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


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






THE

*REAL CRISIS.*



AC911-1735. R48

THE  
REAL CRISIS:

OR, THE  
NECESSITY of giving *immediate* and  
*powerful Succour* to the EMPEROR

AGAINST  
FRANCE and her present ALLIES,

In order to preserve the  
BALANCE of Power, | Our RELIGION,  
Our TRADE, | And the  
Our CONSTITUTION, | LIBERTIES of Europe.

WITH A  
POSTSCRIPT, containing some *Considerations* of our present MEDIATION.

IN A  
LETTER  
TO THE

Right Hon. *Henry Pelham*, Esq;  
Paymaster General of his Majesty's Land-Forces.

---

By WILLIAM REVOLUTION, Esq;

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*You have yet an Opportunity, by God's Blessing, to secure to you and your Posterity the quiet Enjoyment of your Religion and Liberties, if you are not wanting to yourselves, but will exert the ancient Vigour of the English Nation: But I tell you plainly, my Opinion is, if you do not lay hold on this Occasion, you have no Reason to hope for another.*  
K. William's Speech, Dec. 31, 1701.

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L O N D O N:

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T H E

*REAL CRISIS, &c.*

S I R,



**W**HILST the unthinking, I am afraid the far greater, Part of our fellow Subjects, are attentive only to the Motions of the different Armies now in the Field, out of mere Curiosity; whilst these near-sighted Coffee-house Politicians gape for the *French* and *Dutch* Mails, to learn the Number of the Kill'd and Wounded on the *Rhine* and the *Po*, only to gratify a silly Inclination, for News of any kind, so natural to our Countrymen; whilst they are thus employed, without Meaning, and without seeing that one Side contends for Superiority and Power, whilst the other, by far the weaker, struggles hard for the Liberties of *Europe*; I say, whilst these Sons of Ignorance are thus indolently employed, you, Sir, who have so deservedly  
filled

filled one of the most distinguished Posts in the *Nation*, and are conspicuous for a profound Knowledge of her real Interest, will, I hope, indulge me (who see the present Confusions on the Continent in another Light, than most of our Countrymen seem to do) to give you my Thoughts of the present State of the Affairs of *Europe*, and point out to you my Apprehensions, that those Nations must soon be involved in the Calamities of the House of *Austria*, except we speedily support her with all our Power.

I am sensible, that the Weight of our present National Incumbrance should always deter us from most Engagements of Expence, and that we ought to act with the greatest Caution and Wariness in our present Situation; but, at the same Time, you will agree with me, that Circumspection and Parcimony, in some Cases, may justly be deemed rather Vices than Virtues; and such, I will take upon me to say, they would be in the present Conjunction, were we to continue any longer Spectators, as we have been ever since the breaking out of the present War on the Continent.

I am far from promoting an unnecessary Expence, or a War of Wantonness, founded only on Pique or Prejudice; but  
when

when our Religion, our Liberties, the Liberties of the greatest Part of *Europe* are at Stake, it is high Time that we rouse ourselves from our Political Supineness, and exert all our Vigour and Force, in order to preserve all that is worth contending for on this Side Heaven.

Our wise Ancestors, and yours, Sir, in particular, have strenuously supported the Cause of Liberty, and readily concurred in the Maintenance of the *Balance* of Power in *Europe*. They thought no Hazard, no Expence too great, in order to preserve that *Balance*, without which all that was dear to them must be precarious and unsafe. The Blessings we enjoy at this Time, of Religion and Liberty, are owing to their glorious Zeal and Efforts, for the Preservation of this very *Balance*, which must for ever be the surest Bulwark of our happy Constitution. For this heroic Cause have we spent immense Treasure, and spilt Oceans of Blood, since the *Revolution*. Shall we then now look tamely on, and see the darling Fruit of forty odd Years unwearied Toil wrested from us, without making any Efforts towards its Defence? Let not Posterity have any Thing so mean, so imprudent, I might say so wicked, to say of us: Let us, for Shame, act by the next and following  
Gene-

Generations, as our wise and steady Ancestors have done by us : Let it not be said, that we indolently, not to say maliciously, give up the Liberties of *Europe*, and our own, without an Effort to preserve them. Were there but a bare Possibility of Success, it would be unwarrantable not to make the Attempt ; but when there is a moral Certainty of succeeding, not to exercise our Strength and Power, would be unpardonable.

I pity those unthinking lukewarm Patriots who argue, that the *Emperor* had imprudently brought the present Misfortunes upon himself, and therefore should be left to extricate himself out of them the best he can. How weak, how ridiculous are such Reasonings! Supposing this to have been the Case, as undoubtedly it was not, which I shall endeavour to prove presently, shall not we assist him, if our own immediate Interest calls upon us so to do? Shall not a Man give his Assistance towards extinguishing a Fire in his Neighbour's House, because he had imprudently or neglectfully been the Author of his Misfortune? Self-preservation, as it is the first Principle of Nature, should always be the chiefest, and, in my Opinion, never more to be observed than in the present Conjuncture. But that it may appear,  
how

how far Gratitude and Equity, as well as Self-interest, oblige us to give his *Imperial Majesty* Succour at this Time, we will examine into the Conduct of his House for almost fifty Years past, with relation to these Kingdoms. This I shall do in a summary Manner, as it would be unnecessary to be minute in Matters that every Gentleman, of common Reading and Observation, can be no Stranger to.

If it be true, as I doubt not but it is, that all the Subjects of *Great-Britain* look upon the *Revolution* as the greatest Blessing Providence could bestow upon them: How grateful then ought they to be to the House of *Austria*, for her generous Assistance on that memorable Occasion? It would have been next to impossible for King *William* to have succeeded, without the Influence and hearty Concurrence of the Emperor *Leopold*, who had brought many other Powers, and even the *Pope* himself, to contribute largely towards that Expedition. The Sincerity with which that wise Prince acted in the Cause of Liberty, at that Time, is a Matter of such Notoriety as cannot admit of the least Contest. It was by his Influence and Address that Doctor *Burnet*, late Bishop of *Sarum*, was so highly caref'd, and succeeded so well at the Court of *Rome*, at  
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the same Time that Lord *Castlemain*, King *James's* Ambassador to his *Holiness*, saw himself neglected, and almost despised by the *Pontiff*, and all the *Austrian* Faction there: And I think it may be truly said, that the Accession of the *Pope*, at that Time, to the Alliance in Favour of the then Prince of *Orange*, and the Treasure he advanced, did not a little contribute to the Success of his Undertaking.

The *Emperor* continued his faithful Friendship to us till the Peace of *Ryswick*, and proved a most useful Ally during the whole Time we were obliged to draw away all our own Troops, and many Auxiliaries from the Continent, the better to prosecute the War with Vigour against King *James*, in *Ireland*. Here was a Trial of Amity and Friendship; a Friendship never to be forgotten by a grateful People: And yet how unhappily did we seem to neglect this necessary Ally, and indeed ourselves, a very few Years after, when we had acceded to the famous Partition *Treaty*! A *Treaty*, the most injurious to the House of *Austria* that could well be concerted, not only as it stripp'd the *Imperial Family* of a Succession, they could scarcely otherwise be deprived of, but also, in as much as it added to the  
Power

Power of the House of *Bourbon*, the natural and avowed Enemy to that of *Austria*.

Some have been so ungenerous, not to say ungrateful, as to assert, that we had made ample Attonement for that Step, and all former Obligations, by the expensive War we entered into afterwards, in order to procure the present *Emperor* Dominions; but surely they should have considered, that there had been little Occasion for that War, if the *Partition-Treaty* had not paved the Way for it, by giving *France* the Opportunity, under the Shadow of that *Treaty*, of procuring a *Will*, by Virtue of which she foisted herself into the Possession of the whole *Spanish* Monarchy. Let us see, a little after, how we abandoned and gave up the *Emperor*, a second Time, by the infamous Treaty of *Utrecht*. It might be called, indeed, the third Time, for we had partly given him up at *Ryswick* about sixteen Years before, tho' he had, a few Years before that, done us the most signal Services, as has been observed above.

We shall not only find the *Emperor* the sincerest Ally, in the momentous Event of the *Revolution*, and amicably bearing with the frequent Sights put upon him by us afterwards, but also complying

most affectionately with us on many Occasions, to the manifest Prejudice of his own Interest. His agreeing to the Stipulations in Favour of *Don Carlos*, by the *Quadruple Alliance*; his destroying the *Ostend Company*, because we desired it, and his consenting to the Introduction of *Spanish Troops*, instead of *neutral*, are so many undoubted Testimonies of his singular Regard and real Affection for the *British Nation*. We now see plainly how unwarrantable our Jealousies with him, concerning the first Treaty of *Vienna*, on account of particular secret Stipulations with *Spain*, in Favour of the *Pretender*; our Apprehensions, at that Time, were such as we were craftily possessed with by the Court of *France*, whose Interest it was, and ever will be, to sow Contention between the House of *Austria* and her natural *Allies*. It was *France* also that led us to employ our Influence with the *Emperor* to come into all those fatal Concessions, in Favour of *Don Carlos*, which we see to Day so prejudicial to himself and the Liberties of *Europe*. And yet, how like a true Friend, and sincere *Ally*, has he patiently bore with our Neglect of him, when his All is in the utmost Danger, and this even when his Misfortunes are in great measure owing to those

Coun-



Counsels we had entered into, at the Instigation of *France*. He has not publickly inveighed against us by *Manifesto* at all the Courts of *Europe*, for our Supineness and Disregard of him in his greatest Necessities, partly, tho' undesignedly, brought upon him by us, as was observed above. A Practice frequently made use of by Princes inferior to this great and ancient *Ally*.

Let it not be said, that our Guaranty of the *Pragmatick Sanction* was any Equivalent for the Alteration in Favour of *Don Carlos*, as to *Spanish* Troops: For in Reality it was none, nor can it be construed, in any Sense, to be so; for we did therein no more than what our own natural Interest should have obliged us to do many Years before, if it be true, as I am sure it is, that we ought never to suffer the *Austrian* Possessions to be separated or divided; as such a Separation must be attended with the most fatal Consequence, it would be morally impossible to preserve the Balance of Power for which we fought ever since the *Revolution*, if the Dominions of *Austria* were to be divided between the late *Emperor's* two Daughters, and those of his present *Imperial* Majesty. And why we had not acceded to this Guaranty when first it was proposed to us, in

the late Reign, is a Mystery to me, and probably so to all others, who are not more than I am in the Interest of *France*: Therefore, I say, the *Emperor* was induced to come into all our Measures, tho' apparently to his own Prejudice, not so much for the Sake of our aforesaid Guaranty, as to shew us he was ready to concur in every Thing that could promote a good Understanding between us and *Spain*, a Kingdom so useful to these Nations in Point of Commerce.

Let us now examine, if his *Imperial* Majesty may be said to have been the sole Author of the Hostilities of *France* and her Allies. Those, who argue in Favour of our Neutrality, say, that he should not have interfered in the Election of *Poland*; that he ought not to have disoblged the King of *Sardinia*; and that he should have gratified *Spain*, in the Dispensation she demanded in Favour of *Don Carlos*, as Duke of *Parma*: These, say they, have been the Causes of the present War, and, as the Emperor might have avoided it, by a contrary Behaviour, he must be left to shift for himself: Admirable Reasoning! The *Dutch*, by the same Manner of arguing, might have avoided the War of 1672 with *France*, by tamely submitting to all the Insults of *Louis* the XIVth,  
and

and by going blindly into all the Views of that aspiring Monarch ; but because they did not, they were to be abandoned by all the rest of *Europe* (as in Reality they were, except by the *Emperor*) as they themselves were the Authors of all the Calamities of that sanguine War, that had then like to have over-turned the *European* Balance of Power. Is this Reasoning? Is this Argument for *English* Men? Are the Liberties of *Europe*, and the Balance of Power to be trifled away, and given up, because some People can't, or won't see into the Nature of Things? But we shall endeavour to shew, for the Satisfaction of those squeamish Politicians, that the *Emperor* did no more than what became him, in relation to this Charge brought against him ; that he had done no more than any other Prince in *Europe*, in his Situation, ought and must have done, if he would preserve himself and the Balance of Power ; and that the present War is owing to the insatiable Ambition of *France*, and not to those Causes mentioned above. This, indeed, his *Imperial* Majesty himself has partly done, with great Force, in his Answer to the *French Motives or Declaration of War* : But I will examine the Matter yet further, to oblige my Countrymen, who may  
 have

have forgot or over-looked that admirable Piece.

The *Emperor* was obliged by Treaty, as well as by Interest, to preserve *Poland* in Peace and Tranquillity; and he knew that she must be plunged into the greatest Difficulties should *Stanislaus* be elected King. This he knew, as well from the Power and Strength of the Party in the Kingdom, confederated against that unfortunate Prince, as from the avowed Aversion of the *Russians* towards him. He therefore used his utmost Endeavours to bring the Party, gained by *French* Artifice and *Gold*, to a Sense of their own Interest; and they now see, but too late, how salutary his Advices were. He proposed to assist that Nation in any other Choice but that of *Stanislaus*, who, he was sensible, would be opposed by the whole Power of *Muscovy*. He might, indeed, have been pleased that the Choice fell on the Elector of *Saxony*, and it was natural he should, as it would prove a Means to preserve, in Futurity, the Balance of Power in *Europe*; but he went no farther than Advice and good Offices, far from making Use of the Power he had then in his Hands, to back his Mediation. Without casting any Reflections on *Stanislaus*, he was, on many Accounts, a Prince

to

to be objected to by the *Emperor*; but particularly as he was, and must always be, a close Ally to *France*. This alone should be a Reason, not only with the *Emperor* but also even with *England*, to prevent his reigning in *Poland*; and for this Reason, I have often wondered that we had not interfered in the Affairs of *Poland* as early as the *Emperor*. For it is most certain, it should be a standing Maxim with *England*, never to suffer, if possible, any material Addition or Increase to the Power of the House of *Bourbon*. The *Emperor* might reasonably have imagined, that had *Poland* been governed by a Prince in the strictest Amity with *France*, the *Turk* might be induced to attack him on that Side, whenever *France* should think it proper to break with him on the other. A thousand other Reasons might be urged to strengthen the Argument, and justify the *Emperor* in any Opposition he should give to the Elevation of *Stanislaus* to the Crown of *Poland*.

As to the Discontent of his *Sardinian* Majesty, was it not reasonable for the *Emperor* to keep that Prince, in some Measure, in a State of Dependency, in order to prevent his being in a Capacity of disturbing the publick Peace, if ever he should throw himself into the Arms of  
*France?*

*France*? For this Purpose, he would not content that he should fortify some Towns on the Frontiers of the *Milanese*; and for this Purpose also, perhaps, he delayed the Investiture of Part of his Dominions, which he holds of the *Empire*. The very Demand of an Investiture, which had been discontinued for almost two hundred Years, might be a Reason with the *Imperial Court* for delaying a Matter that seemed to have been calculated for some sinister Design; and, indeed, the Consequence proves the *Emperor's* Apprehensions to have been well founded, and that *France* had set on that Prince to act the Part he did on that Occasion; for no sooner had he obtained what he desired, but he fell in with the Views of that Enemy to the *Imperial House*; which plainly shews, that his Negotiations, for two Years before at the Court of *Vienna*, were a Farce only, and carried on on Purpose to delude the *Emperor*, whilst he was bringing his most secret Engagements with *France* to Perfection. We have seen also this Prince, laying up an abundant Store of Corn, and other Warlike Necessaries, even whilst he was treating with the *Imperial Court*; a Certainty that he was then determined to break with her. The *Emperor* might probably have seen  
partly

partly into his Disguise, tho' it might not be proper to have taken Notice of them at that Time, hoping perhaps he should see his Folly of engaging with a Court that is said to have deluded all the Princes who had obliged her for many Centuries, before he should actually put himself in her Power. But it seems *French Gold* to himself, or to his *Ministers*, or to both, prevailed more than real Interest, Honour, or the Faith of Treaties.

The Refusal, or rather the Delay of the Dispensation, in Favour of *Don Carlos*, must be justified by all the World, except the Partisans of the House of *Bourbon*, who wanted this Addition to that young Prince's Power, in order to compleat the approaching Schemes of that ambitious House. The *Emperor* might have thought that he had already gone too far, by his Compliance to us, in consenting to the Introduction of a Prince into *Italy*, who would certainly, in Conjunction with the *Aspiring House* he is sprung from, endeavour to enlarge his Possessions there, and therefore very prudently avoided giving him an earlier Power than his Years allowed of. How then this Step, any more than those in relation to *Sardinia* and *Poland*, can be assigned as Reasons for refusing him Succour at this

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Time,

Time, I leave the impartial World to judge, not only from Events, but even from the very Nature of Things themselves.

That those pretended Causes were not the real Motives that induced *France* and *Spain* to take up Arms against the *Emperor*, will appear from the Conduct of these Courts for a great While before the Death of King *Augustus*, or the feigned Disaffections of *France*, *Spain* and *Sardinia*. As it is notorious that *Louis* the XIVth had the *Spanish* Monarchy in View, when he came into the Peace of *Ryswick*, so likewise does it plainly appear to me, that the Duke of *Orleans*, the most artful Prince of his Time, had all *Italy* in his View when he projected the *Quadruple Alliance*, by Virtue of which a Prince of the House of *Bourbon* was to be introduced into *Parma* and *Tuscany*, as necessary to get a Footing in a Country, he had designed to wrest from the *Emperor*, when ever a favourable Opportunity should offer. The Minority of the present King of *France*, and the *Regent's* Title to the Crown, in Virtue of the fatal and ever famous *Renunciation* of King *Philip*, were the Motives that induced the late King *George* and his Ministers, to fall into all the Measures of *France* about that Time.



It is true, there was then a strong Appearance that these Counfels would have turned to the Advantage of the present *Royal Family*, and that of the Nation in general, and so far they may be justified; but Experience has taught us how dangerous it is for a Court to place too great Confidence in a new *potent Ally*, whose Views are, and always have been, as extensive as his Ambition is insatiable. Our Confidence in the late *Regent* led us, I am afraid, insensibly into a sort of Dependency, imperceptible, in Appearance, to some, but too *real* in Effect. Thus were we artfully induced to be the Means of compelling, I may say, the *Emperor* into a Compliance in Favour of the House of *Bourbon*. Perhaps our Ministers might have judged it proper to diminish the growing Power, as *France* affected to insinuate it was, of the House of *Austria*; and the Interest of our Royal Family in *Germany*, might have been a Reason for our thinking, along with *France*, that the *Emperor* was already too powerful for the *Germanick* Body, and therefore his Wings were to be clipp'd in *Italy*. The Quadruple Alliance produced many other Conventions between us and *Spain*, and particularly the Treaty of *Seville*, which may have been extremely necessary to us, in the Situation

tion our Affairs were in at that Time, from the Measures of the late Reign: But it must be allowed, that that Treaty, however advantageous to us, did put a finishing *Hand* to the dangerous Work which *France* had in View many Years before; for, no sooner was *Don Carlos* arrived in *Italy*, than we saw her and *Spain* preparing for War: We saw *France* levying Troops in Abundance, and putting her Militia on a Footing almost equal to regular Forces. We have seen great Numbers of these Troops march into *Dauphine*, on Pretence of an illicit Trade carrying on in those Parts, tho' nothing is more certain, than that the Officers of the Revenue were, and always have been, capable alone to prevent the *Countreband* there. We have seen *Avignon*, on this Pretence, blocked up by a regular Encampment, the better to carry on the Farce, but, in Reality, to inure the new raised Troops to the Fatigues of War. We had also seen, before that, King *Victor* abdicating in Favour of the present King of *Sardinia*, and afterward, in Appearance, at Enmity with his Son, that he might the better get rid of his Engagements with the Court of *Vienna*.

Does it not appear, Sir, from all these Motions of *France*, and those of *Sardinia*, that the present Alliance between these Powers was projected, if not compleated, long before the Death of King *Augustus*, and that the Designs of the House of *Bourbon* on *Italy* was as early as the Year 1716, and have unchangeably continued to the breaking out of the present War.

The King of *Spain*, indeed, acted with less Reserve than *France*, who had some decent Appearances to preserve towards us, to which *Spain* was not liable. This Prince fairly owned his Intentions when he invaded *Sardinia* and *Sicily*, in the Years 1717 and 1718; and his General, the Marquis *de Lede*, openly avowed the fixed Resolutions of his Court, to strip the *Emperor* of all the ancient Dominions of *Spain*. The *Regent*, it is true, did not seem to concur in the Measures of *Spain*, at that Time: But even this may be accounted for more from the Inability of *France* and the *Minority*, than from a Want of Inclination. The King of *Spain* afterwards proclaims his Designs, indeed the Designs of the whole House of *Bourbon*, when he invaded *Oran*. He then plainly told the World, by a *Manifesto*, published by him on that

that Occasion, that he never would sheath his *Sword*, till he had annexed to the Crown of *Spain* all the Dominions she was in *Possession* of, when he came to the Throne. Here was a publick Declaration of his Intentions, founded, without Doubt, on the secret Measures concerted between him and the *elder Branch* of his House: And altho' very few on this Side the Water, seemed, at that Time, to be alarmed at those Expressions in that memorable *Manifesto*, it is certain that some were, and that the Court of *Vienna* took some Umbrage at them: A Fact well known to some *Great Men* now living; but *France* found the Means of *lulling* Mankind into Supineness and Inattention.

Having thus, Sir, endeavoured to shew, that the *Emperor* has a Right to our Assistance, as well from Gratitude as from Motives of Self-interest; that the Charge upon him is false, of being the Author of his present Misfortunes; that we have ourselves contributed, *undesignedly*, to bring them upon him; that *France*, *Spain* and *Sardinia* had long projected the War broke out on the Continent; and that the Death of King *Augustus* was only the fortuitous Cause of blowing up a Mine that had been  
long

long since laid by the House of *Bourbon*. I shall now consider the Power of the present Alliance, formed by *France*, the *Emperor's* Inability to withstand alone her Efforts, and the Certainty of her being soon capable of destroying the Balance of Power in *Europe*, except she is immediately checked by the Weight of the *Maritime Powers*. I shall, in the next Place, take Notice of the Danger we are like to be in, with relation to our *Commerce*, if *France* should succeed in her Views, and lastly I shall observe, that the very Frame of our Constitution and Government will be in the most imminent Danger, should we any longer continue our present State of Neutrality.

The World was justly alarmed to see *France*, single and alone, carrying on an offensive War, in 1688, against the united Force of all the Powers of *Germany*, *England*, *Spain*, *Savoy* and *Holland*; and altho' she came readily into the Treaty of *Ryswick*, it is certain, it was more from the Designs she had formed on the *Spanish* Monarchy, than from any Disadvantages she could have apprehended from the Prosecution of the War. In the War of 1702 she was not quite so fortunate, in Appearance, as she had been

in the former ; but it must be allowed she was so in Reality ; for she succeeded in the Main, to the Amazement of all the World. She secured *Spain* to a Branch of her House, for which alone she contended amidst a thousand Losses and Disasters. *Spain* was so far from being assisting to her on this Occasion, that she was a great and real Burden to her throughout the whole Course of that long and expensive War. We have, afterwards, seen this powerful Monarchy, not only entirely getting rid of all her *Debts* and *Incumbrances*, but likewise extending her *Commerce* infinitely beyond what it ever had been before : And we have severely felt the Commercial Genius of her People, in the manifest Increase of their *Trade*, and visible Decrease of our own to *Turkey*, to the *East-Indies*, to *Spain*, and to *America* ; so that it cannot, I think, be contested, but that *France* alone, without any Alliance, is at this Time infinitely more formidable, than she has been in any Period of Time, since the Establishment of that Monarchy.

We shall find *Spain* so far from being a Burden to *France*, as she had been in Queen *Anne's* War, now grown formidable both by Sea and Land. We see her Mistress of above one hundred thousand

land as good Troops as any in *Europe*, and of a *Fleet* of above fifty Ships of the Line, which, perhaps, tho' not equal to so many *British* Ships, will probably, in Time, become little inferior in Gallantry to the *Land Forces* of that Monarchy. We see the Commerce of *Spain* extended and improved both at Home and Abroad; and I am sorry we have felt this severely of late Years, in many Instances, but particularly in the little Call for what we term *Spanish Cloths* in that Kingdom, a material Branch of our Trade with *Spain* heretofore. And we have seen her sending out vast and surprising Armaments frequently, for fifteen Years together, which is an undeniable Proof that she is not less powerful in *Treasure*, the Nerves of War, than she is in Ships and Troops.

Without enumerating specifically the Power and Force of the King of *Sardinia*, in Troops, and Means to support them, it will be allowed, that his Situation alone adds prodigious Power to the Arms of *France* and *Spain*: Whence it may be concluded, at one View, that the *Emperor* is not, nor cannot be supposed, in any Sense, to be a Match for the present Allies; and tho' there had been a Possibility that he might, for some Time,

be able to stem the Torrent, if he had been heartily joined and assisted by the whole *Germanick* Body, yet the Defection in some of its most powerful *Members* puts it beyond any Doubt, that a Campaign or two, at the most, must put an End to the Influence, if not to the very Being of the House of *Austria*. In such Case, Sir, I would ask our supine Patriots, what is to become of the Balance of Power, and the Liberties of *Europe*? With what Rapidity was the *Emperor* attacked on all Sides, in the *Milanese*, in *Naples*, and in *Germany*? Is it not obvious, as I have already shewn, that *Poland* has little Share in the present Quarrel? Does it not appear from the Slowness of *France* in succouring *Dantzick*, that she was never in Earnest as to the *North*, and intended, by a Diversion only in those Parts, to leave the Cause of War open, the better to execute her vast Designs? If *France* had not long before intended the Blow, could she have been so prepared as to be able, on a sudden, to march fifty thousand Men into *Italy*, and a hundred and forty thousand to the *Rhine*, besides still keeping above a hundred thousand more in the several Parts of her own extended, but compact Dominions?



We have seen the *Emperor* stripped of his Possessions in *Italy*, before he could well look about him; and, tho' he has made his utmost Efforts to recover the *Milanese*, and had continued his Preparations for that Purpose, ever since the breaking out of the War, we find him unable to act with any Vigour, even where he exerted himself the most; nor do we find him more successful on the *Rhine*, tho' assisted by the *Germanick* Body. This plainly shews how unequal he is to the Alliance formed against him; and that he inevitably must fall a Sacrifice to the Ambition of the House of *Bourbon*, if not timely relieved by the Powers of *England* and *Holland*. Gratitude exacts this Relief from us, and, what is yet infinitely stronger, *Self-preservation* exacts it, if we would preserve our own *Liberties*, and those of most of the Powers of *Europe*. Delays are dangerous in a Conjunction so *critical* as the present; a Conjunction, not to be put in any Competition with that of 1702, when *France* was, not of herself, near so formidable as she is at present, and when *Spain* was in no Condition to support her. But now the Case is quite otherwise; so notoriously so, that it would be absurd to attempt the Parallel.

I own it is surprizing, that *Holland* should have agreed to a Neutrality with *France* in the present Situation of Affairs; and I am afraid it is chiefly owing to the *Reluctance*, which she observed in us, of breaking with *France*. Perhaps the *Dutch* might have thought, unjustly I hope, that there was no great *Reliance* to be made on our *Councils*, looked upon by some, *without Foundation*, to have been strangely fluctuating and unsteady of late Years; perhaps too, there might have been some Coolness arisen between us and *Holland*, on Account of our matching with the House of *Orange*, for Fear it might be a Means of paving the present Prince's Way to the *Stadtholdership*; but perhaps, more probably, that *French Gold* has found its Way to some of the Chiefs in the *Administration* there; and then, if this should happen to be the Case, adieu to the Liberties of *Europe*.

*France* has not been more successful in the Field, than in the *Cabinet* for some Ages. She has often gained Points by her *Counsels* and her *Gold*, that would have been difficult to succeed in by open Force. We have seen many Instances of this Cast in the long Reign of *Louis XIV*, and even *Holland*, to say nothing of another *certain Country*, has furnished us  
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with some memorable Examples of this Nature heretofore. It is more than probable, that the present King of *Sardinia* is an Instance of this Complexion, and I am afraid we shall soon find some *Princes* in *Germany* follow his *pecuniary* Maxims of Policy. That *Poland*, and particularly *Dantzick*, has been tainted by *French* Proteftations, and *French* Coin, is a Fact not to be doubted of: But, thank Heaven, there are no Reasons to apprehend any Influence of this Kind, on the Counfels of *Great Britain*. We have a Sett of *Statesmen* now at the Head of our Affairs, who are above a Shadow of an Imputation on this Head; they are rather in a Condition to practice the *Art* on the Ministers of *France*, than to admit of it here at Home. If they have hitherto judged it neceffary to look on for a While, in order to fee more perfectly the genuine Views of *France*, and to ease the Publick, by the Delay; I doubt not, but they will soon advife his Majesty to take fuch Meafures as are moft likely to tend to the Prefervation of the Religion, Properties and Liberties of his Subjects, and the Balance of Power for which we have been contending, at an immense Charge, ever fince the *Revolution*, I dare answer for it, he will have  
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the hearty Concurrence of all his Subjects in the glorious Attempt. The trading Part of the Subject seems desirous of a War, that, in all Probability, will quicken and enliven, if not immediately, at least in Time to come, the national Commerce, engrossed for some Years past, by our rival *French* Neighbours; and, as for the Gentlemen in the present Opposition, they must throw off all Disguise of Patriotism and publick Spirit, should they oppose Measures so replete with universal Liberty, universal Advantage. So that his Majesty cannot fail of the Hearts and Wishes of all his People, in a Cause so salutary and so glorious. An Expence, not a great deal exceeding that we have been at, for many Years past, will oblige *France* (in Conjunction with our Allies) to desist from her Views of universal Sway: For she will not, dare not, proceed in her Schemes of Power, if *Great Britain* and *Holland* are in the Opposition against her. And I will venture to affirm, that the *Dutch* will sincerely concur with us, when they find us in Earnest.

That *France* has, at all Times, especially since *Henry IVth's* Days, had a View towards *universal* Monarchy, is obvious. That great Prince first formed the Idea, and  
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laid the Foundation ; *Louis XIIIth*, or his great and dangerous Minister *Richlieu*, greatly added to the Structure ; and *Louis the XIVth* had like to have finished the Fabrick : But as nothing is more certain, than that the same Counsels, and the same Views still prevail in *France*, it is not to be doubted, but that *Louis the XVth* will raise the ambitious House of *Bourbon* to the highest Pinnacle of Power and Oppression, if he is not timely stopp'd in his dangerous Career. He has the Means in his Hands, in a far greater Degree than any King of *France* that ever went before him ; and, if we may judge from the present Appearance of Things, he seems inclinable to lay hold of the Opportunity, and make use of his Power. He has told us, indeed, that he has no Intention to conquer or extend the Bounds of his present Dominions. But have not most rapacious *Conquerors* done the like, when they first appeared in Arms ? It would be superfluous to bring Examples of this Kind from the *Greek* and *Roman* Histories. Does not the *Manifesto* of *Louis the XIVth* sufficiently justify a Disbelief in Matters of this Nature ? Do not the late Conquests in *Italy* give the Lye to these sort of Declarations ? Can it be thought that *France* has done so  
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much for others, and will do nothing immediately even for herself, and even have the Assistance of her present potent Allies in so doing? Are we to suppose, that she has not Views on Part of the *Austrian Netherlands*, if not upon the Whole, after she shall have secured *Italy* for a Branch of her *House*? Are we sure neither, that her aspiring Views won't carry her afterwards into Designs upon *Holland*, and even upon these *Kingdoms*? How can we be assured, that she has not stipulated with some *Prince* in *Germany* to raise him to the *Imperial Dignity*; tho' he were sensible he should thereby always subsist in a State of Dependency? What can prevent her Designs, when the House of *Austria* shall be no more capable of opposing the united Power of *France, Spain* and *Italy*? Believe me, Sir, these Speculations are not so ill grounded, nor the Danger so distant, but that every Englishman, who is not wilfully *blind*, must see them, and dread the Consequence to these Nations in particular, to the Protestant Religion, to the Balance of Power, and to the Liberties of *Europe*.

Supposing the present Allies should have stipulated in Favour of the *Pretender*, could we wonder at a Matter so natural,

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tural, and so necessary towards opening the Way to the Succession, in Favour of the Kings of *Sardinia* and *France*, who are the immediate Heirs to the *Chevalier* and his Sons, upon the Footing of Hereditary Right? Supposing, again, that such Stipulation has been enter'd into, in Compliance with the King of *Sardinia*, who, probably, might not think himself safe in his old or new Possessions without the Guaranty of *England*, that is to say, of the *Pretender*, could we admire at the Precaution? Supposing, at the same Time, that, in order to confirm his *Sardinian* Majesty in a good Opinion of the Uprightness of *France*, he should also stipulate, that her *eldest Daughter* shall be married to the *Pretender's eldest Son*: I say, supposing such a Stipulation had been now actually subsisting, could we wonder at it, since the King of *Sardinia* might think, that no other Method could be devised for preserving him, in Time to come, against the Oppression and Power of the House of *Bourbon*? You will observe, Sir, that what I have advanced on this last Head is Supposition and Speculation only; but whether real or imaginary, in my Opinion, merits some Consideration in the present Conjunction, particularly seeing the late Reception of the

*young Chevalier* at *Naples*. It is true, were any Thing of this Kind to take Place, a King, thus imposed upon us by *France*, would sit uneasily upon the Throne, as he must, in all Likelihood, be tributary to that Crown: But what then? we are ruined in the Experiment, or what ever else you are pleased to call it.

As to our Commerce, should a Branch of the House of *Bourbon* continue in the Possession of *Tuscany*, *Naples* and *Sicily*, how precarious would it be, not only to *Spain* and *Italy*, but even to *Turkey*? I am apprehensive, that the whole Naval Force of *Great-Britain* could not secure our Trade to *Turkey* from the Captures of *Privateers*, fitted out of the Ports of *Sicily*, near which we must necessarily pass, in our Navigation to the Dominions of the *Grand Seignior*. As for our *Sugar Islands*, and our Colonies in the South of *America*, such as *Carolina*, &c. there is no great Probability, that we could be long able to prevent their falling into the Hands of the *French* and *Spaniards*, who have, for a great While, looked upon our Possessions in those Parts with invidious Eyes. I wish I could not speak my Apprehensions on this Occasion, of an Intelligence between our  
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Rebel Negroes at *Jamaica*, and the *French* and *Spaniards* at *St. Domingo* and *Cuba*. What Security can *Portugal* have, or what Advantage can we propose to ourselves from the Friendship of that useful Crown, if the House of *Bourbon* be not timely prevented in her ambitious Views? So that, in all human Probability, as to our Commerce, it is more than conjectural, that we shall be greatly restrained, if not totally *deprived* of the most valuable Branches of our Trade, if *France* be not taken down before she puts her vast Designs in Execution.

But to come to my third Point, indeed the most material of all, to those who justly center all their Happiness in our present Government and Constitution, I have already shewn, that there is more than a bare Possibility of a Stipulation in Favour of the *Competitor* to this Crown, and that from Reasons that are not so chimerical as some would imagine them to be. But, without dwelling on Speculation only, won't it be allowed, that if *France*, or the House of *Bourbon*, which is all one, shall be suffered to extend her Power, she may at any Time *embarrass* our Affairs so as to destroy us effectually without an actual Invasion? The Dread

of so formidable a Neighbour must continually have an Effect on our publick Credit. But why shall we imagine she will stop here? May we not as well suppose, she will exert herself to subdue a Nation that has always stood in her Way to universal Power? And can we expect she will not, when she has subdued the House of *Austria*, and forced herself into the *Netherlands*? Again, if we can suppose, that *France* has any real Notion of the Religion she professes, have we not Reason to apprehend, that she will think it meritorious to conquer and convert an obstinate *Protestant* Country? Enthusiasm runs more or less throughout the whole Race of Man, and if we may judge of the King of *France*, young as he is, by his Appearance of Piety, we cannot doubt, but that he would be Bigot enough to project and execute any Scheme, that tended towards the Conversion of what he calls *Hereticks*, especially when it falls in with his Temporal Views. The Zeal and Bigotry of the present King of *Spain* is too well known, for to doubt that he would heartily concur in an Undertaking so consistent with his Notions of Religion; and it is likely enough, that the Court of *Rome* would not only promote and advise it, but also warmly support

port it, and largely contribute towards the Execution. We are not to suppose, that the present *Pope* is another *Innocent* the XIth, nor can we hope for Assistance from another *Emperor Leopold*, who had so generously engaged the then *Pope* in our Cause at the *Revolution*, as has been mentioned in the Beginning of this Discourse.

I have heard some near-sighted Speculatists argue, that the *Emperor* has it in his own Power, at any Time, to heal the present Breach between him and the Allies, by a Match with *Don Carlos*, and a Cession of all his Dominions in *Italy*. Good God! How infatuated must such Politicians be, who would cure one Evil by one infinitely greater? Supposing the *Emperor* should be drove to a Necessity of this Nature, as in all Probability he must, if we should still continue to look on, as we have done hitherto, how are we assured that the House of *France* will listen to Proposals or Expedients about Countries she has in actual Possession? But tho' she should, what Situation shall we be in, or how will such a Step contribute to preserve the Balance of Power, for which we had spilt so much Blood? Could any Thing in Nature ever happen more for the Interest of *France*,  
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than such a Marriage and such a Cession? Would not such a Match open a certain Way to the House of *Bourbon* for mounting the *Imperial Throne*? Is there not a strong Probability, as the *Emperor* has but two Daughters, that a *Prince* so allied to him may, one Day, obtain Possession of all the *Austrian* Dominions in general? And could any Thing in this World more effectually contribute to destroy the Balance of Power in *Europe*, than such an Accession of Power to the House of *Bourbon*? Have we not seen the dangerous Power of this ambitious House rise to its present Height, by a Match (such as our unthinking Politicians would make for the *Emperor*) forced upon *Spain* by *Louis* the XIVth, in Virtue of the *Pyrrenean Treaty*. Surely, Sir, we cannot be so lost to all Sense of Self-security, as to listen to any Medium so big with Destruction, and so dangerous to the Liberties of *Europe*. Can we so soon forget the wise Maxims of our Ancestors? nay, can we so soon forget our own just Apprehensions so little a While ago, as when the \* *Enquiry* was wrote in the late *Reign*, when there was only an Appearance of a bare Probability of any Thing of this Nature in Favour of *Don Carlos*?  
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\* Wrote in 1725.

Let us not buoy up ourselves with Hopes that this, again, may be healed by Difference and Dis-union in the very House of *Bourbon* hereafter: Were any Thing of this Nature to happen, I am afraid it would be of little Use to this or the next Generation. But why shall we expect that this Family is, or will be, any more liable to Discord than that of *Austria*, which had, for above three Centuries, been conspicuous for assisting and supporting its Branches in *Spain* and *Germany*? Precarious Comfort this!

If the *Emperor* had nothing more in View, than the Agrandizement of his own Family, he certainly would have hearkened to such a Proposal, and have brought the Matter to Perfection long before the present Breach; but this generous Prince had the Liberties of *Europe* more at Heart, than the particular apparent Advantage of his own Child. No doubt but that Attempts have been made upon him to conclude such a Match, and that very large Offers of Treasure have been made to induce him to a Compliance; but no Temptation was capable to alter his noble Sentiments of Liberty, and the Good of Mankind. Instead of listening to Proposals so destructive of the Balance of Power, he cast his Eyes upon  
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the Duke of *Lorraine*, a promising Prince, but one of little Power, for his eldest Daughter; and in all Appearance designed some other Prince, not a *Friend* to the House of *Bourbon*, for his youngest, if she should live to a proper Age. So that we have seen this publick-spirited, magnanimous Prince projecting, as far as was in his Power, a lasting Security for the Liberties of *Europe*. What Pity 'tis so glorious, so generous a Prince should be left a Sacrifice to the unbounded Ambition of a House that has frequently attempted, and even now Attempts, the Freedom of Mankind?

You will permit me to say, Sir, that the Honour, the Faith of Nations, seem to oblige us to give the most powerful Succour to his *Imperial* Majesty at this Time. Are we not bound, by many Treaties, to guaranty his *Italian* Dominions? The Treaty of *Utrecht* ties us down to this Guaranty, in the strongest Terms; so does the *Quadruple Alliance*, and some other Conventions, well known to you, Sir, and to the rest of the *Ministry*. But although Treaties should be thought by some, as of no Weight, nor Honour, nor Gratitude neither, surely Self-interest will induce us to assist a Prince, whose House has always been  
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the Shield of Liberty; a House which has been at all Times, since the *Revolution*, and then, our best Buckler, and without which we shall be eternally exposed to the Ambition and Power of that of *Bourbon*.

How long do you think, Sir, shall we be able to preserve the Possession of *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*, if *Spain*, in Conjunction with the other powerful Branches of that House, should succeed in her present Views? She has already given us a Specimen of her Designs and Inclinations, by augmenting her Fortifications near that inestimable Fortrefs; nay, she continued her Works before *Gibraltar* even since we had obliged her in the Introduction of *Don Carlos*, and has lately brought them to the dernier Perfection, as to commanding the Bay. Can we then suppose she will permit us to remain in the quiet Possession of one of her chiefest *Keys*, whenever she shall be in a Condition to wrest it from us? Won't *France* assist in the Undertaking? And can it be supposed that we shall be able to resist both these Powers, after they shall have crushed and subdued our ancient Ally, the House of *Austria*?

Upon the Whole, Sir, I think it a Demonstration, as clear as any in *Euclid*,

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that unless we support the *Emperor* at this Juncture, there is Reason to believe, that *France* must succeed in all her Views of Ambition and Universal Monarchy. If we should any longer be lulled into Inactivity, by *French* Protestations and Appearances of Friendship, we shall be answerable to Posterity for all the Calamities that are to follow. Posterity alone will not only feel the *Yoke*, but even we, who are now living, will feel its dreadful Weight with a Witness; and this much *sooner* than some weak, indolent People imagine: For the *French* are a Nation of Dispatch, when in Earnest, as they seem to be at present; they are not only quick in Council, but also quick as Lightning in the Execution. It therefore behoves us to be sudden in our Resolves, and as sudden in our Preparations, if we would secure our Religion, our Liberties, our Constitution, our Trade and our All.

I make no Doubt but that *France* will listen to all Overtures of Peace, and even go so far as to set on Foot Negotiations for a general Accommodation; nay, her Ministers, at all the neutral Courts, shall carry on the Farce with the most refined Dissimulation. We have already seen a Specimen of the Politicks of that artful Court, in this Particular, in the



the Archbishop of *Paris*'s Mandate to his Clergy, on the Taking of *Philipsburgh*, in which the instructed *Prelate* loudly sounds his Master's pacifick Disposition, amidst his Trophies and Laurels. That insinuating Court will, I doubt not, seem willing to accept of our Mediation, for terminating her Differences with his *Imperial* Majesty, and she will probably assume such an Air of Frankness and Sincerity, on this Occasion, as will leave little Room for us to doubt of her real Inclinations for Peace, tho' all the while, her sole View will be to delude us into a further Suspension of our Efforts in Favour of the Empire, and the general Cause of Liberty, whilst she is wresting the *Mantuan* out of the *Imperial* Hands, and getting Possession of all the strong Fortresses on the *Rhine* and *Moselle*.

I doubt not neither, but that we shall see into the Designs and Artifices of *France*, when, I am afraid, it will be too late; for, after the *Emperor* shall be quite drove out of *Italy*, and the *Empire* shall be stripp'd of all her Bulwarks, what Power can resist the united Strength of *France* and her Allies in the *Netherlands*, the sole Point of View of that aspiring Crown, it may be said, the real Motive that induced her to appear in

Arms at this Time, tho' *Poland* was the specious Pretext. Should we, in Conjunction with our Allies, be supposed to be able to maintain two hundred thousand Men in the *Netherlands*, a Matter altogether dubious, can it be imagined that *France* won't, and can't double the Number in a Country so near the Centre of her Force and Power? Won't an Army in *Flanders* stand *England* in double what it will *France*? And has she not the Means of being, every Campaign, near two Months before us in the Field? For my Part, the dreadful Consequence of delaying our Succours to the *Empire*, at this Juncture, seems to me so obvious, that it amazes me to think we can hesitate one Day in our Resolves. It is certain, that our future Expence must increase in Proportion to our Delay, as it must naturally require greater Force to pull down *France*, when she has thoroughly secured herself in *Italy*, on the *Rhine*, and on the *Moselle*, than before her Conquests in those Parts are compleated.

Besides, as we have good Grounds to believe, that the *Turk* will have made his Peace with *Persia* before the next Campaign, if 'tis not already compleated, how can it be hoped that the *Emperor* will

will be able to give us any Assistance, in the Prosecution of the War on the Side of *Flanders*? Does not the late Elopement of the young Prince *Rogatsy*, from *Vienna*, plainly demonstrate, that *France* has Views of cutting out Work for the *Emperor* and the *Empire* on the Side of *Hungary* and *Transilvania*? And should *Spain* and her Allies from *Naples* make themselves Masters of *Trieste*, in the *Adriatick*, of which there seems to be more than a bare Probability, can it be doubted but that they will assist against the *Emperor* in *Hungary*, from that Quarter, or that an Invasion of *Carniola*, of which *Trieste* is Part, will not be for this Purpose?

Does not the aspiring Views of *France* and *Spain* evidently appear from their vast naval Preparations? *France* was look'd upon at the Beginning of the present War, which has not yet subsisted above fourteen Months, to be in no Condition to make any Figure at Sea, for several Years to come; yet we find her already Mistress of about fifty Ships of the Line, actually fitted for Service in the Bay of *Cadiz*, at *Brest*, et *Toulon*, and at *Rochfort*; and, if we may give Credit to authentick Advices from that Kingdom, she will soon have a Navy of near fourscore capital

capital Ships, which, together with the naval Power of *Spain*, is capable of giving great Umbrage, if not of striking Terror into most of the trading Nations of *Europe*, but particularly these Nations which lye so contiguous to her: And, what should justly add to our Anxiety, is, that we ourselves, by our fatal Neutrality, during the Course of the present War, have given *France* the Opportunity of thus surprisngly encreasing her naval Power. And we shall, by a further unhappy Continuance in the same Neutrality, certainly contribute towards her bringing her maritime Affairs into the highest Degree of Perfection.

To sum up the Whole, it appears evident to me, that any further Delay, in heartily joining against the House of *Bourbon* and her Allies, must be attended with all the Confusion and Misery, which can befall a free Nation, and that we shall only have the melancholy Honour of being the last *undone*; for *undone* we must undoubtedly expect to be, after our best Bulwark, the House of *Austria*, shall be reduced by that ambitious one of *Bourbon*.

Thus, Sir, have I freely given you my Thoughts of the present Situation of Affairs in *Europe*, as they relate to the *Em-*  
*peror,*

*peror*, to the Balance of Power, and the Security of our *Constitution*. I wish I may have said any Thing which can awaken us out of that Political Lethargy, which we have of late unwarily suffer'd ourselves to be seized with, so much to the Disadvantage of our Honour, our Interest, and the Liberties of Mankind.

*I am, &c.*



*POST*



## POSTSCRIPT.

YOU will naturally observe, Sir, that the foregoing was written in the last Campaign, when I imagined the Successes of *France*, even at that Time, were sufficient to have awakened us out of that fatal *Insensibility* we had been seized with, from the Beginning of the Attempts of that ambitious *Crown* on the House of *Austria*. There was then Reason, I thought, to hope that the Power lodged in the King, by the last Parliament, was calculated for that glorious Purpose; nor could I imagine that the M——rs had moved for that uncommon additional Power, at that Time, for any other End than that of employing it for the Preservation of the Balance of Power in *Europe*, which, even then, seemed to me to have been in eminent Danger, from the Strength and Successes of *France* and her *Allies*, and from the obvious Inability of his *Imperial* Majesty.

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I saw, in common with many others, that the Kingdoms of *Naples* and *Sicily* were the favourite Objects of the Cabinet of *Spain*, and that the *Emperor* must inevitably be stripp'd of them, except we should vigorously exert ourselves in their Defence; and I was sensible we had then the Power in our Hands of preventing the Loss of those Countries, the Possession of which must have added so prodigiously to the Strength of the Allies, whom it was our Interest to have depressed, as the certain Means of preventing the Views of the House of *Bourbon* on the Liberties of *Europe*.

I thought also, that as the Preservation of *Naples* and *Sicily* might be a Means, in Futurity, of obliging *France* and *Spain* to listen to Terms of Accommodation, Self-interest would never have permitted us to be Spectators of the Conquest of them, whilst it was in our Power to preserve them. And I hoped the Regard, which should have been constantly had to the trading Interest of these Nations, might induce us to have assisted in the Maintenance of the *Emperor's* Possession of Kingdoms, extremely useful to us in our general Commerce, but more particularly in our Trade to the *Levant*, which must inevitably be en-

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dangered, whilst they are subject to a Branch of the House of *Bourbon*.

But, however, our M——rs might have judged of the Sincerity of the Court of *France*, or whatever else might have been their *Reasons* for continuing Neuters to this Time, in the present Dissentions on the Continent. We have now all the Reason imaginable to hope they will no longer observe a Neutrality, which must certainly endanger our own Safety, the *Protestant* Religion, and the Freedom of all our antient Confederates.

The late Successes of *France* and her Allies should be a Means, one would think, of rousing us to Action, whilst yet there is a Probability of succeeding, because a further Increase of their Conquests, as it would naturally increase their Power, would not only render our Success doubtful, but must also oblige us to a far greater Expence, than can be now looked upon as necessary to bring those Powers to reasonable Terms of Accommodation.

It is true, a *Mediation* is now set on Foot, or at least attempted to be set on Foot; but, as I had already observed, there are Grounds for believing



lieving, that *France* will seemingly hearken to all Overtures of Peace, whilst she is really meditating the most dangerous Designs on the Liberties of Mankind: And this purely, in order to lull us, the Friends of universal Freedom, into Supineness and Inactivity.

Therefore it is to be hoped, our pacifick Measures will have no such fatal Influence on our Counsels, as to be a Means of our slackening the necessary Preparations for War. Necessary they must be looked upon in this Conjunction, perhaps the most critical that has been known in the Memory of Man. A Conjunction big with nothing less than the certain future Safety and Prosperity, or Ruin and Destruction, of our Commerce, our Liberties, and our Holy Religion.

Altho' it must be confessed that Charity, as well as Self-interest require our good Offices towards a general Pacification; yet I think it will be owned, that there does not appear the least Foundation for our hoping to succeed in the laudable Undertaking. For can it be expected, that the *Emperor* will be prevail'd upon, whilst the least Glimmerings of Hopes remain of doing himself Justice,

to make an absolute Cession of his *Italian* Dominions to *Don Carlos*? A Condition without which *Spain* will listen to no Proposals of Peace. And though this Difficulty could be got over, which, by the by, is thought impossible, whilst the *Emperor* remains in Possession of *Vienna*; yet the Re-establishment of King *Stanislaus* on the Throne of *Poland*, is a Point of so delicate a Nature, as leaves us no room to hope *France* will give it up, whilst, at least, the present Career of her Successes continue. This is a Point on which *France* does, and always will insist. And tho' the *Emperor* might be brought to abandon King *Augustus*, can it be supposed the *Russians* will abandon a Prince they have already done so much for, and from whom they have every future Act of sincere Friendship to expect?

Upon the Whole, there seems to be no Reason for us to hope that our Mediation, at this Time, will be attended with any Success; nor can we ever expect to be able to bring the ambitious House of *Bourbon* to such Terms as shall fix the necessary Balance of Power in Futurity, but by powerfully assisting the *Emperor*, without the least Delay.

Our own Interest, and the Liberties of *Europe* call upon us to give this depressed  
Prince

Prince our Succour at this Time; and tho' our Circumstances at home are not as good as they have been, which might deter us from engaging in a War, yet in a C R I S I S, such as the present, there is scarcely a Man in the Kingdom would not give his Assent to a War, calculated for pulling down the Pride of *France*, and for preserving all that is dear to an *Englishman*. I will only add, in King *William's* Words on the like Occasion, *That if we do, in good Earnest, desire to see England hold the Balance of Europe, and to be, indeed, at the Head of the Protestant Interest, it will appear, by our right improving the present Opportunity.*

F I N I S.

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