A LETTER TO THE CRAFTSMEN, UPON THE CHANGE OF AFFAIRS IN EUROPE by the WAR that is begun against the EMPEROUR.

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LETTER
TO
Miss Ellis,
Sent in Answer to
Her LETTER to The Author
Printed in the Year 1796.

LONDON,
Printed for the Author, 1796.
A LETTER
TO THE
CRAFTSMEN, &c.

GENTLEMEN,

The great and sudden Change we see in the Face of the Affairs of Europe, by the War made upon the Emperor, being become the Subject of all Conversation, you will easily believe me, when I tell you it was lately my Fortune to be engaged in a Discourse upon that Subject, with some Gentlemen who happened to be all Friends to the present Administration besides myself.

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On
On these Occasions the *Craftsmen* seldom fail to be brought in, from the Character they have long assumed to themselves, of true Patriots, and able Politicians. And so it happen'd now: Upon my saying something I had learned from you, whom they knew I was a great Admirer of, they asked me, What was the Meaning that my Friends the *Craftsmen* were so silent upon this great Occasion? Why, if they were such Patriots as they pretended to be, they did not assist their Country with some good Advice, when it would be so seasonable? Why, if they were such able Politicians, they did not shew it upon so critical a Conjuncture, when they might do it with so much Advantage to the Publick, and so much Reputation to themselves? That while Negotiations on some late Occasions hung in Suspence, they pretended to treat the Ministers as mere Blunderers in Politicks; that during the Negotiations, as the Face of Things seemed to alter, they had changed Sides, and had taken
the Part of France, or Spain, or the Emperor, as they thought would most embarrass Affairs; that when the Treaty of Seville was at length concluded, by which our Commerce was restored and secured, then they pretended, the Ministers had begun at the wrong End, and should have treated with the Emperor first: And when that Difficulty was got over, and Friendship was restored with the Court of Vienna (which the Ministry knew they always had in their Power, if they could once separate the Spanish Court from them, and for that Reason very wisely began there, and attempted that first,) when the Ministry had happily extricated themselves out of these Difficulties, which their Enemies had flattered themselves they would not be able to do, what Part, say they, did the Craftsmen take then? Why truly, they modestly assumed the whole Credit of it to themselves; they told the World, that the Ministers had at last blundered into what was right, by submitting to follow their Directions and Advice. Now, say these Gentlemen,
tlemen, if the **Craftsmen** really are the great Politicians they would be thought to be, what means this affected Silence at present? Why don't they speak out, and tell us what they think is the Interest of **Great Britain** in this nice and difficult Conjuncture?

I confess, I felt myself here under a very great Difficulty, and had often wondered within my self, why Gentlemen of such great Abilities chose to be so much upon the Reserve; and wanted exceedingly some of their Instructions, to know what Part I should take, and how I might best support it in the Sequel of this Conversation.

But that I might seem to say something, I told them, you did not think it decent to prescribe to the Administration, and that it was Time enough to interpose, when you saw them taking wrong Measures. But this Answer would not pass; what do you talk of. Decency, say they, in Men, who have for so many Years shewn, that they have thrown off all Regard, not only to the Ministry, but to the Crown itself?
self? And how trifling is it to say, 'tis Time enough to interpose with their Advice when the Ministers are entering into wrong Measures? This might pass in the Mouths of Men, who have a better Opinion of those in the Administration; but in Men who pretend the Ministers are always in the wrong, and are such Blunderers that they hardly ever deviate into what is right; for Men of such consummate Wisdom as the Craftsmen, and who can do their Country such signal Service by their early Advice; for such Men to sit silent and say nothing, when a few Words spoken in Time, might perhaps be the saving of their Country from infinite Mischief; this surely nothing can excuse: And after this they must either renounce their Patriotism, and pretended Love to their Country, or give up their Claim to a superior Skill in Politicks; or confess that they mean Themselves more than their Country, and live still in Hopes, that the Distresses which may possibly be brought upon the Go-
Government, may force it to change Hands, and try whether these able Men can mend Matters.

To this, I told them, That I did indeed wonder as well as they, at the Silence you had kept, when I thought it of so much Consequence for Men of your Abilities to give the World your Sense of Things, but that I could by no Means allow of the Construction they put upon it; that it could not be expected you should assist with your Advice Men you so much disliked, before it appeared to the World by their wrong Conduct, how much they wanted it; and that if you did propose to serve yourselves by it, that was not in my Opinion at all to be wondered at, or blamed: That it was a laudable Ambition in Men of so much Merit, to desire to be in a Condition to serve their Country by being in a publick Station; and that it was but a just Reward to such superior Abilities, to be put in the Places of greatest Trust and Distinction; but that I was persuaded you would
would upon no Consideration suffer your Country to be ruined, but timely interpose, and by your wise Counsels save even these Ministers, rather than not save a Country, for which you had so much Love and so warm a Zeal.

But these Answers would not be accepted; they insisted on it, that you had neither the Honesty of Patriots, nor the Wisdom of Politicians; and that the whole Secret was nothing more than this: That you were resolved, at any Rate, to distress the Ministry all you could, in Hopes of getting into their Places; that all your Politicks consisted only in this single Point, to take, in all Cases, the opposite Side to the Ministry, whatever it were; that your past Conduct shewed the Truth of this in a Manner that made it undeniable; and that your pretended Skill in Politicks, was nothing more than to declaim plausibly for and against any Thing you pleased; which, say they, in Questions of a complicated Nature, as political ones always are, is at any Time a very easy Thing.
For in Cases of this kind, there are always Conveniences and Inconveniences on every Side: What then has a Declaimer to do? but to multiply and magnify the Inconveniences of the Measures he would oppose, and to lessen, if not conceal entirely, the Things that are to be said for them. And how very easy this is, we will shew you, say they, in the very Case now before us. Whereas true Wisdom consists in weighing carefully one Thing against another, and judging well on which Side the greater Probability lies, for in political Affairs, Matters will not admit of Demonstration; he is the ablest Man that makes the shrewdest Conjectures, and takes his Measures accordingly: But as it is at most but Conjecture, many Things may happen to defeat the wifest Measures; which is the Reason why all the World are sensible of the Folly and Iniquity of judging of Measures meerly by Events.

These Gentlemen being so confident of their own Abilities, and pretending with so much Assurance that
that all your boasted Skill in Politics was nothing but Declamation,
I had a Mind to make the Experiment: Pray, Gentlemen, said I, if it
be so easy to give Opinions, and support them by plausible Reason-
ings in Things of this intricate Nature, be pleased to favour me so far
as to tell me what you think is most
for the Interest of England at this
Time; for I must own I am entirely
at a Loss what Judgment to make
in the present Situation of Affairs.

You mistake us, replyed one of
the Gentlemen; We don't pretend to
say, what Measures it is most expe-
dient for the Government to take in
the present critical Juncture; that
we leave to our Superiors, to those,
whose known Abilities, and long Ex-
perience in Business, and whose Know-
ledge of many Things which are and
must needs be Secrets to Persons of
our private Station, enable them to
make a much truer Judgment than
any of us can pretend to, and whose
Interest it is to do what is best for
the Nation, as much as it can be of
any Men in the whole Kingdom, let
them
them be who they will. We shall therefore not easily suspect the Prudence of the Measures they shall think fit to take, or fancy, if we were in their Places, we could do better; all we say is, that it is easy to declaim on either Side of a political Question, from the complex Nature of it; and this we will undertake to shew you presently, take which Side you will.

I was not enough prepared to take any Side in so difficult a Point, and upon which so little has been said as yet in Print; and therefore desired to be excused from taking a Part, and that they who seemed to have consider'd the Matter more a great deal than I had done, would choose what Side they pleased.

Upon this one of them began thus: We did not expect you should take a Side as your full Judgment and Opinion, but only for Argument's Sake, and to shew you how easily many specious Things might be said against it; but since you decline the taking one Side rather than another,
another, let us put, says he, all the several Sides in which this Affair can be considered.

A War is, you see, begun in Europe by a powerful Alliance against the Emperor; What now shall England do? There is but one of these three Ways the Government can possibly take: Either to observe a Neutrality between the contending Powers; or to enter briskly into the War in Support of the Emperor; or to suspend a little, and remain for some time in a State of Inaction, in order to see what Turn Things will take, and concert with our Allies the likeliest Measures for restoring the Peace of Europe, with a due Attention and Regard to our own particular Interests, by proper Stipulations before we engage too far. Which ever of these Sides the Government shall think it most for our Interest to take, I will answer for it the Craftsmen will take the Contrary, and will find a great many Reasons to shew 'tis wrong. We will try this, if you please, in each Case.

Let
Let us suppose, first, the Government chooses to observe a Neutrality. A great deal may be easily said against this: It is to sit still, and to see that Balance of Power destroyed, which we have procured at the Expence of so much Blood and Treasure; that it is throwing up at once all the Fruits of the last glorious War; that France will soon be as formidable as it was in the Time of Lewis the Fourteenth, and prepare Fetters for all Europe; that if the House of Austria be forced to truckle to France, it may be driven to purchase its Peace by Concessions and Agreements very prejudicial to the maritime Powers, and to England in particular; that if the Emperor be forced into an ignominious Peace, there will not be any where a sufficient Power left to make head against France, especially with all the Weight of Spain on its Side, and in Possession of all the Strength and Trade of Italy and the Mediterranean. In short, that if by our Neutrality
trality we suffer the Emperor to be ruined or brought too low, our Commerce, our Liberties, our Religion will be precarious, or rather sure to be lost in a very few Years. To chuse therefore a Neutrality, would be an Argument of a weak and cowardly Ministry, who had neither the Wildom nor the Courage to take vigorous Measures in a Conjundure where they were so necessary; and that they sacrificed their Country, to purchase their own Eafe and Continuance in Power, for want either of Forefght to see the Consequences of so wrong a Conduct, or of Honesty to pursue the Measures they saw were right.

Well; now, if you please, we will suppose the Government, for these or other Reasons, to reject a Neutrality, and enter briskly and vigorously, without losing time, into the Defence of the Emperor: Will the Craftsmen allow this to be right? By no means, they will tell us it was our Interest to keep neuter; that we have no Concern in the Quarrel into which the Emperor has
has brought himself; that England has nothing to do with Poland; that the Emperor might have still enjoyed his Dominions in Peace, if he would have let the Poles alone, and permitted a free People to please themselves with a Choice of the King they liked best; that he knew how much France would resent his Opposition to Stanislaus, and yet would venture to provoke, without providing against the Consequences it would probably expose him to, or being in a Condition to defend his own Territories. That England has very little Obligation to the Emperor, who for Twenty Years past has shewn not the least Complaisance to Powers he is so much obliged to, as all the World knows he is to us and the States; witness his Ostend Trade, and his Treaty with Spain: that the very Country we recovered at so vast an Expence of Blood and Treasure for him, he turned against us as soon as he could, and endeavoured to hurt us in so essential a Point as that of our Commerce, by which alone it is that we have been able to do the great
great Things we did in his Defence: That while he has the Dominion of these Countries, the Defence of them is left to us; that he has not a single Town in a proper Condition of Defence in all Flanders, with Respect either to the Fortifications, Troops, Ammunition, or Magazines for their Subsistence; that the Weight and Expence of all this is left to England and Holland, whose Interest the Emperor knows it is, that these Countries should not fall into the Hands of France; that this is most ungrateful and most unjustifiable Usage, after what we have done for him; and therefore the Dutch have taken the only wise Part in coming into a Treaty of Neutrality with France for the Low-Countries; and that if the English Ministry had the Integrity, the Wisdom, and Prudence of theirs, we should have gone into the same Measures: That the Balance of Power is a chimerical Business, and is every Day shifting; and that if we must be drawn into a War every Time a weak or ambitious Prince will provoke a superior Power, we shall ne-
ver be at Peace, but every Day be exposed to suffer by the Folly of others, though our own Conduct, with respect to other Princes, be never so upright and inoffensive; that no body can answer for the Events of War, or be sure what may be the Issue of it; that many Incidents may happen to prevent, or bring things back into the State we would have them, without our engaging; that the good Effects of a Neutrality are immediate and visible to every body, by the great Increase of our Trade, which is already so sensibly felt by the Demands for our Corn, and other Exports; and that it is always the Interest of a trading Nation, if possible, to keep in Peace; whereas the Inconveniences of a War are sure to be severely felt, while the Conveniences are remote and very uncertain.

This is what may be said at first Sight in favour of a Neutrality; and I doubt not the Craftsmen would be able to say a great deal more when they have laid their Heads together, and have whetted their Wits how to oppose
oppose, in the keenest Manner, the Part the Ministry shall have advised against it. Besides many things they will have to say against entering vigorously into the War, they will tell us, that we had no Hand in what gave Birth to this War, and that we shall in the Conclusion reap no Advantage from it; that the Burden of it therefore ought to lye upon those whom it most concerns; that England is already so exhausted, so involved in Debt, and so loaded with Taxes, that it is impossible to find sufficient Resources for a vigorous War; and that we are reduced to this Condition by the Part we took in the two last Wars for the Defence of the House of Austria, and in Support of the Revolution; and partly by the ill Returns the Emperor has made us since, by his setting up the Ostend Company, and his unnatural Engagements with Spain, in prejudice of his old fast Friends and Allies; and therefore a vigorous War is neither reasonable, nor possible to be expected from us, by a Prince to whom we have so little Obligation.

Let
Let us now suppose, in the last Place, that the Ministry take the third Way I mention'd, and decline not only a Neutrality, but also to take Part with the Emperor immediately, and chuse rather to continue for some time in a State of Inaction and Suspence, till they see what other Powers will do who are more nearly and immediately concerned, and particularly our Neighbours the Dutch, with whom it is to be supposed that England will always act in perfect Harmony and Concert: Besides, since if we engage, we can't engage by halves, they may think it proper to see what the Emperor is able to do himself, and how far he will undertake in Defence of his own Quarrel, and upon what Terms we can enter into it, with most Advantage to ourselves. But is there nothing to be said against this? Will not the Craftsmen tell us, that the longer we delay, the more difficult the Work will grow; that by suspending thus between a Neutrality and a vigorous Prosecution of the War immediately, we lose the Benefit of both
both; that our Help will come too late, if we stay till the French and their Allies have made themselves Masters of all Italy: But that if we immediately take a Part, that will cool their Courage, and make them slacken the Vigour with which they push on the War at present; that the Apprehension of a British Fleet in the Mediterranean would make them not so forward in gaining Conquests they would find it so difficult to maintain, when the Sea was shut up to them, so that no Troops or warlike Stores could come that Way from Spain; and that no Door would be open but thro' the Territories of the King of Sardinia. But while by our Suspence that Apprehension is removed, and they see they shall for another Year be Masters of those Seas, we may be sure they will improve the Opportunities we give them, to the utmost. And our Inaction will not only put it in their Power to push successfully their Conquests in those Parts; but will be an Encouragement to them to make a more vigorous Effort on the Rhine, than they would
would otherwise think it safe for them to attempt: Or at least, the less Opposition they will find there, the more Troops they will be at Liberty to pour into Italy. In short, 'tis always easier to prevent Mischiefs than to retrieve them; to keep Places out of an Enemy's Hands, than to retake them; and therefore if a vigorous War must, in the last Result of Things, be entred into, the sooner the better.

At this Rate we may be sure the Crafts men would talk, if the Ministry should go into this Measure. Thus you see, upon all Suppositions, the Crafts men will not be at a Loss for Matter to declaim upon. There is indeed a fourth Way may be taken, but which is at first Sight so manifestly wrong, that if the Crafts men should espouse it, I think it would not be very easy even for such able Demagogues to gain the People to their Side; and that is to take a Part in the War, but not to engage deep in it: 'tis impossible the Ministry should make so absurd a Choice; and therefore there is no great need of considering what these Gentlemen would say
fay against it. But for Argument's Sake, let us for once suppose it, that the Ministry should in the present Condition of the Nation, and in Resentment of the Usage we have met with from the Emperor, take a Middle Way between a Neutrality and a vigorous War; and in Defence of such a Measure tell us, that we ought not to engage in it as Principals, but as Accesories only, since we are not the Parties immediately concerned. Who does not see what the Craftsman would then say? that the Point to be considered is not what the Emperor has deserved of the British Nation, but what it is our Interest to do; that that is the only Consideration should govern Princes in the Measures they take with respect to War or Peace, and not Likes or Dislikes to this or that Prince, and how he has behaved on this or that Occasion: That the Question is, What is now proper to be done? Whether because we are out of Humour with the Emperor, and he has given perhaps but too just Cause for it; we shall, to shew our Re-
Refentment, go into Measures destructive to our own real Interests? That the Distinction of Principal and Accessory looks like something, but often at the Bottom is really nothing but Words: That in a Confederacy it must be considered, not only how far the several Parties are interested, but what the real Strength of each respectively is; and how much Power, upon the whole, is necessary to be a Match for the Power they unite against. For Example, If twenty Degrees of Strength are necessary to support the Emperor in the present War, let us suppose the Powers we would join with, can together make up fourteen Parts; that England, either in pursuance of Treaties, or upon a Proportion of Interests in the War, ought to furnish only three Parts; so that in the whole here will be seventeen; what shall we do? 'tis plain here are three Degrees of Strength wanting to enable the Confederacy to carry on the War with Vigour, and reasonable Hopes of Success: England won't furnish them, because it is beyond their Proportion, and they are obliged
obliged to furnish only pro rata; and the other Allies can't: Why, if we persist in this Resolution of engaging no farther, the Confederacy must break, the weakest Parties will separate, and make their Peace first at the Expense of the rest, and the War must needs end unhappily; and therefore we had better not have entered into the War at all.

And as for the Plea of not being able to carry on a vigorous War; tho' I do allow there is but too much Truth in it, I believe the Craftsmen would treat that as a very ridiculous Pretence, and would argue from the Luxury of the Nation, and the extravagant expensive Way we are run into, in Buildings, Gardenings, Pictures, Jewels, Plate, Equipage, and Tables, that it is in vain to pretend Inability in so good a Cause, when so much Money might be raised by retrenching our Expences in these and the like Articles.

The Example of Holland, I don't know what they would say to, but I know what they should say to it; D they
they should say, that in the last War the States engaged greatly beyond their Strength, upon the Faith of England; and that after a most expensive and successful War, they were scandalously abandon'd by a Ministry, whose Memory will be had in everlast ing Abhorrence by all good English as well as Dutch Men; that this fatal Issue of the last War, whose Glory and Fruits were all thrown away by not an inglorious, but ignominious Treaty, has both disabled and frightened them from entering far into another War, till their Safety shall render it absolutely unavoidable.

But if we really are in so exhausted a Condition, they will say 'tis owing to the vast Debts contracted in Support of the Revolution, which we have paid dearly for, and to the ill Conduct of the Ministry, who have done so little in so many Years of Peace to lessen that heavy Load of Debts, which wise, and frugal, and honest Ministers would before now have made a great Progress in; and to enter into any Method of War under the
the Management of such Ministers is a vain Attempt, and from which no Good can ever be expected.

Thus, Sir, we have shewn you, that let the Ministry take what Part they will, their Enemies can never be at a Loss for Topicks to urge against it, and talk plausibly at least to the Populace, who must needs be very ill Judges of such difficult and intricate Affairs, since 'tis so little they know to form a Judgment by; however, the Craftsman have taken great Pains to read weekly long Lectures to them, and make them fancy themselves to be able Politicians.

I could not but allow these Gentlemen to be so far in the right, as to admit, that any Side in political Questions may, by Men of tolerable Abilities, be made to appear either very ingenious and plausible, or ridiculed and exploded, as may best answer their particular Views: But I flatter myself, you Gentlemen whom I address this to, have that Penetration, that you know what is really for the Interest of your Country,
try, and that you have too much Regard to it, to act against your Con-science and Judgment, in espousing, at this important Juncture, a Side you think to be wrong.

But the Gentlemen I was arguing with would by no Means allow this: They said, that if you espoused even the right Side, you would do it for a wrong Reason, and be mixing false Colours in every Argument with Truth; that you would by a pretended Enquiry into the Causes and Occasion of this War, tho’ such an Enquiry be, as to the Ministry, altogether useless and unnecessary, endeavour to throw it upon them; that they had not by proper Representations to the Court of Vienna prevented the Handle they have given for it; and that ’tis originally owing to the Quadruple Alliance that the Emperor is in Danger of losing all his Dominions in Italy. If you tell them they were not the Ministers that made that Alliance; and that therefore if it twas wrong, the Blame should not be laid on them; the Craftsmen will tell
tell us, that the present Ministry rendered that Treaty effectual by that of Seville. Admit this: Shall a King of England make Treaties, and not preserve his Honour in performing them? Had not Spain a Right to the Performance of it, in Consideration of giving up Sicily to the Emperor? And had not ten Years shewn, that nothing could render the Quadruple Alliance effectual, but the Variation made in it by that of Seville, by substituting Spanish instead of Neutral Troops? But how is this the Cause of the War in Italy? How has this occasion'd the Danger the Emperor is in? Did France enter Italy by the Dominions yielded to Don Carlos, by Parma or Florence? No, 'tis manifestly otherwise. 'Tis the King of Sardinia has let France in to swallow up Italy; that was the Door which was opened for the War that has already devoured the Milanese, by the Entrance of French Troops without the least Assistance from the Spanish Garrisons in Tuscany, or any Forces that came that Way. Had that Door been
been kept shut, the Emperor would have been in as little Danger on that Side as on any other. And why was it not kept shut? Is the English Ministry to answer for that? Had they the keeping of the Key? If the Emperor, by any ill Usage provoked the King of Sardinia into this extraordinary Step, or if he took it without sufficient Provocation, how are the Ministry to blame?

The Part the King of Sardinia has taken, was so unexpected, and is so extremely hazardous to his own Interests, that the Emperor, the Power infinitely most concerned to have a watchful Eye upon him, could not be made to enter in earnest into a real Apprehension or Belief of it; if he had, he would not have left his Italian Dominions so defenceless. I am afraid wise Princes sometimes make very wrong Judgments of their Neighbours, in thinking that they certainly will not do so or so, because in Wisdom and good Policy they ought not. But perhaps upon Enquiry it may be found, that the English Ministers
Ministers did apprehend this fatal step in the King of Sardinia, and did all they could to prevent it, but to no Purpose. They who are acquainted with the History of the House of Savoy, know, their Play has long been to embroil the Affairs of Europe, and blow up into a War the Sparks of Dissention that from Time to Time they have discovered between the two great Powers, of Austria and Bourbon. This they have practised with Success for several Generations, and in all Wars, however they have ended as to the other Parties engaged in them, have found their own Account; as we all know they remarkably did in the Conclusion of the last. If the King of Sardinia was flattered into Hopes of the like Success from fresh Troubles, 'tis easy to see how difficult or rather impossible it was to keep him, actuated with great Expectations and strong Resentments, from entering into the Views of France, without such Expedients as it was not in the Power of the English Ministry to give or procure for him. Such a Prince will be satisfied with nothing,
thing, but what England must either give itself, or be Guarantee for, if promised by the Emperor. This was in Fact the Case in the two last Wars, in which this House would not engage on the Side of the Allies upon any other Terms. In short, 'tis plain from the Conduct of this Prince, that nothing could engage him to come into a Treaty to prevent a War; but either our giving to him large Subsidies, or procuring to him an Addition of Territories. But how was this last to be done? Must we compel the Emperor to give him Part of his Dominions, or Possessions belonging to others, to keep him quiet, and bring him into reasonable Measures? Is this just? And if it were, is it in our Power? And as to Subsidies to be given to an Ally in Time of Peace, to prevent his engaging in Designs that may involve Europe in a War, we already know the Sense of the Craftsmen upon this Point too well, to make it needful to ask how they would approve it. There is no Point they would be able to decline upon with more Fire, or with more
more Success on the Minds of those they would inflame. Unless therefore some other Expedient could be found, by which the English Ministry might effectually have prevailed with the King of Sardinia to keep in the Interests of the Emperor, and not throw himself, as he has done, into the Arms of France, and let so formidable a Power into Italy, the Craftsmen must allow, that the French have entered by this Way, and that it was not in the Power of the Ministry to hinder it; and that therefore, whoever is to blame, the Fault cannot, with the least Pretence or Colour of Truth be charged on them: and yet you may depend upon it, the Quadruple Alliance, and the Subsequent Treaties which have been made to perfect it and render it effectual, will be the Burden of the Song, and we shall have endless Peels rung upon them, as the Cause of the Italian War, though nothing be more evident than the contrary; and it may as well be said, that Savoy is Tuscany, or Piedmont Parma, or the King of Sardinia is Don Carlos, as that the these Treaties have been
the Cause of France's invading the Milanese.

All the Influence those Treaties have had, I think, is this, that they have kept off this War for some Years, which would otherwise probably have broken out much sooner. If Spain has been drawn into this War upon the Emperor's Non-compliance with some Particulars insisted on by Spain in Favour of Don Carlos, which they would have thought to be Appendages of those Treaties, how would they have resented it, if England had concurred with the Emperor to defeat the whole design of them? But 'tis not impossible but the Craftsmen may charge this Quarrel also upon the Ministry; notwithstanding the King of Spain has in his Memorial done the Crown of Great Britain and its Ministers so much Justice, as to acknowledge, in the amplest Manner, their prudent, honest and unwearied Endeavours to prevent a Breach between that Crown and the Emperor on that Account.

Another thing we shall, as I have observed,
observed, be sure to hear of from the \textit{Craftsmen}, whatever Side they take as to the War, is the Debts of the Nation, which they are not content to lay upon the Ministry, but upon the Revolution; to render that odious, and make the present Generation weary of it, who did not feel the Dangers from which we were delivered by it. This is grown very fashionable with these Gentlemen, and yet I must take the Liberty to say, nothing can be more false or wicked; and there is nothing in which they shewed themselves more truly Traytors to their Country, than by this vile Imputation thrown upon the Revolution. The Debts of the Nation, as they stood at the Death of the late Queen, were owing to the two last Wars; which Wars were not entered into to support merely the Revolu-
tion, but in Defence of the Protestant Religion, and the Liberties of Europe, against the Power and Ambition of Lewis the Fourteenth, and his Attempts of Universal Monarchy. 

For let us, says he, consider what would
would have been the Case, if the Revolution had never happened, or rather, that there had been no Occasion for it: Had King Charles the Second been succeeded by a Protestant Prince, and who was hearty in the Interests of his People, would he have sat still, and suffered France to extend its Conquests in Flanders and on the Rhine? Or would he have taken Part with the House of Austria, and entered vigorously into the Confederacy against the exorbitant Power of France? I think it can be no Question, what Part a wise and good King would have taken: Here then would unavoidably have been a bloody and expensive War, though the Revolution had never happened.

And had a Popish Prince been on the Throne, which indeed proved to be our Fate, Things must have been much worse, since he would have gone, as in fact he did, into the Measures of France; to whose ambitious Views, had not the Revolution happened, it would have been impossible to have set any Bounds, and Great Britain
Britain had certainly been made a Province to the Grand Monarch, and we had been Slaves to Popery and all the Evils of Arbitrary Power.

If the War that followed upon the Heels of the Revolution was more expensive or less successful than it might have been, had it been entered into by a Protestant King of British Birth, that must not be imputed to our glorious Deliverer; but to the Rubs, Difficulties and Impediments thrown in his Way by a Sett of Men, that never understood the Interest of England, or at least were never true to it.

And as to the second War, With what Face can that be imputed to the Revolution? 'Tis true indeed that France gave but too just Cause for it by the Affront put upon King William and the British Nation, in declaring and acknowledging the Pretender, upon the Death of King James, King of Great Britain: But if that Provocation had not been given, would any Protestant English King have tamely suffered the Spanish Crown, with all its Dominions on the Continent, and the
the Riches of the Indies, to fall into French Hands? Or was it possible to hinder it without a War? Certainly not; a War was become absolutely necessary; it was accordingly entered into with Vigour, and carried on with a Success answerable to the wise and powerful Measures concerted for the Support of it. This War, therefore, is no more chargeable on the Revolution than the first.

If England did not reap the Fruits they had so much Reason to expect from so glorious a War, this is not chargeable on the Revolution, or its Friends; but on its avowed Enemies, on those who prevailed on the late Queen to remove the Treasurer and the General, who had with such wonderful Success, and to their own immortal Honour, distinguished themselves in her's and their Country's Service. Had they been continued in Power but one Year longer, France must have given the Allies Carte blanche; the Way had been open for our Armies to the very Gates of Paris. This is too well known to be denied. But this was a Happiness too great for us;
us; we had it in View only. These great Men, these Pillars of the State, these Supports of the grand Alliance, in whose Wisdom and Integrity every Part of the Confederacy had an entire Confidence, were removed, to make Way for Men, whose Ignorance in foreign Affairs, and Iniquity in all, whose Perfidiousness and Treachery to their Country and its Allies, are not to be expressed by any Words, or to be matched in any History.

These Men put the most infamous End to the most glorious War, to the infinite Dishonour and Prejudice of their Country; and in lieu of all we had Reason to expect, and even themselves had promised for the Security and Advantage of Commerce, they hoped to delude the Nation with the two glorious Acquisitions of Gibraltar, and the Assiento Contract; the last of which was by no means equivalent to the Benefits of Trade we might have insisted upon, and could not have been denied by a Prince who owed the peaceable Possession of his Crown to the English Ministry: But the main thing proposed to be got by it, was a round Sum
Sum of Money for themselves; tho' by their dilatory Management, and the Quarrels which arose between themselves, even that, if I mistake not, in the end was lost. And as to Gibraltar, what did they obtain? Why, that we should keep what we had been near ten Years in Possession of, and which all the Power of Spain could not take from us. But did they obtain any Point; whereby to render the Possession of it either more indisputable, or more peaceable? Nothing like it.

I heard indeed, says one of the Gentlemen, a noble L—d, who was deep in the Measures of that Ministry, not many Years ago, say with a very grave Face in a certain Place, that there was no other Fault to be found with the Treaty of Utrecht, but that single Omission or Over-sight, for so he would have it thought, that a proper District was not stipulated on the Land Side of Gibraltar for its Defence; and that it was a great Fault in the Seville Treaty, that that Defect was not supplied.
But this was strange Reasoning in that noble L--d, as well as a strange Affirma-
tion. Had not his Memory greatly failed him, he could not have forgot that that Fault in the Treaty of Utrecht was not a Slip or Over-
sight; quite otherwise; it was seen and considered by those who made that Treaty, and yet tamely gave it up. This may be seen in the Appendix to the Report of the House of Commons, upon the Impeachment of those Ministers in 1715. There it appears in a Paper in three Columns, that in one of them a District is demanded; in another is the Answer of France, that they durst not propose such a Demand to Spain, and that the King of Spain would never yield to it; and in the third Column, the English Ministers acquiesce in this Refusal. And this is now pretended to be an Omission and an Over-sight, and the present Ministers are to be blamed for not supplying this Defect in the Treaty of Seville. What, are these Ministers to blame for not insisting peremptorily on a Demand they had no Right to make,
make, when they were at Peace with Spain, and its King in quiet Possession of the Crown, and in a Condition to support any just Pretensions; when their Predecessors, at the End of a glorious War, Arms in their Hands, and Spain at the lowest Ebb, and its King in no Condition to refuse any thing that could with any Colour of Justice or Reason be asked, had given it up, and ignominiously receded from it with their Eyes open, and when they were themselves sensible how reasonable and necessary the Demand was? Strange Reasoning surely this!

These two noble Articles were the Reward of all the Blood and Treasure England spent in that War; unless perhaps they will claim some Addition of Merit from the Demolition of Dunkirk. But in that Article also they did their Business so by halves, and suffered the Articles to be so loosely drawn, as to leave Room for fresh Disputes, and Power to France to put it at any Time in a Condition to annoy our Commerce, (as they did in the former Wars) in the Compass of a very
very few Months, and at a very small Expence, when they ought to have insisted on its being absolutely re- Signed up to them.

But according to the usual Ju-

stice of the Craftsmen, the present Ministers must be answerable for all the Consequences of the ill Mea-
sures then pursued, and of the Blun-
ders made in the Settling so im-
portant Articles; they must quar-
rel with France, and involve the Nation in a new War, to rectify the Mistakes of these great Ministers, and make France do, what by that Treaty they say they are not obliged to.

These are all the Advantages it is so much as pretended that England got by the Treaty of Utrecht, which, were they as great as themselves would have them thought, were pur-
chased at vastly too dear a Rate, when the publick Faith and Honour of the Nation, and the Security it had in the Friendship of so powerful an Alliance, was made the Sacri-
fice. And what makes the bubling the Nation in this shameful Manner with
with these boasted Advantages the more scandalous and the more provocative is, that so considerable an Acquisition as the Kingdom of Sicily was given away from the Emperor in manifest Violation of the Articles of the Grand Alliance, to be a Bribe to the Duke of Savoy, who was the only Prince that could, upon any Terms, be prevailed with to desert the Grand Alliance, and come into the wicked Measures of the English Ministers; and this done by the English Ministers themselves: For France and Spain, I speak it to my Knowledge, would, when they saw the Emperor so stiff that he would come into no Treaty without Sicily, have given up that Point, tho' they were the only Powers who had any Interest in refusing it. No, say the English Ministers, the Emperor shall not have it, he shall have the Mortification to see it given to the only Ally that deserts his and the publick Cause; because he will not quietly evacuate Spain, and sacrifice the Catalans, and come into their infamous Measures.
O Catalans! a Name that can never be mention'd without remembering when and by whom a brave and faithful People were delivered up to Slaughter, and the Loss of all their Liberties, in return for the Confidence they put in the Faith and Honour of this Nation. I wonder the Craftsman have not yet found out a Way to impute this monstrous Iniquity to the present Ministers; which 'tis certain, they might with as much Justice do, as an hundred other Things, which they are no more concern'd in.

But to return to Sicily: To give that Kingdom to a Prince to whom so little was due, and at the same time take so little Care of the Honour and Interest of their own Country, has something in it so absurd, that it can no otherwise be accounted for, than from a Design to subvert the Constitution and the present Settlement, which a successful War and a Peace answerable to it, were in the Nature of them an effectual Bar to. And the Measures they pursued at Home during these Negotiations are
are but too plain a Proof, that this was their Design, which otherwise there was no Sense in.

But whatever their particular Schemes were, by the good Providence of God they were in a Moment blown up, and entirely defeated, and the Prince was peaceably seated on the Throne, whom they had endeavoured to render odious to the Queen and Nation, by the vile Representations they made to her and her People, as if he were preparing to invade the Kingdom, and by Force ravish from her the Crown, which she had, till she fell into these Hands, worn with so much Honour. These Jealousies were industriously infused into Queen and People; it was pretended a considerable Fleet was ready in Holland to bring over Forces, and that all Things were prepared for a Desertion of the Troops in England. And what the Consequence of these Jealousies might have been, if they had had longer Time to spread themselves, and gain Credit with the People, 'tis easy to foresee.

But
But to return once more to Sicily: This insolent Treatment of the Emperor by the Ministers of a Queen in Alliance with him, in giving from him a Kingdom, which his Enemies would have yielded up to him, without so much as pretending to make him any Compensation for it, was not only infamous to the last Degree, but most fatal in its Consequences. And 'tis for that Reason I insist so much upon it: For 'tis to this we owe all the Difficulties we have been since involved in; 'tis this flagrant Injustice to the Emperor, that has made these Years of Peace so imperfect in the Tranquillity and Prosperity which England had Reason to promise itself from such a War. Had this Point been yielded to the Emperor, he would have submitted to the rest of the ill Treatment he had from us, and have come into the Utrecht Treaty, and the Peace would have been general; whereas the Refusal of it made him stand out till he could obtain better Terms. By this Means the Grand Alliance was broken into Pieces,
Pieces, without leaving the least Shadow of Hopes of ever seeing so happy an Union again; to the great Joy of the Common Enemy, who now saw they had nothing to fear in haste from a Confederacy that had been so formidable; since every Part of it, except the Duke of Savoy, was, by the shameful Conduct of the English Ministry, disobliged to the last degree; but above all, the States-General, who are our nearest, and best, and most natural Allies; and the Emperor, without whom 'tis impossible for the other Powers of Europe to be a Match for the House of Bourbon, possessed as it is of the Crowns of France and Spain.

By the Negotiations at Utrecht ending as they did, France and Spain were at Liberty to distress the Emperor and force him into their Measures by the Continuance of the War, which being too unequal to be long born, was ended as to France by the Treaty of Baden. But still with respect to the Emperor and Spain, instead of a solid Peace which should have extinguished their respective Claims by mutual Renunciations,
nunciations, of Spain and the Indies to King Philip, and of the Italian Dominions, and the Low Countries to the Emperor, Hostilities were suspended only by a bare Neutrality, conceived in such doubtful and precarious Terms, that, as no Friendship was restor'd, but their former Animosities and Pretensions still subsisted, it was plain from the Nature of the Thing, as in fact it happen'd, that it would no longer be observed, than till a proper Opportunity or Prospect of Advantage offered for either Side to break it. This made the Quadruple Alliance, and the Treaties since made to render that effectual, absolutely necessary.

Were this Detail to be drawn out into its full Length, it would be easy to shew, by the clearest Connexion of Things one with another, that all the Inconveniences the Nation has felt since the Accession of the present Royal Family to the Throne, (excepting only the Troubles that have hapned in the North, through the Obstinacy of the late King of Sweden, and the dangerous Schemes of the late Czar) all the Disputes we have had with Spain, and all the Evils our Trade
Trade has suffered from the Treaty of Utrecht to that of Seville, are owing to the unhappy Situation in which that Treaty left the Affairs of Europe; or, to speak more justly, put them; and that Treaty, as to every thing bad in it, is the Treaty of the then English Ministers; and particularly of the present Arch-Craftsman.

Let not then the Craftsman load the present Ministry with continual Invectives, on Account of Debts and Taxes, which they and their Friends have been the sole Cause of, for so much at least as has been occasioned by our Misunderstandings with the Emperor and Spain. 'Tis easy to declaim against Debts and Taxes, but the true Question will always be, Were the Services that occasion'd them necessary or not? If they were, 'tis ridiculous to impute them as a Crime to these or any other Ministers. That they were not, is a Supposition I can't easily come into, since they were all laid before the Parliament, and allowed by them, and the Money given appropriated to the respective Services.

But here the Craftsman have the Modesty
Modesty to tell us, that the Matter is not at all mended by the Consent of a Parliament, which they more than insinuate is as corrupt as the Chief Minister. But how does that appear? because the Minority is not the Majority: Which if it had been, and they had adhered to the same Sentiments, this Nation had been long since ruined: But I own I have a better Opinion of them, and that if they could have the good Fortune to get Places and Power into their own Hands, they would have acted in the main just as the present Ministers have done; unless so much worse, as they had less Capacity from their Inexperience, and less Knowledge of Business.

But 'tis in vain to offer Reasons to Gentlemen who must not be silent, and therefore must not be convinced, as long as they are out of Place: They are confident they shall at length talk and write themselves into Power, and therefore must be Proof against all Conviction: Therefore Debts and Taxes must still be the Theme, and these must be imputed to the ill Conduct.
duct of the Ministry: And so must all the Difficulties our Trade is under in the West-Indies; tho' this also be manifestly owing to the Utrecht Treaty, by which Ships are declared to be good Prize, tho' they be guilty of no illicit Trade, but barely upon being found in any part of the forbidden Seas, tho' driven thither by Stress of Weather: A most absurd Concession to a Power that lay at Mercy at the Time that Treaty was begun.

In short the Inconveniences of almost every Kind, which we have suffer'd for these twenty Years past, and still suffer, are evidently owing to that dishonourable Treaty; and had all been avoided, if the English Ministers had, on that great Occasion, acted as they ought to have done, and as their Predecessors most certainly would have done, who were honest, and wise, and able Men. Had that War ended in a safe and honourable Peace, and to the Satisfaction of the Emperor and the rest of our Allies, the good Harmony that had reigned so long, had still subsisted; France and Spain would have been out
out of a Condition to hurt us; no Seeds of Quarrels, no Jealoufies had been left to disturb the Peace of Europe afresh: We should have enjoy'd a profound Tranquillity, and a flourishing Trade; and a great Progress would have been made in discharging the publick Debts; and the Nation by Consequence would have been in Condition, upon a new Emergency, to have gone with Vigour into the necessary Measures in Defence of itself and its Allies; or rather, no such Emergency would have arisen. We should have kept those who have Ill-will to us in Respect, and they would not have been forward to disturb the Peace of Europe, when they found, by the good Condition the principal Allies were in, and the perfect Harmony that would have subsisted among them, that they could not attempt it without the utmost Danger of again undergoing the Calamities they brought on themselves by the last unrighteous War. This would have been our Case, had the last War ended in an honourable Peace; and the Condition we are at present in, is what it is in consequence
quence of its not having ended so; and we all know who we are to thank for it. To this we owe the Troubles that have put us under a Necessity of contracting fresh Debts, and of continuing heavy Taxes, and not of being in a Condition to carry on a new War with that Vigour we did the last. This we see and feel, and too well know to be true, to be by any Harangues persuaded out of it, let the Craftsmen and their Advocates say what they will.

But we know, no Arguments, no Force of Truth, will silence them; they will still declaim, and complain of want of frugal Management and good Husbandry in the Ministry; that they have not retrenched the publick Expenses as they should have done, but have very unnecessarily increased them, particularly in two Articles, the Hessian Troops, and a Standing Army; by which last our Liberties also are in perpetual Danger of being lost.

There are few Topicks on which more Nonsense has been talked, than this of a Standing Army. 'Tis easy to declaim upon this Head, and cook up
up History about the Liberties of other Nations, and how they were lost, to
the Taste of Readers, who do not know whether a syllable of what is
said be true. They don't care to come to the single Point, that in this
Question is to be consider'd: The Question is not, whether it be neces-
sary a Body of Troops should be kept up or not; that no body disputes, but
whether it shall be 3 or 4000 Men more, or less: This is the Question;
and the Resolution of it depends singly upon this, Whether the Situation of
Affairs we each Year happen to be in, make such a Number necessary or
not. If they are necessary for our Safety, we must have them whatever
the Expence be, or whatever Inconvenience may be apprehended from
them: If they are not necessary, they should not be kept up, tho' they cost
nothing, or the least possible Danger could happen from them.

But if this be the single Question, whether such a Body of Troops be neces-
sary or not; who shall be Judge, but the King and his Parliament? No, say
the Craftsmen, Kings love Power and Troops,
Troops, and Members of Parliament are but the Creatures of his Ministers. But what is this but declaring for the Dissolution of the Government, and setting up a Faction in the Place of our proper Governors, and the Populace instead of a House of Commons? Upon these Occasions the Craftsmen think it a sufficient Answer to any Arguments that are alleged in Print, to cry out Ministerial Writers. But I could never comprehend, why Ministerial Writer should be a Term of Reproach more than Antiministerial Writer. I remember indeed a certain Gentleman says in a Letter to a Friend, that Ministry-hunting is a noble Pleasure; but when I read it, I thought it a very stupid Saying, as well as a very unjust one, and concluded the Author was of a Republican Spirit, as I soon found upon looking farther into his Works: For what Sense is there in thinking ill of Ministers in general and of Course? Why is it not as just to suppose the Measures the Government pursues are right, as that they are wrong? The Presumption sure lies strongly in Favour of them, unless we suppose a Prince
Prince so weak and so insensible of his own and his People's Interests, as to be incapable of making a right Choice: Or is there such Witchcraft in Power, that the Minute a Man is made a Minister, he becomes a Knave and a Fool, tho' before he was confessed to be both honest and able? If this be the unhappy Case of Ministers, I must in Kindness to these worthy Gentlemen the Craftsmen, wish they may be always out of Power; which, I confess, I at present do most heartily upon other Reasons. But however that be, in a Writer, Ministerial, or Antiministerial, is nothing to the Purpose; the only Consideration with Men of Sense will be, Has he Reason on his Side, or not? Does he argue fairly? Are the Facts he alledges or appeals to, true? Has he made good his Premises, and does he make right Conclusions from them? If he does, such a Writer will deserve to be attended to; if not, it is of no Importance what Epithet he is distinguished by.

But I must not forget that other favourite Topick of theirs, the Hessian Troops: Upon this they tell us, that
either such a Body of Troops was not necessary to be kept in Pay; or if it was, that it ought to have been of our own Troops, and not Foreigners: But as to the first, Whether they should have been kept or not, that depended upon the then State of our Affairs, and the Obligations we were by Treaty under with our Allies, and particularly the States General; and the keeping of them was not only allowed and provided for by Parliament, but has been explained and defended in Print, with that Perspicuity and Strength of Argument as will admit of no Answer. And as to the other Part of the Objection, that it should have been a Body of our own Troops, and not of Foreigners; do they mean we should have sent abroad, 10 of the 18000 Men we have at Home and at Gibraltar, or an additional Body of new raised Troops? They will not openly say the first, because that would be too plainly declaring, they want to see the Nation left defenceless and unguarded, that it may be open to perpetual Insurrections at Home, and Invasions of Scotch and Irish Jacobites and Papists from Abroad: Which Declaration would
would at this time be the more shocking to their Readers, in Proportion to the seditious Liberty they take to foment Insurrections, and invite Invasions, which we see they daily do: For that would be saying in plain Words, that the more need there is to be in a State of Defence, the less we ought to be so.

The Truth is, the Liberties they take to bring the present Establishment into Danger, are such as every Day tend to weaken what, in great Love to their Country, they say with so much Zeal against Standing Armies! But we will suppose they are not so unreasonable, or at least would not as yet appear so, but that they would have such a Body of new Troops raised. Very well, what will you do with them when raised? Will you send the raw Men, who know nothing yet of their Trade abroad, or send the old Troops and replace them by these? If the first, they who know any thing of Troops, know they will be of little Service; and in a foreign Country, by Sickness, Desertion, and Want of Discipline, in one Year would dwindle away into half the Number, and perhaps moulder into nothing.
nothing in a Year or two more; and fresh Numbers of Recruits would be always wanted to be sent over, to a great Distance, and at a very great Expence. On the other side, If you keep these new Men at Home, and send the Veterans abroad, we shall in Consequence be so much weaker at Home, as a Body of such Troops is inferior to an equal Number of the other. But in either Case, to send a Body of *English* Troops, into such distant Parts as the Nature of the Service might require, what with the Expence of Transports, and other Charges that would be unavoidable, would cost the Nation twice the Money it would do, to take into our Service a like Body of foreign Troops that are already in the Country where they are to be employ'd: And yet this the *Craftsmen* advise by way of good Husbandry.

I mention this the rather, because if in the present Conjuncture it should be thought advisable to take a Number of Foreign Troops into our Pay, to answer the Contingent we are by Treaty obliged to furnish the Emperor whenever it is *casus foederis*, we may be sure the *Craftsmen* will be again at the same Play, and we shall have
have all the old popular Cant trump'd up again, of providing for our own People, and not sending our Money abroad, and the Goodness of English Troops: Which in the Upshot is no more, than if they should say, that Half a Crown is more than Five Shillings; but in Truth, that they are resolved to distress the Government all they can, and to make the Defence of it as expensive, as burdensome, and as difficult as possible.

But however popular these Gentlemen may fancy their Writings have made them with the lower Sort, who naturally love Satyr and Scandal; when the Nation comes to be alarmed with a real Sense of Danger, they will find themselves deceived in their Hopes of having effectually scattered Disunion and Division among us; and that we shall return to our Senses, and unite with our wonted Vigour and Courage in Defence of our Religion and Liberties, our Trade and Rights, that were secured to us by the Revolution, and consequently in Defence of the present happy Settlement in the House of Hanover, from which our Security,
ty, humanly speaking, is inseparable.

Here the Gentleman left off, having worked himself into some Warmth, and his Companions look'd with an Air of Satisfaction upon me, as if they were sure I had nothing to reply. I told them, Gentlemen, I have heard you with great Patience, and without Interruption, but must beg to be excused if I can't acquiesce in all that has been said; I shall not enter into all the Particulars of so long a Discourse now; I am sensible I shall speak at too great a Disadvantage, being not sufficiently prepared for it; besides, I know how difficult it is to maintain almost any Point, when one Man is to argue against many; but I must take the Liberty to observe, that I think a great deal of what has been said is liable to considerable Objections; that many things you have charged on the Craftsmen are what I don't remember to have read in them, and are rather the unfair Constructions their Enemies put upon their Words, than what they have said themselves: In some other Things I can't but think they are much in the right; and in this Point
Point I don't rely on my own Judgment, and if I am mistaken, I am mistaken in good Company. I am very sensible, Persons in private Stations have not the proper Lights, and the Knowledge necessary to form a true Judgment in Things of this high Nature; but we can feel Burdens and Taxes, and should be glad to be convinced they are necessary; and nobody can blame us if we are not very easily to be convinced of it, and listen to those Writers, who espouse the Cause of the People against the Oppressions of Men in Power. But as to what has been insinuated, as if the Craftsmen were Enemies to the present Establishment, I can't easily come into the Belief of that; take out one or two whom we all know, and I am persuaded the rest, in the case of common Danger, would unite as heartily as any other of the King's Subjects, in Defence of his Person and Government, upon which we don't want to be told that our own Security depends. One of the Gentlemen was going to reply, but I was obliged to interrupt him, and begging his Pardon
for it, told him, I must be gone upon some necessary Business, that would not permit me to stay longer, and so we parted.

This, Gentlemen, is the Substance of a Conversation I lately happened to have with some Acquaintance who are in the Interest of the Ministry. I said what I could in your Defence, and wish'd I had been sufficiently instructed to say more. But you are abundantly able to supply my Defects, and can speak much better in your own Defence than I can pretend to; I can suggest no Hints to Persons of your superior Skill in Politicks, and therefore don't trouble you with the Particulars of what I said; but thought it for your Service to send you this Account, that you may take Notice of such Parts of it as you think proper, which will be of great Use to many who want your Instructions upon these Subjects as much as myself, who have no other Way of Information in political Affairs, and therefore am,

Gentlemen,

Your constant Reader, &c.

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