Title: The Polysemy of Security Community-Building: Towards a “People-Centered” Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)?

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Introduction

On December 31, 2015, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formally announced the establishment of its security community\(^1\) despite not fulfilling even its own criteria for doing so. The endpoint of this initiative remains both elusive and ambiguous today. Indeed, ASEAN has referred to itself as a “security community” on numerous occasions since the turn of the 21\(^{st}\) century (ASEAN 2003;2009;2015b;c), and remains a favorite example of a “nascent” security community beyond the West (Adler 2008, 206). Yet it also departs significantly from how this concept is typically understood in International Relations (IR), i.e. as a group of states that have renounced the use of force as a legitimate means of dispute settlement and among which exist dependable expectations of peaceful change (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998).

The ambiguity of ASEAN’s status as a security community has not prevented scholars and practitioners of Asia-Pacific IR to suggest that such a community is in the making. ASEAN’s former Secretary General, the late Rodolfo Severino, even argued that “in a very real sense,

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ASEAN is already a security community” (Severino in Jones 2015, 4). This article takes the ongoing debate over ASEAN’s identity as a security community as its point of departure to develop a broader argument about security community-building as a product of discursive performance.

In the Asia-Pacific as elsewhere in the world, security community-building today implies much more than the mere absence of war among states. On the one hand, non-military and transnational challenges now form an unavoidable and significant part of the mandate of security institutions in every corner of the world, as a result of a larger trend by which processes of securitization increasingly take place in multilateral settings (Haacke and Williams 2008; Buzan and Wæver 2009; Bremerberg 2015). On the other hand, as amply demonstrated by IR scholarship on norm diffusion, non-state actors such as epistemic communities (Haas 1992), international organizations –as actors in their own name– (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) and transnational activist networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 2002; Joachim 2003) play an active role in shaping processes of global governance, including in the security realm (Howorth 2004; Price 1998). In other words, security governance is becoming increasingly diverse, in both the scope of its mandate and the identity of its participants.

Given this diversification, some have begun to argue for a more expansive definition of the security community concept. A security community can in fact be conceived as a collective in which members securitize together to protect a common referent from threat (Buzan and Wæver 2009; Bueng 2013, 301; Bremerberg 2015). Yet the implications of new developments in security governance have not been given enough attention by the security community literature. Indeed,
this literature remains wedded to a conventional definition of security as the absence of inter-
state war. It is still primarily concerned with relations among states and their agents. It also tends
to treat non-military and transnational security issues as secondary to, or derivative of, inter-state
peace, insofar as they are addressed at all. As a result, this literature is more limited in its
understanding of how security community-building unfolds in practice than commonly assumed.
In order to fill this gap, I suggest that a more decisive shift of focus to the role “meaning-in-use”
in the study of security community-building is required.

I argue, more specifically, that security community-building is best understood as a process of
discursive performance that involves constant negotiation between competing understandings of
both security and community. This process, in other words, is inherently polysemic,
*omnidirectional*, and *contested*. First, security community-building is informed by distinct
interpretations of 1. what the pursuit of security means for a given community and 2. where the
boundaries of the community lie, thus making it inherently *polysemic*. Second, this process is
*omnidirectional*, because these distinct interpretations set the security community on different
paths, pursued simultaneously. Third, social agents draw from these competing interpretations to
challenge how their fellow participants in the discursive field talk the security community into
existence (Adler 2002, 101), thus making it a deeply *contested* process.

Such contestation manifests in two distinct but inter-related forms, which I refer to as “external”
and “internal”. On the one hand, social agents engage in “external” contestation by advancing
distinct, relatively coherent, but potentially incompatible versions of the security community
within the discursive field. On the other, even when social agents converge over a single version
of the security community, they still partake in “internal” contestation by debating the specific meaning, boundaries, and policy solutions associated with this version.

To illustrate my argument, I draw from the case of ASEAN as a prime exemplar of a security community-building institution grappling with the diverse character of security governance. First, ASEAN has defined security in “comprehensive” terms since the very inception of its community-building enterprise, putting “traditional” security concerns on par with “non-traditional” ones (ASEAN 2003). Second, it also accommodates the participation of an increasingly broad variety of non-state actors in this process. Therefore, ASEAN presents us with an interesting case for probing further into how security community-building works in practice. Yet this focus on ASEAN also allows me to contribute to making the security community literature more “global” in a theoretical sense. This article indeed takes part in a broader research agenda that highlights a need for process-focused research that “appreciates the subtleties inherent to this region”, relates them to a wider context, and makes room for the ambiguities, inconsistencies, and tensions that arise from the coexistence of contested meanings in world politics (Foot and Goh 2019, 398).

This article makes three main contributions to the security community literature in IR. First, I build on recent insights in the study of security community-building as practice to advance a novel, discourse-based approach that can enhance our understanding of how security community-building manifests in a broader variety of contexts, relationships, and entities. This approach puts the focus of analysis on the play of social practice from the very inception of the process, irrespective of whether the security community is deemed to have reached “maturity”. It thus allows me to make better sense of the polysemic and omnidirectional character of security
community-building in practice. This discourse-based approach makes it possible to seriously account for the otherwise underappreciated effects of the diversification of security governance on the security community-building process. Second, this research also contributes to our understanding of the role of contestation in IR by advancing a distinction between “internal” and “external” forms of contestation that play out in the discursive field in which security community-building takes place. Third, this article outlines a way out of the current stasis that characterizes the study of “nascent” security communities, particularly in the Global South, by showing how they are “talked into existence” by social agents advancing competing interpretations of security and community.

The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. The first section provides an overview of recent literature on security community-building and discusses shortcomings of existing work to better situate the article’s key contributions. Second, I develop an innovative discourse-based approach that allows me to better account for the polysemic, omnidirectional, and contested character of security community-building in practice. I then proceed to apply this approach to the case of ASEAN to show how contestation unfolds in the discursive field where the security community is talked into existence. In section 3, I tackle “external” contestation by shedding light on the coexistence of competing versions of the security community. I highlight the destabilizing but ultimately productive effects of such contestation on the grouping’s ability to reproduce its identity as a security community “in the making” despite a great deal of ambiguity, incoherence, and tension. In section 4, I shift the focus of my analysis to “internal” contestation occurring within the “people-centered” version of the ASEAN security community. I show how non-state actors associated with the “third track” of Asia-Pacific multilateralism are able to
disrupt dominant understandings of security and community. A brief conclusion then reviews the main findings and discusses broader implications for security governance in the Asia-Pacific.

[1.] Security Community-building in IR

This section reviews recent developments in the literature on security community-building in order to better situate this article’s main contributions. I focus, more specifically, on three subsets of this literature and discuss their limitations, before suggesting a way to bridge them in order to enhance our understanding of how security community-building unfolds in practice.

The repositioning of the security community concept into the constructivist research program after its initial Deutschian formulation has fostered a sustained interest among scholars situated somewhere within the “big tent” of constructivist IR. Despite forming a “relatively small niche” (Koschut 2014, 519) in IR today, this scholarship has produced a number of fruitful insights that allow us to better understand how security community-building works in practice (Bially Mattern 2001). On the one hand, the concept has been mobilized to account for a growing number of relationships, entities, and institutions in virtually every corner of the world. On the other, this scholarship has also undertaken a productive “turn” away from an exclusive focus on ideational factors to the role of social practice. This shift is well exemplified by recent scholarship associated with the “practice turn” in IR, yet it also includes work on security community-
building that draw more extensively from the “linguistic turn”, discourse theory, and poststructuralist approaches to IR.

In what follows, I review recent developments in the study of security community-building in the Global South –and Southeast Asia in particular–, the literature on “communities of practice”, and scholarship that draws from discourse theory in IR. Whereas these subsets of the security community literature have evolved in relative isolation, I posit that they can be fruitfully cross-fertilized and expanded upon to better our understanding of how the security community-building process unfolds in the 21st century, in a way that also contributes to current efforts of making the IR discipline more “global” (Acharya and Buzan 2019).

**Security community-building in Southeast Asia and the broader “Global South”**

An explicit aim of the constructivist research program on security communities was to move away from a “commitment to behavioralism against the demand for a more interpretive approach” that would give attention to the role of identity, norms, and the social constructedness of world politics (Adler and Barnett 1998, 8–9). Scholarship on security community-building in the Global South, and Southeast Asia in particular, draws extensively from this program. Yet it also tends to remain committed to positivist tenets of social inquiry and a strict separation between theory and fact that do not make much room for the incorporation of insights from constructivist scholars who have moved further away from the “mainstream” of IR.

This commitment is apparent in the impressive amount of work that had already sought to assess whether ASEAN could be described as a “pluralistic” security community long before the
concept was given an explicit constructivist flavor (Acharya 1991; Alagappa 1991; Ganesan 1994). However, the repositioning of the debate on ASEAN within the purview of constructivist scholarship is what gave it its ongoing salience. According to Amitav Acharya (2014), ASEAN could be described as a “nascent” security community, sustained by a discrete ensemble of norms that underpinned the development of a “we-feeling” among its member states. By characterizing ASEAN as such, Acharya inaugurated a new phase in what became, and still remains, the most central and enduring debate within Asia-Pacific IR (Khoo 2004; Ba 2005; Emmerson 2005; Acharya 2014; Emmers 2017). This debate rapidly came to reflect a broader divide between rationalist and constructivist camps in the study of the region.

Today, this debate is characterized by a consensus according to which the grouping is stuck somewhere on the path towards becoming a security community, yet unable to move past a certain threshold (Weatherbee 2012). In sharp contrast with recent developments in the study of security community-building as practice, ASEAN scholars remain mostly preoccupied with pinpointing its more precise location on the evolutionary path towards a “mature” community, advancing arguments on what moving forward would require, and speculating on its future prospects –with possibilities ranging from a mere avoidance of reversal to actual progress beyond the status quo. The endpoint of the process, however, varies significantly from one account to the next.

Based on scholarly literature alone, to qualify as a fully-fledged security community capable of sustaining over the long term, ASEAN would need to provide concrete solutions to conflict arising from internal, external, and transnational threats (Roberts 2010; Emmers 2017), effectively manage major power relations in the broader Asia-Pacific (Jones 2015), develop into a
supranational institution based on liberal values (Peou 2009), welcome the active involvement of civil society (Collins 2007), and further the emancipation of the people (Chang 2016), while also upholding the very norms it needs to abandon in order to do any of those things (Acharya 2014). Despite the seemingly impossible character of the mission, which is to a great extent the result of the organization itself defining its mandate in aspirational –and one could argue highly unrealistic– terms, the assumption that ASEAN has the potential to meet the challenge despite its limited resources still underlies most accounts. This assumption is a strong indication that claims that ASEAN –or any other entity– forms a security community “in the making” amount to something more than mere rhetoric. Indeed, these claims are imbued with productive power that shape the realm of possible action for the further conduct of regional –and global– governance even as the objective existence of the community “out there” may very well prove impossible to grasp. It is not simply that the endpoint of the process is a moving target. More accurately, there are multiple endpoints to the security community, and they are likely to be irreconcilable.

The tendency to treat the security community as the endpoint of a unidirectional –if not necessarily linear– path outlined by “mature” institutions like the European Union or NATO reverberates far beyond ASEAN and Southeast Asia. It is prevalent in similar debates about other security community-like entities in the Global South, including in Latin America, Africa, or elsewhere in Asia (Hurrell 1998; Ngoma 2003; Lanteigne 2006, among others). This broader literature on security community-building in the Global South is mostly focused on testing whether or not specific objects of study “fit” criteria and indicators elaborated by Deutsch, Adler and Barnett, or a combination of both, to identify the stage the security community is “objectively” in. The conclusion of such an exercise is almost invariably that relationships between states in one region
or another still lack the requirements for being described as a genuine security community. The discussion then inevitably moves to highlighting a path to success and assess its likelihood. There is a good reason for why attempts to discover the security community “out there” are constantly frustrated. Indeed, the security community is at best an ideal type (Bueger 2013), and at worse an artefact built out of a persistent failure to recognize its social “all the way down” quality (Hellmann et al. 2014; see also: Jackson 2006).

Another caveat of this scholarship is that it tends to limit its focus to ideational factors that point to an elusive sense of “we-ness” among a given set of states, before trying to identify its origins. As a result, it not only fails to integrate more recent insights about the play of practice in this process, to which I turn next, but also leaves the omnidirectional character of security community-building and the possibility of contestation outside the scope of analysis.

The purpose here is certainly not to argue that ASEAN—or any other multilateral institution in the Global South— is a fully-fledged community that conforms to the usual yardsticks outlined in the literature. It simply makes the case for moving the discussion elsewhere to refocus on how the security community is reproduced in and through practice. I approach this, more specifically, by building on insights from the “practice turn” and discourse-based IR scholarship on security community-building, to which I now turn.

*Security community as practice*
A recent subset of constructivist literature on security community-building purports to tackle the role of practice in this process. This literature includes scholarship on “communities of practice” associated with a broader “practice turn” in IR (Adler 2008; Pouliot 2008; 2010; Bueger 2013; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014), but also the work of scholars who have drawn more extensively from discourse theory in their work on security communities (Kitchen 2009; Williams and Neumann 2000; Bially Mattern 2001).

Scholars associated with the so-called “practice turn” emphasize how certain practices (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 4) – i.e. socially meaningful patterns of action performed more or less competently – of diplomacy, self-restraint, or cooperative security within groups of states have come to form the defining feature of a security community (Adler 2008; Adler and Greve 2009; Pouliot 2010). They adopt a practitioner-near approach to world politics, zooming in on the inner workings of security communities and the micro-level of interactions among “those speaking, writing and doing [world] politics” (Bueger 2014, 384) on a daily basis to show how a community is brought into being in and through everyday practice (Bremberg 2015; Hofius 2016; Græger 2016). Instead of looking for signs of the community in public rhetoric, proponents of the practice turn focus on uncovering the “background knowledge” practitioners speak from (Pouliot 2008). They emphasize how practitioners engage in a “struggle over competence” (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014, 385) within the joint security community-building enterprise that coalesces around shared practice.

In parallel, a distinct subset of the security community-building literature studies practice differently, by shifting attention away from “the social in the mind” (Bueger and Gadinger 2015)
to the productive power of discourse as “meaning-in-use” (Holzscheiter 2014). This scholarship exposes how “language-power” (Bially Mattern 2001) can act as a motor in the reproduction of security communities in practice, particularly in moments of crisis that see members striving to bring back a rogue actor into the community’s fold. In turn, Kitchen (2009) shows how a security community can be simultaneously maintained and transformed through debate about how to adapt its mandate to an evolving context. Similarly, Williams and Neumann (2000) discuss how a discursive process akin to securitization sustains the security community’s longevity against claims of obsolescence, by allowing it to transition away from their initial mandate. This scholarship highlights the intrinsic relationship between claims about what a security community is and what it ought to do as the site where identity is “nested” (Jackson 2003).

These research strands in the study of practice in IR have evolved on separate, somewhat competing paths. Yet scholars from both “sides” have also made attempts at bridge-building (Neumann 2002; Faizullaev and Cornut 2017; Hansen 2011). These attempts do have some ground to stand on. Indeed, the “practice turn” and poststructuralist IR scholarship both “understand social order as a product of collectively shared knowledge, although they situate that knowledge in different sites” (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 451): either in extra-subjective structures of meaning enacted in situ (Holzscheiter 2014) or in “inaarticulate know-how” (Pouliot 2008). Despite their incommensurable positions on the (im)possibility to grasp world politics “outside the text”, they do share a similar “performative understanding of the world” (Bueger and Gadinger 2015, 449). Practice theorists and discourse analysts both understand discourse/practice as having a role in creating order but also in opening up the possibility for
change through the agency of social actors, even if the extent of the agency they allow for varies (Hansen 2006; Bueger and Gadinger 2015).

This common focus on performativity can be fruitfully mobilized in making better sense of why the security community needs to constantly push back its endpoint to a new horizon –because it depends on its constant reenactment in and through practice. This is an important finding, which can easily be extended to the study of how security community-building unfolds beyond the West, but it requires moving beyond a narrow understanding of this process to fully embrace its multiplicity and indeterminacy. Unfortunately, insights from the study of practice in IR have surprisingly not “travelled” as much as earlier work on security communities to the Global South. One of the reasons, already discussed above, has to do with the positivist underpinnings of the scholarship on security community-building beyond the West. However, it is not the only one.

Scholars who probe into the role of practice in security community-building remain mostly preoccupied with objects of study situated within the geographical core of a “not so international discipline” (Wæver 1998), such as the European Union or NATO. This narrow empirical scope has important theoretical implications. On the one hand, it implicitly reproduces a sequential, evolutionary, if not necessarily linear view of security community-building as progressing in “stages” (Adler and Barnett 1998) along a single path, where the mature stage is predominantly defined from a Western standpoint. As a result, it fails to properly account for the variety of ways in which social agents define this enterprise today.
On the other hand, it introduces a fundamental tension between 1. a commitment to the idea that the security community is necessarily in a “state of permanent becoming” (Adler 2008, 199) and 2. a persistent inability to move past a need to pinpoint the security community as something that exists “out there” before the play of practice becomes apparent and amenable to study. Indeed, dependable expectations of peaceful change, defined first and foremost as the absence of interstate war, remain the underlying prerequisite for probing into the role of practice. It is typically only after a security community is broadly recognized as existing as such “in the real world” that interest is then paid to the role of practice in redefining the mandate of said community. This redefinition occurs due to “new circumstances” that are presented as mostly exogenous (e.g. the end of the Cold War and/or the rise of new security challenges). Taken together, both limitations contribute to sustaining a prevailing but misleading impression that how this process typically unfolds outside the realm of “mature” communities in the West is “strange” or amounts to unfinished business. As discussed above, this dichotomy also informs most of the work on security community-building in the Global South.

In sum, existing literature on security community-building tends to exhibit a narrow understanding of security community-building as following a single path. The security community is still an artefact (Hellmann et al. 2014), even when the focus of analysis is on practice. As a result, the literature is generally ill-equipped to seriously account for what I refer to as the “polysemy” of the security community-building process, i.e. how the security community takes on a plurality of meanings simultaneously, and not just sequentially, irrespective of the “stage” it is considered to have reached.
Social agents are not waiting for a collective to be unequivocally recognized as a security community before claiming the status in its name, if only as an aspiration, and debating what their “joint enterprise” entails. Nothing precludes applying a practice- and/or discourse-based approach to an entity defined by its agents as an aspiring security community, even if this incomplete status is itself a subject of contestation. The inherent polysemy of security community-building also means that the level of coherence involved in this process has been overestimated. There is, in fact, a great deal of contestation involved in this process, which I address in more details below, and a need for a conceptualization of the security community that accounts for the possibility that its construction is guided by the pursuit of multiple –and potentially incompatible– ends, even as all of the goals this process entails remain equally unfulfilled. Consequently, the following section introduces a new discourse-based framework that I posit is better suited to account for the role of polysemy and contestation in (re)producing the security community as a never-ending process.

[2.] Security Community-Building as Discursive Performance: A Framework for Analysis

This section develops a discourse-based approach to account for how security community-building unfolds in practice. It conceptualizes the security community as a product of discursive performance to make better sense of how polysemy and contestation inform its reproduction over time. I distinguish between two types of contestation (external and internal) that occur in the discursive field where the security community is being talked into existence. Both forms of contestation manifest around a debate over the meaning of security and the boundaries of the community. Yet each dimension of this debate tends to be more apparent in one form of contestation than in the other. This section also outlines a way to account for how participants to
the security community-building process exercise discursive power to assert authority in
delineating the meaning of security and the boundaries of the community. I focus, more
specifically, on a set of discursive practices that allow non-state, subaltern, and/or marginalized
speaking agents to disrupt dominant understandings of both security and community, and as a
result reshape the identity of the security community and the entity that is claimed to embody it.

The starting point of the approach I adopt is to treat the security community as a product of
discourse. Following others, I treat discourse as a “grid of intelligibility” that shape how social
agents interpret, and therefore (re)produce, the reality of world politics (Milliken 1999; Epstein
2008; see also: Hansen 2006). Adopting such an approach means recognizing that the security
community, as any social fact, has no “existence” outside of social agents talking and acting as if
it exists. I thus refrain from partaking in the search for signs that a security community exists
beyond discursive statements from social agents that construct a specific entity as moving
towards such an endpoint in the first place. I treat discourse as holding explanatory power in and
of itself in how the security community-building process unfolds in practice, instead of reducing
it to a conduit for inarticulate or unobservable factors in a non-discursive “background”. The
“origin point” of social construction is situated in claims that a collective incarnates a security
community “in the making”, and as such it is necessarily an unstable one.

A focus on discourse does not mean that “anything goes” i.e. that anyone can claim that a
security community exists or that any collective can be deemed one. Indeed, discourse is partly
structure, and the realm of possibilities is necessarily bounded in a discursive field even as its
limits remain porous and flexible. Several underlying assumptions –what discourse analysts
would refer to as “presuppositions” (Doty 1993) – make claims that something “counts as” a security community possible. As they enact the community in practice, social agents 1. position themselves as part of the same community, at least in aspiration, 2. recognize that they share a common destiny, in either doom or peace (which can be defined in more or less positive/negative terms), 3. express a sustained interest in collaborating to achieve security for the collective, and 4. make claims of authority, competence, or legitimacy in defining the meaning of security for the community, as well as where its boundaries lie, that are at least partly acknowledged as such by other members of the community.

Furthermore, it is important to note that claiming that a security community exists “in the making” does not necessarily require, as argued elsewhere, “a shared understanding of what constitutes a threat and what does not, what requires security action and what does not” (Bueger 2013). It merely presupposes a shared recognition that – and participation in – seeking this common understanding is what the “joint enterprise” is about, even if it is unlikely to be achieved. The preconditions I identify here thus paint a more flexible picture than other recent reformulations of the security community concept (Bueger 2013; Buzan and Wæver 2009).

Despite the structuring power of discourse, social agents do have a fair share of room for maneuver in the way that they participate in a discursive field. Whereas practice theory has tended to portray discourse-based scholarship as “armchair analysis” (Neumann 2002) divorced from everyday practice, poststructuralist IR scholars conceive of discourse as practice. This perspective understands discourse as striving for fixity yet always unstable, as it depends on constant (re)articulation by speaking agents in practice, and is therefore fraught with ambiguity,
incoherence, and tension. In fact, a key advantage of adopting a discourse-based approach to security community-building is that it makes instability, contingency, and contestation over meaning the central focus of analysis, whereas proponents of the “practice turn” will instead tend to prioritize the ways in which meaning acquires fixity through practice (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 3). Another significant advantage is that a discourse-based approach does not require “a predetermined definition of who counts as actors” but lets the unfolding of practice itself structure the analysis (Hansen 2011, 290). As the discursive terrain of engagement is mapped out through discourse analysis, “who speaks” (Epstein 2011) and counts as a practitioner is defined broadly in theory, but inductively empirically, making room for the possibility of both state and non-state, elite and subaltern, dominant and marginalized actors taking part in it.

Yet my approach also sets this study apart from other work that rely on a discourse-based approach to security community-building. First, it does not require agents to deem a collective to already be a security community in substance to initiate an inquiry into the productive role of discourse. Second, it brackets out exogenous conditions that arguably contribute to explain contingency, variation, and the rise of contestation over what the security community is and ought to do to refocus on how social agents define security in different ways. Third, it makes space for a more fluid understanding of contestation that avoids overstating the extent of prior coherence in the identity of the security community and reducing contestation to a disruptive event.

Security community-building has as much to do with difference than with homogeneity and a sense of “we-ness”. It always involves a form of “boundary work” distinguishing actors
positioned inside the community from those situated outside of it, while still others are stuck in a liminal position (Rumelili 2003; Hofius 2016). The degree of consensus prevailing inside should not, however, be overestimated. Indeed, difference also often emerges from within (Bially Mattern 2001; Bjola and Kornprobst 2007). It can also have productive effects for the security community, especially when tolerance for divergence comes to form an integral part of its identity (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). These productive effects extend beyond situations where difference is merely “tolerated”, however. The discourse-based approach I adopt in this article allows me to account for how distinct versions of the security community interact and compete within the same discursive field, without one necessarily dominating over others, even if their respective influence may wax and wane over time. Furthermore, and contrary to what most of the literature implies, contestation in the security community is not the exclusive prerogative of states and their agents.

The capacity of non-state actors to set the agenda, to create, implement, and possibly enforce new norms, or to monitor the extent of their implementation encapsulates many of the ways in which these actors shape global governance. Yet the over-emphasis on norms as the primary medium of policy change in mainstream constructivist research has also led to an underappreciation of the productive power of discourse in this story, which extends beyond the mere representation of “shared understandings” situated outside the text. Indeed, the conventional view on the agency of non-state actors in world politics fails to capture other, more subtle ways in which they exercise influence that cannot easily be described in linear-causal terms. Moving away from a focus on norms to “meaning-in-use” allows for a better understanding of how non-state actors who remain on the fringes of spaces in which global
governance is typically negotiated are still able to “constitute, resist, subvert, and transform” world politics by drawing on discursive practices that fly under the radar of constructivist norm research (De Almagro 2018). As Holzscheiter (2005, 725) puts it, “an understanding of the power of non-state actors requires an understanding of the power of discourse.” My approach to security community-building makes room for the possibility of non-elite, subaltern, and/or marginalized actors disrupting, challenging, and re-politicizing dominant understandings of the security community (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016; Boemcken 2018) despite the discursive field being stacked against them. Yet it also pays attention to the trade-offs their participation entails.

I refer to how speaking agents (both state and non-state) advance competing versions of the security community as “external” contestation. Engaging in external contestation presupposes that these agents have a relatively coherent understanding of what “their” version of the security community entails. More specifically, they adopt internally coherent positions on 1. The meaning of security, 2. The boundaries of the community, which acts as the collective referent object that needs to be secured, and 3. The kind of solutions that need to be pursued in order to achieve security for the community. Yet even when speaking agents agree on these fundamentals, they often debate the more precise shape and contours of each version of the security community. Therefore, I also highlight how “internal” contestation simultaneously takes hold within a version of the security community. Both forms of contestation combine to shape the realm of possible action for the further reproduction of the security community in practice. Before turning to how external and internal forms of discursive contestation unfold empirically, I review a set of methodological choices that underpin the application of my discourse-based
approach to security community-building. My methodology draws from general considerations
that inform rigorous discourse analysis in IR, and can therefore serve to guide the study of
security community-building as discursive performance in a variety of contexts, but they also
need to be tailored to the specific case under study.

Drawing from Hansen’s (2006, 73-74) discussion of text selection, I assembled a corpus of
relevant “texts”\(^2\) that met at least two out of the following three criteria. These texts were 1.
clearly articulated, 2. asserted a position of authority in the debate, and/or 3. were broadly
read/heard/seen by participants in the discursive field where security community-building takes
place. The broader aim here is to assemble texts that reflect the current state of a debate while
also providing information on the genealogical development of major “discourse strands.” In the
case under study, the relevant texts point to three main categories of speaking subjects affiliated
with the main “tracks” of Asia-Pacific multilateralism – official (Track 1), 2. expert/informal
(Track 2), and non-governmental/alternative (Track 3).

The first category of texts includes official statements, declarations, and initiatives adopted by
ASEAN and related fora. The second category features policy texts by members of key regional
networks of security think-tanks and institutes.\(^3\) The third category is comprised of statements by
non-governmental organizations that engage the ASEAN process.\(^4\) Finally, the corpus also

\(^2\) In discourse analysis, texts are discursive statements – these can be written, verbal, or even visual (although visual
materials are not included in this research).

\(^3\) The ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), the Council for Security Cooperation
in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), and national institutes affiliated to these networks.

\(^4\) The corpus includes statements from the ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People’s Forum (ACSC/AFP), as well
from the Solidary for Asian Peoples’ Advocacy (SAPA) network and its most active NGOs on issues of peace and security,
including Initiatives for International Dialogue/GPPAC-Southeast Asia, AltSEAN-Burma, FORUM-Asia and Focus on the
Global South.
extends to media texts authored by agents of all three tracks, and was complemented by
documents gathered on a more ad hoc basis during fieldwork research in Southeast Asia.

The final corpus, from which I draw selectively in this article, also incorporates the verbatim of
semi-directed interviews conducted with a total of 68 individuals, distributed equally across
official (34) and non-official (34) tracks.\(^5\) Verbatim were analyzed as other written documents:
not as authoritative sources of knowledge, but as specific articulations of positions in the context
of an artificial dialogical encounter with the researcher (Shepherd 2015). Finally, this research
also relied on participant observation in formal, semi-formal, informal, and non-governmental
multilateral meetings\(^6\), which gave additional clues into how speaking agents engage in the
reproduction of ASEAN’s identity as a security community alongside their counterparts and/or
members of other “tracks”.

In my analysis of the corpus, I worked to identify the textual mechanisms of discourse analysis:
*presupposition, predication*, and *positioning* (Doty 1993). Presupposition refers to the conditions
of possibility of statements, or what needs to be held as “true” for the discourse to be enacted in
practice. Predication, in turn, constructs an object or subject in a certain way by affixing
attributes to it that specify its identity and distinguishes it from other objects or subjects. Finally,
positioning is about the relationships between subjects and objects, by which subjects are granted

\(^5\) Interviewees included 34 officials (acting and retired): Foreign Affairs officials, ASEAN Secretariat staff
members, and diplomats from ASEAN (Thailand - 8, Indonesia - 9, Singapore - 5, Malaysia - 2, the Philippines - 2)
and non-ASEAN states with “dialogue partner” status (Canada - 4, South Korea - 1, the EU - 1, the United States -
1, Russia - 1). Participants also included 25 experts involved in key regional Track 2 networks and 9 representatives
of NGOs working on peace and security issues in ASEAN (cf. supra for a list of organizations).

\(^6\) These include the ASEAN Regional Forum’s Expert and Eminent Persons Group (Track 1.5), the Shangri-La
Dialogue (Track 1), the Asia-Pacific Roundtable (Track 2), the ASEAN People’s Forum (Track 3) as well as other
meetings organized on a more ad hoc basis, between September 2014 and July 2019.
varying degrees of agency with regards to an object, and objects are put in relation to one another as “similar”, “identical”, “opposite”, “complementary”, etc. This methodology allowed me to map out the main discursive strands in the debate on ASEAN’s security community. In the following sections, I apply my approach to shed light on the polysemy and omnidirectional character of security community-building in ASEAN, and to identify external and internal forms of contestation in this process.

[3.] Polysemy in the Security Community: External Contestation in ASEAN

This section shows that three discourse “strands” interact in the discursive field in which the debate over ASEAN’s identity as a security community takes place. Each strand conveys a particular version of the security community, which consists of a relatively coherent set of positions on 1. The main source of regional insecurity, 2. The referent object(s), or what needs to be secured, and 3. ASEAN’s role in the pursuit of regional security. I demonstrate that the security community is a floating signifier that takes on a variety of meanings and implies radically different endpoints. As these versions of the security community compete for dominance within the same discursive field, they also support the (re)production of ASEAN’s identity as a polysemic and omnidirectional security community “in the making”.

ASEAN’s bid to form a security community includes multiple aims, with no clear hierarchy between them. Its main components are: 1. an indirect, dialogue-based approach to inter-state conflict management among regional states, 2. an emphasis on “non-traditional” threats to the security of member states, and 3. a limited overture to a human dimension of security, as part of
a broader objective to transform into a “people-centered” community (ASEAN 2003; 2009; 2015a;b;c). The delineation of these distinct –and competing– aims results from the diverse character of security governance in the Asia-Pacific, characterized by, on the one hand, a sustained process of securitization of non-military and transnational issues that takes root right from the inception of the organization but has intensified over time (Caballero-Anthony, Emmers, and Acharya 2006) and, on the other, the growing participation of a variety of non-state actors in regional governance (Breslin and Nesadurai 2018). The combination of these trends continues to inform security community-building in ASEAN, as actors from different multilateral “tracks” invoke competing, and potentially incompatible interpretations of the essence of regional security and the boundaries of the community.

Actors engaging in the security community-building process support different but relatively coherent positions on the nature of insecurity, the primary referent object, and the nature and extent of ASEAN’s role as a provider of regional security. While distinct, these positions are not always explicitly opposed to one another, but they are grounded in presuppositions that are likely incompatible. As speaking agents position themselves in the discursive field by drawing from competing “versions” of the security community, contestation, even if it is often implicit, forms an integral part of the (re)production of ASEAN’s security community in practice, thus pointing to its polysemic and omnidirectional character. Such “external” contestation has destabilizing effects on the grouping’s ability to develop a coherent approach to security community-building, especially since social agents often navigate from one version to the other. Yet it also allows ASEAN to claim a contribution on multiple security fronts.
In a first version of the security community, regional insecurity is conceived as being primarily transnational in origin, undermining the ability of states to exercise control over their borders. In this version, the regional community encompasses the member states of ASEAN itself –current and aspiring– in line with its vision of “One Southeast Asia”. The transnational realm where danger originates is situated outside but presented as creeping into the community, which needs to pool resources to protect the sanctity of national/regional territory. The primary role of ASEAN is to foster cooperative security among states, given that a unilateral response is no longer deemed appropriate to meet these “new” security challenges. The primary referent object of security remains the state in this version. This position is shared by proponents of the second version of the security community discussed below, but clashes with the third one. Within the first version, the nature of the threat is also presented as having changed fundamentally as a result of globalization, with the risk of inter-state war being situated in the past. This position is compatible with the third version of the security community, but directly opposed to the second one.

A second version of the security community posits that regional insecurity mainly stems from the re-emergence of “traditional” security concerns, amid renewed tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean peninsula, as well as heightened rivalry between the United States and China. As the institutional core of a broader Asia-Pacific security architecture in which it exercises nominal “centrality,” ASEAN is presented as having a special role to play in providing the conditions for peace among states in the greater region, by acting as an “honest broker” of major power relations, fostering dialogue over strategic challenges affecting the region, and supporting

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7 Interviews conducted in Southeast Asia with officials and Track 2 experts between 2014 and 2015. I address internal tension in this version of the security community more extensively in Martel 2017.
the development of cooperation on non-sensitive, soft security issues but that can serve as a basis for building mutual trust.\textsuperscript{8} This version’s depiction of non-military and transnational security challenges as “low-hanging fruits” of cooperation and issues of secondary importance directly challenges the first version and third versions of the security community.

In a third version of ASEAN’s security community, insecurity is presented as originating in the pervasiveness of daily challenges to the safety, well-being, and dignity of Southeast Asian populations. This is a more recent addition to ASEAN’s agenda, which originates in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis of 1997, and was not initially treated as being directly related to security. An important degree of suspicion still surrounds the notion of “human security” within ASEAN, but the grouping has also demonstrated increasing openness towards the recognition of a human dimension to security (Hernandez and Kraft 2012). It increasingly presents human beings, described collectively as “the people” as an appropriate referent object of regional security, in conjunction with the state. This is manifest in the extension of the grouping’s objective to transform into a “people-centered” community, initially circumscribed to the socio-cultural pillar but recently extended to all three pillars –including the political-security pillar– (ASEAN 2015c). The positioning of the “people” as a referent object alongside the state, the understanding of non-military challenges as arising within the domestic sphere, and the distinction between victims and perpetrators of these challenges set this version apart from the first one. The emphasis on cooperation on non-military challenges as an end in itself puts this version in direct opposition with the second one.

\textsuperscript{8} Interviews conducted in Southeast Asia with ASEAN officials and Track 2 experts between 2014 and 2015.
Because of this relative overture, the idea that ASEAN now recognizes the importance of human security in (almost) “all but name” is shared by a number of participants in the regional security dialogue.9 Within this version of the security community, many speaking agents (state and non-state) tend to privilege what they portray as a benign, more consensual, and context-sensitive definition of human security in which the state is treated as “part of the solution” instead of the problem.10 Other adherents to this version of the security community, however, challenge this definition head-on. In the last section of this article, I zoom in on this third version of ASEAN’s security community as an illustration of “internal” contestation among speaking agents from different “tracks” who otherwise adhere to its key features.

[4.] ASEAN’s Identity as a “People-Centered” Community Under Challenge

The purpose of this section is to illustrate how contestation over the meaning of security and the boundaries of the regional community also takes place within a specific – in this case, “people-centered” – version of the ASEAN security community. Participants in the debate over ASEAN’s identity as a “people-centered” security community share a broad agreement, grounded in a set of underlying assumptions, that the grouping should strive to better address challenges impacting the security of “the people of ASEAN” and that the more ASEAN does on that front, the better. Yet they openly disagree on the extent to which the organization ought to be making room for such “people” as a referent object in its approach to security, both in terms of the problems addressed and the degree of involvement of civil society actors in the design and implementation of policies.

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9 Interviews with senior officials of Foreign Affairs of some ASEAN member states, as well as Track 2 experts.
10 Interviews conducted in Southeast Asia with ASEAN officials and Track 2 experts in 2014 and 2015.
of solutions to insecurity. This debate reaches across all “tracks” of ASEAN regionalism, but the clearest opposition to ASEAN’s official discourse stems from a subset of non-state actors from the regional NGO community who infiltrate the discursive field in which ASEAN’s identity as a security community is (re)produced.

It is important to note at this point that NGOs have access to a number of “modes of participation” (Gerard 2014) for engaging ASEAN in general and on peace and security issues specifically. Some of those are directly sponsored by the organization, while others are merely tolerated, and still others are situated outside its purview. The room for maneuver, and therefore, the discursive practices these actors can deploy to shape the security community-building process vary significantly according to the space they are investing.

The participation of NGOs to the debate over ASEAN’s identity as a “people-centered community” unfolds in three main ways, and they are met with various degrees of resistance from their governmental counterparts. First, NGOs push for a definition of regional security that makes more room for a human referent object in ASEAN’s approach to security. Second, NGOs also draw from discursive power to extend the boundaries of the regional community by pushing ASEAN towards more substantive forms of civil society participation. Third, NGOs can often directly take part in the debate over ASEAN’s security community from the margins, even as they remain excluded from spaces sanctioned by the organization.

In what follows, I show how these discursive practices are enacted in context in relation to three specific areas these non-state actors actively seek to disrupt dominant understandings of the
“people-centered” security community. The first area sees NGOs advance alternative meanings of security through their engagement of ASEAN on the issue of trafficking in persons (TIP). The second area concerns their promotion of a “people-driven” approach to community-building to reconfigure the boundaries of the security community, as well as the nature of the agency attributed to those who fall within its purview. The third area shows internal contestation taking place over both the meaning of security and the boundaries of the community through advocacy work on the Rohingya crisis. Taken together, these examples illustrate how NGOs claim the role of “meaning architects” (Lessig 1995 in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897) of security community-building despite important constraints to their participation in this process.

Negotiating the meaning of “people-centered” security in relation to trafficking in persons

Navigating ASEAN’s institutional structure – often referred to as an “alphabet soup” – is a notoriously perplexing enterprise, but NGOs have honed these skills over the years, demonstrating their ability and willingness to adjust their framing of certain issues according to the spaces they are allowed in. In consultations on trafficking in persons (TIP), NGOs have actively worked to reshape the meaning of security and challenge important limits in ASEAN’s approach to security.

Most of the advocacy work on TIP has been conducted by NGOs in relation with the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC). In their consultation work, NGOs promoted the recognition of a “gendered dimension” to TIP in order to ensure that the issue would not be exclusively framed as a matter of “transnational crime”, which is typically a prerogative of the defence sector in ASEAN, and as a result limits
the possibility of engagement on human security. By their own account, NGOs quickly ran into limitations in their engagement of the ACWC given how its mandate is framed, and the low priority level that comes from its association with the socio-cultural pillar of the ASEAN Community – a residual “bin” in which “issues dear to civil society organizations are all lumped.” However, NGOs benefited from an opening within the political-security pillar to emphasize the protection of TIP victims, in the context of consultations during the elaboration of an **ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children** (ASEAN 2015a). Throughout this process, NGO representatives actively relied on their ongoing collaboration with the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), the main mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights in ASEAN. As AICHR is situated within the political-security pillar, it helped facilitate contacts between NGOs and the ASEAN SOM on Transnational Crime, which is the leading sectoral mechanism on TIP.

The 2015 convention still frames TIP as a security issue pertaining to transnational crime, but it also recognizes it as a human rights violation and a gendered issue. It emphasizes the need to prevent revictimization by addressing root causes, not holding victims criminally accountable, and allowing them to remain on the territory when appropriate. The convention also underlines the importance of collaborating with NGOs on victim assistance. All of this brings the framing of ASEAN’s approach to this issue important steps beyond previous declarations and commitments, away from an exclusive emphasis on law enforcement, and closer to the adoption of a human

11 Interviews with a former assistant director at the ASEAN Secretariat and NGO representatives in Thailand and the Philippines in 2015.
12 Interviews with Indonesia’s representative at the ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), as well as with representatives of the Human Rights Working Group (HRWG) and Weaving Women’s Rights in ASEAN in 2015.
security framework (ASEAN 2004). While a direct causal link is hard to draw, NGOs contributed to make these adjustments possible by drawing from discursive power to extend and reconfigure how ASEAN defines TIP as a security issue, thus underlining their ability to actively take part in shaping how the organization defines its approach to security.

Debating agency in the security community: towards a “people-driven” ASEAN?

NGOs also engage ASEAN through broader consultations about the general direction of the community-building process, conducted on a more *ad hoc* basis (Gerard 2014). This type of consultation took place in the context of the adoption of the ASEAN Vision 2025 (HRWG 2015). In these spaces, civil society actors have been careful to frame their recommendations following the structure of the ASEAN blueprints, before conveying them to a “High Level Task Force” led by senior ASEAN officials during an interface meeting. New discursive constructions are therefore deliberately juxtaposed on existing language. According to a co-organizer of a consultation about the Vision 2025, recommendations have more chance of getting adopted “if you use their language” as officials will see them as a “continuity of their work” even if they are actually a direct challenge to it. The level of controversy of NGO inputs has therefore a lot to do with form, in addition to content. This is akin to the process of “grafting” highlighted by norm research in IR (Acharya 2004; Price 1998) but it is observable even in situations where a “norm” cannot be clearly identified –unless the concept is rendered meaningless.

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13 Participant observation at a consultation session in Jakarta in 2015.
14 Interview conducted in Jakarta in March 2015.
This broad discursive practice is enacted in a variety of ways. First, NGOs will borrow phrases already used in official rhetoric and push for one interpretation of their meaning that is more in line with their position. A good example of this is the term “people-driven”, which takes a step further than the “people-centered” rhetoric previously advocated by NGOs and then formally adopted by ASEAN. “People-driven” has been used by NGOs to promote a more active role of civil society in regional policy design and implementation, beyond mere consultation. This creative use of official rhetoric evokes innovation, while ensuring continuity with prevailing linguistic codes in ASEAN. This is particularly attractive to officials from ASEAN member states who, as several interviewees have admitted, are always on the look-out for developing a national brand prior to assuming the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN. The term “people-driven” had indeed been taken up by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2011 (Nurhayati 2011). It was also used by state leaders from the Philippines (Foreign Service Institute 2015).

Second, NGOs will also reproduce consensual language while affixing a different meaning to it to convey a more progressive interpretation of concepts otherwise deemed inoffensive by officials. It is through this process that NGOs supported the translation of a “people-centered” framework into the political-security pillar. NGOs also promote the adoption of concepts that remain alien to ASEAN. As a Foreign Affairs official from the Philippines recognizes: “With ASEAN, sometimes, you just have to repeat the same concept over [and] over again, and after a while, they will begin to adopt it, and then later on, they will parade [it] as their own.”

According to many interviewees, this impression is widely shared across the NGO community.

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15 Interview with a representative of the HRWG; observation of a civil society consultation on the ASEAN Vision 2025 in Jakarta.
16 Interview conducted at the Department of Foreign Affairs (Philippines) in July 2015.
Confronting ASEAN’s identity as a security community: the Rohingya crisis

When there is limited space available for direct engagement, particularly when public discussion of certain issues runs contrary to prevailing practices of non-interference and consensus in ASEAN, NGOs will not hesitate to, as one activist puts it, “take it outside”17 –through walk-outs, protests, or rallies. NGOs quickly reached this conclusion on the Rohingya crisis. Interestingly, they held ASEAN accountable not to standards put forward by the international community, but to the grouping’s Self-identity as a people-centered security community.

This discursive practice was on full display when Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (AltSEAN Burma 2009) described the situation in Rakhine as a “genocide” –as early as 2009– and criticized ASEAN’s position as undermining “its own declared aspiration to be a regional community”. The same practice is observable in a statement from FORUM-Asia (2015) that questions the “seriousness” of ASEAN in implementing its own project, and deems the organization impotent in preventing a catastrophe that it should have been able to avert were it really what it claimed it was. Through these interventions, NGOs that engage the ASEAN process also renegotiate the boundaries of the “people-centered” security community by pushing for a more inclusive definition of “the people” that extends to a broader set of vulnerable groups estranged by the state and thus positioned outside the dominant representation of the collective’s identity. The widespread characterization of the crisis as “the greatest embarrassment ASEAN has ever faced” that followed in regional media speaks to the ability of NGOs to “hold a mirror

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17 Interview with NGO representatives in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.
up” (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2016, 51) to the dominant discourse on the “people-centered” ASEAN and re-politicize the boundary work that it sustains by re-inscribing the Rohingya (among other vulnerable groups) as part of “the people.”

While there has not been much development of ASEAN’s practical capacity to alleviate the plight of the Rohingya because of factors situated well beyond the scope of this research, this engagement of the security community-building process from the outside has certainly contributed to increase pressure on the organization and Myanmar itself. As a result of this external pressure, internal pressure has since been increasingly exerted on Myanmar, both quietly and, sometimes, very publicly, by its fellow member states, whose reputation suffers by association. Myanmar has shown signs of overture to limited forms of intervention by ASEAN in Rakhine, something that was unimaginable only a couple of years ago. Discursive power exercised by regional NGOs is certainly not the only cause for this shift. Yet it certainly contributed, alongside international pressure, to creating the conditions under which a more proactive response by ASEAN was repositioned not only within the realm of possible action, but as necessary to preserve its Self-identity as a people-centered security community.

Taken together, the discursive practices highlighted above have allowed NGOs to challenge, disrupt, and to some extent reshape ASEAN’s identity as a security community in the making. Even when they are not able to foster the diffusion –or localization (Acharya 2004)– of new security “norms”, NGOs can engage in the articulation of an alternative, if not always radical, discourse on regional security, elements of which do find their way in official language. As a result of their active participation in internal contestation, NGOs open up new space for holding
the organization accountable, not to some idealized, extra-regional and/or liberal understanding of what a security community entails but to the collective’s Self-identity.\textsuperscript{18}

Internal contestation puts the security community-building process under stress, but it also has productive effects. In the case of ASEAN, NGOs who visit the discursive field where the identity of ASEAN as a security community is nested adopt similar presuppositions than their counterparts from other “tracks” that remain controversial for NGOS that remain firmly outside this field. These include: 1. a recognition of “security” as a value to be pursued and prioritized over others 2. the idea of a coherent region made of peoples and states, with a destiny distinct from the rest of the world and, most importantly, 3. an understanding that ASEAN, as the main institutional vehicle for multilateral regionalism in Southeast Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific region, is, at least in aspiration, an appropriate provider of solutions to regional insecurity, however defined, and that the realization of its security community is a laudable goal. By adhering to these presuppositions, these non-state actors also take part, if only reluctantly or even unwarily, in the reproduction of ASEAN’s identity as a security community “in the making”.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This article argues that security community-building is best conceived as a polysemic, omnidirectional, and contested process grounded in meaning-making, the finality of which is always in flux and ever movable. Discourse, as both structure and “meaning-in-use”, plays a productive role in the reproduction of the security community from the very first authoritative claim that it exists. I have shown that contestation takes central stage throughout this never-

\textsuperscript{18} Interviews with NGO representatives in Thailand and the Philippines.
ending process of becoming, and thus cannot be reduced to a disruptive event against which the community then re-establishes a coherent identity.

Distinguishing between external and internal forms of discursive contestation over the meaning of security and the boundaries of the community makes it possible to better make sense of how security community-building unfolds in practice, including when the security community remains aspirational, even from the viewpoint of its own (prospective) members. Findings drawn from this study of security community-building in the context of ASEAN can serve as a fruitful basis for rethinking how to approach similar processes unfolding in other contexts, including in what remains the geographical core of a discipline that aspires to become more “global” (Acharya and Buzan 2019).
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