islamic Perspective" in *Modernist Islam*, ed. Charles Kurzman (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002), 120.

Na'ini did not explicitly put forward the concept of *velāyat-e-faqih* as an alternative to despotism, but he certainly headed in that direction. He saw a role for the *ulamā* in the parliament and saw their presence dispersed within governmental institutions:

> [A]ccording to Shi'i Islam, this legitimacy rests in the principle of the supervision of the "the public representatives" of the Hidden Imam during his occultation [*nowwāb-e 'amm-e asr-e Gheibat*]. Thus the legislature should either include some of the experts in religious law or be comprised of people who are given leave by such personages to adjudicate on their behalf. The correction and confirmation of the representative assembly's decisions by the grand experts in religious law will suffice.[146]

Na'ini, however, maintained that the *fuqaha* are the true representatives of the hidden Imam in assuming executive roles within the state apparatus. He wrote:

> It is an essential part of the Imami teachings that in the era of Occultation, the *hasbiyye* duties[vazāyef-e hasbiye]: those which concern the public well-being of the religious community that are not permissible to be dispensed with from the stand point of religion, are the responsibilities of the *fuqaha* and we are steadfast in this belief. [147]

Nai'ini's arguments are only a minimal departure from the nineteenth-century works of the *fuqaha* on the interaction between religious and political institutions. Nai'ini's only variation was that the authority of the Shah, which could not be fully justified from a religious stance in the Imami history, was now under scrutiny from a liberal/constitutionalist perspective. The illegitimate king or *Sultān al-jā'ir* was now called the embodiment of *istibdād* by the populace, hence facilitating the removal of the Shah not for democratic convictions, but to fulfil the "long ambition" of the Usūlis in asserting their will within the state apparatus. It was here that the Usūli account of *Hukumat-e Islami* or *Islamic Government* was born; *hukumat-e Islami* was a government that questions the authority of *Sultān al-jā'ir*, hence meeting the anti-despotic

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[146] Ibid.

[147] Mirzaā Mohammad Hossein Na'ini, *Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Millah* [The Admonition and Refinement of the People], 7th ed., introduced and annotated by S. Mahmoud Tāleqāni (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahāmi-ye Intishār, 1982), 46. Charles Kurzman's translation did not include this section of the book, hence, translation was offered from the original text. The two quotes were also checked to ensure compliance with the original.

sentiments of constitutionalism, yet it does not go as far as accepting the rule of law, in the liberal sense, and with the premise of the implementation of religious law, justifies the rulership of a *faqih*. Completing Nai'ini's project, Khomeini wrote in *Velāyat-e Faqih*:

> Islamic Government does not correspond to any of the existing forms of government. For example, it is not tyranny, where the head of state can deal arbitrarily with the property and lives of the people… It is not constitutional in the current sense of the word i.e. , based on the approval of laws in accordance with the opinion of the majority. It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth in the Nobble Qur'an and the Sunna of the Most Noble Messenger.[148]

Hence, the concept of Islamic Government or *velāyat-e faqih* was by no means a pure invention on the part of Khomeini. The *fuqaha*, who out of pragmatism could not call for the erasure of *saltanat* in previous centuries, now saw constitutional values as a viable alternative that may render service to those Usūli *fuqaha* who saw themselves as the sole legitimate authorities entitled to rule the state apparatus.[149] The rationalism of modernity imbedded in democratic values was placed next to Usūli medieval rationalism imbedded in *ijtihād* to further the cause of the Usūli *fuqaha*'s authoritarianism. The State-thought of modernity was subordinated to the emerging State-thought of the Usūli *ulamā* to put an end to the exteriority of Shi'i pastoralism. The critique of absolutism that had its roots in the French Enlightenment met a medieval Shi'i rationalist interpretation of the *akhbār* to advocate a form of constitutionalism that would enhance the *fuqaha*'s claim to the state. In his elucidation of *velāyat-e faqih* Khomeini referenced the anti-state credentials of previous *ulamā*, their entitlement to rule, and also their employment of rationalist methodologies. Khomeini wrote:

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[148] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, 55.

[149] See Kasravi, "Shi'e-gari,"in Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period* Vol.1 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 285. Kasravi's passionate outcry against the clergy speaks of the clerical claim for state power. See Ch.4.

> Again, when Mirza Mohammad Taqi Shirazi gave orders of *jihad*—or "defense," they called it—all the *ulamā* obeyed because his order was a governmental ruling. Among other modern scholars, the late Narāqi also was of the opinion that the *fuqaha* are entitled to exercise all the worldly functions of the Most Noble Messenger (upon whom and whose family be peace and blessing). The late Na'ini also believed that the doctrine of the governance of the faqih may be deduced from the *maqbula* of 'Umar ibn Hanzala.[150]

Not only was Khomeini not inclined to call his elucidations "novel," he expressed comfort framing his doctrine in the context of Usūli rationalists' pursuit of authority of a *faqih*. Khomeini invoked the *maqbula* of Umar ibn Hanzala, but gave a slightly different interpretation to that of Ansāri, and put it forward as evidence for the rule of the *fuqaha* over the state, as if al-Kulayni had not included the hadith in this compilation to justify the exteriority of Shi'ism from the state. After a short discussion of the *maqbula* of Umar ibn Hanzala, Khomeini wrote:

> In this answer the Imam forbids all recourse to illegitimate governments, including both their executive and their judicial branches… What then is the duty of the Islamic community in this respect?... In the same tradition, the Imam goes on to say: "I appoint him as ruler over you"—that is, "I appoint as ruler over you one who possesses such qualifications; I appoint anyone who possesses the governmental and judicial affairs of the Muslims, and the Muslims do not have the right to have recourse to anyone other than him." … This is the universal duty of all Muslims, not simply of 'Umar ibn Hanzala, who, when confronted by a particular problem, obtained the ruling. [Imam named] the *fuqaha* as "rulers," so that no one might presume that their function was restricted to judicial affairs and divorced from the other concerns of the government… [Therefore no] one can doubt that the Imam (peace be upon him) designated the *fuqaha* to exercise the functions of both government and judgeship. It is the duty of all Muslims to obey this decree of the Imam.[151]

Khomeini ensured that the word *al-hākim* not only means judgeship but also implies the executive role in the government. Khomeini could then stress that "no one might presume that their function was restricted to judicial affairs and divorced from the other concerns of the government." The emphasis on "both government and judgeship" was certainly reminiscent of Khomeini's awareness of the post-Buyid interpretation of the *maqbula* to justify the Shi'i

[150] Ibid., 124.
[151] Ibid., 94-96.

fuqaha's involvement in the state in the implementation of the *hudūd*; yet he went one step further making explicit that which was only implicit in Ansāri's and Na'ini's interpretation of the hadith. Khomeini brought the long Usūli project to its logical conclusion. A tradition that was born outside the state apparatus was now imagined entirely within the apparatus. With Khomeini, pastoral power as a war-machine, to use Deleuze and Guattari's words, was appropriated by the state apparatus. Pastoral power had become internal to the state.

One must note that the process through which *velāyat-e faqih*, as a political doctrine, was able to make itself available to the post-revolutionary state discourse had little to do with Khomeini's elaboration of the concept in Najaf.[152] The Usūlis's long pursuit of expansion and advocacy of the concept, however, provided "the condition of possibility" for *velāyat-e faqih* to be intelligible to its primary audience, that is the Shi'i religious community of Iran, and justify the rule of a *faqih* in charge of the state apparatus. Political contingencies of the time, the most important of which was the charisma of Khomeini, framed *velāyat-e faqih* as a purely Shi'i concept that only awaited the right condition for it to be materialized.

Conclusion:

Rather divergent interpretations ascribed to the *maqbula* of Umar b. Hanzala indicate the evolution of Shi'i political thought in general and the expansionist claim of the Shi'i *fuqaha* in relation to the state in particular. If for al-Kulayni the hadith meant to prescribe Shi'i dissociation with state power, hence envisioning an alternative Shi'i community based on the pastoral model of Al-Bāqir, for later rationalist *fuqaha* such as al-Hilli, the word *al-hākim* in the hadith legitimized Shi'i pastoralists to work for the state in judicial affairs. In this shift of paradigm two

[152] This theme will be expanded upon in the following chapters.

factors may be identified: 1) the formidable relationship of the *fuqaha* to state authorities; 2) the primacy given to '*aql* and rationalist methodologies that enabled the *fuqaha* to contain the quasi mystical and irrational inclinations of the Shi'ism of the *Ghulāt* of the pre-Occultation era. Hence, one begins not only to identify a discursive shift but also what concerns form of thought: the nomadic model of thought associated with schizophrenic mystical inclinations (*junūn*) was healed and replaced by the State-thought of the rationalist *fuqaha*. This statism in the form of thought naturalized pastoralists' close cooperation with the state during the Safavid and Qajar eras, this time not merely as judges but also as a "pole" in state sovereignty. The Shi'i *fuqaha* now claimed equal status to that of kings, and while calling them *jā'ir* they asserted themselves as the legitimate representatives of the twelfth Imam. Here, the classic Sassanid political treatise, already invoked by Sunni scholars, in which togetherness of religion and political institutions was prescribed, came to resonate well with Shi'i *fuqaha* in search of justifying their placement within the state apparatus. Import of classic Persian political thought to the Shi'i context had a similar but slightly divergent implication to the Sunni imagination of political power. In both Shi'i and Sunni conceptions the Prophet was imagined as a head of state—hence a combination of pastoral and state power, whose power was later divided between the *ulamā* and the kings. But unlike the Sunni jurists who attempted to provide legitimacy for heads of states as successors of the Prophet, in the Shi'i mindset, Sultāns remained illegitimate rulers and only the *fuqaha* could claim legitimacy to rule on behalf of the Prophet and the hidden Imam. Hence, if in practice the *fuqaha* shared a status similar to that of kings, on ideal theological grounds they were above the kings. This implied that if, during Al-Bāqir, Shi'i pastoralism was exterior to the state, in the Buyid period onward, especially at the time that Mullāh Ahmad Narāqi coined the term *velāyat-e faqih*, Shi'i exteriority had moved towards the interior. In order for this end of exteriority to find

religious legitimacy, in other words, in order for *akhbār* to approve Shi'i *fuqaha* claims to the state apparatus, once again the *maqbula* of Umar b. Hanzala was invoked; this time the word *al-hākim,* in the theology of the late Qajar Shi'i scholar Mortezā Ansāri, meant "political ruler," hence transferring those tasks previously ascribed to the Sultān to the *faqih*. Imam Khomeini only brought the attempts of the Usūli rationalist *fuqaha* to their logical conclusion and read the word *al-hākim* to mean both judgeship *and* executive governmental roles, hence superimposing pastoral power on state sovereignty. If in the Sunni world, the head of state and the pastor were combined in the image of the Caliph or a Sultān, now with Khomeini, religious and political institutions were to be combined in the image of a *faqih*. If in the Sunni world the state claimed pastorship, in the Shi'i world twentieth century pastors claimed the state; the end result certainly shared striking similarities. One must not underestimate the importance of liberal reason in the material success of Shi'i pastoralists for it was in the mind of modern constitutionalists that kings were the embodiment of *istibdād*. Echoing constitutionalists' sentiments, Khomeini met the constitutionalists midway by denouncing *istibdād*, yet through advocating a form of Islamic Constitutionalism he asserted the authority of a *faqih* as the alternative. Khomeini imagined pastoral power in charge of the modern state. His imagination came through in realpolitik.

Chapter 4: Genealogy of the Modern Islamic State

Between the third and nineteenth century, Usuli Shi'i *ulamā* developed a theoretical framework that legitimized a *faqih* to claim an equal status to the Shah, hence levelling the power of religious authorities to that of state sovereignty. In the twentieth century, Ayatollāh Khomeini (1902–1989) expanded the longstanding Usuli project and called for the sovereignty of the *faqih*. In Khomeini's *velāyat-e faqih*, the jurist was no longer on the same footing with the king; rather, he was to become *the king* of a state that enforces *shari'a* law. Sovereignty of the *faqih* was Khomeini's intervention within the Shi'i Usuli discourse, and while the text was read in the seminary context, it did not receive wide attention, particularly among Islamists. To be sure, Islamists were aware of Khomeini's novel ideas, but by no means did *velāyat-e faqih* function as the inspiring book of the Revolution.[153] In fact, most Islamists closed their eyes to the theological content of the book and only endorsed its anti-imperialist passages.[154] Khomeini himself never publicly dwelled on the concept of *velāyat-e faqih* and only began to speak about it a few months after the Revolution. Khomeini also did not have a final claim on the concept as he had made it clear that his thesis was in need of further development. At least prior to the Revolution, Khomeini was willing to exchange scholarly conversations about *Velāyat-e Faqih* and its underdeveloped areas.[155]

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[153] S Mohammad Ali Hosseinizādeh, *Islam-e Siyāsi dar Iran* [Political Islam in Iran] (Qom: Mufid Publication, 2006), 232.

[154] Sayyid Hamid Rouhani, "Bāztāb-e Enteshār-e Dars-hāy-e Velāyat-e faqih-e Imam Khomeini," in Rasul Jafariyan, *Rasā'el-e Siyāsi-Islami-e Doreyeh Pahlavi* 1 [The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period] vol. 2 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 656-659. Being a state historian and critical of the Bāzargān front, whom he calls "the liberals" (*anāso-re libāral*), Rouhani compares Marxists' and Islamists' reactions to *Velāyat-e Faqih.* He states that Marxists were willing to include the anti-imperialist passages of the book in their writings, but Islamists, fearing being discredited as reactionaries, did not reference the text and give it the attention it deserved. He cites as evidence a newsletter called *Pāyam-e Mojāhed*, published by Banisadr, in which there is no mention of *velāyat-e faqih* and concludes that Islamists were dismayed by Khomeini's concept.

[155] Rasul Jafariyan, *Jaryānhā va Sāzmānhāye Mazhabi-Siyāsi-e Iran* [Religio-Political Currents and Organizations in Iran] (Tehran: Khāne Ketāb, 2012), 297

Given how little influence Khomeini's text had on early revolutionary discourse, the question then becomes: how was it that *velāyat -e-faqih* eventually found its way into the Iranian Constitution and became the most important political dogma in post-revolutionary Iran? Surely the concept of *hukumat-e Islami* (Islamic state) was heard during the days of the Revolution, but, as Michel Foucault registered, the concept was vague and by no means meant the sovereignty of the faqih.[156] Rhetorically speaking, how then were ayatollahs able to take charge in Iran, or to frame the question in a scholarly language: what were the conditions of possibility that gave rise to *hukumat-e Islami* in Iran, and specifically how was *velāyat -e-faqih* incorporated into the Iranian Constitution?

Questions concerning the material conditions that led to the formation of an Islamic state headed by a *faqih* invite for a Foucauldian genealogy of the modern Islamic state in Iran. Since the emergence of the modern Islamic state is well connected to the events of the Islamic Revolution, a genealogical exploration of the Islamic state naturally intersects with questions concerning the root causes of the Revolution, which has been the subject of scholarly investigation since 1979. Not only is the question, "how were ayatollahs able to take charge in Iran?," not a novel one, the premise of the question, in fact, promoted new investigations and responses among two interrelated scholarly camps: 1) scholars of the Iranian Revolution inclined towards a secular reading of the Revolution, and 2) sociologists of the Revolution.

The secularist readers of the Revolution relied on the "hijacking" premise.[157] In this

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[156] Michel Foucault, "What are the Iranians Dreaming About?" in Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 206.

[157] See for instance, Mark Bowden, "How Iran's Revolution was Hijacked*,"* in *The Wall Street Journal*. Nov 18, 2009. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704431804574539633865075864 accessed 25 October 2018). Or see Ted Grant, "The Iranian Revolution*"* in www.marxists.com. https://www.marxist.com/iranian-revolution-grant090279.htm (accessed 25 October 2018), or Kenneth Katzman. "Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran (review)." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 13, no. 4 (2002): 122-125. https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed October 25, 2018).

approach, the Revolution had an overall secular momentum until Khomeini's "appeal to the masses supported by the US … enabled him to change the course of the revolution to his own ends."[158] The secularist reading of the Revolution suggests that the anti-Shah movement had adopted a progressive direction until the clerical establishment with its Islamist base manipulated the revolutionaries and "hijacked" the Revolution and claimed it as their own.[159] Judging by the outcome of the Revolution, the advocates of the hijacked secular Revolution thesis would go so far as to state that "the Iranian revolution was not a true revolution, for its outcome has created … an absolutist theocracy rather than the democratic aspirations of the revolutionaries."[160] Implicit in their thesis is the suggestion that Islam asserted little discursive influence in the making of the revolutionary situation and that only contingencies of politics and not cultural formations brought about religiously inspired political revolution. Behrooz Moazami, an advocate of this approach, though subtler in his exposition, stated that the Islamic Revolution was "a political phenomenon, not an expression of the cultural and religious foundations of traditionalist forces."[161] He too held that the social movements leading the Revolution were predominantly secular and only underwent a process of "Islamization" in their final stages.

Among sociologists of revolutions, the rise of the religious establishment during the course of the Islamic Revolution made scholars revisit the field as a whole and reconsider the

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[158] Parvis Daneshvar, *Revolution in Iran* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), 200.
[159] See also Sharif Arani, "Iran: from the Shah's Dictatorship to Khomeini's Demagogic Theocracy," in *Dissent* 27 (Winter 1980): 9-26. One must note that the proponents of the secularist reading do not advance their position explicitly in the scholarly publications, but their narrative has maintained its popularity in oral discussions of the Iranian Revolution. Often the "hijacking premise" hides itself in underlying assumptions of certain scholarly pieces. For instance, even in the work of a sophisticated scholar such as Said Amir Arjomand, one finds passages where Arjomand regrets that secularists handed over the Revolution to the clerical establishment. See Sa'id Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (Oxford University Press, 1988), 109. In short, in most cases, one only needs to read between the lines to dissect the position of the author, and the underlying assumptions are not always as explicit as those held by Daneshvar or Arani, for instance.
[160] Daneshvar, *Revolution in Iran,* 200,
[161] Behrooz Moazami, "The Islamization of the Social Movements and the Revolution, 1963-1979,"*Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 29:1 (2009), 47.

literature pertaining to theories of revolution. The question of the ayatollah's triumph to power caught Western sociologists of revolution by surprise simply because existing theories could not foresee such an unfolding of events. The most prime example was the case of Theda Skocpol who found the case of the Iranian Revolution "quite anomalous" in that it challenged "expectations about revolutionary causation that… [she had] developed through comparative-historical research on the French, Russian, and the Chinese Revolution."[162] Reflecting on the case of Iran, she acknowledged the "agency" of the revolutionaries and the role ideological institutions played in the making of the revolutionary situation.[163] She also acknowledged that by "the end of 1978, all sectors of urban Iranian society were coalescing under the rubric of Shi'a Islam and were following the direction of a senior Shi'i cleric, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini."[164]

In general, Skocpol and others, mostly trained in Marxist and structuralist paradigms, identified inadequacies of structuralist theories when reflecting upon the case of Iran. They contended that seeing political formations through the status of structures (i.e., their breakdown) and fixed categories such as "state" and "civil society" must be abandoned, and instead "conjunctural models" must be adopted in the study of revolutions.[165] In the new approach, "the whole domain of culture ... must be explored, more deeply; …[and one] must sort out the interrelationships among discourse, political culture, ideology, and motivation" leading to a replacement of one political order with another.[166] Although the revisions on the part of

[162] Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society*. 11 No.3 (May, 1982): 265.
[163] Ibid., 267.
[164] Ibid.
[165] John Foran, "Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation?" *Sociological Theory*, 11, no.1 (March 1993), 16.
[166] Ibid., 17. See also Jeff Goodwin, "Toward a New Sociology of Revolutions," *Theory and Society*, 23, no.6 (December 1994): 731-766.

sociologists of revolution—with primacy given to the cultural approach, as vague as it remains—came to challenge the secularist reading of the revolution, there was no specific mythological framework advanced by these theorists as an alternative that would not contain the hazards of the previous scholarly approach. As a result, it may be stated that the secularist reading of the Revolution, besides ideological conviction, was in fact influenced by a structuralist reading of the Revolution. Through structuralism, the study of the interaction between "state, civil society economy, and class" follows an underlying assumption about these phenomena as fixed historical objects, hence not allowing for a nuanced reading of a particular historical situation, particularly those resulting from a complex interaction between, and evolution of, each object.[167] Here, the proposition that a cultural approach must be embraced was a plausible one, but it did not suggest how future studies might avoid such a methodological predicament.

Therefore, what both sociologists and secularist readers of the revolution have in common is an understanding of their object of analysis, that is the state, civil society, etc., as given and fixed, and not having its own history of evolution and transformation. According to Foucault, the genealogical approach is a method of "not taking as a primary, original, and already given object, notions such… the state, and civil society… [in the way] all those universals [were] employed by sociological analysis, historical analysis, and political philosophy" and instead we must engage in the study of the state while "embracing with the decision that universals do not exist."[168] In dominant sociological and historical approaches concerning the Islamic Revolution, the state is treated as a universal and fixed object without the

[167] Here, the work of Daneshvar, *Revolution in Iran*, provides a good example of a researcher who sided with the "highjacking" premise while heavily engaging with structuralist theories of the Revolution. In the last chapter of his book, Daneshvar offers a detailed discussion of theories of the Revolution, yet he overlooked the cultural factors in the shaping of the revolutionary momentum and offered the conclusions cited above.
[168] Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2-3.

ability to adopt new discursive postures. Similarly, categories such as religion and culture are also presented as fixed entities without evolutionary qualities. In this way, dominant approaches fail to understand these modalities as being in a constant state of flux and transformation. Whereas, in the Foucauldian approach, through the "refusal of universals," the state, for instance, is not assumed as a given but as something that through historical accidents, material influences, and discursive transformations evolves, and there is the possibility that a discursive regime associated with Islam would have a role to play in its formation.[169] In fact, this is the thesis ventured in this study, that Islam had a role to play in the making of the modern state in Iran.

In genealogical investigation one aims to "to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist."[170] Conducting a genealogy of the state as the object of study connects the practice to what Foucault refers to as governmentality. Foucault employs a history of governmentality as both the object of his study and also as a method for studying the rise of the modern state.[171] It is in the governmentality approach that Foucault refuses to assume the state as something already given, but as a set of emerging practices that employs different rationalities, techniques, discourses, and subjectivities to direct individuals to certain ends.[172] Concerning a genealogy of the modern Islamic state, first one must treat the state "as if one did not know … what" state was. And "from there it was a matter of seeing what type of relations of knowledge [in Islamic discourse] were founded by this practice itself, with their structuring and determining effects in the field of knowledge" [and

[169] Michel Foucault, *On the Government of the Living*, trans Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 80. Foucault also calls his approach "anarcheology."
[170] Michel Foucault "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 81.
[171] William Walters, *Governmentality* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 12.
[172] Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 2-3.

Islamic] theory" of governance.[173] Foucault introduces certain "arts of government" or "analytics of power" such as *raison d'Etat*, police, mercantilism, pastoralism, bio-politics, and sovereignty to make reference to these multiple regimes of governmentality. Each of these arts of government takes on certain objectives, knowledge, modes of subjectivity, and techniques of governance in order to make possible conduct of conduct. Having resistance to the state in mind, Foucault also recognizes a modality through which opposition to power can take place. Foucault calls this specific mode of resistance "counter-conduct," which is "the sense of struggle against the process implemented for conducting others."[174] Counter-conduct for Foucault is not about rejecting power all together; rather, it entails a desire to be conducted *differently*.

Specifically, within a governmentality approach one reads a certain political text in order to "reconstruct the function of the text, not according to the rules of formation of its concepts, but according to its objectives, the strategies that govern it, and the program of political action it proposes."[175] Similarly, one studies the historical players not in relation to a certain evaluative historical truth; rather, the question becomes: in what ways do actors' conduct, political struggles, and discourse embody the exercise of a certain art of government? Here both texts and action—or in order words, discourse and power—are studied from the point of "the set of practices by which the state actually became a way of governing, a way of doing things, and a way of relating to government."[176]

Exploring questions concerning Iranian governmentality would be an example of examining what Walter calls *other govermentalities*, where "Foucault's toolkit of analytical

[173] Foucault, *On the Government of the Living,* 80.
[174] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 201.
[175] Ibid., 36.
[176] Ibid., 277.

concepts offers a promising starting point to map ... diverse ecologies of forms of power."[177] Though Walter cautions us not to treat Foucault's concept as universal, there is a way in which some of the concepts he proposes do have universal validity. After all, most novel techniques of governance came into being in the *episteme* of modernity, and there is no modern project of power at the level of state that has entirely escaped them. For instance, all modern states share the analytic of sovereignty, *raison d'Etat,* bio-power, and police. What distinguishes governmentalities from each other are "forms, combinations and intensities of … deployment" of various arts of government.[178] Walter draws on Gilles Deleuze to refer to these analytics of power as "interacting wheels," whose operation defines the overall effect of the state. Treating Foucault's analytics of power as wheels allows one to search for these wheels and their modes of entanglement with each other. Of course, it "goes without saying that the possibility [is there] that these 'interacting wheels' can be jammed, thrown into reverse, or even detached from the state machine, and reconnected to other devices."[179] As the case of Iran shows, this detaching of wheels from the state machine and getting connected with other wheels formed a "war-machine" or counter-conduct and brought about the downfall of the king.

The rise of the modern Iranian state:

Writing about the history of the modern state in Iran would not be possible without taking into consideration the interaction between religion and state dating back to the Safavid era. The centralized state created by the Safavids saw the element of religion in both its early moments of formation and also its maintenance. The interaction between religion and state was never smooth, but until the demise of Safavids, religious authorities functioned as a complement to

[177] Walter, *Governmentality*, 95
[178] Ibid., 95.
[179] Ibid., 52.

state sovereignty, not its negation. With the collapse of Safavids, state hegemony gave way to various tribal resurgences until the Qajar sought to emulate the Safavid model, both in their centralization tactics and also in their interaction with the *ulamā*.[180] The Qajar ulamā, however, held a suspicious view towards state power. They even saw the idea of a Shi'i state "as a contradiction in terms," and believed that the "Hidden Imam had delegated the responsibility of guiding the public not to the temporal leaders but to the religious establishment."[181] Theologically this perspective was shaped by the discourse pertaining to early Shi'i interaction with state power and the position Usuli *ulamā* envisioned for themselves in the absence of the hidden Imam. The tendency to view the state as illegitimate and the *ulamā* as the sole force of legitimate authority never lost its dominant momentum among the clerical and popular imagination until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Expanding on the notion of *velāyat*, Allāmeh Tabātabāee (1904–1981), a leading theologian in the twentieth century, used the analogy of a "flock without a pastor" (*galleh bi shabān*) to describe those who refuted the necessity of an Islamic society having a religious guardian.[182] Tabātabāee held that an Islamic society needs a pastor and posed the question about the desirability of pastoral power being exercised at the level of the state.

The invocation of the pastor-flock metaphor by Allāmeh speaks to Foucault's attempt to explain religious power in pastoral terms.[183] For Foucault, the pastoral relationship is "essentially the relationship of God to men. It is a religious type of power that God exercises over his people," and this power excludes the Greek city-state model of governance.[184] In the modern

[180] Sa'id Amir Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (Oxford University Press, 1988), 1-33.
[181] Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton University Press, 1982), 41, 40.
[182] Allāmeh Mohammad Hossein Tabātabāee, "Velāyat va Ze'āmat" in Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period,* vol. 2 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 1171.
[183] Foucault, *Security Territory Population*, 153.
[184] Ibid., 124-125.

world, however, Foucault saw the pastorate as the art of "governing men," and believed that one must look into "the origins, the point of formation, of crystallization, the embryonic point of governmentality whose entry into politics … marks the threshold of the modern state."[185] According to Foucault, practices pertaining to the modern state emerge "when governmentality became calculated and reflected practice," and similar to pastoral power, various modes of power are introduced in order to govern conduct.[186] He called this new art of government, which evolved from the pastorate and eventually operated as its antithesis, *raison d'Etat*, or reason of the state.

During the reign of Qajar, state sovereignty was relatively weak, and autonomous forms of power consisting of tribes, Khans, central elites, *ulamā*, and landlords ruled the country. The central bureaucracy and army were stagnant and "the Shah actually had [little power] outside the Tehran region."[187] The first call for *raison d'Etat* in Iran was put forward by advocates of three different arts of government: traditional mercantilism, secular advocates of a police state, and religious pastoral.

Mercantilism is that art of government that is primarily "concerned with turning the balance of trade to one's own advantage," yet which introduces a regulatory apparatus that will ensure that the population will be "the source and the root, as it were, of state's power and wealth."[188] Mercantilism hence seeks the sovereign's intervention and essentially imagines power in "the axis of sovereign and subjects."[189] The instruments of mercantilism are "laws, edicts and regulations," a fact that connects mercantilism to another art of government that

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[185] Ibid., 165.
[186] Ibid.
[187] Nikki R. Keddie, "The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800-1969: An Overview," *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 2, no. 1 (1971): 3.
[188] Mitchel Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (Sage publications, 2010), 126; Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 69.
[189] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 70.

Foucault refers to as police.

Police as an art of government "will be the calculation and technique that will make it possible to establish a mobile, yet stable and controllable relationship between the state's internal order and development of its forces."[190] Police entails "administrative modernity par excellence," "professionalization of individuals," "problems of health," "development of roads," and in a nutshell the happiness of individuals in such a way that "the well-being of individuals is the state strength."[191] The binding together of police and mercantilist arts of government instructs the state to go beyond the problems of maintaining the apparatus of sovereignty. Rather, the sovereign "is called upon for something other than God's action in relation to nature."[192] This brings about "degovernmentalization of the cosmos," through relying on principles of nature in order to govern the state. This new art of government marks the beginning of the rise of the modern state and *politiques.* Here, "as opposed to the juridical-theological problem of the foundation of sovereignty, the *politiques* are those who try to think of the form of government rationality for itself."[193] The embodiment of *raison d'Etat* is reflected in the republic, "public matters councils and plans," so it can work "on the consciousness of people not just to impose some true or false beliefs on them, but in such a way that their opinion is modified, their way of doing things, their way of acting, their behavior as economic subjects and as political subjects."[194] Through *raison d'Etat*, the state becomes "for those who governed, for those who advised the governors, for those who advised the government," hence making modalities of power "completely different from the exercise of sovereignty."[195]

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[190] Ibid., 313.
[191] Ibid., 321, 324, 325, 328
[192] Ibid., 236.
[193] Ibid., 246.
[194] Ibid., 257, 275.
[195] Ibid., 276, 66.

The integration of Iran into the world economy in the nineteenth century brought about a new class consisting of wealthy entrepreneurs and merchants who saw themselves in competition with foreign commercial entities. This competition led to the loss of Iranian merchants and "the influx of foreign goods, capital and merchants initiated the decline of the native bourgeoisie."[196] Iranian mercantilism, which imagined itself as a "common political personality," made demands of sovereignty to intervene in order to "erect protective tariffs," only to be refused by the authorities.[197] It has been reported that Naser-din-Shah called these merchants selfish, and he failed to "prescribe any remedies."[198] The Shah's arrogant response ignited opposition and led to the creation of one major demand: that the Shah as sovereign of the nation must intervene and enforce strict regulatory mechanisms to help merchants survive competition with the Europeans. In other words, they called for creation of a "police" state, one that regulates and organizes the flow of capital. According to Foucault, mercantilism appears as "the first rationalization of the exercise of power as a practice of government," but not necessarily at the expense of destroying sovereignty. Iranian mercantilists also did not call for the removal of the Shah. Rather they invited the Shah to enact reforms. Mercantilists view the population "as a collection of a sovereign's subject on which a number of laws and regulations can be imposed from above in an entirely voluntarist manner telling it what it must do and where and how it must do it."[199] But this, Foucault stresses, poses a new challenge. On the one hand, mercantilism intends to increase state wealth; on the other hand, it must cope with the "excessively large, abstract, and rigid frameworks of sovereignty as a problem and institution." In order words, mercantilists' demand for the mechanism of the police state to be introduced is an indirect call for transforming the

[196] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 60.
[197] Ibid., 58, 60.
[198] Ibid.
[199] Ibid., 70.

exercise of sovereignty.

In the case of Iran, one has to note that mercantilists did not make their demand on sovereignty alone. "The mercantile bourgeoisie could not act effectively without seeking support from the hierocracy," that is, pastoral authorities.[200] Similar to the case of the tobacco crisis, Iranian merchants received the support of pastoral clergy in their boycott of the state concession to foreigners, thus combining pastoral-mercantilist arts of government. In the case of the tobacco crisis, Ayatollāh Shirāzi (1814–1895), with the backing of Al-Afghāni (1839–1897), issued a fatwa forbidding consumption of tobacco, which resulted in protests throughout the country against the alliance between the Shah and imperialism. Eventually the Shah annulled the concession, signalling that sovereignty may no longer be limited to symbolic control of a Persian territory. Rather the "sovereign is required to do more than purely and simply exercise his sovereignty… it is supplementary in relation to sovereignty, and it is something other than the pastorate, and this something without a model, which must find its model, is the art of government… This is *raison d'Etat*."[201] Implicit in the exercise of pastoral and mercantilist arts of government was a call not only for an independent sovereign whose strong regulatory system could protect mercantilism, but also *raison d'Etat*—a project that was intensely sought after not only by the *ulamā* and merchants but also the secular middle-class intelligentsia.

A spokesperson in the first stage of the Constitutional Revolution said: "The government must reverse its present policy of helping Russians at the expense of Iranian merchants, creditors and manufacturers If the present *policy* continues, our whole economy will be ruined."[202] The second phase of the Revolution took place again as a counter-conduct to disciplinary

[200] Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, 35.
[201] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 237.
[202] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 81.

mechanisms of the state in relation to merchants, but one of the major demands of protestors was "enforcement of shari'a," which seemed to have been synonymous with economic justice.[203] The third wave also did not fail to have a religious texture. It emerged in the month of Muharram when a public speaker was arrested while accusing conservative *ulamā* and government forces of being responsible for the perceived backwardness of the country: "In the past, others looked on us as a great nation. Now we are reduced to such a condition that our neighbors of the north and south already believe us to be their property and divide our country between themselves when they choose." He continued: "[W]e have no guns, no army, no secure finances, nor proper government, no commercial laws."[204] In other words, the speaker complained about the lack of police, *raison d'Etat*, and sovereignty. This rhetoric was concurrent with the cry of new middle-class intellectuals who had "considered constitutionalism, secularism, and nationalism to be the three vital means for attaining the establishment of a modern, strong, and developed Iran."[205] The three principles they held would destroy "the reactionary power of the monarchy," "the conservative influence of the clergy," and "the exploitative tentacles of the imperialists."[206] After these middle-class intellectuals joined the movement the Revolution reached its zenith with a "proclamation convening a Constituent National Assembly."[207] Constitutional Revolution and the adoption of the Belgium Constitution with Iranian realities marked the birth of Iranian *raison d'Etat.* The term *melli* was attributed to apparatuses associated with *raison d'Etat*, and the term constitutionalist (*mashrooteh-khāh*) was designated to those who believed in a juridical form of sovereignty.

[203] Ibid., 82.
[204] Ibid., 83.
[205] Ibid., 62.
[206] Ibid., 62.
[207] Ibid., 85.

With the new constitution "the traditional gospel of Shi'ism had been incorporated into a modern structure of government derived from Montesquieu." And in that sense "the spirit of society, to paraphrase Montesquieu, had helped formulate the laws of constitution."[208] But soon members of the clergy doubted the compatibility between the laws proposed by the constitutionalists and the *shari'a*. They raised their concerns publicly and the intelligentsia advocating *raison d'Etat* realized that clergies were obstacles to the manifestation of reason of state. The newspaper *Sur-i-Israfil* wrote that "ulamā should keep their hands out of politics," and they were nothing but "money grabbers" who "concealed their slimy interests with sublime sermon. This was the first anti-clerical article to be published in Iran, but it was not to be the last."[209] This marked the beginning of a confrontation between traditional religious forces and *raison d'Etat.* A similar situation arose when many years later "Mohammad Mosaddegh's [(1882–1967)] advisors proposed to enfranchise women on the grounds that the spirit of the constitution treated all citizens as equals[;] the *ulamā* supported by theology students and guild elders" opposed the initiative on religious grounds.[210]

Foucault explains that from a pastoral perspective *raison d'Etat* is considered innovation, heresy, and the "degovernmentalization of cosmos," and its evolution is "just [as similar to the way] Galileo Galilei's (1564–1642) discoveries provoked the scandal in the field of religious thought."[211] Since, according to *raison d'Etat,* the rationality of the government is to be supplied from within, and not from outside divine influences, the pastoral art of government views it as a form of "polytheism" and "atheism." During the course of the Constitutional Revolution, Sheikh Fazlollāh Nūri (1843–1909) was the prominent member of the pastorate who opposed the newly

[208] Ibid., 90.
[209] Ibid., 93.
[210] Ibid., 276.
[211] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 241.

emerging art of government. He denounced novel concepts associated with *raison d'Etat* "as an alien heresy, [and he] traced the contemporary problems of instability, immorality, and ideological insecurity to the subversive influence of that 'atheist Armenian Mirzā Malkum Khān,' and declared that the Majlis Liberals…were paving the way for socialism, anarchism and nihilism."[212] The Sheikh spoke and wrote extensively in opposition to the Revolution, deeming constitutionalism incompatible with Islam. His supporters exclaimed:

> To our Prophet, who revealed the law in the Quran, which is the perfection and completion of all previous laws, and will remain until the day of reckoning. Therefore, there is no need to follow the example of the law of Europe and Germany. If the law of the Seal of the Prophet were defective it would be necessary for God to send another Prophet and another law, so that his proof to the people be not effective.[213]

The Sheikh stood firm on his convictions and was able to form a movement against the constitutionalists but was eventually tried and executed. "The execution caused consternation among the other *ulamā*," and rightly so because the confrontation between the pastorate and *raison d-Etat* had yet to be fully resolved.[214]

Almost forty years after the Constitutional Revolution, the most influential voice of opposition to the pastoral apparatus began to be heard. Kasravi, a secular intellectual and a historian of the Constitutional Revolution, wrote numerous essays with similar themes holding the pastorate responsible for erecting obstacles to constitutionalist ideals. He accused the clergy of authoritarianism and yet not taking responsibility in state affairs. He also accused them of opportunism and promoting suspicious and destructive views towards the state among the masses. He wrote: "Once the incompatibility between the clergy and [the] constitutional

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[212] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 95.
[213] Sheikh Fazlollāh Nūri, *Rasā'el, E'lāmiyeh-hā, Maktūbāt va Rūznāmeh-hāye Sheikh-e Shahid*, [Books, Publications and Writings of Sheikh Fazlollāh Nuri] ed. Mohammad Torkaman (Tehran: 1983), Volume I, 360-62, also quoted in Vanessa Martin, *Islam and Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1989), 125.
[214] Ibid., 190.

apparatus became apparent; the well-intended clergy withdrew from clerical profession and … the ill-minded clergy maintained the old clerical apparatus before the constitutional revolution."[215] He then posed a list of questions to the members of the pastoral community challenging their doctrinal beliefs concerning the question of state. Kasravi held that Shi'i Islam does not provide a sufficient basis for the clergy to assume and theorize state power. He stated that those who come to terms with a secular state would still like to extend their domination and require the state to get permission from the *ulamā*. He then agitatedly asked: "if you have claims over the ruling of affairs, why do you not rise up and take charge yourself?"[216]

Concurrent with Ahmad Kasravi (1890–1946), Ali Akbar Hakamizādeh, another secular writer, attacked the clerical authority with the same line of questioning. In *Asrār-e Hezār Saleh* he too made a case for the insufficiency of Shi'i theological doctrine to have a plan for state affairs.[217] Both Hakamizādeh's and Kasravi's aggressive tone towards the clerical apparatus must be read as a discursive regime produced by *raison d'Etat* in the face of troublesome pastoral power. Here one identifies a clash of two opposing arts of government, one operating as counter-conduct towards the other by posing the question: "how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them."[218]

Members of the clergy did not sit still. They fired back, the long-term effect of which was theorizing the modern Islamic state. The theorization, however, was gradual. One of the early respondents to Kasravi's "blasphemous" remarks was Ayatollāh Sayyid Noureddin Shirāzi

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[215] Ahmad Kasravi "Shi'e-gari," in Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period,* vol. 1 (Tehran: Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 285.
[216] Ibid., 288.
[217] Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period,* vol.1 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 213.
[218] Carl Death, "Counter-conducts: A Foucauldian Analytics of Protest," *Social Movement Studies,* 9, No. 3, (August 2010): 235-251.

(1895–1933), a renowned clergy from Shiraz who took Kasravi to task in series of essays published in a Keyhān newspaper. In a respectful yet at times slightly condescending tone, Shirāzi refuted Kasravi's claims. He boldly relied on the classic Usuli concept of *ijtihad* to make a case for the resiliency of Shi'i jurisprudence in relation to the question of state power.[219] He wrote: "governance of the Imam and *faqih* are transformable and changeable (*ghābel-e tabaddol va tatavvor*) in each period according to certain fundamentals."[220] He acknowledged that from a pastoral perspective, the constitutionalist state has certain flaws but stressed that "we should not call the state usurper" or illegitimate. According to Shirāzi, in contrast to Christian laws, *shari'a* and *fiqh* could provide the basis for political and civil laws.[221] He then adopted an anti-despotic stance and made a case for the compatibility between Islam and democracy. With full confidence he asserted that early Muslim politics was an example of democratic governance: "I invite historians to show me examples from Rome and Greece that had supposedly democratic and national (*melli*) governments and have them compared with the caliphate after the Prophet."[222] Shirāzi ensured his readers that Islam had a much more effective system of democratic rule: "After the decline of democracy in Greece and Rome, European democracy was deduced from Islam."[223] In order to make his case, Shriāzi treated the Rāshidun political experience with regard, yet he appeased his Shi'i readers and demonstrated that the justice-oriented policies of Imam Ali's rule were an example of a democratic government. He then relied on the egalitarian ethos of governance in *Tribe-form* and provided a model for a Shi'i government in which freedom of minorities, women, the press, and commerce would be protected.[224] Similar to those

[219] Noureddin Shirāzi, "Shekast-e Kasravi," in Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period, vol. 1* (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 113.
[220] Ibid., 64.
[221] Ibid., 49.
[222] Ibid., 137, 161.
[223] Ibid., 194.
[224] Ibid., 158.

in the Abbāsid period who invoked Rāshidun's model to critique the Umayyad's, Shirāzi highlighted non-authoritarian aspects of the *Tribe-form* and read them in resonance with *raison d'Etat.* If *raison d'Etat* was a critique of an excessive form of sovereignty, invoking the Tribe/State form dichotomy in the classic history of Islam allowed Shirazi to make a case for the democratic qualities of Islamic governance.

This reading of the *Tribe-form* of the Prophet in resonance with *raison d'Etat* had precedent in works attempting to forge a theory for a viable Shi'i democratic government. Mohammad Hossein Nāi'ni (1860–1936) and Asadollāh Kharaghāni (1838–1936) were among the first who employed this discursive strategy to provide a non-authoritarian reading of Islamic political rule. Nāi'ni argued that there are two systems of political government: despotic and constitutional. In the former "the foundation of the government [tyranny] is absolute power, possession of the nation, inequality of the citizens with the government, and irresponsibility of the leaders," and in the latter government is "based on partnership, liberty, and rights including the right to financial accountability and supervision of administrators."[225] According to Nāi'ni the principles of the second form of government were taught and practiced by the "founder of the religion," and as long as those principles were protected "Islamic government did not degenerate from the second to the first form." During the expansion of Islam and particularly Mu'āwiya (AD 602 – AD 680) rule, however, according to Nāi'ni, "all principles and corollaries of Islamic government were transformed into their diametrical opposites," and the constitutionalist government of Islam was replaced by an autocratic rule.[226] Nāi'ni too was adamant that positive attributes of constitutionalist government were in fact extracted from Islamic tradition. Nāi'ni

[225] Muhammad Hossein Nāi'ni, "Government in the Islamic Perspective," in *Modernist Islam,* ed. Charles Kurzman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 121.
[226] Ibid.

took for instance the notion of equality in the Western political tradition and argued that if one studies the teachings of the Prophet, one "recognizes the equality of a nation's people with their leader in all laws and obligations and the great efforts of the Prophet … to establish this principle, thus guaranteeing the well-being of the *umma*."[227] Kharaghāni also held similar convictions that the era of Rāshidun's caliphs embodied the canon pertaining to a national-democratic government. With this stance, Kharaghāni asked his audience, particularly the elite, "to stop imitating the west and return to the model of Islam in governance because then the realization would be possible that democracies of all nations were elucidated from the teachings of Islam."[228]

Viewing the first forty years of Islamic political governance as the embodiment of democratic rule, as Nāi'ni and Kharaghāni had, certainly informed Shirazi's comfortable attempt at reconciling Islam and *raison'd'Etat*. Throughout his writing, however, Shirazi did not use the concept *hukumat-e Islami*, and while he defended *fuqaha*'s intervention (*madkhaliyat*) in the political arena, he assured his readers that he did not put forward the proposition that a *faqih* must become the ruler.

In *Kashful-Asrār*, Ayatollāh Khomeini adopted a similar stance and refuted the charge of authoritarianism of the *fuqaha.* He stated explicitly: "We do not say that the Shah must be a faqih or be fully instructed on religious knowledge. The Shah must have a military background, but he must not transgress from *fiqh*, which is the official law of the country."[229] *Kashful-Asrār* was the most influential polemical response to criticisms put forward by Kasravi and Hakamizādeh and

[227] Ibid., 123.
[228] Rasul Jafariyan, *Asadollāh Kharaghāni* (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2003), 153.
[229] Rohullāh Khomeini, "Kashful-Asrār," in Rasul Jafariyān, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period* vol. 1 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 22.

had a similar agenda to that of Shirāzi. Here, Khomeini employed and defined the concept *hukumat-e Islami*: a state that is governed not by man-made or European laws, but by the laws of God.[230] He stated: "any law that opposes shari'a loses its lawfulness."[231] Khomeini assumed the role of supervision for the *fuqaha* in state affairs and made it very clear that religious institutions do not reject state sovereignty. He refuted the popular opinion that Shi'ism confronts state power with hostility and stated that Usuli pastoralists have never questioned the concept *saltanat.*[232] In fact, he argued great Shi'i ulamās supported states even if states treated them unfairly: "mujtahids have never opposed states and Muslim independent sovereignty[;] even if they realize that [a] state's laws [oppose] God's laws and [the] state is [a] usurper, they still thought [the] presence of state is better than its absence."[233]

At this particular moment, one begins to see that the hostility and suspicion towards state power begins to fade among Shi'i pastoralists. The state itself is no longer under scrutiny. Rather, the ideology and laws attached to the state became the areas of inquiry of the *fuqaha.* If the Usuli authoritarian inclination had gone far in levelling the status of a *faqih* with that of the Shah in the nineteenth century, in the following century *fiqh* was to be viewed as the basis for *raison d'Etat.* Here, according to Foucault, politics "becomes something that has lost its negative connotation. It has become a domain, a set of objectives, a type of organization of power, it is drawn from Holy Scripture which means that reconciliation with the religious pastoral … has been established."[234] This moment of "reconciliation" is very pertinent as it brings together two opposing arts of government: pastoral and *raison d'Etat*. Pastoral power ceases its opposition to

[230] Ibid., 68.
[231] Ibid., 247.
[232] Ibid., 248.
[233] Ibid., 239.
[234] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 247.

the state and in exchange justifies its lawful presence in it.

One has to note that the position adopted by Shirāzi and Khomeini in relation to state power was not the dominant perspective held by the traditionalist Shi'i pastoralists.[235] In fact, between the secular advocates of *raison d'Etat* and the pastoral art of government, these authors assumed a middle position. This "middle" ground was the solidification of a new critique or the birth of a new art of government that operated as a counter-conduct to the triangle of traditionalist pastoralists, secular constitutionalists, and the Shah's despotism.

Inconveniently, almost forty years prior to Khomeini's *Kashful-Asrār*, an influential person in forging this new "critique" was an Armenian minister of Naser al-Dīn Shāh (1831–1896), Malkum Khān. Inspired by Ottoman *Tanzimāt* movements, in the late nineteenth century Malkum proposed and initiated a bundle of reforms within the governmental apparatus. He was also first to call for *qanun* as a name for laws of reform "to differentiate them from both the shari'a and the existing state regulations (urf)."[236] The concept, however, was attacked as a "heretical innovation," but unlike Kasravi he did not go on the offensive. In his writings he sided with the *ulamā* and accused the ministers of blaming the *ulamā* for Iran's lack of progress.[237] Malkum had realized that the best strategy was to propose "the introduction of modern concepts in terms palatable to conventional Islam"; this is a conclusion that marks a paradoxical feature of the modern Iranian state at its moment of birth.[238] Given the cultural influence of the clergy on

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[235] What confirms this assertion is the controversy around the publication of *Shahid-e Jāvid* in which Imām Hussain had being framed as a holy figure pursuing an Islamic state. Traditionalists denounced the content of the book and deemed it blasphemous.

[236] Mansoor Moaddel, *Islamic Modernism and Fundamentalism: Episodes and Discourses* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 183.

[237] Malkum writes: "poor mujtahids, please do not accuse them. If there is one class [that] understands the meaning of European order, that is the class of mujtahids… the order of state (*intizām-e dowlat*) does not oppose shari'a." See Mirzā Malkum Khān, "Ketābche-ye Gheibi" [The Book of Unseen], in Majmoo'e Āsār-e Mirzā Malkum Khān [Collection of Mirzā Malkum Khān's Writings], edt. Mohammad Mohit Tabātabāyee (Enteshārāt-e 'Elmi, year unknown).

[238] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 67.

the masses, *raison d'Etat* needed the support of the pastoralists; hence it was willing to provide concessions to religious discourse. This implies that the birth of Iranian *raison d'Etat* did not take place entirely outside of religious discourse, and the close cooperation between Malkum and Al-Afghāni further testifies to this fact.

If Malkum's appeasement of the *ulamā* was for pragmatic reasons, for Al-Afghāni it was an effort to revive some form of Islamic civilization that harmonizes religious knowledge and modern science. Al-Afghāni was an anti-imperialist activist and played an active role in the tobacco crisis, encouraging the *ulamā* to engage in the battle against the Shah. However, what distinguishes Afghāni from traditional *ulamā* is that his concern was not just maintaining the *shari'a*. He had a civilizational project in mind and that positioned him in the middle ground between traditional *ulamā* and secular intellectuals. "To the former, he advocated a crusade against the heathen West. To the latter, he emphasized ... reforms, [e]specially political and educational reforms [that] would strengthen the country against the imperialist West."[239] Simply put, with Al-Afghāni one sees the early attempt at "reconciliation" between Islamic pastoralism and modern *raison d'Etat*—a "reconciling" discourse that was rejected by both constitutional secularists and traditional pastoralists. Lamenting the rise of this new discourse Kasravi wrote: "[The traditionalists who have become] modernized have attempted to make constitutionalism compatible with Shi'ism (*shi'e-gari*). [They even ask,] was not Imām Hussain killed for justice? ... Many of these people in fact got government jobs."[240]

This emerging discourse which maintained a middle ground between secularists and traditionalists and sought to reconcile the hostility between the pastoral and *raison d'Etat* may be

[239] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 64.
[240] Kasravi, *Shi'e-gari*, 284.

called *Islamism*. The Islamist discourse operated as a counter-conduct to the secular constitutionalist, pastoral Usuli, and despotic sovereignty, and its project consisted of "giving birth to a new social order and creating a new man."[241] Islamism, here, to borrow from Foucault, "appears and functions internally as a sort of different pastorate, a different governmentality with its chiefs, its rules and its principle of obedience, and to that extent it possesses ... a different form of conduct, and to channel revolts of conduct" in order to create a "counter-society."[242] Islamism sought to be led "differently" than those societies proposed by old pastoralists and new secularists.

To be sure, Shirāzi and Khomeini were not Islamists in the strict sense of the term. They were Usulists that adopted an Islamist discourse in order to gather Islamists' support. This Usulist-Islamist or Islamist-Usuli discourse was even more solidified later on and facilitated Usuli-Islamist relations and helped to resolve conflicts between these discourses. From both Shirāzi's and Khomeini's writings at this point, however, one may infer that neither called for sovereignty of the *faqih*, and their theorization was limited to a pastoral-*raison d'Etat* modality. The reason perhaps being that sovereignty as an art of government had not yet being materialized and various autonomous rules were still in place, and a centralized state with full command over a territory was not yet existent. In other words, Iranian *raison d'Etat* was deployed on a non-effective sovereignty. As Foucault mentions, "sovereignty is absolutely not eliminated by the emergence of [*raison d'Etat* as] a new art of government that has crossed the threshold of political science. The problem of sovereignty is not eliminated, on the contrary, it is made more acute than ever."[243] This was in the context where the rift between *raison d'Etat* and the pastoral

[241] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 119.
[242] Ibid., 199.
[243] Ibid., 107.

art of government had led to internal anarchy and outside intervention, making the status of sovereignty even more troublesome than before. *Farangistān*, a secular publication, had "proclaimed that Iran had freed itself from royal despotism but now needed a 'revolutionary dictator,' who would forcibly liberate the ignorant masses from the clutches of the superstitious clergy."[244] It also stated:

> In a country where 99 percent of the population is under the sway of reactionary mullahs, our only hope is a Mussolini who can break the influence of the traditional authorities, and thus create a modern outlook, a modern people, and a modern nation.[245]

These assertions meant a cry for the rise of an authoritarian king to bring about sovereignty on behalf of *raison d'Etat* for *raison d'Etat.* This also meant that the hostility between pastoral and *raison d'Etat* forces continued. Constitutionalists maintained a secular momentum; this time they attacked despotism and the religious forces. In *Iranshahr*, a journal which reflected the parliamentary majority, an editorial advocated republicanism in order to destroy "royal and clerical despotism." These attacks only infuriated the traditional forces and forced a religious leader to declare that "an attack on the monarchy was an attack on the holy sharia." Supporters of pastoral authority shouted: "we want to keep the religion of our fathers, we don't want a republic. We are the people of Koran, we don't want a republic."[246]

Counterdemonstrations took place, but they were small in number, helping Reza Pahlavi (1878–1944) to realize that only an alliance with religious forces would bring him to power, and once he achieved power he advocated policies to appease the traditional *ulamā*, at least in the beginning of his reign.[247] Under Reza Shah, "for the first time since the Safavids, the state was

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[244] Abrahamian*, Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 124.
[245] M. Kazemi, "What Do We Want?" and "The Iranian Press," *Farngestan*, 1 (May, Agust 1924), quoted in Abrahamian*, Iran Between Two Revolutions,* 124.
[246] Ibid., 134.
[247] Nikki Keddi, *Roots of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 91.

able to control society through extensive instruments of administration, regulation and domination."[248] Reza Shah abolished various autonomous tribal powers and ensured their "permanent subjection by extending army outposts into their regions, disarming their warriors, conscripting their youth, stirring up their internal conflicts, confiscating their lands, undermining their chiefs … and at times, forcing them into model villages."[249] There was a call to end of the "war of races," as "State Racism," in the name of the defense of nationalism, and here the notion of the Aryan race emerged.[250] Reza Shah was partly successful in executing police by building railways, school systems, and a professional middle class. But he failed at meeting the objective of governmentality, that is, "managing the population." Many intellectuals and political activists were murdered and only "official nationalism" could be disseminated.[251] Reza Shah dismantled the independent press and trade unions, and soon "set up a Society of Public Guidance, modeled after propaganda machines in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, to install national consciousness into the population."[252]

What Reza Shah had in mind was combining sovereignty and *raison d'Etat* in the majesty of the king. Ultimately Reza Shah was able to command election results to his favour, but he failed in his goal of affecting the "consciousness of people not just to impose some true or false beliefs on them, but in such a way that their opinion is modified, their way of doing things, their way of acting, their behavior as economic subjects and as political subjects."[253]

Reza Shah lost the support of both religious and secular middle class to the extent that a British minister had warned the foreign office in May 1941 that "The Shah is the object of

[248] Abrahamian*, Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 136.
[249] Ibid., 141.
[250] Ibid., 143.
[251] Keddi, *Roots of Revolution,* 94.
[252] Abrahamian*, Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 143.
[253] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 275.

almost universal execration… Movement for the removal of the Shah or even his dynasty would be popular. Most people in Iran would welcome a revolution, however caused."[254] Upon the removal of the Shah it was unclear as to how forces of sovereignty, *raison d'Etat*, mercantilism, and the clergy were to create a stable assemblage. After all, Reza Shah had solved the crisis of *raison d'Etat* by creating sovereignty over territory, and that is why a constitutionalist as radical as Kasravi maintained some approval for his rule. Abrahamian describes Kasravi's stance:

> [Kasravi] gave the fallen monarch high marks for centralizing the state, pacifying the tribes, disciplining the clergy, unveiling women, eliminating aristocratic titles, introducing mass conscription, undermining feudal authorities, trying to unify the population and establishing modern schools, cities and industries. At the same time, he gave the fallen Shah low marks for trampling over the constitution, favoring the military over the civilian administration, accumulating a private fortune stealing other people's property, murdering progressive intellectuals and widening the gap between the haves and have-nots.[255]

The Shah's removal from power, not by revolution but by Western intervention, brought about the age of sovereignty-*raison d'Etat* rivalry. In the beginning, the new king, Mohammad Reza Shah (1919–1980), "took this oath of office before the deputies reintroduced parliamentary immunity for the deputies" and "invited the parliament to participate again in the process of forming cabinet."[256] But soon the Shah "had bitterly complained of a lack of authority in the constitution and had expressed the immediate fear that he would very soon be at the 'mercy of the deputies.'"[257] Mosaddegh, who later became the embodiment of Iranian *raison d'Etat*, drawing on the history of Constitutional Revolution in the 14th Majlis, said:

> The Shah has no right to interfere in national politics because, according to the Fundamental Laws, the ministers, not he, are responsible to the parliament. If he interferes, he can be held responsible. If he is responsible, then many of us deputies will

[254] Foreign Office, "The Situation in Iran," F.O.371/Persia 1941/34-27153, quoted in Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 164.
[255] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 154.
[256] Ibid., 177
[257] Ibid., 295

conclude that Shahs can be dismissed in the same way a minister can be replaced.[258] After a series of rivalries with Iranian prime ministers, such as Sayyid Ziā'eddin Tabātabāee (1889–1969), Ebrāhim Hakimi (1871–1959), and Ahmad Qavam, also known as Qavam al-Saltaneh (1873–1955), by the time the sixteenth parliament was taking shape the Shah eventually reclaimed his father's unquestionable power. The constitution had been modified to increase his power; the armed forces were now subservient to him, and much of the electoral machine was at his service.[259] Mosaddegh along with his supporters took to the streets to demand free elections. This protest was headed by a committee that later became the nucleus of Mosaddegh's National Front.[260] A pro-National Front publication wrote an article entitled "The Nation Must Rule, The Shah Must Reign," and argued that "the concentration of power in kings created a weak society and a corrupt populace."[261] In other words, asserting sovereignty and *raison d'Etat* from a singular source of power was problematic.[262] According to Foucault, when the statement, "the king reigns, but he does not govern," is seen in political manifestos, this is an indication that "government is basically much more than sovereignty, much more than reigning or ruling, much more than the *imperium*… So there is the emergence of … population, with the mass of juridical, political and technical problems that it gave rise to."[263]

One of the movements that concerned itself with the "technical problems" of the population from an Islamic perspective was *Fadā'iyān-e Islam.* Headed by a young and charismatic activist named Navvāb Safavi, Fadā'iyān was the first wave of Islamism in practice as they moved away from critical abstract religious theorizations and entered politics in action.

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[258] *Parlimentary Proceedings*, 14th Majles, 3-22 October, 1944, quoted in Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 209
[259] Ibid., 251
[260] Ibid., 252
[261] Ibid., 253
[262] Ibid., 253.
[263] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 76.

Navvāb associates assassinated the famous Kasravi; they later made an alliance with Ayatollāh Kāshāni (1882–1962), and by assassinating Prime Minister Razmārā (1901–1951) for allegedly being a "British stooge," they facilitated Mosaddegh's premiership. As an Islamist movement, they were not able to gather the support of the Usuli apparatus headed by Ayatollāh Boroūjerdi (1875–1961). In fact, there was great animosity between Islamists and Usulis at this time. Navvāb Safavi (1924–1956) made contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and as heir to Al-Afghāni's project promoted pan-Islamist and Muslim unity propaganda.[264] Although Fadā'iyān's fame is mostly associated with their assassinations and guerrilla politics, their fundamental project has yet to be thoroughly analyzed in relation to the arts of government they proposed.[265]

Fadā'iyān put forward their version of *hukumat-e Islami*, but they neither referenced *fuqaha*'s supervision nor called for a *faqih* to become the sovereign. For them, *hukumat-e Islami* embodied a utopian society devoid of contemporary predicaments. In their "counter-conduct" they offered an extensive moral critique of an emerging modern society. Sexual indecency, consumption of alcohol and drugs, social problems concerning gambling, unemployment, prostitution, and erotic cultural products, such as music, films, and novels, were the main themes of their critique.[266] For them an Islamic society is that in which such problems are non-existent and "cities are prosperous and water is abundant ... hatred is removed from the social scene … no

[264] See Rasul Jafariyan, *Religio-Political Currents and Organizations in Iran,* 190-231.
[265] For instance, see Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (University of Texas Press, 1982), 93-94. Describing Fadā'iyān (the Devotees), Enayat writes: "they never became a mass movement, always remaining a coterie of zealots dedicated to violent pursuance of their aims… [and they did not have any] contribution to religious and political debate… The Devotees have always been non-intellectual in every sense of the term." Hence, an imminent scholar such as Enayat seems to have underestimated Fadā'iyān's intellectual activities while *Rāhnamāy-e Haghāyegh* may not be easily downgraded intellectually as it contains considerable discussions and solutions pertaining to the problems of the day.
[266] Navvāb Safavi "Rāhnamāy-e Haghāyegh." in Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period,* vol. 1 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 352-370.

innocent person is in prison, votes are not bought ... and no one practices usury, no one insults sacred elements of Islam and hearts are full of love."[267]

Foucault considers elements concerning "public good" and the "goodness of life" under a category of an art of government that involves disciplinary mechanisms. According to Foucault this art of government, that he sees as synonymous with police, concerns "religion, morals, health and subsistence, public peace, the care of buildings … commerce, manufacture and the mechanical arts, servants and laborers, the theater and games, and finally the care and discipline of the poor."[268] Foucault stresses that "police must succeed in linking together the state's strength and individual felicity. This felicity … must in some way be drawn on and constituted into state utility, making men's happiness the state utility, making … [that] the very strength of the state."[269]

In their manifesto, Fadā'iyān stated that in an ideal Islamic state people would not consider the state their enemy. "They would look at the state as a true father … and children love their Muslim father and perform their due towards the state. The state supports the nation and the children as the arm of the state expresses obedience to the state."[270] Hence, through the father-children metaphor Islamist Fadā'iyān proposed a model in which individual felicity and state strength would be linked. For Fadā'iyān implementation of the *shari'a* was not the only concern. They, in fact, thought in terms of the modern state and had detailed proposals for various governmental apparatuses.[271] Fadā'iyān's grand project was the embodiment of what Roy describes as Islamism's main agenda: to offer "Sharia plus electricity." They for instance

[267] Ibid., 424-425.
[268] Foucault, *Security Territory Population*, 334.
[269] Ibid., 327.
[270] Navvāb, "Rāhnamāy-e Haghāyegh," 340.
[271] Sohrab Behdad, "Utopia of Assassins: Navvab Safavi and the Fada'ian-e Eslam in Prerevolutionary Iran," in *Iran Between Tradition and Modernity*. Edited by Ramin Jahanbegloo (Lanham: Lexignston Books, 2004), 81.

proposed that the state should provide telephone lines throughout the country, open up sexual health centres and orphan houses, build good roads and hospitals, maintain the statistical data of the population, increase public trust, and improve the status of morality and culture in the country.[272]

In their manifesto Fadā'iyān did not offer complex theological justifications for their cause, nor did they make reference to the golden Islamic past. They also did not concern themselves with questions concerning political freedom, parliament, constitutionalism, Islamic democracy, and so on. They confronted the reality and the problems of the modern state at the time and proposed their version of the Islamic state as a solution. In a Foucauldian sense, they lamented the lack of a "disciplinary society," and they viewed Islam as a source through which discipline could be enacted within the modern social arena. With Fadā'iyān one begins to see how "police" as a modern art of government adopts an Islamist discourse, and here Islamism gradually turned into a social critique while providing the impression that "Islam is the solution," a slogan famously held by Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) in Egypt, whose organization certainly influenced Navvāb Safavi. Navvāb's followers later on formed the influential bazaar-based political party He'yat-Mo'talef-ye Eslāmi and became integral supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini throughout the Revolution.[273]

Despite the fact that Mosaddegh owed his premiership partly to the Fadā'iyān's terrorist activities, eventually Navvāb-Mosaddegh relations soured. Mosaddegh had stated that "I am

[272] Ibid., 415, 387, 387, 386, 391, 377, 358. Regarding sexual health the pamphlet states: "Women with sexual diseases must be taken to special hospitals for treatment and later they must either be married or should be hired in factories and governmental offices suitable for women."
[273] Sohrab Behdad, "Utopia of Assassins,"86.

neither an advocate of *hukumat-e Islami* nor [do] I want to remain in charge permanently. Please give me space so I can resolve the oil issue."[274] Through mass support, part of which was instigated by the Tudeh, the Marxist-leaning party of Iran founded in 1941, Mosaddegh challenged the Shah's authority on various grounds. In a situation where the Shah's refused to accept Mossadegh's proposed war minister, he stated the following in his resignation:

> I have come to the realization that I need a trustworthy war minister to continue my national mission. Since His Majesty has refused my request, I will resign and permit someone who enjoys royal confidence to form a new government and implement His Majesty's policies. In the present situation, the struggle started by the Iranian people cannot be brought to a victorious conclusion.[275]

Evident in these lines is the clash between sovereignty and *raison d'Etat.* Here one locates the outcry of *raison d'Etat* for excessive presence of sovereignty in governmental affairs, which according to Foucault is "harmful and contradictory."[276] Mosaddegh was eventually able to limit the Shah's power and he introduced a series of reforms and built a state according to rules of *raison d'Etat*. "To govern according to the principles of *raison d'Etat* is to arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent, so that it becomes wealthy and so that it becomes strong in the face of everything that may destroy it."[277]

While implementing his reforms, however, once again the clash between *raison d'Etat* and the pastorate manifested itself in the political scene. With the legalization of alcohol, the introduction of female suffrage, and his refusal to share power with the religious front, Mosaddegh lost the pastorate base, making his government vulnerable enough for the Shah to remove him from office. Conflict with the pastorate was not Mosaddegh's only flaw. He

[274] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 313.
[275] Mossadeq, "Public Letters of Resignation," *Itila'at*, 17 July 1952, quoted in Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions,* 271.
[276] Foucault, *Security Territory Population*, 334.
[277] Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 4.

stabbed his Tudeh supporters in the back by siding with the United States to wipe them off the streets only to be caught by surprise that a US-supported coup d'état had long been in the works. Mosaddegh, the embodiment of *raison d'Etat*, was removed from office, the influence of the national Front and the Tudeh was dismantled, and the sovereign "could feel confident that it had eliminated the organization, if not the appeal, of both the Tudeh and the National Front. Muhammad Reza Shah, like his father, Reza Shah, could now rule without an organized opposition."[278] According to Foucault, "*coup d'Etat* is the state acting of itself on itself, swiftly, immediately, without rule, with urgency and necessity, and dramatically," and is a "particular way for the sovereign to demonstrate in the most striking way possible the irruption of *raison d'Etat* and its prevalence over legitimacy."[279]

Events leading to the toppling of Mosaddegh are indicative of what may be called a clash of governmentalities. Various arts of government—sovereignty, the pastorate, and *raison d'Etat*—came into conflict and, at times, temporary alliance, but were not able to forge an equilibrium of power within the nation-state paradigm. *Raison d'Etat* had not yet fully absorbed pastoral qualities and sovereignty, and *raison d'Etat* had not yet come to an agreement on their provisions. These clashes of arts of government put the state in a constant state of crisis, the implication of which was political unrest and opposition on the one hand and the authoritarianism of the Shah on the other.

One must note that the most assertive counter-conduct towards the autocracy of the Shah was put forward not by Islamists but by the Marxist Tudeh party, at least until late 1960s. Tudeh counter-conduct, however, must not be seen outside the grid of *raison d'Etat.* What one sees as the dominant theme in leftist and socialist-leaning publications such as *Iran-i-Now* and *Kāveh* is

[278] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 280.
[279] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 264, 265.

a paradoxical defence of Iranian capitalism against feudalism, or "national independence and internal reforms, especially secular and educational reforms" as opposed to strict communism or allegiance to the USSR.[280] In later Tudeh Party manifestations one reads explicitly:

> Is the Tudeh party communist? Our enemies, especially Sayyid Ziā, smear us with the label to frighten the capitalists and the traders. The Tudeh party is fully committed to the *Fundamental Laws.* Why? Because we believe that communism is an ideology suitable for social conditions that do not exist in Iran. A communist party will not find mass roots in our environment. We know that our immediate task is to unite that majority against the exploiting oligarchy or strengthen the forces of democracy. *We support, therefore, the constitution.*[281]

Despite the material and intellectual support that the Tudeh received from the Soviet Union, Tudeh was never thought of as a mere extended arm of the Soviet Union in Iran.[282] Tudeh appeared impressive in helping the lower middle class with "salary increases," health, union formation, and fighting for better housing conditions. Tudeh gained support among the the middle class, to the surprise of many Western thinkers, mainly because of its focus on modalities of bio-power which according to Foucault are a "set of techniques that ensure that living, doing better than just living, coexisting, and communicating can in act be converted into forces of the state."[283]

A veteran Democrat had once identified the oligarchy as the Tudeh's best friend, meaning that it was the failure of the Shah to attract the middle class that had opened up space for Tudeh influence. Hence, Tudeh or the left in general emerged to link the question of "better living" to a state agenda. Socialism offered "administrative intervention in domains like those of health, social insurance" if properly connected up with other type of forms of governmentality.[284]

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[280] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions,* 104, 112.
[281] "The Tudeh Party and Partisanship in Foreign Policy," Rahbar, 12 Feburary 1943, quoted in Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions,* 285 (Imphasis added).
[282] Ibid., 344.
[283] Ibid., 339, 327.
[284] Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics,* 92.

The left in Iran launched series of counter-conducts against the Shah, but its primary effect was filling up the gap in bio-power that the state had failed to address. The target of the left was those subjects who had identified themselves as citizens of the emerging modern state but saw its operation as defective; that is why Tudeh had little influence in villages and rural areas where the logic of *raison d-Etat* was still foreign.

Upon return of the Shah, Tudeh was crushed, and by the late 1950s "the Shah had consolidated his control over much of the country, especially over the intelligentsia and the urban working class."[285] At this time, various arts of government were uninstalled from Iranian governmentality, and sovereignty was the only visible art of government aiming to compensate for the absence of *raison d'Etat*, police, and the pastorate. This era was concurrent with the demise of Ayatollāh Boroūjerdi and the emergence of Ayatollāh Khomeini on the political scene. Amazed by Fadā'iyān's activism and enjoying the status of a great Ayatollāh, Khomeini avoided complex theological discussions in his public political lectures. Instead, he took the Shah to task for his policies and spoke on topics with mass appeal.[286] The Shah did not tolerate his critical rhetoric and soon exiled Khomeini to Turkey and then Iraq. While away from the country, he maintained his critical confrontation with the state, and in series of lectures later entitled *Velāyat-e Faqih* or *Hukumat-e Islami* he explicitly called for a political revolution and replacing the Shah's monarchy with governance of a *faqih*.

Influenced by the anti-colonial discourse of the time, Khomeini highlighted colonialism and colonial minds as the main adversarial forces. He also took the apolitical *ulamā* to task for only "studying the questions of menstruation and parturition instead of concerning themselves

[285] Ibid., 42.
[286] Hosseinizādeh, *Islam-e Siāsi dar Iran, 164.*

with politics and drawing the conclusion that religion must be separate from politics."[287] According to Khomeini, the "imperialists have propagated among us the view that Islam does not have a specific form of government. They say further that even if Islam does have certain laws, it has no method for enforcing them, so that its function is purely legislative."[288] In *Velāyat-e Faqih*, one identifies a clear transition from viewing the pastorate in constitutional or legislative paradigms to that of executive and sovereignty. Against the tradition of previous Usulis such as Nai'ni that sought to reconcile the pastorate with *raison d'Etat*, Khomeini asked, "What connections do all various articles of the Constitution, as well as the body of Supplementary Law concerning the monarchy … have with Islam? They are all opposed to Islam; they violate the system of government and the laws of Islam."[289] If in *Kashful-Asrār* Khomeini assured his audience that *fuqaha* do not reject saltanat, and that they only seek supervision over state affairs, in *Velāyat-e-Faqih* Khomeini discarded his previous position and stated that "Islam does not recognize monarchy and hereditary succession: they have no place in Islam."[290] Holding that Islam offers a comprehensive legal system pertaining to state affairs, he contended that "Islamic government is the government of law."[291] The execution and implementation of these laws then, he argued, "depend upon the formation of a government, and that is impossible to fulfill … without there being established properly comprehensive administrative and executive organs."[292] Through theological discussions he concluded that *fuqaha* are entitled to "supervise all executive and administrative affairs of the country, together with all planning" and that the "true rulers are the *fuqaha* themselves, and rulership ought

[287] Imām Ruhullāh Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writing and Declarations of Imām Khomeini,* translated and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizān Press, 1981), 128.
[288] Ibid., 36.
[289] Ibid., 31.
[290] Ibid., 31.
[291] Ibid., 56.
[292] Ibid., 44.

officially to be theirs."[293] After having made his case for the rulership of a *faqih*, Khomeini invited his audience to "work toward the establishment of an Islamic government."[294]

Although Khomeini stressed that sovereignty belongs only to God, by virtue of having a *faqih* in charge of the execution of laws, he proposed the sovereignty of the *faqih* as an alternative to monarchical sovereignty. What is pertinent about Khomeini's discourse is that he took territorial sovereignty and the centralized modern state for granted when advancing his case. In other words, his development of the concept *velāyat-e-faqih* was particular to the post-Reza Shah period in which various autonomous claims to power had being suppressed and the state had claimed sovereignty over Iranian territory. It is in this context that Khomeini was hopeful that a planning body would draw "up programs for the different ministries in the light of the ordinance of Islam and thereby determine how public services are to be provided across the country."[295] Although Khomeini had the long authoritarian Usuli tradition at his disposal, transformations of the art of government, and sovereignty in particular, were extremely influential in his ability to stretch Shi'i imagination of political power. While the first Pahlavi, in a sense, procured state sovereignty, the second Pahlavi, particularly at the time that Khomeini was writing *Velāyat-e-Faqih*, practiced a form of sovereignty that was to take all state affairs into the hands of the Shah. In the face of various opposition movements, Mohammad Reza Shah was not only to "reign," he was to "rule," and this modality of sovereignty had an impact on the way Khomeini theorized *velāyat-e-faqih*. In other words, *velāyat-e-faqih* was the mirror of a ruling sovereign that had annulled the parliament and set out to take state affairs into his own hands. Hence, Khomeini's *Velāyat-e-Faqih* must be seen not as a "reconciliation" of the pastorate with

[293] Ibid., 79, 60.
[294] Ibid., 126.
[295] Ibid., 56.

sovereignty, but rather as a pastorate imagining itself in terms of sovereignty at a time when the Shah was a target of various forces of opposition and the ethos of constitutionalism was relatively weak. In short, both the centralized modern state created by Reza Shah and the autocratic and executive nature of sovereignty with little trust in the *raison d'Etat* during the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah prompted Khomeini to imagine sovereignty in pastoral and executive terms.

The Shah had also assumed a moral quality for his rule and used that to justify the sovereign's intervention in various fields.[296] For Mohammad Reza Shah, *raison d'Etat* was not an exclusive art of government. Rather, it operated as an extension of sovereignty. "The Shah used the military, bureaucracy, and court patronage to back the cabinet and parliament with his own placeman. He amended the constitution, giving himself the authority to appoint prime ministers."[297] He also announced that "he would preside over weekly cabinet meetings."[298] In order to assert sovereignty's control over the population, the Shah initiated a series of liberal reforms known as the White Revolution. He also annulled existing *Mardom* and *Iran-e Novin* parties, and at the suggestion of returning PhD graduates from United States he formed the Resurgent (*Rastākhiz)* Party.[299] These initiatives "were not so much [about] the growth of the state and of *raison d'Etat*, but much more its reduction, and in two forms. One … the reduction of state governmentality through the growth of party governmentality, and … [two] liberal governmentality."[300] This "reduction" of the state was designed to better centralize the nation-state, contain the opposition, assert techniques of bio-power, and consequently better "manage

[296] Ruhullah K. Ramezani, "Iran's 'White Revolution': a Study in Political Development," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 5, no. 02 (1974):124-139.
[297] Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 128.
[298] Ibid.
[299] Ibid., 149.
[300] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 191.

the population."

While the initiatives appeared promising on some levels, overall, they produced negative results. "Instead of bringing stability …[they] weakened the regime, cut the monarchy further off from the country, and thereby added to public resentment."[301] The White Revolution that aimed at incorporating the peasantry and the middle class into the state project not only further excluded the lower middle class from governmental control, it also lowered the status of sovereignty from the perspective of the bourgeoisie. The middle class saw the White Revolution as a "bribery of intellectuals" and felt that "not only do policies of personal political co-optation provide only the most minimal and fragile absorptive capacity but also the co-optation is based on personal loyalty and connections rather than on skill and achievements."[302] In other words, subjects' allegiance to sovereignty and the attempt of the sovereign to influence their lives directly was the process through which political advancement and stability under the Shah's regime could have taken place. Through the one-party system, the Shah meddled directly in economic affairs, aiming to redirect financial currents and change the behaviour of the market. In cultural affairs, through his wife's various charity activities, the Shah took similar measures, and his interventionist policies soon antagonized the public on various grounds, particularly the new religious middle class. Eventually the Shah's attempt to introduce liberal governmentality through party governmentality amounted to a failure of the state because the Shah had not realized that "the relation between the population and sovereign cannot simply be one of obedience or the refusal of obedience… If one says to a population 'do this,' there not only is no

[301] Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran,* 153.
[302] James A. Bill, "Modernization and Reform From Above: The Case of Iran," *The Journal of Politics* 32, no. 1 (1970), 37.

guarantee that it will do it, but also there is quite simply no guarantee that it can do it."[303] Absence of autonomous *raison d'Etat* and top-down liberalism simply meant that "if we restrict ourselves to the sovereign-subject relationship, the limit of the law is the subject's disobedience; [then] it is the 'no' with which the subject opposes the sovereign."[304]

In fact, in a famous essay Ali Shariati (1933–1977), the intellectual father of the Revolution, introduced Islam as "a religion which made its appearance in the history of mankind with the cry of 'No!' [a 'No!' to] … aristocracy and compromise."[305] Shariati's "No" embodied a stanch counter-conduct expressed in Islamist terms to the Shah's sovereignty. Abrahamian is correct to assert that "The White Revolution had been designed to preempt a Red Revolution. Instead, it paved the way for an Islamic Revolution."[306] Islamism, however, was not the only oppositional discourse confronting the Shah's autocracy; the clergy, the nationalists, and the left had long opposed the Shah on various grounds. Nonetheless, during the era between the coup d'état (1953) and the Islamic Revolution (1979) Islamism underwent an evolution with heavy reliance on signifiers from other oppositional discourses, making itself more assertive than before. If the clerical pastorate, the constitutionalist advocates of *raison d'Etat*, and the Tudeh were the main exclusive oppositional currents to the Shah, currents with considerable tensions between them, Islamism had incorporated concepts and qualities from each of these discourses. In many instances, Islamism had also resolved the existing conflicts between the left and the religious forces, the nationalists and the left, and nationalists and the clergy. With Islamism, factors separating the religious from the secular, "traditional bazzaris from modern education

[303] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 71.
[304] Ibid.
[305] Ali Shariati, Red Shi'ism, accessed September, 1, 2018, http://www.shariati.com/english/redblack.html.
[306] Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran,* 140.

professionals, conservative anti-regime clerics from forward-looking radical intellectuals, and the religious establishment in Qum from the patriotic intelligentsia of the National Front" had come to an end, and an anti-Shah discourse was formed that was incomparable in terms of strength and political energy with other oppositional discourses of the time.[307]

Elements belonging to the secular constitutionalist and religious base had already come together in the National Front. Among National Front supporters, figures such as Mehdi Bāzargān (1907–1995) and Mahmoud Tāleqāni later on formed the nationalist religious *Nehzat-e Azādi* movement whose aspirations included both regard for religious values as well as political freedom, Iran's independence, and constitutionalism.[308] Jalāleddin Fārsi, an associate of Nehzat-e Azādi, authored a pamphlet entitled the "Charter of the Islamic Movement" (*Manshoor-e Nehzat-e Islami*) in which he clearly outlined the objectives and action plan for his vision of the Islamic movement. Somewhat more radical than typical *Nehzat Azādi* members, Fārsi was a student of Taghi Shariati (1907–1987) and had travelled to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and translated the memoirs of Hassan al-Bannā, the founder of Islamist Muslim brotherhood in Egypt.[309] He later made a trip to Najaf, met Ayatollāh Khomeini, and played a role in the authorship of *Velāyat-e-Faqih*. A reader of Marxist theory, Fārsi was also influenced by Mosaddegh-Kashani anti-imperialist sentiment and Fadā'iyān's activism.[310] Given his profile, Fārsi's perspective may be identified as emblematic of Islamist discourse before the Islamic Revolution, particularly in the way anti-imperialist, nationalist, constitutionalist, and leftist aspirations came together under the Islamist banner. After its original printing in 1967, the

[307] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions,* 459.
[308] Ibid., 460.
[309] *Hashtādsālegi-e Jalāleddin Fārsi* [Jalāleddin Fārsi's Eighties], accessed September 1, 2018, https://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/333241/weblog/jafariyan.
[310] Ibid.

"Charter of the Islamic Movement" was reprinted in 1969 and 1978.[311] The last print run was undertaken by Abolhassan Banisadr and was published under the title "Action Plan" (*Barnāmeh Amal*).[312] The original incentive behind the publication was to demonstrate that the religious front opposing the Shah was not void of a sophisticated plan of resistance and to position the *ulamā* as progressive national leaders.[313] Unlike Fadā'iyān's fiery and passionate language, the Charter was mindful of both religious and secular audience sensitivities, contained some thoughtful sociological analysis, and demonstrated an understanding of the economic situation of the country with reliable statistics and policy critique.

At the outset, the Charter defined the movement's objective to be "a political revolution in order to establish a national government that respects the rule of law, people governing themselves and sets the provisions and responsibilities of those in executive, legislative and judicial power according to the constitution."[314] Fārsi specifically comments on the root causes of the Islamist movement: "the great Islamic movement is the result of the conflict between the nation and its leaders concerning the contemporary situation, governmentality of those in power and their economic, internal and external policies." Hence, mode of governance (governmentality) (*Āyin-e Keshvardāri-e Hey'at-e Hākemeh*) was the specific target of Fārsi's writing.[315] Islamism's main agenda, according to him, was to rectify the problems of governmentality so that *raison d'Etat* would no longer be instigated by sovereignty.[316] Fārsi

[311] Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period,* vol. 2 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 567.
[312] Ibid., 567.
[313] Ibid., 564.
[314] Jalāleddin Fārsi, "*Manshoore Nehzat-e Islami,*" in Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period,* vol. 1 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 615.
[315] Ibid., 602.
[316] Ibid., 632. In Persian: "*Ghovve ejrāi-ye ghanoonān az changā-le hey'at-e hākemeh biroon āmade va taslim-e mellat khāhad gasht.*"

stressed that one must understand "the Islamic movement as the continuation and complementation of the constitutionalist movement," since the Constitutional Revolution had already defined lawmaking within the constrains of the *shari'a*.[317] Here Fārsi relied on Article Two of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws in which a committee of Shi'i mujtahids were required to supervise legislation and ensure compatibility of laws with religious cannon.[318] Besides having regard for *shari'a* and advocating the establishment of a national and constitutionalist government, Fārsi demanded "free elections" and "freedom of the press."[319] Nationalist and democratic systems were defined as standard political systems that Iran must respect. For Fārsi a "democratic Islamic system" (*nezām-e demokratik-e Islami*) was ideal.[320]

Fārsi critiqued economic policies for widening the gap between rich and poor, and framed the cause of the oppressed and unprivileged and the aim of bringing about social justice as the hallmarks of the Islamist movement.[321] He also offered a series of economic proposals in which the well-being of the peasants and the workers, healthcare, asphalt, water pipelines, and allocating free lands to peasants were considered.[322] He specifically stressed that the military budget must be cut and spent instead on cultural- and health-related programs.

Throughout the piece, Fārsi constantly quoted grand Ayatollāhs such as Khomeini and Milāni (1895–1975), but the quotations only served the agenda of the author in helping him make his case. In other words, Fārsi seems to have his own narrative of the Islamic movement and only brings in perspectives from *ulamā* to attempt to legitimize his discourse among the

[317] Ibid., 575.
[318] Ibid., 616.
[319] Ibid., 617.
[320] Ibid., 589.
[321] Ibid., 611.
[322] Ibid., 613.

more traditional base, and also define a role for the *ulamā* in the movement. After all, bad memories of the rift between the secular and the religious still haunted the religious intelligentsia, and fear of excommunication (*takfir*), particularly on themes advocated under Islamic guise, was always present. On the second page of the Charter he stated that while it is everyone's duty to confront the state apparatus, "this responsibility falls more on the shoulders of *marāje'* and religious ulamā," which hints at Fārsi's pragmatism in prescribing a certain role for the Usuli pastoralists in the Islamist movement.[323] Fārsi also did not define the *ulamā* as the sole leaders of the movement and stressed the importance of collective leadership. However, he stated that *marāje'* have the most important part in the leadership of the movement in "coordinating the struggle" and ensuring that the movement progresses according to Islamic principles.[324]

Towards the end of the Charter, Fārsi adopted a Pan-Islamist tone and spoke of the unity of the Shi'a and Sunni sects in their struggle against imperialism since, according to Fārsi, it is a strategy of imperialism to produce a schism in the Muslim world.[325] Throughout the piece, Fārsi introduced imperialism as the main cause of Muslim predicaments and concluded that liberation movements cannot fight for a nationalist government unless they also confront imperialism. He wrote: "The dominant despotism and internal dictatorship is not only the result of a financial, military and intellectual agreement of the ruling minority, rather, this despotism has external and colonial qualities."[326] In short, for Fārsi, imperialism was responsible for the absence of *raison d'Etat* in Iran and the Muslim world. While the majority of Fārsi's focus is on a religious-minded audience, he did not exclude secular forces. He wrote: "The quick victory of the movement

[323] Ibid., 571.
[324] Ibid., 631.
[325] Ibid., 642.
[326] Ibid., 580.

requires the cooperation and unity of *all*; those who fight for freedom and independence of Iran."[327] He, however, expressed that only unity based on the teachings of Islam could ultimately produce success for the movement.[328]

Though pan-Islamist in inclination, Fārsi did not call for the abolition of the nation-state nor did his ambition for the reign of *shari'a* surpass the Second Article of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws. In other words, Islamism here operated within the nation-state paradigm and only offered solutions to its crisis. Fārsi's Islamism, like other counter-conducts, was "in fact put to work within this genesis of the state, and of the modern state… To that extent, the history of *raison d'Etat* … and the history of the counter-conduct opposed to it, are inseparable from each other."[329]

Even Fārsi's anti-imperialism, as a counter-conduct, was operative at the level of *raison-d E'tat*, and this was in line with the way anti-imperialist discourse was invoked in Iran in the twentieth century. Anti-imperialism was not resistance toward any kind of outside intervention. Rather, it was a particular discourse invoked when the interest of *raison d'Etat* was in danger. Going many years back, "During the tobacco crisis of 1891, the rebels had sought Russian help against the British. And during the Revolution of 1905–1909 the constitutionalists had obtained British assistance against the Russians," not to mention the *ulamā* and Tudeh siding with Western powers on different occasions.[330] The determining factor, then, in identifying imperialist forces "was not rejection of foreign assistance, but rather selectively in whose assistance was sought and at what time" and by who and for what purpose.[331] Questioning the Shah's

[327] Ibid., 625 (Italics added).
[328] Ibid., 631.
[329] Foucault, *Security Territory Population*, 357.
[330] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions,* 460.
[331] Ibid., 344.

dependency on foreign powers was seen as a breach of a particular art of government, namely state sovereignty, and in that sense implicit in Fārsi's anti-imperialism was a call for restoring the sovereignty of the state. Particularly after the coup, the "U.S. was perceived as the real power behind, and the daily instructor of the absolute and arbitrary state," and that meant a form of *exterior sovereignty* was seen as antagonistic to both Iranian sovereignty and *raison d'Etat.*[332] In Fārsi's discourse, the state apparatus (*hey'at-e hākeme*h) neither exercised sovereignty nor *raison d'Etat*, and the Shah was mere subject of *exterior sovereignty,* and hence *not* a sovereign.

According to Fārsi, the Islamic movement could not only solve the crisis of sovereignty, it was able to restore *raison d'Etat*. For Fārsi, the previous conflicts between the pastoral power and *raison d'Etat* were presupposed to have been resolved, and his proposed version of state respected modalities of bio-power and social justice. As a case of Islamist discourse, Fārsi's Charter of the Islamic Movement embodies signifiers from various other liberation discourses that are rearticulated such that Islam becomes "the master signifier" in the anti-Shah discourse. "The master signifier is a signifier to which other signifiers refer and are unified by—and it fixes their identity."[333] And yet this signifier is empty as it signifies multiple arts of government.

If different arts of government and technologies of power were each a wheel, and the Shah's state was a machine, then all the Shah's wheels were disconnected from the state machine prior to the Islamic Revolution. With the Carter administration putting pressure on Iran's human rights situation, the Shah's agency on behalf of *exterior sovereignty* also deteriorated, and hence sovereignty, *raison d'Etat*, pastoral, police, and modalities of bio-power and even liberalism were all detached from the state machine. The Shah did not realize that the attempt to incorporate

[332] Homa Katooziyan, *Iranian History and Politics: the Dialectic of Sate and Civil Society* (London: Rutledge: 2003), 29.
[333] Bobby S. Sayyid *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (Zed Books, 2003), 45.

all arts of government in sovereignty is a "very bad instrument for the Prince himself who risks losing his throne and his principality if he applies them."[334] Here Islamism offered an Islamized notion of sovereignty (Khomeini), *raison d'Etat* (Nehzat-e Azādi), police (Fadā'iyān), left/bio-power (Shariati), and pastoral power (Khomeini), and hence became the strongest anti-Shah discourse with great potential for success in its resistance against the Shah. In Islamist discourse, Islam was an empty signifier as it was an open reference to constitutionalism, democratic nationalism, and a socially just and spiritual society. An Islamist after the Revolution once said:

> When we say Islam, we are encompassing everything ... since Islam is attentive to all human needs. When we say Islam, we have said it all and we have spoken of all rights. God's right, the right of the Prophet and the Imams, people's rights, the rights of the workers, men, women, all guilds, rights of teachers, everyone … even the right of that villager who is deprived from clean drinking water. Social justice and struggle against tyranny is all embedded in Islam.[335]

Khomeini had also said that the "word Islam does not need adjectives such as democratic. Precisely because Islam is everything, it means everything. It is sad for us to add another word near the word Islam, which is perfect."[336] Therefore, Sayyid is correct in saying that "when Islamists claim the best government is an Islamic government, here 'Islamic' refers to the incarnation of goodness, so that the claim becomes: the best government is good government."[337] This good government was not the fundamentalist state strictly governed by *shari'a* law at the expense of liberal freedoms, rather, this government was a solution to a crisis of governmentality. Through Islamism, Islam offered what governmentality *lacked* and hence operated as the only viable alternative able to be appropriated by the state upon the fall of the Shah in the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

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[334] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 224.
[335] *Surat-e mashruh-e mozākerāt-e bāznegari-e qānun-e asāsi-e jomhuri-e eslāmi-e Iran* (The Complete Report of the Re-Appraisal of the Islamic Republic's Constitution) (henceforth*, qānun-e asāsi*), 507.
[336] *International Herald Tribue*, 15 October 1979, 5, quoted in Skocpol, "Rentier State", 278.
[337] Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear,* 48.

One particular figure that played a significant role in emptying Islam from its previous associated meaning was Ali Shariati. Having Marxist leanings, in his works he had shown that Islam "is not a conservative, fatalistic creed, as charged by many secular intellectuals, nor an apolitical personal faith as claimed by some reactionary clerics," hence taking a middle ground between the traditionalist and secular reading of Islam.[338] Shariati redefined the signifiers such that Islam in his definition was "a revolutionary ideology that permeates all spheres of life, especially politics and inspires true believers to fight against all forms of oppression, exploitation and social injustice."[339]

In an essay published seven years prior to the Islamic Revolution under the title of *Ommat va Imāmat*, he set out to offer his reading of Shi'i political power. Similar to Foucault, he differentiated between pastoral power and the notion of politics in the Greek city-state. According to Foucault, pastoral power "is exercised on a multiplicity rather than on a territory," and it has a "purpose for those on whom it is exercised, and not a purpose for some kind of superior unit like the city, territory, state or sovereignty."[340] For Shariati, *umma* was synonymous with a community in movement (*harekat*) towards a certain ideal. Hence, there is a need for an Imam to direct the community to acquire salvation (*sa'ādat*).[341] Shariati even quoted a *hadith* from Imām Sādiq stating: "An individual who does not know his Imam is like a sheep who has lost his shepherd."[342] Here, Shariati differentiated between the Greek notion of *politique* and the Arabic concept of *siāsat. Politique* only concerns managing the city and it bears no responsibility upon directing and instructing individuals, whereas in *siāsat*, according to Shariati, evolution and

[338] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions,* 466.
[339] Ibid.
[340] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 129.
[341] Ali Shariati, *Ummat va Imāmat* [Umma & Imamat] (Ebook downloaded from: Triboon.ir).
[342] Ibid., 43.

betterment of individuals is the concern of political power.[343]

> Hence, there are two distinct philosophies or responsibilities assumed for political powers: either power must adopt the leadership and instruction of people in the best possible way according to a certain ideology and in that case the leader becomes the teacher of people. [This is] *siāsat.* Or he is just the manager of society and only maintains it, [that is] *politique.*[344]

With this framework, Shariati visited modern politics and specifically grappled with the question of state power before and after a political revolution. His choice of theoretical intervention appears unconventional, as Iran of the early 1970s was certainly not in the momentum of an *Islamic* revolution. Nonetheless, Shariati spoke about a revolution with Islamic qualities as if he foresaw what would unfold in the near political future of Iran. Essentially, Shariati's concern was the leadership of a revolution (*rahbari-e-enghelāb*) and the ideological status of the post-revolutionary state. He described the role of the leader of the Revolution as one "who has turned the ideology to a movement … and has turned beliefs into *jihad*."[345] Since this leader has pastoral qualities, Shariati stressed, he must not be voted in nor appointed. Rather, "people [should] come to believe in him because of the logic of his message and the truth of his thoughts."[346] He then connected the pastoral leader of the Revolution to the Shi'i concept of Imām—whose designation was not through popular democracy but rather "Imām was Imām by virtue of being an Imām" (*boodan-e Imām Imāmat ast*)—in order to conclude that it is not for people to choose their leader, instead it is people's responsibility to *recognize* their Imām.[347]

Aware of the Muslim secularist position that sought to differentiate the Prophet's political and religious status, Shariati wholeheartedly argued for the combination of Imamate and

[343] Ibid., 22.
[344] Ibid.
[345] Ibid., 69.
[346] Ibid., 67.
[347] Ibid., 72.

Caliphate, and here he stepped in the direction of Sunni political thinkers such as Rashid Reza (1865–1935) concerning the relation between Islam and the state. Shariati also rejected those who argued that the status of the Imam stands above politics: "The Imām is not next to executive power, nor he is part of the government… He himself has direct political responsibility for society and he is the direct leader of economy, culture, foreign policy and internal affairs."[348] Hence Shariati concluded that the "Imām is both the head of government (*ra'is-e dowlat*) (politician) and the head of state and society (foundation of society), and he is the exemplar of thoughts, so directing people's conduct is his responsibility."[349]

Having in mind the Marxist concept of "dictatorship of proletariat," to which he made reference, Shariati hypothesized a post-revolutionary situation and questioned whether liberal democracy is the most suitable system of governance for a state after a revolution. According to Shariati, a post-revolutionary state undergoes a certain transitional period that makes it unsuitable for democracy. He stated that the very principle of democracy "is incompatible with change, intellectual leadership and revolutionary progress."[350] He then stated, "if political leadership is based on a certain ideology that seeks to change the old systems of thought, the leader cannot be chosen from the same mass holding those thoughts."[351] Overall, having little trust for the consciousness of the masses, he discussed the manipulative nature of liberal democracy and the role capital plays in determining the political order. According to Shariati, the post-revolutionary stage is not ready for democracy because "people's votes [still] cannot choose the most qualified leader… A revolutionary regime (*regim-e enghelābi*) with its own progressive ideology may reach political success but training the thoughts and building the architecture of a

[348] Ibid., 79.
[349] Ibid.
[350] Ibid., 87.
[351] Ibid.

revolutionary society needs time."[352] Having Lenin, Stalin, and the Chinese Cultural Revolution in mind, Shariati wrote: "The political order that must protect and bring about the foundation of communism in the transitional period is not democracy, it is the dictatorship of proletariat." Hence Shariati concluded that "after success in the early political stages, new revolutionary regimes do not hand the state to the trembling hands of democracy [and rightly so]; they do not rely on the vote of the majority."[353] Shariati's solution, once again influenced by the Marxist model of the dictatorship of the proletariat, was "directed democracy" (*democrasi-e-hedāyat-shode*), through which the ideological status of the revolution will be protected and leadership of an Imam and the state would not be handed over to liberal democratic elements. Shariati believed that for as long as society is in the transition period:

> The group who started the new society and launched a revolutionary and ideological movement … must maintain the spiritual and material, political and ideological leadership in their own hands … they must lead society according to revolutionary leadership, not democratic principles, so they can maintain the status of the revolutionary movement among a few generations.[354]

Shariati warned the revolutionaries that after taking over the state there remains a fear that "the same dominant class that the revolution had targeted … would be able to come out of ballot boxes resorting to the power, money and influence that they already possessed."[355] But mindful of his critics, Shariati implicitly acknowledged that his model of revolutionary leadership may turn into a dictatorship but stressed that democracy can have a similar fate, and "what distinguishes leadership from dictatorship, is not form, rather it is the content, the tangible social reality."[356] In other words, actual relations between people and the leader would determine the

[352] Ibid., 96.
[353] Ibid., 98.
[354] Ibid.
[355] Ibid., 97.
[356] Ibid., 26.

dictatorial nature of a regime not its constitution. With these remarks Shariati once again invoked the Shi'i concepts of leadership and made resonance between the notion of Imam and leader within a directed democracy. After the Imam fulfills his role and protects the ideology of the movement, then, according to Shariati, society becomes ready for democracy.[357]

If the function of the shepherd within pastoral power is to "keep watch over the flock and avoid the misfortune that may threaten the least of its members," then Shariati prescribed a pastoral leader in charge of the state in order to protect its flock and "avoid the misfortune" of liberal democracy.[358] Here Shariati deployed the pastoral art of government on sovereignty, calling for a pastoral sovereign who not only maintains the territory but also leads the population towards the ideology of the revolutionary state and protects them from the malaises of liberalism.

What remains outstanding is the fact that Shariati was aware of the exclusive nature of the pastoral care of the Imam and the *politique* of the state. Yet, he still prescribed that a pastor be in charge of a state with *politique* as its exclusive art of government. Through his model of pastoral sovereignty, perhaps viewing "liberal democracy" as a set of techniques concerning *politique*, he implicitly called for the demolition of *politique.* The radicalism of his thought, however, was very similar to Ayatollāh Khomeini's project. The only difference was Khomeini's theoretical state was a juridical state and the sovereign was territorial without any messianic ambition. But Shariati's sovereign had a utopian project of taking the population towards "the king of eschatology" where one hopes "civil society will prevail over the state."[359] But as Foucault stresses, this thought too "was born with form and analysis of governmental reason itself" and could only empower the state.[360] Shariati's radical eschatology then, even in theory,

[357] Ibid., 102.
[358] Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 127.
[359] Ibid.
[360] Ibid.

would not only fail to undermine the reality of *raison d'Etat*, it would maintain the state. In fact, Shariati was famous for discussing the sociological differences between a movement and an institution, and he had specifically spoken in negative terms about movements becoming institutionalized. Turning his focus to that distinction, he theorized a movement appropriated by the state, or to speak in Deleuze and Gutattari's terms, Shariati deployed a war-machine on the State Apparatus. For Shariati, a state operating like a "war machine" and having a warrior as its sovereign was ideal.

Almost a decade later, Shariati's vision was realized as the Islamists took over the state. In the first Assembly of Experts designed to finalize the Iranian constitution, Shariati's model for state governance was advocated not by Islamists but by Usuli clerics. In the Assembly of Experts, Khomeini's concept of *velāyat-e-faqih* was called upon, rationalized, and formulated within Shariati's Ommat and Imamat discourse. What was striking about the process by which *velāyat-e faqih* was incorporated in the Iranian constitution is that in the initial draft approved by Ayatollāh Khomeini there was no mention of *velāyat-e-faqih.* At the request of the liberal-leaning Bazargān and leftist elements, and to Khomeini's initial dismay, eventually a collective became responsible for finalizing the constitution.[361] The irony was that those who put the request forward for a constitutional assembly were the main adversaries to the articles added to the initial draft.[362] They did not see that the majority of those elected by popular vote would be clerics who were then seen as the extension of Khomeini's charismatic reign. The assembly was convened and the majority of its members were Usuli clerics having come to the Majlis with one

[361] Hosseinizadeh, *Islam-e Siāsi dar Iran,* 292.
[362] See: Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent in Post-revolution Iran: Abdolkarim Soroush, Religious Politics and Democratic Reform* (IB Tauris, 2008), 45. Ghamari Tabrizi writes: "Rafsanjani had warned that the assembly will be dominated by 'a fistful of ignorant and fanatical fundamentalists who will do such damage that you will regret ever having convened them.'"

main agenda: add *velāyat-e-faqih* to the constitution. Ayatollāh Montazeri, the head of the Assembly, went on public record with clarity: "Dear colleagues everyone must be sure that we will not even ratify a constitution that does not include *velāyat-e-faqih*… Some may say this is a clerical constitution. So, what? We are clerics; hence the constitution must be hundred percent based on *velāyat-e-faqih.*"[363] The clerical constitution, however, did not proceed with its main agenda without hurdles. The assembly came under heavy attack and was charged with deploying "clerical dictatorship," "religious despotism," and backwardness (*irtijah*). Viewing the main agenda of the assembly as an initiative put forward by Usuli traditional Islam (*Islam-e sonnati*), critics maintained that that implicit in the article relating to *velāyat-e-faqih* was not only exclusivity of one class, namely the clergy, to political authority but also a breach of "people's sovereignty."[364]

Supporters of the *velāyat-e-faqih* used the platform of pre-agenda speech in order to address criticism. While most speeches in defense of *velayat-e-faqih* had theological underpinnings, the deputy head of the Assembly, Ayatollāh Beheshti (1928–1981), adopted Shariati's line of reasoning. A reader of Shariati, Beheshti argued that there are two models of governance: 1) liberal democracy in which a capitalist class uses manipulative propaganda mechanisms to rule over society; 2) ideological governance in which "people have freely chosen an ideology (*maktab*) and then they are willing to limit their choices within the boundaries of *maktab.*"[365] He invoked the example of Marxist societies such as the Soviet Union and China in which Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism operate as the ideological basis of governance.[366] Beheshti then argued that since the Islamic Republic has an ideological model of governance

[363] *qān ūn-e asāsi,* 107.
[364] Ibid., 507, 374, 512.
[365] Ibid., 380.
[366] Ibid.

based on Islam, there needs to be an Imam as both exemplar for society and centroid of political power. Beheshti stressed that the Imam is there to protect the *maktab* and not the clerical garb. Hence he called claims regarding exclusivity of power to clerical authority "accusations."[367] Echoing a similar line of reasoning, another member argued that while leaders in democratic societies are like kind mothers, in divine ideological societies leaders are masterful and kind medical doctors, and since the function of the Imam is to lead the *umma* towards perfection, a *faqih* is in need of executive state power.[368]

In general, pastoral qualities and mass support of Khomeini were used to refute those who framed *velāyat-e-faqih* as an authoritarian force in charge of the modern state. A member of the assembly rationalized: "People choose the experts and the experts are supposed to express their opinion about which Shi'i *ulamā* has qualities such as *ijtihad*, justice and *taqwā* pertaining to leadership, how is that in contradiction with the nation being in charge of itself?"[369] One member intervened in the middle of another's speech: "a human being chooses his destiny based on free will, and this person must be free to take advantage of guidance of those with qualifications, [hence putting national government as an antithesis to] *velāyat-e-faqih* is absolutely irrelevant."[370]

Besides theological and rhetorical justifications, what really made advocacy for *velāyat-e-faqih* most convincing was the actual role that Ayatollāh Khomeini played in the post-revolutionary political climate. Being a charismatic leader with a huge following, with whom he remained in contact through daily meetings, and also his influence in resolving various national crises, allowed supporters of *velāyat-e-faqih* to better advance their cause. Political opposition,

[367] Ibid., 381.
[368] Ibid., 1668, 570.
[369] Ibid., 1102.
[370] Ibid., 515.

terrorist activities, and Kurdish demands for political autonomy had all resulted in a state of crisis, and as Hosseinizadeh points out, Khomeini was "the only source of spiritual power that could put an end to various cases of political turmoil."[371] On this basis a member of the Assembly stated, "when the counterrevolutionary forces in Pāveh or Sanandaj revolted against the Iranian nation, it is only with his order that people resisted them and moved towards Pāveh barefoot; this is a privilege of Islam that we must take advantage of."[372] In other words, Khomeini's ability in managing state crises must not be underestimated. In the middle of the Assembly of Experts, the United States Embassy was seized by student followers of Khomeini, and the liberal-leaning government of Bazargān resigned, all of which added to Khomeini's prestige not only as a national leader but as an uncompromising international player. Khomeini's influence on both the political arena and the revolutionary militia easily facilitated the Assembly of Experts to assume the *faqih* as the Commander of Chief and the person in charge of three governmental bodies: the executive, the judiciary, and the legislative. Arguing against those who called for limiting the power of *velāyat-e-faqih* in the constitution, a member of the Assembly exclaimed:

> I am worried about limiting the power of Imam Khomeini who has already acted as the commander in chief when he was in Paris: he told the members of the army to leave and we all saw that they ran away, and the army… collapsed. Now should we limit the power of this commander in chief? Would not the world laugh at us and say you have such a leader and he is taking your revolution forward, and then you are putting this lion in a cage?[373]

Even Rahmatollāh Moghaddam Marāghei (1921–2012), who opposed the inclusion of *velāyat-e-faqih*, suggested that Khomeini was an exception and there should be an article to allow

[371] S. Mohammad Ali Hosseinizāadeh, *Islam-e Siāsi dar Iran. Political Islam in Iran* (Qom: Mofid Publication, 2006), 291.
[372] *qanun-e asāsi,* 61,
[373] Ibid., 1164.

Khomeini to rule legally until the end of his life.[374] Hence, *velāyat-e-faqih*, as a legal article, was developed and rationalized in the image Khomeini and the material force that he exerted within Iranian political scene. Had it not been for Khomeini as both a theorist of *velāyat-e faqih* and his role as a revolutionary leader, it is improbable that the concept could find such material currency in Iranian post-revolutionary political discourse.

One must note that advocacy of *velāyat-e-faqih* not only allowed the Usuli-Islamist clergy to express their support for Khomeini but also enabled them to put an end to their exclusion from power for decades, at least since Reza Shah's anti-clerical policies had come into effect. The clerical members of the Assembly turned the attacks on *velāyat-e- faqih* into an opportunity to take their opponents to task and introduce themselves as major players in state politics. In their defense of *velāyat-e-faqih* they often used the words Islam, clergy (*ruhānniat*), and *velāyat-e-faqih* together, and held that those who opposed *velāyat-e-faqih* in fact opposed Islam and the Imam of the Age.[375] A clergy member of the Assembly stated:

> People love the clergy and they love religion… and how could a nation that loves religion and the clergy speak against the clergy and the passed law [of *velāyat-e-faqih*] while we know that religion and the clergy are inseparable? ... [The opposition] says we only wanted the clergy to topple the old regime and now that the old regime is gone, again a group of seculars must come to power. They say we wanted the clergy only that far... now the clergy must go and hand over the affairs to us. They want to celebrate our death once again. What type of calculation is that? … No one is willing to let that happen![376]

In lines in which Shariati's warning regarding not handing the state to liberal elements is visible, the Shi'i pastoralists related the secular critique of *velāyat-e-faqih* to the long-held secularization policies of the Pahlavis and unapologetically spoke of their desire to remain in power. Aware of this process, Makārem Shirāzi warned his fellow clergymen: "Please think right about this. The

[374] Ibid., 375.
[375] Ibid., 659, 658/798.
[376] Ibid., 659-660.

enemy inside and outside will accuse us of despotism… [And passing the law pertaining to *velāyat-e faqih*] is the best evidence for our enemies to say that some of *ulamā* went to the Assembly of Experts and wrote a constitution to secure their own power."[377] Makārem's warning, however, was not treated with full caution, and towards the end of the Assembly another clerical member stated that those who accuse the clergy "must study more about the history of the clergy because then they will realize that the clergy has always being financially secure," and hence not in need of political or economic power.[378]

Eventually, in December 1979, the constitution was put to a national referendum, an event that according to Hosseinizādeh was the last step in the Usuli's authoritarian project.[379] With the new constitution, the judiciary and the Guardian council were passed over to the clergy and Usuli pastoralists became the official interpreters of the *shari'a*. What is pertinent about the new pastoralist understanding of governmental reason is that it operated solely at a juridical level as opposed to complex techniques of pastoralist governmental reason. To be clear, there seems to be a consensus among the clergy that through "good" laws, a good government will come into effect, and there is barely a mention of what Foucault refers to as "technologies of the self" within discussion pertaining to post-revolutionary political power. One member of the Assembly, for instance, hoped that through *velāyat-e-faqih* God's laws would become state laws and state laws would become God's law, so obedience to the laws will follow.[380] Another member was also hopeful that the new constitution would put an end to old power relations, restore humanity, and eradicate signs of poverty, hunger, wretchedness, colonialism, and despotism.[381] The Usuli

[377] Ibid., 1115.
[378] Ibid., 1662.
[379] Hosseinizadeh, *Islame siasi dar Iran*, 306.
[380] *qānun-e asāsi,* 73.
[381] Ibid., 1691.

phantasy was shaped through a very strict juridical understanding of power and it was absolutely blind to the complex mechanisms of power in the modern world.

These complex mechanisms of power soon imposed themselves on the clerical mindset, and as Sami Zubaida realized, the Iranian constitution in reality offered "no Islamic models for modern government and administration."[382] His study of the post-revolutionary Iranian state shows that "the elements of shari'a enter the legislation of the Islamic Republic, but constitute only one element among many."[383] For instance in the field of family law and population, one sees "the retreat of traditional interpretations of the shari'a in favor of new principles in line with political pressures and socioeconomic expediency."[384] Zubaida concludes that in Iran "the form of organization of the state and its institutions have no particularly Islamic features," and its features "animate the politics of secular nation-states" as opposed to a state governed strictly by *shari'a* law.[385]

The inclusion of the Usulis within the nation state, however, brought the long rivalry of the pastoral and *raison d'Etat* to a temporarily conclusion. The idea of pastoral sovereignty as put forward by the practice of *velāyat-e-faqih* not only resolved the question of state sovereignty but also struck a balance between pastoral, sovereignty, and *raison d'Etat.* If pastoral force was previously tossed between *raison d'Etat* and sovereignty, and it often acted as an obstacle to the secular evolution of the nation-state, in the post-revolutionary situation, pastoralism was now absorbed into the nation-state project. The mercantilist art of government was preserved and by the first term of the presidency of Hāshemi Rafsanjāni (1934–2017) elements of the liberal art of

[382] Sami Zubaida, "Is Iran an Islamic State?" in *Political Islam,* ed, Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997), 118.
[383] Ibid., 118.
[384] Ibid.,119.
[385] Ibid.

government were introduced, this time having the sanction of pastoral authorities. If liberalism, pastoralism, police, mercantilism, *raison d'Etat*, and sovereignty were various wheels discarded from the state machine during the end of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, the Islamic Revolution brought these various arts of government into relative harmony. Given various conflicts between the leader, Ayatollāh Ali Khāmenei, and the four governments of Ali Akbar Hāshemi Rafsanjāni, Mohammad Khātami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejād, and Hassan Rouhāni, it may be stated that the relation between the pastoral sovereign and *raison d'Etat* has proved to be contentious at times, but not at the expense of complete state collapse. The Islamic Revolution resolved the long crisis of Iranian governmentality, the most important element of which was removing the pastoral power that previously was a powerful obstacle to the evolution of the nation-state. Islam, to speak in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, was appropriated by the State Apparatus. State won.

Conclusion:

The Shah "modernized on a socioeconomic level... but failed to modernize on another level—the political level," writes Abrahamian in reference to the root causes of the Islamic Revolution.[386] Viewing the gap between economic and political development, as identified by Abrahamian and many other scholars, through a governmentality lens, produces significant insights about the history of the state in modern Iran. This governmentality lens indicates that various arts of government pertaining to an emerging modern capitalist environment such as Iran were either not effectively in place or did not function as thoroughly as desired. Being a subject of *exterior sovereignty*, while combining *raison d'Etat* and sovereignty, yet introducing the liberal art of government through a sovereign-subject axis and removal of the pastorate from state machine were all reminiscent of what may be called "bad governmentality" on the Shah's

[386] Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions,* 427.

part.

When writing the Charter of the Islamic movement, Jalāleddin Fārsi had specifically defined the agenda of Islamism to rectify problems concerning Iranian governmentality (*āyeen-e keshvardāri-e hey'at-e hākemeh*). In his ideal Islamic state, the tensions between sovereignty, *raison d'Etat*, and the pastorate were resolved, and sovereignty was no longer the agent of imperialism. Previously, Ayatollāh Shrāzi and Khomeini among others not only put an end to the Shi'i suspicious view of pastoralism towards the state; they had reconciled the relationship between pastoral power and *raison d'Etat.* With Khomeini and Shirāzi, the modern state itself was no longer under scrutiny. Rather its mode of practice was the subject of inquiry. Initially, Shi'i pastoralists only demanded that *raison d'Etat* respect pastoral values, and in that sense, they only sought resonance between the two arts of government. With removal of *raison d'Etat* and concentration of power under the Shah, the pastoralist agenda shifted to reconciling pastoralism with sovereignty. Ayatollāh Khomeini, with the help of Fārsi, drafted *Velāyat-e-Faqih.* Although the text did not have much influence in the making of the Islamist revolutionary discourse, it set the theoretical ground for the Usulis' aim to incorporate pastoralism within state sovereignty in the post-revolutionary context. Employing sociological language, through his concepts of Ommat and Imamat, Shariati too facilitated imagining a pastoral Imam in charge of a post-revolutionary state.

Up until a few months after the Revolution there was no mention of *velāyat-e-faqih*, neither in the first draft of the constitution nor in the popular revolutionary discourse. The Assembly of Experts was eventually convened at the request of those who were not fond of *velāyat-e-faqih*, yet they did not foresee that the majority of elected representatives of the Assembly would be from a clerical background. Fārsi too made it to the Assembly and witnessed

the way *velāyat-e-faqih* was introduced and ratified as the fifth Article. When his turn arrived, Fārsi demanded that the Assembly clarify the elements constituting the power structure of Iran. He stated: "So there seems to be four partners in the state apparatus: 1-God, 2-*fuqaha*, 3-people, 4-executive power or government. Please clarify the share of each in the state."[387] With this observation, Fārsi best summarized the way in which the Islamic Revolution had resolved the previous crisis concerning Iranian governmentality, by locating the art of government such that there would be an equilibrium of power in the post-revolutionary situation. The Assembly did clarify the share of each partner or modality through which various arts of government ought to operate. Pastoral sovereignty was ratified in the image of Khomeini, and the role he played in managing post-revolutionary state crises and *raison d'Etat* was revoked with restoration of a parliament and presidential elections. The state, as Zubaida argues, never became Islamic, but the Revolution served the state in helping its long crisis to come to a temporary conclusion. *Tribe-form* of Shi'ism became State-form.

[387] *qānun-e asāsi,* 524.

Chapter 5: Towards a Politics of Post-Islamism

Seventeen years after the Islamic Revolution, Asef Bayat, a political theorist, identified a major discursive shift in the way the Iranian Islamic state expressed itself. He saw a "condition where following a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy, symbols and sources of legitimacy of Islamism …[were] exhausted, even among its once-ardent supporters." He called the new condition "post-Islamism."[388] For Bayat the Islamist phase began in 1979 and continued until mid-1990s wherein the reformist, liberal-leaning Mohammad Khātami emerged as president. It was during this period that some began to voice criticism if not outright opposition to the principle of *velāyat-e-faqiq*, deeming it as undemocratic.[389]

One has to remember that the Iranian Constitution, which included the clause on *velāyat-e-faqih*, was approved by a majority vote in a referendum in early December 1979.[390] Comparing this referendum, however, with the previous one held in March in which voters could choose either yes or no to an Islamic Republic, indicates a drop of 20 percent in turnout. In the original referendum the concept of Islamic Republic was still vague and there was not yet any mention of *velāyat-e-faqih* in popular discourse, let alone the possibility of it being included in the Constitution.[391] The new Constitution embodied the ideals of the Usulis and those Islamists who were comfortable with Khomeini's (1902–1989) charismatic rule of Iran with constitutional backing. According to the new constitution, *fiqh* was to operate as a major source for the extraction of not only state laws but also mechanisms through which the state must be governed. The laws of the *Tribe-form* of Islam were expected to provide the basis for governing the State-

[388] Asef Bayat, "The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society," *Critique: Journal for Critical Studies of the Middle East* 5, no. 9, 1996: 45.
[389] Ibid.
[390] Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent in Post-revolution Iran: Abdolkarim Soroush, Religious Politics and Democratic Reform* (IB Tauris, 2008).
[391] Ibid.

form. But soon the realities of the modern state formation began to pose new challenges and exposed the limits of modern governance based on pastoral visions. For almost a century the irreconcilable nature of the pastoral art of government and *raison d'Etat* had manifested itself in various meeting points of religion and politics, but the attempt to combine the two had never been experimented with in the realpolitik of state management. Now in charge of not only the state but also an economy based on capitalist principles, through practical experimentations, Iranian Muslims were perhaps best placed to confirm the famous Foucauldian assertion regarding the inherently secular nature of the modern state in general, and atheistic nature of modern economics in particular. Foucault said: "Economics is an atheistic discipline, economics is a discipline without God, economics is a discipline that begins to demonstrate the impossibility of a sovereign point of view over the totality of the state that he has to govern."[392]

Confronting the ethos of bio-power of the modern state and its contradiction with the religious canon, pragmatist Akbar Hāshemi Rafsanjāni (1943–2017) professed to Khomeini: "under these circumstances, based on the teachings of the *shari'a*, many policies of the government would be unjustifiable."[393] In response, Khomeini calmed the ruling party by invoking the jurisprudential concept of *zarūrat* (practical necessities) and offered solutions that suggested reconciliation between *fiqh* and *zarūrat* of the modern state may be possible.[394] Khomeini's solutions, however, were met with dismay among some traditional Usulis who viewed concessions to *zarūrat* as an indication that the *halāl* (religiously permissible) would be replaced with *harām* (the forbidden).[395] In general, the more "the post-revolutionary state consolidated its power, the greater the number of Ayatollahs voiced their displeasure with the

[392] See Michel Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Macmillan, 2007), 282.
[393] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent,* 86.
[394] Ibid.
[395] Ibid., 87.

expansion of state power into their offices."[396] But soon the concept of *maslahat-e nezām* (interest/expediency of the state), a Persian concept for *raison d'Etat*, found prominence and became the *shari'a* of the emerging state.[397] With this approach, "Khomeini began to lay the foundation of an Islamic republic in which the preservation and interests of the state would eclipse the ordained obligations and duties prescribed in *shari'ah*," and in that regard he showed no compromise.[398] He went as far as to declare that even daily prayers and pilgrimages may be dispensed with if upholding them would be contrary to the *maslahat* of the modern state.[399] Under Khomeini, material reconciliation between pastoral, sovereignty, and *raison d'Etat* took place in the real scene of political contestations, making the theoretical framework offered in *Velayat-e Faqih* absolutely anomalous to the actual political experience. *Velāyat-e-faqih* in practice had little in common with what was outlined in *Velāyat-e-Faqih*. If in *Velāyat-e-Faqih*, the primacy was given to *fiqh*, in the real political scene the expediencies of the modern state became the priority to the extent that the conservative *fuqaha* in charge of the Guardian Council resisted the *maslahat* orientation of the Islamic state, although their discourse never prevailed.

With Khomeini's demise in 1989 the *maslahat*-oriented front, those with executive experience, took charge of the state apparatus and the conservatives were partly sidelined. Ayatollāh Khāmenei was appointed the Supreme Leader and the constitution was amended accordingly to remove *marja'iyyat* as a necessary qualification for becoming leader. The fact that the *faqih* in charge of the state no longer needed to have already held a position of religious authority "did not mean the separation of religion from politics, but rather established the

[396] Ibid.
[397] Conceptual adoption of something secular but acting as *shari'a* or a ruling principle was inspired by Wael Hallaq. He refers to secularism as the *shari'a* of the modern state. See Wael Hallaq, *Beyond Secularism and Islamism*. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFAqQiIVsF8).
[398] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent*, 145.
[399] Ibid., 150.

supremacy of politics over religion."[400] Shrewd Rafsanjāni, "who during the entire decade of the Islamic Republic stood on the side of the *maslahat* of the state rather than the realization of Islamic ideals," also began his first term as president.[401] Rafsanjāni introduced a series of liberal economic initiatives and went to the Friday prayers podium and explicitly demanded reconsideration of the constitutive ethos of the revolutionary society. He defended luxury lifestyles and transformation of "the revolutionary virtues of the homo *islamicus*—selflessness, austerity, and perpetual discontent—into a post-revolutionary ethos of the prosperous, joyful and content subject."[402] The anti-*maslahat* fraction of the ruling elite, whose outlook was manifested in the Guardian Council, opposed Rafsanjāni and sided with the new *vali-e-faqih,* Ayatollāh Khāmenei.

There was another fraction that opposed the new approach of the state. They were the religiously devout war veterans who saw the ethos of war at odds with the secular undertone of the *maslahat* of the state.[403] Hence Khāmenei had now two sets of allies, the Guardian Council and the war veterans who looked up to the Supreme Leader as the embodiment of revolutionary and religious values. They all saw Rafsanjāni's post-war policies heading in the direction of separating religion from the state, undermining the leftist aspirations of the Revolution and the liberalizations of culture.[404] They not only targeted Rafsanjāni, but also the protagonist of the Iranian intellectual scene of the 1990s, Abodlkarim Soroush.

Educated in Britain in the philosophy of science with some background in Islamic philosophy and mysticism, Soroush began to formulate a famous thesis entitled *The Theoretical*

[400] Ulrich von Schwerin, *The Dissident Mullāh: Ayatollāh Montazeri and the Struggle for Reform in Revolutionary Iran* (IB Tauris, 2015), 127.
[401] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent,* 159.
[402] Ibid., 159.
[403] Ibid., 161.
[404] Ibid.

Contraction and Expansion of the Shari'a (*Qabz va Bast*), in which he argued for the contingency of the truth of religious knowledge based on time, space, and its juxtaposition to other forms knowledge.[405] With this approach, Soroush sought to put an end to the exclusivity of religious truth as held by the clergy and open a way for a pluralistic reading of Islam.[406] "With these essays, Soroush inaugurated an intellectual movement the main premise of which was to salvage Islam from its officially sanctioned straitjacket."[407] Soroush did not limit his provocative statements to abstract philosophical pursuits. He vocally defended a democratic religious state (*hukumat-e dimukrātik-e dini*) as an alternative to an Islamic state.[408] Soroush also constantly exposed the limits of *fiqh* in relation to state governance and promoted *irfān* (mysticism) as an alternative Islamic discipline suitable for a post-revolutionary society. He defended individual liberty and made extensive attempts to prove that liberal freedoms are not in disharmony with *shari'a*.[409]

Soroush's ideas were deemed blasphemous and his lectures were shut down, mostly by Ansār-Hizbullāh, who "announced that its members would not allow him to speak at any public event."[410] Soroush expressed his grievances to Rafsanjāni, and although his complains were never seriously addressed, a discourse similar to his began to be heard in the reformist government of President Khātami which replaced Rafsanjāni. In the new era, concepts such as *emperialism*, *mostaz'afin*, *jihad*, *mojāhed*, *shahid*, and *enghelāb* gave their place to *demokrāsi*,

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[405] Ibid., 192.
[406] Ibid.
[407] Ibid.
[408] Forough Jahanbakhsh, *Islam, Democracy and Religious Modernism in Iran (1953-2000): From Bāzargān to Soroush* (Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2001), 153.
[409] Abdolkarim Soroush, *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
[410] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent,* 221. Ansār-Hizbullāh was the name of a radical pressure group with religious leanings that appeared in the Iranian political scene in the 1990s. The group was vocally critical of Rafsanjani's political and economic policies, deeming them anti-revolutionary and anti-Islamic.

pluralism, *moderniat*, *āzādi* (liberty), and *jame'ey-e madani* (civil society).[411] Government discourse, if not state, had indeed experienced a shift—the same shift that Asef Bayat had called post-Islamism.

Sixteen years after the first deployment of the concept post-Islamism, Asef Bayat, still studying and reflecting the same movements, came back to his original theorizations. Bayat, however, saw no need for revision of what he had already described as the post-Islamist trend. In the introduction of his book, published in 2013, he wrote: "The program of post-war reconstruction under President Rafsanjāni marked the beginning of what I have called 'post-Islamism.'"[412] Identifying the Islamist project with failure, Bayat continued: "post-Islamism is a discursive and/or pragmatic *break*, a break from an Islamist paradigm."[413] Prior to Bayat, however, it was Olivier Roy who had diagnosed Islamism with a certain "failure." In his much-cited book *The Failure of Political Islam*, Roy commented on the way the energy and the discourse of Islamism had been co-opted by state power and how it had become difficult to identify a movement as "Islamist" with a rather independent social and political vision in both local and global contexts. According to Roy, "Today's Islamist movement… does not offer a new model of society… they reflect first and foremost the failure of the Western-style state model… [Hence t]here is no concrete political, let alone economic model inherent in Islamism."[414] Roy later adopted Bayat's "post-Islamism" to expand on his thesis on the failure of Islamism. He saw the nationalist orientation of Islamism, the lack of distinct geostrategic value, the lack of a distinct Muslim vote, Islamists' role in the secularization of society, and the rise of

[411] Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 186.
[412] Asef Bayat, ed. *Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 39.
[413] Ibid., 25 (Italics added).
[414] Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 195.

private Islam as indications that Islamism had transformed to post-Islamism.[415]

Gilles Kepel, a French sociologist, echoed a similar line of argument viewing Islamism as a movement that is now replacing its "utopian vision" by coming to terms with "concrete realities."[416] It is unclear as to whether Kepel was influenced by Bayat, but he too referred to post-Islamism as an Islamic movement with a strong liberal and democratic impulse.[417] Despite Bayat's conviction that Roy and Kepel have somewhat confused readers as to what he originally meant by post-Islamism, there are no obvious divergences in the way the term post-Islamism has been deployed by these scholars.[418] Nonetheless, Bayat did aim to distance his notion of post-Islamism from that of Roy and Kepel by characterizing it not simply as a condition but also as a "conscious project," both intellectual and pragmatic, taken up by previous Islamists. In this new condition, Islamists tend to abandon the discourse of obligation and duties and adopt liberal values of rights and freedom. Post-Islamism, for Bayat, then "represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity with rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty…[and] instead of duties, [post-Islamism calls for] plurality in place of a singular authoritative voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past."[419]

Farhang Rajãee, a relative latecomer to this line of theorization, sympathized with Bayat's thesis and viewed post-Islamism as a project of "restoration" that aims to combine Islam and modernity. For him, contrary to "Islamist religionists, [post-Islamists]… do not see the world as an us-them dichotomy, and unlike their revolutionary brothers, they do not see life as a constant

[415] Peter Mandaville, *Islam and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2014), 371.
[416] Gilles Kepel, "Islamism Reconsidered," *Harvard International Review* 22. (2000): 26.
[417] Ibid.
[418] Asef Bayat, "What is Post-Islamism?" *Ism Review* 16 (Autumn 2005) [https://goo.gl/GUopeU].
Here Bayat writes: "While the term's currency [that is post-Islamism] may be welcome, the particular way in which it has been employed [by Roy and Kepel] seems to have caused more confusion than clarity."
[419] Bayat, ed. *Post-Islamism*, 8.

struggle along a friend-enemy divide."[420] Both Rajāee and Bayat appeared reluctant to give away the free pass of "post-Islamism" to any form of Muslim politics that adopts a certain façade of modern politics. Rajāee uses "modernism" in negative terms in order to refer to Islamists' utilization of modern apparatuses and technology, and Bayat differentiated between post-Islamists and those who adopt the path of electoral politics as a way to advance an Islamist agenda.[421] For Bayat, a political gesture could only claim the title "post-Islamist" if it fully renounces its Islamicizing tendencies and conforms to liberalism. Bayat even went as far as to express comfort with equating post-Islamism with liberal Islam. He wrote: "if 'liberal Islam' means an interpretation of Islam that accommodates modern democracy, a civil non-religious state, freedom of thought, and human progress, then certainly this shares considerably with post-Islamist thought."[422]

Bayat, however, was keen to stress that post-Islamism does not mean abandoning Islam. In fact, post-Islamism, in Bayat's use of the term, aims to maintain "religious ethics in society" and "an active role for religion in the public sphere."[423] Bayat mentions the Iranian youth who engage in "underground music, illicit sex and dating games, drug use and fashion," yet they did not "abandon their Islam altogether."[424]

It is safe to give Bayat full credit for popularizing the term "post-Islamism" in the academy. Mojtaba Mahdavi, for instance, adopted Bayat's post-Islamism without any hesitation and re-applied it to the case of Iran. He added more content to Bayat's observations but remained

[420] Farhang Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism: The Changing Discourse in Iran* (University of Texas Press, 2007), 22.
[421] Bayat, ed. *Post-Islamism*, 26.
[422] Ibid., 27.
[423] Ibid., 9, 8.
[424] Ibid., 40.

in full conformity with Bayat's use of the term and this trend may be ongoing.[425] In 2007, the British newspaper *The Guardian* published an opinion piece where the future of post-Islamist politics was analyzed, and one must not be taken by surprise if the term gets recycled in the academy, media, and policymaking, and in general discussions in the near future.[426]

But to what extent is the concept post-Islamism able to explain the politics of the post-revolutionary condition in Iran? If Khomeini and his close disciples were willing to provide any concession to the *maslahat* of the state at the expense of overriding the religious canon, then were does his approach fall in the Islamist-versus-post-Islamist dichotomy? Who exactly were the Islamists that decided *to break* from their convictions and become post-Islamists? To what extent was post-Islamism in fact a conscious project as opposed to a forced material condition? If post-Islamism and liberal Islam are synonymous, what may non-liberal Islamic-oriented contestations of state power be called? What is the missing piece in reading the post-revolutionary interaction between politics and religion from the standpoint of post-Islamism?

In attempting to answer these questions, this chapter will problematize the concept of post-Islamism by highlighting the flaws and shortcomings of the concept in explaining the process through which Iranian Muslims encountered state power in modern Iran. Bayat's outline of post-Islamism will be subject of scrutiny while providing the historical context to the trends that Bayat and others identify as a "discursive shift" in the post-revolutionary condition. In order to better historically and intellectually locate Bayat's post-Islamist trends, the ideas of "post-Islamist" thinkers will be invoked and analyzed against Bayat's conceptual framework, and lastly a general attempt will be made to outline an alternative definition for post-Islamism.

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[425] Mojtaba Mahdavi "Post-Islamist Trends in Post revolutionary Iran," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 31 no. 1 (2011): 94-109.
[426] Ali Eteraz, "Post-Islamism," *The Guardian*, October 31, 2007, https://goo.gl/bStv6z.

Bayat's Post-Islamism:

What is fundamentally problematic about Bayat's post-Islamism is that he never clearly defined what Islamism is. The clearest Bayat definition he offered for Islamism was "those ideologies and movements that strive to establish some kind of an 'Islamic order'—a religious state, sharia law and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities."[427] In the case of Iran, Bayat contended that central "to Iran's Islamism was the establishment of an Islamic state based on *wilayat al-faqih*."[428] As limited as these definitions appear, realization of *shari'a* law through the doctrine of *velāyat-e faqih* seems to define the core agenda of Islamism according to Bayat. For Bayat, Islamism and the Usuli's rigorous project of including *velāyat-e faqih* in the Iranian constitution are synonymous, and Islamism cannot be imagined outside the party that wished to rule post-revolutionary Iran according to a jurisprudential reading of Islam. This is while, as previously shown, the phantasy of Islamism concerning the state contained a constitutionalist democracy *only* observant of religious values as opposed to a state governed strictly by *shari'a* law. "Islamic government," as a concept, as Hosseinizādeh puts it, was an empty signifier denoting not the rule of *shari'a*, but a system that combines economic prosperity and ethical conduct.[429] In fact, combining politics with spirituality and ethics was the promise of Islamism.[430] Also the notion of *velāyat-e faqih* was never on the agenda of Islamist activism, and advocacy of the concept began to be heard only a few months after the Revolution. In fact *velāyat-e faqih* was a post-revolutionary Usuli initiative and its success had more to do with

[427] Bayat, ed. *Post-Islamism*, 4.
[428] Ibid., 38.
[429] S. Mohammad Ali Hosseinizādeh, *Islam-e Siāsi dar Iran* [Political Islam in Iran] (Qom: Mofid Publication, 2006), 264.
[430] Ibid., 469.

contingencies of the post-revolutionary state formation as opposed to the Islamists' doctrinal agenda.[431] Undoubtedly, part of the Islamists' energy was appropriated as the ideology of the post-revolutionary state, but the resistant ethos of Islamism did not fully dissipate and various brands of Islamism were among the first groups that came into conflict with the Usuli consolidation of power in the post-revolutionary situation.

Islamism Contesting Post-Revolutionary Power:

Among the first Islamist groups that did not withstand the clergy's authoritarian drive were the anti-Shah activists of the Freedom Movement (*nehzat-e Āzādi*).[432] Members and associates of the Islamist Freedom Movement were able to form the provisional government after the Revolution, and they took charge of drafting the first constitution in which there was no mention of *velāyat-e faqih*.[433] During the Assembly of Experts, Islamist Ezzatollāh Sahābi (1930–2011) expressed discontent with inclusion of *velāyat-e faqih*, not out of secular concerns, but rather his reasoning was based on Ayatollāh's Na'ini's attempt at reconciling Islam with *raison d'Etat.*[434] The provisional government headed by Mehdi Bāzargān (1907–1995) also came into various conflicts with the clerical apparatus, the most critical of which concerned the new constitution and the judicial system. "Bāzargān who had fought the Shah precisely over the issue of human rights… [held that] the judicial system should embody basic human rights, particularly the principle of equality before the law and should improve rather than undo the secular reforms of

[431] Ibid., 384.
[432] Ervand Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojāhedin* (IB Tauris, 1989), 82.
[433] Ibid., 54.
[434] *Sūrat-e Mashrūh-e Mozākerāt-e Bāznegari-e Qānūn-e Asāsi-e Jomhūri-e Eslāmi-e Iran* [The Complete Report of the Re-Appraisal of the Islamic Republic's Constitution] (henceforth:, *Qānūn-e Asāsi*), 88. Sahābi states that "*velāyat-e faqih* does not mean that a jurist must assume an executive position and have a share in distribution and supervision of power." For Na'ini's ideas see Chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation.

[the] 1930s."[435] He and his Islamist sympathizers also believed that the "Constitution should treat all, including the clergy, as equal citizens, place ultimate sovereignty in the people, and be modeled on modern Western constitutions."[436] Opposing Bāzargān, while having a stronger hand in confronting national crises with the backing of the charismatic Khomeini, the Usuli apparatus forced Bāzargān to resign. He was found guilty for deviating from the Imam's line, meaning he would not bow down to the authoritarian wishes of the consolidating clerical state.[437]

The Islamist Banisadr, the next president, experienced a similar fate to that of Bāzargān. Banisadr, who had reprinted Fārsi's *Charter of the Islamic Movement* before the Revolution, was Khomeini's close associate during the leader's stay in Paris. In the *Charter of the Islamic Movement*, not only was there no mention of *velāyat-e faqih*, one identifies a certain anti-authoritarian ethos in line with anti-colonialism and anti-despotism. The Charter had framed Islamists' activism as a continuation of the constitutionalist movement.[438]

Among the non-clerical members of the Assembly of Experts, Banisadr showed no sign of supporting the inclusion of *velāyat-e faqih* in the constitution and warned the members of handing over excessive power to the *faqih*.[439] After the resignation of Bāzargān, he secured a landslide victory as President, but soon conflict between the president and the clerical authority erupted. He was accused of being "a Bāzargān with a different face," and his commitment to the concept of *velāyat-e faqih* came under intense scrutiny.[440] Prior to the Revolution, Banisadr envisioned the idea of Islamic government as one with a highly decentralized state with every

[435] Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, 52.
[436] Ibid.
[437] Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, 57.
[438] Jalāleddin Fārsi, "Manshoore Nehzat-e Islami," in Rasul Jafariyan, *The Political-Islamic Pamphlets of the Pahlavi Period* vol.1 (Tehran: Markaze Asnāde Enghelab-e Islami, 2005), 575.
[439] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent*, 106.
[440] Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, 60.

citizen exercising the function of the Imamate.[441] "For Banisadr, the Government of God was to be maintained and municipally organized by a network of mosques, rather than through a hierarchical relation between infallible imams and their uniformed followers."[442] None of these theories where materialized in practice, yet besides being labelled a power monger and accused of having a cult of personality by his opponents, one may not deny the impact of his Islamist conviction in his confrontation with the clerical apparatus.[443] At first, Banisadr maintained the façade of having good relations with the Usulis, but soon matters of dispute increased, forcing him to side with the anti-clerical Mojāhedin (MKO).[444] Eventually, with Mojāhedin's support he called for the downfall of a clerical state, which according to him "was on all counts worse—more tyrannical, more unjust and more blood thirsty than the previous regime."[445] A mass demonstration in support of him took place and the state responded accordingly. Banisadr was removed from the presidency on account of "incompetency" and the state successfully suppressed the opposition.[446] If Bāzargān's resignation was concurrent with the rise of the phrase "the Second Islamic Revolution," the consolidation of state power through the Usulis after ousting Banisadr was called the "Third Islamic Revolution."[447]

The notorious Mojāhedin and their radical activism also must be seen within Islamist-Usuli state hostility. In the post-revolutionary condition, "the growing appeal of the Mojāhedin in the streets closely corresponded to the emergence of the clergy in the corridors of power," but

[441] In general, Banisdar had a rather novel anti-authoritarian reading of Shi'ism. His analysis of the Shi'i concept of Imamate was in line with anti-dogmatic free-thinking scientific struggles. See Abolhasan Banisdar, *Ta'mim-e Emāmat va Mobārezeh bā Sānsur* [Extension of Imamate and Fighting Censorship] (Abrari Publication, date unknown).
[442] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent*, 119.
[443] Ibid., 128.
[444] Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, 60.
[445] Ibid., 67.
[446] Ibid.
[447] Ibid., 69.

eventually the clergy triumphed, making the Mojāhedin the third Islamist revolutionary fraction that was discarded from the state machine.[448]

Initially the Mojāhedin made all attempts necessary in the provision of their ideological commitment to operate within the confines of the emerging Islamic Republic, yet their refusal to participate in the referendum to ratify the constitution with the *velāyat-e-faqih* clause included counted as their first act of open defiance in relation to the clerical state.[449] "Criticizing the Constitution, the Mojāhedin revealed that before his death [even] Tāleqāni had grown so disillusioned with the Assembly of Experts, especially with its notion of velāyat-e faqih, that he had boycotted most of its sessions."[450] In return, Masoud Rajavi, the head of the organization, was barred from entering the presidential election, and in future parliamentary elections Mojāhedins' supporters were not able to secure victory, for which they blamed authorities for not conducting a fair election.[451] In their political struggles, the long pre-revolutionary rift between the Islamists and Usulis now manifested itself in the state scene. Mojāhedin called the Usulis "reactionaries" and the Usulis charged them with hypocrisy and accused them of being those who promote Islam minus the clergy.[452] Eventually the ruling elite of Mojāhedin concluded that "peaceful opposition was impossible and that the regime would not tolerate a single Mojāhedin deputy inside the Majlis." They also concluded that "We have done our best to persevere on the

[448] Ibid., 42.
[449] Kenneth Katzman "Iran: The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran," in *Iran: Outlaw, Outcast, or Normal Country?* ed. Albert V. Benliot (New York: Nova Publishers, 2001), 101.
[450] Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, 197. Mahmoud Taleqani (1911–1979) was a prominent revolutionary figure with mass support among Islamists, including the MKO followers. He died in the midst of the Assembly of Experts. There are accounts that he was dissatisfied with the direction taken by clerics who were adamant to include the clause on *velāyat-e-faqih*, and he showed his implicit opposition by sitting on the ground in the Assembly and not on designated chairs.
[451] Ibid., 202.
[452] Ibid., 205, 65. The slogan "Islam minus clergy" was stipulated by Ali Shariati and had become a reference point for Islamist groups challenging clerical power.

peaceful path, but the reactionaries have forced us to seek another road."[453] Mojāhedin then adopted armed struggle, sided with Banisadr in political showdowns in the streets, and were eventually suppressed and eliminated from the political scene. Khomeini once said: "Our real enemy is neither in Iraq, nor in Kurdistan, nor anywhere else, but right here in Tehran. It is the monafeqin."[454]

One must also not neglect the radical Islamist Forqān group whose attitude towards the emerging state was uncompromising from the outset. Marxist in orientation yet observant of religious rituals, members of the Forqān group were among the first to employ the term *akhūndism* (mullaism) to describe the ideology of the post-revolutionary clerical state.[455] Highly influenced by Ali Shariati (1933–1977) and his delineation of the concept *permanent revolution*, their post-revolutionary activism mainly focused on removing the clergy from state power. In their writings, they warned their audience about the "revival of the ruling clergy," and described the "clergy's excessive interventions" in state affairs as "catastrophic."[456] Headed by young Akbar Goodarzi (1959–1980), an activist with some clerical training, Forqan did not shy away from armed struggle and assassination of those elements they perceived as the embodiment of social regression (*irtijā'*).[457] Unlike MKO, Forqān members did not have statist aspirations, and their political significance relied on their ideologically oriented terrorist activities. They were responsible for claiming the life of the prominent intellectual clergy Mortezā Motaharri (1919–

[453] Ibid., 205.
[454] Ibid., 259. Mojāhedin are referred to as "monāfeghin" (the hypocrites) up to this date in Iranian official discourse. The term monāfegh is a Quranic description of those who seemed to convert to Islam but did so only in appearance.
[455] Rasul Jafariyan, "Jaryānhā va Sāzmānhāy-e Mazhabi-Siyāsi-e Iran" [Religio-Political Currents and Organizations in Iran] (Tehran: Khāneh Ketāb, 2012), 678.
[456] Ibid., 681.
[457] Ronen A. Cohen, *Revolution Under Attack, The Forqan Group of Iran* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 79-100. Cohen speculates over the question of whether Forqan was in fact supported by foreign intelligence organizations. Given the professional nature of Forgan's terrorist activities, Cohen concludes that the organization could have received support from outside the country.

1979), and their assassination attempts on Ayatollāh Khāmenei and Rafsanjāni remained abortive. Eventually the organization was dismantled as most of their active members including Goodarzi were caught and executed in prison by the state.[458]

These were only four instances of groups with soft and radical Islamist inclinations that not only did not support the doctrine and practice of *velāyat-e-faqih*, they were the first to greatly challenge Usuli consolidation of state power. Despite the internal variance, there was a consensus among these groups that the Revolution was not yet over, and until *velāyat-e-faqih* was removed from the Constitution the democratic and constitutionalist ethos of Islamism would not yet be realized. The fact that Islamists opposed *velāyat-e-faqih* greatly challenges Bayat's sweeping generalization concerning Islamism and his limited definition of the term as a *shari'a*-inclined political agenda through the implementation of *velāyat-e-faqih.* Not only was Islamism not a monolithic ideology, it was more than just an ideology of power. Instead, Islamism operated as an ideology of resistance in the post-revolutionary condition. Therefore, Bayat's post-Islamism, to use Peter Mandavilles' words, relies on "too narrow a conceptualization of Islamism," and Salwa Ismail is correct when she suggests, "Before declaring the advent of post-Islamism, we should question the assumption that Islamism was ever coherent and homogenous."[459]

The Reign of *Maslahat:*

One has to note that Islamists were not alone in their failure to identify with *velāyat-e-faqih*; even grand Ayatollāhs who did not recognize the exercise of the new apparatus were silenced and alienated by the state. Not impressed with the new constitution, Ayatollāh

[458] Ibid., 115-122.
[459] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics,* 372.

Mohammad Kāzem Shariatmadāri (1906–1986) was among the first great religious scholars to distance himself from the direction adopted by Khomeini in state building. He believed that Khomeini's account of *velāyat-e-faqih* "violated the shari'a as well as the principle of democracy and popular sovereignty; that the true role of the ulamā was not to meddle in politics but to guard Islam."[460] For his stance and his supporters' alleged contacts with the United States he was placed under house arrest; the party of his followers, *Islamic People's Republican Party*, was dissolved, and eventually he was disqualified as *marja'-e taqlid*.[461] The Islamic Republic "had done what no Shah had ever dared to do," and this was the case for the fate of Ayatollāh Montazeri as well.[462] An ardent supporter of *velāyat-e-faqih* in the initial stage of the Revolution, he was designated as heir to Khomeini in 1985.[463] Criticism of the mass execution of opposition inside Evin prison, and the involvement of his associates in exposing Iran's secret arms deal with the United States, cost Montazeri his career as a future leader of the country.

Faced with a shortage of arms in the war against Iraq, the Rafsanjāni front secretly launched talks with Robert McFarlane, then United States National Security Advisor, in meetings in Tehran. The objective was to buy arms in exchange for Iran lobbying for the freedom of US hostages in Lebanon.[464] The parties involved in the negotiation had ensured that Montazeri would not be informed of the talks lest he may oppose direct engagement with the United States.[465] There was also another reason for keeping the affairs discreet and that was Montazri's son-in-law's brother, Mehdi Hashemi, (1946–1987) and his involvement in foreign affairs and his particular influence in Lebanon. Shortly after the Revolution, Mehdi Hashemi

[460] Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, 56.
[461] Ibid., 58.
[462] Ibid.
[463] Sussan Siavoshi, *The Life and Thought of Iran's Revolutionary Ayatollah* (Cambrige: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 119.
[464] Schwerin, *The Dissident Mullah,* 96.
[465] Siavoshi, *The Life and Thought*, 128.

began supporting militant Islamic groups in the Muslim world under the banner of an organization called the "Office for Islamic Liberation Movement."[466] A reader of Shariati and his famous theory of "Islam minus the clergy," Hashemi was resented by the conservative clergy for his "radical leftist views as well as modernist religious beliefs."[467] Mehdi Hashemi was also among the early advocates of "exporting the revolution"—that is, encouraging other countries, particularly those in the Muslim world, to emulate the Iranian revolutionary model—and made an effective presence in Lebanon and Afghanistan.[468] Initially Khomeini shared and in fact propagated the discourse pertaining to the export of the Revolution, but, in the face of international isolation and pressure from abroad, he soon sided with a "more pragmatic policy that favored proper relations with all countries, and subsequently adopted an intermediate position between the radical faction and the proponents of a more cautious approach based on the interests of the State" and its foreign policy.[469] Rafsanjāni, the emblem of the pragmatic approach, along with Khomeini's son, Ahmad (1946–1995), began to disdain Hāshemi's radicalism and growing influence in foreign policy and took measures to contain him.[470] Being informed of secret negotiations, Hāshemi initially made attempts to disrupt the talks via his influence in Lebanon and eventually exposed the deal through the Lebanese weekly *alshiraa*.[471] The exposure produced a huge scandal, surprisingly not so much for the Rafsanjāni front, because the entire initiative, also known as the Iran-Contra affair, was coordinated by Khomeini.[472] In fact Khomeini had warned Montazeri in 1986 about his proximity with Hāshemi, for not only did Hāshemi face accusations of murder but also his activism abroad was

[466] Schwerin, *The Dissident Mullah*, 91.
[467] Ibid., 93.
[468] Siavoshi, *The Life and Thought*, 127-128. .
[469] Schwerin, *The Dissident Mullah*, 91.
[470] Ibid., 95. They even offered Hāshemi a diplomatic cultural mission abroad, which he denied.
[471] Ibid., 101.
[472] Ibid.

deemed as interference in state affairs. In a letter to Montazeri, Khomeini wrote: "all those activities under the guise of supporting liberation organizations must stop and those involved must be put on trial."[473] Hāshemi was soon tried in court and then executed, allowing Rafsanjāni to hint to the international players that Iran has toned down its revolutionary momentum.[474] To frame the process that succeeded in containing Hāshmi's radical initiative of "exporting the Revolution" in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, one may state that the Islamist *war-machine* was gradually being appropriated by the State Apparatus.

Upon the mass trial and execution of MKO sympathizers in Iranian prison, which took place in reaction to the MKO offensive on Iranian soil after the Iran-Iraq war, Montazeri voiced his opposition to the process.[475] He expressed absolute dismay with the executions calling them "unlawful" and "un-Islamic."[476] Khomeini wrote to Montazeri that "In Islam the interests of the state are paramount and all else and everything else must be subordinate to them."[477] Montazeri, having little regard for *maslahat*, soon witnessed a swift process to have him resign as the heir to the leader. He was eventually forced to resign and that marked the end of his career as a member of the ruling elite. After Khomeini's demise, Montazeri initially kept a low profile but broke his silence in opposition to the "government's intentions to take up foreign loans to finance the post-war reconstruction."[478] As a result he was boycotted and later on when defying Khāmenei's

[473] Ruhullah Khomeini, "Nāme be Aghāye Montazeri" [A Letter to Mr. Montazeri] in *Sahifeh'ye Imam:* [Leaves of illumination: Collection of Imam Khomeini's Writings] (Tehran: The Center for Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, 2000, 1981-89), Vo. 20, 135-137.
[474] Schwerin, *The Dissident Mullah*, 105.
[475] Shahrough Akhawi, "The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein'ali Montazeri in the Politics of Post-1979 Iran," *Iranian Studies* 41, no. 5, (December 2008): 657.
[476] Schwerin, *The Dissident Mullah*, 110.
[477] As quoted in Ibid., 123.
[478] Ibid., 128.

power, he was put under house arrest.[479] The emblem of strict Usuli sentiments and the export of the Revolution was fully eliminated from state politics.

Certainly, behind the realpolitik of all state measures sat the notion of *maslahat* of the modern state. On a certain occasion, Ayatollāh Sāfi, the Secretary of the Guardian Council, resigned over dissatisfaction with the primacy bestowed on *maslahat* in affairs related to legislation. "Imam Khomeini acknowledged the validity of Safi's objection but nevertheless affirmed that his revolutionary deviation [towards *raison d'Etat*] was necessary."[480] As Sa'id Arjomand concludes: "the legal logic and rationality of the modern state Khomeini had swallowed thus finally overcame the traditional logic of the Shi'i jurist law."[481] During his reign, there was a council named Determination of the Interest of the Islamic Order (*majma'e tashkhis-e maslahat-e nezām*) created to "to resolve the uncertain status of the novel government ordinance and the difficulties in Islamicizing the Iranian public law."[482] A supporter of the Council called the initiative "the most important of all the achievements of the revolution," which implied naturalizing the secularity of the nation-state yet giving it a religious façade.[483] Also, the case of separating the function of *faqih* and *marja'*, which was adopted by the new amendment to the Constitution, implied that the "the State did not receive its legitimacy from the

[479] Akhawi, "The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein'ali Montazeri," 648.
[480] Sa'id Amir Arjomand, *After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors* (Oxford University Press, 2009).
[481] Ibid., 35. The case of Ayatollah Sāfi and his challenges to the rulings of the modern state is a notable one in the early confrontation between pastoral power and raison d'Etat in post-revolutionary Iran. Ayatollah Sāfi was a critic of the famous *Shahid-e Javid*, the book that had depicted Imam Hussain as a revolutionary leader in search of creating an Islamic State. He was also a critical of *irfan* (mysticism), and his position on religious affairs embodied the perspective of traditional Usulis whose views were at odds with the *maslahat* of the modern state. For instance, he was opposed to the creation of a ministry of intelligence, deeming it un-Islamic, and in general he did not appreciate the primacy given to *maslahat* under Khomeini. He resigned as a member of the Guardian Council in 1988. For more on Ayatollah Sāfi, see: Ali Ashraf Fathi, "Vākāvy-e Nezām-e Fekry-e Kohansāl-tarin Marja'e Taghlid-e Shi'e, Negahbān-e Sonnat va Daghdaghey-e Tahdid-e Ghodrat," [A Study of the System of Thought of the Oldest Shi'i Marja', The Dfender of Tradition and Concerns with Limiting Power]. *Taghrirāt Magazine.* (April 2016).
[482] Ibid.
[483] Ibid.

faqih, but the faqih depended on the State for his own legitimacy," which was entirely against the original premise that "the faqih... the most learned scholar, had been meant to supervise the three branches of government in order to ensure that their policies conformed to Islam."[484] The modern state had appropriated Islam.

With this context in mind, one may state that if the beginning of post-Islamism, as stipulated by Bayat, was the moment of exhaustion of the energy and the symbols of Islamism, then Khomeini himself may be characterized as the initiator of post-Islamism.
Through experimentation, Khomeini soon realized that appropriation of the revolutionary religious ideology in fact operated as a great vehicle for the consolidation of power, and the Islamic Republic as an apparatus would not survive without subordinating Islam to the imposition of the modern nation-state. It is for this reason that "once he had the constitution he wanted and securely won the revolutionary power struggle, he dropped his emphasis on ideology in favor of the rule of law."[485] During the immediate post-revolutionary period, state bureaucracy expanded by 300 percent in the years 1979 to 1987, requiring discourses and techniques pertaining to state governance to replace heated revolutionary rhetoric.[486] If ideological commitment (*maktabi būdan*) was a priority of Khomeini's state in the early stages of the revolution, his invocation of the concept dropped from 37 times during the first Majlis election in 1980s to five and to, at the most, two during the second and third Majlis election.[487] The more the state consolidated, religious ideological sentiments subsided and gave their place to a discursive regime pertaining to bio-power. Under the doctrine of *maslahat*, the Islamic state had found itself in the uncomfortable position of expanding and contracting the *shari'a* such that it

[484] Schwerin. *The Dissident Mullāh*, 127, 128.
[485] Arjomand, *After Khomeini*, 30.
[486] Abrahamian, *Radical Islam*, 72.
[487] Arjomand, *After Khomeini*, 30.

would conform to the realities of modern state management. And it was here that Soroush's theory of *Qabz va Bast* appeared not as a challenge to the status of quo, but rather as a theorization of it.

Soroush's theory of *Qabz va Bast* was developed during the final years of Khomeini's life, exactly when contestation over what constituted religious knowledge concerning management of the state was at its height.[488] If *Qabz va Bast* was an abstract theoretical intervention influenced by the philosophy of science, the *Islamic Republic* itself, as a modern experiment, was the embodiment of the expansion and contraction of *shari'a* mediated through state power. Through *maslahat*, religious canon was expanded and contracted to conform to modern arts of government. Here the discourse pertaining to the management of the modern state also influenced the way in which *shari'a* was invoked, organized, and turned into a "regime of truth." In that sense, Soroush had not proposed a radical theory. Rather he had merely described contemporary practices of power in theoretical terms. Sourosh theorized the status quo and in fact when complaints were made to Khomeini about the heretical nature of his theory, Khomeini stated in private that there was nothing wrong with Soroush's line of reasoning.[489] Soroush theorized what Khomeini experienced on a daily basis in his attempt to expand and contract Islam to conform to the realities of the modern state.

In short, if there is anything post-Islamist about Soroush's theoretical investigation, it was the philosophical description of the experimentation of Iranian Muslims with state power. In that sense, there seems to be more evidence to suggest that Bayat's post-Islamism was a natural "material condition" as opposed to a "conscious project." Post-Islamism, as Bayat understands the term, was the fate of any ideological discourse meeting the bio-power of modern

[488] Hosseinizādeh, *Islam-e Siāsi dar Iran*, 368.
[489] Soroush revealed this to the author of this dissertation in a private conversation.

governmental rule, and that implies that in locating a transition from Islamism to post-Islamism there is one gigantic factor absent in Bayat's analysis and that of others, and that is the modern state. Bayat's Islamism was doomed to "fail" upon its encounter with a certain governmental reason based on *politique*, the outlook that had originally emerged as a heresy to the world of the cosmos.[490] Given the contingencies of bio-power and the urgency of the modern state to conform to certain measures of the liberal art of government, as delineated by Foucault, Muslim statists, or what has elsewhere been referred to as neo-Islamists, had no choice but to downplay strict ideological positioning in favour of the interests of the modern state. As Wael shows in *Impossible State*, the homo-economicus subjectivity of the modern state remains at odds with the highly spiritually disciplined Muslim subjectivity.[491] Secularism in Wael Hallaq's perspective is a "theology" of the modern state with its own metaphysics.[492] This theology, like all theologies, regulates one's conduct in both the private and public sphere while having the most sophisticated modern technologies and apparatus at its disposal in order to assert itself.[493] Panoptic eyes, new media surveillance, state and market aggressive regulatory mechanisms, police, hospitals, schools, prisons, and other repressive and ideological state apparatuses are all there to ensure conversion of state subjects to this theology. Hence, when Roy identifies Islamism with "failure" in offering an alternative model for the state, he does not acknowledge the agency of the modern state in asserting its techniques and discourses of governance. The modern state is not a "neutral carrier of ideologies," and its institutions adopt certain objectives, rationalities, and discourses pertaining to the ethics of bio-power.[494] According to Foucault, *raison d'Etat* or the *maslahat*

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[490] Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 246.
[491] Wael Hallaq, *The Impossible State: Islam, politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), Ch. 5.
[492] Wael Hallq, "Beyond Secularism & Islamism," (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WFAqQiIVsF8).
[493] Ibid.
[494] Tony Bennett, *Culture: A Reformer's Science* (London: Sage, 1998), 69.

dictates that the state "has its interests and consequently has to defend these interests… but the state's objective must not be that of returning to the unifying position of a total and global [religious] empire at the end of time. It must not dream that one day it will be the empire of the last day."[495] If Khomeini's state had any dream of Iran becoming the empire of the last day, his "drink from the poisoned chalice," as he referred to the acceptance of the UN truce in the Iran-Iraq war, marked the abandonment of his earlier remark that "the road to Jerusalem goes through Karbala."[496] Khomeini realized better than all his disciples that to "govern according to the principle of *raison d'Etat* is to arrange things so that the state becomes sturdy and permanent… and so it becomes strong in the face of everything that may destroy it."[497] Hence, implicit in the primacy of the state over religiosity under Khomeini's apparatus sat a semi-secularized state, the consequence of which was the emergence of a discursive regime, like that of Soroush, to manifest this secularity to public reason. If post-Islamism was a conscious project, its chief architect was Khomeini himself, not the liberal reformists of the Khatami era.

Post-Islamism: Break with or Continuation of Islamism?

Soroush's theoretical intervention did have political implications and his concept of a democratic religious state and his preference of *irfān* over *fiqh* was an implicit challenge to not only *velāyat-e-faqih* but also to the authoritarian nature of Usuli power.[498] But even then Soroush operated within the anti-despotic, anti-authoritarian, non-Usuli tradition of Islamism. With Soroush, the dialectic nature of Islamism (resistance) and the modern state (power) that had

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[495] Michel Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 6.
[496] "Drink from the poisoned chalice" is the famous metaphor employed by Khomeini marking his pragmatism in accepting the realities of war. He stated: "I am so shameful that I am alive to be the one drinking the poisoned chalice (jam-e zāhr) and accepting the resolution." See Rohullah Khomeini, *Sahifah-e Nur: Majmuᶜeh Rahnavard-ha-ye Imam Khomeini* [Leaves of illumination: Collection of Imam Khomeini's messages] Vo. 21. (Tehran: Ministry of Guidance Press, 1981-89), 93. "The road to Jerusalem goes through Karbala" is Khomeini's famous statement marking the phantasmatic and ideological nature of his rhetoric in the early stage of the war.
[497] Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, 4.
[498] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent*, 193.

come into effect since the Constitutional Revolution was once again revived, and his "formal and informal students emerged as the new voice of Islamism" ready to "rescue the revolution from the dogmatic clergy" and to defy the political order that in theory justified its legitimacy through an exclusive interpretation of the religious text.[499] In that sense, Soroush's post-Islamism was barely a disruption from the Islamist paradigm; it was its continuation.

Specifically concerning the relationship to the West, Bayat described "post-Islamists" as those who desire to implement the following strategy: "We take industry, modernization, philosophical and social science categories, and we offer concepts in ethics and mysticism."[500] This position, as Bayat himself acknowledges, was in line with early Muslim reformers such as Al-Afghāni and Mummad Abdu that had once again been rearticulated in the Muslim public sphere. To appreciate the West for its technological advancement, yet problematizing it for a lack of spirituality, and then offering Islam as a middle ground between care of the body and the soul was a classic Islamist position. If Al-Afghāni, the first modern Muslim activist, had encouraged Muslims to adopt science and technology and admonished them for having "lost the will and capacity to engage in original inquiry and critical thinking," the ethos of Soroush's intellectual activism was more or less the same.[501] On what counts as preservation of old customs, Soroush stated that authenticity does not mean "the perpetuation and revival of the offensive and superstitious customs of one's predecessors…. There is no shame in choosing to maintain or abandon certain elements of one's culture on the basis of investigation, insight and critical inquiry."[502] Soroush, similar to Al-Afghāni, called for the release of religious knowledge "from narrow parochial values in the interest of the universally applicable findings of reason," hence it

[499] Ibid., 193.
[500] Bayat, ed. *Post-Islamism*, 50.
[501] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 60.
[502] Soroush, *Reason, Freedom, and Democracy*, 169.

is not clear how Bayat saw Soroush's discourse as a radical "break" from modernist Islamist convention.[503]

There is, however, one explanation for employing the term *post* in reference to the discursive regime produced in the 1990s in the Iranian Muslim public sphere. Among with Western political traditions such as post-Marxism, post-feminism, and post-anarchism, the term "post" often does not denote abandoning or breaking from a specific tradition. For instance, post-anarchist philosopher Richard Day understands "post" as "a way of working self-consciously within a tradition, reevaluating its values, questioning its questions, to produce something new, something other. Not an abandonment of the past, not a synthesis or even a progression, but an intimately connected divergence."[504] Having in mind this notion of "post," one must acknowledge the way in which Soroush sought to reinvent the tradition of Islamism through scrutiny of its foundations. Combining Popperian philosophy with Islamic mysticism, Soroush downplayed Islamist egalitarian concerns and exposed its modernist democratic potentials. In short, Soroush directed Islamism from Marxism towards liberalism. Having a long career in battling secular Marxism, Soroush charged Shariati with turning religion to a modern semi-Marxist ideology implicitly holding him responsible for "the growth of a totalitarian and tyrannical system."[505] With *Qabz va Bast*, Soroush acknowledged the presence of various Islams and hence discredited Islamism for making universalist claims. Besides Popper's post-positivism, Soroush was also influenced by Quine-Dhum's anti-foundationalism in his delineation of pluralism.[506] Various influences, particularly the anti-foundationalism of Quine-

[503] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 42.
[504] Richard JF Day, *Gramsci is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 129.
[505] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent*, 196.
[506] Ibid., 224.

Dhum, shifted Soroush towards a postmodern reading of Islamism. However, given Soroush's predicament with democracy and the liberal values of the modern state, his theoretical interventions eventually landed in a modernist liberal episteme.

The modernist framework of Soroush's approach poses a new challenge to designating the term *post*-Islamism to his philosophical orientation. In not abandoning Islamism Soroush operated as a post-Islamist. But more importantly, he operated as a post-Islamist in finding "a way of working self-consciously within [the] tradition" of Islamism, hence making Islam the master signifier once again in contesting state authoritarianism.[507] Yet, there is a framework in which Soroush's thought can be disqualified as post-Islamist and that is through the second connotation often ascribed to the term *post* in philosophical traditions. According to Farhang Rajaee, post-Islamism consists of philosophical and theological attempts to "utilize the achievements of post-modernity to deconstruct Islamism and its ideology."[508] Rajaee specifically mentions Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida as two post-structuralist thinkers whose methodological approach may have informed critiques of Islamism in Iran. In fact, Rajaee's characterization of the term as a post-structuralist critique of Islamism resonates with the way philosophical traditions such as post-Marxism and post-anarchism claimed the prefix *post* in their respective revivalist attempts.

In part influenced by Jacques Lacan (1901–1981), Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida (1930–2001), post-Marxist philosophers Ernesto Laclau (1935–2014) and Chantal Mouffe employed the post-structuralist tradition to engage with traditional Marxism. Critiquing the essentialism, foundationalism, and universalism of Marxism, they explicitly called their tradition

[507] Bobby S. Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (Zed Books, 2003), 47.
[508] Rajaee, *Islamism and Modernism*, 6.

post-structuralist Marxism or post-Marxism.[509] Richard Day, Saul Newman, and Todd May also conducted similar critical experiments with anarchism and developed a philosophical paradigm known as post-structuralist anarchism or post-anarchism. Defining post-modernism, Saul Newman held that the concept and the philosophical approach do "not mean that we have somehow left modernity behind and entered a new historical era. It is more accurately seen as a kind of critical reflection upon the limits of modernity, and a moment of transcendence which is, at the same time, *within* modernity."[510] A postmodern lens, according to him, allows for a "general interrogation of [the] ontological foundations… [of a given tradition,] the questioning of their coherence, unity, stability, universality and so on."[511] The *post* version of a certain tradition deconstructs that tradition in order to "move within it [while] being faithful to it… [and] radicalize its possibilities."[512]

Specifically concerning political traditions, post-structuralism shifts the attention of political actors from understanding power in terms of juridical sovereignty to pervasive forces within the social field. "Power is dispersed," as Foucault had it; hence, contestation of oppressive power may not be limited to the state apparatus.[513] Power operates both at the micro (molar) and macro (molecular) levels, and these physics of power meet and complement each other in complex power relations. Power is the result of discursive productions mediated through technical means; hence, production, evaluation, and critique of knowledge become the primary task of knowledge producers. Knowledge may not claim universal truth; rather, it is always produced in relation to certain historical contingencies, therefore, intellectuals, instead of being

[509] See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 2001).

[510] Saul Newman, *Politics of Postanarchism* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 49.
[511] Ibid., 48.
[512] Ibid., 48.
[513] See Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, volume I* (New York: Vintage, 1978).

"universal," must become "specific." The task of an intellectual is not to lead humanity to a certain political salvation, rather, through contextual analysis and intervention, the function of a specific intellectual is "to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-evaluate rules and institutions and to participate in the formation of a political will."[514] Oppression exists not only at the level of class, gender, or race, but rather the axes of class, gender, and race intersect, making the tasks of analysis and battling oppression more delicate and at the same time more urgent.[515] Grand utopian visions are only encouraged when they provide a basis for critiquing the present, otherwise phantasmatic constructions of the future only lead to a totalitarian universalist political order.[516] In a nutshell, through its suspicion of grand-narratives, postmodernism destabilizes foundationalist claims in the realm of the political and discourages ideologies from making universal claims. Instead, according to post-structuralism, state oppression may be transcended "through a certain spiritual transformation of relationships" and "creating alternative, non-statist, non-authoritarian relationships between people."[517]

With this context in mind, post-Islamism may be framed as a critical reflection upon the limits of Islamism through its exposure to a post-structuralist framework. This postmodern Islamism enters into a critical conversation with Islamism, destabilizes its foundations, while remaining faithful to its ethos. Given the modernist episteme through which he expanded his theoretical framework, Soroush barely qualifies as a postmodern Islamist. As alluded to earlier, Soroush ultimately remained within the modernist Islamist tradition, but he did make gestures

[514] Michel Foucault, "The Concern for Truth." *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1984* (1977): 255-67.
[515] Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge, *Intersectionality* (John Wiley & Sons: 2016).
[516] Yannis Stavrakakis, *Lacan and the Political* (London: Routledge, 2002).
[517] Newman, *Politics of Postanarchism*, 162.

towards post-Islamism for which he received backlash from his intellectual opponents. Ironically, however, Soroush's philosophical enemies employed a Counter-Enlightenment philosophical canon to critique Soroush's modernism, the implication of which was a further development of a postmodern evaluation of Islamist thought.

Soroush, his Opponent, and Post-Islamism

"I Ahmad Fardid [1909-1994], have a short message to Imam Khomeini: Abdolkarim Soroush will destroy this Revolution," exclaimed the Iranian secular Heideggerian philosopher whose Counter-Enlightenment ideas influenced a generation of Muslim thinkers in post-revolutionary Iran.[518] Fardid, along with Rezā Dāvari Ardakāni, a Tehran University professor of philosophy, comprised the opposing camp to Soroush.[519] They accused Soroush of counter-revolutionary philosophical ideas in his allegiance to Popperian liberalism. Referring to Soroush, Davari held: "Our enemies abroad use … [Popper] to oppose the revolution, and there are people within the ranks of the Islamic Republic who sanctify him and regard any attack on his ideas [as] sacrilegious."[520] The hostility between Davari and Soroush became so intense that even today the debate between the two thinkers, despite shifts in their ideas, captures the binary of post-revolutionary Iranian intellectualism. Some even characterized this binary as a Popper-Heidegger debate mediated through the Iranian situation. Davari resorted to Counter-Enlightenment philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger to critique what was identified as Soroush's liberal, modernist tendencies.[521] Very suspicious towards modernity, Davari argued

[518] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissen*t, 191.
[519] Farzin Vahdat, "Post-revolutionary Islamic Discourses on Modernity in Iran: Expansion and Contraction of Human Subjectivity," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35, no. 4 (2003): 599-631, 600.
[520] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent*, 190.
[521] Vahdat, "Post-revolutionary Islamic Discourses," 607.

for the incompatibility of Islam and modernity, holding that other than exceptional cases the former should not concede to the latter.[522] Davari held that with the "expansion of the Islamic Revolution all social and political categories such as law, politics, and technology should conform to Islam, because Islam cannot conform to these and remain Islam."[523] Soon the Davari-Fardid front gathered an intellectual following among young religious intelligentsia, the most prominent figure of which was Mortezā Āvini (1947-1993). An architect by training, Avini joined the war front as a documentary filmmaker and produced the famous *Ravāyat-e Fatḥ*, a television series covering the war with Avini, dubbing the poetic narrations of the film. Later on, Mehdi Nasiri, Shahriyār Zarshenās, and Mohammad Madadpoor joined the Davari-Fardid front with one driving thesis: Islam and modernity are two contrasting entities and the attempt to combine the two is meaningless. They held Soroush responsible for the futile project of having a conversation between Islamic mysticism and the liberal values of the modern state.[524]

Soroush, however, did not sit still and disseminated his ideas through an active presence in Iranian intellectual circles, the most famous of which was the *Kian* circle. One of Soroush's concepts that certainly had post-modern implications was what he called: *Maximalist* versus *Minimalist Religion*.[525] In a nutshell, Soroush critiqued the expectation that sought to extract all answers concerning modern life from the religious canon. Soroush held that there "is a view that suggests that all the necessary and sufficient measures, instructions and rules for economics, governance, commerce, law, ethics… have been included in Islamic law." He called this perspective a "maximalist understanding of religion."[526] He then stated that "*fiqh* is confined to

[522] Ibid., 609.
[523] Ibid.
[524] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent*, 161.
[525] Abdulkarim Soroush, *The Expansion of Prophetic Experience: Essays on Historicity, Contingency and Plurality in Religion,* Translated by Nilou Mobasser, Edited with Analytical Introduction by Frough Jahanbaksh (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 93.
[526] Ibid., 94.

'precepts' in other words, it is summed up in a series of shoulds and should nots and dos and don'ts. This is a different matter altogether from drawing up plans and programs for life and living."[527] Soroush advocated a minimalist understanding of religion which rejects the idea that religion can act as a blueprint for governing a modern society. Soroush argued:

> Modern human life has not in any way emerged out of religion. No faqih… ever put forward a plan for technology and technical lifestyle… This is because fiqh is a minimalist system. It is conservative and does not set out to change anything… As people's knowledge undergoes transformations, so too will their lives (as will their religious lives and their religious understanding); it is not the other way around.[528]

Through advocacy of minimalist religion, Soroush radically questioned the modernist, universalist assumptions imbedded in Islamism. If one of the premises of Islamism since Assadollāh Kharaghāni was to frame Islam as an all-inclusive religion with a comprehensive agenda for various spheres of modern life, Soroush's minimalist religion was an outright rejection of that thesis. Islam in Soroush's account was not the solution to all predicaments of modernity; in other words, Islam was not the solution (*hal*), as Hasan al-Banna famously held. Specifically concerning the state, Soroush held that even if "religion has spoken about governance, if at all, it has been in minimalist, not maximalist terms. And this minimum is on the subject of legitimacy, not administration."[529] Soroush defended what he a called "scientific management of society," which stood at odds with attempts to Islamicize the modern state. He held: "In the same way that there does not exist a religious thermodynamics, or religious geometry, governance cannot become religious."[530] With this approach, Soroush remained staunchly critical of the preconceived assumption that Islam is pregnant with wisdom concerning the administration of the whole of life within modernity, as held by Khomeini and Shariati before

[527] Ibid., 100.
[528] Ibid., 107.
[529] Ibid., 116.
[530] Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Islam and Dissent*, 205.

the Revolution. As alluded to earlier, Soroush was not a postmodernist per se, but the anti-foundationalism that he borrowed from Qunine and Duhm certainly informed his critique of Islamist universalist tendencies.

What appears striking is the fact that Soroush's antagonists reached similar conclusions, albeit from an entirely different route. Through arguing for the incompatibility of Islam and modernity, as put forward by Fardid-Dāvari disciples, there was already an implicit acknowledgement of the inability of Islam to be present in all aspects of modernity, hence reifying Soroush's thesis of minimalist religion. This intellectual front, that Āvini was apart of, argued for the supremacy of Islam over modernity, yet that stance rendered a disguised secularism in which the attempt to Islamicize modernity was seen as doomed. If Heidegger's Counter-Enlightenment ideas provided a suspicious view of modernity to this brand of Muslim post-revolutionary intelligentsia, then the project of making Islamism compatible with modern ideologies had already been radically questioned. The "incompatibility thesis," as one may call it, discouraged attempts to extract laws from religion concerning the management of modern life, hence implicitly confirming Soroush's thesis.

Reflecting on the nature of cinema, Āvini questioned the term "Islamic cinema" (*cinamā-ye islami*) through the same framework.[531] Holding that cinema as an apparatus must be understood within the Western cultural context from which it emerged, Āvini argued that cinema is not ideologically neutral. Resonating with apparatus theory in cinema, Āvini held that the cinema can be at the service of Islam, but given the presuppositions attached to its mechanism, it cannot be Islamic.[532] He extended the same thesis to various fields such as economics, banking, modern education, and even the state, and suggested that those who sought to Islamicize these

[531] Sayyid Mortezā Āvini, *Āyne-ye Jādoo* [The Magic Mirror, Vol 1, Theoretical Essays] (Tehran, Sāghi: 2008), 157.
[532] Ibid., 157.

fields were naïve.[533] He saw the attempt to reconcile Islam and Western experimental science as an "assault" against the Islamist ideological front.[534]

Hence, despite the opposition of Āvini's camp to that of Soroush, the similarities between them are astonishing. In the same way that, for Soroush, concepts such as "religious thermodynamics" or "religious geometry" were oxymoronic, for Āvini the term "Islamic cinema" was ambiguous. Soroush's minimalist religion resonated well with Āvini's suspicion that Islam could provide solutions to an inherently ungodly civilization. Heidegger and Popper had met at a crossroads in Iran.

Āvini and Soroush, however, departed on the implications of their findings. While Soroush's concept of minimalist religion was to reduce religious interference in politics, hence allowing the state to take on a liberal leaning, Āvini's incompatibility thesis launched a sceptical stance towards modern institutions as a whole. Āvini never tackled the question of the state directly, but he left enough hints to express disregard for the underpinning assumptions embedded in the modern nation-state.

In *Tose'e va Mabāni-e Tamaddon-e Gharb* (Development and the Foundation of Western Civilization), Āvini launched an attack on the notion of "development," which according to him had interlocking relations with the pleasure-seeking hedonist homo-economicus subjectivity of the capitalist economy:

> Economic development is the attractive vision of the age in which human beings have forgotten God and the immortality of the soul… In our ideological system only a spiritual development is valid… therefore we do not divide the world into developed and underdeveloped nations simply because we do not acknowledge development as a criterion. The question may arise that "can there not be an economic development that

[533] Sayyid Mortezā Āvini, *Tose'e va Mabāni-e Tamaddon-e Gharb* [Development and the Foundation of Western Civilization] (Tehran: Sāghi, 2008), 157.
[534] Ibid.

> does not contradict Islam?" The answer is: yes, but before addressing that question, first, one has to make a case for the necessity of economic development.[535]

Here Avini resonated with Foucault concerning the atheism of modern economics. Echoing thinkers of the Frankfurt school, by whom he was influenced by, Āvini targeted governmental bureaucracy, state propaganda machines, and the education system—all the embodiments of the "dictatorship of economy" (*dictātori-e Eqtesād*).[536] This dictatorship was at the service of "the system" whose original foundation had roots in a machinic understanding of human nature.[537] He even critiqued states' pursuit of nuclear energy for not realizing the dangers associated with such technology.[538] Āvini stated that unless the Revolution dismantles the existing apparatus and offers a new alternative and brings about a new project (*tarhi- no*), one cannot speak of the "victory" of the Revolution. Āvini stressed that a mere political revolution should not impress Islamists since it was natural for revolutions to eventually adopt a different path from what was originally intended by the "movement."[539]

Āvini's distrust of political revolution, his suspicion of the state and capitalism for their incompatibility with Islam, and his call for Islamic alternatives operated as radical critique of Islamists ideological posture. According to Āvini, offering a modernist interpretation of Islam, relying on the apparatus of the modern state to bring about an alternative Muslim world, and Islamist universalist optimism all must be thoroughly scrutinized. If Soroush's lean towards post-Islamism landed him in liberal Islam, Āvini landed in what may be called an anarchist Islam—anarchism in the sense of having major doubts about the major achievements of Western

[535] Ibid., 21.
[536] Ibid., 81.
[537] Ibid., 100.
[538] Ibid., 141.
[539] Ibid., 228.

civilization, namely the ability of the state, capitalism, and modern technological apparatuses to bring about positive social change.

One has to note that despite Āvini's radical scrutiny of modernity, he did not land in the Salafist episteme in which the modern world is considered a pure innovation of the infidels in the *jāhiliyya* social order.[540] There is no doubt that discursively Āvini remained sceptical of Western civilization, yet he was at the same time in conversation with the intellectual giants of modernity, including Marx (1818–1883) and Theodor Adorno (1903–1969) for instance. In fact, when proposing a solution as to how Muslims should confront modernity, once again invoking Fardid, Āvini spoke of *taskhir* (containment or capture).[541] Specifically concerning cinema, influenced by the mystical discourse in which a mystic develops certain supernatural abilities to exercise mastery over the material world, and hence its capture (*taskhir*), Āvini proposed that Muslim filmmakers, while mastering cinematic techniques, should spiritually elevate themselves such that they can subjugate technological machinery for spiritual ends. Otherwise, and without *taskhir*, technology and its Western cultural presuppositions will triumph and rule Muslims; here Āvini certainly echoed Fardid and Jalāl Āle-Ahmad's (1923–1969) famous *Gharbzadegi* (Westoxification) thesis. In Gharbazadegi, Jalal had lamented the lack of Muslims' agency in their confrontation with machines, hence their subordination to the technological and intellectual supremacy of the West. Locating where and how Muslim agency may be exercised in the face of a "satanic civilization" was the prime quest of Āvini, and in that sense his intellectual predicament was not a major departure from that of the conventional Islamist quest. Āvini's

[540] Peter Mandaville, *Islam and Politics* (London: Routledge, 2014), 58.
[541] Morteza Āvini, *How Can Art Be at the Service of Islam? It is Difficult but Not Impossible*, accessed September, 1, 2018, http://cinemapress.ir/news/چگونه-هنر-را-در-خدمت-اسلام-درآوریم-سخت-است-اما-می-شود.

"incompatibility thesis" did not make him turn away from modernity; rather it sought to forge a certain Muslim identity that was able to contain modernity. Āvini wrote:

> Was Islam compatible with *jāhiliyya* that some expect that Islamic culture and [capitalist] economic development to be compatible with each other? No, reconciling these two [Islam and modernity] is impossible. There is, however, one way out, that is to interpret the new culture through the discourse of Islam and that requires us to fully grasp the essence of this new world. Then, this world would be subordinated to Islam since we believe that the material world may be subjugated by a devout person (Ensān-e kāmel). The moment we determine the relation between things with the truth of the religion, then the world would be subjugated by us and the new world will be become captured (*taskhir*). With *taskhir* everything can become subordinated to religious thought even the writings of Marx. What preoccupies Marx has a specific relation with the truth of this world; all one needs to do is to discover that relation, and then Marx will be at the service of Islam. Even Satan has a certain relation with this world… Thus, understanding the new world is essential for us. When we realize the essence of this world, it is then that we may discover its relation with the truth of this world and also religious thought. This is how one may contain (*taskhir*) this world. There is no other way.[542]

Through *taskhir* Āvini hoped to provide a solution to Westoxification, not through the negation of modernity, but rather through containing its ethos. While Soroush sought to read Islam through modernity, Āvini prescribed reading modernity through Islam. Āvini was an Islamist in that he pondered the question of Muslim subjectivity within modernity, and he was a post-Islamist in that he did not share the universalism of Islamism in providing grand solutions to modern crises. Āvini did have a totalizing view of Islam *after* modernity, but his utopian vision only informed his phantasmatic Islamist construct and did not have many ramifications in his actual engagement with modernity.

Āvini had a short life as he perished in a mine explosion while producing a documentary film a few years after the Iran-Iraq war. The "martyred" Āvini was now given the title Master of Pen-Martyrs (*seyyed-e shahidān-e ahl-e ghalam*) by Ayatollāh Khāmenei, and he was to serve as the ideal icon of state cultural policy. Āvini's legacy, however, was paradoxical. Given his

[542] Ibid.

support for Khomeini, some saw him as an apologist for the state, and others saw his radical ideas as a challenge to the status quo. Politically, Āvini influenced the younger generation of Muslims supporting Mahmoud Ahmadinejād's defiant policies against the West. Some were later attracted to state cultural institutions and some became disillusioned with the state as a whole and slowly began to voice their opposition to the state.

Neither Āvini nor Soroush were in fact specifically influenced by post-structuralism in their critique of Islamism. Despite some translations of Foucault and Derrida to Farsi in the 1990s, there was no major engagement with post-structuralism among Islamists, and this may explain why Soroush's postmodernism landed in liberal Popperism and Āvini's anarchism ended up serving the state, acting as a defiant force in international relations over its nuclear program. In that sense, it may be stated that post-structuralist Islamism is still a project to come, but its foundations have been laid down by a new generation of Iranian (post) Islamists.

Āvini through his "incompatibility thesis" and Soroush with his critique of maximalist religion deconstructed modernist Islamist foundations and barred them from grand utopian and universalist claims. Post-structuralist Islamism may continue this critical engagement with Islamism, and instead of placing emphasis on the state it would turn its attention to the microphysics of power and the discursive productions pertaining to the molecular field. In fact, Peter Mandaville had a similar understanding of post-Islamism as he equated the term with "a transformation in how Muslims think about religiously inspired social activism, and shifts in how and where they undertake such activity." He saw post-Islamism not as an "abandonment of Muslim politics, but rather as their reconstitution in forms more suited to a globalized world…

[where] state is only one among many sites of the political."[543] This version of post-Islamism could once again revive (*tajdid*) religion as a liberation theology of the oppressed and turn Islam into the master signifier of movements contesting social inequality, political oppression, and state authoritarianism. Post-Islamism would once again put Islam in conversation with other liberation discourses of late post-modernity, and in the form of "political spirituality," instead of being an apologist for the state, Islamism would insert Muslim subjectivity within contemporary power struggles and take the realization of *umma* as a paradigm for critiquing the state. As Ihsan Dagi suggests, post-Islamism may be imagined as a movement that is not primarily "preoccupied with the state, capturing and using [it] as a transformative agency… As such post-Islamism represents the supremacy of the social over the political. Instead of looking to the state… post-Islamism turns to society and its capabilities to settle political disputes."[544] Post-Islamism would rid Islam of the state apparatus and turn it into a war machine operating outside the *State-form*. Post-Islamism certainly contains the suggestion that "abandoning the idea and ideal that an Islamic state is both theoretically and politically possible. [Hence post-Islamism is an] attempt to conceptualize a polity for Muslims in a world in which there is no preset divine order called the Islamic state."[545] And for this version of post-Islamism to emerge a critical engagement with Āvini and Soroush may be a starting point.

As is evident in the case of Āvini and Soroush, however, not only was post-Islamism not a "pragmatic break" from the Islamist tradition, it operated within the Islamist episteme while radicalizing its possibilities. Post-Islamism exposed the limits of Islamism while maintaining its

[543] Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 376. Overall Mandaville leans towards neoliberal conceptions when speaking of transcending the state. He has social media and the network society of the neoliberal age in mind when speaking of "a globalized world."
[544] Ihsan Dagi, "Post-Islamism a la Turca,"in *Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam*, ed. Asef Bayat (Oxford University Press, 2013), 73.
[544] Ibid.
[545] Ibid.

ethos. Also, Islamism was not an apology for *velāyat-e faqih*; instead it was the main challenger of clerical will to domination. This reading of Islamism greatly challenges Asef Bayat's framework which saw post-Islamism as a critical moment in which Islamists abandoned their support of *velāyat-e faqih* and embraced the liberal values of the modern state. If anyone abandoned the doctrinal reading of *velāyat-e faqih* and made it subordinate to the ethics of bio-power, it was Ayatollāh Khomeini himself. Khomeini's move towards *maslahat* had already proved Soroush's thesis about the minimal role that religion can play in modern state politics. The invocation of *maslahat* also implied that *shari'a* was to be expanded and contracted based on systems of knowledge that it comes in contact with.

Conclusion:

The height of the Soroush-Dāvari debate took place exactly in the midst of a serious encounter of Islam with the modern state in post-revolutionary Iran. The incompatible relations between pastoral and *raison d'Etat* soon manifested themselves in practice, and Khomeini preferred to side with the *maslahat* of the state and subordinate Islam to state reason. Khomeini's *maslahat*-oriented approach produced some conservative backlash but enabled the state to become strong and authoritarian in the face of various oppositions from factions that were previously Khomeini's Islamist allies. As a result, the state's discursive practices gradually replaced neo-Islamist revolutionary rhetoric. Although Soroush and Dāvari were in the business of defending what they considered to be certain intellectual truth, in reality they were theorizing Khomeini's grand experiment. Dāvari's incompatibility thesis justified why Islam could not claim an alternative state and society, and Soroush's minimalist religion drew a conclusion out of the justification that perhaps the whole project was problematic to begin with. Asef Bayat calls this moment of realization "post-Islamism." For Bayat, post-Islamism was a conscious project

that attempted to *break* from Islamism. What Bayat ignored, however, was the "state" factor in what counted as the "failure" of Islamism. Even the strict Usuli project of ruling society through *shari'a* law had to meet with the implications of bio-power and subsequently weaken ideological idealism in favour of the modern state. It is partly true that some of the energy of Islamism was appropriated by the state apparatus, but other parts in fact reproduced its pre-revolutionary momentum and participated in the contestation of state forces. In fact, it may be more accurate to state that it was Usulism that took charge of the state and Islamism remained the resistant force. Islamists were first not to comply with the Usuli will to domination through contesting the concept of *velāyat-e faqih*, and they were among the victims of state authoritarianism. In its ethos, Islamism envisioned a socialist constitutionalist state observant of *shari'a* code. By no means did Islamism fancy a strict enforcement of *shari'a* law. Islamism, however, had other dimensions. First and foremost, Islamism was the embodiment of a Muslim renaissance in the twentieth century that sought to introduce ethics and spirituality to public reason, and by constructing a conversation between Islam and other liberation discourses, it operated as a liberation theology. The question of how governance, in the Foucauldian sense, and spirituality can be combined was the Islamists' main question. In that sense it may be stated that while Soroush was exposing the shortcomings and problematic nature of the Usuli project, his discourse operated within the episteme of Islamism. With Soroush, not only was Islam the master signifier in discourse pertaining to resistance, Islam was once again a liberation theology. Hence, what Bayat identifies as "post-Islamism" was not a break from Islamism; it was the theorization that the Usuli project had failed and Islamism must be revived to expose the failure of the *fiqh*-based Islamic state. Soroush's Islamism was placed in a liberal episteme that was met with intellectual opposition, but the opposition also relied on the discourse of Islamism and

invoked Counter-Enlightenment Western philosophers in order to better confront Soroush's liberalism. The engagement with Counter-Enlightenment thought exposed Islamism to what conveniently may be called a postmodern framework, and this is while Soroush's approach was also influenced by anti-foundationalism in the philosophy of science. Hence, what one may call a postmodern Islamism gradually began to be shaped. This postmodern Islamism exposed the universalist modernist qualities of Islamism yet maintained its anti-authoritarian, liberatory ethos. The best example here is Āvini who supported the post-revolutionary regime, but between the lines in his writing he showed great dissatisfaction with the state and capitalism, and formulated a framework for Islamism imagined outside of the state apparatus. Postmodern Islamism in fact may be called *post-Islamism*, one radically different from what Bayat had in mind. Since the term "post" in other Western political traditions implies revival of a tradition after exposing it to a postmodern/post-structuralist framework, post-Islamism denotes the philosophical and practical approach in which Islamism becomes a subject of scrutiny and revival, having in mind the limits of modernity. This postmodern or post-structuralist Islamism is still in its early stages and is a project to come. Post-structuralist Islamism puts an end to Islamism's obsession with the state and sublimates the energy of Islamism to various struggles pertaining to social justice, combating state oppression, and reviving spiritual and ethical practices. Whatever post-Islamism may be it must be more than what Bayat understood it to be: a scene in which "underground music, illicit sex and dating games, drug use and fashion" has proliferated throughout the social. Post-Islamism is a struggle to create alternatives outside the state, even though these struggles will still be within the grid of *raison d'Etat.* One may be outside the state but not outside "the governmentalization of the state."[546]

[546] In his last governmentality lectures in 1978, Michel Foucault reminds his audience that those movements outside of or opposed to the modern state may not entirely escape the grid of *raison d'Etat*. He writes: "Whether one

Conclusion:

Reflecting on the status of political Islam, Oliver Roy identified the experience of Islamism up to 1990s with a certain "failure." He titled his seminal book *The Failure of Political Islam.* He argued that Muslim countries have failed to offer an alternative model of governance and at best they have emulated the Western model of the nation-state. Having the case of Iran in mind, one must say that Roy was correct.

A few months have past since writing the introduction to this dissertation and signs indicating the failure of the state have become even more alarming. Street riots have continued, the valuation of the US dollar is still on the rise, tough rhetorical exchanges between the US and Iran have intensified, economic conditions have declined, and the state has shown no sign of compromise nor practical intelligence in order to confront the situation. Popular opinion suggests that the Islamic Republic will soon collapse.

Whether the end of the Islamic Republic has in fact begun is still the subject of political speculation, but one thing is for certain: in practice the "Islamic state" has failed to produce the ideal society of its primary engineers. Hence, not only has the Islamic Republic remained bound within the paradigm of the nation-state, nor has it succeeded in offering an Islamic alternative in state governance, it is now being haunted with problems concerning management and the well-being of the population, economic realities and, in short, bio-power. In fact, what counts as the shortcomings of the Islamic Republic is the failure of the state in meeting the ethics of bio-

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opposes civil society to the state, the population to the state, or the nation to the state, it was in any case these elements that were in fact put to work within this genesis of the state, and of the modern state. It is therefore these elements that will be at issue and serve as the stake for both the state and for what is opposed to it. To that extent, the history of *raison d'Etat*, the history of governmental ratio, and the history of counter-conduct opposed to it, are inseparable from each other. See Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population,* 367.

power, the implication of which is public discontent and the state's lack of resilience in the face of various crises. Given the scope of this dissertation this failure appears as no surprise.

As Foucault demonstrates, the birth of bio-politics was at odds with religious art of government. In the European context, the rise of *politique* and *raison-d'Etat* challenged pastoral advocacy and in return clerical institutions identified the ethics of bio-politics with a certain heresy. Hence, as Foucault shows, there is an inherent tension between pastoralism, as an art of government, and state in general and the modern ethics of bio-power in particular. Foucault is also adamant that this inherent tension is not specific to Christianity nor to modernity. He draws on classic Jewish and Greek understandings of political power to show that the God of the Western religions operates in ways that are exclusively different from the gods of the Greek city-state. The pastoral art of government remained apart and exclusive from that of State and it was this classic tension that has reproduced itself in modernity.

Foucault's designation of pastoral power as exclusively different from state power informed this research and its examination of early Islamic history in order to explore the interplay of state and religious institutions. Political anthropology provided clues to translate a pastoral versus state modality to *Tribe* and *State-form*. While State is territorial and through the presence of a sovereign assumes a monopoly over violence and the execution of laws, *Tribe-form* is membership based, and in the absence of a chief's exertion of hierarchical power, it relies on rituals, technologies of the self and sets of codes in order to assert its material and value structure. As Patricia Crone holds, Tribe and State are two exclusive forms of government, meaning that states may not function like tribes, but tribes may transform and become states. Deleuze and Guattari account for the birth of political domination, transformation of technologies of the self and centralization of taxation and land economy as factors that set the

stage for the metamorphosis of Tribe to State. As Feirahi shows, the political entity created by the Prophet Mohammad in Medina shared characteristics of the *Tribe-form*, and Islamic political concepts such as Imāmat, *umma* and *shari'a* had little resonance with governance in the *State-form*. To understand the Prophet's *umma* as Tribe not only anthropologically justifies the political transition that Ibn Khaldun located in the early history of Islam, it also helps to resolve the long debate between Islamists' statist and Muslim secularists' positions.

Reflecting on the early history of Islam, Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth century Muslim historian, identified a metamorphosis of political organization from one form to another. He referred to the change that the Muslim community experienced from the birth of the Medina polity to the Umayyad dynasty as *the transition from Imamate to Mulk*. Umar, the second Caliph, being the key political player in this transition, introduced a series of policies, both political and economic, mostly inspired by the Persian and Roman Empires, that transformed political institutions from *Tribe* to *State-form* in the early history of Islam. The *State-form*, one must add, did not advance without challenge. As Deleuze and Guattari hold, wherever there is State there is war-machine, that which wards off the rise of the State and opposes its machinery. Upon the rise of Mulk/State in the early period, various war-machines contesting the State emerged. The battle of Karbala marked the birth of the most forceful war-machine opposing the State, an event with a tragic ending that led to consolidation of the Umayyad State and the rise of Shi'ism. While the Karbala tragedy helped to solidify Shi'ism as an oppositional ideology/movement, it also made the Imāmi brand of Shi'ism quietist. Though Twelver Shi'ism was not consistently quietist, with the occultation of the twelfths Imam any claim for political power was withdrawn by its intellectual elites making Imāmi Shi'ism the most attractive brand of Shi'ism to reside with the State during the Shi'i-inclined Buyid period.

Therefore, what Ibn Khaldun refers to as a transition from Imamat to Mulk is the transformation of political power on the model of Tribe to State-form. As simple as this categorization may appear the difference between Tribe and State could very well inform an unresolved contemporary debate on the nature of political power in the ideal Islamic entity. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the nation-state a certain debate erupted in the Muslim world that made the mode of politics prescribed by the Prophet the subject of intense debate, scrutiny and political idealization. Muslim statist Rashid Reza referred to various Islamic ordinance on social and political affairs to elucidate a theory for the modern Islamic state and Muslim secularist Abd-Razāq made reference to the absence of order in many fields concerning political organization in the Islamic canon to account for the necessity of secular politics in the Muslim world. Although this debate first originated in Egypt, but with different personalities taking each side, this intellectual confrontation soon made its way to various Islamic circles in the Muslim world in the twentieth century. The Tribe-State dichotomy sheds light on this debate as it confirms the existence of a sophisticated Islamic political organization (*Tribe-form*), hence half way approving the statist position, but it complicates the superimposition of the classic *Tribe-form* of Islam on the modern nation-state, hence challenging the concept "Islamic State." In a nutshell, the Tribe-State dichotomy challenges theorizing a modern Islamic nation-state through the assertion that what is perceived to be *hukumat-e Islami* during the Prophet's time did not follow the model of state. The Prophet Mohammad was never head of state; he was head of, to use Crone's concept, a "super-tribe."

What further problematizes the concept of Islamic State, especially in the case of Iran, is its development in Shi'i political episteme. If Shi'ism emerged as a *war-machine* outside the State-form in early Islam, how was it able to make a claim for a Shi'i Islamic State in modernity

through the concept *velāyat-e faqih?* Both discursive and material conditions played a role in the solidification of the concept in 1980 in Iran. The discursive rise of the concept must be explored during classic Shi'ism when Shi'i elements gradually abandoned radical mystical inclinations and adopted a more rationalist approach under the influence of Mu'tazili thinkers. Rationalism on the part of Shi'is was concurrent with their close association with State power and the rise of Shi'i ulamā as guardians of the Shi'i community in the absence of the twelfth Imām. During the Buyid, Shi'i ulama established a formidable relationship with state authorities and began to draw on knowledge of *kalām* to justify the abandonment of Shi'i hostility towards the state. As relations with state authorities improved, rationalism of Shi'i ulamā intensified and that led to the development of *ijtihad*, a formerly frowned upon concept in Shi'ism that now authorized the Shi'i ulama to employ deductive reasoning in matters of religion. Rationalism of Shi'i ulama and their good ties with state authorities did not go unchallenged and led to a doctrinal split known as the Akhbāri/Usuli debate. Akhbāris stressed reliance on traditions and they despised the rationalism and state inclination of Usulis. Similarly, Usulis accused Akhbāris of extremism, radicalism and being unsuited for affairs related to State. During the Shi'i Safavids, the Usuli strand joined the Safavids in their state-building initiatives and were able to continue the long Usuli pursuit and elevate the status of the ulamā to that of king. This trend continued until the Qajar period wherein under the indirect influence of Sunni thinkers such as Al-Ghazāli, Shi'i ulamā forged an image of the Prophet as sovereign of the state whose authority was divided between the king and the ulamā. Now a *faqih* was not only the leader of the Shi'i community; theoretically he was the king's partner in state affairs in the absence of the twelfths Imam.

Although *fuqaha* developed claims over state affairs they never called for the removal of *saltanat*, nor did they advocate a *faqih* to become the sovereign of the nation-state. Even as late

as the publication of *Kashful-Asrār* in the twentieth century, Ayatollah Khomeini remained cautious and stressed that *velāyat-e faqih* does not mean *fuqaha* taking charge of official power. *Kashful-Asrār* was a response to secularist Ahmad Kasravi who had assumed the task of attacking religious institutions in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution. In the initial stage of the Revolution, religious authorities joined the secular intelligentsia and led the masses against the despotic Shah. Upon the success of the Revolution, however, a rift between secular and religious constitutionalists erupted blocking the secularist horizon of the Revolution. In reaction, Kasravi, embodying the secular intellectuals, took the religious clergy to task, accusing them of seeking worldly power, social regression and intellectual backwardness.

At the heart of the quarrel between the religious and secular icons of the Revolution sat the inherent clash between pastoral and *raison d'Etat*, the two exclusive and inherently opposing arts of government. Similar to the case of Christian Europe, advocates of pastoral power accused defenders of *raison d'Etat* of heresy, and defenders of *politique* held pastoral authorities responsible for political and civilizational decay. Aiming to resolve the dispute, a certain discourse soon emerged that took a middle ground between strictly secularist and religious perspectives. Employing religious signifiers, this new discourse did not deny the relevance and contribution of modern constitutionalism and gradually even advocated constitutionalist ideals within a religious framework. This discourse did not emerge in a vacuum as it had already been developed by Sayyid Jamāl Al-Afghāni during the course of the Constitutional Revolution. This mediating discourse that helped to resolve the dispute between a religious (Usuli) and a secularist approach during the process of nation-state formation is what broadly may be called *Islamism*. As an emerging modernist religious discourse, Islamism borrowed signifiers from various modern discourses such as Marxism and liberalism and adopted an anti-capitalist, anti-colonialist

and anti-despotic tone. In order to make itself credible in the eyes of the emerging middle class, Islamism distanced itself from strict Usuli discourse, hence turning anti-clerical when suitable. There were, however, Usulis who maintained the clerical garb, yet they adopted Islamist discourse. Figures such as Ayatollāh Khomeini, Mortezā Motahari and Mohammad Beheshti are examples of this fusionist discourse that may be called Usuli-Islamist or Islamist-Usulis depending on the degree of their Islamist convictions.

Given the distance between Islamists and clerical Usulis, was the creation of an Islamic state with *velāyat-e faqih* as its core principle advocated by Islamists? The answer is negative. Though Islamists advocated the concept *hukumat-e Islami*, what they had in mind was a constitutionalist socialist democracy with moderate observance of religious creed. In fact, young Islamists residing abroad were hesitant to publish Khomeini's draft of *Velāyat-e Faqih*, and they solely drew upon its anti-colonial and anti-despotic content in their anti-Shah activism. This means that the success of *velāyat-e faqih* in becoming the ruling principle of post-revolutionary Iran had more to do with the charisma of Ayatollāh Khomeini as the leader of the Islamic Revolution and also political contingencies in the immediate post-revolutionary period than a doctrinal advocacy on the part of Islamists. Usuli opportunism in asserting its political will, various national political crises resolved by Khomeini and strategic errors of liberal and leftist elements all set the stage for inclusion of the clause on *velāyat-e faqih* in the Iranian constitution. The *hukumat-e Islami* that Islamists had once idealized now turned into a state governed by strict religious laws; *fiqh* was to provide solutions to the problems of the modern state. But soon the realities of state governance manifested themselves, posing questions to the new ruling elite as to how to resolve areas of dispute between a pastoral art of government and *raison-d'Etat*. No one but Khomeini had the answer: *maslahat* (expediency). In Khomeini's approach the reason of the

state must find primacy even over religious rituals. Hence a new era began in which the realities of the state superseded all ideological considerations; now the state not only could justify removal of its future opponents, it could also find explanations for omission of past opposition from state power on religious grounding. Ironically, the strongest forces of opposition to the new Islamic Republic were not secular liberal and leftist elements; they were Islamists.

Anti-clerical, democratic and socialist in orientation, various brands of Islamists came into conflict with the new ruling apparatus. Freedom Movement, MKO, Forqan group, President Banisdar, radical Mehdi Hāshemi and Abdolkarim Soroush were examples of Islamist icons and groups that contested the ideological and material status of the Islamic Republic, but none were able to shake the foundations of the Islamic Republic. *Maslahat* as a ruling doctrine provided all necessary justifications for the Islamic Republic not only to supress the opposing Islamists but also for the state to step aside from heated eschatological, revolutionary religious ideals. The doctrine of *maslahat* had sanctified a gradual secularization of politics undertaken by those firmly believing in a religious government. The pastoral art of government and *raison d'Etat* or Tribe and *State-form* had clashed once again, this time in modern Muslims' experimentation with state politics.

Though the doctrine of *maslahat* helped to resolve temporary clashes between pastoral and *politique*, areas of incongruity between arts of government pertaining to bio-power and religious considerations have continued to make the state lose the battle on two main grounds: 1) the state failing to operate efficiently as the pastoral relation blocks the ethics of bio-politics 2) the state losing religious credibility for its failure to address the economic and this-worldly necessities of the population. In other words, the "Islamic state" has neither been fully Islamic nor fully a modern state. Given the long history of the interaction between *Tribe* and *State-form*,

the context of this "failure" is clear. The Islamic state had to fail because its very idea was paradoxical and, to use Hallāq Wāel word, "impossible." Hence, Michel Foucault was correct when stating: "I do not feel comfortable speaking of Islamic government as an 'idea' or even as an 'ideal.'"[547]

But does the failure of the Islamic state mean the failure of political Islam as a whole in the way Roy has understood contemporary Muslim politics? Does it mean that a century of political struggle in the name of Islam has effectively had no contribution to political modernity? Is there a way for a long tradition of Islamic activism to act as a heritage for future Muslim politics? In order to better tackle these questions, identifying four major strands of modern political Islam may be helpful: Islamism, Salafism, Usulism and Neo-Islamism. Salafism is distinct from Islamism as its points of emergence, theological foundations and political aspirations are different from Islamism. While the main agenda of Islamism is to offer a compatible reading of Islam and modernity within the nation-state paradigm, and its location of emergence was major metropolitan areas of the Muslim world, Salafism relies on a puritanical reading of the religious text, with rural settings as its location of emergence but also paradoxically having global aspirations. Similarly, Islamism is distinct from Shi'i Usulism in its inclination to enter into conversation with modern liberation discourses and in distancing itself from strict theological inquires. And lastly, the difference between Islamism and neo-Islamism lies in Islamism as a movement/war-machine and institution/State apparatus—a distinction often ignored by both scholars of political Islam and Muslim theorists. Initially Islamism emerged as a movement with political, intellectual and cultural aspirations before part of its energy was

[547] Michel Foucault, "What do Iranians Dream About?" in Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson, *Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 208.

appropriated by the State and the other part preserved its oppositional momentum in the post-revolutionary situation. That version of Islamism is appropriated by the State, yet it has discursive similarities with Islamism and may be referred to as neo-Islamism. In fact, neo-Islamism is a ruling ideology that aims to combine signifiers from Islamism, Usulism, and modern bio-power. Neo-Islamism is now on the verge of ideological and material collapse. But does the exhaustion of neo-Islamism account for the end of Islamism? This dissertation has argued that the failure of the Islamic state and the collapse of its ruling ideology, that is neo-Islamism, must not be equated to the dissolution of Islamism. Quite the contrary, to speak prescriptively, it is now time for an Islamist ethos to once again be revived. A revived version of Islamism that takes into account new realities and contingencies may be referred to as *post-Islamism.*

The term post-Islamism was first deployed in the academy by Assef Bayat to describe a condition in which Islamism was perceived as having ended. He also limited the definition of Islamism to advocacy for *velāyat-e faqih*, ignoring the long tradition of Islamism before *velāyat-e faqih* and Islamists' role in contesting the concept in the post-revolutionary situation. Bayat specifically employed the term "post" to describe a "break" from the Islamist paradigm. Problematizing Bayat's choice of word, one must notice that in Western political traditions the term "post" does not denote an "end" or a "break"; rather, it means continuation or revival of a tradition, having in mind post-modern contingencies. Speaking of post-Marxism and post-anarchism as examples, theorists did not call for abandoning these political traditions. Rather, through exposing these discourses to post-modern critique they sought to maintain the relevance of these political canons to the contemporary order. Having this framework in mind, this

dissertation asked: can Islamism, as a modern ideology, be deconstructed through a post-modern lens not for negation but revival?

Reading through Islamists texts in the post-revolutionary period indicates that there is a critical tradition of engaging with Islamism against a post-modern framework. Hence what is intended as post-Islamism is already a project undertaken by Muslims thinkers, albeit not under the label "post-Islamism." The two intellectual giants of the post-revolutionary condition, Abdolkarim Soroush and Rezā Dāvari, whose hostile debate and intellectual confrontations captured Iran's intellectual scene for almost a decade, are identified to have contributed immensely to a post-modern critique of Islamism. Soroush borrowed from the anti-foundationalism of the philosophy of science to argue for the contingency of religious knowledge and discredited the universality of Islamists' vision. Influenced by Counter-Enlightenment Western philosopher Martin Heidegger, Dāvari made a case for the incompatibility between Islam and modernity, the implication of which was barring Islamism from making universalist claims in relation to the modern world. If Soroush argued that there is no such a thing as Islamic thermodynamics, Dāvari's disciple, Mortezā Āvini, argued that there is no such a thing as Islamic cinema.

Reading Soroush, Dāvari and Āvini in the context of the history of Islamism is striking given early Islamists' claims regarding universality of religion. In the early twentieth century a figure such as Asadaollāh Kharaghāni argued that Islam contains a comprehensive agenda for managing a modern civilization, and even Western democracy was the fruit of Islamic teachings. A century later, Islamist thinkers abandoned their universalist claims and spoke of *minimalist religion* or the impossibility of "Islamic cinema." This shift in discourse, however, must not be seen as a coming to terms with secularism or an abandonment of the quest for religiosity in the

modern world. In fact, the questions still are: how can one be a good Muslim in the new age, and how can the Islamic tradition inform attempts to solve the problems of the modern world? In other words, maintaining personal and social relevancy of faith in modernity is still an intellectual and political predicament, and for as long as this predicament exists Islamism will not fade away. Hence, the collapse or material weakness of the "Islamic state" will not render the dissolution of Islamism. In fact in such an event Islamism will find new currency. The question now is: how can the spirit of Islamism, that is, the relevancy of the faith in the modern world, be revived in the face of the crisis of the Islamic state? The response, this dissertation argued, is post-Islamism, although conceptually different from what Bayat had in mind.

Post-Islamism invites for a shift of attention in relation to faith from centres, metanarratives, universalism and discourses pertaining to the control of the body to subcultures, peripheries and technologies of the self. Instead of official political discourse, Islamism must embrace the sociocultural spheres and revive its interventions in these fields. Post-Islamism is a shift from macro to micro, from molar to molecular, from Statism to Nomadism, from control of the body to that of the soul, from official politics to culture. One must note that this "shift" is not a groundbreaking switch of strategy since Islamism prior to the Iranian Revolution functioned as a sociocultural movement with only certain ramifications in the political. To be clearer, had it not been for the contingencies of the post-revolutionary period, perhaps such a nomadic reading of Islamism would not be essential. Nonetheless there was a modernist ethos informing the universalism of Islamism and the notion of the Islamic state that had to become the subject of post-modern critique—a task undertaken in this dissertation, without which reasserting the new culturalist agenda and preventing Islamism from making universalist claims concerning the Islamic state would be impossible. Through genealogical investigation, this dissertation exposed

the metaphysics of the Islamic state that ruled in accordance with the doctrine of *velāyat-e faqih.* Through locating areas of incongruity and historical accidents, this dissertation also illustrated the contingencies upon which the sacred quality of the Islamic state was formed historically and hence problematized the theology that justified macro Muslim politics. Hence, post-Islamism is both a continuation of, and a shift in relation to, Islamism; it is a continuation as far as informing Muslim subjectivity in sociocultural fields, and it is a shift as far as replacing contextual interventions with a macro-statist political agenda. In fact, Foucault's characterization of Islamism as a form of "political will" may be invoked to describe post-Islamism. Foucault understood Muslim politics as an "effort to politicize structures that are inseparably social and religious in response to current problems."[548] Post-Islamism then is an "attempt to open a spiritual dimension in politics" without taking charge of the modern state.[549]

As to how exactly post-Islamist politics will/should unfold in the future is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but one thing is certain: despite its non-statist agenda, post-Islamism cannot be absolutely blind to the question of state. In fact, similar to Islamism, anti-colonialism, anti-despotism, and anti-capitalism remain the agenda of post-Islamism. Yet specifically concerning anti-despotism, countering state hegemony cannot lead to the erosion of state as a whole. To be more precise, as monstrous as State is, its security and relative well-being are not entirely undesirable, especially when the alternative in the Middle East is not an anarchist utopia of various creative autonomous zones. Rather, the alternative is more monstrous than the modern state: that is, the consolidation of power by ISIS-type radical movements who are waiting at in the wings. Hence, to speak in practical terms, problematizing the Islamic state must lead to seeking alternatives outside the State-form, but that does not mean the question of State and its

[548] Ibid.
[549] Ibid.

reform may be entirely undermined. Taking the pragmatist approach even further, one must hold that a state that respects the ethics of bio-power, one that can address the relative well-being of the population, despite its crisis, is preferable to one bearing the name of Islam yet failing to function as a modern state. Complying with the Islamic tradition that holds, "state survives in the status of *kufr* (faithlessness) but not in the status of *zulm* (injustice)," it is reasonable to suggest that advocating state reform or *Tanzimāt* must be part of a post-Islamist agenda. Of course, *Tanzimāt* presupposes a degree of liberal reforms and measures of secularity at the level of official politics, but it is here that social and cultural post-Islamists' intervention becomes even more pertinent. Coming to terms with the fact that the State is an inherently secular entity whose complete erosion is not in the interests of Muslims, post-Islamism, similar to classic Shi'ism, asks how can social and cultural norms find spiritual and ethical momentum in the face of a monster called the State? In that sense, post-Islamism may be compared to the problematic of post al-Bāqir Shi'i elites whose predicament was to maintain Muslim spiritual and ethical conduct, searching for alternatives to the state, while co-existing with an unlawful yet necessary Sultan/State.

One must also add that advocacy for *Tanzimāt*, yet also combining civilizational norms with spiritual and ethical conduct, was the primary project of Sayyid Jamāl Al-Afghāni, the godfather of Iranian Islamism. Thus, the quest for reform both at the level of the state and society has in fact long been an Islamist pursuit, and in that sense post-Islamism's engagement with *Tanzimāt* while attending to the question of faith at the level of culture is not a divergence from the classic Islamist agenda. In fact, Sayyid Jamal realized that the best strategy to confront colonialism was to call for the creation of a strong Muslim state and society. Hence, simultaneous with the revival of Islamic philosophy and mysticism, he traveled within the

Muslim world, including Iran, and attempted to convince authorities to adopt *Tanzimāt* as that would best prepare Muslims to confront colonialism. In an age where the colonial United States has withdrawn from the nuclear deal and a new set of sanctions are to be launched against Iran, *Tanzimāt* at the level of the state, and spiritual and ethical revival at the level of society, appears to be the best strategy to confront president Trump's aggressive foreign policy towards Tehran. It is striking that post-Islamism is not a digression from Al-Afghāni's project. Al-Afghāni's legacy is still relevant.

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