The Price of Loyalty: Southern Irish Loyalists and the Work of the Irish Grants Committee

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ABSTRACT

In the years between 1919 and 1923 Ireland experienced significant political and social upheavals, most notably the partitioning of the country and the end of British rule in the south following an armed struggle for independence. The division of Ireland resulted in the creation of political minorities on either side of the border; while unionist Northern Ireland found itself home to a sizable nationalist community, the independent Irish Free State inherited a smaller number of loyalists. Although the nationalist population of Northern Ireland has received considerable attention from historians, until very recently, southern Irish loyalists were largely ignored in the historiography of the Irish Revolution and the Irish Free State. Historians are now demonstrating greater interest in the experiences of southern loyalists, but the loyalist community continues to be defined largely through its relationship with the nationalist majority. This study will consider loyalists on their own terms, using sources originating from the loyalist community.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING THE "IMPERIAL IRISH"

In November 1923, the Reverend G.A. Chamberlain stood before a congregation that had gathered for the annual Armistice Day service. In the five years since the end of the Great War, Ireland had been transformed by a series of political and social upheavals, most notably the partitioning of the country and the creation of an independent Irish state in the south following a violent conflict between crown forces and Irish revolutionaries. Recognising that his audience was in need of guidance, Chamberlain chose to address the topic of loyalty in his sermon. After discussing loyalty in abstract terms, he turned to the challenges facing those who had supported the government of the United Kingdom. While his congregation might be disillusioned and fear for the future, Chamberlain believed that they now had a clear obligation to support a "lawfully constituted" Irish government, even if they could not bring themselves to "love" it. Democracy had been threatened and the values and ideals associated with the United Kingdom and "Britishness" had been denounced, but as loyal subjects to the crown and as good Christians his audience had a duty to maintain their allegiance to church and state. There was an additional message in his sermon for those who cared to listen carefully. At a time when many were not only questioning their political allegiance but also their sense of identity, Chamberlain's reference to "We the Imperial Irish" was significant, a suggestion that previous conflicting loyalties might now be reconciled in a hybrid identity, one that emphasised citizenship in both the Irish Free State and the British Empire.[1]

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[1] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 23 November 1923. Also quoted in Margaret O'Callaghan, "Language, Nationality and Cultural Identity in the Irish Free State, 1922-27: the *Irish Statesmen* and the *Catholic Bulletin* Reappraised," *IHS* 24, no 94 (November 1984): 232-233.

Chamberlain and his congregation were not alone in their struggles to come to terms with the Irish Revolution and its aftermath, nor were conflicted loyalties unique to the southern Protestant population. Intended to transform the Irish into loyal citizens of the United Kingdom, the Act of Union between Britain and Ireland enacted in 1800 had strengthened political, social and economic ties between the two nations over the course of the nineteenth century. Ireland's elected representatives sat in the parliament at Westminster, the Irish administration in Dublin Castle was accountable to the British cabinet, and symbols of the United Kingdom, such as the crown and the Union Jack, were found throughout the country. The civil service and the armed forces provided employment for many Irish men and women, who were encouraged to see themselves as serving the crown and the empire. The Irish shared the same language with the vast majority of British people, used the same currency, and had access to the same newspapers and journals. They could travel freely throughout the empire, and many were in close contact with friends and relatives who had emigrated to England or to colonies such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Although the Union ultimately failed to fully integrate Ireland and its people into Great Britain, and unresolved Irish grievances eventually led to the emergence of a popular nationalist movement, British culture remained deeply embedded in Ireland during the early twentieth century.[2]

More recently, ties between the British metropole and the rest of its empire had been tested in unprecedented ways with the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. An estimated

[2] The bicentennial anniversary of the passing of the Act of Union resulted in a number of studies examining the circumstances surrounding the passing of the act and its political and social legacies; see, for example, Michael Brown, Patrick M. Geoghegan, and James Kelly, eds., *The Irish Act of Union 1800: Bicentennial Essays* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003); Patrick Geoghegan, *The Irish Act of Union: A Study of High Politics, 1798-1801* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999); Daire Keogh and Kevin Whelan, eds., *Acts of Union: The Causes, Contexts and Consequences of the Act of Union* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2001); Bruce Stewart, *Hearts and Minds: Irish Culture and Society Under the Act of Union* (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smyth Ltd., 2002). The successes and failures of the Union are also contemplated in several general histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; see, for example, Paul Bew, *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Alvin Jackson, *Ireland: 1798-1998* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999).

200,000 Irishmen had served in the British armed forces, while countless men and women had supported the war effort on the home front.[3] Individual motives for participating in the war effort were complex and varied, but the sacrifices made by servicemen and their families were frequently understood in the context of British identities and imperial allegiances. The Irish had a duty to come to England's assistance in her time of need, many argued, and the war brought the close association between the two nations into sharp relief.

It is therefore not surprising that the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921), also known as the Anglo-Irish War, and the subsequent political settlement that was eventually enshrined in the Free State Constitution, resulted in some confusion regarding citizenship and political allegiance. In an early response to nationalist unrest, the government had passed the Government of Ireland Act in 1920, which was designed to address Irish nationalist demands for greater political independence without alienating the strongly unionist population in the north. The act provided for the partition of Ireland and the creation of two distinct political entities in the north and south, each with its own local parliament. Recognising that the legislation represented an opportunity to ensure their independence from a nationalist controlled parliament, unionists in six northern counties had accepted the act, which in turn provided the constitutional basis for the state of Northern Ireland. Irish nationalists, meanwhile, remained caught up in their fight for independence, and the 1920 act was largely ignored in the south. It was only following a year and a half of fighting, and six months of negotiations, that Irish nationalists and the government of the United Kingdom were able to agree upon a settlement.

While Irish nationalists failed to realize the goal of an independent Irish republic, they did find themselves in control of the Irish Free State, consisting of the twenty-six southern counties. Under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, the Free State was no longer

[3] Philip Orr, "200,000 Volunteer Soldiers," in *Ireland and the Great War,* ed. John Horne (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008), 64.

responsible to the parliament of the United Kingdom but was awarded Dominion status and remained part of the Commonwealth of Nations, with the king as head of state. For moderate nationalists, shaken by the violence and chaos of the 1919-1921 period, the creation of the Free State represented an acceptable political compromise, and they began to focus their attentions on establishing a stable government for the new state. However, a large portion of the Free State population remained committed to their republican ideals, leading to a devastating civil war that proved to be far more destructive, both in terms of property damage and loss of life, than the earlier struggle for independence. Even following the end of the civil war in 1923, the Free State's remaining ties with the United Kingdom and the empire came under repeated attack from Free State politicians. Thus the identities and allegiance of those living in the Free State remained in a state of flux long after the Anglo-Irish military conflict had ended, a situation that was sustained by the inability of the Free State and British governments to resolve outstanding questions surrounding issues of citizenship and nationality.[4]

Of course, there were highly opinionated individuals in the Free State from both ends of the political spectrum who had very clear ideas regarding citizenship and identity. For militant republicans, the remaining ties with Britain were an outrage and were to be ignored until such time as complete independence was achieved. They were "Irish" and felt no connection with Great Britain or the empire; their dedication to republicanism was demonstrated in the aftermath of the Treaty, when they attempted to overthrow the Free State settlement and establish an Irish republic during a ten-month long Civil War. In contrast, certain individuals in the new state continued to identify primarily as British and refused to acknowledge that Ireland was no longer an integral part of the United Kingdom. These loyalists attempted to carry on as if the War of Independence had not occurred, or else chose to emigrate to the United Kingdom or

[4] On these topics, see Mary Daly, "Irish Nationality and Citizenship Since 1922," *IHS* 31, no 127 (May 2001): 377-407.

to other destinations in the empire. For the rest of the Irish population, however, the situation was far more complicated. Moderate nationalists and loyalists held a variety of beliefs regarding citizenship, and not all considered "Irish" and "British" allegiances and identities to be irreconcilable.

Yet those who felt a degree of loyalty to the British connection found themselves in an increasingly difficult position. As successive Free State governments began to distance the state from the remaining political ties with Britain, loyalists in the south of Ireland struggled to maintain their imperial allegiance. Whether they were regarded by the rest of the Irish population as an outdated remnant of a colonial period or denounced as "traitors" to Ireland, loyalists in general did not feel completely at ease in the Free State. From the early nineteenth century onwards, Irishness had been increasingly associated with Catholicism and with an Irish Gaelic culture. Irish republicanism did not recognise multiple allegiances, and those who did not embrace a nationalist construct of Irishness were marginalised within Irish society.[5] Assumptions were made about loyalties and identities on the basis of class, religion, and past political adherences, and these assumptions were to have a profound impact on individual experiences of the revolution and on the loyalist relationship with the Free State. During the chaos of the revolution, those who were identified as "British" were frequently the targets of violent attacks, and political and religious minorities continued to be vulnerable to harassment and intimidation in the Free State. Even those who had previously supported the nationalist movement could find themselves unwelcome in "the new Ireland". Writing in 1926, the constitutional nationalist and author Stephen Gwynn described how he had been labelled in the new Ireland because of his Protestant faith and his Anglo-Irish upbringing: "I was brought up to

[5] DG Boyce and Alan O'Day, "The Union: Introduction" in *Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism Since 1801,* eds. DG Boyce and Alan O'Day (London: Routledge, 2001), 9; Jack White, *Minority Report: The Protestant Community in the Irish Republic* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), 66.

think myself Irish, without question or qualification; but the new Nationalism prefers to describe me and the likes of me as Anglo-Irish... So all of my life, I have been spiritually hyphenated, without knowing it."[6]

Allegations of disloyalty and un-Irishness were met for the most part by the loyalist community with anger or disbelief. Writing of his Protestant, loyalist upbringing in the post-independence period, Brian Inglis described how: "we were unaware that anybody could believe we were *not* Irish; and if we had been told that there were actually people, some of them in positions of authority in Dublin, who thought of us as alien parasites, and who made no distinction between us and the British from who we were descended, it would have seemed a rather bad joke."[7] The dominant nationalist ethos of the new state called into question not only the constitutional loyalties but also the individual and communal identities of southern loyalists.

Seeking to counter nationalist accusations and to address their own concerns regarding the future of the loyalist community, southern loyalists began an emotional process of re-evaluating the history of loyalism in Ireland, the nature of Britishness and Irishness, and their own relationships with Britain, the empire, and Ireland. Some loyalists argued that their community did have a role to play in the new state, and sought to incorporate British values into a new pluralist identity into the Free State. Others, however, found it difficult to forgive what they saw as a series of betrayals by the government of the United Kingdom and Irish nationalists, and took steps to distance themselves from Ireland. Drawing on past loyal traditions, loyalists began to incorporate their own experiences into the wider history of southern loyalism; the result was a number of different narratives which imbued members of the community with a surer sense of identity and which appeared to have provided loyalists

[6] Stephen Gwynn, *Experiences of a Literary Man* (London: T. Butterworth, 1926), 11, quoted in Terence Dooley, *Decline of the Big House in Ireland* (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 2001), 241.
[7] Brian Inglis, *West Briton* (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), 31.

with comfort and direction as they encountered political and social challenges in the years after 1921.

A Post-Colonial Minority?: Loyalists, the Revolution, and the Creation of the Irish Free State

Members of the loyalist community had been engaged in debates about their place in Irish society and their relationship with Britain before this period, but the revolution added a sense of urgency to such discussions. However, attempts by southern loyalists to come to terms with the vast social and political changes occurring around them have been largely overlooked by historians, who have generally demonstrated little interest in southern loyalism and the views of southern loyalists. Instead, historians have focused their attentions on loyalist interactions with militant Irish nationalists, and with the Free State and Britain, in the hopes of learning more about the nature of Irish republicanism and the Anglo-Irish conflict.

A recent outpouring of literature on the 1919-1923 period in Ireland has done much to raise awareness of the impact of the revolution on southern minority groups.[8] Traditionally accounts of the War of Independence and the Civil War have emphasised the political relationship between Ireland and Britain, and focused on the actions of the political elites in both states. In recent years, however, there has been a growing awareness of the social dimensions of the Irish Revolution. In part this reflects the availability of new sources (such as the files of the recently-opened Bureau of Military History in Dublin), which provide greater information about those caught up in the conflict at the local level. But the interest in social

[8] Patrick Buckland's *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885-1922* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1972) remains the classic work on the Anglo-Irish minority during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For other recent studies on the general experiences of southern loyalist and Protestant communities during the revolution, see Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996); Dooley, *Decline of the Big House in Ireland*; David Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish Life, 1913-1921* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1977); Peter Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); RB McDowell, *Crisis and Decline: the Fate of Southern Unionists* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1997).

history is also the result of an ongoing attempt by so-called "revisionists" to challenge traditional narratives regarding the revolution and the origins of the independent Irish state. By exploring the experiences of those who were not actively engaged in the struggle for an Irish republic, historians such as Peter Hart, Joost Augusteijn, and David Fitzpatrick have raised numerous questions regarding the popularity and nature of the republican movement in Ireland. These historians have championed what has been termed "a new revolutionary history," appealing for a more holistic approach to the events of the early twentieth century. Hart, for example, argued that the revolution should be studied in its entirety, with historians moving away from the current focus on major political events and nationalist heroes in favour of comparative and theoretical approaches.[9] Similar arguments have been voiced by others such as David Fitzpatrick, who has written of the importance of local histories in coming to terms with popular politics, and Michael Hopkinson, who emphasizes the need to end partitionist history.[10]

Changing perspectives on Irish society and politics in the early twentieth century are perhaps most evident in regional studies, which have played an instrumental role in revising the historiography of the Irish Revolution.[11] Although the revolution was generally understood to have encompassed the War of Independence and the subsequent Civil War, it is now largely accepted that the violence of the 1919-1923 arose from and was charactarised by a number of inter-related communal conflicts; in addition to the challenge to British rule, for example, there

[9] Peter Hart, "Definition: Defining the Irish Revolution" in *The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923,* ed. Joost Augusteijn (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 17-33.
[10] Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish Life*, xii; Michael Hopkinson, "Negotiation: The Anglo-Irish War and the Revolution, " in *The Irish Revolution, 1913-1923,* ed. Joost Augusteijn (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 121-134.
[11] Fitzpatrick and Hart have both written regional histories of the conflict (on Clare and Cork, respectively). See Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish Life* and Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies.* Other notable regional studies include Michael Farry, *The Aftermath of Revolution: Sligo*, *1921-1923* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2000) and Marie Coleman, *County Longford and the Irish Revolution, 1910-23* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003). Bill Kissane's comparative work on civil conflicts has also noted the importance of local histories. See Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 4-6.

is evidence that class struggles, sectarian conflicts, and intra-nationalist feuds rooted in competing ideologies and constructs of Irishness were also occurring throughout Ireland in the 1919-1923 period.[12] Through local studies, historians have been able to reveal how underlying political and socio-economic tensions in the local communities resulted in regional variations in the nature of revolutionary violence.

Such studies have also permitted historians to gain greater insight into the experiences of individual non-combatants and members of minority communities during the revolutionary period. Loyalists were, and continue to be, largely written out of traditional histories of the Irish Revolution, as they serve as uncomfortable reminders that not all Irishmen and women supported the struggle for Irish independence. Determined to re-integrate minorities into accounts of the revolution, a new generation of historians have nonetheless largely failed to come to terms with loyalism as a political ideology and cultural identity, and have struggled to

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[12]See, for example, the following works which consider the nature of the revolution with reference to class and ethnicity: Hart, "Definition: Defining the Irish Revolution,"17-33; Peter Hart, " Ethnic Conflict and Minority Responses," in *The IRA at War*, *1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 241-258; Liam Kennedy, "Was There an Irish War of Independence?" in *Hearts and Minds: Irish Culture and Society Under the Act of Union*, ed. Bruce Stewart (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 188-229; Charles Townshend, "Historiography: Telling the Irish Revolution," in *Irish Revolution, 1913-1923,* ed. Joost Augusteijn (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 1-16.
There has been considerable debate in particular over whether a social revolution occurred in Ireland during the 1913-1923 period. Most historians, such as Hart and Fergus Campbell, acknowledge the existence of "radical impulses" and accept that limited social change did occur, although they argue against a complete social transformation. See Hart, "Definition: Defining the Irish Revolution," 27 and Fergus Campbell, *Land And Revolution: Nationalist Politics in the West of Ireland, 1891-1921* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 227.
The conflict between competing constructs of Irishness is perhaps most evident during the Civil War period. See in particular Tom Garvin, *1922: The Birth of Irish Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2005) and Jeffrey Prager, *Building Democracy in Ireland: Political Order and Cultural Integration in a Newly Independent Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Prager contrasts the romantic culture of the anti-treatyites with the more legalistic and enlightened values of the treatyites, while Garvin sees the conflict as between ethnic and civic nationalism. Both approaches have critics, who question the usefulness of such absolute distinctions. See John Regan, *The Irish Counter-Revolution, 1921-1936: Treatyite Politics and Settlement in Independent Ireland* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1999) for further analysis of Prager and Garvin's work. The concepts of "ethnic" and "civic" nationalism as applied to the Irish context are also considered in the work of Bill Kissane; see *The Politics of the Irish Civil War* and *Explaining Irish Democracy* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2002); "Nineteenth century Nationalism in Finland and Ireland: A Comparative Context," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6, no 2 (Summer 2000): 25-42.

account for the diversity of loyalist experiences during the early twentieth century. Scattered throughout the south of Ireland, loyalists were not confined to any one class or creed, and while some loyalists experienced traumatic personal losses during the revolution, others emerged from the period relatively unscathed. It is here that local histories reflecting new approaches to the past demonstrate their full potential, providing historians with opportunities to gain a better understanding of the nature and impact of communal violence during the revolutionary period.

According to historians such as Hart, the various political and socio-economic conflicts that played out in Ireland between 1919 and 1923 represented significant danger to southern minorities, and even loyalists who did not experience revolutionary violence first-hand were conscious of their vulnerability. Republicans active in the War of Independence believed that individuals loyal to the government of the United Kingdom were a threat to the nascent Irish state and loyalists were frequently denounced as "spies" and "traitors."[13] As "helpless symbols" of British rule, loyalists were "convenient targets" for republican reprisals.[14] Southern minorities – those who did not adhere to the republican's idealised construct of Irishness – were also vulnerable to threats and violence originating from others in the localities. The political revolution resulted in a partial or complete breakdown in law and order in many regions, and a number of recent studies have argued that marginalised groups were frequently victims of campaigns of intimidation designed to settle long-standing grievances, most often relating to disputes over land ownership.[15] With the rural population believing that the revolution would

[13] See Chapter Six for further information regarding the issue of informing in the revolution.
[14] Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare*, 291; Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies,* 277-278; Kurt Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State: Ireland's Privileged Minority* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), 22.
[15] See, for example, Leigh-Ann Coffey, *The Planters of Luggacurran, Co Laois: A Protestant Community* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2006). Peter Hart, David Fitzpatrick, Tom Garvin and Erhard Rumpf have all noted a considerable correlation between activity in the revolutionary period and past agrarian agitation. The link is strongest in areas that experienced outrages during the Plan of Campaign (1886-91), although there is also a strong correlation between revolutionary violence and activity during first phase of the Land War (1879-82) as well. However, Hart notes that the link between agrarian and nationalist conflict is less

distribute "Irish land" to "Irish people," agrarian grievances were as likely as nationalist sentiment to inspire attacks on the loyalist and Protestant communities.[16] A number of historians have also suggested that sectarianism was likewise a concern for the loyalist community, given the close association between Protestantism and loyalism that had developed over the centuries. Due to their supposed sympathies for the government of the United Kingdom, and because of the uneasy historical relationship between Catholics and Protestants in Ireland, southern Protestants suffered heavily during the Irish Revolution; they were disproportionately represented amongst civilian victims of the revolutionary violence in County Cork, for example, and over a third of the southern Protestant population left the twenty-six counties between 1911 and 1926.[17]

Although many have pointed out that the number of civilian casualties of revolutionary violence, including those from the southern loyalist community, was comparatively small, recent studies have considered the impact of harassment, boycotts, and property damage, calling attention to the importance of the psychological impact of the conflict.[18] The sense of shock and

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evident after the Plan of Campaign period. There is "no correlation" between the revolution and cattle drives of the 1913-16 period, for example, leading Hart to conclude that "we are thus faced with a tradition which appears to have been more influential in memory than in practice". Peter Hart, "The Geography of Revolution," in *The IRA at War, 1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 49-50.

[16] In areas where the majority of the population was engaged in agricultural practices, agrarian agitation could often generate more popular interest than the nationalist struggle for independence. Afraid that agrarian unrest would eclipse the fight for an Irish republic, IRA activists adopted a more conservative position regarding land after the first months of the War of Independence. See Paul Bew, "Sinn Fein, Agarian Radicalism and the War of Independence, 1919-1921," in *The Revolution in Ireland, 1879-1923*, ed. D.G. Boyce (Houndsmill: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988), 217-235. See also Campbell, *Land and Revolution,* 226-228.

[17] Hart, "Protestant Experience of Revolution," in *The IRA at War, 1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 234.

[18] An estimated 1,400 Irishmen and women were killed over the course of the Irish War of Independence, including 624 members of the British forces, 552 members of the IRA, and at least 200 civilians. Numbers for the civil war period are more difficult to estimate; it has been suggested that at least 1,000 combatants were killed during the conflict, although others have argued that this number does not accurately reflect the losses suffered by the anti-treaty forces. No official records exist of civilian deaths for the 1921-1923 period, but it is widely accepted that there was greater loss of life during the civil war period than during the earlier struggle for independence (Kissane, for example, suggests that "as many as two thousand people died" during the civil war). While the Irish population was horrified by the losses suffered during the upheavals of the 1919-1923 period, these numbers pale in comparison to many contemporary conflicts

helplessness felt by political and religious minorities during the revolution was due in part to the fact that they did not fully understand the motives of those carrying out the attacks.[19] Some thought that the violence was primarily sectarian in nature, while others believed that they were being targeted because of their political allegiance. Still others placed the revolutionary violence in the context of the communist movement in Europe, comparing the situation in Ireland to that which existed in Russia and Eastern Europe.[20] The confusion of civilian victims in the revolution was compounded by the contradictory positions adopted by the main participants in the conflict. The government at Westminster occasionally voiced its concerns regarding the vulnerable loyalist community, but it failed to acknowledge the connection between its actions in Ireland and violent reprisals on southern loyalists.[21] Official IRA policy stated that civilians were not to be targeted because of their religious or political views, and only those who represented a direct threat to the armed republican movement were to be punished. Yet the IRA leadership was never fully successful in asserting its authority over the rank and file active in the localities during the War of Independence and little was done to prevent attacks on

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occurring elsewhere – in Finland, for example, 25,000 died in the civil war of 1917-1918. Michael Hopkinson, *The Irish War of Independence* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2002) 201-202; Bew, Politics of Enmity, 443; Kissane, *Explaining Irish Democracy*, 3.
Desmond Bowen has written of "...the widespread sense of trauma experienced by the Irish Protestants who were shocked by the depth of hostility shown to all things British by an unknown number of the majority population". Desmond Bowen, *History and the Shaping of Irish Protestantism* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 389. See also Farry, *Aftermath of Revolution*, 199. A recent collection of essays edited by David Fitzpatrick focuses directly on issues related to terror and trauma, and contains perhaps the most sensitive acknowledgement of the psychological trauma inflicted upon southern protestants and loyalists in a contribution by Anne Dolan. See David Fitzpatrick, ed, *Terror in Ireland*, *1916-1923* (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 2012), especially Anne Dolan, "'The Shadow of a Great Fear': Terror in Revolutionary Ireland," 26-38.
[19] Peter Martin, "Unionism: the Irish Nobility and Revolution, 1919-23" in *Irish Revolution, 1913-23*, ed. Joost Augusteijn (NewYork: Palgrave, 2002), 160. Michael Farry has noted that loyalists in Sligo were surprised to be targeted during the Civil War period, because they had purposely distanced themselves from politics in the belief that earlier attacks on their community had been politically motivated. Farry, *Aftermath of Revolution*. See also Bowen, *History and the Shaping of Irish Protestantism*, 393.
[20] See, for example, *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 21 May 1920; W. Alison Phillips, *The Revolution in Ireland*, *1906-1923* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), 95.
[21] Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence*, 93.

loyalists.[22] Likewise, representatives of the Free State government promised to defend southern loyalists following the creation of the new Irish state, but lacked both the resources and the motivation to do so during the subsequent Civil War.[23] The months that followed the ratification of the Treaty in January 1922 were a time of suffering for many loyalists due to the rise in lawlessness following disbandment of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the withdrawal of British troops. During the civil war, loyalists faced even greater danger due to the continued lawlessness and the republican destruction of property and homes as part of their armed campaign against the Irish government.[24]

Attempts to revise the history of the revolution by acknowledging the social and political complexities of the period have met with resistance from some quarters. The traditional narrative of the revolution, which portrays the War of Independence as a struggle between a united Irish population and armed crown forces, and which furthermore attributes the divisions of the Civil War to the political and social manoeuvrings of the government, is deeply ingrained in Irish culture. In the introduction to his comprehensive account of the War of Independence, Michael Hopkinson writes that "to revise the traditional nationalist account of the conflict, even in the new century, is not an easy task. Sensitivities are acute: even mild correctives are easily distorted into accusations of bias on one side or the other."[25] Hopkinson's observations can be extended to the entire revolutionary period; recent efforts to incorporate the experiences of loyalists and Protestants into accounts of the 1919-1923 period, for example, have provoked

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[22] Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerilla Warfare*, 299; Bew, *Politics of Enmity,* 415-416.
[23] Bew, *Politics of Enmity,* 426-433; Hart, "Ethnic Conflict," in *The IRA at War,* 245. For a specific example of the difficulties facing the government in trying to protect the southern minorities, see Coffey, *Planters at Luggacurran*, 59-61.
[24] It is important not to underestimate the degree to which certain areas were affected by lawlessness and violent upheavals during the civil war period, as pro- and anti-treaty fought for control of strategic regions and certain elements of Irish society seized upon opportunities to engage in criminal activities. This dissertation is intended to demonstrate the degree of violence and unrest that existed in many communities during this period; see, for example, Chapter Five.
[25] Hopkinson, *Irish War of Independence,* xvii.

strong reactions. The resulting discussions have not been limited to academic historians representing conflicting viewpoints, as challenges to the traditional narrative of the revolution have also provoked acrimonious debates between "professional" and "amateur" historians regarding the role of history in the modern Irish state.

The degree to which religious and political minorities were targeted during the revolution and the motivation behind such attacks are particularly contentious issues. For those who believed that members of the IRA were motivated by political idealism and that Dail Eireann represented the political will of the wider Irish population, it is inconceivable that republicans and their supporters inflicted widespread sectarian or agrarian crimes against an innocent civilian population. If minorities are over-represented amongst casualties of the revolution, such commentators argue, it is because they posed a direct threat to the nascent Irish republic, namely as informers.[26] Other commentators, however, point out that criminal behaviour against minorities might be expected in an ethnically divided society experiencing a complete breakdown in law and order.

The work of the late Peter Hart is largely responsible for provoking the recent dispute regarding the revolutionary experiences of southern minorities. In 1998 Hart published *The IRA and its Enemies*, in which he examined the events of the Irish Revolution in County Cork from the perspectives of different political and social communities. Arguing that many civilian casualties of IRA violence were innocent bystanders who had been targeted as a result of their marginalised standing in Irish society, Hart concluded that republicans and their supporters had been engaged in a violent sectarian campaign against the Protestant minority throughout the 1919-1923 period. Hart explored the issue of sectarian violence further in other works,

[26] See, for example, John Borgonovo, *Spies, Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Fein Society: The Intelligence War in Cork City, 1920-21* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007) and Niall Meehan, "'An Amazing Coincidence' that 'could mean anything': Gerard Murphy's *The Year of Disappearances* (www.spinwatch.org, November 2010).

describing how "similar campaigns of what might be termed 'ethnic cleansing' were waged" throughout Ireland.[27]

The IRA and its Enemies, and Hart's later work, *The IRA at War,* were warmly received by Hart's academic peers. Other historians had previously acknowledged the possibility of sectarian and class-based violence during the revolution, but Hart's work attracted unprecedented levels of interest in the issue of conflict between ethnic communities in the twenty-six counties. The thoroughness of his research and his inclusive approach to the revolution's impact on Irish society lent credibility to his claims that the IRA had targeted members of the southern Protestant community. Hart has since been cited in numerous studies concerning the Irish Revolution and has inspired other historians to investigate the nature and impact of revolutionary violence on minority populations during the 1919-1923 period. Despite questions arising from his use of sources (see below), his interpretation of this period continues to dominate discussions of the revolution in the academy.

Hart's influence extended far beyond academic circles; following the publication of *The IRA at War,* members of the southern Protestant and loyalist populations began to come forward with their own stories, telling of family members who had faced intimidation and violence during the revolution and its aftermath. Their experiences were shared online and in newspapers and books, as well as several documentaries produced by the national state

[27] Hart, "Protestant Experience of Revolution," 237. Hart's ambiguous use of the term "ethnic violence" has played a major role in criticisms of his work. Although he never explicitly stated that "ethnic cleansing" occurred in Ireland during the revolution (indeed, he concluded that the "vital ingredients of ethnic cleansing were lacking" in both the northern and southern Irish states), he nonetheless frequently described the revolution in terms of an ethnic conflict, and argued that in some regions republicans and their supporters sought to drive the Protestant minority out of the country. See, for example, Hart, "Ethnic Conflict and Minority Responses," and "Protestant Experience of Revolution". In 2006, Hart denied having argued that "ethnic cleansing" took place in Ireland, enraging critics who believed that he was "inconsistent" in his interpretation of events. See Peter Hart, "Killing of Protestants in the 1920s,"*Irish Times*, 28 June 2006; Niall Meehan, "Killings in County Cork in 1920s," *Irish Times,* 3, 14 July 2006; Niall Meehan, "Troubles in Irish History: A Tenth Anniversary Critique of the *IRA and its Enemies*," in *Troubled History: A Tenth Anniversary Critique of* The IRA and its Enemies, eds. Niall Meehan and Brian Murphy (Cork: Aubane Historical Society, 2008), 4-28.

broadcaster.[28] In 2008, the Church of Ireland organised a conference entitled "Understanding Our History-Protestants, the War of Independence, and the Civil War in County Cork," which coincided with the tenth anniversary of the publication of *The IRA at War*.[29] Descendants of southern Protestants and loyalists have applauded such attempts to draw greater attention to the experiences of religious and political minorities during the revolution, speaking of their frustration that until recently, their communities and experiences were largely written out of the national history of Ireland. In the *Sunday Independent* in June 2011, for example, Paul Colton, the Church of Ireland Bishop of Cork, Cloyne and Ross acknowledged that it was the recent interest in Protestant experiences that had

> empowered people like me to tell my story: to recount unashamedly how we came to be in Ireland; of how we are Irish today, and also to tell a story that is rarely told and even less frequently acknowledged -- the story of Protestants in Ireland who were not well off; not in power, but by a convenient manipulation of history were blotted out because they did not slot into a suitable stereotype and spin.[30]

More are coming forward with stories of suffering and sectarian discrimination, while others are using the opportunity to speak of their continuing sense of alienation in the Irish Republic.[31]

Interest in the fate of minority communities during the early twentieth century is not limited to the Protestant population currently residing in the Republic. Eoghan Harris, a former Irish Senator and columnist for the *Sunday Independent*, has repeatedly called for an honest and

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[28] "Who Will Remember 'Minority' Victims?" *Irish Independent,* 13 August 2006. For examples of recently published family histories, see Jasper Ungoed-Thomas, *Jasper Wolfe of Skibbereen* (Cork: Collins Press, 2008) and Alan Stanley, *I met Murder on the Way-The Story of the Pearsons of Coolacrease* (Carlow: Leinster Leader Ltd., 2005). RTE, "Hidden Histories: The Killings at Coolacrease," first broadcasted 23 October 2007; RTE, "Cork's Bloody Secret," first broadcasted 5 October 2009; RTE, *"An Tost Fada* (The Long Silence)," first broadcasted 16 April 2012.

[29] Eoghan Harris, "Scarred by Forced Exodus of Southern Protestants," *Sunday Independent,* 14 December 2008.

[30] Paul Colton, "Polarising Caricatures of Irishness Must be Consigned to History," *Sunday Independent,* 19 June 2011.

[31] "Sectarianism Here Needs to be Tackled," *Irish Independent,* 6 February 2005; "Telling the Truth about Protestant Experience," *Irish Independent,* 30 October 2005; "Protestants Should Speak the Truth," *Irish Independent,* 10 September 2006; See also Colin Murphy and Lynne Adair, eds., *Untold Stories: Protestants in the Republic of Ireland, 1922-2002*, 2nd ed. (Dublin: Liffey Press, 2002).

open examination into the treatment of southern minorities during the revolution and its aftermath, despite his own traditional republican upbringing.[32] Harris has credited Hart's work with drawing his attention to the atrocities committed by the IRA in Cork and elsewhere in the country, the "last taboo in modern Irish history."[33] Like many admirers of Hart, Harris believes that Irish society can only overcome cultural and political stagnation if past atrocities are acknowledged and made part of the accepted national narrative.[34] The growing acceptance that not all Irishmen and women were actively involved in the struggle for Irish independence has manifested itself in unexpected ways; discussions are now being held in official and academic circles to determine how loyalists and Protestants might be incorporated into the upcoming centennial commemorations of the revolutionary period, for example, and there have also been some efforts at the grassroots level to recognise those who opposed the IRA during the War of Independence.[35]

Although *The IRA and its Enemies* was met with widespread acclaim upon its publication, a small section of public opinion resented what appeared to be an attack on the heroic accomplishments of the old IRA. As time went on, Hart's critics became more outspoken,

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[32] Eoghan Harris has a longstanding career in media, having worked first for RTE, often on current-event programs, and later serving as an editorialist in the *Irish Independent.* In 2007, he was appointed to the Senate by the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, serving until 2011. An influential member of Sinn Fein in the 1960s, Harris later turned his back on the movement. He often acknowledges his republican upbringing and early political activities in his writings for the *Sunday Independent.* See, for example, "Digging up the Other 'Hidden Ireland', *Sunday Independent,* 3 September 2006; "Why Bodies Buried Deep in the Green Bog Must be Raised," *Sunday Independent,* 11 November 2007; "Kenny Speaks Truth to Papal Power on Behalf of People," *Sunday Independent,* 24 July 2011. Harris is not the only one to reject his republican heritage, as is evident from readers' letters praising him for his stance. See, for example, "Eoin Harris on Cork Massacres," *Sunday Independent,* 28 September 2003, "Protestants Should Speak the Truth," *Sunday Independent*, 10 September 2006; "Peace Means Casting a Cool Eye on Past Atrocities," *Sunday Independent,* 29 April 2012.

[33] "Ivan Yates a Role Model for Risen People in Tough Times," *Sunday Independent,* 9 January 2011.

[34] See, for example, "In Memory of Peter Hart, Honorary Irish Man of History," *Sunday Independent,* 25 July 2010; "Peace Means Casting a Cool Eye on Past Atrocities," *Sunday Independent,* 29 April 2012.

[35] See the recent decision to commemorate members of the RIC and DMP. Stephen Collins, "Forgotten Policemen Must Also be Commemorated," *Irish Times,* 25 August 2012, and subsequent correspondence. See also Kevin Myers, "An Irishman's Diary," 30 November 2005, Lord Laird, "Repackaging and Resanitising the Rising an Impossible Task," *Irish Times,* 4 February 2006, and Brian M. Walker, "Commemorations can be a Strong Unifying Influence," *Irish Times,* 27 January 2012 for examples of the larger debate surrounding the issue of commemorations and how to make them more inclusive in nature.

and began to work tirelessly to discredit his findings, denouncing his work in newspapers and online editorials, and organising protests at his speaking engagements.[36] Two issues lie at the heart of their campaign. The first is Hart's conclusion that republican forces and their supporters were responsible for attacks on innocent civilians, particularly members of the Protestant community, during the revolution. The second is Hart's use of sources, particularly his refusal to reveal the identities of anonymous sources.[37] According to his critics, Hart was at best a misguided or "sloppy" scholar, at worst a liar who purposely distorted facts to suit his own political agenda.[38] Some critics have taken advantage of the controversy over Hart's sources to justify their rejection of his work in its entirety, as well as the findings of anyone who acknowledges Hart's influence.[39]

Such criticisms are closely connected with a more general reaction against the perceived dominance of "revisionist" Irish history in academic and official circles.[40] In the correspondence columns of Ireland's two largest national newspapers and in *History Ireland*, a popular bi-

[36] The campaign against Hart, and against revisionist interpretations of the revolution, has included a vast letter writing campaign to historians, university administrators, politicians, and media figures. See, for example, Eoghan Harris, "Why Bodies Buried Deep in the Green Bog Must be Raised," *Sunday Independent,* 11 November 2007; Niamh Sammon, "Unfounded Claims about Killings," *Sunday Independent,* 25 November 2007. David Fitzpatrick has angrily noted that the administration at Trinity College Dublin has been forced to answer at least one query as to whether Hart should be posthumously stripped of his doctorate for having committed academic fraud. David Fitzpatrick, "Dr Regan and Mr Snide," *History Ireland* 20, no 3 (May/June 2012).

[37] For a detailed example of the criticisms directed towards Hart and his work, see Meehan, "Troubles in Irish History."

[38] Meehan, "Troubles in Irish History," 15. "Historian Disputes Sectarian Motive for Murder of 13 Protestants in Cork," *Irish Times,* 30 April 2012. See also, for example, the letters written by Niall Meehan and Sean O Ceilleachair (of the Kilmichael and Crossbarry Commemoration Committee), *History Ireland* 13, no 5 (Sept/Oct 2005), and "Peter Hart, etc-Letters Extra", *History Ireland* online (www.historyireland.com), nd, accessed 4 February 2014, especially the letter by Sean Kelleher.

[39] See, for example, Niall Meehan's, "'An Amazing Coincidence,'" in which he begins his review of Gerard Murphy's *Year of Disappearances* by noting that Murphy "acknowledges his debt to the late Peter Hart," before adding that "subsequent criticism established that Hart invented evidence and misreported archival material in order to establish his case".

[40] For more on conflicting accounts of the revolution, and particularly the divide between "academic" and "popular" histories as well as Hart's role in such debates, see Joost Augusteijn, "Review-Coolacrease: The True Story of the Pearson Executions," *History Ireland* 17, no 3 (March/April 2009); John M. Regan, "Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde: the Two Histories," *History Ireland* 20, no 1 (January/February 2012). For David Fitzpatrick's critique of Regan, see "Dr Regan and Mr Snide."

monthly magazine with a wide readership, correspondents have expressed their anger and frustration with professional historians who have contradicted popular interpretations of the revolution. For many of these correspondents, the debate is intensely personal, as accounts of the revolution produced by academic historians are frequently at odds with the stories passed down through families and celebrated in local communities.

Some of Hart's most vocal detractors are associated with the Aubane Historical Society, a local history association located in north County Cork. According the society's website, the Aubane Historical Society "was founded by a number of local people in Aubane in 1985," with the intention of contributing "to the growing body of local history publications being produced across the country."[41] Outside observers like Steven King have noted, however, that the society "is not a local historical society in the conventional sense", pointing to the past political activities of leading members of the society, particularly Jack Lane and Brendan Clifford's involvement with the British and Irish Communist Organisation.[42] The society's recent campaign against "revisionist" accounts of the revolution has appeared to confirm suspicions that the society's interpretation of the revolution is influenced by a broader political agenda. In recent years the Aubane Historical Society has sponsored pamphlets and other publications in which it is argued that the IRA had popular support for its republican agenda in War of Independence and that there is little, if any, evidence to justify claims that Irish republicanism was sectarian in nature. Confident that their research provides a "true" account of the revolution, the society's supporters defend their views by personally attacking their critics and by repeating carefully constructed arguments that fail to acknowledge the complexity of the period.

[41] http://aubanehistoricalsociety.org, accessed February 2014.
[42] Steven King, "Coolacrease Book Has a Number of Axes to Grind," *Sunday Business Post,* 30 November 2008 and for a reply to King, see Jack Lane, "A Review of What? BICO is Dead – Long Live BICO," *Irish Political Review and Northern Star Incorporating Worker's Weekly* 24, no 1(January 2009): 36-37.

Although historians of the Irish Revolution have concluded that Protestants and loyalists offered little active support to the government of the United Kingdom during the revolution, publications written under the auspices of the Aubane Historical Society continue to insist that the IRA only targeted individuals who posed a serious threat to the republican movement.[43] Lashing out in defence of nationalist narratives, Hart's critics in the Aubane Historical Society and elsewhere have accused revisionists of seeking to undermine the legitimacy of the national struggle for independence.[44] Those who share the Aubane Historical Society's views are concerned that the desire for "inclusive" commemorations will limit celebrations of nationalist achievements in the coming years. One commentator in the *Irish Times* wrote in disgust, "The centenary celebration is indeed in danger of turning into a commemorative circus to include everything from the RIC to Billy Mc Ginty's goat!"[45]

Academic historians are acutely aware that they are vulnerable to politically motivated attacks when presenting their interpretations of this period, and some have taken to popular forums to directly address their critics and to defend their work.[46] Few academic scholars have been willing, however, to acknowledge openly the controversy surrounding Hart's work, giving rise to accusations that elite historians are reluctant to criticise one of their own and that Hart's work reflects broader institutional assumptions and biases.[47] While Hart's colleagues have attempted to defend his reputation from the most extreme allegations, some, such as David

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[43] As of February 2014, the Aubane Historical Society's publications were largely available on their website, http://aubanehistoricalsociety.org. The most detailed arguments regarding loyalist informers can be found in Borgonovo, *Spies, Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Fein Society'.* Although Borgonovo undertook the study independently from the Aubane Historical Society, he credits the society's role in his decision to publish his work in the 'Acknowledgements' of his book.

[44] See, for example, "The Killings at Coolacrease," *Irish Times,* 2 November 2007.

[45] "Marking the End of the RIC," *Irish Times*, 25 August 2012.

[46] See, for example, David Fitzpatrick's letters in *History Ireland.* Peter Hart himself also addressed his critics through an interview with *History Ireland,* as well as with at least one comment on Indymedia.ie, where much of the initial debate regarding his work occurred. See Brian Hanley, "Hart to Heart," *History Ireland* 13, no 2 (March/April 2005); "Peter Hart and his Enemies," *History Ireland* 13, no 4(July/August 2005). See also Hart's comment dated 21 October 2004 on Niall Meehan, "John Bruton looks into his own 'Hart'-to see what the Irish people should be thinking," indymedia.org, accessed 11 February 2014.

[47] Meehan, "Troubles in Irish History," 19.

Fitzpatrick, have written that Hart's unexpected death in 2010 left a number of unanswered questions about his findings.[48] Many historians have chosen to address the controversy indirectly, generally when the question of sectarianism arises in their own work. A few, such as John Regan of the University of Dundee and John Borgonovo of University College Cork, have been more forthright in criticising Hart's work and in discussing their own misgivings regarding his conclusions.[49]

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The position of southern minorities in the immediate post-revolutionary period has also become a contentious issue, although here the discussion is somewhat more measured and has generally attracted less popular attention.[50] In the context of Ireland, historians once more present loyalists and Protestants as being at odds with Irish nationalists; their focus, however, is primarily on the social and cultural differences which existed between minorities and the wider population, as communal tensions rarely led to violent confrontations in the Free State. Accounts of this period are dominated by the apparent struggle between the Gaelic-Catholic ethos of the majority and the Anglo-Irish traditions of the loyalist minority, as both communities sought to influence the values of the new Irish Free State. When the Free State government began to promote the Irish language and pass social legislation influenced by Catholic social

[48] See, for example, David Fitzpatrick, "Dr Regan and Professor Hart," *History Ireland* 20, no 5 (September/October 2012).
[49] See, for example, Regan's writings in *History Ireland*, particularly "Dr. Jekyll and Mr Hyde," and "Dr Regan/Mr Snide Replies," *History Ireland* 20, no 4 (July/August 2012); "Historian Disputes Sectarian Motive for Murder of 13 Protestants in Cork," *Irish Times,* 30 April 2012. Borgonovo's concerns are outlined in *Spies, Informers, and the 'Anti-Sinn Fein Society,'* 66-104.
[50] There are a few exceptions regarding limited popular interest in the treatment of minorities following the revolution. One is the issue of the Senate, as recent debates about its role in the Irish Republic have resulted in interest in its origins as a safeguard for southern minorities. See, for example, "Get Rid of the Seanad," *Sunday Independent,* 19 September 2013; Joanna Tuffy, "Seanad's Proud Past has Potential for Fruitful Future," *Sunday Independent*, 17 September 2013; Ulick O'Connor, "First Senate Led the Way and Showed How it Could be Done," *Sunday Independent,* 3 April 2011; John A Murphy, "A Separate Significant Voice," *Irish Times,* 21 January 2009; Elaine Byrne, "Hands that Shaped Irish History," *Irish Times,* 29 July 2008; Elaine Byrne, "There is a Place for a Second Chamber of Democracy," *Irish Times,* 24 March 2009; "Saving the Seanad," *Irish Times,* 27 July 2012.

teachings, for example, outspoken individuals from the loyalist population advocated for the creation of a more pluralist culture that would accommodate different traditions in Ireland.[51]

While it is generally agreed that loyalists were to some extent marginalised within the Free State, scholars differ as to whether this marginalisation was the result of discriminatory policies and intimidation, or if it was in fact largely self-imposed. Some have argued that while the culture of the new state did reflect the beliefs and values of the majority, considerable efforts were made to accommodate other religious and cultural groups, most notably by protecting religious freedoms in the Free State constitution. If minorities were marginalised, it is implied, then it is because they failed to take an active role in the political and cultural life of the new state.[52] Yet in a nation attempting to distance itself from its colonial past, culture was a powerful political tool. The Free State legislation might not have been specifically intended to alienate minority groups, but it is indicative of a popular desire to cultivate and assert an Irish identity that was heavily reliant on a rejection of anything associated with British rule, including Anglo-Irish culture. Although the religious freedom of the Protestant minority might be protected, the Gaelic, Catholic culture of the nationalist majority was imposed upon the Free State population in a number of ways, leading Donald Harman Akenson to state that while "the Protestants were tolerated and well treated as a religious minority" they "were penalized and ill-treated as a *cultural* minority".[53]

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[51] FSL Lyons, *Culture and Anarchy in Ireland, 1890-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Terence Brown, *Ireland: A Social and Cultural History, 1922-1985* (London: Fontana Press, 1985). This scenario of two cultures at war has since been challenged by others; see, for example, O'Callaghan, "Language, Culture and National Identity".

[52] This attitude is not limited to historians who have embraced the traditional nationalist narrative; See, for example, FSL Lyons, "The Minority Problem in the 26 Counties," in *The Years of the Great Test,* ed. Francis MacNamara (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1978), 92-103, and Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland,* 300-301.

[53] D.H. Akenson, *A Mirror to Kathleen's Face*: *Education in Independent Ireland, 1922-1960* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975), 118-119. Similar observations have also been made by Kurt Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State*, 34-36, and Ewan Morris, *Our Own Devices: National Symbols and Political Conflict in Twentieth Century Ireland* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005), *passim.*

There is much evidence to support claims that southern minorities were disengaged from their surroundings; outspoken members of these communities were often critical of the passive behaviour demonstrated by their fellow loyalists and Protestants.[54] Historians generally portray southern minorities as keeping to themselves, emphasising the refusal of loyalists to participate in the process of state formation, with the result that the disengagement of its members has become the chief characteristic of the loyalist community in accounts of the post-1923 period.[55] The passive behaviour of the loyalist and Protestant communities has exercised considerable influence in how southern minorities are represented in histories of the Free State, as minority detachment has allowed historians to incorporate loyalists and Protestants into differing (and at times conflicting) interpretations of the post-revolutionary period with relative ease.

For those who emphasise that the politics and culture of the Free State did not discriminate against minorities, for example, loyalist detachment is interpreted as a symptom of the general malaise and lack of leadership that existed within the loyalist population, rather than any sort of reflection of the community's experiences in the new state.[56] The passivity of southern minorities, particularly during the revolution and its immediate aftermath, has given rise to doubts as to whether loyalists and Protestants maintain strong political or cultural allegiances, just as public statements from loyalists and Protestants regarding their acceptance

[54] This is a common theme in the writings of the Irish essayist Hubert Butler, for example, who frequently complained of the marginal interest of the Anglo-Irish in Ireland, although did acknowledge their suffering during the revolution; see his "Anglo-Irish Twilight" and "Divided Loyalties," in *Escape from the Anthill* (Mullingar: Lilliput Press, 1986), 75-87, 95-102. FSL Lyons also identifies as a member of the southern minority community, perhaps accounting for his frustration with Protestant and unionist disengagement in the new state. See Lyons, "Minority Problem in the 26 Counties".

[55] FSL Lyons wrote that "the most striking characteristic of the minority" in the 1920s and 1930s was its "ghetto mentality", while Kurt Bowen has also detailed the growing political indifference and apathy of the minority in the years after 1926. Lyons, "Minority Problem in the 26 Counties", 99-100; Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State,* 55-66.

[56] Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland,* 284-297; McDowell questioned whether ex-unionists and Protestants experienced widespread discrimination in the new state, suggesting that at times "a belief in discrimination can become an *idee fixe*, providing the unsuccessful with a more satisfying explanation for failure than mere lack of merit." McDowell, *Crisis and Decline,* 166.

of the Treaty settlement and the new state are taken as confirmation that most were generally content to remain in Ireland after 1923. Had loyalists and Protestants faced widespread violence and discrimination during the revolution and in the new state, it is implied, then they would not have acknowledged the Treaty settlement and more members of the community would have spoken out against the Free State's nationalist ethos.[57]

Although loyalists have been criticised for failing to engage with the new state and for not protecting their own interests against the cultural aggression of the dominant majority, some historians have interpreted loyalist detachment as a natural reaction to the political and social changes occurring in the early twentieth century. From this perspective, loyalists kept their "heads down" because revolutionary violence had demonstrated the full extent of their vulnerability in southern Ireland, and because the culture of the new state ultimately failed to accommodate individuals who were not Catholic or republican.[58] Largely dismissed as remnants of the "English garrison," loyalists were expected by many in the Free State to simply be grateful for permission to remain in Ireland, which is seen to account for public statements from the loyalist community that minorities were safe and content in the new state.[59] Historians such as Enda Delaney, David Fitzpatrick, and Andy Bielenberg have drawn attention to the large numbers of southern Protestants who left the twenty-six counties during the 1911-1926 period, and in the process have acknowledged that migration on such a large scale brings into question loyalist and Protestant statements that they faced little hostility in the new state.[60] The decline

[57] This argument is frequently adopted by individuals wishing to defend the Free State and Irish Republicanism from charges of sectarianism and discrimination. See, for example, the letter by Niall Meehan published in the *Irish Times,* 5 November 2007.
[58] White, *Minority Report,* 96.
[59] Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State,* 47.
[60] Enda Delaney, *Demography, State and Society*: *Irish Migration to Britain, 1921-1971* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 73-95; David Fitzpatrick, "Protestant Depopulation and the Irish Revolution," *IHS* 30, no 152 (November 2013): 643-671; Andy Bielenberg, "Exodus: The Emigration of Southern Irish Protestants during the Irish War of Independence and the Civil War," *Past and Present*, no 218 (February 2013): 199-233. See also Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State,* 22-37;

of Protestant and unionist numbers is often portrayed as a tragedy for the whole nation, on the grounds that a strong Anglo-Irish culture might have curbed the worst political and social excesses of the independent Irish state.[61]

Some historians have maintained that minorities in the Free State were not without agency and have attempted to challenge the "history of benign silence" surrounding the loyalist and Protestant populations by drawing attention to the efforts of minorities to adapt to the political and social realities of the Free State.[62] By shifting the focus to the behaviour and views of loyalists and Protestants themselves, historians such as Ian d'Alton have been able to present a more balanced and comprehensive evaluation of the challenges encountered by minorities in the Free State and the Irish Republic. Summarising the situation of southern Protestants in the post-revolutionary period, for example, d'Alton observes that: "Protestants were on a rough journey from a situation in which Britishness was normative to one where, not alone was it out of favour, but its public expression also carried a degree of risk."[63] The primary focus of his article is not the rejection of Britishness by the majority and the resulting implications for southern minorities, however, but rather southern Irish Protestant "survival within a shifting sense of identity."[64] Such sensitivity to the agency of Protestants and loyalists in the independent Irish state is more commonly found in studies that examine minority behaviour

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Bernadette C. Hayes and Tony Fahey, "Protestants and Politics in the Republic of Ireland: Is Integration Complete?" in *Irish Protestant Identities,* eds. Mervyn Busteed, Frank Neal and Jonathan Tonge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 72.

[61] See, for example, Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland,* 301; Eoghan Harris, "The Road to Recovery Starts at Rock Bottom," *Sunday Independent,* 21 November 2010.

[62] Pauric Dempsey, "Trinity College Dublin and the New Political Order" in *Ireland: the Politics of Independence, 1922-1949*, eds. Mike Cronin and J. M. Regan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 217. However, recent work on the Protestant community in the Free State is beginning to question this "history of benign silence". Dempsey's article, for example, examines the reactions of Trinity College Dublin, one of the leading Protestant and unionist institutions in Ireland, to the creation of the Free State. In particular, Dempsey considers the role played by university representatives in the Irish parliament. The article concludes that "the history of post-1922 Trinity [College] belies the notion of a minority too timid to stand up for its rights".

[63] Ian d'Alton, "'A Vestigial Population?' Perspectives on Southern Irish Protestants in the Twentieth Century," *Eire Ireland* 44, no 3&4 (2009): 25.

[64] d'Alton, "'A Vestigial Population?'":13.

over much of the twentieth century, when the impact of the revolution and the creation of the Irish Free State can be assessed in a long-term context.[65]

Just as loyalists are frequently used by historians as a means of commenting upon the nature of politics and society in the Irish Free State, southern minorities are increasingly being incorporated into discussions on the state of Britain and its empire in the interwar period. Until very recently southern loyalists have been primarily considered within an Irish framework and were largely ignored by British historians, a result of being overshadowed by the larger and more vibrant loyalist community in the north. However, growing interest in the changing nature of Britishness in the twentieth century, as well as in Britain's relationship with its imperial subjects at a time of great unrest in its colonies, has produced a tentative recognition of the British and imperial contexts for southern minority experiences. As Paul Canning and others have pointed out, there was considerable unease in Britain during the interwar period concerning the decline of British power and influence, as well as in regards to the growing influence of nationalism within the empire.[66] Southern Irish loyalists provided those who refused to accept the changing political and social landscapes in Britain and its empire with a cause around which they could rally; for a small coterie of diehard conservatives in particular, the fate of southern loyalists confirmed their fears regarding Britain's inability to defend itself from the evils of the modern world.[67]

In her doctoral dissertation, LM Moulton concludes that Ireland "became foreign" to Britons during the interwar period, as a newfound emphasis on domestic stability led the British public to turn away from contentious political issues and to reject those who did not "fit" the

[65] See, for example, Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State;* White, *Minority Report*.
[66] Paul Canning, *British Policy Towards Ireland, 1921-1941* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), ix; LM Moulton, "Private Irelands: The Legacies of the Anglo-Irish War in Interwar England" (Doctoral dissertation, Brown University, 2010), 12.
[67] Canning, *British Policy Towards Ireland,* 17-25.

construct of Britishness accepted by the majority. Within the British Isles, she argues, "potential sources of instability" were "relocated into the private sphere", and this included Ireland and the Irish, with "the remaining manifestations of Irishness within England" being "swept into the realm of the private and personal".[68] Southern loyalists, particularly southern loyalist refugees, play a significant role in Moulton's study, as she links British views on southern minorities both during and after the revolution with more general attitudes towards national identity, the empire, and immigration.[69] Intriguingly, Moulton suggests that southern loyalists occasionally challenged the construct of Britishness championed by conservative politicians and members of the general public in England, traditionally the strongest supporters of the southern loyalist community; she points out, for example, that the multiple loyalties of southern loyalists and the failure of some refugees to integrate seamlessly into English society ran counter to conservative expectations for these "British" subjects.[70]

Both contemporaries and historians alike have generally agreed that Anglo-Irish relations in the interwar period were largely unaffected by the presence of southern loyalists in the Free State. For contemporaries, the "minority problem" in southern Ireland was an uncomfortable reminder of the recent Anglo-Irish conflict, and in both Britain and Northern Ireland the situation of southern minorities was generally ignored out of embarrassment and a desire to avoid conflict, or less often, exploited for political ends. Some historians have occasionally identified instances where the presence of southern minorities could not be overlooked, further complicating relations among Britain, the Free State and Northern Ireland in the 1920s and 1930s; Paul Bew has pointed out, for example, that the issue of minorities in the Free State exercised a considerable influence over the negotiations between Michael Collins and

[68] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 10-11.
[69] Ibid., 329-358.
[70] Ibid., 352.

James Craig in the aftermath of the Treaty signing, while RB McDowell has examined how the British and Free State governments negotiated compensation payments for loyalists and other victims of the War of Independence.[71] Generally, however, historians are in agreement that southern minorities exercised little influence in Anglo-Irish affairs in the interwar period, particularly following the settlement of the boundary crisis. After decades of debates on the "Irish question," the British public and political elites alike demonstrated little interest in Irish affairs, and even less in the fate of a small number of southern minorities, who were often understood to be the authors of their misfortune.[72]

As well as examining the place, or lack thereof, of southern loyalists and Protestants in Anglo-Irish relations, historians are beginning to study them within an imperial context. The manner in which southern Ireland gained its independence, and later the Free State's active involvement in the Commonwealth during the 1920s, is often stated to have influenced other dominions and colonies in the empire, and some historians have also noted that Britain's Irish policies in the interwar period were heavily influenced by the imperial experiences of its statesmen.[73] Historians engaged in more theoretical discussions regarding Ireland's relationship

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[71] Bew, *Politics of Enmity,* 426; Paul Bew, *Ideology and the Irish Question: Ulster Unionism and Irish Nationalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 97. For more on compensation, see Niamh Brennan, "A Political Minefield: Southern Loyalists, the Irish Grants Committee and the British Government, 1922-1931," *IHS* 30, no. 119 (May 1997): 406-419.

[72] See below, Chapter Three for further information.

[73] Suggestions that the Irish struggle for independence influenced other nationalist conflicts in the colonies are frequently made in works on early twentieth century Ireland, albeit often in passing. See, for example, Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare*, 339; Canning, *British Policy Towards Ireland,* x. For a more comprehensive examination of Ireland's role in, and relationship with, the wider empire, particularly in the twentieth century, see DW Harkness, *The Restless Dominion: The Irish Free State and the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-1931* (New York: New York University Press, 1970); Keith Jeffery, ed., *'An Irish Empire?' Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996); Nicholas Mansergh, "Ireland: External Relations, 1926-1929," in *The Years of the Great Test*, ed. Francis MacManus (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1978), 127-137; Deirdre McMahon, *Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1984) and "Ireland and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1900-1948," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: the Twentieth Century,* eds. Judith M Brown and William Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 139-162. For examples of studies which compare Ireland's experiences to specific regions of the empire, as well as consider the wider influence of the Irish struggle for independence, see TG Fraser, *Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine* (London: MacMillan Press, 1984), and Kate O'Malley, *Ireland,*

with the United Kingdom and with the rest of the empire have meanwhile found considerable evidence to support arguments that the development of Ireland in the twentieth century is consistent with a colonial/neo-colonial society.[74] Comparisons are frequently made between Ireland and colonial African states that gained their independence at later stages in the twentieth century, for example; as with Ireland, these states fought for their independence and experienced bloody civil conflicts, but remain relatively underdeveloped and reliant on former colonial powers.

There have been several tentative attempts in recent years to incorporate southern minorities into these wider debates regarding Ireland's imperial status and the nature of decolonisation in the empire. Moulton has concluded, for example, that British attitudes and policies towards former colonies were largely determined by their Irish experiences and furthermore suggests that the treatment of southern loyalists anticipated British attitudes towards later colonial elites set adrift by the process of decolonisation.[75] Most scholars, however, have chosen to focus on the culture and politics associated with Ulster unionist community when analysing Ireland's colonial situation, as Ulster unionism is frequently assumed to represent the only pro-imperial or colonial-settler mentality on the island of Ireland. Critics of post-colonial theories have complained that theoretical interpretations of Ireland's development in the twentieth century tend to depict Ireland's internal political and social

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India and Empire: Indo-Irish Radical Connections, 1919-1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008). It should be noted that Stephen Howe has argued that the impact of British withdrawal from Ireland in regard to decolonisation movements elsewhere in the empire can only be assessed when there is a better overall understanding of the reasons and motives behind the decline of the empire. Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 69.

[74] Stephen Howe's work remains the most thoughtful and comprehensive evaluation of the debates surrounding Ireland's colonial/neo-colonial/post-colonial status. Howe, *Ireland and Empire*. However, Howe concludes that there are considerable limitations to the usefulness of analysing Ireland within the post-colonial/neo-colonial framework. For examples of arguments made by scholars who have adopted a more favourable attitude towards post-colonial theories and their application in Irish studies, see Terrence McDonough, ed., *Was Ireland A Colony? Economics, Politics and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Ireland* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2005) and Clare Carroll and Patricia King, eds., *Ireland and Post-Colonial Theory* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), particularly the essay by Joe Cleary.

[75] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 330.

struggles as occurring between two opposing monolithic groups; in such an absolute understanding of the revolution and its aftermath, there is little room for the southern loyalist community.[76] Occasionally southern loyalists are acknowledged as a colonial-settler population or a post-colonial minority, but such references are usually made in passing and rarely involve any comprehensive comparisons between the minority in the Free State and other colonial minority populations elsewhere in the empire.[77]

Interestingly, southern minorities have been more successfully integrated into studies that favour a European framework for Ireland in the modern era. Irish historians have often been reluctant to view Ireland in its European context; Bill Kissane, who has worked extensively on Ireland's political development in the early twentieth century, has observed that scholars often assume that "comparisons with the colonial world are more suitable" as "Ireland is the only European country that is a former colony of Great Britain."[78] He has also suggested that the tendency to view Ireland in the context of Great Britain is the result of Anglo-centric biases, which lead historians to assume that the Irish Free State was relatively stable and democratic in the inter-war period largely owing to British influences and to Ireland's proximity to the United Kingdom.[79] Yet by moving away from the British Empire, or at least by considering alternative frameworks for Ireland, scholars are able to avoid problematic comparisons between Ireland and "Third World" post-colonial nation-states. When compared to African nations in the British Empire that gained their independence later in the twentieth century, for example, Ireland

[76] See, for example, Howe, *Ireland and Empire, passim* and Liam Kennedy, "Modern Ireland: Post-Colonial Society or Post-Colonial Pretensions?" in *Colonialism, Religion, and Nationalism in Ireland* (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, 1996), 177.
[77] See, for example, Kurt Bowen's work on southern Protestants, in which he frequently refers to the southern Protestant population as a "colonial" and "post-colonial" minority. *Protestants in a Catholic State,* 6, 10, 17, 198.
[78] Kissane, *Explaining Irish Democracy*, 6.
[79] Ibid.; Tom Garvin has also suggested that "the usual British Isles parochialism" is responsible for the tendency of historians engaged in Irish studies to underestimate influences from outside Britain and the empire, particularly from Europe. Garvin, *1922*, 1.

becomes an "exception" to a number of patterns in the process of decolonisation as experienced by these states.[80] In a European context, however, Ireland's experiences with colonialism and decolonisation are hardly unique; as Stephen Howe has pointed out, "most of Europe is 'post-colonial'", and Ireland is one of at least ten other European states to have successfully liberated itself from foreign rule in the early twentieth century.[81]

As noted by Howe, political divisions often followed confessional lines in Europe, so it might be assumed that the southern loyalist community, which encompassed most of the Protestant minority in southern Ireland, can be easily written into narratives that situate Ireland in its European context.[82] Similarly the migration of a third of the southern Protestant population between 1911-1926 can be considered as part of the mass population movements that occurred on the continent during the interwar period, as the collapse of European empires led to the emergence of new states and the redistribution of ethnic populations.[83] Many European states developed "minority problems" in the interwar period, and historians have recognised the similarities between southern Irish Protestants and other minority ethnic groups such as Germans in Bohemia and Swedes in Finland.[84] Despite calls for comparative studies between southern Protestants and similar minority populations on the continent, however, there have been few comprehensive works placing southern Irish minorities in a European framework.[85] At the moment, the most promising comparative studies involve relating Irish

[80] Liam Kennedy addresses many of the shortcomings of comparisons between Ireland and Third World Nations in the essays in *Colonialism, Religion, and Nationalism in Ireland, passim*.
[81] Howe, *Ireland and Empire,* 232.
[82] Ibid., 227. Interestingly, contemporaries appeared to have drawn comparisons between conflicts in Ireland to those occurring on the continent because of the "racial" and "religious" components in both. See, for example, Bew, *Ideology and the Irish Question,* 72.
[83] Bielenberg, "Exodus," 232; Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State,* 34; Hart, "The Protestant Experience of Revolution," 240.
[84] See, for example, Hart, "Ethnic Conflict and Minority Responses," 241; McDowell, *Crisis and Decline,* vii.
[85] d'Alton, "'A Vestigial Population?'" 12-13.

Protestants to other religious minorities on the continent, although historians responsible for such work continue to focus considerable attention on the Ulster Protestant population.[86]

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The interest in minority communities in Ireland, as well as in their experiences in the early twentieth century, shows little sign of abating. Historians continue to debate whether Protestant loyalists were targeted during the revolution because of their religion or constitutional loyalties, and whether individuals who had remained loyal to the government of the United Kingdom faced discrimination in the newly created Free State. Scholarly studies have also become closely intertwined with popular narratives of the revolution and its aftermath; inspired or angered by works like Hart's *The IRA and its Enemies,* more Irishmen and women are coming forward with personal stories of family members and their revolutionary experiences, while outspoken commentators have used the issue of southern minorities to gain a wider audience for their opinions on the nature of Irish republicanism and the role of history in the Irish Republic.

Although all these factors have led to a greater awareness regarding the experiences of southern loyalists and Protestants, much work remains to be done on the issue of southern minorities and their relationship with the independent Irish state. Debates over the nature of revolutionary violence and the position of minorities in the new state have progressed very little in recent years, for example; increasing numbers of studies on the revolution and its aftermath have only served to muddy the waters, while scholars, in their efforts to disprove arguments

[86] See, for example, Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, "Protestant Minorities in European States and Nations," *National Identities* 11, no 1 (March 2009): 1-8; Joseph Ruane and David Butler, "Southern Irish Protestants: An Example of De-Ethnicisation?" *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no 4 (2007): 619-635; John Coakley, "A Political Profile of Protestant Minorities in Europe," *National Identities* 11, no 1 (2009): 9-30.

made by their ideological opponents, are focusing more and more of their attentions on personal attacks and on revisiting the same material as others.[87]

Perhaps the most significant shortcoming in the current literature of southern minorities, however, is how rarely southern loyalists and Protestants are considered on their own terms. While the incorporation of loyalists and other minorities into narratives of twentieth-century Ireland has provided further fuel for the nationalist-revisionist debate, there have been few attempts to consider the loyalist community as an independent entity. There is a growing danger that southern loyalists are being considered solely in the context of their conflict with the nationalist majority; the impact of violence, intimidation, and marginalisation on minority communities is less often the subject of comprehensive study than the motives and identities of those who perpetrated the attacks. To fully understand the experiences of southern loyalists in the early twentieth century, it is undoubtedly necessary to address the relationship between minority communities and the nationalist majority; as Jack White has stated, "there is no way of defining a minority except by reference to a majority."[88] Yet while their experiences are beginning to receive more recognition, loyalists continue to be seen predominantly as passive victims caught up in events beyond their control, and few historians appear willing to credit southern minorities with any degree of agency.

Assumptions and generalisations about southern minorities, particularly the emphasis on their passivity and victimhood, are possible largely because of the shortcomings in existing

[87] David Fitzpatrick addresses these issues in a recent book review, noting that "At least three new series of local studies covering part or all of the period 1916–23 threaten to inundate an already muddy field over the next few years". While he acknowledges that local histories can contribute significantly to our understanding of the period, he also observes that: "there is no consensus about what questions to ask, what sources to seek, or what statistical or other tests to apply when offering judgments. Even so, the intense debates provoked by earlier studies make it difficult for newcomers to avoid contentious issues such as the impact of sectarianism, the morality of republican violence, the extent of popular support and the degree to which revolutionary activists truly broke with the past." David Fitzpatrick, "Review-The Dynamics of War and Revolution: Cork City, 1916-1918," *History Ireland* 21, no 5 (September/October 2013).
[88] White, *Minority Report,* 41.

knowledge regarding the southern Protestant and southern loyalist communities in the twentieth century. Southern loyalism in particular has rarely been identified as significant enough to warrant extensive examination; instead, it is often dismissed as merely a sideshow to the nationalist struggle for independence. The culture and political views of southern loyalists have been condemned as conservative, static, and out-dated, especially when compared to the more modern and progressive values popularly associated Irish nationalism and republicanism.[89] It is rarely acknowledged that loyalties to Britain, the crown, and the empire could be as deeply felt as those to Ireland, the Irish nation and the Irish republic, nor is it often recognised that the allegiances of an Irish loyalist might arise from a number of factors beyond self-interest. The decline and ultimate disappearance of southern loyalism in the twentieth century appears to be taken as confirmation of the shortcomings and failures of Irish loyalism, reinforcing the tendency to dismiss the loyalist community as inconsequential to the development of the Free State.

Irish historians have long struggled to come to terms with southern loyalism as a political ideology as well as a cultural identity, in part because their understanding of the concept is heavily influenced by more recent developments in Ireland. The troubled situation in Northern Ireland has contributed to many of the assumptions and ambiguities surrounding Irish loyalism, as too frequently those involved in debates regarding southern minorities and sectarian violence project modern constructs of loyalism backwards in time. As Allan Blackstock notes in the introduction to his work on loyalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, loyalism in Ireland is "understood as a product of the recent 'troubles' in Northern Ireland, " and

[89] Buckland for example, suggests that "The story of southern unionism is the story of how the Anglo-Irish in the south of Ireland reacted to the advent of democratic nationalism," and he frequently compares the 'democratic' nature of nationalism with the aristocratic and elitist behaviour of southern unionists. Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland.*

as a result, "it has distinctive connotations of paramilitarism, sectarianism, illegality and a form of tribal identity..."[90]

The post-1966 situation in Northern Ireland has shaped understandings of sectarianism and communal violence in Ireland.[91] At the time of the revolution Ulster unionists voiced concerns regarding the vulnerability of religious and political minorities in the south, and it is frequently suggested that the experiences of loyalists and Protestants in the independent Irish state continue to influence Ulster unionist perceptions of the Irish Republic.[92] Many historians argue that there must be an honest reappraisal of republicanism in the south if there is to be a genuine and lasting rapprochement with the unionist majority across the border.[93] Furthermore, commentators such as Eoghan Harris maintain that the glorification of the IRA and of the south's struggle for independence serves only to strengthen existing divisions and to embolden republican dissidents in Northern Ireland.[94] Not surprisingly, attempts to acknowledge the sectarian legacy of partition and the revolution in the south have met with mixed reactions. Some in the Republic believe there is little to be gained from examining painful incidents that

[90] Allan Blackstock, *Loyalism in Ireland, 1789-1829* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press 2007), 1
[91] John Regan claims that there is a reluctance in the Republic to even describe the events of the early twentieth century as a "revolution", because such terminology invokes images of the more recent conflict and violence in Northern Ireland. Regan, *Counter-Revolution,* xiii.
[92] For an account of Ulster unionist views on the Free State during the revolution and its immediate aftermath, with some consideration of the role played by the treatment of southern loyalists in the formation of those views, see Dennis Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State, 1919-1949* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1988). The treatment of southern Protestants, and the impact of southern attitudes towards minorities on north-south relations, recently received greater public attention following a speech made by the grand secretary of the Orange Order before the Republic's Senate. In his speech, Drew Nelson, contrasted rising Catholic numbers in the north with the rapid decline of the Protestant population in the south, suggesting that it was clear which state had treated its minority better. For more on the debate, see the press coverage of the Orange Order delegations visit to the Oireachtas, particularly "Protestant Community's Difficulties Emphasised," *Irish Times,* 4 July 2012.
[93] White, *Minority Report,* 192-193.
[94] See, for example, Eoghan Harris, "Time to Wake Up the Mute Media Lambs in Drury's Glen," *Sunday Independent,* 16 January 2011, "Miriam Did Us All a Service by Respecting Obama's Roots," *Sunday Independence,* 29 May 2011, and "We Must Forget the Fantasies of the Past and Face the Tough Truth," *Sunday Independent,* 18 September 2011.

occurred nearly a century ago.[95] More outspoken critics of revisionist history, meanwhile, have voiced their concerns that a sectarian interpretation of the revolution that seeks to discredit Irish nationalism will only distract from unionist bigotry and violence in the north.[96]

The situation is Northern Ireland is not the only present-day public concern influencing studies on the revolution and southern loyalism. At a time when the Republic is facing considerable uncertainties about its future, interpretations of the past are being used both to bolster existing political positions, as well as to challenge the status quo. Many who adhere to the nationalist account of the revolution believe that an inspirational narrative can provide unity and guidance for the Irish people as the Republic nears the centenary celebration of Irish independence; academic historians have been accused of creating fragmented history that fails to serve a constructive role in modern Ireland, and which instead draws attention to existing divisions within Irish society.[97] For their part, some so-called "revisionist" historians contend that the traditional nationalist narrative has prevented Ireland from developing as a nation. They point out that politics in the Republic remain rooted in the divisions of the Civil War, and that there have been few attempts to create a more modern, pluralist Irish identity. A few individuals have even suggested that the causes of the Republic's current economic troubles and stagnant

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[95] Ann Marie Hourihane, "Sensitive Strands of Our History," *Irish Times,* 8 November 2007. Martin Mansergh, a prominent Fianna Fail politician and strategist, as well as a member of the Anglican community in the south, wrote a series of letters to the *Sunday Independent,* suggesting that recent interest in Protestant community was simply an attempt to exploit old murders, "as the main plank of an ideological project to criminalise the entire national independence struggle along with the 1916 Rising, quite often in terminology as offensive as it is possible to devise, going on in some cases to attack the value of independence itself." He repeatedly stated that the focus should be on "how well Ireland is doing today" and that there was little interest in the Protestant community to stir up old suffering, writing in one letter that: "Amongst the Church of Ireland in the South, I detect little interest in and much resistance to attempts to upset public harmony by encouraging a reactionary or revanchist approach to the events of 80 years ago and indeed the entire ethos of this State." See Mansergh's letters in *Sunday Independent,* 20 August, 10 September, 1 October 2006.

[96] See, for example, Niall Meehan, "Sectarian Gloss on State's Early Years is Flawed," *Irish Times,* 12 October 2009; "Cork's Bloody Secret," *Irish Times,* 14 October 2009.

[97] Martin Mansergh,"Protestants Should Speak out the Truth," *Sunday Independent,* 10 September 2006. The role of history in the modern Irish state is at the heart of nationalist-revisionist differences. See, for example, Ciaran Brady (ed), *Interpreting Irish History: The Debate on Historical Revisionism* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994), particularly the essay "Against Revisionism" by Desmond Fennell, 181-190.

political atmosphere can be traced back to the revolution and the marginalisation of southern minorities.[98]

The relationship between southern minorities and the wider Irish population, as well as the experiences of loyalists during the revolutionary period and its aftermath, can indeed contribute to a broader understanding of Irish republicanism, particularly by indicating the motives and expectations of those who supported the struggle for Irish independence. Similarly, a greater awareness of the treatment of southern loyalists at the hands of the Free State and British governments can benefit those interested in the decolonisation process, as well as in the evolution and applications of British identity by those in the colonies. Yet to assume that southern loyalism was simply a negation or rejection of Irish nationalism, or that loyalists embraced a British or imperial identity solely out of self-interest, is to do a disservice to the southern loyalist population. Only by first considering the southern loyalist population on its own terms - by acknowledging loyalism as a legitimate ideology and identity, and accepting that loyalists had their own opinions regarding the revolution and its outcomes - will it be possible to understand the community's wider significance in terms of the Free State, Britain and the British Empire.

In Their Own Words: "Public" and "Personal" Constructs of Loyalism

Efforts to identify and define southern loyalism are complicated by the existence of what might be termed "public" expressions of loyalism made on behalf of the wider community, particularly in the years after 1921. During the revolution and its aftermath, for example, prominent loyalist institutions and outspoken members of the loyalist community publicly urged

[98] See, for example, Eoghan Harris, "The Road to Recovery Starts at Rock Bottom," *Sunday Independent,* 21 November 2010. Ann Marie Hourihane frequently refers to the loss of the southern minority and the need for more diversity in those involved in the political and economic life of the Republic. See, for example, "Nice Reliable Protestants Could Set us on an Even Keel," *Irish Times,* 13 December 2010.

their fellow loyalists to accept the treaty settlement and later the constitution of the Irish Free State. This message of public acceptance, examined in this study in Chapter Three, was designed to reassure members of the loyalist community that loyalist values and identities were both adaptable and enduring. It was also intended to highlight the protection offered to the loyalist community under the terms of the Free State constitution; as pointed out by many leading loyalists, Free State's Dominion status and membership in the Commonwealth ensured that loyalists could maintain their close relationship with crown and empire. Above all else, however, leading loyalists were attempting to construct a public narrative that would appeal to those outside of the loyalist community; this narrative was intended to reassure the Free State political elite, as well as the wider southern population, that loyalists did not pose a threat to the new state and that the ultimate allegiance of southern loyalists in the post-revolutionary period was to the constitution of the Free State.[99]

Whether these public statements regarding loyalism reflected or influenced the personal views of individual loyalists can be debated; this study will examine both public statements of loyalism as well as more personal expressions of identities and allegiance made by individual loyalists, in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the evolution of southern loyalism in the early twentieth century. Prior to 1922 loyalists were united in their support for the Union, although disagreements over attempts to reform the Union and concerns regarding the growing popularity of the Home Rule movement revealed the existence of deep-rooted divisions within the loyalist community. Individual loyalists had constructed deeply personal relationships with Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the rest of the British Empire, and the nature of such relationships affected the manner in which individuals understood and acted upon their allegiances. Reactions to the revolution and the eventual creation of the Free State

[99] See below, Chapter Three.

similarly varied from loyalist to loyalist. Certain members of the loyalist population were unswerving in their allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom, openly supporting the crown forces during the 1919-1921 period and choosing to leave southern Ireland after 1922 rather than accept the authority of an independent Irish government. Larger numbers chose to keep their heads down during the War of Independence before grudgingly accepting the Free State settlement, transferring their allegiance from the United Kingdom to the Free State while taking comfort in the constitutional ties that bound the new state to the crown and empire.

Given that most individual loyalists were hesitant to publicly discuss their identities and allegiances in the early twentieth century, it is difficult, if not impossible, to construct a definition of loyalism that would accurately reflect the views of all members of the loyalist community at any given time. This study will therefore not attempt to create a dominant construct of loyalism that is then imposed upon the entire southern loyalist population, but it will instead examine the varied views and opinions that existed within the loyalist community. By acknowledging the diversity of the southern loyalist community and the existence of different (and at times competing) constructs of loyalism, the study intends to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of southern loyalism and its evolution in the early twentieth century. It will also consider the events of the revolution and the creation of the Free State from the point of view of individual loyalists, examining how personal experiences influenced identities and allegiances, and vice-versa.

It is possible to reconstruct the views and experiences of large numbers of individual loyalists largely as a result of the work of the Irish Grants Committee. In the aftermath of the revolution, civilian victims of revolutionary violence struggled to rebuild their lives. There was widespread public criticism in Ireland that the governments of both the Free State and the United Kingdom were failing to provide sufficient financial aid to compensate for the damages

caused by their armed forces, leading to unnecessary stress and financial ruin for innocent bystanders. Members of the southern loyalist population were particularly aggrieved; not only had large numbers of loyalists suffered personal and financial losses during the 1919-1923 period, but the apparent apathy of the government of the United Kingdom regarding the sufferings of its strongest supporters in Ireland was interpreted by loyalists as a further betrayal, following the government's decision to abandon the loyalist population in 1921.

In response to growing public outrage on both sides of the Irish Sea, the British government sanctioned the formation of an Irish Distress Committee in 1922 (later the Irish Grants Committee) to provide grants and loans to Irish refugees and to individuals with compensation claims arising from damages inflicted during the War of Independence. The government once more bowed to public pressure in the fall of 1926, leading to the formation of a second Irish Grants Committee (IGC), this time authorized to consider post-truce claims from Irish loyalists. To the relief of Irish loyalists, the second IGC committee was instructed to consider claims for injuries and losses that had been previously outside the scope of earlier compensation agreements, allowing loyalists to claim for losses arising from personal injury, theft, and boycotts.

This study relies heavily on the records of the second Irish Grants Committee, which operated between 1926 and 1930. During this time the committee processed 4,032 claims from loyalists, making recommendations in 2,237 cases that resulted in awards totalling £2,188,549.[100] Of these applications, files for 3,749 cases are lodged at The National Archives in Kew, England, where they were made available to the public beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The records of the IGC have been frequently used by historians, especially in recent years; it appears, however, that no one has considered the files in their entirety, instead

[100] A complete summary of the work of the second IGC can be found in the Committee's final report. "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.

sampling a small selection of the files or consulting only the files that pertain to a certain region.[101] This is problematic for a number of reasons. When the files are considered in their entirety, it is possible to gain a much better understanding of the workings of the committee. As committee members processed the files, for example, they came to recognise certain patterns in terms of the geographic locations of applicants and the nature of the outrages inflicted upon loyalists. Their observations often influenced later cases from the same regions or which involved certain types of crimes, although this is rarely explicitly stated in the later individual files.[102] Similarly, the committee occasionally requested references from one individual for multiple cases; the subsequent correspondence with the reference might only be included in one file, rather than the files for all of the cases being evaluated by the reference.

More significantly, the current order of the files was determined by a number of factors, but it appears that many of the larger claims and claims relating to high-profile cases were submitted early on and settled quite quickly by the committee. Such claims are therefore to be found at the beginning of the collection, in the first several boxes of files. While the work of the IGC was widely publicised in Britain and urban areas in Ireland, the committee had more difficulties in communicating with rural loyalists from the lower classes. As a result, claims from these loyalists were received quite close to the initial deadline for applications, and in fact the committee was forced to extend the deadline on a number of occasions to accommodate

[101] The files are very popular with academics that have engaged in local studies; see, for example, Coffey, *Planters of Luggacurran*; Farry, *Aftermath of Revolution* and Hart, "Protestant Experience of Revolution." The IGC records are also increasingly being used by historians examining more thematic aspects of minority experiences in the independent Irish state. See, for example, Bielenberg, "Exodus"; Moulton, "Private Irelands" and Niamh Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists After the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1922-32" (Doctoral Dissertation, University College Dublin, 1994). A new study by Gemma Clark which makes extensive use of the IGC files only came to my attention after the completion of this thesis. Gemma Clark, *Everyday Violence in the Irish Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[102] This is particularly true of false claims that were submitted in groups from certain regions, such as Ennistymon in County Clare. Once the committee had encountered several such claims, they became proficient in identifying certain features in the applications that marked it out as a fake claim, such as the name of a certain individual who had acted as a reference for fake claims in the past. As the committee encountered more of these claims, they rarely took the time to indicate why it was being rejected. For more on fake claims, see below, Chapter Six.

isolated loyalists who became aware of the IGC years after its formation. Most of these cases were considered by the IGC shortly before it was disbanded, and the related files are now found at the end of the collection. If sampled improperly, the impression given by the IGC files could be very misleading - if files from only the first several boxes are considered, one would assume that loyalists were largely drawn from the upper middle and gentry classes, and had suffered immense losses during the Civil War period. Unfortunately, most historians who have sampled the files have failed to disclose their sampling methods and not all have provided the box and file numbers in their citations, making it difficult to determine if files from throughout the collection have been included in the sample group.

This study, by contrast, is based on a more extensive and systematic use of the IGC files. The files were categorised by the committee according to the location of the outrage or outrages that formed the basis of the claims therein. Although the contents of all of the files were photographed, for the purposes of this study, a random sampling of the files was created. For each of the twenty-six counties in the Free State, 25 percent of the files were randomly selected with the use of a random number generator.[103] The information contained in each of the selected files was then transcribed into a database. The database entry for each file contained information from the initial application form, as well as from subsequent correspondence between the IGC and the applicant. On average a file might contain roughly fifteen to twenty documents, but some files contain considerably more, depending on the nature of the case; in some of the most complex cases, the files contain hundreds of documents generated by the committee and the applicant, as well as by lawyers, auctioneers, bank managers, and character references.

[103] For more details regarding sampling method, see Appendix A.

Claiming compensation for losses suffered as a result of the unrest of the 1921-1923 period, loyalist applicants to the IGC not surprisingly focused much of their attention on the nature and extent of their losses. As discussed in Chapter Four of this study, the IGC records contain considerable information regarding the experiences of the loyalist population during the Irish Revolution, including first-hand accounts of attacks on individuals who were perceived as government supporters. The socio-economic backgrounds of individual loyalists are also examined; accounts of southern loyalism have been dominated by the views of the former landed elite, but the IGC files provide insight into the experiences of lower and middle class applicants from a variety of geographical and socio-economic positions. Crucially, a significant number of applicants to the IGC were Catholic, meaning that the files represent a valuable opportunity to question the popular association between loyalism and Protestantism in Ireland.[104]

The IGC files likewise provide considerable insight into the nature of southern loyalism, with applicants required to submit evidence that their losses or injuries were "occasioned in respect or on account of [their] allegiance to the Government of the United Kingdom." The importance of the "nexus" between loyalty and injury was stressed in both the committee's Terms of Reference as well as in its final report, and it was not uncommon for committee members to demand further details regarding an applicant's loyalty before deciding whether or not to award compensation.[105] Chapter Five of this study examines how individual applicants articulated their pre-revolutionary allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom, and how loyalists reacted to the republican movement during the War of Independence, at a time when public support for the government was punished with hostility and violence. As the IGC

[104] Of the 917 files in the random sample created for this study, the religion of 513 applicants is known, based on the information provided by the applicant to the IGC and on the census records from 1911. Of these 513 applicants, 140 were Catholic.
[105] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," CO 762/212, 89-90.

was active from 1926 to 1930, the committee's files also reveal the attitudes and fears of southern loyalists in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, recording in particular the struggles of individual loyalists to transfer their allegiance to the Free State and the tensions that existed within the community between "active" and "passive" expressions of loyalism.

The IGC files are not an unbiased sampling of loyalist experiences of the Irish Civil War. As applicants to the committee were seeking compensation for losses sustained during the conflict, the files record the views and experiences of individuals who had witnessed first-hand the worst excesses of the revolution. Yet while it should be acknowledged that the files do not represent the experiences of all southern Irish loyalists, it is also important to appreciate the significance of the IGC records. Each file represents a story, an eyewitness account of a momentous period in Irish history that is important in its own right. When these stories are examined together, in the context of the work of the IGC, they allow scholars to offer a number of observations regarding the nature and impact of the lawlessness and violence arising from the revolution. Furthermore, in addition to the letters and records submitted by each applicant, the files also contain collaborating evidence from the applicants' family members, neighbours, clergymen, and other community leaders. While the IGC's work was intended to provide relief to individual loyalists, its records also reflect the shock and terror experienced by the wider loyalist community in the twenty-six counties.

By considering both public and private, communal and individual, expressions of loyalism, this study will contribute to a more nuanced understanding of both the loyalist population and of southern loyalism. Historians have frequently underestimated the diversity that existed within the southern loyalist population, both in terms of its membership and in regard to the many interpretations of southern loyalism that existed within the community. It is often assumed in the literature on southern loyalists, for example, that public statements made

on behalf of the community by outspoken loyalists and loyalist institutions accurately reflected the experiences and opinions of the entire loyalist population. Historians, however, have largely failed to take into account the context in which these statements were voiced. Similarly, the most commonly used sources for the study of loyalists – particularly the *Church of Ireland Gazette,* and the Irish Grants Committee files – have rarely been considered in their entirety. In addition to drawing attention to the diversity within the loyalist community, this study also intends to generate greater awareness regarding the strengths and weaknesses of loyalist sources, with a particular emphasis on the Irish Grants Committee files.

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Writing to the Irish Grants Committee in April 1927, the Reverend W.J. King gave his unqualified support to a claim that had been submitted by a parishioner and close friend, Richard B. Reynolds of Fahagh, Beaufort, County Kerry.[106] Reynolds had applied to the IGC in November 1926, but had provided the committee with few details regarding his loyalty. On his application form, he simply stated his belief that the attacks on his property were the result of his being a "Protestant Unionist" in a district where sectarian tensions were running high; when pressed by the committee for further details, he outlined the difficulties of providing evidence of his loyalty, given that he had been too old to serve in the European war. King, however, wrote of Reynolds' loyalty with admiration and respect. In his letter to the IGC, he explained that Reynolds had arrived in the parish around 1909, before adding:

> And after a time I thanked God that he had settled down amongst us. He was such a fine fearless Unionist and Loyalist that he became a tower of strength to us all. He made it a point of selecting unionists for his work at all times when available… He was looked upon as an outstanding unionist. And I am firmly convinced that he would lose his life, rather than trail his flag in the mire before those ruffians.

[106] CO 762/ 35/514

The contrast with Chamberlain's sermon and King's letter is striking, to say the least. Chamberlain, speaking publicly less than a year after the end of the Civil War, had urged his listeners to make peace with the treaty settlement and to support the lawfully constituted government of the Free State. His sermon had emphasised the importance of accepting the new state and of establishing peaceful relations with the nationalist majority. King, by contrast, clearly found it difficult to set aside his bitterness regarding the events and outcome of the revolution and had no qualms about applauding Reynolds' preferential hiring of unionists. Writing what he believed to be a private letter, given the assurances of the IGC that references would be treated confidentially, King praised Reynold's continuing loyalty in the form of his refusal to submit to "those ruffians." While both Chamberlain and King acknowledged the strength of will and determination found within members of the loyalist community, they appear to have differed in their views regarding the Free State and the survival of the southern loyalist community. Chamberlain might urge acceptance, but there were other loyalists such as King who, at least privately, were less willing to forget the troubles that they had experienced during the revolution, and who continued to believe that they were engaged in a struggle with the men who now controlled the Free State.

CHAPTER TWO: THE PUBLIC LANGUAGE OF LOYALISM IN THE IRISH FREE STATE

Near the end of *Bowen's Court*, Elizabeth Bowen's literary account of her family's history in County Cork, the author described a garden party held at Mitchelstown Castle in August 1914. Fifteen years old at the time, Bowen had been primarily concerned with the weather and her appearance. When news reached her father that England had declared war on Germany, her immediate response was to ask whether they would still attend the party. Yet the significance of the day was not entirely lost on her; as she would write decades later, "It was an afternoon when the simplest person begins to anticipate memory - this Mitchelstown garden party, it was agreed, would remain in every one's memory as history." She continued, now with the wisdom of hindsight: "It was, also, a more final scene than we knew. Ten years hence, it was all to seem like a dream… Many of those guests, those vehement talkers, would be scattered, houseless, sonless, or themselves dead. That war - or call it now that first phase of war - was to go far before it had done with us. After 1918 came the war in Ireland… For Ireland, between 1918 and 1939, "peace" contracted into a shorter space than people in England realize - in fact, perhaps one does not say of Ireland that war began again, but that war resumed."[1]

In 1914 few predicted that the war on the continent would last years, not months, and no one could have foreseen the cost of the conflict, both in terms of sheer destruction and in human lives lost. Many Europeans also failed to anticipate the challenges that they would face after 1918, with civil unrest, ideological clashes and vast movements of displaced peoples undermining nations across the continent. Yet Bowen's story reflects her specifically Irish, and Irish loyalist, background. The Mitchelstown garden party is described as "an assemblage of Anglo-Irish people from all over north-east County Cork, from the counties of Limerick,

[1] Elizabeth Bowen, *Bowen's Court* (Cork: The Collins Press, 1998), 436.

Waterford and Tipperary".[2] As members of a community whose political and social dominance was increasingly challenged by the rising nationalist movement, Bowen's neighbours and friends embraced the war as an opportunity to resume their traditional leadership roles and to reaffirm their loyalty to king, country and empire. "Braced against the gale from the mountains, licking dust from their lips, these were the unmartialled loyalists of the South," she wrote. "Not a family had not put out, like Bowen's Court, its generations of military brothers - tables in Protestant churches recorded deaths in remote battles; swords hung in the halls. If the Anglo-Irish live on and for a myth, for that myth they constantly shed their blood. So, on this August 1914 day of grandeur and gravity, the Ascendancy rallied, renewed itself."[3]

As Bowen came to realise, the war marked a turning point in the history of the southern Irish loyalist community. Far from securing their future in Ireland and the empire, the war killed many of the younger generation and eroded loyalist confidence and morale. Those who survived the conflict on the continent returned to Ireland to find their community under siege as Irish revolutionaries engaged in an armed struggle against the Act of Union. The Irish Revolution led to the partition of Ireland and the creation of an independent Free State in the south, and southern loyalists, like many other minority groups who had allied themselves with colonial powers, suddenly found themselves struggling to survive in a new age.

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The public reactions of the loyalist community to this new age were polarized. Some loyalists advocated a policy of accommodation, arguing that the settlement embodied in the Free State constitution had freed them from the constraints imposed by unionism; rather than fighting for an outdated political settlement that had produced widespread societal tensions, loyalists could now work with the rest of the population towards the betterment of an Irish state

[2] Ibid., 435.
[3] Ibid., 436.

that was still part of the British Empire. Others believed, however, that the interests of the loyalist community were best protected by adopting a defensive position, on the grounds that accommodation to the nationalist majority would hasten assimilation, leading eventually to the disappearance of loyalist values in the south of Ireland.[4] They also feared that the Irish Free State was simply a "stepping-stone" to an Irish republic, and they doubted whether the Free State constitution would be respected by the former revolutionaries now in government.

At the heart of loyalist disagreements was the community's widespread confusion over the nature of southern loyalism after 1922. Prior to the revolution, loyalists had given their allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom and had supported the Act of Union, consciously emphasising the political and cultural divisions that existed between themselves and the nationalist population. But under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the Anglo-Irish treaty, Ireland was no longer part of the United Kingdom and loyalists were expected

[4] In many ways, these differences of opinions were the most recent manifestations of longstanding disagreements that had fractured the southern unionist movement during the home rule crises of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Describing the experiences of unionists in Co. Clare, the historian David Fitzpatrick has concluded that "the history of Southern Unionism from 1917 to 1919 was one of division." (David Fitzpatrick, *Politics and Irish Life, 1913-1921* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1977), 57). During this period, a section of the southern unionist population, consisting mainly of older conservatives, minor landlords and businessmen from rural towns, insisted on resisting any settlement on the basis of home rule and actively sought to undermine the work of Ulster unionists and the government of the United Kingdom, experiencing a limited degree success in the aftermath of the 1916 Rising. Other southern unionists, however, were more willing to accept that home rule was inevitable and, rejecting the traditional "negative unionism" of the past, turned their attentions towards securing the future of their community in an independent Irish state (Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland*, 128-29). At the Irish Convention of 1917-1918, where delegates representing various communities in Ireland gathered to find a solution for the political crisis, a number of southern unionists declared their willingness to accept a limited form of self-government for Ireland, breaking with their more conservative colleagues (Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland*, 83-128. See also R.B. McDowell, *The Irish Convention, 1917-18* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970). Led by William St John Fremantle Brodrick, ninth Viscount Midleton (later Earl of Midleton), those who supported a more moderate, conciliatory position split from the leading unionist organisation, the Irish Unionist Alliance [IUA] to form the Unionist Anti-Partition League [APL] in early 1919. While the IUA persisted with its anti-home rule propaganda campaign in the rest of the British Isles, the APL focused on opposing the partition of Ireland and sought to ensure that any home rule settlement contained safeguards for religious and political minorities in the south. Both groups were to pursue their respective campaigns until the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty, although loyalist political activity in the south was largely overshadowed by the events of the revolution. For a firsthand account of this period, see Earl of Midleton, *Ireland: Dupe or Heroine?*, 2nd. ed. (London: Heineman, 1932) and *Records and Reactions, 1856-1939* (London: John Murray, 1939). See also McDowell, *Crisis and Decline,* 63-66; Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland*, 129-194.

to transfer their allegiance to the Free State constitution. Did this mean the end of southern loyalism, the community wondered, and how would the creation of the Free State affect their relationship with the rest of the Irish population?

Recently, historians have begun to pay closer attention to the strategies used by the southern loyalist minority to survive the revolution and to adapt to life in the Free State. Writing on ethnic conflict in Ireland, Peter Hart catalogued the options available to southern Protestants during the revolutionary period. According to Hart, when faced with a choice of resisting the IRA, emigrating from Ireland, or accommodation with the new state, most southern Protestants chose to stay and accept the Free State settlement.[5] Ian d'Alton has written extensively on southern unionism and southern Protestantism in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century, and in a recent article he detailed the creation of a Protestant narrative that allowed for "survival within a shifting sense of identity" based on four strategies: engagement, exclusivity, invisibility and assertion, which were adopted by the minority at different points over the course of the twentieth century.[6]

Although each of the specific strategies mentioned by d'Alton gained greater prominence at various points during the twentieth century, all of these tactics were employed by the loyalist population to a certain extent in the Free State, and all were incorporated into the public statements that emerged from loyalist institutions in the aftermath of the revolution. These public statements must, of course, be treated with caution; prominent figures who

[5] Peter Hart, " Ethnic Conflict and Minority Responses," in *The IRA at War*, *1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 254-255.

[6] Ian d'Alton, "'A Vestigial Population?' Perspectives on Southern Irish Protestants in the Twentieth Century," *Eire Ireland* 44, no 3&4 (2009): 9-42. D'Alton's conclusion that Protestants became more assertive in the post-1960 period is shared by others who have engaged in similar studies of the southern Protestant population; Kurt Bowen, for example, has found that southern Protestants began to interact more freely with the rest of the Irish population following the end of the Second World War. Kurt Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State: Ireland's Privileged Minority* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), 195-210. See also Bernadette C. Hayes and Tony Fahey, "Protestants and Politics in the Republic of Ireland: Is Integration Complete?" in *Irish Protestant Identities*, eds. Mervyn Busteed, Frank Neal and Jonathan Tonge (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 70-83.

attempted to shape loyalist discourse about the implications of the Free State constitutional settlement and about relations with the majority did not always have the following that they claimed. Nevertheless, those who advocated accommodation with the Free State, and those who remained implacable in their hostility, provided the framework within which loyalists addressed the political and social upheavals brought about by the revolution. This chapter examines the nature of that framework, the public languages of southern loyalism; the following chapter discusses how that framework and those languages are connected to the establishment of the Irish Grants Committee.

The Public Language of Loyalism: Support for the Free State

"In quietness and confidence must be our strength"
- *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 1932-1936

In the immediate aftermath of the War of Independence, prominent loyalists and loyalist institutions put forward a public message of acceptance and accommodation that would be publicly repeated countless times throughout the 1920s and early 1930s. Leading members of the community insisted that as loyal subjects of the crown, "ex-unionists" were bound to support the lawfully established southern state, regardless of their views on the circumstances surrounding its creation. The government of the United Kingdom to which they had pledged their allegiance had decided in its wisdom to sever the ties between southern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, a decision that had furthermore received royal assent. Loyalists had no choice but to forget old grievances and past divisions; according to public statements made by prominent members of the community, individual loyalists would be best served by joining with their Catholic nationalist neighbours in working towards securing the future of the empire's newest dominion. Moral leadership, the fulfillment of civic duty, and continued loyalty to the

imperial connection as enshrined in the Free State constitution: these were to be the touchstones of public loyalism in the years after 1921.

Two of the most influential institutions in the southern loyalist community, the Church of Ireland and the *Irish Times,* came to dominate public expressions of loyalism in the Free State in the years after 1921.[7] For the most part, both embraced a moderate policy of accommodation, publicly voicing their acceptance of the Treaty settlement and later speaking in favour of the Free State constitution. The Protestants churches had opposed Irish independence during the Home Rule controversies of the later nineteenth century, but following the creation of the Free State the focus of leading clergymen shifted away from political controversies to ensuring the safety and well-being of their congregants.[8] Seventy-four percent of the non-Catholic population of the Free State in 1926 belonged to the Church of Ireland, and members of the Episcopalian church were determined to secure a future for the institution and its members in the Free State.[9] Although individual bishops could be outspoken when they felt that the community they represented was at risk, in general the Church of Ireland hierarchy adopted a policy of acceptance and co-operation. Like many loyalists, clergymen and other members of the Church of Ireland viewed the Free State as a preferable alternative to an Irish republic, as the Free State constitution preserved certain ties with Britain and the empire, and also guaranteed a number of safeguards for religious and political minorities.[10] Church of Ireland representatives were therefore careful to publicly support the new state, and even after successive Free State

[7] Bowen, *Catholics in a Protestant State*, 47, 55.
[8] For more on the reaction of protestant churches to the issue of Home Rule, see Alan Megahey, "'God will Defend the Right': the Protestant Churches and Opposition to Home Rule." in *Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism Since 1801*, eds. D.G. Boyce and Alan O'Day (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 159-175; Alan Megahey, *The Irish Protestant Churches in the Twentieth Century* (London: Macmillan Press 2000); Andrew Scholes, *The Church of Ireland and the Third Home Rule Bill* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2010).
[9] W.E. Vaughan and A.J. Fitzpatrick, *Irish Historical Statistics: Population, 1821-1971* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 1978), 49; Jack White, *Minority Report: The Protestant Community in the Irish Republic* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975), 96.
[10] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 8 December 1921; *Irish Times,* 10, 11 March 1925.

governments began to challenge the constitution, they ensured that their criticisms were directed towards party policies rather than the Free State itself.

Public loyalist discourse was heavily influenced by internal debates taking place within the Church of Ireland community in the years after 1921. The challenges facing the loyalist and Protestant communities were discussed in sermons and at synod meetings, with the clergy and the hierarchy frequently using the press to transmit their message of accommodation to a wider audience. Debates about southern loyalism, the nature of Britishness and Irishness, and the future of religious and political minorities in the Free State also played out in the pages of the weekly Church of Ireland newsletter, *The Church of Ireland Gazette*. The *Gazette* was noteworthy not only for the direct manner in which it approached sensitive issues, but also for the diversity of opinions expressed in its pages. The *Gazette* was edited by clergymen throughout the 1920s and 1930s, although it has been described as "editorially independent" from the church.[11]Assuring their readers that the *Gazette* was more than a "mere glorified Parish Magazine," the editorial staff took care to publish letters from representatives of other Protestant denominations, as well as from the occasional reader who claimed to be Catholic or to hold nationalist or republican sympathies.[12]

Issues relating to the situation of loyalists in the Free State were also discussed and debated in the *Irish Times*, one of Ireland's oldest continually published daily national newspapers. The *Irish Times* had been closely associated with the Protestant ascendancy and the loyalist cause in the nineteenth century, and it continued to represent the interests of the ex-unionist community in the years after 1921. Like the Church of Ireland, the *Irish Times*

[11] A list of *Gazette* editors has been placed online by the Representative Church Body Library; see http://ireland.anglican.org/cmsfiles/pdf/AboutUs/library/Archive/Aug13/Editors.pdf. For the period of this study, the editors of the *Gazette* included Reverend George Ashton Chamberlain (1919-1924); Canon Hugh WB Thompson (1924-1930); and Canon Ernest William Greening (1934-1954). Between 1930 and 1934, the *Gazette* was edited by a series of temporary editors whose identities are unknown.
[12] See for example, *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 2 September 1927, 8, 15 June 1928, 1 June 1929, 8, 15 August 1930, 22 May 1931, 1 September 1933.

acknowledged that the Free State settlement represented the best possible outcome of the revolution for loyalists in the south. In its coverage of events, as well as in editorials and letters to the editor, the *Irish Times* "helped to supply an essential narrative of continuity, easing the ex-unionists into a tolerance - albeit often grudging - of the new Ireland."[13]

Public statements urging accommodation were readily accepted by those loyalists who strongly identified as Irish or who could not envision a future for themselves and their families outside of the Free State; many openly embraced an accommodationist stance in the hopes of countering nationalist assumptions that the ex-unionist population posed a threat to the independent Irish state. Commentators in the *Irish Times* and *Church of Ireland Gazette* who urged upper- and middle-class loyalists to place their education, political experience, and economic power at the disposal of the new state found a receptive audience; in particular, businessmen and professionals who were eager to re-establish their dominance of public and economic life in southern Ireland were quick to recognise the benefits of vocally announcing their support for the new state.[14] Protestants and ex-unionists were disproportionately represented amongst the business and professional classes in the Free State; by 1926, for example, members of the Church of Ireland accounted for approximately 19 percent of "secular" professionals, despite forming slightly less than 7 percent of the overall population in the Free State.[15] Motivated by a strong sense of duty and also by the belief that their support was essential to the establishment of peace and stability in Ireland, loyalist and Protestant businessmen recognized that a public conciliatory stance made good business sense, as it would

[13] d'Alton, "'A Vestigial Population'?": 18. For more on the *Irish Times* and southern loyalists, see Ian d'Alton, "A Protestant Paper for a Protestant People: The *Irish Times* and the Southern Irish Minority," *Irish Communications Review* 12 (2010): 65-73; Caleb Richardson, "Transforming Anglo-Ireland: R.M. Smyllie and the Irish Times," *New Hibernia Review* 11, No 4 (Winter 2007): 17-36; Mark O'Brien, *The Irish Times: A History* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008).
[14] *Irish Times*, 16 December 1921; 23 February 1928; *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 3 July 1925, 27 September 1929.
[15] Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State*, 85-88.

hasten the return of law and order and thereby stabilize the economy.[16] A young, urban and professional population, representing the interests of both substantial landowners and urban businessmen, adopted a confident and determined public façade, openly declaring that southern loyalists were integral to the success of the new state and emphasising their willingness to fulfill their civic duty to the Free State.[17]

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In the immediate aftermath of the revolution southern minorities expressed considerable anxiety regarding their future in Ireland. In May 1922, four months after the treaty settlement had been ratified, representatives of the Church of Ireland met with Michael Collins, chairman of the provisional government, to inquire whether Protestants would be allowed to remain in the new state.[18] Collins hastened to reassure the delegation that minorities would be safe in the Free State, and pro-treaty politicians made similar statements with the intentions of putting the minds of ex-unionists and Protestants at ease.[19]

In order to acknowledge the support of the provisional government, as well as in the hopes of strengthening their position in Free State, loyalists quickly set about declaring their acceptance of the treaty settlement. [20] As early as January 1922 unionists in County Clare sent a written resolution to the provisional government, in which they thanked pro-Treaty politicians for "the assurances which they have already publicly given that their administration will be just and impartial" and promised to assist the government in its attempts to oversee the

[16] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 3, 10, 24 August 1923; *Irish Times,* 21 March 1922; 15 June 1923, 24 August 1923.
[17] Patrick Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885-1922* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1972), 139, 284.
[18] Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885-1922*, 288.
[19] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 13 January 1922. See also Chapter Three.
[20] *Irish Times,* 21 March 1922, 20 March 1923, 8 June 1926; W. Alison Phillips, *The Revolution in Ireland, 1906-1923* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), 311.

establishment of the new state.[21] Loyalist statements published in the *Irish Times* and the *Church of Ireland Gazette* during this period emphasised the constitutional nature of southern loyalism, making it clear that minorities would not challenge the treaty and would provide full support to the provisional government and the Free State.[22]

To emphasise their acceptance of the Free State constitution southern loyalists began to alter the manner in which they expressed what they considered to be their "British" allegiance, in order to give greater emphasis to their Free State citizenship. In December 1922, for example, Orangemen in Monaghan proposed that a separate Grand Lodge be established for members of the order in the south of Ireland, accompanied by a new constitution. This proposal was accepted by northern lodges, but lacked support from Orangemen in other Free State counties. A year later the Orange oath was redrafted for lodges located in the Free State; the new oath allowed southern members to pledge allegiance to the monarch and to the laws of the realm, an arrangement which was deemed more suitable for members in a state with dominion status.[23] The Girl Guide organisation in the south of Ireland pursued a similar course of action, eventually rewriting its oath in 1932 to reflect the Dominion Status of the Free State.[24]

Members of the loyalist community paid heavily for publicly backing the treaty settlement during the Civil War, when Irregulars seeking to destabilise the new state targeted its known supporters.[25] Yet loyalists prided themselves on their lawful behaviour and they continued to voice their allegiance to the Free State constitution in the face of republican

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[21] "Clare Unionists, Resolution Supporting the New Government", 17 January 1922, NAI S58.
[22] See, for example, *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 5 Jan 1923; 13 April 1923; *Irish Times,* 21 March 1921, 12 May 1922, 20 March 1923.
[23] David Fitzpatrick, "The Orange Order and the Border," *IHS* 33, no 129 (2002): 57-59.
[24] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 29 January 1932.
[25] *Irish Times,* 3 October 1922; *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 12 January, 23 March 1923. For more details regarding attacks on Free State Senators, see Donal O'Sullivan, *The Irish Free State and its Senate: A Study in Contemporary Politics* (London: Faber and Faber 1940), 99-115. FSL Lyons has suggested that these attacks on loyalist supporters of the Free State was the final straw that broke loyalist confidence and caused most loyalists to withdraw from public life. FSL Lyons, "The Minority Problem in the 26 Counties," in *The Years of the Great Test,* ed. Francis MacNamara (Dublin: Mercier Press, 1978), 99.

opposition. Some loyalists went even further; believing that loyal Free State citizens owed the state more than passive statements of allegiance, they insisted that members of the southern loyalist community had a moral responsibility to serve Ireland "to the best of their ability," and encouraged members of the community to assume active roles in political and cultural life of the new state.[26] An editorial that appeared in the *Irish Times* in June 1923 stressed that loyalists had a particular obligation to act in the interests of the new state in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, noting that "in these uncertain conditions the minority has one clear duty. It must not be satisfied merely to wait upon events, but must try to shape them."[27]

By publicly offering their services to the Free State, loyalists sought to demonstrate that they were fully committed to the new state and also hoped to win over acceptance from the rest of the Free State population. Prominent loyalists who openly promoted a policy of accommodation tended to focus their attentions on the political affairs of the new state, encouraging individuals with education, wealth and experience to help establish a strong democratic foundation for the Free State. A number of individuals from the loyalist community did answer the call; while no formal loyalist party emerged in the years after 1921, loyalists were represented in the Free State parliament by former unionists who took their seats as independents, and university members were also believed to act on behalf of the interests of the loyalist community.[28] The upper house of parliament, the Seanad or the Senate, was one of the few political safeguards promised to southern unionists during the treaty negotiations that were subsequently enshrined in the constitution of the Irish Free State.[29] As candidates for Senate seats were nominated by the Dail and elected through a restricted franchise, there were

[26] *Irish Times,* 20 March 1923.
[27] *Irish Times,* 15 June 1923.
[28] For more on minority involvement in the politics of the new state, see Brian Walker, *A Political History of the Two Irelands: From Partition to Peace* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 59-61.
[29] For more regarding the formation and activities of the early Seanad, see Thomas Garvin, *The Irish Senate* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1969), 1-14 and John Coakley, "Ireland's Unique Electoral Experiment: the Senate Election of 1925," *Irish Political Studies* 20, no 3 (2005): 231-269.

greater opportunities for minorities to gain political representation.[30] Outside of parliament, loyalists and Protestants found other ways to represent their community in public life. In 1925 five out of nine judges in the Supreme and High Courts were Protestants, a number of Protestants and ex-unionists continued to serve in local government positions throughout this period, and Protestants were also represented on the Censorship Board.[31]

For those who were not in a position to seek elected office or positions in the Free State civil service, voting offered an opportunity to fulfil the civic duties associated with citizenship in the Free State. In both the *Church of Ireland Gazette* and the *Irish Times*, loyalists were publicly encouraged to vote during state elections. An editorial in the *Gazette* published in October 1926 argued that voting was more important in the Free State than it had been during previous decades, as voters were no longer deciding upon one issue (that of the Union) but were instead voting upon comprehensive policies designed by a large number of parties. With a smaller electorate and a government located closer to home, the actions of voters had greater influence than ever before.[32]

Eligible voters were encouraged by leading loyalists to use their vote "wisely", to vote "with the greatest care", "to exercise an intelligent vote", as much was at risk throughout this period.[33] In the aftermath of the War of Independence, loyalists had thrown their support behind the pro-treaty Cumann na nGaedheal party, as members of the party had expressed a

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[30] Coakley, "Ireland's Unique Electoral Experiment," 233; see also O'Sullivan, *The Irish Free State and its Senate,* 91-92. Despite intentions that the Seanad would represent minority interests, however, it never fully enjoyed the support of the loyalist population. Amidst growing loyalist complaints that the Senate was not living up to its potential or protecting the values and culture of the loyalist community, a number of measures were introduced to reform the structure and power of the Seanad. Yet doubts about the role of the Senate continued to be voiced, and while loyalists finally rallied to its defence as it increasingly came under attack from nationalists, the second house was abolished in 1936. See *Irish Times,* 23 February 1928; *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 4 March 1927, 14 February 1934; *Times* [London]*,* 16 January 1936.
[31] *Irish Presbyterian*, July 1925; *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 2 January 1925; "Local Government Elections," *Notes from Ireland*, 2 vol 2 (November 1934); *Times* [London], 23 December 1936.
[32] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 22 October 1926.
[33] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 20 January 1933, 17 August 1923, 22 October 1926; See also *Irish Times,* 25 August 1923, 24 August 1924.

willingness to work within the confines of the Free State constitution. The party had remained largely unchallenged during the early years of the Free State, and for almost a decade its members had worked to strengthen the economic and political foundations of the new state and to assert Irish autonomy on the international stage.[34] The stability achieved by Cumann na nGaedheal governments in this period was no small feat; of all the independent European states to emerge in the years after the First World War, the Irish Free State was the only one to remain fully democratic.[35] By the mid-1920s, however, popular support for Cumann na nGaedheal was beginning to decline. The party's policies were increasingly seen as conservative and uninspiring, and the party was also confronted with disappointed nationalist expectations in the aftermath of the revolution.

With Cumann na nGaedheal unwilling or unable to address the concerns of the electorate, the way was open for a new political party to move to the forefront of the Free State political scene. Until 1927 republicans had refused to acknowledge the Dail or to participate in its work, leaving Cumann na nGaedheal without substantial political opposition. However, the formation of an anti-treaty republican party known as Fianna Fail and the decision of party's members to participate in the Free State government radically altered the political landscape in the new state. Fianna Fail championed the republican values associated with the War of Independence and its members were dedicated to attacking the Free State constitution in order to establish an all-Ireland republic.[36] The party's rise to power was rapid; led by Eamon de Valera, the party emerged from the general election of June 1927 with 44 seats in the Dail, a

[34] See John Regan, *The Irish Counter-Revolution*, *1921-1936* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1999) for an excellent account of the challenges facing the government of the Irish Free State.
[35] Bill Kissane, *Explaining Irish Democracy* (Dublin: University College Press, 2002), 5. It has been argued that the stability of the southern Irish state was in fact due to the prevalence of British values in Ireland. Charles Townshend, "Historiography: Telling the Irish Revolution" in *Irish Revolution 1913-1923*, ed. Joost Augusteijn (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 12
[36] See Regan, *The Irish Counter-Revolution,* for further details regarding Cumann na nGaedheal's attempts to remain in government and the rise of the Fianna Fail party.

number which increased to 57 after a second election in September of the same year. Less than five years later, Fianna Fail became the largest party in the Dail, taking 72 seats with 44.5 percent of the popular vote in the general election of 1932.[37]

Over the course of the next sixteen years, Eamon de Valera used his position as President of the Executive Council to fulfil his party's republican agenda by attacking the constitutional ties that bound the Free State to the rest of the Commonwealth. By 1937 the Free State constitution was in tatters, and de Valera introduced a new constitution that created an Irish republic in all but name.[38] The increasing popularity of republicanism in the Free State during the late 1920s and early 1930s was a blow to the optimism of loyalists who had publicly transferred their allegiance to the new state; while they had been willing to accept a state founded on the Free State constitution, they were concerned that their values and culture would have no place in de Valera's Ireland. Their fears intensified as, in an effort to win over new voters, Cumann na nGaedheal began to move away from its original centrist policies and embrace a more extreme nationalist position.

In the late 1920s, loyalists began to threaten publicly that they would withdraw their support for Cumann na nGaedheal unless the party ceased courting the republican vote and took a stronger stance to protect the Free State constitution.[39] Such warnings were rarely a cause of concern for the party - as was pointed out by one observer in the *Times,* loyalists could not abandon Cumann na nGaedheal without risking further political gains by Irish republicans - yet loyalists did on occasion set aside party preferences when they believed the interests of the

[37] Paul Bew, *Ireland: Politics of Enmity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 451-2.
[38] Bew, *Politics of Enmity,* 455. For further information on challenges to the treaty settlement, see Deirdre McMahon *Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1984).
[39] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 12 December 1924, 2 January, 6 February 1925; *Irish Times,* 10 March 1925, 9 June, 28 November 1929.

state to be at risk.[40] Determined to justify their support for the new state, and growing increasingly desperate to carve out a public role for their community, leading loyalists and loyalist institutions began to argue that the minority could best serve the Free State by acting as a moderating political influence. It was pointed out that loyalists were not involved in the nationalist disagreements and conflicts that threatened the stability of the state, and some commentators suggested that loyalists, rather than allying themselves with any one political party, might exercise greater political influence by representing an independent political alternative.[41]

While editorials in the *Irish Times* and the *Church of Ireland Gazette* encouraged loyalists to denounce political extremism in all its manifestations, the loyalist community consistently identified republicanism as the greatest threat to the new state.[42] The republican movement, as represented by the Irregulars in the Civil War, and later by Eamon de Valera's Fianna Fail party, was criticised by the southern loyalist population as a destabilising force. Once again, commentators appealed to the loyalist sense of duty, arguing that it was the responsibility of all loyal Free State citizens to speak out against the evils of republicanism. Loyalists who had adopted an accommodationist stance, however, were careful to publicly attack only the most extreme expressions of republicanism, in an effort to avoid antagonising large sections of the Free State population. They sought to undermine the credibility of republicanism as a viable political ideology by presenting it as a fringe movement with limited support, for example,

[40] *Times* [London], 17 June 1929; When the Cumann na nGaedheal party became associated with the National Guard (the two would eventually merge, along with the National Centre party, to form the Fine Gael party in 1933), for example, the editor of the *Irish Times* withdrew its support in the belief that the party had allied itself with the fascist elements in Irish society. Richardson, "Transforming Anglo-Ireland", 24.
[41] See, for example, *Irish Times,* 10 March 1923.
[42] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 18 January 1924.

dismissing early attacks on the Free State constitution and the loyalist community as the work of a misguided minority misled by cunning political leaders.[43]

It was frequently suggested in loyalist discourse that those who supported anti-treaty politicians did not fully understand the implications of the republican agenda.[44] "We are faced with the unpleasant truth that throughout Ireland the political education of the people is extremely low", wrote the *Gazette* in 1934.[45] This patronizing view of the masses strengthened convictions within certain sections of the loyalist community that its members had a duty to provide moral leadership to the population of the Free State. Loyalist commentators, particularly in the *Gazette*, insisted that loyalists needed to redirect the misguided patriotism of the masses into a civic, rather than an ethnic, construct of citizenship, for the good of the Free State. Loyalists and Protestants were encouraged "to help others to think," and were led to believe that by educating the masses on their civic responsibilities, they could effectively challenge those who espoused political radicalism in the Free State. Support for republicanism, as well as criminal activity and a decline in moral standards, were seen by many loyalists to be the natural consequences of decades of political and social instability. [46] By positioning themselves as a moderating influence, loyalists envisioned themselves to be in an excellent position to oversee the creation of a new political culture in the Free State that would value citizenship based on contributions to the new state rather than on issues such as ethnicity, religion, or disruptive political activism.

Many loyalists sincerely believed that the rejection of divisive political ideologies in favour of a civic construct of citizenship would not only resolve many of the social problems that threatened the Free State, but would also provide an opportunity to reconcile communities and

[43] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 3 July 1931; *Irish Times,* 21 July 1934.
[44] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 8 April 1932; *Irish Times,* 19 April 1934.
[45] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 27 April 1934.
[46] *Irish Times,* 10 March 1923; *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 7 April 1928.

traditions that had long been at odds. Forgiveness of past grievances became a common theme in the rhetoric of pro-treaty politicians in the years after the Civil War, and loyalists were amongst the vocal supporters of the governments' attempts to overcome long-standing political and social rifts in the 1920s. Lay and clerical members of the Church of Ireland encouraged members of their community to focus on the similarities shared with their fellow Irishmen and women, and to "drop old distinctions" which had "little or no relevance" in the Free State.[47] They strongly believed that past resentments and grievances needed to be set aside by all political and social communities if the new state was to survive. Speaking at his inaugural address in 1934, for example, the Bishop of Limerick expressed the view that "If Irishmen - and Irishwomen - can only prevail of themselves to forget the past and fix their eyes on the future, if they will only forgive old wrongs and forget old injuries, and set themselves with a single heart to build the old wastes and raise up the former desolations, then and then only will there be hope for Ireland, and a future more glorious than anything she has yet experienced."[48]

Already seeking to cultivate a new role and identity for their community, leading loyalists attempted to portray the ex-unionist and Protestant populations as crucial partners in government's campaign to unite the population of the Free State in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. The violence of the Civil War period had demonstrated the failings of extreme nationalism and republicanism, at least according to many loyalist commentators, who believed that it might now be possible to reconcile the Free State population to the Free State constitution. The creation of the Free State had completely altered the Irish political landscape, and as the nationalist majority was at last in possession of an independent Irish state, it was hoped by loyalists that the imperial connection would no longer be interpreted as a threat, but would in fact provide a common cause around which the various political and social factions

[47] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 23 March, 29 June 1923, 18 June 1926; *Irish Times,* 11 February 1928.
[48] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 23 February 1934.

could rally.[49] Such a scenario would not only safeguard the Free State's position within the British Commonwealth, moderate loyalists believed, but it would also remove any remaining ill-feeling towards the southern loyalist community, allowing minorities to fully integrate into Irish society without requiring them to abandon their cultural traditions or compromise on their allegiance.

In particular, loyalist commentators assumed that once the masses had been made to understand their duties and responsibilities as citizens of the Free State, they would come to recognise the advantages of the Free State's connections with the Commonwealth. Hoping to hasten this process of reconciliation, leading loyalists were careful to present the Free State's imperial connections in the most appealing manner possible. Once more loyalists assumed the role of educators, publicly lecturing the masses on the practical benefits of constitutional ties with the crown and the empire. They explained that it was possible for the Free State to maintain its independence under the terms of the treaty settlement, arguing that neither the monarch's position as head of state nor the Free State's membership in the Commonwealth would limit the sovereignty of the state.[50] The Commonwealth was portrayed as a union between independent nations "inspired by the same ideals, the love of truth, justice and liberty, and all showing the same spirit of brotherly kindness and enthusiastic loyalty."[51] Loyalists emphasised that the Commonwealth was a constantly evolving institution designed to meet the needs of its member states; they would later point out that the organisation of the Commonwealth itself was largely due to the work of Irish politicians participating in imperial conferences in the late 1920s.[52]

[49] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 12 November 1926.
[50] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 27 October 1933.
[51] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 22 April 1932, 29 December 1933.
[52] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 3 May 1935, 21 May 1937.

To further assuage nationalist misgivings regarding the constitutional ties binding the Free State to the crown and empire, loyalists were careful to emphasise the admirable values that they suggested linked the Free State with the rest of the Commonwealth. Ideals such as "justice, liberty, order and toleration" were portrayed as part of the British heritage of the Free State, with loyalists arguing that these values were "accepted as the ideals of all civilisation".[53] Irish and British cultural traditions were not mutually exclusive, outspoken loyalists claimed, and it was possible to respect British cultural traditions without compromising one's allegiance to the Free State. Loyalists urged their fellow Free State citizens to distinguish between the "national" identity of the Free State and the "imperial" identity of the Commonwealth.[54] Loyalists considered British culture to be "an unparalleled civilising force," and believed that it represented a means of countering the intolerant and repressive influence of republicanism, which if unchecked threatened to result in "the establishment of one of the most narrow, and probably most unprogressive, little countries in the world."[55]

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In the literature on religious and political minorities in the Free State the decline of southern loyalism is presented as both inevitable and immediate in the years after 1921. It is assumed that following the end of the Act of Union and the creation of the Irish Free State, ex-unionists transferred their allegiance, albeit grudgingly, to the government of the new state, and that with the loss of their political ties to the United Kingdom, they gradually ceased to identify as British. The public discourse that emerged from the loyalist population in the 1920s and early 1930s, however, suggests that influential sections of the community were initially determined to reconcile their Free State citizenship with their British cultural heritage and with their

[53] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 22 May 1925*; Church of Ireland Gazette,* 23 November 1923, 22 May 1925, 22 April, 6 May, 10 June 1932.
[54] See, for example, *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 13 November 1925, 26 April 1929.
[55] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 22 May 1925, 19 July 1929.

constitutional ties to the empire, not only for their own peace of mind but also for the benefit of the new state. Publicly adopting a policy of accommodation, the Church of Ireland through the *Gazette* consistently portrayed the loyalist community as a moderating influence upon Free State society and politics. Loyalist commentators spoke out in favour of a civic construct of nationalism, for example, one heavily rooted in British or loyalist values such as justice and fair play that they believed had the potential to transcend the traditional unionist and nationalist political divide as well as more recent divisions caused by the Civil War. Loyalists also publicly voiced their support for the Free State's membership in the Commonwealth, encouraging their fellow citizens to recognise the benefits of the state's close relationship with the empire. By the mid-1920s, loyalist commentators were declaring that their policies of accommodation and toleration were bearing results; both the *Irish Times* and the *Church of Ireland Gazette* published editorials suggesting that old divisions and grievances were being forgotten as former constitutional nationalists, ex-unionists and others who feared the republican fringes united to provide the basis for a stable Irish state within the boundaries of the empire.[56]

In recent years many aspects of loyalist public discourse have been subjected to greater scrutiny from historians, who have cast doubts on the commitment of southern loyalists to civic duty and on the popular appeal of the accommodationist position. Ian d'Alton, for example, has concluded that those who readily accepted an Irish identity were not representative of the southern Protestant community, that very few southern Protestants felt a sense of duty to the Free State in the years after 1921, and that the majority of the Protestant community showed little interest in assuming public roles in the new state.[57] Contemporary statements and events have also undermined loyalist claims that they exercised a moderating influence on the wider

[56] *Church of Ireland Gazette*, 7 November 1924, 12 November 1926, 10 June, 8 April 1932; *Irish Times,* 11 February 1928, 15 June 1929.
[57] d'Alton, "'A Vestigial Population?", 33.

population in the Free State; growing support for republicanism throughout the 1930s, for example, suggests that the Free State's constitutional ties with the Commonwealth had little popular appeal.

However, while loyalist commentators undoubtedly exaggerated the desire of their community members to assume active roles in the new state, their public statements offered the loyalist population a sense of purpose and direction, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. There is also evidence to suggest that public statements advocating accommodation with the majority and participation in the new state were indicative of broader loyalist views on issues relating to identities and allegiance. In a recent article, Joseph Ruane and David Butler have argued against the idea that southern Protestant loyalists constituted a British ethnic or national group, who then "transformed" themselves into an Irish minority distinguishable only by their religion following the revolution. Ruane and Butler instead suggest that southern Protestants had long maintained a strong Irish national identity, while their identification with the United Kingdom was "at one more diffuse and more specific," consisting of "feelings of historic kinship and affinity with the diverse peoples of Great Britain and the empire with whom Protestants shared a common language and traditions, an allegiance to the crown and a wish (for a multiplicity of reasons) to remain part of the Union and empire."[58] This would explain why many loyalists increasingly understood their British identity and imperial allegiance in terms of civic values and moderate patriotism, and why they were seeking out practical applications for their values and culture in the Free State. They already maintained a strong sense of Irishness, and their "diffuse" identification with the United Kingdom facilitated their attempts to reconcile their Britishness with their position as Free State citizens.

[58] Joseph Ruane and David Butler, "Southern Irish Protestants: An Example of De-Ethnicization?" *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no 4 (2007): 625.

The potential of southern loyalists to make valuable contributions to the new state has occasionally been acknowledged by later observers, who have lamented the failure of southern minorities to translate the rhetoric of leading loyalists into action. Hubert Butler, writing in the second half of the twentieth century, frequently expressed his opinion that the religious minority might have tempered the political and cultural extremism found elsewhere had they sought more prominent roles in the Free State.[59] In his study of the Anglo-Irish community, the historian Patrick Buckland observed that Protestants and loyalists might possibly have provided the basis for a viable conservative party in the Free State and thereby moved Irish politics beyond repetitive debates over the treaty settlement, if only minorities had formed a united political front in the years after 1921.[60]

In the end, however, moderate loyalists were simply unable to overcome the many challenges facing their vision for the loyalist community in the Free State. The loyalist and Protestant communities were small and scattered, and these minority populations were divided by differences of opinion and class. No loyalist political organisation emerged in this period, and individual loyalists were reluctant to speak out too forcefully, unsure of their role in the Free State and fearing that they would attract unwanted attention. The statements that were made on behalf of the loyalist population demonstrate the widespread failure within the community to come to terms with the social and political realities of the new state; ex-unionists, for example, had a tendency to overestimate popular support for the treaty settlement and the Free State's membership in the Commonwealth. Public statements made by prominent loyalists also reveal the social conservatism of even the most moderate of loyalists. By suggesting that their community could provide moral leadership for the rest of the population, loyalists were

[59] See, for example, Hubert Butler, "Divided Loyalties," in *Escape from the Anthill* (Mullingar: The Lilliput Press, 1986), 95-102. For more on Butler's views, see Roy Foster, "Hubert Butler and His Century," in *Unfinished Ireland: Essays on Hubert Butler*, ed. Chris Agee (Belfast: Irish Pages, 2003), 38-59.
[60] Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885-1922*, 301.

implying that the values of the majority of the Free State citizens were somehow lacking. Loyalist public discourse could adopt at times a distinctly paternalistic tone, one that echoed older ascendancy views regarding the inability of the Irish to govern themselves. The patronizing attitude adopted by prominent loyalists reinforced existing cultural and political tensions in the new state and only served to undermined their attempts to integrate themselves into the political and social life of the Free State.

The primary shortcoming of the accommodationist position, however, was identified in a *Church of Ireland Gazette* editorial published shortly after the creation of the Free State. Writing on the issue of mixed marriages, the article concluded that "it is difficult for minorities to practice complete toleration and survive."[61] While the *Gazette* was speaking specifically regarding religious practices, the observation also applies to the political minority in Ireland. Southern loyalists were encouraged by leading members of their community to become law-abiding citizens of the Free State and to respect the cultural traditions of the majority. It was hoped that the imperial loyalties and culture of the loyalist community would be similarly respected by the rest of the Free State population, resulting in a more pluralist and inclusive Irish culture. Loyalists sought to facilitate this process by expressing their British loyalties in terms of the ideals they associated with southern loyalism and Britishness, emphasising in particular a sense of civic responsibility. However, the "Britishness" of these ideals was not universally recognised, and moderate policies of accommodation and acceptance failed to provide a strong foundation for loyalism in the Free State. As the Free State constitution was gradually dismantled in the 1930s, there were fewer ties with the United Kingdom and the empire to reinforce loyalty to the crown and empire in the Free State, and a younger generation of more moderate loyalists began to identify primarily as Irish. While boundaries between

[61] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 14 September 1923.

religious communities were maintained in the south, the political minority fell into terminal decline as the southern state drifted towards republicanism.[62]

The Public Language of Loyalism: Uncompromising Allegiance to the United Kingdom

"To the Loyalist who loves his country as dearly as any "patriot," and is ready to give his best for her, one thing is daily becoming more clear - there is no place for him in the Saorstat na nEireann"
-"A Southern Resident", *Notes from Ireland* (February 1924)

Despite the intentions of many prominent loyalists, particularly those associated with the Church of Ireland, the loyalist community failed to rally around public calls for its members to accept the Free State constitution and to actively work for the benefit of the state. For loyalists who had suffered losses during the revolution, and who continued to face intimidation and violence in the new state, their personal experiences contradicted claims that minorities were welcome in the Free State and that the values associated with southern loyalism would provide the foundation for a more inclusive Irish culture. Many loyalists were left hurt and angered by declarations from church officials and other leading members of their community that minorities faced little or no discrimination in the south of Ireland; having previously been abandoned by the government of the United Kingdom during the revolution, southern loyalists

[62] This confirms the findings of Kurt Bowen, who concludes in his study of the southern Protestant community that "the British loyalties of the minority were the first of its many differences with the Catholic majority to fall into decline... Unlike many postcolonial minorities who were racially distinguishable, it was much easier for Protestants to mask, deny and eventually discard their colonial heritage when independence made it a liability. Moreover, the costs in doing so were minimal, since religious differences enabled them to preserve their separateness and to justify their feelings of superiority without reference to their ethnic heritage". Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State,* 198. While Ruane and Butler do not agree with the argument that southern Protestants were a British ethnic group that transformed themselves into an Irish religious minority, they do agree that "The vast majority of Southern Protestants abandoned their British allegiance in the decades after independence." Ruane and Butler, "Southern Irish Protestants: A Question of De-Ethnicization?": 633.

who had suffered traumatic losses felt that members of their own community were now brushing them aside.[63]

Intended to meet the needs of loyalists who could not or would not subscribe to the accommodationist stance publicly adopted by many in the community, an alternative construct of loyalism emerged in the years after 1921. Rather than focus their efforts on becoming dutiful citizens of the Free State, some loyalists chose instead to wage a public campaign designed to protect and strengthen the remaining constitutional ties that bound the new state to the crown and empire. According to these uncompromising loyalists, the creation of the Irish Free State had placed the constitutional rights of hundreds of thousands of loyal British subjects at risk. While they were unsupportive of the Free State, these loyalists were determined to fight republican attacks on the Free State constitution in order to preserve their status as British subjects. Some went so far as to call upon the government of the United Kingdom to defend the constitution on their behalf; without direct intervention on the part of the government of the United Kingdom, they argued, an Irish republic would inevitably be established and southern loyalists would be forced to give up their status as British subjects against their will.[64]

Loyalists who publicly stated that their primary loyalty was to the United Kingdom or the empire justified their rejection of the Free State by putting forward a bleak analysis of the situation in which the southern loyalist community now found itself. They denied that there was a future for religious and political minorities in the new state, pointing to attacks on loyalists and Protestants during the revolution as evidence of the popular desire to rid Ireland of those who did not conform to nationalist constructs of Irishness.[65] The situation was wryly summed up by

[63] See, for example, "Lord Glenavy and Southern Unionists," *Notes from Ireland* 30, no 18 (November 1924).
[64] "Drifting into a Republic," *Notes from Ireland* 30, no 14 (November 1923); "Our Review," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 2 (November 1934).
[65] "Loyalists in the Free State," *Notes from Ireland* 30, no 15 (February 1924).

Terence de Vere White, who acknowledged that while pro-treaty politicians "made generous attempts to unite the nation in a happy family… those who accepted the invitation were discouraged when their houses were burnt down."[66] Abandoned by their supporters in Britain and Northern Ireland, and popularly regarded as foreign oppressors in the Free State, loyalists had little reason to be optimistic about their future. Acting in the belief that accommodation with the majority would simply hasten the decline of the values and culture they associated with southern loyalism, distrustful loyalists encouraged others in the community to hold themselves apart from the Catholic and nationalist majority.[67] It is not entirely clear what diehard loyalists hoped to achieve through their refusal to co-operate with the new state and the rest of the southern population; it is possible that some loyalists entertained hopes for the continued survival of their community, although most appeared to regard their noncompliance as a futile act of defiance against the nationalist majority.

As prominent loyalist institutions and leading member of the loyalist community immediately embraced a public policy of acceptance and accommodation, it is understandable that individual loyalists might have been reluctant to express a viewpoint that would contradict this "official" public narrative. Letter writers occasionally challenged the accommodationist stance in the pages of the *Church of Ireland Gazette* and the *Irish Times*, but these sources were careful to maintain the impression that such sentiments were not shared by the rest of the loyalist community in the Free State. As a result, many loyalists chose to "keep their heads down," venturing to express their opinions only when assured of a like-minded audience. Loyalists criticisms regarding the Free State and the nationalist majority are perhaps most readily accessible in the many personal reminiscences and memoirs written and published in the

[66] Terence De Vere White, *A Fretful Midge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), 23.
[67] "Toleration!" *Notes from Ireland* 31, no 15 (August 1929); "Protestant Minority"/"Wanton Outrage", *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 4 (November 1935); *Irish Times,* 25 August 1923.

mid-twentieth century by a younger generation brought up in loyalist households. The authors of such works frequently struggled to understand the unwillingness of their elders to accept the outcome of the Irish Revolution, and observed in considerable detail the small ways in which their parents refused to acknowledge the new state.

Given the reluctance of many southern loyalists to speak out against perceived injustices, the most public critics of the revolutionary settlement were individuals whose social standing and political connections made it unlikely that they would face repercussions for voicing controversial opinions. Protestant clergymen and members of other professions working in rural areas provided active leadership for the loyalist community in the provinces. Many were in a position to observe first-hand the devastating effects of the revolution and the treaty settlement on minority communities; helpless to stop the large-scale migration of Protestants and acutely aware of the economic struggles of loyalist businesses and institutions, they frequently participated in campaigns intended to gain official recognition of the suffering of civilian victims of revolutionary violence. The Reverend Robert E. Weir, for example, was an Anglican clergyman who lived in Queen's County during the late 1920s. He was at this time heavily involved in the work of a charitable organisation designed to relieve loyalist suffering, and his advocacy on behalf of minorities in the Free State earned him considerable notoriety, even bringing him to the attention of the Dail.[68]

The work of local loyalist activists was bolstered by the efforts of a small coterie of dedicated and well-connected allies who operated throughout the British Isles. These Irish and British supporters of southern minorities transformed the pre-existing structures of the defunct

[68] "Minutes of Irish Sub-Committee, later Advisory Committee, Southern Loyalist Relief Association," PRONI D989/B/1/2; "The Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association Minute Book," PRONI D989/B/1/3; *Irish Times,* 15 May 1929; Tomas O Conaill, "Ceisteanna - Questions – Protestant Children in Catholic Schools", *Dail Eireann* vol. 30, 5 June 1929; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.

Irish unionist party into a support network for victimised southern loyalists. The Dublin office of the Irish Unionist Alliance [IUA] became the Free State office of the Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association [SILRA], while in 1933, the London office of the Irish Unionist Alliance was transformed into the headquarters of the Irish Loyalist Imperial Federation [ILIF].[69] To counter the influence of the *Irish Times* and the *Church of Ireland Gazette*, these loyalists and their supporters continued to publish the IUA's newsletter, *Notes from Ireland*, on a quarterly (and later bi-annual) basis from London.[70] This publication allowed diehard loyalists and their supporters to draw attention to the suffering of loyalists in the Free State, as well as providing to publicly criticise political and social developments in Ireland. Loyalist campaigns to protect their remaining constitutional ties with the crown and empire were also championed by the *Morning Post,* a daily newspaper published in London, while the *Times* of London occasionally printed letters or editorials that acknowledged the fears and concerns of southern loyalists in the Free State.[71]

Loyalist criticisms and concerns regarding the revolutionary settlement that were generated for public consumption in the Free State and in Britain were primarily managed by a small faction of loyalists and their supporters scattered across the British Isles, a fact that must be taken into account when analysing loyalist statements regarding their revolutionary experiences and their relationship with the Free State. Just as loyalist institutions such as the Church of Ireland claimed to speak on behalf of the entire community, so too did these diehard loyalist activists, despite the fact that many were from privileged backgrounds and frequently lived outside of the Free State. Believing that they had an obligation to speak on behalf of

[69] R. B. McDowell, *Crisis and Decline: The Fate of Southern Unionists* (Dublin: Lilliput Press 1997), 112.
[70] Niamh Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists After the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1922-32" (Doctoral Dissertation, University College Dublin, 1994), 14.
[71] It is worth noting that the attitude of the *Times* towards Ireland was strongly influenced by the *Irish Times*. Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists after the Anglo-Irish Treaty," 23.

individuals who lacked the resources to publicise their suffering, loyalist activists frequently ignored statements by loyalists who claimed to have experienced little or no hostility after the revolution, implying instead that the entire community was labouring under the continued effects of discrimination and intimidation. The involvement of prominent individuals in campaigns to publicise loyalist grievances was well-known, and led many commentators of the period, both nationalist and loyalist, to dismiss victimhood narratives as the work of British agitators seeking to discredit the Free State. Yet other contemporaries argued that public criticisms of the Free State did indeed reflect the views of some sections of the loyalist community; activists in the United Kingdom had to be getting their information from somewhere, it was pointed out, and southern loyalists rarely sought to discredit statements made in *Notes from Ireland* and the *Morning Post.*

In order to support their allegations of loyalist suffering, loyalist activists often co-opted the narratives of victimised groups whose loyalty to the crown was assumed rather than established. Articles and editorials in *Notes from Ireland* played up the suffering of loyalists from the lower classes, focusing in particularly on Protestant "yeomen farmers" who had experienced extensive losses during the revolution and who allegedly bore the brunt of discrimination in the new state.[72] Loyalist support organisations such as SILRA argued that these small farmers lacked the resources to bring attention to their suffering themselves and were reluctant to speak up out of fear of reprisals. Similarly, the plight of ex-servicemen became a prominent issue in loyalist attacks on the Free State. Once they had returned home to Ireland following the war, ex-servicemen struggled to find employment and were regarded with suspicion by extreme nationalists and republicans. Although Irishmen who had participated in the Great War had

[72] "Loyalists in the Free State", *Notes from Ireland* 30, no 15 (February 1924); "The Lot of Loyalists," *Notes from Ireland* 31, no 5 (February 1927); Southern Irish Loyalists To-Day," *Notes from Ireland* 31 no 28 (November 1933).

enlisted for a number of reasons, it was often implied that all ex-servicemen had been devoted to the crown and the empire, and that their suffering in the Free State was due to their continued loyalty.[73] The labelling of individuals due to their occupation, class, and religion has long posed problems for scholars interested in southern loyalism, and it is important to recognise that loyalist propaganda played an instrumental role in this process.[74]

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Loyalists who sought acceptance in the Free State expressed their views in public statements that ranged from passive confirmation of their transferred allegiance to more determined announcements regarding their intentions to participate in the development of the new state. Loyalist who rejected the Free State settlement similarly advocated a wide range of strategies in their public discourse. Rather than concede defeat, many loyalists attempted to distance themselves from the Free State and ignoring the changes brought about by the treaty settlement. Loyalists who adopted this tactic tried to publicly justify their lack of attachment to the new state in ways that would avoid further controversy, often arguing that their lasting loyalty to the United Kingdom and the empire was simply a matter of personal preference that did not have significant political implications for the Free State or the nationalist majority. Witnesses testifying to the Boundary Commission, for example, repeatedly emphasised that they did not wish to attack the Free State nor did they pose a threat to the nationalist majority. The secretary of the Donegal Protestant Registration Association testified before the commission that although his organisation was campaigning to have regions in County Donegal placed under the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland, "We none of us [loyalists] give evidence in any

[73] "The Lot of Loyalists," *Notes from Ireland* 31, no 5 (February 1927); "The Unionist Minority," *Notes from Ireland* 31, no 11 (August 1928); "British Ex-Servicemen," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 9 (May 1938). See also *Irish Times,* 25 April 1923, 11 June 1927, 16 September 1929.
[74] Niamh Brennan acknowledges the issue of labeling in her dissertation; see Brennan, ""Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists after the Anglo-Irish Treaty."

spirit of hostility to the Free State. The local Nationalist paper attacks us for not being loyal to the Free State. We want to disabuse you of the idea that we have any personal feeling whatever."[75]

Similarly, other loyalists went so far as to suggest that their lack of enthusiasm for the new state arose out of a desire to disengage entirely from politics and political concerns. Terence de Vere White, for example, wrote of his father's political views:

> A group of small boys in green caps singing 'Kevin Barry died for Ireland' decided my father not to send me to Belvedere, the Jesuit College… My father was convinced that he had no politics himself and he was determined that his children should not go to a school in which politics were discussed. He achieved his object but on the condition that we were given the education of English children.Had those Belvedere boys sung 'Rule Britannia', he would not have thought of politics, for to him the status quo was desirable and 'politics' meant only opposition to the status quo. He said of himself that he had no politics, that he could not afford to have politics. In this he was doubly deceived; he had politics, of course. He was a Unionist.[76]

Many loyalists also attempted to publicly register their rejection of the Free State by limiting their interaction with the nationalist majority and making few, if any, changes to their daily routines. Disengagement from Free State society became a noted characteristic of the loyalist community in the years after 1921, leading both contemporaries and later scholars to write of the community's "ghetto" mentality.[77] Loyalist detachment was largely possible as a result of the long-standing segregationist tendencies of Irish society, where divisions based on class, religion, and political views were generally accepted without question. While accommodationists argued against political and cultural exclusivity for the loyalist community in the Free State, other loyalists consciously adopted such a strategy in the belief that it would

[75] "Londonderry, 25 May 1925 (2nd Witness) Capt. J Scott, Hon. Secretary, Donegal Protestant Registration Association," Boundary Commission Papers, NLI, POS 6514.
[76] De Vere White, *A Fretful Midge*, 7.
[77] Lyons, "The Minority Problem in the 26 Counties," 100; d'Alton, " 'A Vestigial Population?": 19

better protect the interests of southern minorities; accommodation, they argued, would simply make them complicit in the demise of their own community and its values.[78]

Loyalists and Protestants had long sought security and comfort in Ireland by living in close-knit communities.[79] During the early twentieth century this tendency became more pronounced as Protestant families gravitated towards Dublin and its suburbs. By 1926, over a third of the southern Protestant population lived in the Dublin region, leading one historian to dub this area "the new Pale".[80] Living in such concentrated numbers imbued some members of the loyalist and Protestant communities with greater confidence regarding their future in the Free State; it is not surprising that urban businessmen and professionals from Dublin and the surrounding suburbs were amongst the most outspoken supporters of the accommodationist position.[81] However, minority strongholds in the Dublin suburbs also provided other loyalists with sufficient resources to disengage from the rest of the Free State, and as a result the suburbs of Dublin became well-known loyalist neighbourhoods. Recalling his childhood in the 1920s, Brian Inglis described the seaside town of Malahide in County Dublin as "a typical English village", where the social life of the community revolved around the Protestant church and the golf club, and where his family had very little interaction with those outside of their "set". Strongly loyalist in nature, the Protestant community in Malahide refused to make concessions to the nationalist culture of the Free State, continuing to sing "God Save the King" at private

[78] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 3 August, 12 October 1923; "Southern Irish Loyalists," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 2 (November 1934); "The Protestant Minority," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 5 (May 1936).
[79] Liam Kennedy, "The Long Retreat: Protestants, Economy and Society, 1660-1926," in *Colonialism, Religion and Nationalism in Ireland* (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies 1996), 1-34.
[80] McDowell, *Crisis and Decline: The Fate of Southern Unionists* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1997), 5.
[81] It was generally acknowledged that those who lived in Dublin were less likely to experience discrimination and hardships. See, for example, "Loyalists in the Free State," *Notes from Ireland* 30, no 15 (February 1924).

functions and ignoring the Gaelic names given to towns and other geographical features after independence.[82]

Passive resistance to the new state extended beyond the political sphere, with many loyalists likewise rejecting the dominant Catholic and Gaelic ethos of the Free State. While it has been recently argued that the extent of cultural differences between loyalists and the rest of the population have been largely exaggerated, there can be no denying that culture played a significant role in the decision by southern loyalists to remain detached from the Free State.[83] Although loyalists and Protestants tended to be somewhat more willing to air their concerns over the gaelicisation of the Free State than their political grievances, once again the majority of conservative loyalists appeared to have chosen to resist the changes brought about by the treaty settlement quietly, in the privacy of their own homes. A sailor born in Northern Ireland, Edith Devlin's father found the culture of the Free State to be insular and intolerant. To counter the stifling culture of the new state, he smuggled books that were not approved by the Free State censors into his house, denounced the language laws to his family, and encouraged his children to read widely, including books by English and Protestant authors.[84] This was common practice in southern loyalist households, as parents sought to resist the cultural influence of the state; such families embraced cultural traditions associated with Britain, and the children were carefully educated with "their own kind", preferably in English boarding schools or, for the lower classes, in Protestant national schools.[85] Generally children of upper- and middle- class loyalist households were introduced to the dominant Gaelic, Catholic culture of the majority through

[82] Brian Inglis, *West Briton* (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), 12, 28-29.
[83] See Margaret O'Callaghan, "Language, Nationality and Cultural Identity in the Irish Free State, 1922-7: the *Irish Statesmen* and the *Catholic Bulletin* Reappraised," *IHS* 24, no 94 (November 1984): 226.
[84] Edith Newman Devlin, *Speaking Volumes: A Dublin Childhood* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000), 111-112.
[85] Inglis, *West Briton*, 24; de Vere White, *Fretful Midge,* 2; Richard Murphy, *The Kick* (London and New York: Granta Books, 2002), 43.

their interactions with household servants, although many went on to gained greater exposure at a later point in their lives through their education or work in the Free State.[86]

It should be noted that while many loyalists believed that their retreat into "social exclusivity" was the logical outcome of their resistance to the new state, disengagement from the Free State was also the response of individuals who simply could not cope with the changes brought about by the revolution, and who were unable or unwilling to overcome centuries of prejudices and assumptions regarding those outside of their community. Social exclusivity was in many ways the path of least resistance for southern minorities. Ian d'Alton, for example, has suggested that the policy of disengagement allowed southern Protestants to avoid an otherwise inevitable identity crisis in the aftermath of the revolution.[87] By refusing to acknowledge the Free State settlement and by socialising with their "own kind", it was possible for many loyalists and Protestants to largely ignore uncomfortable questions of identity and allegiance throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

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In addition to the significant numbers of loyalists who adopted a policy of quiet resistance, there existed a small number of diehard loyalist activists who believed that more aggressive and coordinated actions were required to protect the constitutional ties that bound the Free State to the empire. Drawing attention to the suffering of the loyalist population during the revolution and the continued distress of southern loyalists in the Free State, they sought to publicly justify the rejection of the treaty settlement by their fellow loyalists and to inspire even greater acts of resistance amongst the loyalist community. Diehard activists also intended that their propaganda campaign would attract support from public opinion elsewhere in the British

[86] See, for example, Devlin, *Speaking Volumes,* 63; Inglis, *West Briton*, 15; Frances Moffett, *I am also of Ireland* (London: BBC, 1985).
[87] d'Alton, " 'A Vestigial Minority?": 19

Isles as well as from the other Commonwealth nations, which in turn might encourage the government of the United Kingdom to intervene in Free State affairs.[88] Such a situation would not only strengthen the remaining constitutional ties between the Free State and the empire, diehard loyalists believed, but would also ensure the survival of the southern loyalist population. The suffering of the loyalist community thus became a potent political weapon in the hands of die-hard activists; not only did tales of distress and persecution play an essential role in loyalist campaigns for compensation, but they also had political ramifications for the governments of the Free State and the United Kingdom.

Seeking to publicise the suffering of southern minorities, activists were quick to rally around the various loyalist relief organisations that emerged during the revolution and its aftermath. Such organisations fulfilled a variety of functions for distressed southern loyalists, from providing clothing and material aid to loyalist refugees to campaigning for official recognition of the losses sustained by loyalists during the revolutionary period.[89] The loyalist relief organisations relied on propaganda to attract public support, and individuals associated with such organisations were not above exaggerating or even falsifying facts in order to increase the effectiveness of their appeals for aid.[90] Loyalist relief associations received the greatest amount of support from individuals in the United Kingdom, and as a result the propaganda produced by such associations was heavily influenced by British political agendas and outside interpretations of events in Ireland.[91] However, outspoken members of the loyalist population in

[88] See Chapter Three.
[89] The work undertaken by SILRA between its formation in 1922 and the end of the organisation in 1962 is detailed in the various reports and minutes of the organisation, now kept at the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland. See, for example, "Report of the Irish Claims Compensation Association to the House of Lords Committee of Enquiry into compensation paid for loss and damage during the "Troubles," PRONI, D/989/B/2/9.
[90] See Chapter Three, note 83 for details regarding falsified letter to the press.
[91] L.M. Moulton, in her study of Anglo-Irish relations in the interwar period, concludes that the propaganda produced by SILRA was somewhat misleading in nature; the organisation's early propaganda, she writes, "included the rhetorical trappings of a citizen's movement" but "in fact the closeness of its leaders to the

the Free State were also active in the work of the relief associations, and there was a degree of support in the loyalist community for the efforts of activists who were willing to challenge the "official" accommodationist position.

A reoccurring theme in *Notes from Ireland* and other propaganda material produced by relief associations was the insistence that discrimination and prejudice against southern minorities in the Free State had not ended with the revolution, but continued to be widespread and unavoidable. Whereas loyalists seeking accommodation with the majority publicly stated that only a small, unrepresentative section of the wider population was responsible for the intolerance and harassment directed towards loyalists and Protestants, loyalists who sought to justify their refusal to engage with the Free State argued that the situation was far more complicated. In the minds of die-hard loyalists, there could be no co-existence between nationalism and loyalism, as these two political and cultural traditions were utterly irreconcilable. Diehard loyalists considered Irish nationalists of all shades to be actively working against the values and culture which provided the foundations of southern loyalism; this mentality accounts not only for the opposition of diehard loyalists to the moderate message of accommodation, but also for the sweeping assumptions and generalisations that figure heavily in loyalist propaganda. Believing themselves to be under attack from all sides, conservative loyalists rarely attempted to distinguish between different nationalist traditions, or between "official" and "popular" attitudes towards the Free State constitution and southern loyalism.

The spread of republicanism dominated diehard propaganda in the 1920s and early 1930s, giving strength to claims that the Free State constitution was under attack and allowing diehard loyalists to undermine official assurances that loyalists were welcome in the new state.

Government itself meant that this was no popular agitation, but a very personal lobbying effort". LM Moulton, "Private Irelands: The Legacies of the Anglo-Irish War in Interwar England" (Doctoral dissertation, Brown University, 2010), 362.

Loyalist propagandists became fixated on the social and political unrest arising from the activities of gangs of young men who claimed to have connections with the anti-treaty IRA. Seeking to challenge the Free State's constitutional ties with the empire, these republican activists generally targeted symbols that reflected the Free State's dominion status or which served as reminders of Ireland's previous membership in the United Kingdom. They boldly censored newsreels containing images of royal marriages and coronations, and physically attacked royal statues and insignia in Dublin.[92] They also sought to keep the Free State free of English influences; in his semi-autobiographical work, for instance, Terence De Vere White described how a publican was attacked for selling Bass, a beer produced in England. Stripped of almost all his clothing, the man was then forced by republicans to walk down a road with "Boycott Bass" written on the seat of his pants. De Vere White used the story to illustrate the chaos and uncertainty of this period, observing that "One knew that those who were satisfied to do this schoolyard bullying (it was winter) might just as easily have beaten the publican to death. What surprises me now is the comparative calm in which we lived with so much violence around us."[93]

Commentators seeking further evidence that the loyalist community was at risk in the Free State also pointed to the anti-treaty and anti-loyalist rhetoric favoured by Irish politicians. On several occasions, for example, Free State politicians publicly stated that "imperial agents" were present in the Free State, actively working against Irish interests.[94] Protestants and unionists were also accused of exercising undue political influence in the Free State, and as early as 1925 the Cumann na nGaedheal government was denounced by its critics for holding "West

[92] "Atmosphere of Disloyalty," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 7 (May 1937); "Removing English Kings," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 8 (November 1937); *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 7 December 1934; *Times*, 13 August 1931.
[93] De Vere White, *Fretful Midge*, 98.
[94] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 27 April, 31 August 1934, 21 June 1935.

British" tendencies and for allegedly falling under the influence of Freemasons.[95] Many loyalists were made uneasy by such statements, worried that the gangs who were destroying evidence of the Free State's imperial connections would also seek to punish the "imperialists" so vehemently denounced by republican politicians. Although the government publicly condemned republican violence, loyalist commentators pointed out that nothing was being done to stop what appeared to be a concerted nationalist campaign intended to drive minorities from the Free State. Diehard activists reinforced loyalist fears by publicising attacks on high profile loyalist and Protestant figures, such the murder of Vice-Admiral Somerville at his home in County Cork in 1936.[96]

In their attempts to justify their disengagement from the Free State, loyalist commentators emphasised that violence was not the only threat to the southern loyalist community. Diehard activists portrayed the official campaign to gaelicise the new state, undertaken by early Cumann na nGaedheal governments and further developed by Fianna Fail politicians, as part of a wider movement to rid the Free State of its minority problem.[97] According to many loyalists, the issue of culture allowed extreme nationalists and republicans to launch a two-pronged assault upon the loyalist community; by emphasising a "gaelic Irish" identity, they could cast doubt on the Irishness of southern loyalists, while Irish language requirements provided a convenient means of discriminating against loyalists and Protestants seeking official aid or employment.[98] Diehard loyalists feared that the next generation of

[95] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 2, 16 January 1925, 14 June 1929, 27 April 1934, 21 June 1935; *Irish Times,* 27 August 1927; *Times* [London], 23 February 1928.
[96] Somerville appeared to have been targeted because he had been providing information to local boys who planned to enlist in the Royal Navy "The Wheels of Justice," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 5 (May 1936); *Irish Times,* 26 March 1936. Ian d'Alton offers some analysis of the motives behind the attack in " 'A Vestigial Population?'": 27.
[97] "Tyranny of Compulsory Irish," *Notes from Ireland* 31 no 12 (November 1928); "Protestant Minority," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 5 (May 1936); *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 27 September 1929.
[98] The issue of language as a means of discrimination was openly debated during the Mayo Librarian controversy of 1930. In the Mayo case, Letitia Dunbar Harrison, a Protestant woman, had been appointed as county librarian, only to have her appointment later rejected by the County Council. The Council stated that they were concerned because she did not speak Irish, although it was later acknowledged that her religion and degree from Trinity College also caused unease. See *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 5, 24

loyalists and Protestants would be forced to abandon their cultural heritage and fully embrace the Gaelic culture of the majority in order to secure a future in the Free State.[99]

Many loyalists also had growing concerns regarding the influence of the Catholic Church in the Free State. While moderate loyalists generally attempted to distinguish between political allegiance and religious beliefs, diehard loyalists understood the two to be closely linked. For loyalists who believed that their culture and values were Protestant in nature, the Catholic social teachings imposed upon the Free State population provided further evidence that the minority was not welcomed in the new state.[100] Diehard activists went to great lengths to publicise instances of institutionalised discrimination against Protestants in order to support their claims that the Catholic Church encouraged bigotry and intolerance, focusing in particular on the *Ne Temere* decree.[101] One leading Protestant clergyman suggested that the decree jeopardised the success of the Free State, arguing that:

> Under the Constitution of the Irish Free State the old political and racial barriers have been swept away... Is there anything then to prevent the whole of the inhabitants of the Irish Free State from being gradually fused into one Irish nation? Unfortunately there is; and that barrier is the Roman Church and her marriage laws.[102]

Just as the republican rhetoric of Free State politicians was linked to attacks on the loyalist community by the conservative narrative, so too did conservative loyalists accuse the Catholic Church of inciting violence against minority communities.[103]

December 1930, 30 January 1931; *Times* [London]*,* 20 December 1930. For more information on the case, see Pat Walsh, *The Curious Case of the Mayo Librarian* (Cork: Mercier, 2009).

[99] "The Empire's First Dictator," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 5 (May 1936); "The Eire-Dominion," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 9 (May 1938); *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 5 October 1923, 15 January 1932. "Mr. Condle to Boundary Commission," 4 May 1925, NLI POS 6513; "Statement on behalf of Unionists in Co Donegal submitted to Boundary Commission," NLI POS 6514; "Reverend O'Donnell to Boundary Commission," 26 May 1925, NLI PO 6514.

[100] Devlin, *Speaking Volumes,* 116-118, 124.

[101] "Conditions in the Free State," *Irish Presbyterian* (August 1925); *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 27 September 1929; 1 January 1932.

[102] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 5 October 1923.

[103] "Wanton Outrage," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 4 (November 1935); *Irish Times,* 22 July 1935; *Times* [London], 23 July 1935.

Diehard southern loyalists and their supporters were so convinced of the existence of a campaign to eradicate southern minorities that they frequently found evidence of discrimination even when there appeared to be little to distinguish the experiences of the loyalist community from those of the rest of the Free State population. For example, the Free State faced considerable economic difficulties in the interwar period, as the destruction of the revolution, the lack of industrialisation in the south and the global depression took their toll on business interests. The situation worsened once the Free State became embroiled in an economic conflict with Britain in 1932. Although loyalists and Protestants were not alone in their struggle to cope with unfavourable economic conditions in the Free State, the economic crisis was nonetheless incorporated into loyalist discourse and propaganda; reflecting their fears and suspicions regarding the intentions of the nationalist majority in the Free State, diehard loyalists suggested that the adverse economic situation was being exploited to increase the suffering and distress of the loyalist community.

Taxation was a particular grievance of southern loyalists, as they resented paying for the destruction caused by the revolution as well as for the pensions of those who had fought against the Act of Union (an article in *Notes from Ireland* published in 1936 complained that those who had fought on either side of the Civil War had also begun receiving pensions).[104] As loyalists were strongly associated with business and landed interests, it was also argued that the loyalist community was most affected by the Free State's economic policies. Taxation was mentioned time and again by loyalists in the border counties who wished to be placed under the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland; they were particularly aggrieved that their community remained politically marginalised in the Free State despite the fact that loyalists frequently paid the majority of taxes

[104] "More Pensions," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 6 (November 1936); "Southern Irish Loyalists-A Statement of Their Disabilities," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 9 (May 1938).

in the region.[105] There was widespread outcry by loyalists who were expected to pay taxes on property that had been seized or boycotted during the revolution, from which they had received limited or no income.[106] As always in Ireland, the issue of land remained contentious; loyalist commentators frequently argued that legislation intended to break up large estates and redistribute land unfairly targeted members of religious and political minorities, without benefitting lower-class southern loyalists or Protestants.[107] By the mid-1930s, editorials in *Notes from Ireland* were suggesting that land seized from minorities was being used to pay off government supporters and republican activists.[108]

Loyalists used the economic troubles of the Free State to further justify their disengagement from the Free State. According to diehard commentators, southern loyalists could not be expected to support the actions of a government that they had not wanted and which was proving itself incapable of making a successful transition to independence. Loyalists had warned of the economic consequences of independence prior to the revolution but their advice had been disregarded, and they resented paying the price for the recklessness and ignorance of nationalist political leaders. Conservative loyalists had little faith that the Free State government was capable of stabilising the economy or of stimulating economic growth; the conservative narrative often implied that official economic policies reflected the "peasant mentality" of Irish republicans, who struggled to understand the sophisticated economic

[105] "Donegal Loyalists' Petition," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 3 (May 1935); "Reverend Matthew Neill to Boundary Commission," 12 June 1925, "Mr. Condle to Boundary Commission," 4 May 1925 (NLI POS 6513); "Statement on behalf of Unionists in Co Donegal submitted to Boundary Commission," and "Major RL Moore to Boundary Commission", 25 May 1925 (NLI POS 6514); "Petition by Monaghan Loyalists, submitted to Boundary Commission," nd (NLI PO 6515); *Irish Times,* 25 March 1936.
[106] "Loyalists' Objections to the Free State", *Notes from Ireland* 31, no 1 (February 1926)
[107] "Land Confiscation," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 3 (May 1935); "Land Unsettlement in the Free State," *Notes from Ireland,* 32, no 6 (November 1936); "Protestant Community in the South of Ireland," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 8 (November 1937); "Conditions in the Free State," *The Irish Presbyterian* (June 1925); *Irish Times,* 6 July 1923. For more on land policies in the Free State, see Terence Dooley, *Land for the People: The Land Question in Independent Ireland* (Dublin: UCD Press, 2004).
[108] "By-elections and Politics," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 6 (November 1936); "Land Unsettlement in the Free State," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 6 (November 1936).

systems at play in the nation.[109] Diehard loyalists likewise voiced frustrations over the tendencies of Free State administrators to prioritise nationalist politics over economic concerns.[110] They objected in particular to the expense of projects intended to "gaelicise" the nation, especially at a time when so many were struggling with the rising cost of living.[111]

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While leading loyalists emerged from the revolution declaring that their community was ready and willing to participate in the political and social development of the Free State, not all loyalists and their supporters were as prepared to accept the political outcomes of the revolution. Loyalists who claimed to have no interest in politics or to have no strong feelings regarding the Free State settlement were in fact announcing their refusal to transfer their allegiance to the Free State; while most were reluctant to attack the treaty settlement publicly, they refused to accept the label of "ex-unionist" and continued to identify as loyal British subjects and as committed citizens of the empire.[112] Only a small number of loyalist activists openly engaged in a campaign against the treaty settlement. Adopting more aggressive rhetoric, they attempted to discredit the Free State by drawing attention to the continued suffering of the southern loyalist population. Believing that loyalists were helpless to stop the spread of political extremism and social unrest in southern Ireland, they appealed to Britain for assistance, arguing that only the reintegration of the Free State into the United Kingdom would protect their constitutional rights.

The propaganda campaign led by loyalist activists provided a voice for individuals who refused to transfer their allegiance to the Free State. Despite reassurances from leading

[109] "Ourselves Alone Economics," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 3 (May 1935).
[110] See, for example, "Ground Rents Attacked"/"Coal and Scuttle Pact", *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 3 (May 1935); "Ourselves Alone Economics," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 3 (May 1935); "The Empire's First Dictator," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 5 (May 1936).
[111] "Raids on the Public Purse," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 6 (November 1936).
[112] "Southern Irish Loyalists," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 2 (November 1934)

members of the community, not all loyalists found comfort in the constitutional ties that bound the Free State to the empire; it was widely believed throughout Ireland and the United Kingdom that it was only a matter of time before the Free State was transformed into a republic. In this context, the policies of acceptance and conciliation publicly advocated by influential members of the loyalist community appeared to many in the community to have been adopted out of fear and self-interest. Those who refused to transfer their allegiance believed themselves to be showing greater moral fibre by upholding their ideals, especially in the face of opposition from members of their own community and hostility from the wider Free State population.[113]

Diehard loyalist propaganda also held considerable appeal for those who could not accept the changes brought about by the revolution, or those struggling to adapt to the rapidly evolving economic and social realities of the twentieth century. As observed by RB McDowell, "a belief in discrimination can become an *idée fixe,* providing the unsuccessful with a more satisfactory explanation for failure than mere lack of merit."[114] Whereas loyalists who adopted an accommodationist stance shared a sense of optimism and a determination to find a role for themselves in the new state, diehard loyalists were united by a collective sense of victimhood, despair and marginalisation. Initially, loyalist propaganda articulated the bitterness felt by many loyalists in the wake of the revolution and their betrayal by Britain, but by the mid-1930s, it had also come to reflect the growing anger and disillusionment felt by many loyalists in the Free

[113] The decision of the Girl Guides to alter its oath of allegiance in 1932, for example, led to a split in the movement when 250 Girl Guides who refused to accept the changes left the organisation in order to form the Girls' Life Brigade. Although the changes were intended to reflect the dominion status of the Irish branch, conservative loyalists believed them to be part of a wider campaign to minimize the status of the monarchy. Reverend R. E. Weir was furious over the decision to redraft the oath, accusing moderate loyalists within the organization of seeking acceptance from the Catholic nationalist majority. He criticised the decision on "moral grounds," arguing that the incident was an attempt "to teach the young to camouflage their loyalty."(*Church of Ireland Gazette*, 29 January, 22 July 1932) While they would abide by the new laws of the state, they did not mean to accept it as a permanent settlement, nor did they feel that the new state was owed more than a token allegiance. *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 25 August 1923; "A Question of Honour," *Notes from Ireland* 31 no 13 (February 1929).
[114] McDowell, *Crisis and Decline,* 166.

State as the treaty settlement increasingly came under attack and an exclusive Gaelic and Catholic culture was imposed upon the southern population.

Conclusion

In a letter published in the *Church of Ireland Gazette* in September 1929, W. Lindsell Shade contemplated the prospects of the Episcopalian community in the Free State, observing that "there exists within our fold two distinct visions of the future of our communion," one that advocated "controversy" and the other "accommodation".[115] Shade's observations can also be applied to the loyalist population in the Free State, which was similarly divided in its reaction to the revolution and subsequent treaty settlement. While some loyalists believed that the future of their community rested with the Irish Free State and set about to consolidate their position in the new state, others were less willing to abandon their allegiance to the United Kingdom.

Individual attitudes towards the revolution and the creation of the Free State were intensely personal and varied immensely from individual to individual, and frequently evolved over time. Loyalists who had most feared the changes brought about by the revolution, for example, occasionally discovered that their concerns were unfounded. Brian Inglis described how after the revolution loyalists in Malahide had initially carried on with their traditional way of life in the hopes of provoking the nationalist majority, but added that within a few years after the introduction of the treaty settlement, they had become somewhat reconciled to the Free State government: "…as soon as they [the unionists] found that the new Irish Government could be trusted not to expropriate their land, debase the currency, or make general legislative mayhem, they settled down to ignore its existence." [116]

[115] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 20 September 1929.
[116] Inglis, *West Briton,* 15.

Other loyalists grew increasingly disillusioned with the Free State as time went on, expressing doubts about the future of their community. In the original conclusion of *Bowen's Court*, Elizabeth Bowen expressed the hope that Anglo-Irish relations would improve following the revolution, and that the loyalist minority might be fully integrated into Irish society. "With the Treaty, with which I virtually close my book, a new hopeful phase started: I believe in its promise," she wrote.[117] By the end of her life, however, her outlook had changed drastically. Her attempts to save the family home, Bowen's Court, had met with failure; the house was sold in 1959 and torn down shortly after. She herself had begun to spend increasingly more time travelling, feeling that there was little left for her in Ireland. Hubert Butler, another Anglo-Irish literary figure who was also distantly related to Bowen, described meeting Bowen shortly before her death, and was shocked by the transformation in her views. "When I last met her in County Kilkenny, just before her own death, she spoke of Ireland with such bitterness that I have tried to persuade myself that it was her last illness that was speaking and not her utter disillusionment," he later wrote in an essay that contemplated the failure of the Anglo-Irish minority to integrate into Irish life.[118]

Individual attitudes towards the Free State were often complicated and prone to change, yet it is interesting to note that the public statements crafted by prominent loyalists and loyalist institutions often implied that opinions within the community were polarised and static. In the aftermath of the revolution, outspoken loyalists attempted to rally others in the community around their preferred strategy, be it "controversy" or "accommodation," by incorporating shared experiences and communal values into carefully constructed narratives that eventually became fixed through constant repetition. These narratives helped to foster a

[117] Bowen, *Bowen's Courts,* 453.
[118] Hubert Butler, "*The Bell:* An Anglo-Irish View," in *Escape from the Anthill* (Mullingar: The Lilliput Press, 1986), 151.

stronger sense of community amongst an otherwise disparate group of individuals drawn from diverse socio-economic backgrounds. They also presented a framework for individual loyalists struggling to understand the revolution and its aftermath, allowing loyalists an opportunity to consider their experiences in a wider context and providing them with a vocabulary with which to express their values and allegiance. While not all loyalists were victims of revolutionary unrest, many shared a sense of alienation, a fear of discrimination, or a desire to integrate their values into popular culture. The experiences and views of others contained within public loyalist narratives influenced how individuals understood their own relationship with the Free State, the United Kingdom, and the British Empire.

Knowing that their words would also be carefully scrutinised by those outside of their community, loyalists making public statements in the post-independence period took care to ensure that their messages had widespread appeal. Individuals and institutions seeking to live quietly in the Free State publicly emphasized their allegiance to the new state in order to win acceptance from the nationalist majority; their words attempted to reassure the government and population of the Free State that the loyalist community posed no threat to the independent Irish state. By contrast, the propaganda produced by loyalist relief associations and loyalist activists was directed towards a British audience and was intended to shame the government and population of the United Kingdom into recognising loyalist suffering. In both cases, individuals and institutions who presumed to be speaking on behalf of the loyalist community recognised that their agendas would best be served by clear and concise narratives, and frequently sacrificed accuracy in favour of appeal; public ambivalence was generally avoided, and

The public statements that emerged from the loyalist community in the years after 1921 are therefore somewhat misleading, presenting simplistic and at times contradictory accounts of

loyalist attitudes towards the Free State. The situation is further complicated by the discrepancies that emerged between loyalist rhetoric and loyalist behaviour in the Free State; despite the hopes of moderate loyalists, for example, no loyalist political party emerged to protect loyalist values, nor did conservative loyalists rise up in large numbers to stem the growth of republicanism. In the end, the vast majority of loyalists chose to "keep their heads down" rather than engage in any public activism that might attract unwanted attention. Yet the significance of loyalist public rhetoric must not be overlooked; in addition to both reflecting and shaping the views of individual loyalists, the public narratives put forward by members of the loyalist community had considerable political currency and as will be examined in the following chapter, eventually led to the formation of the Irish Grants Committee.

CHAPTER THREE: REPAYING A DEBT OF HONOUR: THE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF LOYALIST NARRATIVES

Standing before the House of Lords in May 1922, Edward Carson, recently made Lord Carson of Duncairn, spoke of the violence and unrest in Ireland and demanded to know what options were available to southern loyalists caught up in the chaos.[1] A Dublin Protestant who had been a key figure in the Ulster Unionist campaign against Home Rule before accepting his title and assuming a seat in the upper house at Westminster, Carson professed himself to be deeply appalled by the British government's betrayal of southern loyalists in the Free State. Until his death in November 1935, he frequently spoke out on behalf of the southern loyalist population, seeking to draw attention to the suffering of southern minorities during the revolution and later using his influence to publicize the work of the various loyalist relief associations.[2] Following his death, *Notes from Ireland* paid tribute to Carson's support for the southern loyalist community, noting that "loyalty - the foundation on which the Empire rests - was to him something real".[3] For Carson and for others who shared his values and worldview, the position of southern Irish loyalists was not only an important political challenge for the new Irish state, but it was also an issue that had widespread ramifications for the survival of the United Kingdom and the British Empire.

The public loyalist narratives that emerged during the interwar period fulfilled a number of functions within the loyalist population, namely providing a sense of purpose and direction

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[1] *Parliamentary Debates,* Lords, 5th ser., vol 50 (1922), cols 397-403.

[2] Carson's parliamentary speeches were widely reported by the press in Ireland and the United Kingdom; see for example *Irish Times,* 12 May 1922, 3 November 1922; *Times* [London], 29 January 1925. Carson and his wife were also active supporters of SILRA, with Carson offering to speak at a SILRA fundraiser in 1927 and holding elected position within the organisation in 1934 and 1934. See SILRA Minute Books, PRONI D/989/B/1/1-4. Carson's sympathies for the southern loyalists were so well-known that he was frequently contacted by members of the loyalist population seeking assistance with their own compensation claims or on behalf of others. Letters from loyalists to Carson can be found amongst the Carson papers on microfilm in PRONI. See, for example, Carson papers, PRONI D/1507/A/46/5, 7, 10-11.

[3] "Lord Carson of Duncairn," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 4 (November 1935).

for southern minorities after the end of the Union and affording a framework through which loyalists could explore their changing identities and allegiance. Yet public statements also played a significant role in loyalist interactions with those outside of their community, and there is considerable evidence to suggest that southern loyalists were cultivating public narratives with a wider audience in mind. Southern loyalists and Protestants were acutely aware of the importance of making a favorable impression on public opinion "in an age of publicity and propaganda".[4] In a somewhat desperate attempt to ensure the survival of their community after 1921, southern loyalists found themselves repeatedly asserting the importance of their presence in the Free State; while Edward Carson and his fellow conservative politicians needed little convincing that the future of southern loyalism was an issue affecting more than a scattered minority of Irishmen and women in the south of Ireland, others proved less receptive to loyalist narratives.

Largely due to the efforts of powerful supporters such as Carson and the work of loyalist relief associations in Britain, propaganda from diehard loyalist activists exercised considerable influence outside of the Free State, tapping into the shame and guilt felt throughout the United Kingdom over the treatment of loyalists in southern Ireland. "I came away sick at the thought that any British Government could have abandoned to such a fate those who had been loyal subjects of the King," wrote one supporter of southern loyalists in England.[5] In the Free State, meanwhile, Irish politicians eager to downplay political and social tensions directed public attention towards loyalist declarations that the community had not only willingly transferred its allegiance to the new state, but that the Free State was largely free from sectarianism and violence. While prominent Free State politicians were willing to concede that loyalists had

[4] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 5 October 1923. In the article, the author encourages the formation of a press bureau for the Church of Ireland, in order to directly address Irish issues and to control the image of the church as an Irish institution.
[5] "The Lot of Loyalists," *Notes from Ireland* 27, no 5 (February 1927).

suffered during the revolution, they were quick to point out that suffering had not been limited to southern minorities and that the Irish government had attempted to the best of its abilities to protect minorities in the new state after 1922. If Britain wanted to acknowledgement of loyalist suffering, it was argued, then the suffering of republicans and innocent civilians during the War of Independence should also be recognized.[6]

Not all loyalists were comfortable with the attention directed towards their community. Leading southern loyalists found themselves struggling to maintain control over the public image of southern loyalism, and regularly expressed concerns that the position of southern minorities was being exploited by individuals or institutions primarily motivated by unrelated political agendas. As early as October 1923, the *Church of Ireland Gazette* was criticizing the *Daily Mail* for its sudden interest in the plight of Irish loyalists, suggesting that the "Harmsworth" press was planning to use the abandonment of southern minorities as a means of embarrassing the former Unionist party.[7] The *Irish Times,* meanwhile, noted that much of the harshest criticisms regarding the issue of compensation came not from Irish loyalists but from "the other side of the Channel."[8] In an editorial that appeared in the *Irish Times* in July 1923, one that was possibly directed towards Carson himself, it was implied that the ongoing debates in the British parliament regarding the position of southern loyalists were motivated by a desire to attack the Free State rather than any genuine concern for the southern minority.[9]

In communicating their views and opinions to a wider audience, loyalists were seeking more than public acknowledgement of their experiences or validation of their allegiance and identities. Many within the loyalist community argued throughout the interwar period that as

[6] Niamh Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists After the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1922-32" (Doctoral Dissertation, University College Dublin, 1994), 358.
[7] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 26 October 1923.
[8] *Irish Times,* 13 April 1923.
[9] *Irish Times,* 26 July 1923, 21 November 1934. See also *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 23 November 1934.

Irish loyalists had been innocent victims caught up in a struggle not of their own making, they were "owed" support and assistance from the two governments responsible for the violence and unrest of the 1919-1923 period. Those who favoured a policy of acceptance and accommodation believed that the debt owed to the loyalist community could be repaid with opportunities for the minority to participate fully in the political and social life of the Free State; others, particularly those who had experienced losses and hardships as a result of the revolution, insisted that financial compensation was the only acceptable form of recompense for their suffering.

Whereas the previous chapter examined the nature of public statements developed by the loyalist population in the Free State, this chapter will consider the reception of loyalist narratives by those outside of the community, focusing in particular on the issue of financial compensation. Loyalist propaganda placed government officials in both Britain and the Free State under considerable pressure to ensure that victims of revolutionary violence were adequately recompensed for their losses; as compensation was an issue that required co-operation between both states, loyalist narratives also came to play a role, albeit a minor one, in the development of Anglo-Irish relations in the interwar period. In Britain, the work of loyalist supporters and relief associations was directly responsible for the re-formation of the Irish Grants Committee in 1926, a commission originally established in 1922 by the British government with a mandate to recommend financial grants and loans for distressed southern Irish loyalists. As the remainder of this study relies heavily on information originating from the files of the IGC, this chapter will conclude by examining the circumstances surrounding the creation of the IGC and its work in compensating southern loyalists in the aftermath of the revolution.

Responses to Public Loyalist Narratives

Although southern loyalists acknowledged the importance of putting forward a united front in the years after the revolution, the community remained divided on a number of issues. Debates over how best to secure the future of southern loyalism were particularly acrimonious, and the decision of some loyalists to seek support from those outside of the community exacerbated longstanding tensions within the loyalist population. From the very beginning public statements had been carefully constructed to appeal to a wide and varied audience, yet there was little consensus as to who might prove to be the community's most valuable ally - moderate loyalists tended to court favour from the Free State and its nationalist population, while diehard activists turned their attentions to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. Each faction believed itself to be working in the best interests of the loyalist community, and each was quick to criticize the position adopted by its opponents. While loyalist statements had been intended to bring the concerns of the minority community to the attention of the wider Irish and British populations, the process by which the narratives were communicated inadvertently resulted in greater public awareness of the divisions that existed within the loyalist community.

In the immediate aftermath of the revolution and throughout the decades that followed, southern loyalists struggled to convey their anger and disillusionment arising from their perceived betrayal by Britain. For years British statesmen had ignored unionist advice on the Irish Question, choosing instead to make concessions to Irish nationalists. According to loyalists in the Free State, such "moral cowardice" had contributed to the mishandling of the revolution and to the eventual end of the Union in the south of Ireland.[10] Believing that British statesmen had attempted to win the loyalty of their enemies at the cost of their friends, many

[10] "Independence and After," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 8 (November 1937).

southern loyalists were unwilling to "move on" or to conceal their resentment.[11] "The pusillanimous betrayal by England of southern loyalists gave a shock that cannot be gotten over," explained an editorial in the *Church of Ireland Gazette* in 1926, and the bitterness felt by loyalists is palpable in their recollections of the revolution and the treaty settlement in the years after 1921.[12]

Loyalists were further disgusted by the general ignorance in the United Kingdom regarding Irish affairs. Shortly after the end of the Civil War, an editorial in the *Times* of London acknowledged that "public opinion on this side of St George's Channel has never really grasped the appalling conditions of peril and strain through which a whole class of Irish men and women has been passing in the last two or three years," and loyalists repeatedly informed the British public that the treaty had not brought an end to their suffering.[13] Southern loyalists complained of the "haughtiness" and "ignorance" of Englishmen who refused to contemplate the ramifications of the treaty settlement and who failed to acknowledge that Irish republicanism represented a threat to the stability of the empire.[14] England appeared more "amused than resentful" at de Valera's actions against the treaty, observed the *Church of Ireland Gazette*, and it was generally felt that the British public focused on ridiculous incidents such as the banning of English beer without considering the wider significance of such events.[15]

The anger and disillusionment of southern loyalists, combined with a pragmatic acceptance of their vulnerable situation in Ireland, led a section of the loyalist population to turn their attentions away from Britain and to prioritize their relationship with the Free State. This relationship has often been neglected in accounts of twentieth century Ireland, with scholars

[11] "Ourselves Alone Economics," *Notes from Ireland* 32 no 3 (May 1935).
[12] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 2 July 1926.
[13] *Times* [London], 26 June 1923. See also Elizabeth Bowen, *Bowen's Court* (Cork: The Collins Press 1998), 436-437.
[14] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 22 April 1932; "Let them have their Republic!" *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 2, (November 1934); "Tragedy," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 4 (November 1935).
[15] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 15 September 1933, 24 December 1936.

preferring to emphasize loyalist allegiance to crown and empire. Constructs of Irishness had long been incorporated into loyalist identities, however, and historically the loyalist community fell back upon its Irish roots on occasions when its members could not rely on British support.

Leading loyalists who advocated a policy of acceptance and accommodation recognized that they could only participate fully in the political and social development of the new state if the rest of the Free State population came to accept them as fellow Irishmen and women. Anxious to favourably alter perceptions of their community in the new state, their conciliatory statements were designed in part to facilitate dialogue with the wider Free State population. *The Church of Ireland Gazette* frequently addressed specific nationalist criticisms of the loyalist community, for example, challenging assumptions regarding the foreign origins of the political minority and their supposed hostility to the Free State.[16] Believing that a better understanding of the loyalist position would facilitate greater co-operation between southern loyalists and the national majority in the Free State, moderate loyalists repeatedly and publicly clarified their views on Ireland and its position in the Commonwealth.[17] The remaining ties with the crown and empire were presented in terms designed to appeal to a nationalist audience, with loyalists focusing on the practical economic and political benefits of Commonwealth connection.[18] Above all else, loyalists who adopted a conciliatory attitude desired to convince the Free State majority that the loyalist community did not in any way represent a threat to the new state, and to demonstrate that its members were in fact willing to put aside past grievances in order to contribute to the success of the new state.[19]

Public statements from loyalists who had accepted the Free State settlement appeared to confirm widely-held nationalist expectations that southern loyalists would embrace their Irish

[16] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 16 January 1925,10 July 1936.
[17] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 8 June 1928, 30 August 1929, 1 September 1933.
[18] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 15 January, 5 February 1932.
[19] *Irish Times,* 12 May 1922.

nationality once it became evident that the United Kingdom was no longer willing or able to protect minority interests in Ireland. Loyalist anger over their apparent abandonment was gleefully observed by the Irish majority, who reveled in the irony of so-called "loyalists" denouncing the government of the United Kingdom with such bitterness.[20] Nationalists, however, were left bemused by the continued preoccupation of southern loyalists with the United Kingdom and the British Empire; despite accusing Westminster politicians of mismanaging Irish affairs, for example, loyalists persisted with expressions of allegiance to the crown and the empire. Diehard loyalist activists went even further, targeting the government and people of the United Kingdom as the primary audience for their public propaganda campaign. Determined to gain acknowledgement for their suffering and losses, they dedicated themselves to informing the British public of the shortcomings of the treaty settlement and the mistreatment of the loyalist population in the Free State.[21]

Loyalists addressing an audience outside of the Free State frequently referenced the "debt of honour" they felt was owed to the southern loyalist community. Southern loyalists had stood by England during the Great War, with many loyalist families making considerable sacrifices, only to be abandoned themselves during their time of need.[22] Furthermore, British politicians had offered pledges of continued assistance and protection for southern minorities during the treaty negotiations in order to reassure the loyalist and Protestant communities and to gain their tacit support for the settlement. In the opinion of many loyalists, the British government had failed to live up to its promises and obligations. Seeking recognition, including

[20] See, for example, *Irish Independent,* 16 July 1923.
[21] In *Notes for Ireland,* for example, it was occasionally implied in 1922 and 1923 that there was a widespread desire amongst the Irish people for British rule to be restored. In September 1922, for example, it was stated that "In a land of whispers one even hears, in quarters least expected, of the "good old days of the RIC" and fervent hopes that the British may soon return". "The Trail of Destruction," *Notes from Ireland* 29, no 11 (September 1922).
[22] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 12 March 1920; *Irish Times,* 3 October 1922, 13, 19 March 1923, 20 February 1929.

financial compensation, for their suffering on behalf of their allegiance to the United Kingdom, loyalists carefully constructed public statements designed to play upon British sympathies, one which drew attention to the many broken promises made to southern Irish loyalists by elected officials before, during and after the revolution.[23]

Not all loyalists were comfortable appealing to the population of the United Kingdom for sympathy and financial support. Loyalist commentators who sought to establish better relations with the nationalist population in the Free State were adamant that southern loyalists needed to rely on their own resources in the aftermath of the revolution and encouraged loyalists to focus their efforts on integrating the loyalist community into the Free State rather than on campaigning for British recognition of loyalist victimhood.[24] They realized, correctly, that tales of loyalist suffering reflected badly on the new state and would be badly received by public opinion in the Free State.[25] In an effort to undo the damage caused by loyalist propaganda, they continued to insist that the vast majority of loyalists were committed to the Free State and blamed the campaign against the new state on individuals from outside of the southern loyalist community.[26] Loyalists began to grow anxious whenever the issue of southern loyalists was raised in the British parliament or in the press, fearing that their situation offered a convenient pretense for others to publicly criticize the Free State. Even the most well-meaning of loyalist supporters in the United Kingdom could inadvertently create difficulties for loyalist population in Ireland; while praising the work of SILRA and other relief associations, for example, the *Church of Ireland Gazette* criticized the propaganda of such agencies on the

[23] See, for example, *Irish Times,* 22 December 1922; "Attitude of British Government," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 2 (November 1934); "Grave Constitutional Issue" and "Independence and After," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 8 (November 1937).
[24] *Irish Times,* 3, 9 October 1922, 22 December 1936.
[25] *Irish Times,* 6 October 1924; *Freeman's Journal*, 27 June 1923; *Irish Independent,* 2 November 1923, 27 June, 23 October 1923, 8, 10 February 1928, 16 November 1934; *Irish Press,* 27 June 1934; *Southern Star,* 6 April 1929.
[26] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 26 October 1923; *Irish Times,* 13 April, 26 July 1923; *Westminster Gazette,* 2 October 1924.

grounds that it conveyed a distorted impression of life in the Free State. By failing to acknowledge the Irish government's efforts on behalf of the loyalist community, the *Gazette* argued, such propaganda made southern loyalists appear ungrateful and unwilling to integrate into the new state.[27]

Reactions to Loyalist Narratives in Ireland and the United Kingdom

Responses to public loyalist discourse from those outside of the community were mixed. There existed a genuine desire throughout the United Kingdom and Ireland to help those who had suffered most during the revolution and its aftermath. At the same time, however, individuals who feared that the loyalist position might be exploited for personal and political were vindicated in the years after 1921, as politicians and activists on both sides of the Irish Sea introduced the southern loyalist community into acrimonious debates regarding Anglo-Irish relations and the future of the empire. In the decades that followed the revolution, southern loyalists were forced to accept that they had little control over interpretations of their public narratives; while the narratives did bring some benefits to the community, largely in the form of additional compensation, public statements regarding the revolution and the Free State were also used against the community.

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From an early stage in the revolution onwards, loyalists in the Free State found themselves caught between competing constructs of Irish nationalism. The tensions arising from the conflicting desires of moderate nationalists to welcome minorities into an independent Irish state and the more exclusive constructs of Irishness maintained by republicans were never fully resolved during the revolutionary period. During the War of Independence, for example, some

[27] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 28 September, 23 November 1934.

members of the republican forces expressed concerns over attacks on unionists that appeared to be motivated by sectarian and agrarian grievances, while others found it difficult to distinguish between minority communities and British supporters actively working against the nascent Irish republic.[28] The issue of southern loyalism was frequently raised during the debates over the proposed treaty settlement. Many republicans and extreme nationalists were unable to overcome longstanding prejudices against Protestants and unionists, referring to southern minorities as "anti-Irish Irishmen" and implying that they were loyal only to the United Kingdom. By contrast more moderate nationalists recognized the advantages of welcoming minority communities into an independent Irish state; given that loyalists and Protestants were popularly associated with wealth and education, pro-treaty politicians hoped that the inclusion of these communities into southern Irish society would help to stabilize the Free State.[29]

The loyalist population continued to pose challenges for leading nationalist politicians in the south of Ireland in the years after 1921. Mindful that the public statements put forward by prominent loyalists could be exploited for political gains, members of the pro-treaty government were particularly sensitive to the potentially disastrous repercussions of the victimhood narrative for the new state. In 1922, for example, land was illegally confiscated from a group of Protestant farmers in Queen's County, resulting in a campaign of intimidation and agrarian unrest that lasted for several months. In a private government memo, an unidentified Free State civil servant pointed out that if news of the Queen's County attacks reached Northern Ireland, the situation would be exploited by unionist politicians seeking to reinforce the boundaries of the northern state by publicizing instances of sectarian and political discrimination against

[28] Paul Bew, *Ireland: Politics of Enmity, 1789-2006* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 415-416.
[29] Attitudes towards southern minorities were openly expressed during Dail debates, especially the debates on the treaty settlement. See "Debate on Treaty," *Dail Eireann*, vol T, 3-7 January 1922; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.

Protestants and loyalists in the Free State.[30] At a time when the southern government was attempting to convince northern unionists of the benefits of a united Ireland, Irish nationalists viewed public statements portraying loyalists as victims with considerable concern.

By contrast, statements which emphasized the minority's willing acceptance of the treaty settlement and which furthermore constituted a denial that sectarianism and political violence was widespread in the new state offered Free State politicians a means of limiting the damage arising from claims of loyalist victimization. When Protestants from County Clare submitted a written declaration to the provisional government in January 1922, in which they assured the administration of their support and praised the lack of sectarian violence in the state, Michael Collins suggested that the letter be made available to the press.[31] Statements made by church leaders and other prominent loyalists that similarly praised the pro-treaty government for restoring law and order in Ireland were also widely reported in the nationalist press, while in Dail Eireann, members of the Free State government frequently spoke of the willingness of the ex-unionist community to support the new state.[32]

Although their reactions to public statements were primarily dictated by pragmatic political concerns, certain pro-treaty politicians expressed some genuine sympathy for the difficult position in which southern loyalists found themselves after 1921. While they were reluctant to give too much credit to loyalist propaganda, the fears of the Protestant and loyalist populations were acknowledged by members of the pro-treaty government, who felt obliged to assure minorities that they were welcome in the new state. Kevin O'Higgins, the pro-Treaty

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[30] 'Laoighis, Land Agitation 1922,' n.d., NAI S566. See Leigh-Ann Coffey, *The Planters of Luggacurran, Co Laois: A Protestant Community, 1879-1929* (Dublin: Four Courts Press 2006) for more information regarding the Luggacurran land seizures.
[31] "Clare Unionists, Resolution Supporting the Government," 17 January 1922, NAI S58.
[32] See for example, *Irish Independent,* 28 June 1923; *Freeman's Journal,* 30 July 1924; Darrell Figgis, "Department of Industry and Commerce - Motion by Deputy Seamus O Dolain," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 9, 31 October 1924; "Private Bills for Divorce," *Dáil Éireann*, vol. 10, 11 February 1925; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.

Minister for Home Affairs, stated in a speech in Dail Eireann in September 1922 that while nationalists might believe the concerns of minorities to be without basis, "of the reality of these fears there can be no doubt." He went on to encourage members of his party to find ways of reassuring loyalists and Protestants that they were not seen as "alien enemies" or "planters".[33] Other pro-treaty politicians also spoke of the need to address the fears of loyalists and Protestants, and they justified the creation of the Senate and other safeguards for loyalists on the grounds that these measures would promote goodwill and help to integrate minorities into the new state.[34]

Yet loyalists found it difficult to overcome the suspicions and prejudices of the republican element in Free State society. Members of Fianna Fail were outspoken in their belief that imperial agents were working against the Free State, and they viewed attempts to publicize the difficulties of the loyalist minority as part of a larger campaign intended to undermine the stability of the new state.[35] As early as the mid-1920s, editorials in nationalist newspapers were warning the loyalist community that appeals to Britain would jeopardize any existing sympathy in the Free State for their suffering.[36] The editorials furthermore reminded loyalists that unionists in Britain and Ulster had abandoned them during the home rule crisis and the revolution; if British politicians were now demonstrating an interest in the loyalist cause, it was

[33] Kevin O'Higgins, "Constitution of Soarstat Eireann Bill," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 1, 20 September 1922; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.
[34] See, for example, "Nominations for the Senate-Motion by the President," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 1, 25 October 1922; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.
[35] *Southern Star,* 6 April 1929; *Irish Times,* 2 November 1934; *Irish Press,* 27 June 1934. "Unionist", "Loyalist", "Imperialist," and other references to the Protestant Ascendancy were commonly used in political debates as a means of questioning an opponent's nationalist credentials and dedication to the new state; see for example, Dr. Ward, "Private Deputies' Business-Legal Practicioners (Qualification) Bill 1928 – Second State (Resumed)," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 26, 7 November 1928; Frank Aiken, "Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, 1931," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 40, 27 November 1931; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.
[36] *Irish Independent,* 24 April 1925.

argued, it was not due to any sense of guilt or concern, but rather because they recognized an opportunity to publicly attack the Irish state.[37]

Annoyed by public suggestions that loyalists had suffered extraordinary losses during the revolution and that they continued to face hardships in the Free State, nationalist and republican commentators pointed out that the entire population of the Free State had experienced the effects of revolution and the resulting social and economic unrest.[38] Loyalists were often accused of exaggerating their suffering during the revolution, and many in the wider population resented the efforts of loyalist relief associations for serving as constant reminders of a painful period in the nation's recent past.[39] By the early 1930s even some of the community's earlier supporters were growing frustrated over the apparent unwillingness of the loyalist community to forget the events of the revolution, and loyalists faced criticisms over their perceived lack of gratitude for their generous treatment in the aftermath of the revolution.[40] Nationalists and republicans emphasized that minorities in the Free State were guaranteed freedom of worship and had received numerous political concessions, arguing that few political or religious minorities elsewhere on the continent or in the empire had been shown the same consideration.[41] Nationalist commentators in the Free State particularly favoured comparisons between loyalists in the Free State and the Catholic nationalist minority in

[37] *Irish Times,* 6 October 1924*; Freeman's Journal*, 20 June 1923, 27 June 1923; *Irish Independent,* 19, 27, 29 June 1923, 23 October 1923*,* 8 February 1928; *Meath Chronicle,* 28 July 1934; *Irish News,* 27 June 1923.
[38] *Freeman's Journal,* 27 June 1923, 8 February 1924; *Irish Independent,* 17 June 1923, 8 February, 6 March 1924, 24 April 1925; *Meath Chronicle*, 24 July 1926; *Sunday Independent,* 20 January 1935.
[39] *Meath Chronicle,* 2 May 1925; *Southern Star,* 23 February 1929.
[40] *Irish Press,* 16 November 1933, 30 April 1934; *Southern Star,* 20 July 1935.
[41] *Irish Press,* 30 April 1934; Eamon de Valera, "Adjournment of the Dail-Saorstat Conditions," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 58, 25 July 1935; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014; "Constitution (Amendment No. 23) Bill, 1934 – Motion of Enactment," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 61, 22 April 1936; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.

Northern Ireland.[42] Time and again allegations of loyalist hardships in the south were countered with references to discriminatory legislation and sectarian violence in the north; such comparisons, nationalists believed, clearly demonstrated the baseless nature of southern loyalist complaints.[43]

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Throughout the Home Rule crisis and later during the War of Independence, Irish loyalists frequently complained that government officials in the United Kingdom demonstrated a lack of awareness of Irish political and social realities. They became more outspoken in their criticism following the treaty settlement, voicing frustrations over the unsympathetic response in the rest of the British Isles to the plight of loyalists in the Free State. It was generally believed that there was a marked decline in popular interest in Ireland after 1921.[44] Lady Augusta Gregory, for example, recorded in her diary a number of instances when acquaintances in

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[42] See, for example, Patrick Baxter, "Treaty (Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Bill 1925 – Second State (Resumed Debate)," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 13, 9 December 1925; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.

[43] *Irish Independent,* 10 January 1923; *Freeman's Journal,* 28 June 1923, 8 February 1924; *Irish Times,* 29 July 1935; *Southern Star,* 20 July 1935; *Anglo-Celt,* 26 October 1929; "Committee on Finance – Irish Grants Committee," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 8, 25 July 1924; "Treaty (Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Bill 1925 – Second Stage (Resumed)," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 13, 8 December 1925; "Adjournment Debate – Compensation in Northern Ireland," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 21, 17 November 1927; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.

Interestingly, southern loyalists who adopted an accommodationist stance appear to have been willing to collude with claims that bigotry was primarily a northern phenomenon. In keeping with their rejection of all forms of political and religious extremism, southern loyalists spoke out against expressions of loyalist triumphalism and incidents of sectarian violence in the north. Leading loyalists used outbreaks of unrest and violence in Northern Ireland to praise the Free State government for establishing a stable state in the south, while also exploiting such occasions to draw attention to the law-abiding and moderate nature of southern loyalism. Many southern Protestants, like their fellow Free State citizens, sympathized with the plight of the northern minority. Standing in parliament in December 1925, Bryan Cooper contrasted the treatment received by the minority in the Free State with the conditions faced by nationalists in Northern Ireland (see, for example, Cooper, "Treaty (Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Bill 1925 – Second Stage (Resumed)," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 13, 8 December 1925; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014). Despite such public acknowledgement of their good fortune, however, southern loyalists continued to be criticized by extreme nationalists and republicans throughout this period for not being more outspoken against the actions of "their co-religionists" in the north (*Irish Press,* 30 April 1934; *Southern Star,* 20 July 1935).

[44] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 15 August 1924, 22 July 1932; "The Last Link Broken," *Notes From Ireland* 32, no 8 (November 1937); *Irish Times,*7 December 1932; *Northern Whig,* 27 October 1923; *Times* [London], 26 June 1923.

England complained about the difficulties of keeping abreast of Irish news; after lunching in May 1923 with Augustine Birrell, former Chief Secretary for Ireland, Lady Gregory recorded in her diary that "He keeps his interest in Ireland, but doesn't take an Irish paper, and there is nothing or all but nothing in the English papers about us now the outrages have disappeared."[45] Historians have done little to challenge contemporary interpretations of this period, accepting that the British public demonstrated negligible interest in Ireland following the creation of the Free State and the signing of the treaty.[46]

The situation in Britain appears to have been more complicated than many have realized, however. Changing views on ethnicity, the empire, and political loyalties possibly led to a reevaluation of the Anglo-Irish relationship on the part of the British population. In a recent dissertation, L.M. Moulton notes that Ireland did not excite widespread political activism in England during the interwar period, as it was increasingly viewed as a "foreign" concern at a time when political activity in the United Kingdom was focused on ensuring domestic stability.[47] However, Moulton goes on to argue that while the English people and their political leaders attempted to turn their backs on Irish political affairs, they found it difficult to escape reminders of the recent unrest in Ireland. Despite claims that the "average Englishman" was no longer interested in Ireland, there appears to have existed in English society a widespread sense of

[45] Lady Augusta Gregory, *Lady Gregory's Journals*. Vol. 1, *Books One to Twenty-Nine, October 1916-February 1925*, ed. Daniel J. Murphy (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smyth Ltd., 1978), 453; Lady Augusta Gregory, *Lady Gregory's Journals*. Vol. 2, *Books Thirty to Forty-Four, February 1925-May 1932*, ed. Daniel J. Murphy (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smyth Ltd., 1987), 74.
[46] D.G. Boyce sums up British interest in Ireland thusly: "after 1918 government policy in Ireland was of vital public importance until, with the outbreak of the Irish Civil War in June 1922, Irish questions at last began to merge into the comparative background in which they were to remain for nearly fifty years". D. G. Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of the Irish Policy, 1918-1922* (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1972), 13. For an examination of the historiography of Anglo-Irish relations in the interwar period, see Kevin Matthews, *Fatal Influence: The Impact of Ireland on British Politics, 1920-1925* (Dublin: UCD Press, 2004), 3 and LM Moulton, "Private Irelands: The Legacies of the Anglo-Irish War in Interwar England" (Doctoral dissertation, Brown University, 2010).
[47] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 6-8, 329-458.

shame over the government's mismanagement of its nearest imperial possession.[48] Moulton's work concludes that, partly as a result of lingering guilt over British involvement in the revolution, as well as due to changing views on ethnicity, popular interest once shown in Irish political affairs was redirected in this period towards "safer" cultural aspects of Irishness.[49] Moulton's interpretation of Anglo-Irish relations in the interwar period offers a different context in which to consider reactions in the United Kingdom to the public narratives crafted by loyalists, one that draws much needed attention to the wider political ramifications of southern loyalism as well as to the existence of public trauma in the United Kingdom over events in Ireland in the early twentieth century.

Although the average Englishman might wish to avoid contemplating the uncomfortable historical relationship between Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, politicians in the United Kingdom could not afford to turn away from the political dangers posed by a divided Ireland. Hopes that the Treaty settlement had at last resolved the Irish Question were short-lived, as the political elite in Westminster was forced almost immediately to confront problems arising from the Civil War in the Free State and the boundary settlement. At a time when they were prioritizing domestic stability and attempting to come to terms with the changing structure of the empire, British politicians could ill afford another conflict in Ireland.[50] In this context, southern loyalists were both an unfortunate reminder of the recent War of Independence and a possible source of future unrest. Perhaps more so than Free State politicians, the government in the United Kingdom was wary of the potential political repercussions of loyalist complaints and statements. Some chose to dismiss loyalist concerns in the interwar period, while others sought

[48] Ibid., 87, 329-458.
[49] Ibid., 10, 459-548.
[50] Matthews, *Fatal Influence,* 6-8; Paul Canning, *British Policy Towards Ireland, 1921-1941* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 8. For more on changes to the empire in this period, and the Free State's role in the evolution of the empire, see D.W. Harkness, *The Restless Dominion: The Irish Free State and the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-1931* (New York: New York University Press, 1970).

to position themselves as champions of the Irish loyalist community. In both instances southern loyalist narratives were made to fit the needs of political interests in the United Kingdom, often resulting in further difficulties and frustrations for the loyalist population in the Free State.

Reactions in the United Kingdom to the loyalist narratives must be seen in the wider context of the Irish Question, which had dominated politics in Britain for much of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Following Gladstone's famous conversion to the home rule cause in 1885, supporters of the Liberal party had largely accepted the Irish nationalist case for self-determination, hoping to preserve wider imperial unity through a reconstructed Union. Party members expressed few concerns for the Irish unionist population during the home rule campaigns, believing unionists to be the authors of their own misfortune. During the War of Independence, Liberals outside of the Coalition government joined members of the Labour party in protesting the government's use of force against Irish republicans.[51] While independent Liberals and Labour supporters lacked sufficient numbers in parliament to directly influence the government's Irish policies in the 1919-1921 period, they did succeed in placing the coalition under pressure by drawing attention to the government's activities in Ireland.[52]

Following the treaty settlement, Liberal and Labour politicians were largely impervious to the discourse of victimhood cultivated by some southern loyalists. As argued by Moulton, the treaty settlement had severed ties between Ireland and the United Kingdom, at least in the minds of left-wing politicians, who accordingly viewed the Free State as a distinct nation.[53] They argued that the Free State government was now responsible for those resident in southern Ireland and warned that the government of the United Kingdom could not directly interfere in the domestic affairs of an independent state. Furthermore, Liberal politicians questioned the

[51] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 92; Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles,* 51.
[52] Matthews, *Fatal Influence,* 27-35; Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles,* 61.
[53] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 95.

extent of loyalist suffering during the revolution and its aftermath, suggesting that loyalist propaganda was exaggerating the distress of southern minorities. Armed with public statements made by loyalists seeking acceptance and accommodation, they argued that minorities in the Free State were content and prosperous under the new Irish government.[54]

Despite the lack of concern demonstrated by left-wing politicians for the loyalist victimhood narrative, the Liberal party did maintain a humanitarian interest in Ireland. At the same time that members of the party were speaking out against efforts to compensate southern loyalists for the losses they had suffered during the revolution, they were supporting attempts to alleviate distress in the west of Ireland following the failure of the harvest in 1924-1925.[55] Left-wing politicians also prioritized the suffering of communities facing economic and social hardships elsewhere in the United Kingdom over the troubles of the southern loyalist community in the Free State, demanding, for example, that British aid be directed towards mining communities in England.[56] This approach towards southern loyalists was consistent with the wider political and social values of left-wing politicians; the Labour party in particular tended to portray Irish unionists as part of an upper-class elite who were entirely capable of supporting themselves despite the changes brought about by the revolution, and members of the party strongly resented that Irish unrest drew attention away from other, more pressing, matters.[57]

In contrast with the rather scornful reaction of left-wing politicians to loyalist complaints, the plight of southern loyalists became, in Moulton's words, "a cause celebre" for the political right in the decade after the revolution.[58] Conservatives in the United Kingdom had long been sympathetic to Irish unionists, denouncing Irish nationalism during the home rule

[54] See, for example, *Irish Times,* 24 February 1928.
[55] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 166.
[56] See, for example, *Irish Times,* 24 February 1928; *Times* [London], 11 July 1925.
[57] Matthews, *Fatal Influence,* 135-136.
[58] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 352.

debates as a threat to the established order in the British Isles and a destabilizing influence in the empire. During the initial stages of the War of Independence, conservative politicians had supported the government's efforts to restore law and order in Ireland, although the violence perpetrated by the Black and Tans eventually led some members of the party to question the cost of maintaining direct rule over their nearest neighbor.[59] By the spring of 1921, conservative politicians were forced to acknowledge, along with others in the political establishment, that the situation in Ireland could not be easily or tidily resolved. While a small group of diehard conservatives spoke out against the treaty in 1921, considering it to be a betrayal of their party's values and traditions, few politicians from any party were willing to stand in the way of a settlement that had the potential an end to the crisis in Ireland and that also held widespread support from the British public.[60] Furthermore, the treaty settlement was seen by many conservatives to offer stability and protection to the rest of the United Kingdom, particularly Ulster; as John Turner observes, an initial "attempt to stabilize the Union" during the Home Rule crisis of 1912-14 "ended with a fairly convincing bid to give most of Ireland away in order to preserve the rest".[61]

The subsequent outbreak of the Civil War in the south of Ireland appeared to vindicate conservative fears regarding the dangers of an independent Irish state. When a conservative government replaced the coalition in October 1922, southern loyalists and their supporters could be forgiven for expecting a more sympathetic response from officials regarding the plight of the loyalist community in the Free State. However, it soon became apparent that the government was unwilling to intervene directly in Irish affairs, and loyalists struggled to

[59] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 329; Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles,* 51-53, 63, 101.
[60] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 334; Brennan, "Compensating Irish Loyalists,"12; Canning, *British Policy Towards Ireland*, 9.
[61] John Turner, "Letting Go – The Conservative Party and the End of the Union with Ireland," in *Uniting the Kingdom? The Making of British History,* eds. Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer (London: Routledge, 1995), 255-256; Stephen Evans, "The Conservatives and the Redefinition of Unionism, 1912-21," *Twentieth Century British History* 9, vol 1 (1998): 23-24.

transform the fate of their community into a priority for a party that was beset by internal divisions arising out of power struggles and long-standing ideological differences.[62] Support for the southern loyalist population was primarily limited to a small coterie of diehard conservative backbenchers and peers in the House of Lords, men who had attacked the coalition government's Irish policies during the War of Independence and who continued to challenge the conservative leadership throughout the interwar period over conditions in Ireland.[63] According to Paul Canning, the diehard movement "had its roots in the conservative reaction to the revolutionary surge sweeping Europe in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917."[64] Diehard conservatives, many with strong ties to Ireland, were determined to protect the rest of the United Kingdom and the empire from what they believed to be an international conspiracy against British interests, the same forces responsible for the decline of southern loyalism.

Unable to muster sufficient numbers to determine party policies, diehard conservatives nonetheless continued to agitate for official recognition of loyalist suffering. The *Morning Post*, a diehard paper that was outspoken in its support of southern loyalists, praised Tory backbenchers for their efforts to generate interest in the plight of loyalists in the Free State following the end of the Irish Civil War.[65] Conservative party members associated with the diehard movement raised the issue of southern loyalists at the party conference in 1921 and again in 1923, arguing that the party had a duty to ensure that southern loyalists received fair

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[62] *Belfast Telegraph,* 7 June 1923; *Northern Whig,* 9 June 1923. For more on divisions within the Conservative party during the interwar period, see Stuart Ball, "The Legacy of Coalition: Fear and Loathing in Conservative Politics," *Contemporary British History* 25, no 1 (March 2011): 65-82; David Close, "Conservatives and Coalition after the First World War," *Journal of Modern History,* vol 45, no 2 (June 1973), 240-260.
[63] For the role of Ireland on Conservative divisions, see Canning, *British Policy Towards Ireland,*17-26, 67-85, 148; Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles,* 163-165; Matthews, *Fatal Influence,* 37-64.
[64] Canning, *British Policy Towards Ireland,* 17.
[65] As reported in the *Belfast Telegraph*, 7 June 1923.

treatment.[66] The prominence of certain politicians associated with the diehard faction made it difficult for other conservative party members to dismiss entirely the issue of southern loyalists, particularly when respected individuals such as Colonel John Gretton, Lord Edward Carson and the Duke of Northumberland frequently raised the issue of southern loyalists in both houses of parliament.[67]

Outside of parliament, influential Tory politicians and members of the nobility accepted prominent roles in the various loyalist relief associations established in England. At the inaugural meeting of the Southern Loyalist Relief Association in May 1922, for example, the executive committee included the Marquess of Linlithgow, the Marquess of Salisbury, and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson.[68] Ten years later, in 1932, the Duke of Portland was named as president of SILRA, with the Duke of Bedford, the Duke of Devonshire and the Duchess of Northumberland elected as Vice-Presidents.[69] Many did far more than simply lend their names to the loyalist cause; Carson gave a number of speeches on behalf of various loyalist associations until his death in 1935, for example, while SILRA's "Ladies Committee" organized fundraisers throughout the interwar period.[70] With their parliamentary speeches and extra-parliamentary activities, diehard conservative activists ensured that the loyalist victimhood narrative was widely transmitted to a British audience.

Diehard activists who championed the loyalist cause were motivated in part by genuine concern for southern minorities. They had been horrified by the callous treatment of loyalists at the hands of the British government in 1921, and some appeared to be seeking atonement for

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[66] *Times* [London], 18 November 1921, 17, 25, 27 October 1923.
[67] See, for example, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol 56 (1924), cols. 535-565; *Parliamentary Debates,* Lords, 5th ser., vol. 59 (1924), cols. 591-666; *Parliamentary Debates,* Lords, 5th ser., vol. 93 (1934), cols. 1063-1082. See also "Victims of Anarchy," *Notes from Ireland* 30, no 30 (August 1924).
[68] "Minutes of Meeting held in Committee Room No. 12, House of Commons, at 10-15 on May 30th, 1922," PRONI D989/B/1/1.
[69] "The Southern Loyalist Relief Association Minute Book," PRONI D989/B/1/3.
[70] "Minutes of the Ladies Committee," PRONI D989/B/1/4; "Program from SILRA Ball," June 1930, PRONI D989/B/5/2.

their own role in the betrayal of their former political allies.[71] But the issue of southern loyalists also afforded diehard conservatives with a platform from which they could expound their wider worldviews, and conservatives in the United Kingdom were determined to transform the experiences of southern loyalists into a cautionary tale regarding the evil forces of political extremism and socialism currently aligning against the United Kingdom and its empire. They seized upon the most lurid and heartrending cases of loyalist suffering in order to reinforce their public message, while largely ignoring the experiences and opinions of moderate loyalists who professed themselves to be content in the Free State.[72] Diehard conservative activists similarly dismissed other inconvenient aspects of the loyalist communal narratives; Moulton points out in her study, for example, that conservative activists deliberately downplayed the fact that many southern loyalists identified as imperial Irish or Anglo-Irish, "emphasizing the very British worthiness of Southern Loyalists while treating their Irish origins as circumstantial or irrelevant".[73]

Furthermore diehard activists in the United Kingdom rarely considered the implications of their statements and actions for loyalists in the Free State. Astute observers questioned the motives of conservative diehard activists - an editorial from the *Times* in 1923 asked whether the confrontational approach adopted by the diehard campaign was really designed to benefit loyalist interests - but such criticism had little impact on diehard conservative activity in

[71] This was certainly the case with Edward Carson, who consistently stated in public speeches after 1921 that he felt responsible for the plight of southern loyalists, as he had advised them to trust the English government during the treaty negotiations. To defend himself, he often added that he himself had been misled by British politicians who had promised for the loyalist population. *Times* [London], 27 June 1923; *Sunday Independent,* 27 January 1924. Interestingly, Austen Chamberlain also expressed public regret over the situation in which loyalists now found themselves, although he argued that he had placed too much trust in the power of Collins and Griffith to protect southern loyalists in the Free State. *Irish Times,* 4 May 1922.

[72] On at least one occasion, the acting secretary of the Irish Loyalist Imperial Federation appears to have forged a letter to the *Morning Post,* detailing the suffering and fears of the loyalist population written from the perspective of a southern loyalist, presumably because genuine complaints from southern loyalists were not dramatic enough to suit his purposes. "MCM to Miss Murray, 14 August 1934," PRONI, D989/B/3/26.

[73] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 366.

Britain.[74] And despite accusations that they were exploiting the loyalist position to advance their own political agendas, diehard conservative activists did succeed in winning over a degree of public sympathy in the United Kingdom for the southern loyalist population. They cleverly singled out the one aspect of loyalist discourse that was most likely to resonate with a wider British audience; by arguing that southern loyalists were owed a debt of honour from the government of the United Kingdom, diehard conservative activists were appealing to traditional British values such as fair play and individual freedoms.

There appears to have existed within the United Kingdom - both amongst the political establishment and also within general public opinion - a tremendous sense of unease over the treatment of southern Irish minorities both during and after the revolution. Although politicians had attempted to minimize their responsibility for the loyalist population by arguing that the suffering of minority groups was inevitable in any conflict, it was generally felt that southern loyalists had been unfairly abandoned. Throughout the home rule crisis, politicians in Westminster had publicly assured the southern loyalist population that their community had nothing to fear and had made similar promises during the treaty negotiations, yet the presence of loyalist refugees in England after 1920, along with published accounts of loyalist suffering, contradicted assurances from British politicians that minorities were welcomed in the new Irish state. Loyalist propaganda in the United Kingdom focused almost exclusively on the failure of the government to protect British subjects in Ireland, making it difficult for politicians and the general population alike to ignore loyalist demands for public acknowledgement and financial restitution.

Arguments that southern loyalists were owed a debt of honour found a ready audience in Northern Ireland in particular, where unionists were somewhat unsure of their relationship

[74] *Times* [London], 26 June 1923

with the southern loyalist population. When the Ulster unionist leadership was finally forced to accept the inevitability of partition during the 1912-1914 Home Rule crisis, they had justified their desertion of the southern unionist population by claiming that an independent Unionist state in the north would offer protection to loyalists and Protestants in other regions of Ireland.[75] Later during the treaty negotiations, it was assumed by Ulster politicians that the existence of a Catholic minority in the north would prevent the Free State government from mistreating the loyalist community in the south, for fear of leaving its northern supporters vulnerable to reprisals.[76] Yet tangible support for southern loyalists never materialized in Ulster; the unionist government of Northern Ireland was primarily concerned with establishing its dominance over the northern state, and it lacked the resources and inclination to directly intervene in southern politics on behalf of loyalists across the border.[77]

This did not prevent northern unionist politicians from making strategic use of southern loyalist propaganda, however. Unionists in Northern Ireland frequently spoke out against the suffering and discrimination experienced by loyalists in the Free State; as with diehard conservative activists elsewhere in Britain, unionists in Ulster seized upon the most dramatic

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[75] The arguments used by Ulster Unionists to counter accusations that they had abandoned southern loyalists are best summarized in Fred Crawford's pamphlet, *Why I Voted For the Six Counties;* Lt. Col. F.H. Crawford, *Why I Voted for the Six Counties* (PRONI, D 1700/5/16), as reproduced in Patrick Buckland, ed., *Irish Unionism, 1885-1923: A Documentary History* (Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1973), 409. For more on the Ulster Unionist position regarding southern loyalists, see Ronald McNeill, *Ulster's Stand for Union* (London: John Murray, 1922).

[76] Paul Bew, *Politics of Enmity,* 426.

[77] Protestants in east County Donegal, for example, submitted several petitions to the northern government in the early 1930s in the hopes that their region might be transferred to Northern Ireland, or that some alternative arrangements might be made for them. In July 1934, a petition was sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs in Belfast signed by six individuals who claimed to represent more than 5,000 Protestants. Sir James Craig, now Viscount Craigavon and the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, recommended that the government take no action, and a similar petition submitted four months later also received little acknowledgement. (Dennis Kennedy, *The Widening Gulf: Northern Attitudes to the Independent Irish State, 1919-1949* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1988), 168-9). Hoping that the British government might intervene on their behalf, the disaffected Protestants of east Donegal next sent a petition with over 7,300 signatures to the Dominions Office in London in December 1934. This petition was forwarded by the Dominions Secretary to the Northern government, who again refused to take any action, simply announcing that it was willing to assist in the exchange of farms and property between nationalists in the north and loyalists in the south, if any individuals desired to pursue this course of action. ("Donegal Loyalists' Petition," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 3 (May 1935); Kennedy, *Widening Gulf,* 168-9).

examples of southern loyalist suffering, which were then widely publicized through public speeches and printed editorials.[78] In doing so northern unionists sought to reinforce the partition of Ireland, as reports of southern loyalist suffering appeared to vindicate unionist fears of Irish republicanism and the mistreatment of minorities by the dominant Catholic population. Yet while they were vocal in their condemnation of loyalist suffering in the Free State, leading northern unionists were careful to stress that the "debt of honour" owed to southern loyalists was ultimately the responsibility of the British government.[79] It was the British government who had betrayed Irish loyalists, north and south, argued northern unionists, and British politicians should be made to fulfill their promises to both the Ulster unionist community and to the loyalist population in the Free State. The southern loyalist victimhood narrative thus provided a convenient excuse for northern unionists to remind the British government of the debts also owed to the northern community, particularly in terms of compensation.

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When one examines reactions to loyalist public discourse from those outside of the community in the years after 1921, it becomes evident that public statements from member of the minority had the potential to generate considerable political unrest. Suggestions that loyalists faced hostility and discrimination in the Free State raised the ire of Free State politicians, for example, who were offended by the implication that they could not be trusted to treat their fellow Irishmen with respect and decency. In the United Kingdom, meanwhile, loyalist statements were an uncomfortable reminder of the recent unrest in Ireland and the questionable treatment of British subjects in the south of the island.

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[78] For more on Northern Ireland and the attitudes of the northern population towards southern loyalists, see Kennedy, *Widening Gulf.*

[79] The theme was picked up by the northern press, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the War of Independence; see, for example, *Fermanagh Times,* 8 December 1922; *Belfast Newsletter,* 28 December 1922; *Belfast Weekly Telegraph,* 12 May, 7 June 1923.

For their part, southern loyalists soon came to the realization that despite their efforts to carefully construct and manage the public image of their community, they could not control how statements made by loyalists and their supporters were received and exploited by those outside of the community. Statements by loyalists were frequently twisted or taken out of context, with politicians and commentators throughout the British Isles and Ireland favouring claims that best supported their individual political agendas. Contradictions within loyalist narratives were soon exposed and manipulated. Moderate loyalists struggled to convey their Irish identities to conservative in the United Kingdom, who preferred to portray loyalists as Britons unfortunate enough to be caught up in the unrest in Ireland.[80] In the Free State, meanwhile, the moderate message of accommodation and acceptance led the nationalist majority to assume that loyalists were willing to fully abandon any connection with the United Kingdom, the empire, and their British cultural heritage. While loyalists were adept at using narratives to rally their community and to make political gains, other groups and factions throughout the British Isles were also capable of fashioning narratives for political ends. Loyalist accounts of suffering during the revolution and under nationalist rule were challenged by counter-narratives that offered different and at times conflicting perspectives of southern loyalism and the Free State settlement in the post-independence period.

Compensation, Loyalist Relief Associations and the Irish Grants Committee

When loyalists and their supporters spoke of the "debt of honour" owed to the southern loyalist community, they did so in the context of seeking acknowledgement for the failure of the governments of the United Kingdom and the Free State to adequately protect southern minorities. It was generally assumed that such an acknowledgement would involve

[80] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 366.

some form of financial compensation for the losses loyalists had sustained during the revolution and its aftermath. Some loyalists sought reimbursement for temporary discomfort or for minor losses, requesting funds required to replace stolen property or to recover costs relating to loans, medical bills and lost wages. In many such cases, compensation was expected as a matter of principle and represented a simple financial transaction between the government and the individual. For other loyalists, however, the issue of financial compensation became an obsession. Families who had lost everything during the revolution and who were struggling to rebuild their lives, either in the Free State or elsewhere in the empire, believed that financial compensation would provide them with the means to gain a degree of stability and peace of mind. According to loyalist propaganda, nothing could fully compensate southern loyalists for the horrors they had endured during the revolution, but they nonetheless stressed the moral obligation of both governments to ensure that victimized loyalists were provided with generous financial support that might allow them to live out the rest of their lives with some degree of comfort and security.

Under the terms of the 1898 Local Government (Ireland) Act, those who had sustained property damage prior to 11 July 1921 could apply for compensation against the local county council. In 1919 and again in 1920, legislation was passed that modified the terms of the council's responsibilities, in order to relieve the burdens placed on local taxpayers during the conflict; the arrangements made in 1920, for example, allowed councils to pay compensation in installments when funds were not readily available. Despite the government's efforts, however, the issue of compensation remained problematic. Ratepayers frequently refused to increased taxes required by the councils to compensate distressed property owners, while loyalists complained that they could not expect a fair hearing in the courts. Additionally, nationalist county councils often refused to acknowledge the decisions made by county court judges, and

as a result many property owners never received the settlements awarded to them by the court.[81]

It was clear by the spring of 1921 that compensation would have to be provided by a greater authority than the county councils, and the issue thus came to play a role in the negotiations between Britain and representatives of Dail Eireann. Under the terms of the treaty settlement, each side agreed to be responsible for the damages caused by their own forces, although the Free State would also be accountable for "neutral" claims in which damages could not be linked to a political motive. Losses sustained between 21 January 1919 and 11 July 1921, which had not been defended before a county court or where the applicant had not been paid the sum awarded by the court, would be put before a joint commission to determine the compensation to be awarded.[82]

The Compensation (Ireland) Commission, also known as the Wood-Renton Commission, sat from May 1922 to March 1926, and awarded settlements amounting to £7,044,470 in over 41,000 claims. The Commission focused exclusively on cases involving damage to property or personal injury, and it did not take into account losses sustained by boycotting, looting or the psychological impact of the conflict.[83] As separate arrangements had been made in the treaty settlement for RIC members and civil servants, many individuals who had relied directly on the British government for employment received generous settlements.[84] Civilians who were reliant on the Wood-Renton Commission, however, were less satisfied with the arrangements on their behalf. Many felt that the commission's terms of reference were too narrow, and argued that they should also be compensated for indirect losses, such as furniture in houses which had been

[81] Terence Dooley, *The Decline of the Big House in Ireland* (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 2001), 197-201.
[82] The most comprehensive work on the issue of compensation is Niamh Brennan's unpublished PhD dissertation. For the Compensation (Ireland) Commission, see Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists," 259-288.
[83] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 2-4, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.
[84] For more on compensation arrangements for the RIC, British servicemen and civil servants, see Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists," 100-257.

looted, or for the billeting of soldiers in homes during the conflict.[85] Applicants also voiced concerns over the length of time taken by the commission to settle claims, as many were in desperate need of cash to pay off mounting debts and rebuild their homes.[86] There was a general sense that applicants were not receiving adequate sums to compensate for their losses, and the commission was accused of being more concerned with minimizing the liabilities of both governments than with ensuring the well-being of victims of revolutionary unrest.[87]

This last criticism of the commission was not without grounds. By the early 1920s, both the government of the United Kingdom and the government of the nascent Irish state were encountering serious financial difficulties. Both governments were fiscally conservative and budget-conscious, and while this meant that they were often willing to co-operate on the compensation issue, they were not overly generous in settling compensation claims.[88] The Free State in particular was struggling in the early years of its existence, as it attempted to rebuild the fragile Irish economy. In order to meet its responsibilities in regards to compensation claims, the Free State government was required to take a number of loans from the United Kingdom, leading loyalists and their supporters to worry that the Free State would not be capable of settling awards decided by the Wood-Renton Commission.[89] Possibly sharing similar concerns, the government of the United Kingdom clearly stated that it would not be responsible for more than its fair share of the damages incurred during the War of Independence, particularly as it believed that much of the violence and destruction had been the result of common criminal activity and was not political motivated. The commission eventually broke down over disagreements regarding compensation for counties that had not been under martial law, and in

[85] Dooley, *Decline of the Big House,* 199.
[86] Ibid., 200-201.
[87] See, for example, *Times* [London], 31 March 1923.
[88] Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists."
[89] *Irish Times,* 29 November 1922, 26 July, 25 August 1923, 13 December 1924; *Irish Independent,* 17 July 1924; *Times* [London], 22 August 1923.

1925 the government of the United Kingdom offered a lump sum settlement to the Free State in exchange for a release from any further liabilities.[90]

In 1923 the Free State government passed a controversial piece of legislation, the Damage to Property Act 1923, which was intended to resolve the issue of compensation for damages arising in the post-Truce period.[91] Post-Truce claims were described by one civil servant in the Free State as "probably the most serious financial problem facing the Government".[92] The 1923 Act provided the government with the means of limiting compensation payouts, as it replaced older criminal acts that had been considered too generous in their terms of reference. Under the new act, any post-Truce claims that had already been settled through the courts were to be re-opened, as the Free State government believed that pre-Truce settlements had been too liberal. Furthermore, the act limited any future claims to property damage only, providing little support for individuals who had suffered personal injuries or loss of life.[93] Other "consequential losses", including losses due to boycott or land seizures, could not be considered by the courts, although judges could use their discretion in instances of theft related to political motives.[94]

The government of the Free State insisted that it had created the 1923 Act with the welfare of the new state in mind, and the legislation was portrayed as a measure designed to protect taxpayers from unreasonable compensation claims.[95] From the beginning of the War of Independence onwards, nationalists had suggested that claimants, especially loyalists, were

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[90] Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists."
[91] For more on the 1923 Act, see Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists," 289-322.
[92] "Brennan to Minister for Finance," 2 October 1922, NAI DT S/1309.
[93] Shortly after introducing the bill, the Free State government set up a Personal Injuries (Compensation) Committee to make recommendations in cases involving injuries or death that had occurred at any point in the 1919-1923 period. According to the later report of the Irish Grants Committee in Britain, the Personal Injuries Committee had very limited powers. "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 6-10, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.
[94] For a discussion on how these limitations affected loyalist claimants, especially landlords and owners of large estates, see Dooley, *Decline of the Big House,* 201-207.
[95] Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists."

inflating their losses, and the government insistence that all post-Truce claims be thoroughly investigated was wide praised.[96] The government also prioritized growth in the new state over individual well-being, insisting that compensation payments were subject to taxation and encouraging the attachment of reinstatement clauses to awards, which forced claimants to rebuild in Ireland if they wished to receive the full amount of their settlement.

Even as the bill was being debated in Dail Eireann, the proposed legislation was attacked in the Free State and in the United Kingdom, with loyalists and their supporters amongst the most vocal of the bill's critics.[97] It is important to note that the 1923 Act did not specifically target the loyalist population, but as southern minorities were heavily represented amongst civilian victims of the Civil War, Protestants and loyalists constituted a considerable faction of the claimants seeking compensation under the terms of the 1923 Act. Many loyalists and Protestants in fact believed that the act intentionally discriminated against their community, a view that was reinforced by the tendency of Free State politicians to equate the compensation issue with southern minorities.[98]In light of existing concerns regarding the ability of the Free State government to protect the Protestant and loyalist populations, the 1923 Act provided critics of the Free State with further ammunition. Diehard loyalist activists argued that the act was contrary to the terms of the treaty settlement and demanded that the government of the United Kingdom intervene on behalf of southern loyalists. Loyalist relief associations such as SILRA actively campaign on behalf of loyalists seeking compensation, publicizing the failure of the Free State to adequately compensate those who had suffered losses during the Civil War; at a well-attended public rally in London in February 1923, for example, Carson and other speakers

[96] "Abhar Ruin on Uachtaran," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 1, 22 September 1922; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014; *Freeman's Journal,* 27 October 1923; *Irish Times,* 29 November 1922*,* 6 October 1924.
[97] See, for example, *Irish Times,* 13, 26 April 1923, 8 October 1924, 18 February 1925.
[98] See, for example, *Times* [London]*,* 31 March 1923; *Northern Whig,* 31 March 1923.

demanded immediate payment of compensation for loyalists facing hardships in the Free State.[99] The Irish Claims Compensation Committee was especially active behind the scenes, with its members presenting a report to the British government in March 1923 that illustrated the desperate circumstances in which many southern loyalists found themselves as they awaited compensation. [100] In all of these instances, it was stressed that the government of the United Kingdom owed a debt to the loyalist population and that the government was ultimately responsible for the fate of southern loyalists ("the obligation rests on the Imperial Government to see that justice is done.")[101]

As condemnation of its compensation policies became more widespread, the Free State government decided to address its critics. In October 1924, the Irish Free State government's Publicity Department released a statement in which it was noted that all of the recommendations made by the Wood-Renton Commission had been paid in full by the Irish state. In the statement, the Free State government also denied that loyalists had faced discrimination in the hearing of post-Truce claims; such reports of discrimination, the official statement suggested, were the work of "some newspapers and persons in England hostile to Ireland" who were behind "a series of attacks on the Free State."[102]

It is interesting that Free State politicians felt themselves to be under attack, as it appears that diehard loyalists and their supporters were in fact directing their attention towards the government of the United Kingdom. Outspoken loyalists denied that they were seeking to destabilize the new state with their criticisms of the Free State government and its policies on

[99] *Times* [London], 8 February 1923.
[100] *Irish Times,* 22 August 1922; *Times,* 31 March 1923.
[101] "Loyalist Victims of Anarchy," *Notes from Ireland* 30 No 16 (May 1924); "Loyalist Victims of Anarchy-and Compensation", *Notes from Ireland* 30, no 21 (August 1925); *Times* [London], 8 February 1923, 8 December 1925; *Northern Whig,* 29 June 1923.
[102] *Irish Times,* 6 October 1924.

compensation.[103] Few expected that the Free State would increase its payments to loyalist applicants, although diehard supporters were hopeful that the Free State might be pushed into bankruptcy if the Irish government was forced to pay loyalist claims in full.[104] In 1925 the Free State government agreed to pay an additional 10 percent on awards for post-Truce losses, but the decision was very unpopular amongst nationalists, who recognized that southern minorities would be the primary beneficiaries of the new measure. [105] The nationalist backlash alarmed Free State politicians, who realized that any further concessions regarding compensation would cost them the support of the Irish electorate.

Recognising that Free State officials were unlikely to take further steps to improve the situation of southern loyalists in Ireland, diehards focused their attention on the United Kingdom, hoping that their propaganda campaign might provoke the government there into fulfilling the debt of honour they believed was owed to the southern loyalist population. In contrast with the Free State government, public officials in the United Kingdom were more vulnerable to public pressure. The Westminster government was facing a potential public relations crisis, as demands for loyalist compensation continued to grow and the propaganda campaigns organized by loyalist relief associations generated further interest in the loyalist victimhood narrative. While it was reluctant to interfere in what many believed to be an Irish domestic matter, by the mid-1920s, politicians in the United Kingdom could no longer ignore pressure from the diehard movement.[106]

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[103] *Irish Independent,* 2 November 1923, 9, 10 February 1928; *Times* [London], 8 February 1923.
[104] Canning, *British Policy towards Ireland,* 77.
[105] See, for example, "Treaty (Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Bill 1925," *Dáil Éireann*, vol 13, 7 December 1925; "Treaty (Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Bill 1925 – Second Stage (Resumed)," *Dáil Éireann*, vol 13, 8 December 1925; "Treaty (Confirmation of Amending Agreement) Bill 1925 – Second Stage (Resumed Debate)," *Dáil Éireann*, vol 13, 9 December 1925; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014.
[106] *Leitrim Observer,* 1 August 1925; *Irish Times,* 4 May 1922, 19 March 1923; *Irish Independent,* 3 July 1925;

Although they did not immediately realize it, officials in the government of United Kingdom had already developed a possible solution to the difficult situation in which they now found themselves, one that would allow them to meet their financial obligations to southern loyalists without exacerbating existing tensions with the Free State. In the spring of 1922 the government of the United Kingdom had sanctioned the creation of an Irish Distress Committee, which operated under the auspices of the Colonial Office and which was given a mandate to supply financial aid to Irish loyalist refugees living in England.[107] As the loyalists receiving grants and loans from the committee were located in England or elsewhere in the United Kingdom, it could be argued that the government of the United Kingdom was well within its rights to provide aid to citizens within in its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the government stressed that the committee was the result of both public and parliamentary interest in the plight of southern loyalist refugees, and vigorously denied that it constituted a challenge to the Free State government; the committee was portrayed as a private or domestic affair, one that was designed to meet the government's obligations towards the southern loyalist community.[108]

The Irish Distress Committee was initially allocated £10,000 to compensate worthy applicants, but the government had significantly underestimated the numbers of distressed loyalists in the United Kingdom. Within the first six months of its existence, the committee had received applications from 3,349 loyalists and had distributed almost £17,000 in grants and loans.[109] In March 1923 the committee was reconstituted as the Irish Grants Committee; now under the chairmanship of Lord Eustace Percy, the committee found itself considering

[107] For more on the Irish Distress Committee, see Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists," 354-403. The report of the later Irish Grants Committee also contains a summary of the work undertaken by the Irish Distress Committee; See "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 5-6, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.
[108] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212; see also *Times* [London], 18 May 1922.
[109] Detailed reports of the Committee's progress appeared regularly in the press in both Britain and Ireland; see for example, *Times* [London], 9 November 1922; *Irish Times,* 2 February 1924; *Irish Independent,* 28 January 1924.

applications not only from loyalist refugees in England but also from loyalists in the Free State who were awaiting their awards based on the decisions of the Wood-Renton Commission.[110] In a widely reported speech made before the National Unionist Association, Percy encouraged loyalists to apply for assistance and strongly denied that the IGC was a charity. "It [the Irish Grants Committee] was set up by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in order to take over all questions of personal assistance to Irish Loyalists, and to advise them on all questions affecting their interests," he explained, going on to add that, "the Government was steadily meeting the needs of Irish loyalists in a progressive way."[111] Before it work was suspended in mid-1925, the Irish Grants Committee recommended grants totaling more than £64, 000 and loans amounting to over £17, 000.[112]

Despite the best efforts of the government, the work of the Irish Distress Committee was not entirely free of controversy. Government officials were understandably concerned with the large sums awarded by the committee, and some half-hearted attempts were made to recover the funds from the Free State. In May 1922, for example, the British government sent a claim to the Irish Governor General for the initially £11,587 awarded by the Irish Distress Committee, arguing that the Free State owed some responsibility for the plight of southern loyalists under the terms of the treaty. Free State officials reimbursed the government of the United Kingdom for the claim but refused to accept responsibility for any further expenditure on Irish loyalist refugees, arguing that loyalists were free to return to the Free State following the end of the War of Independence.[113] Nationalists accused loyalists of exaggerating their losses to gain support from the imperial government; writing to the Colonial Office, for example, the

[110] *Irish Times,* 26 March 1923; *Times* [London], 16 July 1923.
[111] *Northern Whig,* 27 October 1923; *Times* [London], 27 October 1923.
[112] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," p 5, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.
[113] Correspondence between the Colonial Office in London and various Irish government departments over the issue of loyalist refugees can be found in the National Archives of Ireland. See in particular, "Relief for those forced to live in Britain due to Intimidation," n.d., NAI S2112.

Secretary of the Free State Provisional Government argued that "a considerable number [of refugees] have left on a plea of compulsion without any justification whatever for that plea."[114] To further complicate the situation, the Free State greeted the creation of the Irish Distress Committee with demands to be reimbursed for political refugees from the northern province who had settled in Free State territory following the partition of Ireland. This in turn provoked similar demands from government officials in Northern Ireland, who claimed that large numbers of southern loyalists were fleeing across the Irish border to escape political and economic unrest in the south.[115] The matter was only resolved at the Imperial Conference in 1926, when the government of the United Kingdom waived the Free State's liability for awards decided by the Irish Distress Committee in exchange for an increase in Irish payments towards compensation for British property damaged during the revolution.[116]

Although the formation of the Irish Distress Committee and later the Irish Grants Committee was intended to silence critics of the government of the United Kingdom and its treatment of Free State minorities, loyalists and their supporters continued to make demands upon the British state. Even as the IGC continued its work on behalf of loyalist refugees, loyalist activists were turning their attention to the shortcomings of the 1923 Act in the Free State, arguing that the government of the United Kingdom had an obligation to provide funds for loyalists who had not been properly compensated for post-Truce losses as a result of sectarianism and political discrimination in the Free State.[117] Eventually the work of the IGC was suspended as the government appointed a new committee to investigate the issue of post-Truce compensation for loyalists. The findings of this committee, commonly known as the

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[114] *Liability for the Relief of Irish Refugees,"* Secretary of Provisional Government of Ireland to L. Curtis, Command 1684 xvii 531.
[115] Brennan, "Compensating Irish Loyalists," 408.
[116] "Amery to Healy," 27 April 1926, NAI, S2112.
[117] See, for example, Lord Selborne's speech in the House of Lords. *Parliamentary Debates,* Lords, 5th ser., vol. 61 (2 July 1925), cols. 975-1013.

Dunedin Committee after its president, were heavily influenced by activists working on behalf of loyalist relief associations; as part of the committee's investigation, both SILRA and the ICCA put forward reports containing information pertaining to "typical cases" of loyalist suffering, and the committee was also addressed by legal counsel retained by the ICCA.[118]

The subsequent report produced by Lord Dunedin and his committee, which was made public in October 1925, concluded that while the government of the United Kingdom had no legal responsibilities towards Irish loyalists, pledges made by previous governments had created the impression that loyalists could rely on continued official protection. The report therefore recommended that the government nominate a new committee to evaluate the need for grants in cases of post-Truce suffering, giving special consideration to "consequential losses" that had not been previously considered by other compensation tribunals. The findings of the report gave credibility to loyalist claims that they were owed a debt of honour from the government of the United Kingdom; as Brennan notes, "it [the report] was the (qualified) confession of neglect, even guilt, which Carson, Northumberland and others in the House of Lords had spent years trying to extract from the highest levels of government."[119] From this point onwards the Dunedin report dominated loyalist interactions with British officials.

Accepting the findings of the Dunedin report, the government of the United Kingdom appointed a new Irish Grants Committee in October 1926.[120] The Committee consisted of three members, with Sir Alexander Wood Renton serving as Chairman. The final report of the committee, presented to parliament in February 1930, offers a succinct summary of the work

[118] *Irish Free State. Compensation. Report of the Committee Presided over by Lord Dunedin* (Dunedin Committee) Cmd. 2748 (1926); *Times* [London], 15 October 1926; *Irish Times,* 15, 16 October 1926.
[119] Niamh Brennan, "A Political Minefield: Southern Loyalists, the Irish Grants Committee and the British Government, 1922-1931," *IHS* 30, no. 119 (May 1997): 415.The measure was indeed seen as a victory for prominent loyalist activists; see, for example, "The Compensation Question," *Notes from Ireland* 31, no 4 (November 1926).
[120] *Irish Times,* 16 October 1926.

undertaken by the committee.[121] According to its terms of reference, the IGC served as an advisory committee to the government, making recommendations for ex-gratia grants in cases where it felt that applicants had suffered considerable distress "on account of their support of His Majesty's Government". Only losses sustained between 11 July 1921 and 12 May 1923 were considered by the committee, although grants were occasionally recommended in cases where the nature of the injury had prevented claims from being heard before other compensation tribunals.

Applicants to the committee applied by submitting an application form that contained details of their losses and evidence of their allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom.[122] In addition to acting as secretary to the committee, Major A. Reid Jamieson was also appointed "contradictor" by the British Treasury; in this position he represented the British taxpayer at each sitting of the committee, asking questions regarding the legitimacy of loyalist claims and ensuring that the committee's recommendations were not grossly inflated. The committee could request clarification from claimants if any questions arose regarding the information provided on the application form, and the IGC also had valuable contacts in the Free State who were willing to verify details in cases where the committee suspected the applicant was exaggerated losses or loyalty.[123] In extremely complicated cases or cases involving

[121] From this point onwards, references to the first Irish Grants Committee will be indicated by the term "old Irish Grants Committee". Unless otherwise stated, information pertaining to the work of the Irish Grants Committee (1926-1930) is from the final IGC report submitted in February 1930. "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.

[122] Details regarding the application procedure were provided through the press. Applicants were encouraged to fill out the forms on their own, without legal counsel, as the IGC could not reimburse claimants for legal costs. See *Times* [London], 18, 30 October 1926; *Morning Post,* 18 October 1926; *Irish Times,* 19, 23 October 1926; *Church of Ireland Gazettte,* 10 December 1926, 7 January 1927. Nonetheless, the ICCA encouraged loyalist applicants to engage "professional assistance," much to the concern of the IGC. See "Jamieson to Robert Sanders (Chairman of ICCA)", 20 October 1926 and "Sanders to Jamieson", 28 October 1926, NA, CO 762/01-A1.

[123] See below, Chapter Five.

considerable sums of money, applicants were often asked to appear before the committee in person and could chose to be represented by legal counsel.[124]

Applications were initially accepted between October and December 1926, although owing to the difficulties some loyalists had in preparing their claims, as well as to the unexpected demands for application forms, the deadline was extended to the end of January 1927 and then again to 29 February 1928. In total, over 4,032 applications for compensation were submitted to the Irish Grants Committee, with the committee making recommendations for grants in over 2,200 of these cases. The large number of applicants presented the committee with a number of challenges. As an advisory body, the IGC could not guarantee that its recommendations would be accepted by the government; it had been intended that the IGC would simply investigate the cases before forwarding its recommendations to the government, who would then decide how to proceed. However, the committee had no precedents from other tribunals to guide them in cases of boycott, loss of employment, and confiscation of land, and the sheer volume of applications meant that the investigative process took much longer than anticipated. As months dragged on with few developments, loyalists grew increasingly frustrated over the lack of information regarding their claims. The committee also came to realize that in certain cases of extreme hardship, immediate financial aid was required in order to prevent bankruptcy or starvation.[125] A number of measures were therefore introduced to increase the effectiveness of the Irish Grants Committee in relieving loyalist distress. The Dominions Office sanctioned the use of emergency grants in cases of extreme hardship, for example, a decision that permitted the IGC to release small advances on future awards for claimants in desperate need of funds.

[124] According to the records of the IGC, a total of 840 claimants were invited to appear before the committee.
[125] *Irish Times,* 2 June 1927.

The IGC's recommendations caused significant difficulties for the government of the United Kingdom. The IGC had initially been informed that the government was prepared to award up to £400,000, although committee members had decided that this amount would not influence their recommendations. As with the earlier Irish Distress Committee, it had quickly become apparent that the IGC's recommendations would far exceed the funds intended for its work. By the beginning of 1928, the government was facing increasing pressure over delays in paying out compensation to loyalist claimants. British officials decided to begin paying out the recommendations of the IGC, but as the committee had yet to finish its work, there was no means of predicting the final cost of the committee's findings. As a result, the government announced that it would only pay a fraction of the recommendations at this time. Adopting the "Sumner Scale" first developed to provide compensation for victims of air raids in the Great War, the government would award the full sum in all claims amounting to £250, would pay half of the next £750, and then provide 30 per cent of the remaining recommendation.

The public outcry from loyalists and their supporters was immediate. Once again they accused the British government of abandoning southern loyalists. Prominent loyalist supporters and relief associations went to great efforts to draw public attention to loyalist suffering, publicly denouncing the government for not abiding by the findings of the Dunedin commission.[126] Bowing once more to popular pressure, the government agreed in February 1928 to raise the amount received by claimants, now paying the full amount in cases of where

[126] In a private letter, Carson was scathing in his criticisms of the government decision not to pay the recommendations of the IGC in full, writing: "From the observations I have been able to make during the past year, the Government's actions throughout seems to be governed by a desire to be cheaply whitewashed under the clock of the Irish Grants Committee, and to evade their promises and pledges by means which if adopted by any of us in our private concerns would render us unfit for the society of decent men". "Carson to Danesfort", n.d., PRONI D1507/A/46/3. For public protests against partial payments of recommendations, see *Times* [London], 15 February 1928; *Irish Times,* 13, 18 May 1927, 10, 11, 14, 15 February 1928.

the award was £1,000 or less, and 60 per cent of any remaining claims. [127] The government continued to find itself under attack, however, and one year later, the Prime Minister himself stood in parliament to announce that the government would pay in full all recommendations made by the IGC. In total the recommendations of the IGC amounted to £2,188, 549, with the last payments made to applicants in 1930. The work of the committee thus satisfied, the IGC was brought to a close early that same year.[128]

Although the Dunedin report clearly implied that moral responsibility for loyalist compensation rested with the government of the United Kingdom, nationalists in the Free State were disgruntled over the creation of yet another compensation tribunal that intended to provide aid for loyalists only. The Dunedin report was denounced as a further attempt by diehards in the United Kingdom to attack the Irish state, while nationalist politicians reiterated that minorities faced little, if any, discrimination in the Free State.[129] Upon the formation of the Dunedin committee, L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to William Cosgrave, then President of the Executive Council for the Free State, to assure him that his government would make no attempt to challenge post-Truce settlements decided in Irish courts under the 1923 Act. The Dunedin committee, Amery emphasized, was to evaluate British obligations towards southern loyalists only, and would not comment upon Irish policies regarding compensation. The Irish attorney general remained suspicious, however, believing that the British actions constituted a "hostile" challenge to the new Irish court system.[130]

The Irish Grants Committee was largely regarded with contempt in the Free State, with Irish nationalists questioning how much compensation could possibly be required by the loyalist

[127] *Irish Times,* 21 February 1928; "The Compensation Question," *Notes from Ireland* 31 no 10 (May 1928).
[128] *Times* [London], 6 February 1930.
[129] *Irish News,* 28 July 1925*; Cork Examiner,* 1 August 1925.
[130] Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists." Interestingly, Cosgrave later offered to contribute £150,000 towards the work of the IGC, on the condition that the offer remained confidential.

minority. In a satirical editorial entitled "My Conversion" that appeared in the *Southern Star* in June 1930, the author "Seandun" spoke of the "pile of money in a fund over in England" set aside for loyalists, and went on to state his intention of becoming a member of the loyalist population, noting that "there never was a time when loyalty of the distressed kind paid better, and sign on, the ranks of the "distressed" are growing larger daily."[131] Far more sinister than satirical essays, however, were attempts to impede the work of the committee and to harass loyalist claimants seeking compensation from the IGC. In January 1927 the IGC received correspondence from SILRA in which the Duke of Northumberland voiced his suspicions that regional Irish newspapers were deliberately withholding information regarding the IGC application process.[132] A small number of applicants in the Free State complained that correspondence from the committee had been interfered with by postal workers in the Free State, or requested that the IGC send correspondence to another individual, as they did not trust the postal workers in their area.[133] Anonymity was highly valued by claimants in the Free State, who worried that they would be subjected to unwanted attention should it become known that they had received funds from the government of the United Kingdom. Their fears were not unfounded; several nationalist papers published editorials demanding that claimants be publicly identified and the matter was also raised in Dail Eireann, where the "secretive and anonymous" manner in which the British government distributed funds to residents of the Free State was strongly condemned.[134]

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[131] *Southern Star,* 7 June 1930.
[132] "White to Jamieson," 26 January 1927, NA, CO 762/01-A14.
[133] See, for example, files 310, 2519, 2561, 3290; "White to Jamieson," 21 January 1927, NA CO 762/01-A13
[134] See, for example, *Southern Star,* 23 February 1929; "Ceisteanna – Questions. Oral Answers.-Payments under Indemnity Act, 1924," *Dáil Éireann,* vol. 38, 21 May 1931; available from http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie, accessed 23 March 2014. In an interesting aside, the Free State government had a Captain O'Donnell followed during a visit to the Free State in early 1935, as he was suspected of working for SILRA and was meeting with a large number of known loyalists. A report dated 9 March 1935 concluded that "he is not engaged in any activities which could be construed as inimical to

The work of the Irish Grants Committee appears to have been regarded more favourably by the vast majority of Irish loyalists and by the general public in the United Kingdom. Although left-wing politicians in the Westminster parliament accused loyalists of exaggerating their claims, the findings of the Dunedin report went largely unchallenged.[135] Loyalists in the Free State generally expressed satisfaction with the creation of the Irish Grants Committee, not only because they recognised that some loyalists were genuinely in need of financial assistance, but also because they hoped that the Irish Grants Committee would bring debates over loyalist compensation to a close.[136] There is no question that the government of the United Kingdom believed that the IGC would at last rid it of its debt to the loyalist population. The government's position is perhaps best summed up by Amery, who, when speaking in parliament in February 1928 on the issue of loyalist compensation, quoted an *Irish Times* editorial which stated that "no other Government would have gone nearly so far as the British Government has gone in the honouring of a moral responsibility."[137]

For a small but vocal minority of southern loyalists, however, the Irish Grants Committee did not satisfy their demands for compensation. Over a 1,000 additional applications were sent to the IGC after its final deadline, with many subsequently complaining that news of the committee had not reached rural areas of Ireland or loyalists living abroad in sufficient time.[138] Others sought compensation for losses they had incurred after 12 May 1923, arguing that intimidation and harassment of southern minorities had not ended on this date.[139] In 1931 reports began to emerge regarding the formation of a new organisation, the Irish Loyalists' Association, which intended to campaign for the re-establishment of the Irish Grants

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the Government in this Country." "Southern Ireland Distressed Loyalist Association: General File, 1935," NAI, JUS 8/389.

[135] *Irish Times,* 24 February 1928.

[136] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 7 January 1927.

[137] *Irish Times,* 21 February 1928.

[138] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 21-22, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.

[139] For more on applications that fell outside of the IGC's Terms of Reference, see below, Chapter Five.

Committee.[140] When representatives from the association met with government officials, however, they produced a petition with only 159 signatures. Despite the failure of the petition campaign, rumours continued to abound and in June the Secretary of the State for the Dominions rose in parliament to state that the government had no intention of reinstating the IGC.[141] Refusing to be daunted, small groups of diehard loyalists continued to agitate throughout the interwar period, although they were largely ignored in the years after 1930.

Conclusion

It is difficult to make conclusive statements regarding the reactions of those outside the community to loyalist narratives, particularly in regards to the amount of attention given to the issue of southern loyalists and compensation in the interwar period. At times loyalists proved to be an uncomfortable reminder of the recent unrest in Ireland, but it would appear that in both the Free State as well as in Britain, loyalists were primarily a concern for those associated with the governments of the two states. Even the loyalist relief associations in Britain were dominated by politicians with close ties to the government; as Moulton observes, such organisations attempted to portray themselves as citizen's movements, but they are in fact more accurately describes as a personal lobbying efforts by experienced political figures.[142] While loyalists hoped that their narratives might bring about public recognition and financial compensation for members of their community, their narratives were valued by non-loyalists primarily for their political currency. Whether it be British diehard conservatives warning of the dangers facing Britain's once great empire, or extreme nationalists in the Free State making

[140] Brennan, "A Political Minefield," 419. See also, "Letter dating 17 July 1930 from SILRA repudiating connection with Irish Relief Association of Ballina, Co Mayo", NA, CO 762/02-A45.
[141] *Irish Times,* 4 July 1931.
[142] Moulton, "Private Irelands," 362.

allegations regarding the pro-British sympathies of their political opponents, loyalist narratives proved useful to a bewilderingly diverse collection of political agendas.

The creation of the Irish Distress Committee and of the later Irish Grants Committees suggest that loyalists were capable of manipulating their narratives to achieve some of their goals; they proved particularly adept at rallying their supporters around the concept of a debt of honour owed to the loyalist population by the British government, for example. Yet overall the southern loyalist population faced too many challenges to transform itself into a successful political pressure group at a national or international level. The loyalist population was small in number and scattered across the British Isles, which made it impossible for loyalists to launch a sustained campaign for recognition without the support of those outside of the community. In any case, loyalists remained divided over the future of southern loyalism and of their community, and the elements of their identities that provided some degree of unity within the loyalist population - namely the belief that local patriotism was compatible with imperial allegiance - were rejected by their supporters and critics alike. While the communal narratives provided a useful framework in which loyalists could come to terms with their identities and experiences in the aftermath of the revolution, the narratives ultimately failed to unite the loyalist community or to facilitate the assimilation of southern loyalists into the wider British or Irish populations.

CHAPTER FOUR: ORDINARY LIVES, EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: SOUTHERN LOYALISTS AND THE IRISH CIVIL WAR, 1921-1923

Following the establishment of the second Irish Grants Committee in 1926, Robert Milne of Knocknakearn, Ballyfin, Queen's County, was one of thousands of loyalists who contacted the committee seeking compensation. In his application, and in subsequent correspondence with the committee, Milne detailed his allegiance to the United Kingdom and his experiences in Ireland during the revolution. Originally from Scotland, Milne had been working in Argentina when the Great War had broken out on the continent in 1914. Upon hearing news of the conflict, Milne had promptly quit his position and "at his own expense" returned to Europe in order to enlist. Having survived the war, he then travelled to Ireland where he resided for a short time at his father's residence in County Cork, before marrying an Irishwoman who managed a small farm of twelve acres in Queen's County. [1]

In his application to the IGC, Milne stated that he and his wife had been boycotted from 1920 to 1924, "like all other loyalists in the district." His claim consisted of the losses sustained by his family between August 1921 and the spring of 1923 as a result of the boycott. Unable to find labourers willing to work on his farm, Milne had attempted to thresh his corn alone but was unable to save much of the crop. The family suffered further financial losses with the theft of the yearly supply of turf in the autumn of 1921 and again in the summer of 1922. In January 1923 a nine-stone pig valued at £9 was poisoned, while a plough was also damaged and a hedge separating fields destroyed a few months later. Already struggling to support his family, Milne could ill-afford such losses. In his application, he described being "so crippled by the boycott" that he did not have sufficient funds in 1923 to purchase seed for the three acres he traditionally set to tillage. In February of that year Milne was forced to sell a farm cart and three

[1] The following information about Milne's situation is found in the application form and the attached letters from his references, CO 762/192/3409.

cows to pay his outstanding debts; the cows were not only sold at a loss, but they had also provided the family with milk and butter, and their sale further reduced the family's income. At the time that he submitted his application, Milne owed £200 to the bank and to various shops in the district. Milne's references readily acknowledged his loyalty – his clergyman wrote of the "agonies in mind and body" Milne suffered during the "troubled times" as "a loyalist and Scotchman" – as well as his mounting debts; several of his fellow loyalists voiced their concerns about the family's ongoing financial struggles and urged the committee to help settle Milne's debts.

The contrast between Milne's account of his experiences and the writings produced by Elizabeth Bowen and other loyalists who shared her privileged background is striking. The prosaic details provided by Milne, his emphasis on the material nature of his losses, and his ongoing struggles to provide for his family are difficult to reconcile with Bowen's elegiac literary narratives that mourned the passing of the Anglo-Irish community. Understandably the differences between the narratives of Bowen and Milne can be attributed to their motivation in chronicling their experiences; whereas Bowen was at liberty to express her personal views in her novels and memoirs, individuals such as Milne seeking financial assistance from the Irish Grants Committee were limited by the committee's regulations and Terms of Reference. Moreover, one might be forgiven for assuming that, at a time when they were encountering financial difficulties and an unsympathetic Irish state, loyalists from the lower and middle classes had little interest in romanticizing the fate of their community or in contextualizing their suffering within long-standing ideological struggles.

It quickly becomes apparent when reading through the files of the Irish Grants Committee, however, that loyalists, regardless of their socio-economic standing, held passionate views regarding the revolution and the creation of the Irish Free State. While individuals from

the upper classes produced editorials and autobiographies in the hopes of coming to terms with the changes occurring around them, loyalists from less privileged backgrounds were eager to discover a forum in which they could openly discuss their personal circumstances and political opinions. They believed that the members of the Irish Grants Committee were sympathetic to their plight, which emboldened applicants to reveal to the IGC the full extent of their suffering during the revolution and its aftermath. To the dismay of the committee's secretary, Major A. Reid Jamieson, the relief of loyalists who were finally at liberty to speak of their experiences often resulted in frequent and detailed correspondence directed towards the IGC. Many claimants supplemented their initial application form with letters, telegrams, and documents that recorded their experiences and losses in a surprisingly comprehensive and affecting manner. Even a simple request from the committee for a specific date or a financial record could result in a flood of correspondence from the individual whose case was under consideration; the IGC frequently had to repeat requests for information, as it was not uncommon for claimants to become so engaged in their emotional outpourings or political rants that they failed to address the committee's original query.

The relief and gratitude of loyalist applicants to the IGC who were at last free to express themselves is palpable in their correspondence with the committee, but so too is their frustration and despair. Applicants to the Irish Grants Committee recognized an opportunity to communicate their anger to the government of the United Kingdom, not only criticizing the behavior of the government officials and armed forces during the revolution in their applications, but also expressing their concerns regarding English ignorance of social and political conditions in the Free State. Writing to the IGC in August 1928, for example, Catherine Grogan stated: "It is most difficult - I may say impossible - to convey adequately on the attached form all I actually went through. Suffice it now to say that British officials like Sir H. Greenwood

made many fair promises while it suited them and then left all who depended on them to the rude mercy of a hostile people. Surely you will agree that there is very little British justice in such behaviour..."[2] Time and again applicants pointed out in response to the committee's queries that "those who live in England can have little realization of what the loyalists in Ireland suffered and the personal dangers to which they and their families were exposed."[3]

Judging from the correspondence exchanged between claimants and the IGC, loyalist anger intensified as the committee finished its work in the winter of 1929-1930. It had been hoped that the IGC would be the first of many government measures by the government of the United Kingdom designed to address the post-revolutionary plight of the southern minority, but as the committee's final recommendations were paid out to applicants, loyalists were forced to acknowledge that political support for their cause was waning elsewhere in the British Isles. Having waited so long to tell their stories, southern loyalists, particularly those of the lower classes living in rural regions, were devastated to find themselves once more without a safe environment in which they could freely express their suffering and fears.

* * * *

Although the IGC was somewhat skeptical regarding the number of individuals who claimed to have suffered in silence for years, members of the southern loyalist community accepted the reluctance of some individuals to publicly acknowledge their revolutionary experiences without question. Writing on behalf of one his parishioners in October 1927, for example, the Revered R.G. Harbord in Cork attempted to explain to the IGC why isolated loyalists in the Free State had been unwilling to speak of their losses, even to other loyalists. "I did not hear of this raid for some time after, chiefly, I think because threats were made," he stated when supplying a reference for one his parishioners, adding that many loyalists, "even to

[2] CO 762/102/1730.
[3] CO 762/151/2561; see also CO 762/32/459, CO 762/198/3591.

the present day, are afraid of any particulars furnished by them falling into the hands of the Republicans."[4] The Reverend G. Graham furnished the committee with a similar statement, confirming that one of his parishioners in Co. Kildare, "a most respectable farmer," had suffered during the Civil War, although he was unaware of the exact details, "as the less said about these matters at the time, the better for the person concerned".[5]

The silence surrounding individual loyalist experiences had a profound impact on the manner in which the revolution was, and continues to be, remembered in Ireland. Personal stories, particularly from small farmers and rural merchants, were largely absent from the public loyalist narratives that were developed in the 1920s and 1930s. Occasionally a specific case involving a loyalist from the lower or rural middle classes was brought to public attention, but in such instances the victim was rarely identified by name, and his or her experiences were conveyed by other members of the loyalist community, who were often creating narratives to bolster their own political agendas. The inability or unwillingness of many loyalists to discuss their suffering during the revolution allowed leading loyalists, their supporters, and others outside of the community to create narratives regarding southern loyalism that did not necessarily reflect the opinions and experiences of individual loyalists scattered across the twenty-six counties. Such public narratives were also somewhat impersonal in nature, struggling but ultimately failing to capture the terror and heartbreak that had been experienced by isolated loyalists in rural areas.

The records of the Irish Grants Committee offer a more intimate account of loyalist experiences during the revolution and the early years of the Irish Free State, in contrast with literary works produced by loyalist authors and the politicized communal narratives championed by prominent members of the loyalist community. Whereas communal narratives relied heavily

[4] CO 762/151/2551.
[5] CO 762/183/3211.

on generalizations regarding the community as a whole, the IGC files reveal intensely personal tales of suffering and endurance. It cannot be claimed that the committee's records are untainted by political biases and personal agendas, particularly as applicants were seeking official recognition for their suffering as well as financial compensation for their losses. The IGC, however, provided a rare opportunity for loyalists, particularly from the lower and middle classes, to document the impact of the revolution upon their lives.

Working with the information contained in the records of the IGC, this chapter will address a number of contentious issues that lie at the heart of debates regarding minorities and the revolution, namely the identities of southern loyalists and their interactions with the rest of the Irish population during the revolution. It is necessary to acknowledge the diversity within the loyalist community in order to understand if and how factors such as age, gender, and geographical location influenced individual experiences during the revolution. Recognizing the diversity within the loyalist population is also essential if scholars are to move beyond the generalisations that surround loyalism in Ireland and the southern loyalist community during the early twentieth century. The accounts provided by loyalist applicants to the IGC are not without limitations, but they offer a different perspective on the revolution, demonstrating the extent to which lives of ordinary people were disrupted by the extraordinary events of the era.

Loyalist Profiles: Who were the Applicants to the IGC?

As a government-sanctioned commission whose recommendations had political and financial implications for a number of departments at Whitehall, the Irish Grants Committee rightfully anticipated that its decisions would come under intense scrutiny. Its members were careful to record all aspect of their work, from detailing meetings in official minutes to logging correspondence with applicants and relief organisations. The process by which the committee

evaluated individual claims was documented in the files themselves, in handwritten notes as well as more formal committee memos. Major Jamieson, in his dual role of secretary and "contradictor", also provided typed reports for a number of the files, summarising the principal details of the claim and offering his thoughts on the available evidence.[6]

Although the IGC was primarily interested in the nature and extent of loyalist losses, its records suggest that committee members also took into account the personal circumstances of applicants when formulating their recommendations. Both committee members and loyalists alike appreciated that factors such as an applicant's age, marital status, and living arrangements had influenced the degree of hardship experienced by the individual both during and after the Civil War. Applicants frequently sought to draw the committee's attention to details that they believed entitled them to greater compensation; married men with children cited the costs of supporting dependent family members, for example, while elderly applicants stressed the financial difficulties attendant on their advanced age, namely costly doctor bills and inadequate pensions.[7] Loyalists attempting to account for their losses also argued that their personal circumstances had often determined their interactions with the wider Irish population during the revolution; in addition to constitutional allegiances, for example, an applicant might suggest that he or she had been targeted as a result of their substantial land holdings or because his or her occupation had required regular contact with the police force.[8] A number of applicants argued that the IRA had targeted the most vulnerable members of the loyalist community during the War of Independence, while Irregulars had continued to do so in the Civil War. Elderly loyalists, single women living alone or with children, and isolated loyalists in rural regions

[6] The details of the working of the Irish Grants Committee are available in the Committee's report and minute books. See CO 762/207-212.
[7] See, for example, the following claims to the Irish Grants Committee: Files No. 359, 640, 674, 793, 838, 1601.
[8] See, for example, the following claims: Files No 21, 2519, 2556, 2557, 2853, 3135, 3432, 3371.

were all thought to have been subjected to extraordinary hardships and losses, particularly following the withdrawal of the crown forces and the outbreak of the Civil War.

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Of the 916 files in the sample group created for this study, 563 files (or 65 percent of the sample group) can be termed "successful," as the applicants involved in these cases were awarded compensation. It is important to recognise that the committee had a number of grounds upon which they could justify the rejection of a claim; not all of the rejected files can be dismissed as falsified claims submitted by unscrupulous individuals.[9] For the purposes of this chapter, however, it will be assumed that the successful files provide a more accurate profile of victimised loyalists. Not only did the committee take care to verify the loyalty and losses of these claimants before deeming them worthy of compensation, but successful applicants were more likely to have provided detailed personal information in their applications or in response to requests by the committee.

Among the initial questions on the official IGC application form was a request for the applicant's current age. Five hundred and seventeen successful applicants within the sample group provided this information; the remaining forty-six successful applications were filed on behalf of businesses or groups, or else were submitted by older applicants who were either unwilling or unable to supply their date of birth (the term "of full age" was occasionally used in such cases). Table 4.1 (below) demonstrates the full range of ages for both successful applicants and all applicants within the sample group.

[9] Some of the rejected files were in fact been submitted by bona fide loyalists who had suffered verifiable losses during the revolution, but in certain cases the IGC was prevented by their Terms of Reference from providing assistance. See Chapter 6 for more regarding claims rejected by the IGC.

TABLE 4.1: AGE AND GENDER OF APPLICANTS IN SAMPLE GROUP

	Successful Applicants			Total Applicants		
AGE	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**
0-19	0	1	1	0	1	1
20-29	13	3	16	36	7	43
30-39	57	20	77	102	29	131
40-49	75	15	90	133	29	162
50-59	142	17	159	209	41	250
60-69	91	23	114	134	32	166
70-79	46	10	56	74	18	92
80-89	3	1	4	4	2	6
NA	24	11	46	33	16	65
Total	451	101	563	725	175	916

[1]Age of applicant at time of application (1926-27)

Successful claimants were overwhelmingly middle-aged, with 60 percent aged fifty years or older at the time their applications were submitted to the IGC. This older demographic created certain challenges for the Irish Grants Committee and contributed to the sense of urgency surrounding the committee's work; eighteen individuals from the successful group were reported to have died between 1926 and 1930, and the IGC also received a number of applications from individuals claiming for revolutionary losses sustained by family members who had since passed away. It was eventually decided that the committee could make recommendations in favour of applicants who "by virtue of kinship, had at the critical period a legal interest under the law of intestate succession, in the person who, or whose property, had been the object of attack," although family members would not be compensated for the

personal suffering of others.[10] In an effort to ensure that financial awards directly benefited loyalists who had suffered during the Civil War rather than their estates, the IGC began to approve small interim grants to ill and elderly applicants in dire need of funds.[11]

The demographic profile of the successful applicant group has been largely determined by the tendency for the heads of households, or a representative family member, to claim for losses on behalf of their entire families. Successful applicants within the sample group were most likely to be married middle-aged men. At such a stage in their lives, many of the claimants were supporting growing families and dependent relatives, and it is important to recognise that a single file submitted by a male head of household might represented the diverse losses and experiences of an entire family. In one case from County Limerick, for example, a sixty-year old labourer named Maurice Lynch sought compensation not only for the loss of his own health, but also for the suffering of his three children (all of whom had died of tuberculosis during the early 1920s) as well as for losses arising from the boycott of his wife's knitting industry.[12] Similarly, Edward Hall Taylor, originally from Rathsaran, Rathdowny, Queen's County, claimed for the losses sustained by himself and his wife, as well as those suffered by his sister-in-law, when they were forced to flee the country owing to threats and armed raids made upon the family in autumn 1922.[13]

Although the IGC accepted applications on behalf of family groups, it did encounter predictable complications in a small number of cases, with individuals complaining that awards had not been fairly distributed by the relative who had overseen the joint claim.[14] In order to

[10] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 53-54, CO 762/212. See also IGC memos relating to CO 762/182/3173.
[11] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 15-16, CO 762/212.
[12] CO 762/80/1304.
[13] CO 762/10/73.
[14] See, for example, Files No. 1270, 1416, 1888.

avoid becoming embroiled in legal disputes between family members, the IGC occasionally sought confirmation from individuals that they were willing to have their losses represented by the family member or acquaintance that had filed a claim on their behalf. In instances where the committee was very concerned about the distribution of compensation within family units, it would arrange for the initial claim to be re-submitted, generally as a joint claim between the head of household and another family member.[15] In one case within the sample group, the IGC ordered that an entirely new claim be filed after a husband had submitted an application on behalf of his wife.[16] As compensation was awarded to the individual or individuals named on the application form, a joint submission or case re-submitted under another name ensured that funds were received by those who had been directly affected by the losses described in the initial claim.

The nature and extent of the losses sustained by loyalist claimants in the sample group reflect the advanced age and family obligations of the applicants. Although middle-aged male applicants were often responsible for dependent relatives, many had nonetheless achieved a degree of economic stability after a lifetime of hard work and careful investments. The quality of life in Ireland had been steadily rising over the course of the late nineteenth century, and this period witnessed not only the growing influence of the upper middle classes but also the emergence of what L.P. Curtis termed "a rural *petit bourgeoisie"*.[17] Like others who shared their socio-economic standing in this period, lower-and upper- middle class loyalists had invested heavily in land and property, and had carefully built up savings in the years prior to the revolution. Their children were well educated, and if they were not to inherit the family business or farm, were encouraged to take up promising careers in white-collar or professional fields.

[15] See, for example, Files No. 225, 834, 1942.
[16] CO 762/102/1739.
[17] L.P. Curtis Jr, "Ireland in 1914," in *A New History of Ireland, vol 6: Ireland Under the Union, 1870-1921*, ed. W.E. Vaughan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 149.

The agricultural boom of the war years brought further prosperity to the loyalist middle classes, and established loyalists had many reasons to maintain an optimistic outlook on the future.[18]

During the revolution, however, the comfortable lives of southern loyalists made them attractive targets for criminal elements in Irish society, and they were also vulnerable to the general economic decline brought about by years of political unrest. Many emerged from the chaos of the 1919-1923 period on the brink of financial ruin. In the application that he submitted to the IGC in October 1926, James F. O'Donnell of Burtonport, County Donegal contrasted his financial situation in 1917 with his current difficulties:

> In 1917 my lands were fully stocked with Sheep and Cattle, my stores were all filled up with provisions, my Hotel and all the works in which I was engaged was[sic] flourishing. Today I am a ruined man. My lands are waste since 1920, my stores are empty and my Hotel is closed and unfurnished. My Banking accounts which I herewith enclose speak for themselves and in addition I owe my creditors £820.[19]

Men who had once anticipated a few more years of employment followed by a peaceful retirement now struggled with the cost of daily life and bitterly complained of life savings that had been lost as a result of their experiences during the revolution.[20]

Adding to their financial difficulties, a number of applicants to the IGC had borrowed considerable sums of money during the pre-revolutionary period for their investments or on behalf of younger relatives. One farmer from County Galway explained to the IGC that his inability to pay his debts was entirely due to the losses he had sustained during the revolution.

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[18] For an overview of socio-economic trends in Ireland in the decades prior to the revolution, see Mary E. Daly, *Social and Economic History of Ireland Since 1800* (Dublin: Educational Company of Ireland, 1981); H.D. Gribbon, "Economic and Social History, 1850-1921," in *A New History of Ireland, vol 6: Ireland Under the Union, 1870-1921*, ed. W.E. Vaughan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 260-356; Timothy W. Guinnane, *The Vanishing Irish: Households, Migration, and the Rural Economy in Ireland, 1850-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Kieran A. Kennedy, ed. *From Famine to Feast: Economic and Social Change in Ireland, 1847-1997* (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1998); Cormac O'Grada, *Ireland: A New Economic History, 1780-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
[19] CO 762/03/4.
[20] See, for example, Files No. 149, 903, 2557

"I bought my present farm of 100 acres on a mortgage of £1,000 and could easily have cleared it off, had it not been for the loss of my leased farm [surrendered as a result of threats in 1921]," he explained, before adding, "Now owing to the cost of upkeep of house, rent, rates and interest on mortgage, I have been unable to clear off any of the mortgage, but have actually been compelled to sell my stock on the home farm by degrees to meet these demands." In July 1928, the IGC was informed by the Bank of Ireland that unless the applicant reduced his debts, the bank would begin proceedings to recover the property.[21] For applicants in similar situations, attempts to improve their families' socio-economic standing had disastrous consequences during the revolution and its aftermath. A mortgage or loan that could have been managed with little difficulty prior to 1919 was suddenly transformed into a terrible financial burden, especially as applicants who were middle aged or older found it nearly impossible to find employment in the Free State or to "start over" outside of Ireland.

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It is important not to conflate the pre-revolutionary financial stability of most loyalist applicants with wealth or elevated social standing. While applicants to the IGC lived comfortable lives, they did not all belong to the upper classes or to the landed gentry. Members of the gentry, prominent civil servants, and strong farmers were to be found amongst the successful applicants in the sample, but so too were small farmers, rural merchants, and former members of the RIC rank and file, as Table 4.2 demonstrates. Unfortunately, as the official application form did not inquire directly as to the occupations and pre-revolutionary financial standing of loyalist applicants, the information contained within the files on such matters is somewhat unreliable.An applicant's pre-revolutionary occupation might be mentioned only in

[21] CO 762/189/3329.

passing in certain claims, while in other cases, particularly where an applicant's professional or economic standing was considered central to his or her revolutionary experiences, detailed employment histories, bank records, and other financial papers might be submitted to supplement the information contained in application form. Applicants to the IGC tended to provide information regarding their pre-revolutionary household economies when speaking of their losses, rather than focus on household occupations; an applicant might emphasise the importance of the income gained from a farm without specifying who had worked the land, for example, or else describe a wide range of work he or she had undertaken without identifying a primary occupation.

Information presented in such a fashion is difficult to quantify, largely ruling out statistical comparisons within the sampling of IGC applicants, as well as between IGC applicants and the wider Irish population. Nonetheless, a number of general qualitative observations can be put forward regarding the socio-economic standing of successful applicants within the sample group. Firstly, the diversity within each occupational category is striking. Merchants and business owners constituted the second largest occupational group for successful applicants within the sample, for example, but this category encompassed shopkeepers, hoteliers, publicans, and any other applicants who provided goods and services to customers. Loyalist-owned and operated businesses ran the gamut from Samuel Sanders' "high class grocers" in Cork city and David O'Sullivan's numerous retail and trading ventures in Ballylongford, County Kerry, to small shops and licensed houses in rural areas that served the daily needs of the local populations.[22] For many rural loyalists without sufficient land to support their families, part-time

[22] CO 762/90/1479; CO 762/162/2755. For examples of small shops and license houses in rural villages, see Files No. 2349, 2610, 3524.

business ventures, such as hiring out motorcars or offering dressmaking services from their homes, represented valuable opportunities to supplement household incomes.[23]

Secondly, the IGC files point to the importance of diversified household economies in the early twentieth century, drawing attention to the significance of work that was often overlooked in official records that tended to prioritize primary occupations. Fourteen percent of the successful applicants within the sample acknowledged receiving income from multiple occupations prior to 1921, and this figure does not include retired RIC men and ex-servicemen, whose pensions supplemented any additional household income earned after their retirement or discharge from service. Given that small economic ventures such as market gardens or poultry farms were often dismissed as "hobbies" or were associated with female family members (see below), it is likely that other successful loyalist applicants similarly received funds from secondary occupations but did not deem the income sufficiently important to bring to the attention of the committee.

Finally, the occupational profile of loyalist applicants underscores the importance of land to the Irish economy in the early twentieth century. Not surprisingly in a nation where 43 percent of all occupied men were involved in agriculture in 1911, a significant number of applicants in the sample group depended on the land for their living prior to 1921.[24] Thirty-five percent of successful applicants within the sampling described a household economy that was entirely dependent on farming prior to the revolution, while an additional 9 percent derived part of their household income from farming. Four percent of applicants in the sample group described their ownership of landed estates, which they farmed themselves or rented out to

[23] See, for example, Files No: 770, 971, 2535.
[24] Curtis, "Ireland in 1914," 151.

TABLE 4.2: OCCUPATIONS OF APPLICANTS IN SAMPLE GROUP IN 1921[1]

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	Male	Female	Total[2]	Total
Merchant	60	12	74	121
NA	4	44	56	109
Farmer (Medium)[3]	71	10	81	93
RIC	30	0	30	81
Farmer (NA)[4]	38	3	39	67
Farmer (Small)[5]	47	6	53	64
Other Multiple Occupations	41	3	41	59
Labour (Semi/Unskilled)[6]	16	5	21	41
Professional	15	7	24	37
Other Occupation	12	0	12	34
Farmer (Large)[7]	22	2	24	27
Labour (Skilled)	6	3	10	27
Civil Servant	12	0	12	24
Civil Servant-Farmer	13	0	15	21
Merchant-Farmer	13	0	13	20
Clergyman	9	0	9	18
Ex-Serviceman[8]	9	0	9	15
Landlord (Estate)[9]	11	3	14	14
Civil Servant-Landlord	9	0	9	9
Farm Labourer	5	0	5	9
Landlord (Other)[10]	2	1	3	7
Unemployed	2	0	2	7
Landlord (NA)[11]	2	1	3	5
Merchant-Landlord	0	1	2	3
Shop Assistant	1	0	1	2
Student	1	0	1	2
Totals	451	101	563	916

[1] The pre-Civil War occupation of applicants was recorded whenever possible; however, applicants were not always clear on the timeline of events and in a small number of cases, it is possible that the applicants lost their position or changed occupation shortly prior to and during 1921.
[2] In files belonging to joint applicants, an occupation has been listed if relevant to the claim, but no gender is recorded-this explains the discrepancy between total number of gendered applicants holding an occupation and the total number of files for each occupation.
[3] Farmers who occupied 50-199 acres of land.
[4] Farmers who did not specify acreage of land under their management.
[5] Farmer who occupied 1-49 acres of land.
[6] Semi/Unskilled labour includes labourers on estates and domestic servants.
[7] Farmers who occupied 200-499 acres of land.
[8] A small number of applicants in the sample group provided no other occupation than "ex-serviceman"; in several of these cases, the applicant had only left active service in 1920.
[9] Owners of 500 or more acres.
[10] Landlords of non-agricultural holdings, primarily homes or urban buildings rented out to others.
[11] Landlords of estates who did not specify acreage of land under their management.

tenant farmers. Aside from applicants who were directly involved in the agricultural sphere, a significant number of claimants were dependent on farmers for their own economic survival, such as farm labourers and rural merchants.[25]

The information provided by IGC applicants in regards to landholding and farming practices is not without limitations. Of the 272 successful applicants from the sample group who informed the IGC that they owned or worked land in the pre-1921 period, 213 provided details regarding the acreage of land under their management. Applicants claiming for losses arising out of land seizures or agrarian violence generally offered the IGC detailed descriptions of their farms and farming practices, stating the size of their holdings, the quality of the land and its rateable value, and the nature of their claim over the land. Solicitors or representatives of SILRA submitting claims on behalf of loyalist applicants were also meticulous in presenting information relating to land holdings. Unfortunately, not all the claims put before the IGC were as carefully prepared, and it was common for applicants to simply identify themselves as "farmers" working a certain number of acres. In such cases it is not clearly indicated whether the applicant was a tenant or owner-occupier, or if the applicant had revealed the full extent of his or her holdings. Farmers often held multiple holdings in different locations, and an applicant might not have felt obligated to disclose information relating to all the land under his or her management if the outrages had been confined to one area.

The information available from the IGC files suggests that successful applicants from within the sample group were considerably better off than the vast majority of farmers in

[25] For the importance of agriculture to the Irish economy, see sources listed above, note 18. See also, Michael Turner, *After the Famine: Irish Agriculture, 1850-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For agriculture and the Irish economy after the revolution, see Terence Dooley, *'The Land for the People': the Land Question in Independent Ireland* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2004); Brian Girvin, *Between Two Worlds: Politics and Economy in Independent Ireland* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1989).

Ireland prior to the revolution (Table 4.3). In 1911, 83 percent of all agricultural holdings in the twenty-six counties were fifty acres or below, with 50 percent falling within the six to thirty acre range. By contrast, only 37 percent of the 213 holdings managed by successful loyalist applicants were fifty acres or below, with 16 percent of holdings categorised in the six to thirty acre range. At the other end of the scale, 12 percent of the 213 loyalist applicants described holdings of 201 to 500 acres, and an additional 9 percent occupied more than 500 acres. This is again in stark contrast with the Irish population in a whole; in 1911, less than 2 percent of agricultural holdings in the twenty-six counties were between 201-500 acres, while less than 1 percent of holdings were above 500 acres. At a time when there was intense competition for land, ownership of large farms and estates by loyalist families created tensions between loyalists and their nationalist neighbours, and several applicants reported to the IGC that they had experienced agrarian unrest and intimidation prior to the outbreak of the revolution.

Even in the context of general regional landholding patterns, the advantages of successful loyalist applicants engaged in farming are evident. Over three-quarters of successful farmer applicants (179 of 213 applicants) provided pre-revolutionary addresses in the provinces of Leinster and Munster, fertile regions that contained large numbers of strong farmers and graziers. By 1911, holdings of fifty-one acres or above constituted 33 percent of all agricultural holdings in Leinster and 28 percent of holdings in Munster (in the northern and western provinces of Ulster and Connacht, by comparison, such holdings represented only 11 and 9 percent respectively of total agricultural holdings).[26] Yet 64 percent of Leinster applicants in the successful farmer group claimed for holdings of fifty-one acres or above, a number that rises slightly to 67 percent when considering applicants from Munster.

[26] Agricultural statistics from *Census of Ireland, 1911, pt ii: General Report, with Tables and Appendix*, Cd. 6663 (1912-13).

TABLE 4.3: HOLDINGS OF KNOWN ACREAGE OCCUPIED BY SUCCESSFUL APPLICANTS IN SAMPLE GROUP, 1921

		Percentage of Total Holdings					Known Holdings Occupied by Successful Applicants	
		Ireland	Leinster	Munster	Connacht	Ulster	Number of Holdings	Percentage of Total Known Holdings
Acres (Statute)	0-5	19	30	24	12	13	2	1
	5.1-10	14	11	7	19	18	10	5
	10.1-15	12	8	6	18	17	7	3
	15.1 -20	11	7	6	16	14	8	4
	20.1 -30	13	10	11	15	16	12	6
	30.1 - 50	14	13	17	10	13	40	19
	50.1 - 100	11	12	18	5	7	40	19
	100.1 -200	4	6	8	2	2	49	23
	200.1 -500	2	3	2	1	0.7	26	12
	500+	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.2	19	9

Given the extent of their holdings prior to the revolution, it is interesting that many loyalist farmers applying to the IGC insisted on identifying themselves as "small farmers," and emphasized that it had only proved possible to comfortably earn a living from their land after years of hard work and sacrifice. When asked to describe his current financial situation, for example, Richard Kingston in County Cork wrote "I have no other income than what I derive from my small farm, and this is only sufficient to support my family." In describing his experiences during the 1921-1923 period, however, Kingston admitted to holding a farm of 100 acres, "30 of which I till, the other 70 being rough mountain."[27]

Applicants who drew attention to their modest circumstances were likely seeking a sympathetic response from the IGC; loyalists applying for compensation had the difficult task of convincing the IGC that they had been sufficiently prosperous to have suffered significant losses during the upheavals of the civil war period, but that they were not so wealthy as to have recovered from said losses in the intervening years. It should not be assumed, however, that successful applicants engaged in farming were misrepresenting their pre-revolutionary economic standing. The privilege of loyalist landholders is most evident in comparisons with the

[27] CO 762/176/3082.

rest of the Irish population, and it did not always translate into individual wealth. Fifty-five percent of the successful farmers in the sample group (118 out of 213 applicants) worked holdings of 100 acres or under; the average farm size for these applicants was forty-six acres. Holdings of this size could provide a comfortable enough lifestyle for most families, but middling farmers remained vulnerable to fluctuating agricultural prices and often relied on credit.[28] As Kingston acknowledged in his application, a farmer's success also depended on the quality of the land under his control; other applicants were similarly quick to draw the committee's attention to the "indifferent land," "useless" acres, and "poor mountain land" that they claimed constituted significant portions of their holdings.[29]

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With a third of successful applicants in the sample entirely reliant on farming for their income, and almost half of successful applicants engaged in some form of agricultural activity, the strong rural bias in the demographic profile of IGC applicants sampled for this study is not unexpected. However, an analysis of the files in the sample group suggests that loyalists from urban areas were possibly underrepresented in the IGC files. The 1911 census report designated an urban area as a town or city with 2,000 or more inhabitants. At a time when almost a third of the Irish population lived in urban communities, only 15 percent of successful loyalist applicants located their revolutionary losses in an urban area; this number rises slightly to 20 percent for the entire sample. The dearth of urban applicants to the IGC would appear to support claims, made by loyalists and later scholars alike, that isolated loyalists and their families had been

[28] Curtis, "Ireland in 1914," 149.
[29] See, for example, Files No. 1655, 2356, 3371.

targeted during the chaotic years of the revolution, as part of organized campaigns designed to drive religious and political minorities out of Ireland.[30]

Terms such as "rural" and "isolated" were applied by contemporaries to a number of different environments where loyalists lived and worked at the time of the revolution, however. Certainly some rural loyalists and their families lived on isolated farms where they had little contact with even their closest neighbours, but others were settled in villages and towns where they were accustomed to daily interactions with other members of the community. As L.P. Curtis pointed out, there were a number of small Irish communities that by 1911 had "most of the attributes of urbanism," such as schools, churches, RIC barracks and post-offices, despite having less than 2,000 inhabitants.[31] Loyalists living in such communities enjoyed many of the benefits of urban life, but would nonetheless be considered "isolated" if they had limited contact with other loyalists or had few opportunities to expand their social and economic connections beyond the boundaries of the nearest village or town.

Applicants to the IGC commonly emphasized the importance of geography in determining their revolutionary experiences. In addition to drawing attention to the vulnerability of isolated rural loyalists, applicants acknowledged regional variations in the intensity and nature of violence within their claims. Describing his losses through boycott in a statement drawn up by his solicitor, Benjamin Merrick Slocock noted

> This area of Ireland [Carlow] was not so bad as some parts and a certain amount of discretion seemed to exist. Instead of shooting loyal people down freely who showed friendship to Military and were marked Loyalists, the tendency was often to cause injury otherwise

[30] See Chapter One, Introduction. Again, there is considerable debate as to whether loyalists were targeted in organized campaigns of harassment and intimidation designed to drive them out of Ireland, and if such campaigns did exist, what motivated their attackers. For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that many loyalists did indeed believe that there existed a widespread desire amongst the nationalist majority to drive out Protestants and loyalists; see below, conclusion.
[31] Curtis, "Ireland in 1914," 150.

> than shooting them…. we considered ourselves fortunate to escape personal violence.[32]

Loyalists living in districts that served as Irregular strongholds faced additional challenges; as well as being targeted by Irregulars seeking supplies and shelter, and encountering hostility and aggression from their neighbours due to their allegiance to the United Kingdom, loyalists in disturbed regions faced losses and disruptions resulting from armed encounters between Irregulars and Free State troops.[33]

Table 4.4 records the location of outrages reported by applicants within the sample group to the Irish Grants Committee.[34] With the exception of a handful of cases within the sampling, the outrages were reported to have occurred at, or in the vicinity of, the applicants' homes or places of work; it can therefore be assumed that the locations of the reported outrages are indicative of the home addresses of applicants during the revolutionary period. The vast majority of files from the sampling are from regions where anti-treaty forces offered some resistance to the Free State after the signing of the treaty.[35] By all contemporary accounts, the south-west of Ireland was the most active region in Ireland during the Civil War period, and almost half of the applicants from the successful sample group lived in the province of Munster at some point between 1921 and 1923. There was also a strong Irregular presence in the midlands and in certain regions of the west during the initial phase of the Civil War, accounting for the significant numbers of files from counties such as Offaly, Queen's, Sligo, Mayo, and

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[32] CO 762/187/3293.

[33] Although the losses sustained in such incidents were clearly outside of the IGC's terms, a number of applicants nonetheless applied for compensation for damages to property or personal injury arising from armed conflicts in which they had been innocent bystanders. See, for example, Files No 1025, 1872, 1971.

[34] For an explanation of how the files were chosen based on geographical distribution for the random sample, see Introduction.

[35] The most comprehensive account of the Civil War is Michael Hopkinson's *Green Against Green: A History of the Irish Civil War* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1998), in which he details the events of the conflict in chronological order and also accounts for geographical variations in the violence. Peter Hart takes a more analytical approach to examining the geography of violence during the revolution. Peter Hart, "The Geography of Revolution," in *The IRA at War, 1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30-61.

Galway. While the associations between geography and specific categories of outrages are examined in greater detail below, it must be acknowledged that not all outrages inflicted on loyalists were committed by active members of the anti-treaty IRA. The complete breakdown of law and order that accompanied the struggle between pro- and anti-treaty forces for control over the new state also allowed certain elements within local populations to engage in criminal behavior and to settle longstanding grievances without fear of repercussions.

TABLE 4.4: LOCATION OF OUTRAGES COMMITTED UPON APPLICANTS IN SAMPLE GROUP

	Number of Successful Applicants in Sample Group			Total Number of Applicants in Sample Group	Rate of Success
	Male Applicants	Female Applicants	Total Applicants		
Leinster	*138*	*30*	*170*	*247*	*68.83%*
Carlow	12	2	14	16	87.50%
Dublin	11	1	12	45	26.67%
Kildare	7	2	9	12	75.00%
Kilkenny	8	1	9	10	90.00%
Queen's	53	13	66	76	86.84%
Longford	4	2	6	13	46.15%
Louth	2	1	3	4	75.00%
Meath	5	0	5	9	55.56%
King's	15	4	19	26	73.08%
Westmeath	6	2	8	12	66.67%
Wexford	8	1	9	11	81.82%
Wicklow	7	2	10	13	76.92%
Munster	*214*	*50*	*272*	*464*	*58.62%*
Clare	14	4	18	88	20.45%
Cork	114	21	139	209	66.51%
Kerry	25	4	28	48	58.33%
Limerick	21	1	23	31	74.19%
Tipperary	37	18	58	76	76.32%
Waterford	3	2	6	11	54.55%
Connacht	*72*	*16*	*88*	*150*	*58.67%*
Galway	21	5	26	24	108.33%
Leitrim	11	2	13	36	36.11%
Mayo	14	3	17	23	73.91%
Roscommon	8	2	10	25	40.00%
Sligo	18	4	22	42	52.38%
Ulster	*27*	*5*	*33*	*54*	*61.11%*
Cavan	11	1	12	23	52.17%
Donegal	15	4	20	28	71.43%
Monaghan	1	0	1	3	33.33%

TABLE 4.5: THE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-CATHOLIC POPULATION AND OF APPLICANTS IN THE SAMPLE GROUP, BY COUNTY

	Non-RC population in 1911 (as % of total population)	Successful Applications		Total Applications	
		Number of Files	Percentage of Total	Number of Files	Percentage of Total
Carlow	10.85	14	2.49%	16	1.75%
Cavan	18.54	12	2.13%	23	2.51%
Clare	1.86	18	3.20%	88	9.61%
Cork	10.05	139	24.69%	209	22.82%
Donegal	21.07	20	3.55%	28	3.06%
Dublin	22.94	12	2.13%	45	4.91%
Galway	2.36	26	4.62%	42	4.59%
Kerry	2.74	28	4.97%	49	5.35%
Kikenny	5.03	9	1.60%	10	1.09%
Kildare	17.93	9	1.60%	12	1.31%
King's County	9.95	19	3.37%	26	2.84%
Leitrim	8.53	13	2.31%	24	2.62%
Limerick	6.2	23	4.09%	31	3.38%
Longford	8.04	6	1.07%	13	1.42%
Louth	8.42	3	0.53%	4	0.44%
Mayo	2.14	17	3.02%	36	3.93%
Meath	6.81	5	0.89%	9	0.98%
Monaghan	25.32	1	0.18%	3	0.33%
Queen's County	11.26	66	11.72%	76	8.30%
Roscommon	2.37	10	1.78%	23	2.51%
Sligo	8.76	22	3.91%	25	2.73%
Tipperary	5.43	58	10.30%	76	8.30%
Waterford	6.05	6	1.07%	11	1.20%
Westmeath	8.68	8	1.42%	11	1.20%
Wexford	7.69	9	1.60%	13	1.42%
Wicklow	20.94	10	1.78%	13	1.42%
Total	-	563	100.00%	916	100.00%

Given the close association between Protestantism and loyalism, it might be expected that the claims received by the IGC would reflect to some degree the distribution of the Protestant population in the south of Ireland. As Table 4.5 demonstrates, however, there appears to be no overt correlation between the strength of a region's Protestant population and the number of outrages reported from the same area. In 1911 the non-Catholic population of

the 26 counties was 327,179 (or 10 percent of the inhabitants of southern Ireland). Applicants from the overall sample group are divided evenly in half, between those who reported outrages in counties where the non-Catholic population constituted less than 10 percent of the entire population in 1911, and those who lived in counties where non-Catholics formed 10 percent or more of the general populace. There are slightly more files from counties where non-Catholic inhabitants comprised 10 to 14 percent of the overall population than from any other region; just over a third of the files (36 percent, or 327 applicants) fall into this category, a number that rises to 42 percent when only the successful files from the sample are considered.

The connections between religion and loyalism are deserving of greater consideration, and the records of the IGC would appear to represent a valuable opportunity to consider how individuals incorporated their religious beliefs into their personal constructs of loyalism.[36] However, very few applicants to the IGC believed it necessary to disclose their religion to the committee. One hundred and forty-five applicants in the sample group mentioned their religion in their course of their claims; of these, 131 were Protestants, 107 failing to provide any details about their denomination. Fourteen of the applicants were Catholic, a fact that was often brought up not by the applicants themselves but by their references. Seventy-two percent of the Protestant files were accepted by the IGC, while only 57 percent of Catholic applicants were successful with their claims. Given the small sample size, however, it is difficult to determine whether the different success rates of applicants whose religion was disclosed to the IGC are significant.

Working from the census records of 1911, it is possible to determine the religion of a further 367 applicants in the sample group. When the information from the census and from the IGC files is combined, the religion of 512 applicants, or 56 percent of the sample group, can be

[36] For more on religion and loyalism, see Chapter 6.

ascertained. Table 4.6 below indicates the religious distribution of the applicants in the sample group. Twenty-eight percent of the applicants whose religion has been ascertained were Catholics, a not inconsiderable number of individuals; there might have been some truth in the claims of leading loyalists that the appeal of loyalism had transcended religious boundaries. Catholic applicants, however, had a significantly lower success rate with the IGC than did Protestant claimants; whereas only 55 percent of Catholic applicants gained compensation from the committee, Protestant applicants had a 70 percent rate of success. Again, not all files that were rejected by the committee were falsified claims submitted by non-loyalists, but the fact remains that Catholic applicants were far more likely to be rejected by the IGC than their Protestant counterparts.

The overrepresentation of Protestants in the files of the IGC appears to support suggestions, made by contemporaries and later observers alike, that revolutionary violence in Ireland, particularly during the civil war period, was frequently sectarian in nature. Certainly, several well-known republicans figures in this period expressed concerns by mid-1921 that the movement was becoming more sectarian, with increasing attacks on the protestant population.[37] A number of applicants to the IGC believed they had been targeted because of their protestant faith, describing how their attackers had used sectarian language and informing the IGC that only protestant families had been subjected to abuse and violence in their neighbourhoods.[38]

It is important, however, that the complex nature of communal violence in the revolutionary period is acknowledged, especially when the victims are members of the southern minority, and it is here that the value of the IGC records to historians becomes fully evident. The term 'sectarian' has a tendency to obscure the many other socio-economic divisions that existed

[37] Paul Bew, *Politics of Enmity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 415-416.
[38] See Chapter 5, especially pp. 271-276.

in Irish society in the early twentieth century. Those accused of perpetrating sectarian acts were rarely motivated by doctrinal differences; instead, it appears that they used "protestant" as a useful label to indicate individuals whose class, nationality, and/or political loyalties marked them out as enemies of the republican movement. Labeling revolutionary violence as sectarian understandably focuses attention towards religious differences and reinforces a view of Irish society in which religion was the major source of societal tensions and conflicts. The IGC files might not be representative of the revolutionary experiences of the entire southern loyalist community, but the records demonstrate how class and political allegiances intersected with religion to determine each individual loyalist's interactions with their local community, as well as with the wider Irish and British states.

TABLE 4.6: RELIGIOUS DISTRIBUTION OF APPLICANTS IN SAMPLE GROUP

	Successful Applicants	Total Applicants	Success Rate
Catholic	78	141	55.32%
Church of England	6	7	85.71%
Church of Ireland	169	254	66.54%
Methodist	20	24	83.33%
Presbyterian	12	21	57.14%
Protestant (NA)	37	54	68.52%
Protestant (Episcopalian)	3	5	60.00%
Other	2	5	40.00%
NA	236	405	58.27%
Total	563	916	

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Gender played a curious role in loyalist accounts of the revolution. Attacks on female members of the loyalist community during the 1919-1923 period generated emotional responses from contemporaries, who were appalled by such instances of republican brutality towards defenceless members of the civilian population. Loyalist associations were eager to

include women in their catalogues of loyalist victims of revolutionary violence, and several high-profile attacks on female loyalists garnered widespread attention in Ireland and abroad.[39]

In the years after 1923, however, female victims of revolutionary violence appear to have been somewhat marginalised in communal loyalist narratives. The losses sustained by ex-servicemen and other male members of the community who had demonstrated active loyalty to the government in Ireland assumed greater prominence in loyalist discourse following the Civil War; when leading loyalists and their supporters sought to illustrate the suffering of the community in the aftermath of the revolution, they almost inevitably referred to the struggles of male heads of loyalist households to support their families in the Free State.[40] The wider loyalist community occasionally acknowledged the loyalty and suffering of female loyalists after 1923, but there appears to have been a degree of reluctance to direct attention towards female victims of revolutionary violence. The reasons for such reticence are unclear; the loyalist community was perhaps united in its desire to shield female victims from further public scrutiny, or perhaps the losses suffered by women were deemed to be less significant than those inflicted upon their husbands, brothers, and sons.

Given the tendency of head of households to apply for compensation on behalf of all family members, the claims of female loyalists were commonly presented to the Irish Grants

[39] Two of the highest profile cases before the IGC were those of Miss Violet H. Mangan and Mrs. Eileen M. Warburton Biggs. Mangan had acted as a land agent for Col. Biddulph in King's County throughout the revolution when she was attacked in December 1924. Her assailants tied her up and forced green paint down her throat. She was violently ill and spent years recovering from the physical effects of the poisoning. CO 762/03/01 [not part of sample group]. Biggs, meanwhile, was gang-raped in her home in County Tipperary in June 1922 while her husband was beaten and held captive in the adjoining room. CO 762/04/19. Both cases were widely discussed in the press and in parliament, and details of the publicity surrounding these cases were recorded in the files. See also "Lest We Forget: An Irish Record of One Year July 1920-July 1921," Irish Unionist Alliance Pamphlet, nd (PRONI D989/C/1/52); "A Diurnal of Some Events Relating to Ireland…", *Notes from Ireland*, 1922-1924.

[40] One fundraising pamphlet produced by SILRA in the post-1923 period, for example, consisted solely of quotes from ex-servicemen with large families who could not find work or shelter in Ireland. "Irish Ex-Servicemen: Fate of Loyalists who Fought for the Empire," SILRA, nd (PRONI DA 989/C/1/68); See also for example *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 12 November 1926, 5 August, 25 November 1927; "The Royal Irish Constabulary," "The Demobilised Soldier," *Notes from Ireland* 29 no 10 (May 1922); "Plight of British Ex-Servicemen," *Notes from Ireland* 31 no 8 (November 1927).

Committee by male relatives. Within the sample group, however, 177 applications, or 19 percent of the sample files, were submitted by women, with compensation awarded in 101 of these cases. Female applicants to the Irish Grants Committee can be divided into two groups, based on the nature and extent of their claims; while some applicants were married or otherwise dependent on male relatives and submitted their applications in conjunction with other family members, others had greater personal and financial freedoms, submitting independent claims that reflected their significant losses.

Although the committee accepted applications from men claiming on behalf of their entire households, married women and women who were otherwise dependent on male relatives were encouraged to submit their own applications in cases where they had suffered considerable personal losses. According to the records of the Irish Grants Committee, 22 percent of female applicants in the sample group were related to other IGC claimants. In the majority of such cases, the female applicants had permitted the head of household or a representative family member to claim for the losses that had affected the wider family, while they themselves sought a lesser sum to compensate for the loss of personal belongings or for injuries to their mental and physical well-being. Mabel Beatrice McKenna, for instance, was an unmarried thirty-four year old woman claiming £30 for the loss of personal goods following an arson attack on her father's house in Fore, County. Westmeath in June 1922. Her application was not the only one the IGC received from the McKenna family - Mabel's father and two brothers likewise sought compensation for losses relating to the destruction of the house.[41] Mary Murphy is another example of a female loyalist who chose to submit a personal application to the IGC, while her wider family losses were claimed by a male relative. In this instance, Murphy's husband, a former member of the RIC, initially contacted the committee in

[41] CO 762/204/3698; See also Files No. 637, 3706, 3708.

the hopes of obtaining compensation for the losses associated with the family's hasty removal from County Tipperary to London at the height of the Civil War. Mary Murphy used her application, however, to detail the "severe nervous shock" she had suffered following an attack in April 1922 on the family home in Cashel, a condition that had ultimately led to the premature birth of her child. While her husband received a small sum from the Committee, Mary Murphy was awarded £150 in acknowledgement of her "bodily suffering".[42]

Applicants such as McKenna and Murphy, and other female loyalists applying in similar circumstances, were often seeking reparation for losses that had not been fully recognized by the Irish court systems or other compensation tribunals; claims regarding jewellery and cash, for example, had been disallowed under the terms of the Free State Act of 1923. [43] The Irish Grants Committee acknowledged the complications surrounding such cases in its report and questioned whether the loss of jewellery, cash, and clothing constituted a serious hardship. [44] However, its members appeared to have recognised in the course of their work that such items were highly valued by women who otherwise had limited rights to personal property. Similarly there had been few provisions for those suffering from the effects of stress and anxiety prior to the formation of the IGC. In the sample group of files created for this study, female loyalists were slightly over-represented amongst applicants whose claims related to mental stress.[45] While it was not uncommon for husbands and fathers to claim for the mental stress suffered by their wives and daughters, a substantial number of women chose to submit personal claims regarding their mental health in order to convey to the IGC the full extent of their suffering.

[42] CO 762/40/615; See also File No. 28.
[43] Unusually, Mabel McKenna had succeeded in obtaining compensation for her losses under the court system, and her IGC claim was rejected on the grounds that she had been adequately compensated for her losses. CO 762/204/3698.
[44] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 96-97, 121-122, NA, CO 762/212.
[45] Women made up 18% of successful applicants in sample group, but constituted 24% of successful applicants who claimed for mental stress.

In contrast with the cases outlined above, the majority of female loyalists in the sample group were independent claimants who had assumed control of their households either during or after the revolution. In terms of age, religion, and geographical distribution, there is little to distinguish female applicants from the wider applicant group. However, women submitting claims to the IGC were far more likely than their male counterparts to be unmarried or widowed when presenting their cases to the IGC; while 58 percent of successful male applicants in the sample group were married, a slightly higher percentage of successful female applicants were without spouses, either widowed (44 percent) or unmarried (17 percent). These women had little choice but to act as their own advocates when seeking compensation, as they did not have male relatives sufficiently familiar with the circumstances of their cases to apply on their behalf. Women living independently were also accustomed to managing their own financial affairs, and would have accepted the task of applying to the IGC accordingly.

The high proportion of unmarried and widowed women in the female applicant group, along with anecdotal evidence provided by female loyalists to the Irish Grants Committee, suggests that independent women lacking the protection of a spouse were vulnerable to harassment and intimidation during the revolution and in the early years of the Free State. In particular, the experiences of widows and unmarried women attempting to manage farms or businesses on their own appear to substantiate allegations that certain elements in Irish society were seeking to force loyalists out of rural districts. In 1922, for instance, Sarah Watson found herself the target of a widespread boycott. An unmarried woman of advanced years, Watson occupied a twenty-four acre farm in Queen's County that had provided her with a comfortable living prior to the revolution. Following the boycott, however, she was unable to make a profit from the farm; at some point in 1922 an attempt was also made on her life, as her house was set on fire while she slept inside. Unlike many others in similar circumstances, Watson refused

to give up her land, and she continued to experience low-level harassment for several years after 1923 as a result.[46]

It is difficult to compare the occupational profile of female applicants with that of their male counterparts in the sample group. Scholars such as Joanna Bourke have pointed out that women's contributions to household economies were often overlooked in early twentieth century Ireland, particularly in rural settings, where the distinction between household work and farm labour was not always apparent. Male applicants to the IGC generally identified themselves by their occupations, despite the fact that the IGC did not explicitly ask for that information; less than 1 percent of successful male applicants failed to indicate their occupations or source of income. Female applicants, by contrast, were less likely to provide details about their household roles or financial affairs, with 43 percent of successful female applicants making no mention of occupations or any personal contributions to their household economies. Many female applicants identified as wives and mothers, but rarely indicated the financial ramifications of these roles for the household.[47] Remarkably, male applicants were more willing to acknowledge financial losses sustained when female family members were unable to fulfill their household duties as a result of harassment or injuries. A considerable number of men, for example, complained that they had been forced to engage a housekeeper or hire extra farm labour to undertake work that had been undertaken by their wives or daughters prior to the revolution.[48]

Successful female applicants in the sample group who did provide the IGC with details about their occupations were most likely to be engaged in business or farming. Both occupations offered a degree of financial independence for women, particularly those who were

[46] CO 762/143/2413.
[47] See Files No. 178, 615, 806, 3022.
[48] See, for example, Files No. 2451, 3453, 3519.

unmarried or widowed.[49] Fourteen successful female applicants in the sample group were business owners, of whom half were unmarried or widowed at the time they submitted their applications. Twenty-four female applicants stated that they owed their livelihood to the land and that they were involved to some degree in the management of their farms or estates. The holdings managed by female applicants ranged from an estimated one to 4,078 acres, suggesting that loyalist women could be found at all levels of rural society. Similar to their male counterparts, these women found themselves facing considerable challenges during the revolution, and despite struggling to maintain control over their lands, many were forced to give up their holdings due to financial constraints and harassment. In one such instance, two unmarried sisters were forced to abandon their farm consisting of 216 acres located near Castlecomer, County Kilkenny. The farm had provided the women with a comfortable living in the years prior to the revolution, earning an estimated annual net profit of £400, but when it became publicly known in June 1921 that one of the sisters had provided information to the military, it was no longer safe for either woman to remain in the locality. After they had fled to England, their house was burned and the lands occupied by men they identified as "local republicans". One of the women died in 1924 and the remaining sister decided to remain in England. Given the deterioration of the land under republican control, she decided against selling the farm and instead gave the lands to a relative in 1926.[50]

Not all of the women representing households before the IGC were widowed or unmarried. Several female applicants explained that they had been targeted by hostile elements from the local community in the absence of their husbands or other male relatives who had been forced to flee the locality. Mary Murphy was far from the only policeman's wife to receive

[49] Of the thirteen successful female applicants who were merchants, for example, only four were married, while only four of the twenty-one successful female applicants who were farmers were married.
[50] CO 762/75/1215.

unwanted attention following her husband's decision to leave Ireland, for example. In one troubling case brought to the committee's attention, the wife and six young children of a former RIC sergeant were forced by a hostile crowd to parade through the streets of Frenchpark in County Roscommon in June 1922. During their ordeal shots were fired over their heads, their house was looted, and a pet goat belonging to the children was hanged from a tree. The family was then driven out of the village. The applicant eventually joined her husband in London, but in her application described herself as a "complete wreck both mentally and physically".[51]

In a considerable number of cases, women had been forced to assume control of their households when husbands or other male relatives had been incapacitated as the result of their experiences during the revolution. In addition to the female applicants who were managing land holdings in 1921, an additional sixteen successful female applicants in the sample group inherited holdings during or immediately after the revolution, as a result of the illness or death of male family members. These women soon found themselves targeted by the same hostile elements that had initially harassed and intimidated their husbands, sons, or brothers. Susan Colclough of County Tipperary and Elizabeth Anne Connell of County Cork, for example, faced intense pressure from the local community to abandon their holdings following the murders of their husbands at the hands of republicans.[52]

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The profile of the loyalist community that emerges from the IGC files is striking in its ordinariness. While some individuals in the sample group had undoubtedly enjoyed privileged socio-economic positions prior to 1919, the majority of applicants had simply been content with their lower and middle-class lives, focusing on the same banal concerns and cares that preoccupied others in similar situations. A sense of nostalgia for this pre-revolution existence

[51] CO 762/58/890.
[52] CO 762/151/2562, CO 762/111/1910; See also Files No. 448, 1878, 3067.

permeates the records of the IGC; applicants frequently bemoaned the loss of familiar routines and small comforts in their applications, with many stating their intentions to rebuild their previous way of life if awarded compensation.[53] In their correspondence with the committee, loyalist applicants revealed the full extent of their shock and despair over the destruction of their ordinary lives. The violent upheavals of the revolution proved to be so traumatic largely because its victims believed that they had done nothing to attract or deserve the violence and hostility directed towards their community. Throughout their lives loyalists had played by the rules – they had been law-abiding British subjects who worked hard to achieve a comfortable lifestyle for themselves and their families - but the rules had changed with the outbreak of violence in 1919, and loyalists were shaken to discover that their ordinary lives offered little protection in the new state.

The data gathered from the profile of IGC applicants in the sample group simply confirm that loyalists could be found in a wide variety of socio-economic positions in all regions of Ireland. The findings are otherwise inconclusive – no patterns emerge that might explain why these particular individuals were victimized, while claims that Irregular forces targeted vulnerable members of the loyalist community remain largely unsubstantiated. It is possible that the national scope of the sample group has obscured regional patterns; here one must turn to local studies, although aside from some observations regarding the geographic distribution of victimized minority populations, few such studies have fully considered possible connections between the socio-economic profile of the loyalist community and loyalist interactions the wider Irish population.

Personal details such as age and gender remain essential to understanding the loyalist experiences of the revolution, however. Certainly individual loyalists attempted to explain the

[53] Moulton has similarly noted that Irish loyalist migrants to England frequently adopted nostalgic tones when speaking of their formers lives in Ireland. L.M. Moulton, "Private Irelands," 371-391.

violence and harassment they experienced in the 1919-1923 period within the framework of their personal lives, and their reactions to the trauma of the revolution were largely dictated by their socio-economic background. Furthermore, factors such as age, gender, and occupation appear to have influenced the nature of individual allegiances and the manner in which claimants expressed their loyalty, as will be discussed in the following chapter. It is also possible that it was the ordinary nature of their lives that left loyalists vulnerable to intimidation and violence during the revolution. While not all loyalists lived in luxury, many maintained comfortable, respectable lifestyles. The small comforts attained by loyalists conceivably led to jealousy in some elements of the local community, while the stability and respectability of the loyalist community were perceived as a threat to the social and political transformations advocated by republicans in Ireland.

Outrages and Losses

After recording their personal details such as name, age, and address on the IGC application form, applicants were then asked to "state the nature of the loss in respect of which application is made, giving material dates," although they were subsequently advised that "detailed particulars need not be furnished at this stage." The committee had intended that applicants would record only a short summary of their losses on the form, which would then allow committee members to identify the cases that merited further investigation. Loyalists, however, were eager to convince the IGC of the merit of their claims, and frequently wrote rambling replies to the questions. As secretary of the committee, Major Jamieson found himself accepting a daunting workload, as it fell to him to collect and evaluate evidence for each individual case. It was not an easy task; despite the lengthy responses submitted by loyalists in their initial applications, not all claimants provided the committee with the information its

members needed to evaluate their case. Applicants tended to focus on their personal nature of their revolutionary experiences, describing their fear and suffering in considerable detail. By comparison, statements regarding events and material losses were vague and contradictory; a claimant might make allusions to boycotts or raids without specifying the dates on which these events occurred, for example, and many failed to account for the sum they were requesting as compensation for their suffering. While the IGC's Terms of Reference enabled it to compensate for losses sustained between 11 July 1921 and 12 May 1923 only, applicants who had suffered outrages during the earlier phase of the revolution found it difficult to distinguish between their pre-and post-treaty experiences. Many struggled to recall the details requested by the committee; as Mary Jane Ross from Cork admitted in her application, "we kept no proper account of what happened to us [in 1921-1923], as we had no idea we would be able to apply for compensation."[54]

The unexpected responses provided by applicants in regards to the question of losses created considerable difficulties for the IGC, whose members not only had to evaluate each application they received, but also to justify their decisions to bureaucrats from other departments. The committee struggled in its final report to convey both the extent of loyalist suffering as well as the material nature of loyalist losses; in an effort to impose order upon the vast quantity of information contained within its records, the IGC divided loyalist losses into two general categories - losses arising from personal injuries and losses sustained through injury to property – before undertaking a more in-depth analysis of specific types of outrages. The committee's final report also contained excerpts from application forms selected from "illustrative cases," which were designed to impress upon readers "the extraordinary variation

[54] CO 762/186/3265.

and degrees of hardship which the records of the Committee disclose, and which, but for its appointment, would have remained without redress, and indeed undisclosed."[55]

This study has adopted a similar approach to the issue of loyalist losses. Based on the information contained in the IGC files, the following section provides a brief overview of the ten different categories of outrages inflicted upon loyalist applicants in the sample group, supplemented with references to individual cases. Table 4.7 reveals the number of applicants in the sample group who recorded losses arising from each category of outrage. As many applicants had a tendency to write of their experiences in general terms without indicating an exact timeline of the outrages they had experienced or the frequency of the crimes inflicted upon them (stating for example, that they were "raided multiple times" or "boycotted for months"), it is impossible to accurately identify and categorise each incident experienced by individual applicants. It is therefore the losses claimed by applicants that have been considered in the table, rather than the applicants' actual experiences; an applicant claiming for losses arising from raids might have been raided on multiple occasions, for instance, but the file will have been added only once to the "raid" category. By contrast, a file involving losses sustained in both raids and a boycott would be added to both of those categories.

TABLE 4.7: NATURE OF OUTRAGES INFLICTED UPON APPLICANTS IN SAMPLE GROUP

	Successful Applications		All Applications		Success Rate
	Number of Files	Percentage of Files	Number of Files	Percentage of Files	
Land Seizure	54	9.59%	58	6.33%	93.10%
Mental Stress	123	21.85%	162	17.69%	75.93%
Raid	181	32.15%	239	26.09%	75.73%
Boycott	208	36.94%	275	30.02%	75.64%
Forced Migration	135	23.98%	198	21.62%	68.18%
Damage to Property	118	20.96%	176	19.21%	67.05%
Theft	25	4.44%	43	4.69%	58.14%
Other	27	4.80%	52	5.68%	51.92%
Injury to Person	37	6.57%	80	8.73%	46.25%
Loss of Employment	21	3.73%	65	7.10%	32.31%

[55] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 126-127, NA, CO 762/212.

Of the 583 successful applicants in the sample group, 409 reported losses sustained in one type of outrage only (i.e. boycott, theft, or raid). It would appear from a closer analysis of the claims, however, that the majority of these applicants experienced repeated or prolonged incidents that fall under the same category of outrage. Certainly boycotts, by their very nature, extended over a lengthy period of time and involved continued indignities being inflicted upon its victims. The same observation applies to land seizures and forced migration. As for raids, only thirty-five percent of those who reported raids sought compensation for an isolated incident. With its focus on the distinction between injury to persons and injury to property, the IGC report largely overlooked another division that naturally occurred within the collection of files. The experiences and losses of applicants who suffered as a result of isolated attacks differed significantly from those who were victims of sustained campaigns of intimidation that lasted throughout much of the 1921-1923 period and beyond. While material losses due to isolated thefts or raids did have repercussions for the financial well-being of an applicant and his or her family, the inconveniences caused by outrages of this nature often pale in comparison to the suffering and losses caused by boycotts, land seizures, and forced migration.

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Thefts and Raids

Forty-two applicants within the sample group claimed for losses arising from incidents in which their property was stolen by unknown individuals, with twenty-four receiving compensation from the IGC. Committee members were rather skeptical of claims involving theft, and there was some debate as to whether cases of this nature were eligible for compensation under the IGC's Terms of Reference. As pointed out in internal memos, the victims of theft might have been targeted as a result of their constitutional allegiance, but their losses could also be attributed to the general unlawful conditions that existed in Ireland at the

time. Committee members had little sympathy for one applicant, for instance, who had left his bicycle unattended on a public road while walking out in his fields, only to find that it had been stolen in his absence.[56] The question of hardship was also raised in many cases involving theft, as the losses sustained through such crimes tended to be relatively minor. In a memo written in September 1928, Jamieson reminded the IGC Chairman that the committee had decided not to compensate for claims under £20 save in exceptional circumstances, as such claims did not involve sufficient hardship to qualify for funds under the committee's Terms of Reference.[57]

Thieves frequently targeted goods that would be of use to men on the run. Clothing and boots were taken from houses and yards, while loyalists with gun permits were particularly attractive targets for thieves. [58] A significant number of applicants contacted the IGC regarding the theft of bicycles and motor cars; while the loss of a bicycle was not considered a significant loss by the committee in London, many small farmers pointed out that they had no other means of transportation. Many could ill-afford to replace stolen goods, especially if they had experienced other losses during the revolution.[59] Not surprisingly in rural areas, the theft of livestock was also a constant concern for loyalists.[60] Edward Brennan in Queen's County described how his cow was stolen in August 1921, followed by two pigs in early January 1922. "My wife heard the animals screaming, but the next morning they were gone," he wrote in his application to the IGC. In addition to his missing animals, Brennan lost two sows who were poisoned in early 1922, and he estimated that the damages to his livestock had cost him £95.[61]

From the experiences of successful applicants from the sample group, it would appear that thefts rarely occurred in isolation to other crimes. Of the twenty-five successful claimants

[56] CO 763/56/860.
[57] CO 762/183/3204. See also CO 762/72/1175 for a claim of theft amounting to £9, rejected by IGC because of lack of hardship.
[58] See, for example, Files No. 162, 1288.
[59] See, for example, Files No. 775, 828, 1180, 2559.
[60] See, for example, Files No. 338, 838, 909, 1101.
[61] CO 762/92/1527.

who were victims of larceny, fifteen also claimed for losses sustained through other categories of outrages. Marian Olivia Wade was living in County Galway at the time of Civil War, and her house was robbed in July 1922 while she was away in Dublin. In addition to claiming £55 for the goods stolen in her absence, she also sought compensation for the mental stress caused by a later raid that took place in September 1923 and her subsequent relocation to England. Her entire claim before the IGC amounted to £900.[62] Edward Thompson, an agricultural labourer also from County Galway, was boycotted throughout 1921 and 1922. He was not only refused grazing for his cattle, but his animals were eventually driven off his lands and he was briefly kidnapped by armed men in the summer of 1922. In June 1922, Thompson's carpentry tools and bicycle were stolen out of his outbuilding. He estimated the goods to be valued at £16; while his total claim amounted to £403, he appeared particularly troubled by the loss of his bicycle.[63] It is significant that two of the seven applicants seeking compensation for losses sustained in a single incident of theft also alluded to wider campaigns of boycott and intimidation in their applications, although they made no claim for losses resulting from these outrages.[64]

Thefts were closely associated with raids, defined for the purposes of this study as any forceful interaction with armed individuals who demanded goods or services from unwilling loyalists. Loyalist interactions with armed Irregulars varied, although all were unpleasant. Irregulars frequently demanded that loyalists pay subscriptions to fund the republican cause or fines for supposed infractions of republican laws. Loyalists who refused to pay such fines were warned that their livestock or other household goods would be seized in order to fulfill their "debts".[65] Edward Brennan attributed the loss of his livestock throughout 1921 and 1922 to his refusal to subscribe to the republican movement; his pigs were stolen only a few days after an

[62] CO 762/189/3344.
[63] CO 762/151/2559.
[64] CO 762/50/775; CO 762/78/1278.
[65] See, for example, Files No. 121, 192, 685, 3071, 3073.

encounter with Irregular representatives in January 1922, for example.[66] A significant number of applicants within the sample group complained of the costs associated with billeting armed Irregulars, who demanded food and a place to sleep, and who often stole household goods as they left.[67] George Tyrer, a farmer in County Cork, found himself billeting groups of six to ten IRA men at various stretches between 1920 and 1922. As he explained to the committee, "I had to give them any provisions I had in the house. I was afraid to keep an account of what this cost, but I believe it amounted to between £200 and £300. After the harvest in September 1921, two volunteers (hooligans) were billeted upon me. I was ordered by the IRA leader to pay them £1 a week and keep them."[68]

In several other cases, victims were surprised by armed raiders who suddenly appeared to demand money and goods, before disappearing once more.[69] Merchants in particular complained of IRA raids on their businesses; William Robert Musgrave, for example, owned a drapery and hardware business in Leitrim and was raided multiple times from November 1921 onwards. On one occasion the raiders, described as "armed men," seized the shop's cash box along with goods valued at £100.[70] Raids on loyalist families and businesses seem to have been a frequent occurrence throughout the revolutionary period; a number of applicants reported raids that occurred prior to 11 July 1921, in addition to post-Truce attacks by Irregulars.[71] These

[66] CO 762/92/1527.
[67] See, for example, Files No. 508, 1735, 1941, 2560. Loyalist applicants in the sample group who were forced to billet Irregulars frequently complained of the costs incurred in disinfecting bedding and rooms afterwards. Several make reference to "the itch," an apparently highly contagious skin disease that could only be prevented by burning the bedclothes and mattresses where irregulars had slept. One hotelier in Letterkenny, County Donegal, described how "something approaching an epidemic of scurrilous itch" had broken out in the area after the arrival of Irregulars in the town. CO 762/102/1735; see also Files No. 1159, 1359, 2560, 2956.
[68] CO 762/80/1312.
[69] See, for example, Files No. 181, 421, 745, 747.
[70] CO 762/33/495. See also Files No. 1163, 1529, 2588, 3117.
[71] See, for example, Files No. 715, 1136, 2810.

armed raids, or "direct raids," were described by the IGC in its final report as "the favourite weapon in the republican armoury".[72]

Within the sample group of IGC applicants, 238 out of 916 individuals claimed for losses arising from raids, with 180 receiving compensation from the committee. Sixty-three of the successful claims involved losses sustained from raids only, of which twenty-two were from applicants seeking compensation for a single isolated incident. Successful applicants within the sample group were thus far more likely to have suffered through repeated or sustained attacks from republicans than to have experienced a single raid. This is consistent with the findings of local histories of the revolutionary period; Joost Augusteijn, for example, has argued that the IRA and later the Irregulars were more likely to place the burden of their presence on loyalists and other "outsiders," rather than risk alienating their supporters through excessive demands for money, shelter, and supplies. Isolated loyalists in regions with significant republican activity found themselves unwillingly providing long-term support for Irregular forces, and the resulting financial losses increased as time went on.[73]

Overall, there is little to distinguish individuals who reported losses arising from thefts and raids from other successful applicants in the sample group. In terms of age and gender, victims of thefts and raids fit the general demographic profile of the sample group-these claimants were overwhelmingly male, with an average age of fifty. The geographic distribution of successful applicants who reported thefts and raids is also generally consistent with that of the sample group, with a few minor deviations between provinces. The only significant statistical difference emerges when the occupations of successful applicants within the sample group and the occupations of successful applicants seeking compensation for thefts and raids are compared. Whereas farmers constituted 35 percent of successful applicants in the sample

[72] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 137-138, NA, CO 762/212.
[73] Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerilla Warfare* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 251.

group, they represented 54 percent of successful applicants who sought compensation for raids. This slight overrepresentation of farmers amongst victims of raids is easily accounted for, however, when one considers that Irregulars were generally more active in rural regions during the later stages of the Civil War, and that farms represented ideal targets for men seeking supplies and billets.

Boycott

Boycott was the most frequently cited category of outrage by applicants in the sample group, and the IGC spent considerable time and energy in evaluating claims involving prolonged periods of hostility and intimidation. The IGC had in fact been created partly in response to the lack of support for loyalists who had been victims of such crimes, as previous measures designed to compensate victims of revolutionary violence, such as the Compensation (Ireland) Commission and the Damage to Property (Compensation) Act 1923, had failed to acknowledge boycotts and related consequential losses. Boycotting was an immensely problematic issue for the government officials tasked with regulating compensation, as even the targets of this type of outrage struggled to state the full extent of their suffering and to provide evidence that they had been victims of an organized campaign designed to inflict fear and misery. The IGC noted in its final report that it had been largely ignorant of the damages perpetrated upon loyalists through the use of boycott, which accounted in part for its inability to work within the confines of its initial budget:

> The whole situation was novel and anomalous. Types of malicious injury, hitherto unrecognised, were being admitted to consideration…The sufferers from boycott and expulsion, for the most part, had not been vocal, for the law gave them no remedy, except a right of action against the individual wrong-doers, the exercise of which would in most cases have proved abortive. Indulgence in unavailing complaints might merely have drawn upon them the attention of their enemies, and intensified their wrongs.

> Investigation alone could disclose the depth of the misery that had been caused, and the mischief that had been done.[74]

Two hundred and seventy-five applicants in the sample group claimed to have been victimized through boycott, with 208 receiving compensation for their losses. Given the prevalence of boycotting claims amongst successful files in the sample group, it is not surprising that the demographic profile of victims of boycott is closely aligned with that of the wider sample of applicants. In terms of geography, Connacht is slightly under-represented and Leinster over-represented in applications for losses sustained through boycott (16 percent of all successful files are from Connacht outrages, while only 9 percent of reported boycotts occurred there; Leinster meanwhile was the location of 38 percent of boycotts, but only 30 percent of all successful files were submitted by applicants originally from the province). As the IGC observed, the majority of boycotts were directed against merchants and farmers; these two categories (along with merchant-farmers) account for 78 percent of all successful files claiming for losses sustained through boycotts.[75]

"'Boycott' is a terrible and potent weapon, which only those who have had to suffer it, can possibly realise," wrote one loyalist in a letter originally addressed to the Irish Claims Compensation Association.[76] Other supporters of the southern loyalist population expressed similar sentiments, struggling to convey to the London based committee the devastation resulting from sustained campaigns of harassment and intimidation. Major White of SILRA sent a letter to the IGC secretary in February 1929, vehemently denying suggestions that an applicant seeking compensation for losses related to boycott was exaggerating his claim. "The situation which all these small farmers had to face during the Rebellion was one which was general

[74] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 19-20, NA, CO 762/212.
[75] Ibid, 115-116.
[76] CO 762/03/04.

throughout the country," White stated, "…That deadly weapon, the boycott, was used to the utmost on them and one has had to have lived in those parts, as I have done, to realise what a boycott really means…I write from personal experience and I know what such men had to go through, and how utterly helpless they were."[77]

Merchants and professionals, reliant as they were on the public frequenting their businesses, were easy targets in campaigns designed to cause both financial hardships and social exclusion. Irregulars or other individuals who wished to inflict a boycott upon loyalists involved in business or professions focused their attentions on members of the wider community, who were warned to take their custom elsewhere. Margaret Colohan of Listowel, County Kerry, was a widow running a small shop and a licensed house. She attached a statement from one John Ahern dated November 1928, confirming that "customers were warned against and intimidated from going to her shop or doing business with her." Ahern himself had been advised by two young men not to frequent her shop: "They said if I did I should take the consequences. Their conduct and language was not to be mistaken and I considered that I would be risking my life by going into Mrs. Colohan's shop. Accordingly I refrained from doing so until I thought I could do so without risk to my life."[78]

Other loyalists who depended on public custom reported similar situations. An undertaker from Tipperary wrote a letter to the IGC in support of an acquaintance's claim, explaining that he had been threatened with boycott himself after being prevented from purchasing goods from the applicant.[79] The losses sustained by merchants, commercial traders, and professionals under boycott were immense, and a number of applicants had been forced to abandon their businesses due to financial pressures and hostility from the local community. One

[77] CO 762/193/3455.
[78] CO 762/64/1006.
[79] CO 762/168/2882.

large business owner from Wexford who had been boycotted from 1920 onwards eventually sold his business in 1923 and emigrated to London; he described his life in Ireland to the committee as a "wreck" from which he was able to salvage very little.[80] A garage owner from Cahir, County Tipperary, wrote to the IGC in November 1929, explaining that "I have been quietly squeezed out of my business until I had to sell out at a great loss as it was impossible to got a living. I am now residing in Northern Ireland looking for work as I have lost all."[81]

If boycotts were a costly affair for shopkeepers and business owners, they could have disastrous consequences for loyalists engaged in agriculture. While the IGC report acknowledged only that sales of land were frequently boycotted, boycotted farmers faced numerous other challenges. The chief complaint from farmers seeking compensation for boycotts was the difficulty they had experienced in hiring and retaining labourers. Without assistance, farmers struggled to perform their regular workload; occasionally neighbours, friends, and other loyalists could be prevailed upon to help, but they in turn were threatened with boycott and were also engaged in work on their own farms. Maurice White from Queen's County explained to the IGC the predicament faced by boycotted farmers in his application:

> During the years 1921, 22, 23, I was, in common with others, boycotted and could get no help for ploughing, sowing or reaping. Other years the neighbours would help us, and we would help them, but during this time no one would speak to us or work with us. My tillage suffered, and as I had only one horse and a small pony it was impossible for me to work my farm. In 1921 I had 7 acres of tillage; in 1922 my tillage was reduced to 4 acres; and in 1923 I could only till 3 acres. I therefore lost 3 acres of tillage in 1922 and 4 acres in 1923.[82]

Boycotted applicants from rural regions described in heartbreaking detail their efforts to harvest their corn and wheat, even as it grew overripe and fell from the stalks, and of selling livestock on

[80] CO 762/93/1559.
[81] CO 762/54/814.
[82] CO 762/71/1154.

the verge of starvation due to lack of fodder.[83] Even if they were successful in planting and harvesting crops, or caring for their livestock, boycotted farmers had little hope of selling their produce at markets or even privately to neighbours.[84] Farmers who normally rented out land for grazing on the 11-month system, or who took grazing themselves, were unable to carry out their usual farming practices, leading to significant financial difficulties. [85] Defeated farmers who could no longer afford to maintain their land were forced to endure further injustices, as auctions to sell their land and other property were boycotted and they were forced to dispose of their livestock, land, and homes at a loss.[86]

The risks of associating with a boycotted individual could not be easily dismissed, and even loyalists were known to shun boycotted friends and neighbours in order to avoid attracting unwanted attention. A solicitor wrote to the IGC to describe the situation faced by one of his clients from County Limerick during the Civil War, explaining that "no one dare to associate with the family - one man who visited [the family] was taken away by Republicans to an unknown place and detained six months."[87] So great was the fear generated by threats of boycott that applicants to the IGC frequently complained that they continued to suffer from the repercussions of the republican campaigns for years after the end of the Civil War. One garage owner explained in that his customers had continued to avoid his business, even after the Irregulars who had called for the boycott against him had been arrested; another applicant wrote in 1929 that she had not been able to rent out her land again that year as a result of the boycott against her.[88] William H. Argue, a former crown solicitor, explained in a letter to the IGC that while "it might be supposed that animosity towards loyalists in the Free State has to a great

[83] See, for example, Files No. 735, 1627, 1850, 1968.
[84] See, for example, Files No. 1627, 1969, 2067.
[85] CO 762/190/3351.
[86] See, for example, Files No. 2067, 2981.
[87] CO 762/53/903.
[88] CO 762/89/1456; CO 762/190/3351.

extent disappeared by now" this was not the case for loyalists who had actively displayed their allegiance to the United Kingdom during the recent conflict. "On the contrary, they [active loyalists] still suffer from the ill-will of the large section of the community who are still in sympathy with the original object of the IRA, who leave nothing undone to injure the business and professional interests of such loyalists."[89]

Destruction of Property/Land Seizures:

The Irish Civil War is often associated with widespread destruction of houses and country homes, particularly those belonging to the landed gentry. Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall, famously described the actions of the Irregulars in this period as creating "a bonfire for a generation that was having its full fling and escape from the dullness of Irish rural life… ."[90] One hundred and seventy-six applicants in the sample group applied for compensation for losses arising from damage to property, with compensation being awarded in 118 of these cases.

Of the successful applicants claiming for property damage, forty-nine had lost their homes as a result of arson attacks. On 5 March 1922, George Cartwright and his family in Cavan were raided by a group of armed and masked men who threatened to burn the house but decided instead to give the family two weeks to move out. For reasons that Cartwright never fully explained, the family decided to remain in Ireland and took no steps to protect their home. The raiders returned on 12 March and while the family was asleep, they "set fire to the house which was reduced to ashes also all furniture, valuables and personal belongings."[91] In the application of Sarah Elizabeth Twiss, it was stated that she had "lost everything" when Birdhill

[89] CO 762/167/2851.
[90] Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall, *Seventy Years Young: Memories of Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall* (1937; repr., Dublin: Lilliput Press, 2005), 412. For more on the destruction of country estates, see Terence Dooley, *Decline of the Big House in Ireland* (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 2001), 171-208.
[91] CO 762/98/1649.

House, in County Tipperary was burned in August 1922 by armed raiders. Her claim, amounting to £17,845, included the loss of an extensive library of books gathered by her late husband.[92] The claim submitted by Thomas Satchwell of County. Roscommon reveals the details of a particularly tragic case. Satchwell's son, a member of the RIC, had been killed during the War of Independence as a result of an IRA ambush, and on 10 July 1921, the family home was burned to the ground. Satchwell's wife's health had suffered greatly from the loss of her son, and the stress of the arson attack further undermined her strength; she died ten days after the attack of "shock". Shortly after the attack, Satchwell applied for compensation under the Criminal Injuries (Ireland) Act, estimating the loss of his house and his contents to have cost him £2,600. He was awarded £1,700 by the County Courts, but this was still unpaid as of 1923, when he was then informed that the Compensation Commission had decided to limit the award to just £960.[93]

As the application submitted by Satchwell indicates, applicants who had suffered extensive property damage had already applied for reparations through other channels. The IGC thus found itself in a difficult position when evaluating such claims; as per the Dunedin Report, the IGC was not to act as a Court of Appeal for individuals unsatisfied with the compensation received from the Irish courts, yet it was evident to all involved in these claims that applicants who had suffered the loss of their houses had not been adequately compensated. [94] Applicants complained that they had been forced to find alternative accommodations, and that the destruction of the house had reduced the value of the property in question.[95] Many also rebelled against the reinstatement clauses imposed by the Irish courts, which required individuals to rebuild in the same location if they wish to receive the full amount of their

[92] CO 762/11/95.
[93] CO 762/185/3248.
[94] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 98-113, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.
[95] See, for example Files No. 490, 1215, 1649.

settlement. Loyalists who had been burned out during the revolution were understandably reluctant to resettlement amongst hostile neighbours.[96]

The destruction of property, however, encompassed more than the burning of homes; applicants to the IGC also complained of damages to cars, destruction of business premises, and occupied houses that were left uninhabitable once abandoned by the Irregulars. George Denforth of County. Cork, an ex-serviceman and boot repairer, was subjected to a boycott from July 1921 onwards. Prior to the boycott, however, his house was stoned in April 1921, leading to broken windows and considerable damage to the rest of the structure.[97] Cecil Stoney's house in County Donegal was occupied by Irregulars between 13 May and 10 July 1922. When Stoney regained possession of the house, he found "the house with its furnishings and appointments was in such an indescribable state of filth and dirt and so much damage had been inflicted that before Mr. Stoney could return with his family, workmen had to be brought in to repair some of this damage caused and clean up the place." He estimated his losses arising from damaged and missing property to be approximately £3,240, an amount that does not include consequential loss, including the cost of repairs and rent for alternative accommodations.[98]

Given that so many applicants were engaged in farming, it is not surprising that destruction of property often involved agricultural supplies and tools. Mary Feeney of County. Sligo claimed for the destruction of hay and a ladder, which were set on fire in September 1921. While such a loss might appear insignificant in comparison to the destruction of entire homes, small farmers could ill-afford to replace damaged goods and lost feed; Feeney, for example was forced to sell off two cows and four calves following the attack, as she could no longer provide

[96] Reinstatement clauses were immensely unpopular with loyalists seeking compensation, but the Free State government did not wish to provide large sums of compensation to individuals who were intending to settle outside of the new state. See Dooley, *Decline of the Big House,* 202-203.
[97] CO 762/28/394.
[98] CO 762/86/1416; see also CO 762/107/1833.

for them. These cattle had been supplying her with milk and butter, which she had sold to the local creamery; Feeney estimated that her losses from the original attack amounted to at least £172.0.0, although she applied to the IGC for £98 only, to cover the cost of the hay.[99] Several applicants complained of damage done to their livestock, often in retaliation for refusing to pay IRA fines. Robert Hurst of Leitrim was a self-described "small farmer", who found himself subjected to a boycott after refusing to contribute to Irregular funds. In addition to the destruction of his potato crop in 1923, his cows were repeatedly attacked; two milch cows had their udders cut off and had to be sold at a loss, while a heifer was poisoned.[100]

Damage to property rarely occurred in isolation to other losses, with only twenty-three of the 118 successful applicants claiming for damages arising from a single incident. Most applicants had sustained property damage in the course of sustained campaigns of intimidation, some of which eventually escalated to land seizures and forced migrations. Twenty-six successful applicants who had sustained property damage also claimed for land seizures or forcible migrations, not including those who had been forced to find temporary accommodations following the destruction of their homes. Beginning in January 1922, for example, John Bennett from County Offaly had faced a series of attacks on his property, including the loss of several cattle and the destruction of the walls that surrounded his property. Between September 1922 and September 1924, he was unable to gain access 170 acres of his land that had been seized as public grazing lands.[101]

Compensation for land seizures had been offered prior to the formation of the IGC, but the IGC nevertheless found itself considering a small number of claims from applicants seeking reparation for the consequential losses they had incurred after being forcibly dispossessed from

[99] CO 762/20/250.
[100] CO 762/133/2360; see also Files No. 2488, 2541.
[101] CO 762/10/84; See also Files No. 21, 1649, 226, 490.

their lands; fifty-eight successful applicants in the sample group applied for losses arising from land seizures, with fifty-six receiving compensation from the committee.[102] Thomas Nappier from Queen's County, for example, had his farm of thirty Irish acres confiscated by armed men in April 1922, who claimed his farm in the name of a former tenant who had held the lands forty years earlier. He was forced to accept £200 for the land, which he valued at £800, leading the local Presbyterian Minister to inform the IGC that "a more flagrant piece of robbery could not be imagined." The same minister also explained why the applicant had accepted the £200, adding "nothing, absolutely nothing, could be done as there was simply no law and no protection of any kind. The only redeeming [unclear] in this whole bad case is that Mr. Napier did not loose[sic] his life".[103]

Crimes of this nature were particularly feared by Irish loyalists, not only due to the difficulties of recovering from the loss of one's home and livelihood, but also because of the apparent motives behind such attacks. In the eyes of the loyalist community, house burnings and land seizures sent a clear message that minorities were not safe in Ireland and that there existed a wider "conspiracy" to drive them out of the country.[104] An anonymous contributor to *Notes from Ireland* in May 1923 described the burning of houses in Munster, suggesting that the region was now "a land of the dead," before summing up loyalists' fears by adding: "Destruction has proceeded apace. Nothing that we have can we call our own."[105] It is not surprising, then, that references to house burnings and land seizures continued to dominate loyalist narratives in the Free State and that the IGC came under intense pressure to adequately compensate those who had lost their homes or lands.

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[102] For more on land seizures during the revolution, see Leigh-Ann Coffey, *The Planters of Luggacurran, County Laois: A Protestant Community* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2006).
[103] CO 762/17/202; See also Files No. 444, 1300, 2342.
[104] See, for example, Files No. 1196, 1426, 1894, 1895.
[105] "From our Provincial Correspondents," *Notes from Ireland* 29, no 13 (May 1923).

Personal Injury/Mental Stress:

Relatively few loyalists seeking compensation from the IGC claimed for personal injuries inflicted during the Civil War. Within the sample group, for example, eighty applicants claimed to have suffered direct personal injuries, with the IGC awarding compensation in only thirty-seven of these cases. The committee rejected a number of personal injury claims on the grounds that the applicants had already received adequate compensation from previous compensation commissions. Margaret Gunn, for example, sought compensation for the death of her son John, who had been a Sergeant in the RIC and who had been murdered shortly after the disbanding of the force. John had supported both his mother and his sister, and Margaret's IGC claim rested on the argument that the £700 settlement received from the Free State government had not sufficiently compensated the family for its loss. The IGC disagreed, however, with Jamieson arguing in an undated memo that the case had been settled by the Free State government and that the committee should be wary of re-opening previously settled claims.[106] Other applicants were rejected by the IGC because their personal injuries had been unrelated to their allegiance to the United Kingdom. George Hare, for example, had cycled into a bridge earlier damaged by the IRA, rendering himself unconscious and unable to work for three months, while Raymond O'Keefe had been injured by a bomb blast in Dublin in May 1921; in both cases, the IGC pointed out that the applicants had simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time, and their injuries could not be attributed to their loyalty to Britain.[107] Most claims for personal injury in the

[106] CO 762/23/313.
[107] CO 762/17/198; CO 762/178/3124; See also Files No. 253, 3763.

sample group, however, fell outside the committee's Terms of Reference, as applicants were seeking compensation for injuries sustained prior to the Truce.[108]

As noted in the official IGC report, genuine claims for personal injury "exhibited comparatively little variety. They consisted, for the most part, of murder and assault."[109] Claims for murder were generally submitted under the name of a dependent relative seeking compensation for loss of income and support. Josephine Dillon of Cork, for example, had witnessed the murder of her husband in January 1923, but had been refused compensation from the Free State, leaving her dependent upon her elderly father.[110] Patrick Walsh of County Cork, meanwhile, applied for compensation for the death of his brother in June 1921; as he explained in his application, his brother had "supported applicant and two brothers, who are not yet in employment, also an Aunt who was living in the House." Walsh asked the IGC for £250 to help cover the family's expenses, which the committee granted.[111] Several applicants were applying on their own behalf, following attempts on their lives that had left them permanently maimed. John McGeehin of County Mayo, for example, had been attacked in bed early one morning in April 1923; he was lucky to have survived, as a bullet hit him in the face, damaging an eye and coming to rest at the back of his tongue, and medical care was delayed as the neighbours were too frightened to help transport him to the hospital.[112] Assaults, meanwhile, varied in severity, although most followed a similar pattern; an applicant would be taken out of his house in the middle of the night, beaten (often before family members), and then taken away, to be released a few hours later or left tied to a tree or post in a public area.[113]

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[108] See, for example, Files No. 997,1281, 1885, 1910. A significant number of falsified claims from Ennistymon were based on allegations of personal injuries; see, for example, Files No. 653, 2006, 2671.
[109] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 94-95, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.
[110] CO 762/23/311.
[111] CO 762/155/2623.
[112] CO 762/30/433. See also Files No. 676, 1196.
[113] See, for example, CO 762/167/2844. For other cases involving assault, see Files No. 44, 75, 223, 737, 2963.

Women were slightly overrepresented amongst successful applicants in the sample group who recorded instances of assault or other outrages, as female applicants constituted 17 percent of the successful sample group but were responsible for 30 percent of successful personal injury claims. Like Josephine Dillon, female applicants were often seeking compensation for the death of a family member who had supported them financially. Isabella Latimer's husband had been suspected of giving information to the Royal Irish Constabulary and had been shot by the IRA in March 1921, leaving her a widow with six young children. She approached the IGC for compensation not only for her husband's death, but also for the subsequent confiscation of the family's lands.[114] Alice Davis had also been left a widow with five young children in County Tipperary following the murder of her husband in March 1922, and she too wished to be compensated for the consequential losses arising from the crime.[115] If the files in the sample group are any indication, assaults against women were relatively rare, but did occur on occasion; Emily Harris, for instance, complained that she was frequently tripped while walking in Dublin, and pushed into a gutter in November 1922.[116] Other cases involving more serious injuries attracted widespread public attention, appearing to confirm beliefs that republicans were targeting vulnerable members of the loyalist community. In October 1922, Henrietta Cary-Barnard was in a car driving through County Kildare, when a wire stretched out across the road by Irregulars caught her by the neck, leaving her critically injured.[117] Sarah Byrnes of County Wicklow refused to provide Irregulars with a key to the bank in which she worked, and was beaten in August 1922 as a result. She later developed breast cancer, which she blamed on the injuries sustained during the revolution.[118] Only one case of gang rape was

[114] CO 762/04/14.
[115] CO 762/53/806.
[116] CO 762/08/51.
[117] CO 762/15/165.
[118] CO 762/184/3224.

reported to the IGC, by Eileen Biggs of County Tipperary, who was seeking compensation for the medical expenses associated with the "outrage" she had experienced in June 1922. Biggs' experiences and subsequent suffering while awaiting her compensation was widely reported in both the English and Irish press, as well as in the British parliament.[119]

Murder, rapes, and assaults might have been relatively rare in Ireland during the Civil War period, but the IGC files document the impact that the fears of such crimes had upon the loyalist community. One hundred and sixty-two applicants applied for compensation for losses related to "shock" and "mental suffering," with 123 receiving funds from the IGC; many more described symptoms related to stress but did not seek financial compensation for their suffering. Mental suffering manifested itself amongst applicants in a variety of ways; while some loyalists described their "breakdown in health," others suffered from what was frequently termed "neurasthenia," leading to erratic behaviour, depression and in some instances, time in mental institutions. Julia Greer described how her husband fought off raiders in June 1921 after an attack on their home in Aghancon, Roscrea, Co. Tipperary, leading to a boycott being enacted against the family. Her husband suffered badly from shock, made worse by the fact that the family eventually was forced to leave their home, and as Greer informed the IGC, "his mind was never the same since, and became unhinged altogether for some months before he died on 29 September [1927]."[120] Following the shock of seeing her husband attacked by raiders in County Wexford in May 1922, Mrs. Tarsony began to suffer from mental strain and was eventually committed to an asylum in 1927, where she died shortly after.[121] Several applicants described how their expectant wives suffered complications after having endured raids, threats, and

[119] CO 762/04/19.
[120] CO 762/31/448.
[121] CO 762/164/2786.

forced migrations; the wives of Michael Gibbons and Maurice Dowling, from Counties Mayo and Kerry respectively, were not alone in losing their babies during the 1921-1923 period.[122]

The IGC was remarkably sympathetic towards those suffering from the effects of shock. The committee's policies were clearly articulated in its final report; inspired by the Sumner Commission, the IGC suggested that it would be "unjust" not to consider the suffering of those who had witnessed horrific events or had been under prolonged strain, although it did distinguish between the shock resulting from targeted attacks and the "mental worry" and "anxiety" caused by the general conditions of the country.[123] The committee could hardly overlook the large numbers of applicants describing similar medical conditions, which had often been documented and verified by medical practitioners. Additionally, the IGC received other indications that loyalists had been, and remained, under immense pressure and strain. In addition to those who feared that their neighbours would discover they had been communicating with the IGC, loyalist applicants also demonstrated a tendency to place their revolutionary experiences in the context of attacks on their relatives, friends, and neighbours. The murder of William Latimer in March 1921, for example, had shocked his neighbours, increasing anxiety about who might be attacked next.[124] Scholars, especially those working in recent years, have often overlooked or attempted to play down the significant of trauma and terror in the loyalist experience of the revolution. The IGC files, however, demonstrate how fears and concerns significantly influenced the behaviour of loyalists during the conflict, and the records of the committee also reveal the long-term cost of the anxiety and mental stress suffered by loyalists in the 1919-1923 period.

[122] CO 762/27/382; CO 762/176/3068. See also, for example, Files No. 2049, 2507, 2541, 2882.
[123] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," pp 95-97, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.
[124] See, for example, CO 762/98/1663.

Forced Migration

The Irish Grants Committee files contain valuable information regarding the movements of loyalists who were forced to leave their homes during the revolution or its aftermath. Within the sample group, for example, 293 applicants informed the IGC that they had migrated to another destination in the south of Ireland or further abroad, with 198 of these applicants receiving compensation from the IGC. Although some had travelled as far as New Zealand[125] and Canada,[126] the vast majority had stayed closer to home, with 150 settling at some point in the British Isles, most in London or along the western coastline of England.[127] Forty-five of the successful applicants who left their original homes returned to the Free State when they deemed it safe to do so. Francis Radbourne, for example, had been a caretaker at Dungannon Fort in County Wexford when it was occupied by the military. During the revolution, she had received numerous threats, and was eventually forced in the spring of 1922 to flee with her daughter to her father's house in County Tipperary. Radbourne and her daughter then proceeded to England where they lived for two years, until her health broke down. By that time, however, "things [had] settled down in Ireland" and they felt it was safe to return to the Free State.[128] A number of applicants had left Ireland with every intention of returning, leaving behind their homes and businesses in the care of other family members.[129]

Not all applicants who left southern Ireland during the revolution or the Free State after 1921 applied for compensation to cover the expenses associated with their journeys, however. The IGC was adamant in its report that only applicants who had experienced threats or violence were eligible for compensation for losses arising from their "expulsion".[130] One hundred and

[125] CO 762/63/1101.
[126] CO 762/37/562; CO 762/200/3626.
[127] See, for example, Files No. 101, 226, 1559, 1674.
[128] CO 762/24/327.
[129] See, for example, Files No. 555, 1043, 1279.
[130] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," p 114, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212

ninety-eight applicants applied for compensation on the grounds that they had been forced from their homes, with compensation being awarded in 135 of these claims. Peter Folan, who had been disbanded from the RIC in September 1922, tried to return to his property near Spiddal in County Galway. He was met by an armed party, who gave him twenty-four hours to leave the area, forcing him to return to Dublin and leave all his personal belongings behind. Unable to return to the house in Galway, Folan remained in Dublin at the time of his application.[131] Edwin Bradley, a labourer working in County Sligo, was similarly informed by armed men that he had to leave the area after ignoring a boycott against his employer. Leaving all of his personal belongings behind, Bradley fled across the border to County Tyrone in July 1922, eventually settling in County Fermanagh.[132] As noted by the IGC, forced migration resulted in numerous expenses relating to the loss of income, the cost of removal, and "the expense of alternative accommodations."[133] Bradley's claim was a rather modest £35, as he was seeking compensation only for the loss of his personal possessions and the cost of transportation to Tyrone. Others, however, amassed considerable expenses; Col Middleton W. Biddulph, for example, estimated that it had cost him £500 simply to move himself, his family, and some of his furniture to England from King's County in June 1921.[134]

Emigration affected even those applicants who remained in the Free State. Sixty-eight successful applicants within the sample group had immediate family members who left home at some point during the revolution or in the early years of the Free State. In all but a handful of these cases, the applicants were parents who had watched their child or children leave for a new life abroad. Robert Ginn, a garage owner in County Cork, described how both of his sons

[131] CO 762/179/3142.
[132] CO 762/184/3232.
[133] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," p 114, 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212

[134] CO 762/46/715.

were ordered out of the country by the IRA. When they refused, one was kidnapped and threatened, before being forced onto a boat to England. His brother followed shortly thereafter, and both became police officers in England.[135] Rebecca Forbes' son was threatened by republicans in May 1924, forcing him to go to Canada.[136] A number of children appear to have left their families willingly, in order to pursue economic opportunities elsewhere. A small farmer in Leitrim, Thomas Cunningham had two daughters who went to work in the United States, while a son "had to go abroad" to Canada.[137] By 1927, one of William Jagoe's daughters had moved to Calcutta with her husband, while his younger son had recently left for Calgary and another son had joined the Ministry of Labour in Northern Ireland.[138] Families who had depended on support from offspring working in the family business or providing much needed income found it difficult to cope with their absence; Jagoe's son had worked as a motor mechanic and had maintained the family's lorry, for example, while the son of Lewis J Watters, who had been a partner in the family's law firm, "had been obliged to emigrate owing to the fact that their legal business has been almost ruined."[139]

Scholars have long debated the causes of loyalist and Protestant migration from the south of Ireland in the early twentieth century. While it has often been assumed that large numbers of minorities left Ireland during the revolution as a result of violence or fear of violence, more recent works have suggested that factors unrelated to the revolution, such as economic opportunities, were more influential upon the decisions of minorities to leave Ireland.[140] While the IGC records might not provide a complete picture of loyalist emigration,

[135] CO 762/66/1151.
[136] CO 762/149/2517.
[137] CO 762/98/1663.
[138] CO 762/04/11.
[139] CO 762/153/2582.
[140] See "Introduction," notes 58, 81. The most recent and comprehensive consideration of southern Protestant migration is Andy Bielenberg article in *Past and Present.* Bielenberg himself concludes that southern Protestant migration was largely due to factors unrelated to revolutionary violence. See

they do provide valuable insight into the experiences of loyalists who were in fact forced to leave Ireland, largely against their will, and even more importantly, contain details of their experiences once they had reached their destinations. From the applications submitted by loyalists to the IGC, it is clear that for some individuals and their families, violence and fear of violence had permeated their lives to such an extent that migration appeared to offer the only escape. The IGC files also demonstrate how, traumatized by events in Ireland, loyalists struggled to rebuild their lives outside of Ireland.

Conclusion

Members of the IGC were largely unprepared for the outpouring of emotions by loyalist applicants finally at liberty to speak of their revolutionary experiences. The committee was forced to acknowledge that its members, like most civil servants and politicians in the United Kingdom, had been unaware of the full extent of loyalist suffering during the Civil War and in the early years of the Free State. It is telling that members of a committee intended to provide official assistance to southern loyalists, at least some of whom had prior experience with loyalist relief organizations, were surprised by the magnitude of loyalist struggles to rebuild their lives in the Free State following the revolution. Such ignorance highlights the failure of the southern loyalist community to gain popular sympathy in the years after 1921 on either side of the Irish Sea. Loyalists from the lower and middle classes, the ordinary people who dominated the files of the IGC, were unable or unwilling to communicate their experiences to a wider audience, but their stories of hardship and suffering might have helped to alter perceptions in Britain and the Free State of the loyalist population.

Bielenberg, "Exodus: The Emigration of Southern Irish Protestants during the Irish War of Independence and the Civil War," *Past and Present*, no 218 (February 2013): 199-233.

Both during the revolution and in the Free State, militant nationalists deliberately cultivated an unflattering image of the loyalist population, leaving the impression of a homogenous community whose members enjoyed wealth and privilege, and who were actively working against the interests of the Free State. It is not surprising, then, that many from the majority community enjoyed witnessing the suffering and humiliations of those associated with the pre-independence government. The loyalist population failed in the early years of the Free State to challenge popular assumptions regarding the minority community; the most outspoken of southern loyalists tended to be drawn from the educated or landed classes, thus reinforcing popular suspicions regarding the elite status of the community. Failing to shake their community's association with landed elitism and with the government of the United Kingdom, loyalists were often dismissed as merely the remnants of a dying gentry class. Yet the IGC files reveal the suffering of individuals who were thoroughly traumatized by the destruction of their ordinary lives. In an editorial published in *Notes from Ireland* in February 1929, it was suggested that "the records of the Irish Grants Committee, if published, would startle the public conscience"; the author undoubtedly recognized that the ability of the IGC records to influence public opinion was due to the fact that they document the suffering and endurance of ordinary people in extraordinary times.[141]

[141] "A Question of Honour," *Notes from Ireland* 31, no 13 (February 1929).

CHAPTER FIVE: THE PRICE OF LOYALTY: IRISH LOYALISTS AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

In September 1923, an article entitled "Loyalties" appeared in the *Church of Ireland Gazette.* Offering a series of observations regarding abstract loyalties and allegiances, the article was clearly meant to address the situation of southern loyalists, who were still reeling from the recent social and political upheavals brought about by the revolution. The anonymous author of the piece noted that allegiances are often taken for granted, unless individuals are forced through a sudden disruption to their lives to confront their values and identities:

> All of us live by our loyalties. Like many other fundamental things, we are not always conscious of this. The heart which sends the life-blood through our bodies does not rise above the threshold of consciousness – until things begin to go wrong. And so we are often not conscious of our loyalties until things begin to go wrong.[1]

Southern loyalists had already been contemplating their identities and allegiances in the years prior to the revolution, but the Anglo-Irish conflict and the creation of the Irish Free State created a new sense of urgency in the debates surrounding these issues. Privately, loyalists could only come to terms with the events of the 1919-1923 period by redefining their relationships with the United Kingdom and the Free State. Publicly, they faced immense pressure from a number of sources to redefine their allegiance to the United Kingdom in an "acceptable" manner. Loyalist communal narratives suggest that there was considerable pressure on individual loyalists not to abandon their British values and allegiance to the crown after 1922, as to do so would not only be a betrayal of the southern loyalist community remaining in the Free State, but also of the traditions and values passed down from earlier generations of loyalists. At the same time, loyalists were also aware of the need to reassure the

[1] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 21 September 1923.

wider Free State population that they were loyal Irishmen and women, whose prior allegiance to the United Kingdom did not pose a threat to the new state.

The creation of the Irish Grants Committee in 1926 further contributed to demands that the southern loyalist community define their loyalties according to the expectations of others. Applicants were for the most part aware that they had to convince the IGC of their allegiance to the United Kingdom in order to be awarded compensation, but this proved more difficult than many loyalists had anticipated. As the committee consisted of English civil servants in London, applicants were required to specifically describe and provide evidence of that allegiance. Vague statements of allegiance and subtle social cues that identified an individual as a loyalist in Ireland were not recognised or acknowledged by the IGC, and so, for perhaps the first time in their lives, many applicants were obligated to clearly articulate their relationship with the United Kingdom and its government. Interestingly, loyalists who were seeking aid from the IGC tended to express their allegiance with reference to the same values that were also being emphasised in public narratives designed to reassure the Free State government that loyalism was compatible with citizenship in the new state. When asked about their allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom by the IGC, for example, loyalists portrayed themselves as law-abiding citizens with a strict moral code who were intensely loyal to their families, communities, and to the lawfully established government.

Throughout the early twentieth century, there were multiple claims upon the loyalty of the Irish population. From the Dublin Castle administration to the republic established by the rebels of the 1916 Rising, from family and local communities to the wider British Empire, Irishmen and women were required to manage multiple and often conflicting allegiances. Yet as the author of "Loyalties" noted, it is rare for individuals to "consciously" consider their loyalties "until things go wrong." The responses of IGC applicants to questions regarding their allegiance

to the government of the United Kingdom demonstrate the confusion and uncertainties that arose when men and women were asked to define their loyalties and identities. While loyalists defined themselves as loyal and patriotic Irishmen and Irishwomen, as well as loyal British subjects, they struggled not only to prove their membership in the loyalist community, but also to express their personal construct of southern loyalism. Testimony provided by applicants concerning their loyalties was a mixture of tangible evidence of their support for the government of the United Kingdom, and of vague statements regarding their emotional attachment to Britain, the Crown, and the Empire. This chapter will analyse the ways in which loyalist applicants attempted to define their loyalty to the government of the United Kingdom, and it will also examine the tensions that existed, both at a personal level and a communal level, between "active" and "passive" expressions of loyalism.

Exaggerated Losses and Fake Statements of Loyalty

The members of the Irish Grants Committee were acutely aware that they would encounter falsified claims submitted by individuals seeking to profit at the expense of the British taxpayer. Both the chairman of the committee, Sir Alexander Wood Renton, and the IGC's secretary, Major A. Reid Jamieson, had prior experience working with compensation claims arising from the Irish Revolution; between 1922 and 1926, Wood Renton had served as the chairman of the Compensation (Ireland) Commission, established to provide reparations for damages to property sustained during the War of Independence, while Jamieson had been associated with the earlier Irish Grants Committee and had also been in charge of the Irish Compensation Branch of the Dominions Office until 1926.[2] It was hoped that their experience settling Irish compensation claims would assist them with their work in the IGC, as the

[2] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," CO 762/212, 2-3, 25-26, 29-30.

committee faced a number of challenges not previously encountered by earlier tribunals jointly commissioned by the British and Irish governments.[3]

The IGC struggled in particular with the task of identifying and evaluating the loyalty of claimants submitting applications for the consideration of committee members. In order to be eligible for compensation, applicants had to provide evidence that their losses were directly related to their loyalty to the government of the United Kingdom. Cases in which the applicant could submit proof of '"active loyalty", such as enlistment in the crown forces, were relatively straightforward; the IGC had little difficulty connecting the applicant's losses to his or her active support for the state, and furthermore, the committee had access to military records and to the papers of the RIC Tribunal, allowing them to verify details in the claims presented by former soldiers, policemen and their families.[4] For the most part, however, applicants to the IGC were unable to provide such tangible examples of active loyalty, let alone present convincing evidence that their allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom had been the cause of their suffering after July 1921. Committee members were thus faced with the unenviable task of assessing vague declarations of support for the government of the United Kingdom, in addition to evaluating the financial claims of applicants, all without the co-operation or support of officials in the Free State.

The IGC found creative ways to evaluate claims, despite the fact that committee members could not access official Free State records. They relied heavily on statements from other members of the loyalist community in the Free State, although the committee readily acknowledged the limitations of letters of reference and favoured statements from referees whose background and political allegiance were known to committee members. Jamieson, for example, was sceptical regarding the trustworthiness of letters written by former RIC men who

[3] Ibid., 19-20, 25-26.
[4] Ibid., 26-27.

had remained in the Free State after 1922. He explained his position in a short memo, writing that "it must be remembered that these RIC men living as they are in an isolated and usually rather unfriendly part of the country cannot very easily refuse to give references without exposing themselves to grave risk."[5] The IGC also requested that referees provide details regarding their relationship with the claimant, in order to verify that the referees had been familiar with the applicants prior to the revolution.

Most referees appear to have been honest with the committee regarding their relationship to the applicants, candidly disclosing to the IGC any information they might have that was pertinent to the claims in question; referees generally demonstrated a marked reluctance to involve themselves with questionable cases.[6] At the same time, however, Jamieson was correct in observing that loyalists seeking to keep their heads down in the new state would find it difficult to decline requests for reference letters. Potential claimants were not above seeking statements from influential loyalists and members of the landed gentry, regardless if the intended referee was familiar with the details of the case. Lady Gregory described being approached in December 1927 by "an ex-policeman" who

> came to ask me to write on his behalf for compensation or a gratuity from an English Association. I did not know him, and his face was indicative of drink, but as I could not say that to him I was relieved when I found that the signature to be of any use should be that of "a prominent Loyalist. I told him I was not one and he seemed surprised…[7]

Several other individuals complained directly to the committee that they had been pressured to write letters for applicants who were unknown to them or that their names had been used as

[5] CO 763/44/674.
[6] See, for example, the letter written to Major White of SILRA by P. O'Farrell of Granard, County Longford, in which O'Farrell expresses his relief that he could disown his involvement in a case that he now knew to be false. This letter was forwarded to the IGC by SILRA; see CO 762/184/3225.
[7] Lady Augusta Gregory, *Lady Gregory's Journals*. Vol. 2, *Books Thirty to Forty-Four, February 1925-May 1932*, ed. Daniel J. Murphy (Gerrards Cross: Colin Smyth Ltd, 1987), 225.

references without their permission.[8] One individual did not hide his anger when contacted by the committee regarding a case whose details he could not corroborate, stressing that "he [the applicant] had no authority from me to give my name as a reference... I am very annoyed at the idea of this man having the impudence to give my name as a reference in connection with a claim which he knows I could not substantiate."[9]

Aside from references provided by the applicants, committee members also had other means to verify the loyalties and losses of individuals claiming to be southern loyalists. SILRA, with its wide network of contacts and supporters in the Free State, was ideally situated to assist the IGC with its investigations. In certain cases where the claimants lived in isolated regions or where the details of the applicants' allegiance were troubling, the IGC contacted Major H.G. White in the London Office to inquire whether SILRA could uncover further information.[10] As time went on, the IGC began to establish its own network of supporters in the Free State. Loyalists who had received financial assistance from the IGC were often willing to help the committee with its investigations as a means of demonstrating their gratitude; the Reverend George Ingham of Drumkilla, Mohill, County Leitrim, for example, received a grant for £400 in December 1927, and was later contacted by the IGC to investigate the loyalty of at least three other applicants in the sample group.[11] Jasper Travers Wolfe, Crown Solicitor for Cork City and County West Riding, found himself in a similar position; while he himself received £3,000 in compensation for the IGC, he also supplied references for twenty-five files in the sample group

[8] See, for example, Files No. 544 and 2577. In one case, the Parish Priest was approached by a couple to support their claim. When he pointed out to them that he knew the claim to be false, they suggested that "he play along" regardless. They then used his name as a reference without his permission. He informed the IGC of the situation in his correspondence with the committee, and urged committee members to make a public example of the couple. CO 762/36/544.
[9] CO 762/169/2898.
[10] See, for example, files 120, 2698, 2758, 2956.
[11] For Ingham's application, see CO 762/53/812 [not part of sample group]. See Files No. 548, 581, 2821 for Ingham's investigations.

and established a close working relationship with Jamieson.[12] Francis William Gore-Hickman, a solicitor from Ennis, County Clare, applied for compensation in January 1927, and later investigated at least thirty-four claims in the sample group at the request of the IGC.[13]

The committee had a number of grounds on which members could justify their rejection of claims, and it appears that committee members were less likely to cite doubts regarding loyalty than other concerns when turning down applications. Files that did not fall within the IGC's Terms of Reference rarely required investigation; instead, the claims were generally marked "OS-Outside Scope" in the committee's records, and the applicants were informed that the committee would not be making a recommendation for compensation to the Government, as the case did not come within its Terms of Reference. Of the 916 files in the sample group, 137 were recorded as "Outside Scope", with most of these claims based on losses sustained either before the Truce or after the Civil War, or losses that were unrelated to the applicants' political views. John Willis from Balinphelie, Carrigaline, County Cork, for example, wrote to the IGC claiming that five armed men had robbed him of "a substantial sum of money" before threatening his life and forcing him to leave the country within twenty-four hours; as the crime had occurred in March 1921, however, Willis' claim did not come under the committee's Terms of Reference and the case was ruled "Outside Scope".[14] Individuals who had worked for the government of the United Kingdom in Ireland and had then found themselves without employment after the creation of the Free State frequently sought compensation from the IGC.

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[12] For Travers Wolfe's file, see CO 762/54/830 [not part of sample group]. See Files No. 75, 580, 738, 1008, 1127, 1317, 1407, 1710, 1781, 1801, 1810, 1812, 1815, 2029, 2035, 2067, 2475, 2481, 2562, 2898, 3379, 3467, 3703, 3736 for cases in which he was involved as reference, legal counsel or investigator.
[13] For Gore-Hickman's file, see CO 762/81/1335 [not part of sample group]. See Files No. 840, 1246, 1557, 1689, 1724, 1733, 1850, 1859, 1866, 1934, 1997, 2006, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2484, 2653, 2659, 2660, 2667, 2671, 2679, 2697, 2701, 2717, 2827, 2874, 2910, 2934, 2941, 3008, 3017, 3032, 3033. Gore-Hickman's work for the IGC extended far beyond the thirty-four cases in the sample group; he appears to have investigated at least seventy-nine cases in the Ennistymon-Lahinch district alone. For Gore-Hickman's reports and communications with the IGC, see CO 762/02-A30: "Cases submitted to Mr. Gore Hickman on 23/7/28 for investigation in Lahinch and Ennistymon".
[14] CO 762/09/68.

Again, however, loss of employment due to the creation of the Free State was deemed to be unrelated to the personal loyalty of the claimants, and the committee had no choice but to declare such cases as "Outside Scope".[15]

In a small number of cases, applicants misunderstood the intentions of Westminster in establishing the IGC, believing that the committee was offering compensation for damages caused by the crown forces during the War of Independence.[16] John J. Coley, a draper from Drogheda, County Louth, claimed for the loss of his shop following a raid by the Black and Tans in February 1921, for example, while Timothy Daly of Youghal, County Cork, complained that the British military had left the area without settling their debts at his small shop.[17] Loyalty became a contributing factor in the IGC's decision to rule such claims as "Outside Scope"; as many of the applicants did not understand the connection between loyalty and compensation in the committee's Terms of Reference, they saw no reason to provide any evidence of allegiance to the United Kingdom and generally ignored questions from the IGC on the topic of loyalty or else denied involvement in any political movement.[18]

In contrast with files that were rule "Outside Scope", many of the claims that the committee believed to be false were formally "Rejected" only after the committee had completed preliminary investigations.[19] Two hundred and three claims within the sample group were recorded as rejected, primarily due to the inability of the claimants to provide evidence

[15] See, for example, Files No. 483, 489, 875.
[16] See, for example, Files No. 773, 908, 990.
[17] CO 762/55/ 842; CO 762/67/1089.
[18] See, for example, files 317, 543, 1016, 1089, 1562. Not all claimants seeking compensation for damages caused by the British forces were necessarily republican, however. Coley, for example, was reported to be a well-known unionist and it is unclear why his shop was targeted by the Black and Tans. CO 762/55/842.
[19] The committee was not always consistent with its use of the terms "Outside Service" and "Rejected" when recording their decisions on files, and the committee did investigate some files that were eventually labeled "OS." However, the terms recorded in the committee papers help to distinguish between rejected claims and those claims that had some merit but that did not fall within the IGC's Terms of Reference. It is important to understand that some claims were in fact submitted by genuine loyalists who had suffered losses that could not be considered by the IGC.

documenting material losses or substantiating the outrages described in the application forms. William Burns, for example, claimed that he had been forced to flee his home in Ennis, County Clare on the night of 4 April 1922 during an armed raid by armed men seeking to murder him. An ex-RIC constable, Burns had fled through the bedroom window and was now seeking compensation for the injuries sustained to his feet and hands during his escape, and also for subsequent shock and nervousness. The IGC, however, found that there was no evidence to support his claims that he had been injured during the attack and rejected the claim accordingly.[20] In a slightly smaller number of rejected cases, the claimants failed to convince the committee that the outrage inflicted upon them was due to their allegiance to the United Kingdom. John Daly of Ashford, County Wicklow, complained of the losses he had sustained during repeated raids on his farm between February and May 1922. Although he had worked for the Board of Excise for forty-five years, Daly stated his belief in correspondence with the IGC that he had been targeted because of his refusal to provide land for a new schoolhouse, leading the committee to reject his claim on the grounds that his losses had not been related to his constitutional allegiance.[21]

The committee took care to scrutinize carefully claims that were eventually rejected owing to the applicants' questionable allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom. Given that the majority of claimants to the IGC could not cite examples of "active loyalty" and instead provided brief, undefined statements regarding their allegiance, the committee had to be capable of justifying its rejection of certain claims while awarding compensation in others. To be rejected on the grounds of insufficient proof of loyalty, a claimant had to either fail to submit adequate supporting evidence or be caught lying about his or her support for the government of the United Kingdom. Many claimants resented having to 'prove' their loyalist credentials and

[20] CO 762/93/1555. For other examples, see Files No. 660, 674, 692.
[21] CO 762/12/106. For other examples, see Files No. 860, 897.

struggled to find suitable documentation of their allegiance.[22] It was not uncommon for applicants and their supporters to question the ability of committee members in London, who had little experience of life in Ireland during the revolution, to adequately judge the allegiance of applicants from the Free State.[23]

Surprisingly, the committee found itself rejecting a number of cases in which the loyalty of the applicant appeared to be established, but the details of the claim for damages had been exaggerated or falsified. Former members of the RIC and the crown forces were frequently found to be lying on their applications, thereby undermining the significance that the IGC as well as the loyalist community bestowed upon the concept of "active loyalty." Almost all those who had been closely associated with the pre-1921 government in Ireland in Ireland had been compensated for their losses prior to the formation of the second Irish Grants Committee in 1926, either with generous pensions or through the work of earlier compensation commissions.[24] Former members of the crown forces or civil servants who chose to apply to the IGC generally did so on the grounds of "special hardship," citing losses that had been overlooked by the earlier compensation arrangements. Thus former members of the RIC frequently argued that their cases had not been fairly treated by the RIC Tribunal, or that they had encountered additional hardships after the Tribunal had ruled on their claims.[25] The IGC tended to disagree that the RIC Tribunal settlements had been inadequate; of the 101 claims in the sample group submitted by men who had served in the RIC at some point in their lives, sixty were from men who had served with the RIC until the force had been disbanded and were therefore eligible to

[22] See, for example, Files No. 372, 541, 590.
[23] See, for examples, CO 762/36/553.
[24] The most comprehensive study of compensation for loyalists and others who had been actively involved in governing Ireland prior to 1921 is Niamh Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists After the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 1922-32" (Doctoral Dissertation, University College Dublin, 1994).
[25] Edward Carson claimed that the terms of the RIC Tribunal were difficult to navigate, resulting in many men presenting cases that did not meet with the Tribunal's approval. Niamh Brennan, however, disagrees that the Tribunal policies were unclear. See, Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists," 156-189.

have their losses considered by the RIC Tribunal. The majority of these claims from disbanded members of the force (forty-one claims, or 68 percent) were rejected or ruled as "Outside Scope", as the IGC considered that the claimants had been satisfactorily compensated by the RIC Tribunal. In at least twenty of the rejected claims from RIC men who had served until 1922, the IGC expressed concerns that the applicants appeared to have exaggerated their losses or falsified their claims.

Former RIC men and their families who applied to the IGC appeared not to have been aware that the committee would have access to the records of the RIC Tribunal. Much to the disgust of the IGC members, a number of former RIC men submitted applicants to the IGC that bore little resemblance to the earlier claims they had made before the Tribunal. William Brien from Eyrescourt, County Galway, for example, was a former member of the RIC seeking compensation for losses that he claimed to have incurred through the boycott of his licensed business and the death of his wife from shock. Brien estimated these losses to have cost him at least £2,500, a sum that he now requested from the IGC. Although he assured the committee that "I am sure I am one of the most deserving cases that ever applied to your Committee for compensation", the committee discovered that Brien had a history of lying about his revolutionary experiences. After browsing the records of the Home Office, Jamieson discovered that Brien had been forced to refund the whole of the Disturbance Allowance advanced to him on disbandment, as he had not been able to account for the money. In his memo on the case, Jamieson also outlined the discrepancies between Brien's claim before the IGC and the details Brien had supplied the RIC Tribunal, concluding that "this is a claim… that must be rejected. There is no doubt that the majority of claimant's statements in the Proofs are untrue."[26] Other rejected RIC claimants tended to be less greedy than Brien when presenting their claims to the

[26] CO 762/201/3645.

IGC, although they conveniently discovered one or two small losses that had been missed by the RIC Tribunal.[27]

The intention of individuals such as William Brien in submitting falsified or exaggerated claims is not difficult to identify; whether motivated by greed or out of genuine financial need, these applicants hoped to receive generous financial settlements from Westminster. Applicants frequently attempted to justify their exaggerated claims by arguing that they were "owed" compensation for risks and sacrifices that had never been fully recognized by the government. William Burns, for example, wrote to the IGC in February 1928 after his case had been rejected to express his disappointed; while urging the IGC to reconsider its decision, Burns took to remind the committee of the dangers RIC men had faced in Ireland during the revolution.[28] Others pointed out that they had been unprepared for the financial hardships they encountered after the revolution and argued that the elected government of the United Kingdom had a duty to support loyalists and their families as they struggle to rebuild their lives. Thomas Joseph Morrison, for example, had left Cork to live in London following the disbandment of RIC, and later wrote to the IGC to complain of his "wholly inadequate pension" and his inability to find employment. He argued that as his "unfortunate position" was "solely caused" by his loyalty and allegiance to the United Kingdom, he was deserving of compensation.[29]

It is also likely that falsified and exaggerated claims were the result of changing allegiance. Individuals who had not been strongly attached to the government of the United Kingdom or who did not identify primarily as British might have felt little, if any, remorse in trying to take money from the government that had openly abandoned Ireland and the loyalist population. Allegiance to one's self and family might also have trumped a more abstract loyalty

[27] See, for example, Files No. 1796, 1896, 2035, 2619.
[28] CO 762/93/1555.
[29] CO 762/38/566.

to Britain; the desperation of applicants who had fallen on hard times is palpable in many of the IGC files, and some applicants might have felt that they had little to lose in submitting exaggerated or falsified claims to the IGC. As noted by Niamh Brennan, it is also likely that some individuals who were popular perceived to be loyalists had been 'mis-labelled'.[30] Men had joined the British army and the RIC for a number of reasons, not all of which required a strong allegiance to the United Kingdom.

Claims were also submitted by individuals who had little, if any, connection to the pre-1921 administration in Ireland, but who recognised an opportunity to exploit the British government's sense of responsibility over its treatment of southern loyalists. The loyalist community and its supporters were appalled by the audacity of republicans who submitted applications to the IGC claiming to have suffered due to their loyalty to the government of the United Kingdom. In one case investigated by SILRA, Major White informed the IGC that the applicant was a well-known republican who had seized land for loyalists in the region, adding that a local loyalist had observed that ""Kelly might be a loyalist in London but certainly not in Philipstown."[31] In another case, a known and respected loyalist had written to the IGC that a particularly claimant was lying regarding her past allegiance, and also denounced those who had provided references for the claiming, stating that "any man that signs she was Loyal to get the grant has no conscience."[32]

Soon after the committee began its work of processing claims, members began to notice that significant numbers of falsified claims were being submitted from certain regions. Within the sample group, for example, forty-nine claims were received from the Ennistymon-Lahinch region in County Clare, while eight of twenty-three claims from County Cavan in the sample

[30] Brennan, "Compensating Southern Irish Loyalists," 7-8.
[31] CO 762/36/553.
[32] CO 762/100/1694.

group were from Arva; all of these claims were eventually rejected on the grounds that the applicants could not supply suitable evidence documenting pre-1922 allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom. Noting the similarities in these applications, the IGC was able to eliminate other claims from these regions. Falsified claims from the Ennistymon-Lahinch district, for example, were almost invariably supported by a "Major" or "Reverend" Michael Moran, who frequently wrote applications on behalf of claimants and attached his personal comments regarding each case to the application forms.[33] While the IGC took care to investigate all of the claims from Clare, it soon became evident that the vast majority of claimants were lying in regards to both their loyalty and their losses.[34] Jamieson and other committee members failed to hide their exasperation as, undeterred by the claims that had already been rejected, Moran continued to submit further applications from the region. In a memo prepared for one Ennistymon case, Jamieson wrote dismissively that "this claim, which is the same as the vast majority of claims from Ennistymon, can only be described as a claim for special unemployment benefits."[35] The committee eventually retaliated by sending out rather brusque letters that clearly conveyed its scepticism regarding claims from the region. The letter informed applicants that the committee was not "satisfied that the injuries alleged were directed against you on account of your support of the British Government prior to the 11 July 1921" and that unless "full and acceptable evidence" in support of the claim was submitted, the committee was "unable to consider the case."[36]

These falsified claims provide insight into how loyalism was perceived by those from outside of the loyalist community. In response to questions regarding their allegiance to the

[33] See, for example, Files No. 1098, 1482, 1509, 1997.
[34] See correspondence between IGC and FW Gore-Hickman, who was investigating cases in this region. CO 762/02-A30: "Cases submitted to Mr. Gore Hickman on 23/7/28 for investigation in Lahinch and Ennistymon".
[35] CO 762/96/1610.
[36] See, for example, CO 762/91/1509.

government of the United Kingdom, for example, applicants from Ennistymon responded with effusive statements regarding their affection and support for the government and the King. Several applicants from this region testified that they had been loyalists since birth, and detailed their persistent attempts "to maintain law and order," despite the high personal costs that their loyalty entailed.[37] Other claimed to have suffered on account of their friendship with the crown forces stationed in the town; Bridget McMahon, for example, described how she worked for the crown forces and also claimed to "have saved them many a time when they were going to be attacked on the street."[38] When false applicants received notice of their rejections, they often vigorously objected the committee's decisions, renewing their protestations of loyalty and pleading with the committee to reconsider its decisions.[39] The statements made by applicants lying about their support for the United Kingdom emphasised the same themes found in the correspondence written by genuine loyalists, such as the importance of family traditions and the maintenance of law and order. However, as is discussed below, genuine loyalists were rarely so unguarded about their allegiance to the United Kingdom, especially in written communications with the IGC. Applicants submitting fake claims overplayed their hands by assuming that genuine loyalists were far more demonstrative regarding their loyalty than was the case.

There were undoubtedly false claims filed with the IGC, and the committee almost certainly accepted some claims in which the applicants had lied about their allegiance to the United Kingdom. However, the committee was careful to investigate claims as thoroughly as possible, seeking assurances that claimants had indeed demonstrated a degree of allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom before awarding financial compensation. Although the

[37] See, for example, Files No. 1404, 1509, 1567, 1610, 2012, 2013.
[38] CO 762/96/1695; See also Files No. 1850, 2667, 2733.
[39] See, for example, CO 762/82/1350; CO 762/86/1404. In one his many letters to the IGC, Major White noted that a false claimant from Cork had become quite unpleasant when informed that SILRA could not help her. He added that, based on his experiences, such hostile and aggressive behavior was further proof that the claim was not genuine. CO 762/80/1310.

IGC struggled without access to Irish records and support from Irish officials, it did receive valuable assistance from the loyalist population in the Free State, particularly in regards to verifying the pre-revolutionary allegiance of applicants. It is remarkable that the IGC was able to establish such a strong network of supporters, at a time when many loyalists were afraid to be associated with the government of the United Kingdom or to publicly identify as loyalists. The willingness of individuals such as Jasper Wolfe and George Ingram to work closely with the IGC in order to ensure that compensation was granted to deserving loyalists is a testament to the strong communal ties that existed within the loyalist population and also indicates the importance that loyalists placed upon official recognition of the community's revolutionary losses.

The Price of Loyalty: 'Active' versus 'Passive' Support for the Government of the United Kingdom

Individuals who submitted falsified claims were not the only applicants to have carefully crafted their statements of loyalty. All applicants to the IGC were conscious of the need to persuade the IGC that they qualified for compensation, but loyalists who had suffered genuine losses tended to perceive questions relating to their loyalty as a challenge to their character and values. Loyalist applicants were therefore attempting to defend their personal identities and allegiances at a time when the loyalist community was growing increasingly defensive about such issues, yet were also aware that any statements made regarding loyalty had to meet with the IGC's approval if they wished to receive compensation. Loyalist anxiety was compounded by the fact that the official application form created for the IGC provided little direction on the matter of allegiance. While the committee's Terms of Reference as well as its final report stressed the importance of the "nexus" between loyalty and injury, applicants were simply

asked if their loss "was occasioned in respect or on account of" their allegiance to the Government of the United Kingdom, and if so, to provide further details.[40] There was no indication if the government was seeking active demonstrations of loyalty or simply general statements of allegiance to the United Kingdom.

Lacking guidance from the IGC, individual applicants addressed the question of loyalty to the best of their abilities, with many assuming that the committee would contact them if its members had any doubts or concerns about their allegiance.[41] Applicants were often somewhat defiant, insisting that they had suffered owing to their constitutional allegiance despite having little tangible evidence to demonstrate their support for the government of the United Kingdom. As with the issue of losses, questions of loyalty were also met with suggestions that committee members in London could not possibly understand conditions in Ireland during the revolution, when it had been dangerous for individuals to openly declare their allegiance to the government.[42] Some individuals seized the opportunity to express their regrets concerning their support for Britain, arguing that the government of the United Kingdom was breaking its pledges

[40] "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," CO 762/212, 89-90. The question pertaining to loyalty and loss on the official IGC application form reads as follows: "Do you claim that the loss of injury described was occasioned in respect or on account of your allegiance to the Government of the United Kingdom? If so, give particulars on which you base this claim".

[41] The belief that applicants would be contacted by the IGC in order to defend their claims in person before the committee proved detrimental to a number of applicants, who, when rejected or given smaller sums than anticipated, protested to the IGC that they had not provided the full details of their losses and allegiance on the application form, or that they had not been able to sufficiently explain their case in written form. See, for example, Files No. 226, 417, 566,1703. The committee did permit some applicants or their representatives to testify in person, if the applicant requested an interview and it appeared that an interview would assist the committee in evaluating the case. The IGC was concerned, however, that unnecessary interviews would cause interminable delays and slow down its work. The committee's position on personal interviews was communicated in the press and was outlined in its final report. "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," CO 762/212, 31-32.

[42] Irish solicitors acting on behalf of loyalist claimants as well as members of SILRA became increasingly annoyed by the IGC's request for documentation and evidence regarding losses and allegiance that simply did not exist. See the letter written by Robert Wilkins' solicitor regarding demands for business records, CO 762/102/1735. See also SILRA's letter in response to the IGC's request for the names and addresses of the farm labourers who had left their positions on William Draper's farm; much to SILRA's amazement, it appeared that the IGC was planning on contacting the labourers to verify that they had abandon their work due to Draper's allegiance. CO 762/195/3483. See also CO 762/110/1898 for another statement from a solicitor outlining difficulties in obtaining evidence of client's allegiance. For examples of claimants expressing similar frustrations, see, for example, Files No. 13, 459, 541, 923.

to southern loyalists and had therefore proven itself unworthy of loyalist attachment.[43] A small number of claimants openly acknowledged that they felt little affection for the United Kingdom and that they had not engaged with political movements of any kind in the years prior to the revolution, although they believed that their willingness to abide by established laws qualified them as supporters of the pre-1921 government.[44]

The reactions of applicants and their supporters to questions concerning constitutional allegiance reveal the diversity of opinions that existed within the southern loyalist population regarding loyalty to the United Kingdom in the early twentieth century. This diversity partly accounts for the wide range of loyalist experiences during the revolution, as well as the varied reactions within the minority population to the creation of the Irish Free State and the ambiguous attitudes of southern loyalist towards Britain in the years after 1921. Furthermore, responses to questions concerning political allegiance reveal both the commonly held beliefs and values that bound members of the loyalist population together, as well as the differences of opinions that threatened to tear the community apart. The lack of a single, established construct of loyalty created tensions, both within the loyalist population as well as between applicants and the IGC. Influential loyalists, as well as members of the IGC, tended to emphasise 'active loyalty,' praising and rewarding those who had openly supported the government of the United Kingdom before and during the revolution. In the aftermath of the revolution, a hierarchy of loyalism began to emerge, which manifested itself in the records of the IGC through the correspondence received from loyalists; while some applicants challenged the definition of active loyalty favoured by their community and the committee, others attempted to enhance their claims by comparing their active loyalty with the more passive expressions of allegiance common amongst other southern loyalists. Although the public narratives put forward in the 1920s by leading

[43] See, for example, Files No. 92, 133, 372, 515, 617, 926.
[44] See, for example, Files No. 107, 908, 1910, 2799.

loyalists generally focused on presenting the community's loyalties in a manner acceptable to the nationalist majority in the Free State, it is evident from the private responses given to the IGC that individual loyalists were also concerned with how their allegiance was viewed by others within the loyalist community.

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Abiding by one's allegiance and loyalties was a dominant theme in loyalist discourse after the creation of the Free State, as can be seen in the *Irish Times* and the *Church of Ireland Gazette*.[45] Loyalist commentators attempted to defend the community from claims that southern loyalists were being merely stubborn or clinging to the past by refusing to abandon their allegiance to the United Kingdom; loyalists could not forsake their principles, they argued, without also abandoning their honour and betraying their families and communities. Furthermore, it was often pointed out that loyalists had a duty to speak out or act upon their allegiance, regardless of the personal costs. Before and during the War of Independence, then, loyalists who provided active support to the government and the state were living up to their obligations as loyal subjects of the crown. In the aftermath of the revolution, an individual's active support for the pre-1921 government of the United Kingdom or for the wider British Empire assumed even greater significance within the loyalist community; those who had fought in the Great War or provided supplies to the RIC during the War of Independence, for example, were admired by their fellow loyalists for their dedication to their allegiance and were seen to embody the best of the southern loyalist tradition.

While active loyalty was fervently praised within the loyalist community and was highly valued by the IGC, there was little consensus as to what constituted an active demonstration of loyalty. Individually, loyalists tended to argue that any acts or statements in support of the

[45] See Chapter Two.

United Kingdom had put their property and lives at risk, and were therefore deserving of recognition within the loyalist community as well as by the IGC. Yet members of the IGC were sceptical about the allegiance of those who claimed to have been government supporters, but who could provide few, if any, details regarding their active support for the established authorities, while active supporters of the former government in Ireland believed that they had paid a greater price for their allegiance than more passive loyalists who had suffered less in the aftermath of the revolution. Papers prepared by lawyers on behalf of William H. Argue, a former Crown solicitor, reminded the committee that Argue and other dedicated servants to the crown continued to suffer because of their actions:

> It might be supposed that animosity towards Loyalists in the Free State to a great extent disappeared by now. This might apply to those persons who were loyalists in name only, i.e. passive Loyalists, but as far as Loyalists who were active and openly showed their opposition to the revolutionary element are concerned, it does not apply. On the contrary, they still suffer from ill will of the large section of the community who are still in sympathy with the original object of the IRA, who leave nothing undone to injure the business or professional interests of such loyalists. To the present day, Applicant has many reminders of his loyalty, and his clients are induced to go elsewhere...[46]

Despite tensions within the loyalist community regarding different manifestations of loyalty to the United Kingdom, some categories of loyalists were universally regarded with respect and admiration by all members of the community. Ex-servicemen and their families, for example, were transformed into a cause around which loyalists and their supporters could rally in the years after 1921. The Great War had brought the loyalist community together at a time of great political and economic uncertainty in Ireland, with the events of 1914-1918 allowing those who had failed to embrace the Home Rule movement – namely unionists, protestants, members of the landlord class – to set aside their domestic concerns in order to dedicate themselves to

[46] CO 762/167/2851.

the war effort.[47] The sacrifices made by young men who had voluntarily enlisted in the British armed forces were never forgotten by southern loyalists, which took pride in their community's long tradition of expressing its allegiance to the crown through military service. The efforts of individuals who had supported the war effort on the home front were also gratefully acknowledged by other loyalists in Ireland, both during the conflict and in the decades that followed.[48]

In response to the question regarding allegiance on the IGC application form, sixty-six claimants within the sample group referenced their service on the front or their contribution to the war effort, with forty-eight receiving compensation from the committee. These successful applicants were overwhelmingly middle-aged men; ninety-four percent of the group was male and the average age of successful male applicants at the time they submitted their applications to the IGC was fifty-two years old, meaning that the average age in 1914 would have been approximately forty years old. Less than half of the successful claimants (twenty-one individuals, or 44 percent) stated specifically that they had fought at the front; the rest of the claimants

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[47] For more on Irish participation in the Great War, see John Horne, ed., *Our War: Ireland and the Great War* (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2008); Adrian Gregory and Senia Paseta, eds., *Ireland and the Great War: 'A War to Unite Us All'?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); Keith Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Myles Dungan, *They Shall Not Grow Old: Irish Soldiers in the Great War* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1997). The reactions of the unionist population and of the landed gentry in Ireland to the war have been documented by scholars such as Patrick Buckland, Terence Dooley and Peter Martin. See, for example, Patrick Buckland, *Irish Unionism I: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885-1922* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1972); Terence Dooley, *Plight of the Monaghan Protestants, 1912-1926* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2000); Peter Martin, "Dulce et Decorum: Irish Nobles in the Great War, 1914-1919," in *Ireland and the Great War: 'A War to Unite Us All'?,* 28-48.

[48] The *Church of Ireland Gazette,* for example, frequently reflected upon the sacrifices made by Irish loyalists during the war, especially during Remembrance Day services and when announcing the completion of private war memorials in Protestant churches. Calls for financial support for ex-servicemen also provoked reflections upon the war and the losses sustained by the loyalist community. See *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 14 November 1919; 17 August, 23 November 1923; 15 February, 7 November 1924; 7 August 1925; 19 November 1926; 5 August, 11 November 1927; 8 November 1928. The war also looms large in many of the autobiographies of unionists, southern protestants, and landed gentry that reflect upon the early twentieth century. See, for example, Elizabeth Bowen, *Bowen's Court* (Cork: The Collins Press, 1998); Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall, *Seventy Years Young: Memories of Elizabeth, Countess of Fingall* (1937; repr., Dublin: Lilliput Press, 2005); Frances Moffett, *I am also of Ireland* (London: BBC, 1985).

were primarily men who had been too old or infirm to enlist for active duty, and had instead embraced the war effort in Ireland and elsewhere in the British Isles.

Ex-servicemen applicants in the sample group generally mentioned their involvement in the war only in passing, providing few details regarding the nature and extent of their service or concerning their experiences on the frontlines. Thomas Jestin's response to the question of his allegiance was typical of ex-servicemen applicants. He wrote merely that "I served in the British Army during the Great War, and was well-known for my loyalty to the British connection," leaving his references to supply the IGC with the particulars of his service; the Reverend Greene informed the IGC, for example, that Jestin had served in the South Irish Horse from August 1914 to the end of the war and that he had lost two brothers at the front.[49] Similarly, ex-servicemen in the sample group were rarely forthcoming regarding their motives for enlisting, although several did place their wartime experience in the context of their families' established traditions of allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom.[50] George Thomas Hall from County Wicklow, for example, wrote that he had served in the Royal Marine Artillery from April 1914 until he was invalided out in April 1917, adding that he belonged "to a family well-known for its loyalist sympathies."[51] John Wood from Skibbereen, County Cork, initially stated that the boycott of his garage was due in part to his being an ex-officer of the British Army. He later wrote to the IGC explaining that he had joined the Mechanical Transport Branch of the British Army in November 1915, also pointing out that several immediate family members had been active supporters in the war effort.[52] Most ex-servicemen applicants in the sample group who had fought in the Great War, however, appear to have considered their veteran status to be

[49] CO 762/193/3454. For further examples of ex-servicemen seeking compensation from the IGC who fail to provide the committee with details of their service, see Files No. 84, 405, 3714.
[50] See, for example, Files No. 75, 2457, 3340.
[51] CO 762/59/905.
[52] CO 762/105/1801.

sufficient evidence of their patriotism; with such credible proof of their active support for the government of the United Kingdom, these applicants saw no need to elaborate upon their loyalties for the benefit of the IGC or to affirm in writing the link between their service in the British army and their losses during the revolution.

In addition to applicants who explicitly mentioned their service during the Great War, thirty-seven other individuals within the sample group wrote of their involvement in the British forces when asked to provide evidence of their allegiance, with twenty-four receiving compensation from the Irish Grants Committee. Again, few of these applicants provided details of their service; most simply referred to themselves as an "old soldier," "a British officer," or "a British ex-serviceman."[53] Without further details of their service, it is difficult to discover from the IGC records how long these applicants had served or in what capacity, or to determine if they had been active during the Great War. Thirteen of the twenty-four successful applicants in the sample group provided other evidence of their allegiance, such as a tradition of family loyalty or a refusal to subscribe to the IRA during the War of Independence; in such cases, the applicants' time in the armed forces appears to have been listed primarily in order to reinforce the overall impression of his or her patriotism.[54] For the remaining eleven applicants, however, their cases rested primarily upon their status as ex-servicemen, with their military service functioning as both evidence of their loyalty and an explanation for their revolutionary losses. As one applicant wrote while attempting to explain his losses to the IGC: "I was a discharged British Soldier and this was an offence heinous enough in their eyes to warrant any outrage."[55]

Individuals who had not fought on the front during the 1914-1918 period, whether they had previously served with the army or not, could still point to their activities during the war as

[53] CO 762/28/403; CO 762/62/973; CO 762/148/2486.
[54] See, for example, Files No. 36, 169, 2646.
[55] CO 762/202/3668. For more examples, see Files No. 2475, 2486, 3240.

evidence of their active allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom. Older or infirmed men who had been rejected for service on the front had often chosen to act as recruiters and fundraisers in Ireland, later attempting to convey to the IGC the dangerous repercussions of their contributions to the war effort. While a strong sense of duty compelled them to support the armed forces during the war, these individuals had faced increasing criticism and hostility from the republican population.[56] Isaac Gibson, from King's County, informed the IGC that he "took an active part in all war work," adding that "during and after the 1916 rebellion, I received threatening letters for helping troops stating that I would be made to pay for it later on."[57] R.H. Johnstone from County Cavan stated that he and his sons had played an active role in recruiting for the army during the war, "and incurred considerable ill-will thereby."[58] Men such as Gibson and Johnson tended to place their recruiting and fundraising activities in the context of their wider commitments to the state. Many of the most active recruiters and fundraisers in Ireland were men who held administrative and judicial positions under the government of the United Kingdom; Johnstone, for example, had been the Deputy Lieutenant for Cavan, while John McGeehin of County Mayo, who had spoken at local recruitment meetings and claimed to be known as "England's Recruiting Sergeant," was a former Chairman of the Belmullet Board of Guardians and a County Councillor.[59] Generally civil servants and others who held positions under the pre-revolutionary government believed it was their duty to set an example for others by throwing themselves wholeheartedly into the war effort.[60]

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[56] See, for example, CO 762/30/433 and CO 762/189/3346.
[57] CO 762/93/1541.
[58] CO 762/08/55.
[59] CO 762/30/433.
[60] See, for example, Files No. 55, 689, 1812. Patrick Buckland observed that the Anglo-Irish gentry were especially active in the war effort, given their traditions of military service and political leadership. It is not surprising, then, that many of the successful applicants actively involved in the war effort in Ireland were members of the gentry who had also held official government positions. Patrick Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885-1922* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1972), 34.

Women, too, were active in the war effort, although once again their activities are primarily documented in applications submitted by husbands and fathers. Henry Benjamin Sampey, from County Roscommon, described how three brothers served in the army, while he and his sisters became active recruiters in Ireland.[61] John Hayes from County Cork, Maurice Lynch from County Limerick, and John Lowndes from Queen's County all referenced the war work undertaken by their daughters in Ireland and elsewhere in the British Isles.[62] Wartime service provided female applicants or male relatives applying on their behalf with rare opportunities to cite instances of active support for the government of the United Kingdom. In addition to assisting the crown forces stationed in Ireland during the War of Independence, for example, Henrietta Farmer, from Tralee, County Kerry, had also supported ex-servicemen during and after the Great War through her voluntary work with the YMCA.[63]

As with male applicants citing wartime service as evidence of their allegiance to the United Kingdom, female applicants and their representatives provided few details regarding their experiences. Evelyn Bruce, for example, applied for compensation on behalf of herself and her three sisters, writing simply that "we were all engaged in war work and were known to be loyal supporters of the British Government" on her application form. It was Major White of SILRA who informed the IGC of the full extent of the sisters' work on behalf of the Red Cross and of their continued activism on behalf of ex-servicemen, while another reference drew attention to the fact that two of the sisters had received MBEs for their services to the government.[64] Once again it is unclear why the Bruces, like so many others who had been engaged in active service during the war, supplied so little information to the IGC. It is possible that many believed wartime service required no explanation, as their willingness to "do their part" during the

[61] CO 762/189/3346.
[62] CO 762/07/49, CO 762/80/1304, CO 762/150/2536.
[63] CO 762/48/744.
[64] CO 762/190/3351.

conflict clearly indicated their allegiance to the United Kingdom. Others might have assumed that the IGC would have access to wartime service records, and that members of the committee would be capable of verifying information and learning further details while undertaking its work in London. Despite the lack of information supplied by the applicants, however, it is clear that those who had been active during the Great War were strongly motivated by a sense of patriotism and a desire to do their duty.

The fulfillment of duty and the willingness to make sacrifices on behalf of one's allegiance was also a key theme in the applications submitted by former policemen. As with ex-servicemen, members of the RIC tended to be viewed sympathetically by the loyalist community and their supporters. Individual RIC men who had admirably fulfilled their duty were praised for their brave public displays of loyalty in immensely trying circumstances.[65] The falsified claims originating from some members of the RIC gave rise to legitimate questions regarding the motives of individuals who joined the force and the allegiance of its members, but the IGC recognised that some men had served with honour and had attempted to uphold the government's rule in Ireland in unfavourable conditions. One hundred and seven applicants in the sample group cited their service in the force as evidence of their pre-revolutionary loyalty to the government, with forty-six receiving compensation from the IGC.[66] The average age of successful RIC applicants in the sample group was fifty-six years old, reflecting the tendency of the committee to favour applicants who had not been eligible for funding through the RIC Tribunal. Only eighteen of the successful forty-six applicants in the sample group had served with the RIC up to its disbandment, with the rest having retired from the force prior to 1922.

[65] See, for example, comments in the *Church of Ireland Gazette* shortly after the signing of the Treaty. The police were praised as "they stood for King and Empire, and held the old flag high," and it was noted that while "they had to fight, in a sense, against their own people, never for a moment did they swerve from the path of their duty." *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 24 February 1922.

[66] Additionally, there were two members of the Dublin Metropolitan Police in the sample group who cited their position in the force as evidence of their allegiance. Both received compensation from the IGC. See Files No. 1728, 3521.

There are many similarities between the applications in the sample group submitted by ex-servicemen and those prepared by former members of the RIC. Once again the IGC did not always receive detailed statements that would allow committee members to reconstruct the careers and experiences of former members of the RIC. Many RIC claimants, successful or otherwise, simply stated that they had joined the force prior to the revolution and served to the best of their abilities.[67] William Longhead had been a policeman in Cork prior to the revolution; when asked if his losses had been sustained because of his allegiance to the United Kingdom, his lawyer informed the IGC only that Longhead had been a Sergeant in the Royal Irish Constabulary and had served for over 20 years.[68] Samuel Willoughby from Carlow applied for compensation for the theft of his bicycle and some building material, noting "I am an ex-RIC Constable."[69] If committee members had hoped that references would be able to provide further details regarding the service of RIC claimants, they would have been soon disappointed. Given the confidential nature of RIC work, as well as the tendency of RIC men and their families to relocate shortly after the force had been disbanded, the committee struggled to find references who could confirm the allegiance and losses of applicants who had served in the force.[70] In many cases, the papers of the RIC Tribunal proved invaluable to the IGC, allowing Jamieson to verify the service and revolutionary losses of RIC applicants.

A number of successful RIC applicants, particularly those who had served until 1922, provided the committee with some indication of the nature of their work, presumably to demonstrate their commitment to the government of the United Kingdom at the height of the

[67] See, for example, Files No. 225, 733, 2032, 2042.
[68] CO 762/102/1744.
[69] CO 762/79/1288.
[70] See, for example, Files No. 1961, 3171, 3233. One applicant addressed this problem directly in his application, writing that he could not provide names of references, as "I told no one outside of my family as to the reason for my departure from Dublin. It was a very anxious time and people were full of mistrust and suspicion. I had no one whom I could consult or ask advice-the RIC was being disbanded and the British Regts had left and nobody knew what was going to happen next…" CO 762/11/92.

War of Independence. John Lynch, originally stationed in Nenagh, County Tipperary, wrote that he had "over thirty prosecutions for political offences and was specially detailed by my authorities to accompany the military when the houses of notorious Sinn Feiners were to be searched and to identify them" between 1916 and 1921.[71] James Terrett was a former Sergeant in the RIC who had played an active role in suppressing the rebellion of 1916, and who also claimed to have assisted with the arrest of De Valera in May 1918.[72] Timothy Gleeson of Tallow, County Waterford, had been a Head Constable with over thirty years service in the RIC, who took immense pride in his "particularly high record for vigilance and activity in prosecuting Sinn Fein."[73] Men like Lynch, Terrett, and Gleeson emphasised in their applications to the IGC that they had remained loyal and continued to fulfil their duties at a time when many of their colleagues chose to abandon the government, the southern loyalist community, and the RIC. Lynch, for example, declared on his application form that "I served the government to the last and would do so again if required," while one of his fellow RIC colleagues pointed out that he had "served to the end faithfully and loyally in the face of considerable difficulties."[74] The demanding and dangerous conditions in which the RIC had operated during the last years of its existence was highlighted by RIC applicants, in order to draw further attention to the sacrifices they had made in order to fulfill their duty. As the "instrument for maintaining British Law and Order in the Country," the RIC had become increasingly unpopular in the early years of the twentieth century, with its members facing boycotts, intimidation and violence.[75] Yet RIC men such as Peter Folan, who had served at Dublin Castle and received threatening letters, had been determined to serve "at any cost."[76]

[71] CO 762/06/33.
[72] CO 762/11/92.
[73] CO 762/66/1057.
[74] CO 762/06/33; CO 762/86/1418. See also Files No. 675, 692, 1043 3233.
[75] CO 762/65/1020. See also Files No. 65, 225, 548.
[76] CO 762/179/3142.

Aside from ex-servicemen and the RIC, the most visible supporters in Ireland of the government of the United Kingdom had been Irish civil servants and individuals who had been appointed to largely honorary administrative and judicial positions. When asked by the IGC about their allegiance, these applicants pointed to their personal involvement in sustaining the government in Ireland and the losses they had endured as a result of their loyalty. Sixty-eight applicants cited their service to the state in response to the question of their allegiance on the official IGC application form, with the IGC making recommendation in forty-eight of these cases. The occupations of civil servants and other government representatives ranged from Postmasters to High Sheriffs and Crown Solicitors; sixteen of the successful applicants had served as Justices of the Peace, and an additional six had been Deputy Lieutenants for their counties. The average age of civil authorities and low-level functionaries who received compensation from the IGC for their claims was sixty-two years old, suggesting that these individuals had been well established in Irish society and in government circles prior to the outbreak of the revolution. Several applicants were able to provide the IGC with a long list of official credentials in response to questions regarding their support for the government of the United Kingdom; James Gunning Alcorn, for example, was eighty-two years old in January 1927, and in his application he detailed his forty-four years of service to the state. Upon his retirement from the civil service in 1910, he had settled in County Galway, where he served as a magistrate and later as High Sheriff for the county. During the 1919-1923 period, his commitment to the government of the United Kingdom resulted in boycotts, raids on his property, attacks on his person, a brief kidnapping, and the eventual loss of his wife's loss of health as a result of mental strain.[77]

[77] CO 762/20/266. For other applicants with substantial careers in the civil service, see Files No. 49, 120, 801.

Following the example established by applicants who had been members of the RIC, former civil servants consistently stressed the dangerous conditions in which they had maintained their allegiance to the pre-1922 government in their correspondence with the IGC. Many had come under intense pressure from Irish revolutionaries to resign their positions, later complaining that they had been subjected to threats and abuse after they refused to abandon their posts.[78] On retiring from the RIC, Peter Roe had accepted the Commission of the Peace for Queen's County; as he explained to the IGC, "this, as I afterwards learned was a very serious crime against the Republic…"[79] Applicants in disturbed regions attempted to draw the committee's attention to the fact that they had fulfilled their duties when many others in similar positions had conceded to IRA demands or else had left the country. A tax collector for County Sligo, for example, wrote to the IGC to explain that he had refused to hand over his collection of rates to the IRA. As "the only rate collector in the County who refused to do so voluntarily," he was subjected to threats and abusive letters throughout much of the revolution.[80] Joseph Cooke was a merchant tailor in Navan, County Meath, who had been appointed to the position of Justice of the Peace after the Great War in reward for his success in recruiting and fundraising during the conflict. He explained to the IGC that his losses were due to his decision to maintain

> my position as magistrate, in the face of threats of assassination, in the terrible years of 1920 and 1921, when most of the magistrates resigned their commissions and those who did not evaded their duties, in consequence of which, the entire magisterial duties of the county devolved on me.

The failure of his fellow loyalists to fulfil their duties drew greater attention to his own activities on behalf of the government, making Cooke and his family an attractive target for the IRA and later the Irregulars, as well as their supporters. Cooke was boycotted to the brink of bankruptcy,

[78] See, for example, Files No. 53, 68, 1782, 1104.
[79] CO 762/114/1961.
[80] CO 762/84/1382.

and complained that he continued to be "oppressed by debt" when he submitted his application to the IGC in December 1927. The stress of his situation caused his wife's health to fail, leaving his young daughters to manage on their own. In his reply to the IGC regarding his allegiance, however, Cooke stated that although the family had "suffered the torments of the damned" during the revolution, "what I did before, I should be prepared to do again, regardless of the consequences."[81]

For many applicants who had held official commissions, it had been unthinkable that they would choose to betray the government they had sworn to represent. The government of the United Kingdom was not an abstract notion to these individuals, but rather an institution to which they belonged, and which had been a constant throughout their lives. Many had been appointed to their positions as a reward for their loyalty, and they recognised that it would be dishonourable to abandon these positions because the political situation in Ireland had begun to favour the revolutionaries. James F. O'Donnell, a sub Post-Master in County Donegal, was approached by representatives of the republican movement shortly after the 1916 Rising. These men had hoped that O'Donnell might be willing to betray his employers and provide the Volunteers with information the police and government were transmitting through the Post Office. O'Donnell had refused to assist the Volunteers, however, telling them that it would be dishonourable to act in such a dishonest manner while a "paid servant of the Government".[82] When asked to provide details of their allegiance, other applicants who had held civil service or other official positions explained to the IGC that those who had been "acting in a Government capacity" had had a duty to maintain their support the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, regardless of the personal sacrifices.[83]

[81] CO 762/38/568.
[82] CO 762/03/04.
[83] See, for example, CO 762/19/226; CO 762/56/862.

Civil servants and other government representatives in Ireland who had chosen to remain in their posts in the years after 1916 had done so for a number of reasons, including loyalty to their employer and to their colleagues. By continuing with their work and refusing to resign their positions, these applicants were also able to make a very public statement about their own personal allegiance. One applicant, a retired RIC County Inspector who had later been appointed as a magistrate, wrote to the IGC of his "conspicuous loyalty" in deciding to remain in his position.[84] Another emphasised his "sworn (and voluntarily given) allegiance to the Government", which he refused to hide or betray.[85] George Richard Williams, a Commission of the Peace in Sligo, refused to resign his position during the War of Independence, later explaining to the IGC that "I functioned as a Magistrate to the last moment, notwithstanding the threats levelled at me for so doing. I supported British rule all my lifetime and did so to the end openly and fearlessly. I scorned to hide my patriotism and suffered heavily as a consequence."[86] Such open demonstrations of loyalty took tremendous bravery in 1920 and 1921, earning the admiration of other loyalists and British observers. A Brigadier Vasser, who had been the commander of the Battery quartered at Clogheen, County Tipperary in 1920, wrote to the IGC in 1929 to support the claim of Dr. William Patrick Walsh, who had served as a Medical Attendant to the military and the RIC in the region. Vasser explained to the IGC that:

> During that period of 2 years I got to know Dr Walsh very well, not only in his official capacity but also as a private practitioner - for he attended the Troops as MO and also my wife and family. I can say that in that district there were many Loyalists in Life Service but very few who put their so-called loyalty into actual practice. Dr. Walsh was one of those who put loyalty before anything and who actually carried out his principles to the letter… [87]

[84] CO 762/112/1922.
[85] CO 762/102/1735.
[86] CO 762/195/3485.
[87] CO 762/25/335.

In another case, an applicant's dedication to his work as a magistrate in County Cork earned him praise from a number of prominent local individuals. Although these references did not necessarily share his allegiance to the crown, they nonetheless admired his "unswerving loyalty" and faithfulness to the government of the United Kingdom.[88]

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Loyalists who had actively served the government in Ireland or elsewhere in the empire felt it unnecessary to supply the IGC with elaborate statements regarding their patriotism; the fulfilment of the duties associated with their positions, whether they were ex-servicemen, or had belonged to the RIC or civil service, provided them with evidence of the 'active loyalty' so highly valued by members of the IGC, as well as by the loyalist community in Ireland. In comparison, individuals who had not worked in an official capacity for the government frequently struggled to convince the IGC, as well as their fellow loyalists, that they had satisfied their obligations as loyal citizens by actively supporting the government of the United Kingdom. When asked about their allegiance on the IGC application form, 250 applicants in the sample group cited examples of what they considered to be active support for the government of the United Kingdom, excluding service in the armed forces, the RIC or the civil service. Two-thirds of these applicants, or 166 individuals, received compensation from the IGC for their claims.

Applicants who had been members of unionist clubs and other loyalist associations, for instance, evidently assumed that their involvement in such groups constituted proof of their committed support for British rule in Ireland. In response to the question regarding their allegiance on the IGC application form, nineteen applicants cited their participation in unionist politics as evidence of their loyalty; Edward Hall Taylor, for example, wrote that he had been the Secretary of the Rathdowny Branch of the Irish Unionist Alliance in Queen's County, "which may

[88] CO 762/113/1939.

have added animus to my republican neighbours."[89] Another applicant, William Huggard of Limerick, described himself as a "well-known loyalist all my life," and in addition to his position as Justice of the Peace for Kerry and Income Tax Collector, he also mentioned his membership in the Primrose League as evidence of his support for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.[90] Fourteen applicants in the sample group pointed to their involvement in the Orange Order when asked by the committee to provide evidence of their allegiance; nine had received compensation from the IGC, two of whom also acknowledged signing the Ulster Solemn League and Covenant in 1912.[91]

Some applicants might have thought that showing too strong of an affinity for the Orange Order or Covenant, both popularly associated with the political unrest of the 1912-1914 period, would be distasteful to the civil servants in London tasked with evaluating their claims for compensation. However, any involvement in unionist political associations or loyalist groups in the pre-revolution period had represented a very public declaration of support for the Union between Britain and Ireland, and members of such organisations had suffered immensely during the revolution. From the applications submitted to the IGC, as well as the loyalist communal narratives popularised during and after the revolution, it is evident that many loyalists had felt that they were obligated as loyal Irishmen and British subjects to speak out in defence of their political views at a time when the Union was coming under sustained attack. As the allegiance of loyalists who had been associated with unionist politics and associations such as the Primrose League or Orange Order was public knowledge, these individuals were left vulnerable and exposed during the revolution. One applicant from County Donegal explained to the IGC that once the RIC had been withdrawn in 1922, "people like myself, whose feelings were so well

[89] CO 762/10/73. For further examples of applicants citing involvement in unionist politics as evidence of their allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom, see Files No. 36, 1048, 1277.
[90] CO 762/53/801.
[91] For references to Covenant, see CO 762/177/3098 and CO 762/183/3196.

known, were victimised in every way," while others in the sample group described themselves as a "known strong Unionist" and "a declared Unionist," and explained how their "well-known" connections with loyalist associations and the unionist political movement had attracted resentment and hostility from the Irregulars and their supporters.[92]

As they had been fully aware of the risks in publicly voicing unpopular political views, individuals who had openly defended their allegiance judged themselves to be "active" loyalists. Similarly, applicants in the sample group who had refused to subscribe to the republican cause or who had publicly rejected republican requests for assistance during the revolution also believed themselves to be "active" loyalists, and referred to themselves as such in their correspondence with the IGC. When asked to provide evidence of their loyalty, a total of forty-nine successful applicants described situations in which they personally refused to join the IRA or provide the movement with financial support.[93] Dawson Miller in County Carlow had not allowed three revolutionaries into his house and refused to provide them with food and shelter; he was subjected to a number of violent raids before his house was burned in February 1923.[94] When asked to subscribe to republican funds, Thomas Parker from County Wicklow refused to do so: "I was told even a small contribution would do, but I refused and said I'd take the consequences."[95] Leo Mulhern resisted all attempts to recruit him into "the ranks of Sinn Fein", despite later receiving threats and being subjected to a boycott.[96]

While a reluctance to support the revolutionary movement was not necessarily indicative of allegiance to the United Kingdom, a refusal to assist the IRA during the War of Independence was popularly perceived as a public declaration of support for the government of

[92] CO 762/66/1048; CO 762/15/174; CO 762/93/2543; CO762/110/1888.
[93] See, for example, Files No. 828, 838, 1256, 1456.
[94] CO 762/92/1535.
[95] CO 762/28/398.
[96] CO 762/89/1456.

the United Kingdom. For the average Irishmen and women - small farmers and shopkeepers with limited political or social influence – refusing to co-operate with the IRA was one of the few means available to them of publicly embracing a loyalist identity in a meaningful way. As Jacob Landen, a farmer from Ardravinna in County Cork, explained to the IGC:

> I refused to recognise or support the Irish Republican Government or army, by subscribing to their funds or in any other way. This was the only means at my disposal, by which I could show my support of the British Government. If the British Government do not[sic] consider this placed me in the ranks of their supporters, the Irish Republican Army thought so, and made me pay the penalty for my loyalty…[97]

As Landen's statement suggests, the IGC was initially sceptical regarding the validity of claims based on refusals to support the IRA and later the Irregulars. However, committee members came to appreciate the bravery of these applicants; individuals who had refused to assist the IRA with its campaign did so in the knowledge that the repercussions for their actions would be severe. In July 1920, as the violence in Ireland began to spiral out of control, a letter was published by the *Church of Ireland Gazette,* in which a member of the church asked for guidance regarding the issue of taxes and other fines that being claimed by representatives of Dail Eireann. The author of the letter stated that payment to Dail Eireann implied an acceptance of the republican agenda, but he was unsure what other action could be taken by loyalists. "We can leave the country, which means "Every one for himself and the devil takes the hindmost," or *we can refuse to pay and take the consequences,* which will be useless unless our united action is adequately supported and protected by both Church and State."[98] Support from the government or the Church of Ireland was sadly lacking, however, and those who had challenged the republican movement during the War of Independence often paid the price during the Civil War. At best those who refused to subscribe to republican funds could anticipate raids and

[97] CO 762/34/508.
[98] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 9 July 1920.

thefts, as the IRA and later Irregulars stole goods in lieu of subscription fees.[99] At worst, however, loyalists who refused to concede to republican demands faced threats, boycotts, destruction of property, and often exile.[100]

Members of the Irish Grants Committee might have initially dismissed claims in which the applicants insisted that their refusal to join or subscribe to the IRA was proof of their loyalty, but they eventually came to accept that many of these applicants had been primarily motivated by their allegiance to the United Kingdom. The committee, however, was never fully comfortable with cases that constituted another category of "active" allegiance, in which the applicant's loyalty rested on claims that he or she had enjoyed "friendly relations" with the RIC and military forces.[101] At least 167 applicants within the sample group claimed to have been on friendly terms with the RIC and military in response to questions regarding their allegiance. As the committee began its investigations, however, it soon became evident that "friendly relations" encompassed any form of non-hostile behaviour towards the crown forces, from not actively interfering with police activities, to permitting police and soldiers to purchase goods in their shops and businesses, to providing the RIC with valuable information regarding republican activity during the War of Independence.

The IGC generally displayed the greatest sympathy for claims involving individuals who had offered meaningful assistance to the RIC at great personal risk, favouring in particular applicants who could provide tangible evidence of their support for the crown forces. Sixty-six successful applicants offered what might be termed active support for the RIC and military stationed in Ireland from 1916-1921. A few of these applicants described socialising with members of the armed forces, entertaining them in their homes and offering the men other

[99] See, for example, Files No. 1527, 2487, 2387.
[100] See, for example, Files No. 2535, 3699, 3608.
[101] See, for example, CO 762/64/1006 for an example of a claim based on "friendly relations to the British crown forces".

opportunities to leave their military barracks, at least temporarily, in the early stages of the War of Independence.[102] Isaac Charles Gibson of Geashill, King's County, for example, explained to the IGC that he had received threatening letters as a result of his support of the troops during the 1916 rebellion. These warnings did not deter him from socialising with members of the armed forces during the War of Independence, however, as Gibson went on to describe how he had accompanied "auxiliaries shooting near Ballykean district where I had shooting" throughout 1920, although these outings were eventually brought to an end when he received information that an ambush was planned for one such shooting party.[103]

The majority of successful applicants who had applied on the grounds of their support for the crown forces in Ireland, however, had done more than socialise with members of the armed forces; they had supplied the RIC and the military with goods and services throughout the 1919-1921 period and had suffered considerable losses as a result. Some applicants had assisted the RIC in an informal capacity, either providing the men with food and milk during social visits, or buying supplies and passing the goods on to the police force surreptitiously to avoid detection.[104] Other applicants had continued to allow members of the armed forces and their families to frequent their shops, businesses, and public houses, ignoring growing pressure to boycott members of the RIC and military.[105] Benjamin Stone, a small shopkeeper in Youghal, County Cork, was himself a former member of the RIC with over twenty-seven years of service; he was on good terms with the soldiers, coastguards, and police in the region (although he did complain that the Black and Tans left the area without paying their debts), and continued to supply the crown forces with goods, despite receiving "several threatening letters warning me to sever my associations with the British troops". When the police and military were withdrawn

[102] See, for example, Files No. 11, 421, 155, 2364.
[103] CO 762/93/1541.
[104] See, for example, Files No. 1646, 250, 648, 2364.
[105] See, for example, Files No. 223, 857, 1006, 1837, 2982.

from Ireland, he found himself his boycotted and was forced to sell his shop. His wife, a nurse, was also boycotted, with a local Catholic priest allegedly claiming that he would refuse to baptize any child whose birth she had attended.[106] Richard Sweetnam operated a garage out of Listowel, County Kerry and frequently did repairs for the police, despite receiving threatening letters warning him to close his business. He was eventually given police protection, but during the Truce he was fired upon and decided to leave for England. His bitterness is apparent in a letter that he wrote to the old IGC in November 1923, a copy of which was attached to his file: "I stood by my King and flag during the dark hours of terror and lost my only means of livelihood, and now have to suffer in silence for my loyalty."[107]

Despite many loyalist applicants suggesting that they had been on good terms with the crown forces before and during the revolution, members of the police force and military stationed in Ireland during the 1919-1921 period later complained that they had received little assistance from the civilian population. They expressed disgust at the attitudes of southern loyalists, who had demanded protection from the government, but who were rarely willing to aid the crown forces with their efforts to halt republican activity in Ireland.[108] Attempts by representatives of the crown forces to win over support from the local population were largely unsuccessful. In Cork City, for example, General Strickland gave two interviews asking civilians to come forward with information about republican activity, while anonymous pamphlets appealing for information regarding attacks on police were also left in doorways, but such repeated appeals for assistance appear to have produced few results.[109] While few scholars have found evidence to suggest that loyalists offered meaningful assistance to the crown forces

[106] CO 762/14/149.
[107] CO 762/119/2058.
[108] Buckland, *Irish Unionism: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland,* xxiv, 211.
[109] John Borgonovo, *Spies, Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Fein Society': The Intelligence War in Cork City, 1920-21* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 124-130.

during the War of Independence, John Borgonovo has recently published a study in which he argues that informing by loyalists was more widespread than is generally believed, at least in Cork City during the 1920-1921 period. He suggests, for example, that there was a possible civilian loyalist spy ring operating in Cork and points to the large numbers of civilians who were executed during this period by the IRA as evidence that loyalists were actively working against Irish revolutionaries.[110]

One might expect that the IGC files would contain considerable evidence regarding civilian informers and their work on behalf of the armed forces, and yet very few applicants said anything about providing the crown forces with intelligence information during the War of Independence when asked questions about their allegiance. In the sample group created for this study, for example, twenty-seven individuals, or less than 3 percent of applicants, explicitly stated within their application forms that they had provided information to the crown forces, with compensation awarded in nineteen of these cases. The successful applicants consisted of thirteen men and six women, half of whom were farmers or farm labourers. Nine of the successful applicants were from Leinster, six of whom were located in the midlands; the remaining applicants were from Munster (six) and Connacht (four). Most applicants did not provide the IGC with many details regarding the information that they had passed on to the military; many appear to have warned the military of planned ambushes and raids, while others gave information regarding the location of arms and wanted men.[111] John MacBeth, stationmaster at Banteer, County Cork, claimed to have given warnings "on several occasions"

[110] Borgonovo, *Spies, Informers and the 'Anti-Sinn Fein Society'*, passim. Borgonovo's findings regarding loyalist and Protestant informers are somewhat undermined by his reliance on republican sources. For a review of Borgonovo's work that is also connected to the wider debates on this period, see Peter Hart, "Review," *History Ireland* 15, no 2 (March/April 2007). For more on the issue of informers elsewhere Ireland, see Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerilla Warfare* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1996), 291; Michael Farry, *The Aftermath of Revolution: Sligo*, *1921-1923* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2000), 186; Peter Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
[111] See, for example, Files No. 399, 3511, 3067.

to the police, "which must have been the means of saving many lives". On one occasion, he explained to the IGC, he had warned a group of Auxiliaries not to travel on foot between Banteer and Millstreet because of a planned ambush, and arranged for a special train to carry the police safely to their destination.[112] Annie Taylor had discovered IRA guns hidden in her field in County Carlow, and as a supporter of the government had felt it was "her duty" to inform the police. In July 1921, raiders entered her house and smashed all of her belongings, forcing her to live elsewhere for two months, although it is unclear if the two events were related.[113]

Only two successful applicants in the sample group provided letters from former or current members of the crown forces confirming that they had acted as informers. Dudley Ryder Ensor of King's County wrote that he had given information "on several occasions to the RIC resulting in a number of rebels being interned." The lawyer's papers for his case contained a copy of a letter written by M. O'Sullivan, ex-Head Constable of the RIC, in which O'Sullivan praised Ensor's bravery:

> During the years 1920 and 1921 I was in close touch with him [Ensor]. Whenever information of value came into his possession very often he cycled here to Birr to see me. I need not point out that this was a self-imposed task, but I mention it as affording an index to the fine spirit of loyalty and bravery by which he was at all times animated. I have no hesitation in stating that I have never in my experience met a more loyal or brave man.[114]

Not all applicants had been recognised for their bravery or loyalty, however, in part because fear of discovery had led individuals such as Madeline Dunkling to act anonymously and to conceal their actions even from other members of the loyalist community. Dunkling claimed to have discovered plans for an imminent attack on the local police barracks, and had therefore written a note of warning and slipped it under the doors of the barracks later that night to avoid

[112] CO 762/92/1531.
[113] CO 762/96/1615.
[114] CO 762/99/1674. For a similar case see CO 762/75/1215.

detection.[115] Another applicant informed the IGC that he had given "valuable information" to the local Commanding Officer of the crown forces, but also admitted that he had little evidence to support his claim, as "I have been afraid until now to state my real case."[116] In one of the most extreme cases reported to the IGC, an applicant had provided information to the military but had fled to Wales to avoid discovery, living under an assumed name. His sudden disappearance had led many in the region to assume that he had been killed by the IRA, and his references were shocked when contacted by the IGC, whose members were struggling to confirm the details provided by the applicant.[117] Fears of being publicly exposed as an informer were justified, as the IRA and their supporters could inflict severe punishments upon individuals suspected of assisting the crown forces. In the Dunkling case, it was popularly believed that the police had been warned by a female servant who worked at the barracks; she was attacked and beaten, and later died of her injuries. Others described being physically assaulted and forced to flee their homes when it became known that they had conveyed information to the RIC and military.[118] Isabella Latimer sought compensation for the loss of her husband, who had been murdered in March 1921 as punishment for passing on information regarding the location of rebels active in the Leitrim area.[119]

Given their concerns regarding the repercussions of being publicly identified as a "spy" or "informer," loyalists might be forgiven for being unwilling to provide the IGC with detailed accounts of their activities. Several applicants and their supporters expressed their reluctance to fully reveal their support for the government of the United Kingdom in writing, despite the passage of time, and in some instances, the resettlement of applicants outside of Ireland. J.

[115] CO 762/55/834.
[116] CO 762/73/1196.
[117] CO 762/192/3398.
[118] CO 762/73/1196; CO 762/92/1531.
[119] CO 762/04/14.

Russell, an ex-District Inspector with the RIC, wrote to George R. Williams' solicitor in response to a request for a letter of reference for Williams' application. Russell stated that he would be willing to confirm Williams' loyalty and assistance, but added "I cannot state the really important things he did as it would be highly dangerous to you, Mr. Williams, and myself." In his statement for the IGC, Russell also wrote that "In the fight against revolution Mr. Williams rendered other highly valuable assistance the particulars of which I am prepared to state but orally only."[120] The solicitor for the Patterson family similarly refused to put certain details regarding the case and the family's loyalty in writing for fear that the information might be leaked, although the Pattersons had already migrated to New Zealand.[121] In another case the applicant contacted the IGC to protest the size of her grant, stating that she had been expecting to testify in person before the committee, where she planned to reveal her role in preventing a raid and saving the lives of eight policemen. She complained that the details had not been included in her application form, as she "couldn't give on paper the details of what I had to say, owing to the exceptional circumstances of my case, and to the danger of my communication being intercepted in the post."[122]

It is possible that applicants who feared their written correspondence might be intercepted supplied the IGC with further information through other means, such as personal interviews or telephone conversations, and that these details were not fully recorded in their files. Yet it is striking how many applicants appeared unwilling to fully acknowledge their role in passing information to the crown forces in Ireland at a time when they were attempting to convince the IGC that they were worthy of compensation. Some applicants, like Marcus Patterson, simply stated that they were "active supporters" of the Government of the United

[120] CO 762/195/3485.
[121] CO 762/68/1101.
[122] CO 762/100/1703.

Kingdom, when they had in fact provided the crown forces with essential information.[123] Others mentioned their active support for the crown forces only in the context of other examples of their active allegiance. It is clear, for example, that Robert Hurst felt his refusal to subscribe to the Volunteers and his participation in the war effort were just as significant to his case as his decision to warn the police of an ambush.[124] Others failed to mention their service on behalf of the crown forces when completing their application forms, only bringing their activities to the committee's attention afterwards. In his application form, Jonathan Boyers of County Sligo wrote simply that he had given "every assistance in my power to crown forces," for example, and his role in providing information to the police was only revealed by one of his references.[125] Richard Clark of County Sligo described himself as a member of the Church of Ireland minority, adding that his family "have never identified ourselves in any movement except a loyal and constitutional one." It was only through correspondence with one of his referees that the IGC learned he had gone to considerable effort to warn the RIC of a planned attack on their barracks in 1920.[126]

At the same time, a sizeable number of applicants in the sample group took care to inform the IGC that they had been accused of being spies and informers by the IRA, without confirming or denying these accusations in their application forms or in their subsequent correspondence with the IGC.[127] These applicants were likely trying to mislead the committee - by including accusations made against them by the IRA, they were not only accounting for the motives of their attacks, but also implying that they had been more active in their support of the government of the United Kingdom than was indeed the case. The IGC, however, were unwilling

[123] CO 762/68/1101.
[124] CO 762/140/2360.
[125] CO 762/202/3666.
[126] CO 762/200/3625.
[127] See, for example, Files No. 207, 324, 485, 832, 1312, 2356.

to award compensation solely on the grounds that the IRA had accused the applicant of supporting the crown forces, although in the course of its investigations, the committee discovered that in a few such cases, the applicants had indeed supplied information to the police or military.[128] It would appear that some applicants were either too frightened to admit to the IGC the extent to which they had supported the RIC and military during the War of Independence, or that they simply did not believe that their assistance had been significant enough to bring to the attention of the committee.

It is clear that loyalists who assisted the police, either by providing supplies or information, faced terrible repercussions if and when their activities became known to the public. Very few applicants explained to the IGC their reasons for taking such immense personal risks for a government that was ultimately unable to protect them. Individuals occasionally referenced family traditions of loyalty in response to the committee's questions regarding their allegiance, suggesting that their support for the government of the United Kingdom had been ingrained from a young age. Many such applicants mentioned personal connections to the crown forces, whether through their own service in the police or army, or the service of other family members.[129] William John Rafter was a draper from Tullamore who provided supplies for the RIC throughout the War of Independence. He explained in his application that "I am a loyalist and always have been and so are my family. I am the son of a Sergeant in the Royal Irish Constabulary…and several brothers were in the RIC and three brothers were in the Army during the War…". Rafter clearly had friendly relations with members of the crown forces, and he could not conceive of abandoning them during the conflict, as he wrote to the IGC:

> At the end of 1920 the RIC were shot down at sight and even then I was friendly with them - some of them having gone through France with my brothers - although I knew my loyalist sentiments would have,

[128] See, for example, Files No. 11, 3051, 3303, 3666.
[129] See, for example, Files No. 149, 181, 223, 403, 573.

> and before long had, a bad effect on my business yet my sympathies were all with them…[130]

Men in the RIC were often members of the local community who had generally enjoyed good relations with their loyalist neighbours prior to the revolution. Even newer recruits into the force, the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries, found it possible to integrate into the local loyalist and Protestant communities during the early phases of the War of Independence. Applicants like Rafter found it impossible to turn their backs on individuals they knew personally, and whose families often lived in the local community.[131] Several applicants found themselves facing republican anger when, acting out of compassion or a sense of morality, they refused to observe the boycotts and campaigns of intimidation that targeted policemen and their families from 1920 onwards. Two successful applicants described attending funerals of murdered RIC men, for example; two others, both undertakers, helped to bury murdered members of the RIC and comfort their families. In all of these cases, the repercussions were immediate and extreme; Leo Mulhern, one of the undertakers, was boycotted, raided, and fired upon, and described his life during this period as "intolerable."[132]

Occasionally applicants suggested that they were acting out of a sense of duty, and that they were supporting the police force and military because it was their obligation as patriotic Irish and loyal British subjects.[133] For the most part, however, it was left to others to describe an applicant's active support for the crown forces in the context of loyalist obligations to the state and to their fellow loyalists.[134] The solicitor for George Davidson, for example, summed up his client's efforts on behalf of the police and military as doing "his duty as a loyal citizen should,"

[130] CO 762/173/2982.
[131] See, for example, CO 762/60/924.
[132] For the file of Mulhern, see CO 762/89/1456. For the other examples, see Files No. 1150, 3410, 3454.
[133] See, for example, CO 762/56/857 and CO 762/119/2058.
[134] See, for example, CO 762/25/335 and CO 762/99/1674.

endeavouring "to the best of his abilities to prevent…crime, intimidation and terrorism."[135] Praising James Phelan for supplying the RIC with food, one reference suggested that Phelan was "following the British ideal, as opposed to distinct from [sic] the purely local and Irish one."[136] Many referees, however, imitated the example of the applicants on whose behalf they were writing the letters, and simply confirmed that the applicants had provided supplies or other support to the crown forces. Given the potential repercussions of assisting the police or military in Ireland during the War of Independence, it did not seem necessary to elaborate on the allegiance of those who had risked their property and lives to assist the crown forces.

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Members of the loyalist community, and especially vocal supporters of the southern loyalist cause such as SILRA, placed *active* loyalists such as ex-servicemen and disbanded members of the RIC at the forefront of their propaganda campaigns in the early twentieth century, in order to win more sympathy and respect for southern loyalists in the British Isles and the empire.[137] The emphasis within the community on active allegiance, however, likely troubled many loyalists who were attempting to rebuild their lives in the aftermath of the revolution, especially those seeking compensation for revolutionary losses. Although these individuals could produce little, if any, evidence of active support for the government of the United Kingdom, they identified nonetheless as members of the loyalist community, and they were adamant that their losses had arisen as a result of their allegiance. "Passive" loyalists presented considerable challenges to the IGC, who quickly realised that committee members would be required to investigate large numbers of claims in which the applicants were only capable of supplying what appeared to be vague, perhaps meaningless statements regarding their allegiance to the

[135] CO 762/42/648.
[136] CO 762/177/3108.
[137] See Chapter 2.

government. In response to the question regarding allegiance found on the IGC official application form, 420 individuals, or 46 percent of the sample group, provided what might be termed 'passive statements' of loyalty. "I was always a good loyalist and subject to the laws of the land," wrote one applicant, while another assured the IGC that the destruction of her family's property "was done in consequence of our allegiance to the Gov of the United Kingdom."[138]

Yet as unimpressive as such statements seemed to be, the IGC clearly discovered sufficient evidence to confirm the allegiance of many of these applicants, as the committee eventually made recommendations in 65 percent of claims where the applicants had offered passive statements of allegiance. It was not unusual for information regarding an applicant's allegiance to be found elsewhere in the application or to be submitted independently from the initial claim form. Some applicants had evidently been confused by the IGC's official application form, and answered the questions incorrectly; in answer to the question regarding his allegiance, for example, Samuel Atkinson curiously described a cattle drive that had robbed him of his livestock, although he also added that he had never joined the rebels "in any way." Yet in his response to another question on the application form, Atkinson mentioned the death of his son in France during the war and noted his own contributions to the war effort.[139] Jeremiah Long, a shopkeeper from County Cork, wrote only that he had "always been a loyalist and befriended British soldiers and the families of murdered loyalists in this neighbourhood" when replying to the question regarding his allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom. Elsewhere on the application form, however, he stated that he and his wife had provided refreshments to troops after an ambush killed several men of the Hampshire Regiment. Long also enclosed a separate letter with his application form, in which he described himself as "the

[138] CO 762/17/202: CO 762/31/441; See also Files No. 836, 942, 1973.
[139] CO 762/48/737.

representative of the oldest family of Protestant Loyalists in this district" and admitted to being "a prominent member of the Masonic Order (the oldest subscribing member of Youghal Lodge and past officer of the Grand Lodge of Ireland)".[140]

In cases where the applicants had engaged the services of a solicitor, the official application form was often completed as a formality, with few details provided regarding the applicant's losses or allegiance. After the application form had been submitted, however, solicitors would prepare what were known as "the lawyer's proofs," extensive collections of records and statements containing the information required by the IGC to evaluate the claim.[141] In response to the question of whether his losses were the result of his allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom, William Leader had simply written on his application form, "Yes." The papers that were later submitted by his solicitor, however, documented Leader's long record of service to the government, including his work as a Justice of the Peace and Deputy Lieutenant for the County of Cork, as well as his refusal to resign his positions during the War of Independence following republican threats.[142]

Yet less than half of successful claimants in the sample group were represented by solicitors, and committee members could therefore not assume that further documentation would be submitted after the IGC had received a claimant's initial application form.[143] The committee could choose to contact applicants directly when they required further evidence of support for the government of the United Kingdom, generally posting letters that contained a list of questions to guide the applicant's response. John Lambert from Craughwell, County Galway, for example, initially attributed his losses to "my being a loyal British subject and the

[140] CO 762/27/379. See also Files No. 626, 640, 627, 715, 1815.
[141] See, for example, Files No. 605, 1358, 2755.
[142] CO 762/106/1820.
[143] Three hundred and forty-two applicants in the sample group were represented by solicitors at some point during the compensation process, with 240 being awarded by compensation from the IGC.

surrounding population being republican." When questioned about his allegiance by the IGC, however, he revealed that he had entertained the Auxiliaries ("better known as the "Black and Tans") at his house during the War of Independence and that he had in fact been welcoming troops into his home since before 1916, despite threats of violence directed towards others in the region who had been on similarly good terms with the armed forces.[144] Deborah Ball had replied to the question regarding her allegiance by stating that she had been "always a loyalist." Although her solicitor complained that he was finding it difficult to procure evidence to support her allegiance, he was able to elaborate upon her response, noting that her father had been a well-known loyalist active in local politics.[145]

In most instances where the IGC required further details regarding the applicant's allegiance, however, committee members preferred to contact the referees whose names had been provided on the application form, or other well-known loyalists who might be familiar with the claim in question. Whereas an applicant might waver or continue to submit vague statements that failed to provide details of his or her loyalty, referees were more likely to deliver a straightforward confirmation or denial of the applicant's pre-revolutionary allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom.[146] George Loftus Bassett, for example, stated on his application form that "I was a well-known professing Loyalist as my father was before me, and my losses arose owing to my loyalty." When contacted by the IGC, his referees were able to confirm not only that he was a "staunch loyalist to the very end," but also provided further details as to how his outspoken support for the Union had resulted in threats and a boycott of his business as a coal merchant, eventually forcing him to leave Ireland.[147] Similarly, George Cartwright was very evasive when responding to the question regarding his allegiance, making

[144] CO 762/61/942.
[145] CO 762/110/1898
[146] See, for example, Files No. 116, 310, 836, 3537, 3625.
[147] CO 762/93/1559.

vague allusions to his loyalty to the government and support for the military. One of Cartwrights's referees was responsible for informing the committee that Cartwright had long been engaged in unionist political activity and had once served as an "emergencyman" for Lord Audilaun, presumably during the Land War.[148]

The committee's reliance on the opinions of others who were better situated to appraise an applicant's losses and allegiance allowed the IGC to fairly compensate genuine loyalists who had suffered traumatic losses during the revolution. It is not surprising that the IGC appears to have favoured statements from referees who were prominent members of the loyalist community or who were known to the committee members personally. However, the familiarity of the committee with several references meant that these individuals were rarely required to submit formal, detailed statements that directly addressed any questions surrounding an applicant's allegiance. As a result it is not always possible to discover from the IGC records how some passive loyalists qualified as members of the southern loyalist community, as their referees only provided short statements that confirming that the applicants were "genuine" loyalists. Additionally, some referees chose to communicate their findings through telephone calls and personal interviews, records of which were not always placed in the files.

Other references, particularly members of the gentry or well-known political figures, believed that their interest in a case should be considered sufficient evidence of an applicant's allegiance. Lady Mahon, for example, testified on behalf of Canon George Townshend by writing a short note to the IGC that simply assured committee members that they could "absolutely depend on any statement made by him [Townshend]."[149] Applicants took pride in the prominent

[148] CO 762/98/1649.
[149] CO 762/161/2736. Not all well-known applicants adopted this approach however; Lady Clodagh Anson wrote a very long letter on behalf of William Roe of Co. Waterford, for example. See CO 762/108/1861.

figures who intervened on their behalf, correctly recognising that prominent names bestowed a degree of credibility to their claims. One applicant did not attempt to describe his allegiance or give evidence of his loyalty when preparing his application form; instead, he simply pointed out that if he were not a genuine loyalist, "he would not have been supported as he was by Mrs. Leigh White and the Crown Solicitor."[150] In another case, one of the applicant's references argued that the applicant was clearly a loyalist, having previously earned praise from Lord Farnham for his support for the Union.[151]

Details regarding applicants' allegiance were also scarce in claims prepared by SILRA. Of the 223 claims sponsored by the association, 134 contained passive statements of allegiance, yet applicants in all but fourteen of these cases received compensation from the IGC. Once again these passive claimants supplied vague statements when asked to describe their allegiance on the application form. "I was always a loyal supporter of the British Government and had no sympathy with the Republicans," wrote one loyalist who had prepared his application with SILRA's assistance, while another stated that he had been "always a loyal subject of the Crown," adding that "it was only the known loyalists who suffered in our neighbourhood."[152] Referees in both of these cases provided no further details regarding the applicants' losses or behaviour during the revolution, only confirming that the applicants were genuine loyalists. As time went on, SILRA developed a standardised form letter to be signed by the references of IGC applicants; the letter did not provide any specific details about the allegiance of applicants, but simply stated that as far as the referee was aware, the statements contained in the application were true. As SILRA had its own methods of verifying the allegiance of southern loyalists seeking

[150] CO 762/104/1781.
[151] CO 762/98/1649.
[152] CO 762/71/1159; CO 762/144/2434.

reparations, the IGC was willing to accept that the claimants sponsored by the association were genuine loyalists eligible for compensation.[153]

The lack of detailed statements from certain applicants and their referees regarding allegiance can be attributed, at least in part, to confusion over the application process or to information not being recorded properly in the appropriate files. Yet passive statements of allegiance also reflect the struggle of individual loyalists to articulate their allegiance in a manner that would be understood and respected by persons outside of the loyalist community. Individuals who identified as loyalists knew themselves to be part of the wider loyalist population; they had not participated in republican politics or moved in nationalist circles, instead accepting British rule in Ireland and choosing to act as law-abiding citizens, both prior to and during the revolution. While such behaviour might not seem significant to committee members in London, it was sufficient in Ireland to mark a person out as a loyalist. Applicants believed that their short statements in which they described themselves as "a well-known professing Loyalist," "a loyal subject," "a good loyalist and subject to the laws of the lands," and "a law-abiding subject" adequately fulfilled the IGC's request for information about their allegiance and the link between their loyalties and their revolutionary losses.[154] Few had likely been required to justify their loyalist credentials prior to completing the IGC application form; individuals in their local community in Ireland would have been aware of their allegiance and any Irish person would immediately have appreciated the connection between their willingness to accept the government of the United Kingdom and their revolutionary experiences. The ability of referees to confirm the allegiance of certain applicants without mentioning any specific

[153] The records of the Southern Irish Loyalist Relief Association can be found in the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland. The SILRA papers include minutes of association meetings and details of fundraising campaigns. They also contain correspondence with the IGC and with loyalists in the Free State and in Britain seeking compensation and assistance from both organisations. See, for example, "Correspondence concerning cases to be put before the IGC," PRONI D/989/B/3/8.
[154] CO 762/17/202, CO 762/93/1559, CO 762/98/1663, CO 762/87/1423.

situation where the applicant had demonstrated "active loyalty" is similarly tied to a particularly Irish understanding of identity and allegiance. Members of the loyalist community might have emphasized the importance of active loyalty, and openly complained about passive loyalists who had failed to provide support to the crown forces during the revolution, but they were nonetheless ready to recognise law-abiding citizens as fellow loyalists whose willingness to embrace the values associated with southern loyalism had cost them dearly during the 1919-1921 period.

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The existence of a loyalist culture and its role in the allegiance of passive loyalists can be discerned from the responses provided by applicants to the IGC's queries. Many of the passive loyalists who could not provide examples of their own active support pointed to the contributions of family members to the growth and development of the United Kingdom and the Empire. Ninety-nine successful applicants from the sample group mentioned traditions of loyalty within their families when addressing the question of their allegiance on the IGC application form; sixty-one of these applicants relied entirely on family loyalty in their statements, while thirty-eight cited the actions and values of their relatives in conjunction with their own support for the government of the United Kingdom. Applicants such as Richard Beamish and Harold Simson chose to make sweeping statements that provided a general indication of the loyalist tradition that existed within their families; Beamish wrote that "my family, predecessors, have resided in this country (at Cashel and Harehill) for several centuries and have always been loyal subjects of the Government of the United Kingdom" while Simson blamed his losses on his connection through marriage to "a family well-known in County Cork for its loyalist sympathies."[155]

[155] CO 762/79/1301; CO 762/59/917.

Most loyalists citing family allegiance provided more specific details regarding the contributions made by their fathers, brothers, and children to the United Kingdom and the Empire, however. Fifty successful claimants in the sample group mentioned relatives who had served with either the Royal Irish Constabulary or the military, while thirty-nine mentioned family members who had contributed to the war effort between 1914-1918.[156] Maurice O'Brien from County Limerick explained to the IGC that he had two brothers in the Royal Irish Constabulary and had therefore been on friendly terms with the military both prior to the revolution and during the War of Independence.[157] The Reverend Zebulon Wright Miller explained to the RIC that his son had served in the Royal Navy, while Charles Francis de Freyne had "several" brothers who had served during the Great War.[158] Twelve successful applicants also provided details of the work done by relatives in the civil service or who had otherwise represented the government of the United Kingdom in Ireland.[159] Elizabeth Vaughan's husband, a Justice of the Peace and Deputy Lieutenant in Tipperary, was described as a "staunch upholder of the Government of the United Kingdom, especially during periods of disturbances," when he had required police and military protection.[160] In many cases, it was evident that a specific tradition of service to the crown existed within families, with many citing multiple relatives in the RIC or military. James Lloyd of Tipperary wrote that "I was a life long loyalist, and my family was always represented in the British Army," with two nephews currently active in the forces.[161] Another applicant gave the names of four uncles who served in the army or navy, while Henry Flynn explained that he "had a number of relatives in the Army, Navy, Flying Corps and the Royal

[156] See, for example, files 1563, 2387, 2933, 3135.
[157] CO 762/59/902.
[158] CO 762/144/2418, CO 762/146/2466.
[159] See, for example, files 1762, 2358, 3387.
[160] CO 762/99/1673.
[161] CO 762/59/909.

Irish Constabulary. My father served as a Head Constable and I had three Brothers in the RIC."[162]

Applicants who highlighted the active allegiance of their relations in their IGC claims argued that the loyalty of their family members not only reflected their own personal beliefs, but had also placed them at considerable risk during the revolution. Individuals reported being targeted by the IRA because of the actions and allegiance of family members; John Flynn, a farmer in County Cork, claimed that his brother's position as a Sergeant in the RIC meant that "the IRA knew applicant was not a sympathiser of theirs, as is indicated in the attached letter of warning, " while Sarah Twiss of County Tipperary stated that her nephews involvement in the war and her husband's work in the civil service were "well known in the district," rendering her vulnerable to attack.[163] Applicants paid the price for their relative's allegiance in other ways as well; within the sample group there was a number of individuals who were still mourning the loss of loved ones during the Great War, while a few had also experienced more recent losses during the revolution.[164]

By citing family loyalty, applicants were alluding to the existence of a wider loyalist culture to which they and their relatives all subscribed, and which helped to reinforce ties between members of the loyalist community. Passive loyalists clearly hoped that by placing their losses in the wider context of family allegiance, their claims would gain greater credibility owing to the active support for the government of the United Kingdom that had been demonstrated by

[162] CO 762/99/1563, CO 762/171/2933. Emphasising the allegiance of family members, particularly those who made considerable sacrifices for king and country, could have unintended consequences for applicants, however; at least one claimant in the sample group found himself having to explain to the IGC why he had remained at home, while his brothers, whose loyalty he had cited as evidence of the family's allegiance, served at the front during the Great War. CO 762/144/2466.
[163] CO 762/68/1113; CO 762/11/95.
[164] See, for example, files 806, 1151, 1878, 2328. Somewhat cynically, Edward Cantillon, the owner of a farm supply business in Cork City, measured the price of his losses not only in emotional terms but also in wages, explaining that of his brother and three cousins had signed up and only one returned. "…their loss to me was very great," he explained, "having apart from they being my own flesh and blood having to pay wages for a long period to men to do their work." CO 762/38/573.

other family members. Active loyalists and their supporters also emphasised the importance of family allegiance, however, even in cases where the applicant had provided the IGC with sufficient evidence of his or her own allegiance. Southern Irish loyalists clearly believed that allegiance was taught by example, with several applicants mentioning that that their loyalties had been ingrained since childhood. In the southern loyalist community, then, the political allegiance of an individual could be seen to reflect upon the rest of his or her family. In accounting for the theft of cattle from one applicant's farm, for example, Henry Powell Bridge, who had acted as a Solicitor for the applicant in the past, explained to the IGC that "I say definitely that these cattle were taken from Mr. Lloyd because he was a loyalist whose nephews were in the British Army."[165] In another case, both referees confirmed that the applicant, who had a brother in the RIC, was victimised because of his close ties to the police force.[166] Others described the applicants in question as coming from families were all the members were "law-abiding loyal citizens,"[167] "staunch Loyalists,"[168] "respectable loyal people,"[169] "true, loyal and friendly to the crown forces,"[170] "prominent loyalists,"[171] and "loyal British subjects and worthy public-spirited citizens."[172]

Familial loyalty held particular significance for female loyalists, who either lacked opportunities to actively demonstrate their personal support for the government of the United Kingdom, or else were more comfortable expressing their patriotism by drawing attention to the allegiance of their wider family units. Of the 101 female applicants awarded compensation from the IGC, 50 referred to family allegiance only when responding to the question regarding

[165] CO 762/59/909.
[166] CO 762/68/1113.
[167] CO 762/192/3420.
[168] CO 762/204/3705.
[169] CO 762/101/1714.
[170] CO 762/62/964.
[171] CO 762/75/1218.
[172] CO 762/189/3346.

allegiance on the IGC application form. Several female applicants described their husbands' active service to the government of the United Kingdom; Anne Hurley of County Wicklow wrote of her husband's membership in the coastguards, while Mary Murphy from County Tipperary identified her husband as a Crime Special Intelligence Officer.[173] Although the majority of these female applicants focused on the activities of their husbands, some also cited the support given to the United Kingdom by their fathers, brothers, and sons. "The applicant is the daughter of a Major in His Majesty's Army, and it is well known that she and the other members of her family were in sympathy with His Majesty's Government," read Ruth Beaumont's response on her application form regarding the question of her allegiance.[174] Occasionally, female applicants cited the behaviour of their daughters and other female relations as evidence of the family's pro-British allegiance. Sarah Louis of County Galway explained to the IGC that her daughter had married a member of the RIC, while Lizzie Anderson's son-in-law had served with the army, and Olive Byrne from County Wicklow assured that committee that "both my mother and myself were always loyal subjects of the Crown."[175]

It is striking how many female applicants spoke in terms of the family unit, even when the IGC claim was submitted under their own names and they were not specifically describing the service of family members to the government. Female claimants frequently wrote of "our allegiance" and "our loyalty" when communicating with the IGC; it is clear that female applicants were attempting to convey to the committee how the actions of other family members reflected their own political views.[176] These women might not have actively supported the government themselves, but they had done their duty to their families, as well as to the United Kingdom, by supporting their relatives who had publicly demonstrated their loyalties

[173] CO 762/14/154; CO 762/40/615.
[174] CO 762/173/2985.
[175] CO 762/47/728; CO 762/174/3039; CO 762/188/3324.
[176] CO 762/31/441; CO 762/186/3265; see also, for example, files 178, 836, 3467.

before, during, and after the revolution. As a result, these women had suffered alongside their husbands, fathers, and sons during the upheavals of the 1919-1923 period, and they could confidently claim to be entitled to compensation from the IGC. From the "special hard treatment" meted out to Mary Ann Northridge of County Cork because of her brothers' service during the war, to Isabella Latimer's loss of land and complete financial ruin following her husband's decision to inform upon the IRA, female loyalists shared in the wider experiences of their families and community, despite not being able to provide the IGC with examples of their own "active" patriotism.[177]

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Once again it appears that the members of the Irish Grants Committee were caught off guard by the responses of IGC applicants to questions posed during the course of the committee's investigations. Committee members had clearly anticipated straightforward answers to the question on the application form regarding the allegiance of applicants, and were therefore unprepared for the diverse nature of the statements they received from southern loyalists. Loyalists struggling to define and express their allegiance to the United Kingdom often failed to provide the IGC with the answers and evidence it required to evaluate claims; loyalists who could cite examples of active allegiance such as membership in the RIC or the military, for example, believed their loyalty to be self-evident, but the IGC was aware that an individual could have many motives for joining the police force or military, and often sought further evidence of pre-revolutionary allegiance to the United Kingdom. Applicants who had not served the government of the United Kingdom in an official capacity also had a tendency to provide the IGC with only a few details of their allegiance, relying instead on statements that were politically significant from an Irish perspective but which carried little weight with the IGC.

[177] CO 762/101/1727; CO 762/04/14.

In the end, the IGC largely adopted the standards by which loyalty was judged within the southern loyalist community, focusing on the willingness of applicants to publicly acknowledge their allegiance to the government of the United Kingdom prior to and during the revolution, regardless of the personal costs.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION:
TERROR AND SURVIVAL: VULNERABLE MINORITIES, POST-WORLD WAR ONE

The sense of nostalgia that permeated loyalist accounts of their pre-revolutionary lives was inspired not only by their Irish experiences, but also a more general sense that they were witnessing profound changes in the wider world. The Great War had disrupted lives across the European Continent and had destabilised long-standing social and political regimes across the globe. Southern Irish loyalists tended to situate the Irish Revolution and the creation of the Free State in the context of European political developments in the post-war period. Throughout the 1920s, commentators noted that Ireland was not alone in experiencing prolonged social and political unrest. In an editorial regarding crime in the Free State that appeared in the *Church of Ireland Gazette* in January 1924, for example, it was observed that "over five years have passed since the European War came to an end, yet still we have not settled down to a normal condition of affairs. In this respect Ireland does not suffer any more than other countries."[1] In April of the same year, it was again noted that "Ireland has not escaped the unsettlement which has been experienced by every country in Europe."[2]

The post-war context assisted loyalists with their attempts to engage with the ideology and actions of Irish nationalists, as well as with their efforts to come to terms with the partition of Ireland and the creation of the Irish Free State. "The Sinn Feiners demand the kind of independence which is being enjoyed by Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Azerbaijan, and the several other creatures of the recent war," explained one editorial in the *Gazette* shortly after the Truce, while the efforts of the Boundary Commission were compared to the work undertaken by similar commissions in Upper Silesia and the Austrian border with Czechoslovakia.[3] Although

[1] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 4 January 1924.
[2] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 11 April 1924.
[3] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 26 August 1921, 1,15 February, 21 March 1924

such statements were often intended to simply locate the Irish situation within a broader European context, references to developments on the Continent also provided loyalists with opportunities to express their opinions and concerns regarding events in Ireland in an indirect manner. Occasionally developments in Europe were referenced with the intention of reassuring loyalists that their fears regarding Irish nationalism and the Free State were misplaced; one correspondent in the *Gazette* argued that the cultural policies of the new Free State government were not without precedent, pointing to Hungary, Denmark, and "Jugo-Slavia" where similar cultural programs had succeeded in uniting divided populations.[4] For the most part, however, comparisons between the Free State and other European nations reflected loyalist concerns regarding the spread of lawless behaviour and immorality. In the same editorial that noted Sinn Fein's desire for an independent Irish state along the lines of other nations which had emerged as a result of the war rather than the Dominion status which was being offered by Britain, the *Gazette* cautioned Irish nationalists that "the average Pole or Azerbaijanian would give the eyes out of his head to change places with the average Canadian or New Zealander."[5] Loyalists frequently referenced the Russian Revolution and conditions in Soviet Russia, arguing that the Irish Revolution could be seen as similarly "irreligious" in nature and making comparisons between the Soviet economic policies and land grabbing in the Free State.[6]

Loyalist concerns regarding their own futures were similarly reflected in their attitudes towards displaced populations and vulnerable minority groups on the Continent and in the Middle East. Throughout the 1920s, loyalists urged the Free State to use its position within the League of Nations to protect vulnerable communities. As argued by one editorial in the *Gazette,*

[4] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 8 December 1926.
[5] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 26 August 1921.
[6] See, for example, *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 21 May 1920, 10 March 1922, 21 February 1930; "Land Unsettlement in the Free State," *Notes from Ireland* 32, no 6 (November 1936); W. Alison Phillips, *The Revolution in Ireland*, *1906-1923* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1923), 260-62; CO 762/05/25.

"there is no question that the injustices on minorities, which still continues, are among the most likely causes of war."[7] Although loyalists did not explicitly compare their situation with that of Armenian Christians in Turkey and "non-Moslem minorities" in Iraq, loyalist commentators tended to employ the same vocabulary of minority victimisation to describe the plight of religious minorities abroad that they used in reference to the southern loyalist community in the Free State. Loyalist commentators repeatedly praised persecuted Christian minorities for bravely refusing to recant their beliefs, for example, a not-so-subtle reminder that Protestants and loyalists in the Free State had similarly suffered for their own unfaltering adherence to their loyalties and values. Britain was subjected to particular criticisms for its treatment of minority groups ostensibly under its protection; while other minorities across Europe had been protected by peace treaties following the war, loyalists accused Britain of betraying the religious and political minorities who had been its allies during the Great War and who had often been amongst the most outspoken supporters of its empire.[8] While loyalists did not directly place their own experiences in this context, it is clear that they were drawing parallels between the "betrayal" of their community and the "abandonment" of minorities elsewhere.[9]

It is interesting to note that the sympathies of southern loyalists tended to be with minority communities consisting of what might be termed "subject peoples," at least in the context of the British Empire. While one might expect that loyalists would embrace the similarities between themselves and other colonial groups who had enjoyed the privileges arising from close association with Britain and the Imperial government, many loyalists rejected comparisons between their own situations and those of British settlers elsewhere in the empire. The *Gazette* was quite critical of white settlers in east Africa, for example, stating that the

[7] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 15 March 1929. See also *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 26 September 1930.
[8] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 31 March, 1 June 1923, 13 June 1930, 31 July, 9 October 1931.
[9] See, for example, *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 31 July, 9 October 1931.

settlers' vulnerable position was largely due to their exploitation of the colonies and arguing that it would be unfair to give such a small, privileged minority unlimited "self-government".[10] When loyalists sought precedents for their own relationship to Britain and the empire, they tended to turn to the past, focusing on the eighteenth-century loyalists who had suffered immense losses during the American Revolution. Southern Irish loyalists directly compared their plight to the distress of the American loyalists, with both groups claiming to have suffered on account of their undying allegiance to the British state.[11] By incorporating American loyalists into their narratives, southern loyalists were also able to contrast the treatment of the American minority by the British government at the end of the eighteenth century with their own betrayal and abandonment at the beginning of the twentieth century. A series of articles in *Notes from Ireland* repeatedly pointed out that American loyalists were fully compensated for their losses and encouraged to find homes elsewhere in the empire, particularly in the Canadas. The sacrifices and suffering of southern Irish loyalists, by contrast, had yet to receive adequate official recognition.[12]

Southern Irish loyalists clearly felt themselves to be the victims of wider historical forces that had not only threatened the peace and stability of the British Empire in the past, but that were now also responsible for the violence and disorder spreading throughout the empire and the rest of Europe. Yet loyalists rarely created a sophisticated ideological framework for their comparisons between the situation in Ireland and unrest elsewhere in Europe or the British

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[10] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 22 November 1929.

[11] It is estimated that between 1781 and 1784, "tens of thousands of colonists who had supported the British cause during the American Revolution were forced to leave the Thirteen Colonies". Generally known as the United Empire Loyalists, these refugees were drawn from all levels of colonial society and most went on to settle in the Canadian colonies, where their experiences became tied up in English-Canadian national identity. See Jane Errington, "Loyalists," in *The Oxford Companion to Canadian History*, ed. Gerald Hallowell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[12] See, for example, *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 3 May 1929; "The United Empire Loyalists: A Contrast, 1784 and 1923," *Notes from Ireland* 29, no. 14 (August 1923); "The Loyalists – 1782 and 1923," *Notes from Ireland* 30, no. 14 (November 1923).

Empire; such comparisons would have been useful to draw attention to their own circumstances, but it is clear that, aside from the American loyalists at least, they believed themselves to hold a unique position in Ireland and the United Kingdom, as well as in the empire. Historians have also made comparisons between southern Irish loyalists and other "colonial minorities" and "neo-colonial castes" across space and time; R.B. McDowell, for example, begins his book on the southern unionist minority by stating that "receding imperialism usually leaves behind those who have for generations staunchly upheld its authority and flourished under its aegis", citing the Germans in Bohemia, Swedes in Finland, and Muslims in the Balkans as examples.[13] Yet again, however, most such references are simply used as a framing device. Similarly to McDowell, Peter Hart introduces the topic of Irish minorities with the observation that "all of Europe's new post-war states had minority problems: hostile or vulnerable populations offering at least a potential threat…to new-found sovereignty." But he makes few references to European minorities throughout the rest of the article, instead focusing on the experiences of southern Protestants and northern Catholics.[14] Other historians have occasionally labelled southern Protestants as a "colonial" minority, yet again rarely provide context or explanation.[15] By contrast, scholars such as Stephen Howe and Bill Kissane, who have written extensively on British and European comparative contexts for Ireland's nationalist struggle, largely ignore southern loyalists in their works, using the term "minority" to refer almost exclusively to Ulster Unionists.[16]

[13] R.B. McDowell, *Crisis and Decline: the Fate of Southern Unionists* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1997), vii.
[14] Peter Hart, " Ethnic Conflict and Minority Responses," in *The IRA at War*, *1916-1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
[15] See, for example, Kurt Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State* (Montreal-Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), 17 and Ronan Fanning, *Independent Ireland* (Dublin: Helicon, 1983), 40.
[16] Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bill Kissane, *The Politics of the Irish Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and *Explaining Irish Democracy* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2002).

Although there was and is little consensus amongst loyalists and scholars alike regarding the most appropriate context for the revolutionary experiences of the southern minority, it is significant that comparisons between southern Irish loyalists and other marginalised communities all emphasise that these groups consisted of law-abiding citizens, whose lives had suddenly been thrown into disarray as a result of disruptive changes in political authority and social values. In both Europe and the British Empire, it was feared that the war had unleashed evil forces that desired to overthrow the established order. Attacks on law-abiding individuals and the governments they had supported or represented were taken to indicate that these forces were gaining strength. As a result of regime changes or the redistribution of state boundaries, individuals on the Continent who had lived their lives as loyal citizens were suddenly at the mercy of the political and social movements they had attempted to control or destroy. Many found themselves denounced as enemies of the new states, and those who were not forced into exile faced oppression and marginalisation.[17]

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[17] There is a vast amount of literature on the experiences of ethnic and religious minorities in Europe during the interwar period. The work of Carole Fink offers a thorough introduction to attempts to resolve ethnic conflicts and protect minorities through international treaties during the interwar period; see, for example, *Defending the Rights of Others: the Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); "The Paris Peace Conference and the Question of Minority Rights," *Peace and Change* 21, no 3 (1996): 273-288; "The League of Nations and the Minorities Question," *World Affairs* 157, no 4 (1995): 197-205. For more on the League and Nations and minorities, see Stefan Dyroff, "Avant-Garde or Supplement? Advisory Bodies of Transnational Associations as Alternatives to the League's Minority Protection System, 1919-1939," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 24, no 2 (June 2013): 192-208. Mark Mazower, whose work considers official state attitudes towards European minorities throughout the entire twentieth century, offers an evaluation of the interwar treaties in "The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950," *The Historical Journal* 47, no 2 (2004): 379-398 and "Minorities and the League of Nations in Interwar Europe," *Daedalus* 126, no 2 (1997): 47-64.

For examples of specific minority experiences on the continent following the upheavals of the First World War and the various peace treaties, see Mark Cornwall, "'National Reparation?': The Czech Land Reform and the Sudeten Germans, 1918-1938," *Slavonic and East European Review* 75, no 2 (April 1997): 259-280; Winson Chu, *The German Minority in Interwar Poland* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Ladislav Deak, "Minority Rights and Their Implementation in Trianon Hungary," *Human Affairs* 10, no 2 (December 2000): 156-162; John Hiden, *Defenders of Minorities: Paul Schiemann, 1876-1944* (London: Hurst, 2004); V. Krivickas, "The Polish Minority in Lithuania, 1918-1926," *Slavic and East European Review* 53, no 130 (1975): 78-91; Vincent O'Connell, "Left to their Own Devices," *Journal of Belgian History* 43, no 4 (2013): 10-45; N.G. Papp, "The German Minority in Hungary Between the Two World Wars: Loyal Subjects or Suppressed Citizens?" *East European Quarterly*

It is not surprising that southern loyalists demonstrated considerable interest in the plight of minority groups outside of Ireland, and that they hinted at comparisons between their own situation and those of other communities similarly dispossessed and ostracized as a result of the violence and disorder of the post-war period. Ironically, the concept of an all-encompassing conflict between good and evil, between loyal and disloyal, was not new to Irish loyalists, who had long believed that they were engaged in a struggle against the forces of disorder. Loyalists throughout Ireland had insisted that their loyalty distinguished them from their "disloyal" republican neighbours, and they also believed loyalism to be a civilising influence upon an Irish culture that favoured violence and disloyalty.[18] As Kurt Bowen observed of the southern Irish loyalists, "like other colonial minorities, they were convinced that not only their own interests but those of the entire nation were bound to suffer if the guiding hand of their experienced leadership was removed."[19]

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To receive compensation from the IGC, applicants not only had to convince committee members of their loyalty to crown and empire, but also to demonstrate that their losses directly resulted from their support for the government of the United Kingdom. While many loyalists struggled to convey to the committee precisely how their losses had been related to their constitutional ideology, few challenged the suggestion that conflicting political ideologies had played a significant role in producing communal violence during the revolution. Throughout the upheavals of the 1919-1923 period and the early years of the Free State, moderate loyalists had

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22, no 4 (Winter 1988): 495-514; Ioan Scurtu, "The Evolution of Romania in the Inter-War Period: The Status of National Minorities, 1918-1939," *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* 39, no 1-4 (2000): 189-202; Cameron J Watson, "Ethnic Conflict and the League of Nations: The Case of Transylvania, 1918-1940," *Hungarian Studies* 9, no 1/2 (1994): 173-180.

[18] The distinction between "loyal" and "disloyal" was an essential element to Ulster unionism as well; see, for example, David W. Miller, *Queen's Rebels: Ulster Loyalism in Historical Perspective* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978), 110, 119-120.

[19] Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State,* 17.

insisted that violence against minority populations had been motivated primarily by political differences. Several leading members of the Protestant community in Ireland had attempted to curtail public suggestions that the violence in southern Ireland was sectarian in nature. In an article that appeared in the *Review of Churches* in January 1924, John Henry Bernard, the provost of Trinity College, discussed the development of the Church of Ireland from disestablishment onwards. The *Church of Ireland Gazette* drew the attention of its readers to this "splendid article," praising in particular the sections in which Dr. Bernard had considered relations between Protestants and Catholics in southern Ireland. Bernard argued that between 1920 and 1923, "there have, indeed, been outbursts of violence directed against loyalist minorities," but he added, "for the most part it has been *qua* loyalists, and not *qua* Protestants," an opinion that the *Gazette* apparently shared.[20]

Individuals who had been active in the civil service or the RIC apparently saw little need to elaborate upon their allegiance largely because they believed that the correlation between their loyalties and losses during the revolution would be obvious to anyone, including the IGC in London.[21] One applicant who had served with the RIC wrote that his failure to leave the force at the insistence of the IRA "was the sole reason they boycotted my wife and family and persecuted myself."[22] Another ex-RIC man also affirmed that his losses were due to his allegiance "because being a member of the RI Consty at that time and the general animosity which existed towards this Force no injury from the general public point of view seemed to be bad enough also because we were considered the instrument for maintaining British Law and Order in the Country."[23] George Robert Kelly, an ex-serviceman and merchant in Cahir, County Tipperary, told the IGC that "the Republicans made it clear to us that their intolerance of us was

[20] *Church of Ireland Gazette,* 18 January 1924.
[21] See, for example, Files No. 33, 92, 226.
[22] CO 762/27/382.
[23] CO 762/65/1020.

on account of our long connection with British troops, and my service in the Civil Service and Army."[24] Arthur Blennerhassett from County Kerry had served with the "Remount Department" supplying horses to the British forces during the War. When he returned to Ireland after the war, he settled on the Ballyseedy Estate outside of Tralee and worked as a Senior Starter for the Turf Club in Ireland. In February 1922, he was kidnapped by "about a dozen masked and armed men" and was held against his will overnight. In his application form to the IGC, Blennerhassett explained that he had no doubts that his allegiance was behind his experiences, as "on the night that I was kidnapped the Raiders taunted me with having been in the British service."[25]

Applicants who had not actively served the government of the United Kingdom in an official capacity were similarly informed that their allegiance to the United Kingdom had brought them to the attention of Irish revolutionaries. One applicant in County Carlow had refused to allow members of the IRA to stay in his house or to take supplies. In February 1923, twenty armed men forced their way into his applicant's house, which they then raided and set on fire. He reported that when the men turned his family out of the house, "they said…they would make me obey their orders."[26] Individuals who were subject to boycotts were publicly informed of their alleged crimes, which were clearly stated in the letters and placards used to notify the local population of the campaign against them. After William West Murphy from County Kerry had refused to sign a petition against Irish conscription during the war and later refused to subscribe to the Sinn Fein clubs, notices were put up in the local area accusing him of being "a traitor" and "a spy," and informing the public to have no dealings with him. Murphy eventually lost his business as a result, and also suffered a nervous breakdown.[27]

[24] CO 762/178/3117.
[25] CO 762/55/848.
[26] CO 762/92/1535.
[27] CO 762/13/121.

Even if those responsible for the crimes inflicted upon applicants did not explicitly state that their actions were politically motivated, loyalists had no doubt about the reasons that they were targeted. The IGC was repeatedly informed by applicants that only loyalists had been made to suffer by "armed men," "Republicans," and "Irregulars" in their locality.[28] "People who belonged to the other side were not interfered with," wrote one applicant. Another, a Protestant clergyman who was robbed of his bicycles, noted that "the robbery was regarded here as Political. Non-loyal clergy were never robbed in this or any similar way."[29] Another clergyman, Richard Maunsell Kellett from Piltown, County Kilkenny, also insisted that he had been targeted on account of his loyalty, writing that "I believe my car was taken because I was a loyalist and a Protestant. No other cars were seized in this district, though there were several others belonging to Sinn Feiners."[30] While the IGC required further evidence in such cases that an applicant's allegiance had been the cause of his or her losses, the loyalists who had suffered during the revolution were left with no doubts regarding the motives of their attackers. John Hamilton of County Donegal complained to the IGC that his car had been stolen in May 1922, before being burnt out a month later by Irregular Forces. In a letter addressed to committee members in April 1927, Hamilton pointed out that not a single car was taken in the area throughout the revolution that did not belong to a Protestant or Loyalist. Furthermore, he added, his car had been a two-seater, making it impractical for the Irregulars who were seeking to transport men and goods, yet larger cars in the area belonging to republican supporters were left untouched. This was clearly not a case of ordinary theft, but rather a concerted attempt to harass and intimidate Hamilton and other loyalists in the district.[31]

[28] See, for example, Files No. 745, 1796, 3409.
[29] CO 762/153/2586; CO 762/161/2736.
[30] CO 762/180/3148.
[31] CO 762/72/1180.

Loyalism was strongly associated with the Protestant faith and the landed gentry classes. This influenced the way in which applicants attempted to convey their allegiance and also how they interpreted the motives of those responsible for their losses. Constitutional divisions in southern Ireland generally mirrored the religious divide between Catholics and Protestants; given the close association in Ireland between religion and loyalty to the government, one might expect that Protestant applicants to the IGC would have attempted to strengthen their claims by drawing attention to their faith. Surprisingly, however, few applicants cited their religion when responding to the question of allegiance on the IGC application form. Eighteen successful applicants from the sample group gave their religion as the sole evidence of their allegiance, while an additional twenty-seven successful applicants mentioned religion alongside other proof of their loyalty. The applicants in all but four of these twenty-seven successful claims identified as Protestant, and none of them specified their denominations.

The nature of the relationship between religion and loyalty was not discussed by any of the successful applicants. Those who did disclose their religion distinguished between Protestantism and their constitutional beliefs, describing themselves as "a Protestant and a Unionist," and "a loyalist and a Protestant."[32] Religion was also avoided by most individuals who acted as references for applicants, although clergymen frequently provided statements of loyalty on behalf of their parishioners. Aside from clergymen identifying applicants as belonging to their parish, however, only a handful of referees were willing to openly discuss the religion of an applicant or to suggest that the religion of the claimant had any significance to the claimant's experiences during the revolution. It is possible that applicants and their supporters who were familiar with the IGC's Terms of Reference, or who knew that a British commission would not wish to involve itself in Irish sectarian disputes, believed that it would not be in their best

[32] CO 762/180/3148. See also Files No. 3706, 2065, 3550.

interests to focus too heavily on an applicant's religious beliefs or on the religious divides in Ireland.

Instead, applicants primarily referred to religion when accounting for their experiences. In response to questions regarding their losses during the revolution, applicants such as Georgina Loretto of Leitrim argued that isolated Protestants had been singled out for harassment and ill-treatment during the 1919-1923 period.[33] Loretto had been subjected to a raid in August 1922 in which her linens and other household goods were stolen. As she later informed the IGC, only Protestant houses were raided at the time, and she blamed her losses on being a Protestant and a loyalist.[34] Loyalists corresponding with the IGC believed that revolutionaries had targeted Protestants because religion was a convenient means of identifying an individual's constitutional allegiance. When writing on behalf of Henry McKenna of County Westmeath, the Reverend J Levis observed that McKenna and his sons, "like all other Protestants, were and are loyal to King and Empire. "[35] The solicitor for George Sparks of County Carlow made a similar argument, informing the IGC that "My client is a Protestant, and Protestants were looked upon as being loyal to the British Government, as indeed in most cases they were…"[36]

The association between Protestantism and loyalism was further highlighted by attitudes within the loyalist community towards Catholic loyalists. Protestant loyalists often seemed surprised by the presence of Catholics in their ranks; individuals who provided references for Catholic applicants to the IGC often stressed the applicant's genuine loyalty despite his or her religion. It was often suggested that Catholic loyalists had suffered more through their loyalty than had their Protestant counterparts, as their support for the

[33] See, for example, Files No. 21, 541, 1543, 3158.
[34] CO 762/54/819.
[35] CO 762/204/3706.
[36] CO 762/39/582.

government transformed them into pariahs within the general Irish Catholic community. It is unclear if this was indeed the case, but their fellow loyalists went to great lengths to ensure that Catholic loyalists were suitably compensated for their sacrifices. One of the referees writing on behalf of George Robert Kelly acknowledged that Kelly was a "Roman Catholic," but hastened to reassure the IGC that he was "thoroughly loyal" and had suffered greatly as a result of his support for the government.[37] The Reverend Leonard Henry, meanwhile, wrote to the IGC on 5 April 1929, in response to the committee's questions regarding the Delaney family. Henry noted that as Roman Catholics, the Delaneys were not his parishioners, but he described them as "out and out loyalists" and praised their "personal bravery."[38]

It thus appears that in the context of the IGC files, applicants used the "Protestant" label primarily to highlight their minority status and vulnerability during the revolution and its aftermath. In their correspondence with the IGC, few of them referred to or attempted to explain the origins and nature of the relationship between religion and politics in the context of southern loyalism or in the wider Irish community; there was little incentive to do so, as the committee was interested in constitutional allegiance only, and loyalists were accustomed to accepting the connections between religion and loyalty without question. Religion, when it was mentioned at all, was assumed to have been used by republicans and their allies as a means of identifying individuals who supported the United Kingdom.

Loyalists also believed that members of the landed gentry and upper classes were targeted because of similar assumptions regarding class and allegiance. Landlords and former landlords had shown themselves to be amongst the strongest supporters of the government of the United Kingdom in Ireland. A referee for Evelyn Bruce and her sisters observed that "the Misses Bruce are representatives of a class who never wavered, who never repined or grumbled,

[37] CO 762/178/3117.
[38] CO 762/83/1367.

but just "carried on"-had they thrown in their lot with the other side they might now be thriving and well to do!"[39] The losses of Caroline Fairholme from County Waterford was described by her lawyer as due to her allegiance, but he also noted that the "masses of the people were extremely hostile to members of the Claimant's class."[40] In the case of George Cartwright, his solicitor wrote that "My client and his family belonged to a class in this country which always supported the British Government…I am convinced that, if Mr. Cartwright did not belong to the Loyal Party in Ireland, he would not have been subjudigated[sic] to all the trouble, loss and expense he was at."[41]

Applicants insisted that their losses were due to their constitutional allegiance, but some were honest enough to admit that those responsible for their injuries could have been motivated by other factors as well. The breakdown in law and order allowed local communities to act on longstanding grievances, and former landlords and members of the gentry class were made to pay for old crimes. Michael Buckley was a farmer in County Kerry whose farm of about 200 acres was boycotted and property was raided in the summer of 1922. Buckley complained to the IGC that during the revolution "loyal and law-abiding citizens like us where then made the victims of political revenge and personal gain. We, being property owners and known supporters of the British Government, were made the targets for the attacks of the rabble of the country."[42] Several applicants referenced decades-long conflicts over land or politics; writing in support of the case of John Lambert of County Galway, J. Mulhall, the Manager of the local Provincial Bank, described Lambert as belonging to "the class against whom the natives have shown the greatest hatred for many years."[43]

[39] CO 762/190/3351.
[40] CO 762/94/1563.
[41] CO 762/60/923.
[42] CO 762/164/2790.
[43] CO 762/61/942.

Yet it was not only the upper classes or former landlords who were targeted in this manner – any loyalists with desirable goods or land could find themselves facing unwanted attention from armed revolutionaries. William Hosford from County Cork attributed the attacks on himself and his property to his being "an isolated loyal Protestant," adding that he believed "the principal effect was to drive me out of my farm to make way for some one else."[44] George Denford who owned a business repairing boots near Skibbereen in County Cork believed that his loyalty (he had served in the Navy) and the fact that he was an Englishman were the causes of his troubles. While he did not know who was behind the attacks, he "suspected it was to drive me away from the place by this method."[45] Aggressive campaigns of intimidation were believed to reflect the desire of republicans to run minorities out of the Free State. Applicants wrote of "campaigns of loyalist extermination" and rebels attempting to "drive out several loyalist families from this district."[46] Richard Reynolds in County Kerry attributed his losses to his status as "a Protestant Unionist." Reynolds told the IGC that "a Parish Priest in a local chapel advised his congregation not to shoot Protestants but to make their existence impossible. Being a new Resident in their part of the country they tried to force me to leave."[47]

Referees submitting statements on behalf of applicants, and individuals asked to investigate claims on behalf of the IGC, confirmed that differences of class and religion were closely linked with politically motivated communal conflicts. In the course of their investigations of a case from County Kerry the IGC had contacted TP Flanagan, an ex-District Inspector for the county.[48] In his rambling reply, Flanagan revealed the difficulties of distinguishing between the social, economic, and political motives of those responsible for attacks on loyalists. He believed

[44] CO 762/04/21.
[45] CO 762/28/394.
[46] CO 762/48/747; CO 762/37/562.
[47] CO 762/36/541.
[48] CO 762/73/1196.

that certain elements in the wider Irish population had hoped to force loyalists out of the country:

> I think that in those days a good many people, including the RC clergy, got it into their heads that if once they got rid of the RIC they could seize valuable farms etc belonging to those people who did not line up with them. In fact a priest told me (by way of a friend) that once Ireland got Home Rule no ex-RIC man or his family would be permitted to live in Ireland.

Yet when Flanagan turned his attention to the specific case that he was evaluating on behalf of the IGC, he could not state with certainty that the applicant had suffered because of his allegiance. The applicant had been shot as he attempted to stop poachers on his property in the spring of 1921, leading Flanagan to conclude that the incident "was not in any way connected with Sinn Fein or the rebellion." However, he suggested that the subsequent harassment of the applicant was likely related to his position as a loyalist, adding:

> looking back now, I have no moral doubt whatever that if Hewson had not been the class of man he was, the interference with him would be very trivial. He belongs to an old and respected family of the Irish gentry class, and he never faltered in his open loyalty to the crown and to the RIC.

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Recent debates over the factors that led to attacks on southern loyalists during the revolution have largely focused on the motives of those responsible for the violence. The opinions and interpretations of southern loyalists have been generally ignored in studies on communal violence during the revolution. It is evident, however, that loyalists had strong feelings regarding their experiences during the revolution, in addition to their views regarding their survival in the Free State. In statements provided by applicants to the IGC, and in the communal narratives that dominated loyalist discourse in the Free State, the importance of remaining true to one's identity and allegiance, regardless of the consequences, was repeatedly emphasised. While contemporaries and later historians alike questioned the commitment of

loyalists to the government of the United Kingdom, loyalists themselves believed that their refusal to support the struggle for Irish independence constituted a public declaration of their allegiance.

Loyalist rejection of the republican movement came at a very high price. The records of the IGC, more than any other source, demonstrate the extent of loyalist suffering throughout Ireland during the revolution. Whether they had been the targets of raids, thefts, boycotts, or personal violence, loyalists applying to the IGC generally described their sense of outrage in similar terms, focusing not only on the losses sustained during the actual attack but also on the psychological impact of the crime on their partners, children, and the wider loyalist community. Given the comparatively low casualty rate amongst Irish loyalists during the revolution, one might question whether loyalist attempts to situate their experiences in the context of political and social unrest on the Continent during the early twentieth century were intended primarily to exaggerate their vulnerability and losses. Yet loyalists clearly related to vulnerable populations on the Continent, largely because of the uncertainty of their own position in Ireland; at a time of heightened fear, loyalists saw little to distinguish between reports of unrest in other European nations and rumours of violence against loyalists in other regions of Ireland.

Even before the end of the revolution, the loyalist community began to contemplate its survival in Ireland, considering the practical needs of its members as well as voicing fears about the fate of its values and culture. For those who had suffered losses during the revolution, particularly as a result of significant property damage or long-term campaigns of intimidation, the struggle to rebuild their lives continued throughout the decade and into the 1930s. Here again the IGC files provide an intimate account of the ongoing distress of individual loyalists, many of whom were still suffering from the effects of stress-related illnesses, the loss of their homes, or the costs associated with relocating to a new country at the time they submitted their

applications to the IGC. Also, while it is frequently assumed that the end of the revolution brought an end to minority suffering, a number of applicants in the sample group complained that they continued to face boycotts, intimidation, and harassment in the Free State. Adding to their distress, loyalists feared that the values that had sustained their community in Ireland for generations were in danger of disappearing, a loss that they believed would not only affect their own community, but that would have negative repercussions for Ireland and for the British Empire. While the end of the revolution significantly reduced the threat of violence and armed attacks on the loyalist community, it did not bring about an end to the anxieties and concerns of southern minorities.

The current scholarly interest in southern loyalists should be encouraged, as the Irish Revolution can only be understood if it is considered from the perspectives of all the different religious and social groups present in Ireland in the early twentieth century. Yet it is not sufficient for loyalists to simply be incorporated into narratives that are primarily concerned with the nature of the republican movement and the motives of those involved in the struggle for Irish independence. Such an approach is responsible for a distorted portrayal of the identities and experiences of southern minorities, allowing misleading assumptions to flourish. The records of the Irish Grants Committee provide a powerful corrective to the generalisations frequently made regarding southern loyalism and loyalists, revealing as they do the socio-economic diversity within the community and the tensions that existed between "public" narratives of loyalty and the experiences and private opinions of individuals. Yet the files have been largely overlooked by historians and have yet to be used to their full potential, and few have acknowledged the strengths and limits of the records. The Irish Grants Committee was concerned not only with loyalist experiences of the revolution, but also with the survival of individual loyalists in the aftermath of the conflict; its records therefore document not only the

immediate trauma inflicted by the revolution on southern minorities, but also the lasting impact of the conflict on individuals and the wider Free State population, both of which were considerable.

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APPENDIX A: SAMPLING METHOD USED FOR THIS STUDY

This study relies heavily on the records of the second Irish Grants Committee, which operated between 1926 and 1930. During this time the committee processed 4,032 claims from loyalists, making recommendations in 2,237 cases that resulted in awards totalling £2,188,549.[1] Of these applications, files for 3,749 cases are lodged at The National Archives in Kew, England, where they were made available to the public beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The sample for this study is composed of a random selection of approximately 25 percent of these files, which were photographed between 2006-2009. All of the documents in the selected files were included in the study, from the initial application form to all subsequent correspondence between the applicant and the committee.

To create the test sample, the 3,749 files were first categorized by county where the outrage for which the applicant was seeking compensation occurred. As this study is concerned with southern Irish loyalists who lived in what became the Irish Free State, the seventy-five claims listed from Northern Ireland were excluded. For each of the remaining twenty-six counties, 25 percent of the associated files were randomly selected, so that the relative distribution was preserved.

The second Irish Grants Committee assigned each file a number and categorized the file by county where the outrage for which the applicant was seeking compensation occurred. These file numbers were used to randomly select the cases for the test sample using an online pseudo-random number generator (http://www.randomizer.org). For each of the counties, the associated file numbers were entered into the generator, which then randomly selected 25 percent of the total number. When the number of files for a county was not divisible by four (i.e. it was not possible to select exactly 25 percent), the number of selected files was rounded

[1] A complete summary of the work of the second IGC can be found in the Committee's final report. "Report of the Irish Grants Committee," 3 February 1930, NA, CO 762/212.

up to the nearest integer. For example, there are 78 files from County Carlow in the IGC records. Since 25 percent of 78 is 19.5, 20 files from Carlow were included in the sample. The total sample consists of 916 files, or 27.3 percent of the 3,360 files from the twenty-six counties.

In certain instances the committee opened a file, only for the applicant to later withdraw his or her application form. When an empty or incomplete file was selected by the random number generator, the file was set aside and another file from the same county was randomly selected in its place. The committee also on occasion mislabelled files, assigning them to the wrong county. This appears to have occurred in cases where the applicants lived along the border separating counties, or had suffered outrages in more than one area. When such files were selected by the random number generator, they remained classed according to the county assigned by the committee. Such errors were very rare, however, and are unlikely to have influenced the representative nature of the sampling in any meaningful way.